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ABSTRACT
This book investigates how a corporation, as a legal entity with certain specific attributes, but
lacking human form, can take action in the “real world” of human activity. It contends that a
corporation must take such action through, and by means of, an organization, both inside and
outside its “corporate” legal limits, consisting of real individual persons and groups of persons.
The corporation thus presents itself both as a legal entity assuming the legal form of a corporation
and as a social entity taking the form of an organization. One form overlays the other. Those with
whom it has legal relations, its legal counterparties, are also, in respect of its organization,
participants in that organization. This theory of, or perspective on, the corporation and its
governance is explicated here as “corporative”.
The corporation comes into being, is situated, participates, and is “embedded”, in a complex sociopolitical-economic environment, which includes its legal counterparties and organizational
participants. In addition to shareholders, they include employees, customers, suppliers, creditors,
local, regional, and national communities, polities and governments, and non-governmental and
other organizations, including those whose objectives include the environment, sustainability,
governance, and social responsibility. Despite arguments from advocates of shareholder primacy
and maximizing shareholder value, neither the corporation nor any of its participants, including
shareholders, have any single objective. Instead, such participants have a variety of objectives
which may be consistent to varying degrees with those of each other and with those of the
corporation. However, the prosperity and well-being of corporations and their organizational
participants, and the groups and other organizations of which organizational participants are
members, at a macro-level, are, in many ways, interdependent.
Today, prompted by various concerns (including the environment, sustainability, technology,
changes in employment and other economic engagement patterns, and increasing income
disparities), corporations, industry groups and NGOs, like governments, educational institutions,
and other organizations, are facing challenges to the continued viability of contemporary
capitalism and of its paradigmatic vehicle, the corporation. Addressing these challenges requires
that corporations be considered in the context of the complex socio-political-economic
environment in which they are situated and of which they partake.
Drawing on analysis of corporate statutes and other relevant law, and historical, social, political,
economic, organizational, business, and other theory, information and analysis, this work
elucidates the corporative theory of, or perspective on, the corporation. It outlines how this might
be applied in analyzing the corporation and its governance from a legal perspective. It illustrates
how organizational participants may, and do, influence the behaviour of the relevant corporations;
and how corporations may, and do, influence the behaviour of organizational participants. This
contributes to understanding how such relationships may be employed, not only to “save”
capitalism and the corporation, but to advance common interests in human prosperity, happiness,
meaning, and even simple sustenance.
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INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS A BUSINESS CORPORATION?
As the twenty-first century continues to unfold, the question “What is a (business) corporation?”
is perhaps more significant than ever, as a result of its pervasiveness not only as a form of
organization; but also in its importance in the economy, society and the polity, to participants in,
and analysts of, those domains, and to lawyers and legal scholars in particular; and challenges to:
the relationship among the economy, society, and the polity; the modern state and its relationship
to the domestic, regional, and transnational economies, societies, and polities; the evolving nature
of liberal and post-liberal political economy and late stage capitalism, in a period of massive
technological development, and challenges to the relationships among labour, capital, education
and training, social welfare, and government action, also characterized by massive imbalances of
wealth, income, capital, and personal welfare.
The Importance of Framing the Question
The question may be answered, as might be said, “legalistically” in terms of the legal attributes of
what is established to be a “(business) corporation” in the statute or common law of a particular
jurisdiction. It may be answered “economically” in terms of what economic function it performs,
what function it has in the economy. It may be answered “teleologically” in terms of what goals it
pursues, “politically” in terms of how it fits into political life, “sociologically” in terms of how it
fits into society broadly speaking and how it fits into the lives of human beings, and so on. These
remarks mean to suggest that the question can be answered not only in terms of various roles,
functions, or systems affecting human beings, but also in terms of various academic disciplines
and fields which may be brought to bear on, or which might pursue, its analysis.
Just as found by Berle in the early and middle years of the last century, and by Chandler in the
middle and late middle years of that century, the corporation today is different from the corporation
of previous years. Or is that the case? We must also ask, if it is different, in what ways it is different,
and what implications those differences have for the various functions, roles, and systems of, and
disciplines and fields examining, the modern corporation, and in particular, the modern business
corporation.
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Even asking the question “What is a (modern) (business) corporation?” presents us with a
conundrum: how will or would we go about developing an answer and how will or would we know
if that answer is veridical?
One answer might be to employ a theoretical approach, developing theories about what a
corporation is, applying a successive refining or recursive logic, and arriving at various results
accordingly. Such a methodology can be tested for internal or logical consistency, and even
assessed for its simplicity and elegance. However, if such a theory is to be employed to explain or
predict actions, such a theoretical approach requires consideration of its explanatory and predictive
power, which requires at least some application of the theory to, and testing the theory in, the “real
world”. The theory might then be assessed in terms of its explanatory and predictive capacity.
Depending on the theory itself, it may suffer from a high level of endogeneity, in which many of
the consequences would be logically related to assumptions made by the theory. Alternatively, it
may appear to be exogenous. This will also affect its utility and efficacy. A theory may even be
sufficiently endogenous that its assumptions lack explanatory and predictive capacity “in the real
world”, especially if some of its closely related assumptions are not at all present in the “real
world” situation, are not as pervasive as the theory assumes, are tautological, or approach being
tautological.
When the corporation is considered “from a legal perspective”, how does one proceed? And what
does “considering” a corporation “from a legal perspective” mean? Perhaps the answers are
different depending on whether the legal perspective considered is that of a practicing corporate
or securities or other lawyer, a corporate, securities, or other legal academic, a corporate, securities
or other regulator, a legislator, a non-legal academic, a member of the public, a consumer or other
observer or affected party.
The Corporation as an Object of Legal Research and Theorization
The position taken in this work is that theorization about what the corporation is, or about the
nature of the corporation, as a matter of law, is, in most cases, affected by a number of assumptions
extrinsic to law, in terms of both the function of the corporation and the academic disciplines and
fields with which it engages. Many of the assumptions currently made in theorizing about the
corporation are essentially, and arguably necessarily, economic in nature. In large part, thinking
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about the corporation, and, in particular, the modern business corporation, even in the twenty-first
century, is affected by assumptions made by political economists in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
Some of those assumptions were developed employing a theoretical approach, and then were
applied and tested to varying degrees, and with varying degrees of success, and with varying
degrees of successive refinement and development. In some cases, this application and testing was
theoretical and non-empirical, being limited to testing logical coherence, or appeals to one’s own
feelings or sentiments, or to one’s own experience. Some of the tests purportedly made of such
theories in the “real world” employed unscientific or otherwise unsatisfactory and unreliable
methodologies. Some of these assumptions were not applied to and tested in “the real world” at
all. Indeed, it will be argued in this work that some of those assumptions of classical political
economy are incapable of such application and testing, either because they are considered to be
true a priori, or are otherwise incorrigible, or because it is not clear what verification of them is
possible, or because they are tautological, or because they are otherwise logically or
epistemologically incoherent, logically inconsistent, or contradictory.
The nature and impact of those assumptions of classical political economy, and the extent of their
explanatory power and predictive capacity, unfortunately, are not susceptible of exact
measurement and statistical capture in a scientific or social scientific sense, at least in such as work
as the present one; however, the reader may bring to bear his or her own judgement in this regard.
Instead, this work aims to articulate such assumptions, to explicate some of their implications and
consequences, and to problematize such matters.
Generalizations and Assumptions in Legal Research and Theorization
Accordingly, this work will identify and consider certain assumptions commonly made about, and
which relate to, the corporation, and its attributes, functions, and circumstances, speaking broadly;
and will seek to consider their logical consistency, analytical integrity, explanatory power and
predictive capacity, especially when basing “real world” hypotheses upon such assumptions. This
work will demonstrate the shortcomings of theories relying upon such assumptions.
In fact, as argued in Chapters One through Three and in Appendix B of this work, it appears that
extant legal theories of the corporation adopt and are significantly modelled on economic
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assumptions regarding “the firm” which many modern economists now reject as inadequate, even
as theoretical models of “the firm”, in the modern economy. Many economists now consider the
modern economy to be significantly different from the model economy posited, or the historical
economy described, in classical political economy.
Importantly, when it is assumed that each individual human being acts purely atomistically and
perfectly rationally, solely in the pursuit of his or her own well-being, which is to say in a manner
which is characterized as “economic”, it is almost a tautology to conclude that such human being
behaves only “economically” and lacks or, at least, acts as if he or she lacks, any associative or
affiliative needs and impulses. Such a view of human nature may have significant consequences
for one’s expectations, and regulation, of human, and hence corporate, behaviour. A less atomistic
perspective on human nature, acknowledging such associative and affiliative needs and impulses,
and the satisfactions derived by most humans from their pursuit, presenting “a different model of
man”, and a methodology that is not burdened by methodological reductionism permit more wide
ranging observation, consideration, evaluation, and explication, and even prediction of “real life”
behaviour in many spheres of human activity.
Indeed, even many of the greatest utilitarian and like-minded political economists did not assume
that behaviour of the nature they posited could be observed with respect to actual human beings in
the real world; but, instead, acknowledged that even idealized constructs of behaviour were not
thoroughgoing in respect of man’s exclusive rational pursuit of self-interest. The review of
assumptions undertaken in this work permits a conclusion, however preliminary and tentative in
nature, that the model of man posited by the theorist will be strongly related to the model of
organizations derived from or in respect of such theory, including the model of organizations
engaged in economic relations, the model of the business firm, and the model of the corporation,
including the modern business corporation. In turn, the model of organizations adopted has a
determinative effect on the model of the corporation which can be derived, and the relation of the
corporation as organization and the corporation as legal entity.
Some further discussion of these subjects appears in Chapter One, particularly under the heading
“Assumptions about the Corporation”, mainly concerning how the corporation takes action.
Chapters Two and Three focus specifically on how the corporation, as a legal entity, takes action
“in the real world” through “real human actors” and the implications of the same. That discussion
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is rooted in generalizations and assumptions that concern the nature of man, and the nature and
objects of human activity, more generally. In order not to unnecessarily burden the text and the
explication of corporativity, detailed examination of those assumptions and generalizations is set
forth in Appendix B. It seeks to establish that a new theory of the corporation is required which
will have greater logical consistency, analytical integrity, explanatory power, and predictive
capacity. It is argued, primarily in Chapters Seven through Ten inclusive, that corporative theory
has the capacity, or at least, the potential to meet those requirements.
THEORIA, PRAXIS, AND CORPORATIVITY
A Descriptivist Approach
Instead of proceeding by a priori reasoning, this work will seek, instead, to apply a more rigorously
empirical approach. Starting with a more descriptivist approach, it will inquire into how certain
widely used terms, such as the term “corporation” (in Chapter One and in Appendix A), and “the
economy” and “society” and “the polity” (by way of additional background, in Appendix B),
appear to be used, what they appear to describe, and how the referents of those terms, both alone
and in relation to other such terms, are experienced by individuals. This will provide a certain
definition in use or taxonomy in use in respect of such terms.
With respect to the corporation and, in particular, the modern business corporation, certain
attributes commonly considered by legal experts as characterizing and identifying the corporation
and the modern business corporation are identified in Chapter One. In order not to burden the main
text, how those attributes are instantiated in modern corporate law is explored in Appendix A.
Further explication of how the corporation presents itself and takes action “in the real world” is
undertaken in Chapters Two and Three. Those chapters present empirical evidence on the subject
through the lens of “business history”, describing the development of the corporation in North
America (primarily in the United States) from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day.
This work will then seek to generate a theoretical basis upon which can be constructed hypotheses
that are consistent and testable, involving a method that is more “scientific” in nature. Such a
scientific method is generally taken to involve the recognition and formulation of a problem or
matter to be considered, the collection of data through observation, measurement, and experiment,
and the formulation, testing and modification of hypotheses, on an iterative basis, successively
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evaluating the explanatory and predictive capacity of those hypotheses or assumptions and refining
them progressively.
Such theoretical basis will be sought by examining the corporation as an organization of human
beings or persons, in effect, without making the assumptions of the “economic” approach outlined
above. Instead, the work will seek to characterize the corporation as an organization of human
persons having certain primary goals or objectives, namely, of generating surplus value or profit,
as well as other complementary, subordinate, and even sometimes conflicting, goals or objectives.
The work will consider some of the characteristics of organizations generally, and of organizations
having a dominant or significant economic objective, and of organizations that are considered to
be separate legal entities vis-à-vis the individuals who are involved in and with the organization.
Such examination of the organization appears primarily in Chapters Four through Six inclusive.
Such a methodology will facilitate consideration of the corporation as compared and contrasted
with other organizations or associations having different primary goals or objectives, permitting
conclusions to be drawn about the functions and operations of the corporation as compared with
those of such other organizations. This comparison is undertaken in Chapters Four and Five, but
is particularly concentrated in Chapter Six. This method of proceeding will assist our undertaking
in a number of ways, including in evaluating how most effectively to understand, and to approach
regulating, the behaviour of the modern business corporation.
A Model of Social or Relational Man
A model of the firm in terms of an atomistic rational individual seeking only optimization or
maximization of his or her own utility or gratification of his or her own needs and pleasures is
unlikely to be of great assistance in explaining either the behaviour of such an individual in society
or the behaviour of society as a whole. This is demonstrated in Appendix B. Some limitations of
such atomistic characterization of individuals have been recognized in certain other academic
disciplines, such as politics and sociology; however, they appear to be, as yet, recognized
insufficiently (as to depth, breadth, and otherwise) in legal fields. These limitations are discussed
in the present work in the main text, and in more detail in Appendix B.
A model of the firm which involves individuals forming and acting in relation to social groups is
more likely to explain behaviour of human individuals and groups within organizations and the
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aggregate behaviour of organizations considered as such, and considered in relation to, their
engagement with other organizations and individuals, and within society, and the polity, as a
whole. The defining and other attributes of organizations are discussed in Chapters Four through
Six inclusive. This engagement may be related to economic, social, political, and other role and
functions of the society and polity concerned. Such a model is the corporative theory of, or the
corporative perspective on, the corporation presented in Chapters Seven through Ten inclusive.
Surely, the answer to the question how to determine whether an answer to the question “What is a
(modern) (business) corporation?” is veridical must be sought in the explanatory power and
predictive efficacy of the answer proposed. In this regard, it is proposed that a modern business
corporation is an organization of individuals pursuing certain goals and objectives, which are to a
significant, but by no means exclusive degree, economic, acting as a separate legal entity in relation
to some, but by no means all, of its engagements, which are largely external to it as a legal entity.
In respect of those external engagements, it functions as a separate legal entity possessing certain
legal attributes. As an organization composed of individuals and groups of individuals collectively
pursuing common economic and other goals and objectives, the engagement of the corporation,
internally, is that of, and among, individuals and groups of individuals. The present work
denominates this as involving the corporative theory of, or the corporative perspective on, the
modern business corporation.
The Corporation as Organization
Thus, the present work will demonstrate that the modern business corporation is in, and of, society,
and society is in, and of, the modern business corporation. Internally, the corporation is social, in
the sense that its function and operations are constituted, at least in part, by individual human
beings interacting with other individual human beings.1 Internally, it may be said to be a situs of

1

See the discussion in Chapter Two, notably in the sections entitled "the Neoclassical Firm as a Single Economic
Actor" and "History of the Development to the Modern Business Corporation"; and other discussions cited in this
paragraph and in the following paragraph.
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political behaviour among individuals and groups,2 of social and interpersonal interaction,3 of
group interaction,4 of social and personal identity,5 of search for meaning,6 of economic
attainment,7 and of many other species of behaviour, instrumental, teleological, and otherwise.
In addition to economic activities, the corporation, internally, is a situs of associative, affiliative,
political, and other social activities.8 As a social group, it may be said to be composed, not only of
individuals, but of “groups of groups”.9 As a political group, it may be composed not only of
individuals, but of groups, and “groups of groups”, acting in a manner that may be broadly
described as “political”, seeking power and influence, for various reasons, and forming,
participating in, adjusting, readjusting, dissolving and re-forming coalitions, to those ends. The
composition and nature of those coalitions and their duration may vary temporally.10
The Corporation as Legal Entity and as Organization
Separate Legal Entity
Externally, of course, the corporation presents itself as a separate legal entity (“SLE”). 11 As such,
it has a number of attributes, which may be summarized, roughly, as follows: firstly, it can enter

2

See the discussion in Chapter Three in the section entitled "Organizations as Political Systems" and "Forms of
Corporations – Legal and Organizational Variants", particularly under the heading "M-Form Corporations"; in Chapter
Five in the section entitled "Organizational Personnel"; and in Chapter Five in the section entitled "Organizational
Goals and Intraorganizational Goals"; and in Chapter Six in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and
Intraorganizational Goals".
3
See the discussion in Chapter Four in the section entitled "Groups of People or Social Units", particularly under the
heading "A Social Unit or Group of People"; and in Chapter Five in the sections entitled "Organizational Structure"
and "Organizational Personnel".
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
See the discussion in Chapter Six in the sections entitled "Existence and Typology of Organizational Goals and
Objectives" and, more especially, "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals".
7
See the discussion in Chapter Two in the sections entitled "The Neoclassical Firm as a Single Economic Actor" and
"History of the Development of the Modern Business Corporation"; and in Chapter Six in the sections entitled
"Existence and Typology of Organizational Goals and Objectives" and "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational
Goals".
8
Supra notes 2 through 5 inclusive.
9
Supra notes 3 through 5 inclusive.
10
Ibid. See also the discussion in Chapter Six in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational
Goals", particularly under the headings "The Dominant Coalition as Intraorganizational Group", "Organizational
Goals and Corporate Operations", and "Goals of Corporations".
11
See the discussion in Chapter One, especially in the sections entitled "The Corporation in Law and in Discourse"
and "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism in Law". As noted there, the attributes of the corporation as an SLE
are summarized variously by different commentators but generally much the same effect. One recent discussion of a
number of such formulations is that of Christopher M. Bruner, "What is the Domain of Corporate Law?" (December
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into contracts, and initiate, maintain, and defend legal actions, and can own assets in its own name
(SLE status);12 secondly, the corporation and its assets are subject only to claims arising in respect
of the business of the corporation (limited liability), and are not subject to claims made against
persons involved in the corporation as shareholders (asset partitioning);13 thirdly, contributions to,
and interest in, its equity capital are essentially permanent, or “locked-in”, although they are, in
many cases, transferable, conditionally or otherwise;14 fourthly, it is managed centrally, not by
independent action of owners or others, and can act through agents;15 and fifthly, it survives
changes in its ownership and management, potentially indefinitely.16 These characteristics are
examined in greater detail in Chapter One under the heading “The Corporation and Corporate
Essentialism in Law”, and, with greater specificity, in Appendix A, which explains in some detail
how such legal essentialist characteristics are instantiated in modern business corporation law.
Organizations as Separate Legal Entities
Of course, the modern business corporation (MBC) is not the only separate legal entity or SLE
which obtains separately from, but in some relation to, human persons implicated by or concerned
in it. Others include labour unions, universities, and religious organizations.17 As such, those

31, 2018). University of Georgia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-04. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308611 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.330861, especially at 13-21.
12
See the discussion in Chapter One, especially in the section entitled "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism
in Law" and therein under the heading "Essential Attributes of the Corporation Law" and the subheading "Separate
Legal Entity".
13
See the discussion in Chapter One, especially in the section entitled "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism
in Law" and therein under the heading "Essential Attributes of the Corporation Law" and the subheading "Limited
Liability and Asset Partitioning".
14
See the discussion in Chapter One, especially in the section entitled "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism
in Law" and therein under the heading "Essential Attributes of the Corporation Law" and the subheading Transferable
Equity Interests and Capital Lock-In".
15
See the discussion in Chapter One, especially in the section entitled "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism
in Law" and therein under the heading "Essential Attributes of the Corporation Law" and the subheading ""Central
Management Independent of Equity Ownership".
16
See the discussion in Chapter One, especially in the section entitled "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism
in Law" and therein under the heading "Essential Attributes of the Corporation Law" and the subheading "Indefinite
Duration".
17
Chapter Four discusses the defining and other attributes of organizations and identifies examples of the disparate
nature of the same. In particular, in that regard see the discussion under the heading “Groups of People or Social
Units” and Max Weber’s delineation of the organization as a social relationship; and see, also, the discussion in
Chapter Five under the heading “Structure, Process, and Personnel”.
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organizations have various degrees of similarity with the modern business corporation, some of
which are explicated in the following paragraphs.18
Even Jensen and Meckling, generally considered classic expositors of the contractarian theory of
the firm, acknowledge this, saying: “It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply
legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals”,19
which includes “firms, non-profit institutions such as universities, hospitals and foundations,
mutual organizations such as mutual savings banks and insurance companies and co-operatives,
some private clubs, and even governmental bodies such as cities, states and the Federal
government, government enterprises such as TVA, the Post Office, transit systems, etc.”20 Of
course, it is not necessary to accept their characterization of organizations as “simply legal
fictions” or “simply a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” in order to
acknowledge the merit of their comparison of corporations with other types of organizations as
involving relationships among individuals. However, those relationships are not necessarily only,
or even primarily, contractual in the case of most organizations; nor are they only “among
individuals”. Instead, they involve relationships between each individual and the organization and,
in many cases, between groups of individuals and the organization.
The Corporation as a Nexus of Relationships and as an Organization
As is more fully discussed below, an organization may be considered to involve a social unit or
group of persons who collectively pursue some common goal or objective.21 As such, the means
by which they determine to pursue such goal or objective certainly involves some kind of social
relationship which may involve the dispensation of positive sanctions (“rewards”) and negative
sanctions (“punishments”) as a means of increasing the likelihood of achieving such goal or

18

See the discussion in Chapter Four in the section entitled "Groups of People or Social Units", particularly under the
heading "Max Weber on Organizations and Related Matters", and under the subheading "Typology of Organizations".
19
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure (1976)” 3:4 Journal of Financial Economics 305 at 310 [emphasis in the original.]
20
Ibid.
21
See the discussion in Chapter Four in the sections entitled "Working Definitions and Formal Definitions"; and
"Groups of People or Social Units", particularly under the heading "Max Weber on Organizations and Related
Matters", and under each of the subheadings thereunder; and the discussion in Chapter Five in the section entitled
"Structure, Process, and Personnel", especially under the heading "Rational-Legal Authority, Administration, and
Bureaucracy".
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objective and decreasing the likelihood of failing to do so.22 This may involve the application of
norms, rules, and, perhaps, appeal to “the agreement” by which the organization is constituted and
to which members agree to adhere upon their acceptance into the organization as members.23 Such
“agreement” may or may not involve some aspects which may be considered to be contractual and,
in that sense, “legal”.24
Jensen and Meckling are, of course, well known for their acknowledgement that “[t]he private
corporation or firm is simply one form of a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting
relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of the visible residual claims on the
assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the
other contracting individuals."25 As discussed under the immediately preceding heading, this
additional feature is not the sole distinguishing feature of the corporation. As discussed under this
heading, it is also not necessary to accept their characterization of the corporation as “simply… a
legal fiction” in order to acknowledge that they accept not only corporations, but also other
organizations, as involving relationships and, importantly, as having “legal” reality.
Organizations, according to Weber and others, involve social relationships which are not
exhausted only between or among its members, or by admission of new members, but which,
instead, obtain between the organization and each of its members and between the organization
and all of its members, as a kind of “type” relationship. Weber observes that such social
relationship can be represented both internally, vis-à-vis its own members (the composition of
which is subject to change), and externally, vis-à-vis extraorganizational parties, generally, or
subject to some specification.26 Thus, organizations have both intraorganizational and

22

See the discussion in Chapter Six in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals",
particularly under the headings "Theories of Intraorganizational Power" and "Information and Sanctions as Sources
of Intraorganizational Power". See, also, and the discussion in Chapter Three in the section entitled "Forms of
Corporations – Legal and Organizational Variants" and therein under the heading "M-Form Corporations".
23
See the discussion in Chapter Four in the section entitled "Groups of People or Social Units", particularly under the
heading "Max Weber on Organizations and Related Matters".
24
Ibid.
25
Supra note 19 at 311 [emphasis in the original.].
26
See the discussion in Chapter Four in the section entitled "Groups of People or Social Units", particularly under the
heading "Max Weber on Organizations and Related Matters", and under each of the subheadings thereunder.
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extraorganizational “reality”, the exact nature of which is complex and often imprecisely and
differently expressed by various social theorists.27
Our reading of social theory suggests, firstly, that one factor at play is the myriad of social
relationships which individual and group participants in an organization may have, which may be
expressed in some difficulty in establishing the “limits” or “boundaries” of the organization itself;
secondly, that these limits or boundaries vary depending, in large part, upon the purpose for which
they are sought to be identified; and thirdly, that such limits or boundaries are relative in that they
occupy a continuum between highly intimate relationships (“more internal”) and relatively remote
relationships (“more external”).
Of course, the corporation itself is not immune from such difficulties of classification. Jensen and
Meckling usefully point out that defining a firm or corporation as involving a multitude of
relationships (which they maintain are contractual) has the consequence that it may be difficult to
determine whether such relationships are within or without the corporation. Consequently, they
say, “it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are “inside” the firm (or
any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it.”28
As will be seen, the “corporative” notion of corporate duality has some sympathy with Jensen and
Meckling’s “relationship” characterization of the corporation. However, this work maintains that
the corporation, as a separate legal entity, requiring human agency in order to take action, engages
in legal or contractual relationships with certain persons or entities, or described here as “legal
counterparties” of the corporation, while also acquiring human agency by means of an organization
which enables it to take action and seek to accomplish its goals and objectives. The organization
by which the corporation takes action normally involves some contractual or legal relationships
between the corporation as a separate legal entity and those organizational participants (in their
capacities as legal counterparties), however, such contractual or legal relationships do not exhaust
the relationships between the corporation as organization and its organizational participants.

27

See the discussion in Chapter Four in the sections entitled "Working Definitions and Formal Definitions"; and
"Groups of People or Social Units", particularly under the heading "Max Weber on Organizations and Related
Matters", and under each of the subheadings thereunder; and the discussion in Chapter Five in the section entitled
"Structure, Process, and Personnel", especially under the heading "Rational-Legal Authority, Administration, and
Bureaucracy".
28
Supra note 19 at 311.

13

Trust and Reciprocity Within Relationships and Within the Organization
This work’s characterization of the corporation as a legal entity and also as an organization
involving a social unit or group of people working together to achieve common goals or objectives
finds support on the latter point from diffuse perspectives. For example, after completion of the
main text of this work, an article in business ethics by the philosopher Elizabeth Anderson, entitled
“The Business Enterprise as an Ethical Agent”, appeared, which argues for the morality and
benefits of norms of trust and reciprocity within a business enterprise.29 Unlike this book, which
treats the corporation as both separate legal entity and as organization, she characterizes the firm
as an organization, that is to say, in terms of relationships, rather than exclusively in terms of
contractual or legal relationships, as do Jensen and Meckling, but uses similar “nexus” language.
In fact, Anderson’s theory views the firm as “a joint enterprise constituted by a nexus of
cooperative relationships in which internal stakeholders commit firm-specific assets to relatively
long-term team production arrangements, subject to common governance, and repeatedly interact
on the basis of norms of trust and reciprocity, all for mutual and reciprocal benefit, the terms of
which are not exhausted by law and contract.” She also notes that “[t]he “firm also typically enters
into protracted reciprocal relationships with external stakeholders… which are supported by
normative expectations of trust, reciprocity, and mutual gain, not all of which are defined in
explicit contracts.”30
In effect, she argues that many corporations behave “ethically”, as well as prudently, going beyond
the terms of their contracts with employees, customers, creditors, suppliers “by recognizing that
both their day-to-day operation and their legitimacy depends on relations of reciprocity and trust
among internal and external stakeholders in the firm”. Based on “reasonable, informed
expectations that all sides will gain from their relationship”, which we might describe as a “shared”
understanding, “multiple stakeholders, including not just shareholders but creditors, suppliers,
employees, the surrounding community and even customers commit investments to the firm that
it is costly or impossible for them to withdraw. Living up to the demands of reciprocity requires
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not only that firms not exploit those commitments, but that they conceive of their mission in a
positive sense as including the interests of all stakeholders. The firm is not just a nexus of contracts
but a nexus of reciprocal relationships.”31
Of course, what Anderson describes as “a nexus of reciprocal relationships” is the organization
by which the corporation, as a legal entity lacking capacity to act in the real world without human
agency, is empowered to take action on its behalf .32 And, while ethical behaviour can certainly be
justified in normative terms, its invocation may be considered by some as superfluous in this case
since reasons of practicality alone are invoked in support of such relationships.
The Corporation’s Intraorganizational and Extraorganizational Orientations
In the case of the modern business corporation, we may express its nature, by analogy to the
physical world, as a composite being that has a soft (perhaps even highly permeable) inner core
and a hard (although still perhaps somewhat permeable) outer shell. This inner core is “social” in
that it is composed of individuals and groups interacting with one another, in pursuit of economic
and other objectives. We may describe this as the “inward facing” aspect of the corporation.
Although these individuals and groups may have legal relationships with the corporation, as legal
counterparties, which surface at certain times and in certain contexts (including within the
organization), those individuals and groups present consistently as participants in the organization
through which the corporation operates, as organizational participants. The outer shell of a modern
business corporation is “legal”, involving the corporation as a single legal entity with certain fixed
legal attributes (as noted above), and pursuing economic and other objectives interacting with other
entities as legal counterparties. We may describe this as the “outward facing” aspect of the
corporation.
As noted above under the subheading “The Corporation as a Nexus of Relationships and as an
Organization”, the relationship between the corporation, as a legal entity, and other human persons
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or entities is always, as a matter of law, "external" to the corporation; however, as between the
corporation as organization and other human persons or entities as participants in such
organization, the relationship may be characterized, on the one hand, as relatively immediate,
direct, proximate, or in that sense, “intimate”, or, on the other hand, relatively remote.
Relationships of the first description may be characterized as relatively more “internal”, while
relationships of the second description may be characterized as relatively more “external”. For the
reasons described above, such relationships may be characterized, more meaningfully, as
involving a continuum as between proximate and remote; however, with this background of
understanding, it will frequently be simpler to refer to relationships of the first description as
“internal” and to relationships of the second description as “external”.
The Corporation’s Dual Nature – Corporativity, its Goals, and Legal Theory
The corporation thus engages with other parties in its legal capacity as legal counterparties and in
its organizational capacity as organizational participants. This work refers to this dual nature as
“corporative” and the characteristic or attribute of possessing such dual nature as “corporativity”.
An adequate legal theory of the corporation must explain the relationship between the “inner core”,
or more “inward facing”, or intraorganizational, aspect of the corporation, on the one hand; and its
“outer shell”, or more “outward facing”, that is, its legal and extraorganizational, aspect. This work
argues that the failure to recognize this relationship has contributed to the failure of extant
theorizing about the firm, in formulation, logical consistency and predictive capacity.
Although proof of this proposition is beyond the scope of the present work, this work maintains
that existing legal theories of the corporation and of the firm fail to sufficiently take into account
the fact that, while the corporation or the firm “in the world” is considered to be a single actor, at
least as a matter of law, it does not act externally as a monolithic entity,33 since that entity is
incapable of action per se. Instead, the corporation acts, and can act, externally only by means of
individual human actors who animate or vivify the corporation as an entity capable of action.34
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Consequently, any legal theory of the corporation must recognize that the corporation is, or, at
least, involves, a species of organization, composed of real persons, and not a pure economic or
production function. Chapters One through Three explicate how corporations act “in the real
world”.
Legal theory must recognize that the corporation, as an organization, involves a group or groups
of real persons, who severally may have a multiplicity of ends or goals, working toward the
attainment of some particular collective end(s), goal(s), or objective(s).35 Weber and other
authorities explain that an organization is constituted by some order or authority pursuant to which
it is established, and by which it is operated and regulated and pursuant to which other rules are
adopted and administered, rationally in pursuance of its agreed common interests.36 In the case of
the corporation, a primary goal or objective involves economic activity, but that does not
necessarily exhaust all the goals or objectives for the attainment of which it is constituted or
operated.37
This work argues that concentration of focus on the “outer shell” or “outward facing” aspect of the
corporation, the specifically “legal” attributes of the corporation, has inhibited development of a
legal theory “of” , as well as “about”, the corporation; a theory about not only what the corporation
“is”, from legal and other perspectives, but also what it “does” in the real world, which involves
describing how the corporation, both statically and in action through real human actors, is
experienced by external parties. Such description of what it is and what it does must acknowledge
not only its external presentation as a “single legal entity”, but also its “inner core” or “inwardfacing” aspect as an organization, which is also relevant to how it takes action externally. As
argued in this work, economic analysis of the corporation or firm, classically, at least, and arguably
even latterly, has largely ignored this “inner/outer” and “inward/outward” facing distinction.
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By concentrating on the specifically “legal” attributes of the corporation, extant legal theory has
generally failed to go beyond them. That is to say, much extant legal theory of the corporation
provides a theory of “why” that particular legal entity has those particular legal attributes, in terms
of “what” objectives those attributes accomplish. Often, this involves an answer to the effect that
the corporation has those particular attributes “because they work” or “because they are there”,
because they allow certain results to be derived, or because the institution of these attributes with
respect to (or “in”) the corporation has been borne out as necessary by experience.
A theory of that nature attempts to explain the “why” of the corporation as an entity and as a
separate legal entity or SLE, from a perspective that is largely theoretical and ahistorical, without
attempting to explain the “what” or “whereof” of the corporation, that of which it consists. Instead,
such a theory focuses solely on its external operations. This work maintains, instead, that the
(predominantly) “external” legal attributes of the corporation must be interpreted and applied in
relation to its (predominantly) “internal” organizational attributes.
A question that arises, or should arise, in theorizing about the corporation as a matter of law, which
is to say “in legal theory”, is to what extent it is necessary and desirable to endeavour to reconcile
those two aspects, and whether, and, if so, how, this might be effected. This subject will be
considered further in this introduction and in the main text, below, particularly in Chapters Seven
through Ten inclusive.
“CORPORATIVE” AND “CORPORATIVITY” AS USED IN THIS WORK
As just mentioned, this work refers to this dual nature of the corporation as “corporative” and the
characteristic or attribute of possessing such dual nature as “corporativity”. No use of the latter
term has been found in mainstream academic literature in the English language, except quite
recently (during the late stage of development of the present work) principally in works by Russian
authors apparently as a translation of a Russian word, корпоративность, where it is apparently
used as a synonym of, and is often translated as, “corporate culture” or “organizational culture”. 38
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It is used in connection with solidarity in professional goals and values, and otherwise relating to
joint activity or synergism, and competitiveness, in the context of educational institutions.
The use of “corporative” and “corporativity” in this work is not to be confused either with that
usage or with “corporatism”, sometimes referenced as “corporativism”, the socioeconomic and
political doctrine in which major interest groups or “ corporate” groups in society represent their
members in society at large, such that the society or polity is organized, and characterized by the
actions and interactions of, corporate groups, rather than by individuals. Those major interest
groups or corporate groups may be based on common interests characterized in terms of business,
agriculture, labour, military, scientific, clan, ethnic, patronage, religious, or other affiliations.39
In this work, the terms “corporative” and “corporativity” refer to the dual nature of corporations
and other separate legal entities, and not to the social/political world exclusively, namely, the
division of the state, polity, and society, into, or their composition by, interest groups exclusively
representing a particular interest at the state or sociopolitical level.
In effect, in this work, corporativity refers to a characteristic of the corporation or the organization
itself, rather than to a characteristic of the society or polity in which it resides.
“CORPORATIVISM” AND “CORPORATISM” DISTINGUISHED
The principal expositor of corporatism, Howard J. Wiarda, traced the origins of modern
corporatism to a commission established by Pope Leo XIII in 1881 to study corporatism. It
reported in 1884 in Freiburg, defining “corporatism” as a “system of social organization that has
at its base the grouping of men according to the community of their natural interests and social
functions, and as true and proper organs of the state they direct and coordinate labor and capital in
matters of common interest.”40 Wiarda traces this, in turn, to passages of the Bible, principally, I
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Corinthians 12:12-31, in which Paul discusses politics and society as an organic whole, like the
human body, the organs of which are functional elements within the polity and society.41
According to Wiarda, what is generally described as “progressive” corporatism developed,
commencing in the 1850s as an antidote to classical liberalism and Marxism,42 partly as a way in
which the Catholic church and clergy could ameliorate the threat of social disturbance with a more
pacific and collegial outlook on society and the polity. Emile Durkheim hoped that a variant he
called “solidarism” would effect a change in the role of labour, and promote conflict resolution,
by creating an organic social solidarity with other elements of society, as a collective, thereby
avoiding social dislocation and anomie.43 Liberal corporatism, attributed to John Stuart Mill, as a
counter-balance for labour and other economic organizations to management power and
influence44, was an influential element in “progressivism” and “progressive corporatism” in the
United States in the early twentieth century, including in the New Deal.45
Importantly, corporatism was discredited in practice, in the opinions of many social theorists,
commentators, and observers as a result of its significant association with Fascism, especially in
Italy. Its prominence there was influenced by an early constitution which was proclaimed in Fiume
in Italy in 1920, which established a corporatist state in which nine corporations (plus one
representing “superior individuals”) represented various sectors of the economy.46 Italian Fascism
aggregated separate economic spheres represented individually in a governing apparatus the level
of the state or polity, which coordinated and harmonized those spheres in that unity.47 The fascist
state corporatism in Italy, in turn, influenced Fascists in other countries, such as Austria, Portugal,
Estonia, and Latvia, where Fascist governments were established, and also in Fascist political
groups in Britain and elsewhere.
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Jurisdictions as varied as Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Scandinavian countries have been considered to exemplify “neo-corporatist”
political economies in which labour, employers, and national governments would negotiate and
manage a national economy. Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps has also described what he calls “new
corporatism” in which he claims that modern states subordinate the individual to the community
and state.48 This characteristic of “new state corporatism” will be shown to be antithetical to the
corporative organization and to the corporativity and corporativism delineated in this work.
As explained above, the present work employs the term “corporative” and “corporativism’ in
relation to the dual nature of the corporation as both a separate legal entity and an organization,
rather than in relation to the composition of the state or polity itself.
With this statement of the objectives of the present work, the assumptions of modern corporate
law, corporate governance, and legal theory present themselves for consideration. In this regard, a
common sense or everyday life identification of such assumptions must suffice for the purposes
of the present inquiry, at least if an extensive, even if not infinite, regression of facts and
circumstances is to be avoided. This introduction will make certain prefatory remarks in this regard
and, in order not to burden such preface, without attribution or discussion of sources. A more
thorough examination appears in Chapters Two and Three.
ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERAL ECONOMICS AND OF LEGAL THEORY
Economy, Society, and Polity Distinguished
This work positions the modern business corporation within a framework which is relatively
undifferentiated in respect of its economic, social, and political characteristics. That is to say, it
considers “economic activities”, “social activities”, “political activities” as situated within a broad
spectrum of human activity, activity which the humans engaging in it do not consciously separate
into different spheres of action, whether “economic”, “social”, or “political”. Their perceived
sphere of action is, instead, “human”, expressed in the broadest possible way.
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Of course, this is not the position adopted by classical and neoclassical economics, which has had,
historically, an extremely significant influence on discussion of the “firm” and the “corporation”,
in disciplines and fields other than economics, including law. As just indicated, this work
advocates a holistic approach to the “firm” and the “corporation”, but not one which would
embrace only learning from one discipline or field and exclude others. While this perspective is
extremely important to the corporative theory or corporative perspective developed in this work,
an explication of its dimensions, even summarily, would distract significantly from the articulation
of the corporative theory or corporative perspective. Accordingly, the exploration of those issues
is presented in Appendix B.
Disembeddedness of the Economy
Classical liberal economics assumes, firstly, that the economy, the society, and the polity are
strictly separated.49 Secondly, it considers the economy to be largely a “private” sphere,50 which
is assumed, thirdly, to be divorced from other “public” spheres.51 Thus, fourthly, the community,
society, and polity can each be analyzed, as such, separately, employing a methodology
appropriate for each. Thus, analysis of the economic sphere would proceed in a manner which is
intrinsically different from the method of analysis which is appropriate to the society and polity.
The method of analysis appropriate to the economic sphere would, instead, be appropriate to the
economic sphere alone.52 Fifthly, classical liberal economics thus envisions a relationship between
society and the economy in which the economy is part of the society, but operates largely
independently. Similarly, the relationship between society in the polity is one in which the
economy and the polity are largely separated from one another. Indeed, the principal relationship
between the two involves the polity intervening in the economy, principally to promote aggregate
social welfare.53
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Embeddedness of the Economy and History
Many of these assumptions hearken back to, and perhaps even beyond, Ancient Greece and
Ancient Rome.54 At such time, the word “economy” referred to household and other activities that
were essentially “life-supporting” in that they enabled a citizen to live, and to live a certain kind
of life appropriate to that status, a status not then widely enjoyed within the polity. Such
“economic” activity enabled a citizen to engage in the kind of discussion, debate, and other aspects
of public affairs that were considered to be the proper activity of citizens, who were, at those times,
mainly members of the landed aristocracy and current and former civil and military authorities.55
Such “household” activity, being primarily conducted within the household itself and its environs,
and thus out of “public” view, was considered to be “private” as opposed to “public” in nature.56
Of course, in Ancient Greece and in Ancient Rome, the “household”, considered geographically,
embraced lands appurtenant to the country dwelling of the citizen-aristocrat. Thus, it frequently
involved activities that today would be considered agricultural or industrial pursuits, such as the
manufacture of wine or oil, operation of mines, the conduct of other metallurgical activities, and
other manufacturing. It seemed not to involve trading, however, as that pursuit was not then
considered as a suitable activity for citizens and aristocrats, as in Britain and much of Europe in
more recent periods.57
Activities that were “economic” in this sense were considered to relate to facilitating life as a
human being, and not to “public” life as a citizen. Economic life enabled and was essential to civic,
social, and political life and activity. Thus, such economic activity was conducted apart from social
and political activity. It was, moreover, considered to deal almost exclusively with matters not
considered suitable for public discussion or action. Thus understood, “economic” matters were
both implicitly and explicitly segregated from “social” and “political” matters, which allowed a
simplified conception of the nature of “economic” man which was abstracted from his social and
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political contexts.58 The historical background to the separation of economic life (or aspects or
elements of economic life) from other life (or aspects or elements of life), including social and
political, and to the public/private distinction is important in explaining the origins and content of
those concepts; however, those concepts are no longer thought to operate in that fashion.59
Like other historically generated opposites, pairs or binaries, the public/private distinction has been
the subject of considerable contestation in the last two or three centuries and, most especially, in
the past half century, not only in law, but also in other fields.60 This is also the case with respect
to the economic/social, economic/political, and social/political “distinctions”.61 However,
although contested, the involvement of the society or polity in the economy has been assumed to
be justified in terms of seeking to promote aggregate social welfare, whether by means of
competition, addressing inequality of bargaining power, compensating for information
asymmetries, or otherwise.62
Classical liberal political economy did not dispute, but instead, assumed the reasonableness of
such distinctions.63 This work will argue that the separation of the economy from its ambient
society and polity is not justified theoretically, historically, or empirically; with the result that the
methodology of sociopolitical/socioeconomic analysis can be treated as a more acceptable
alternative to classical economic theory, particularly when combined with later developments in
economic theory, such as institutional economics and behavioural economics, than has historically
been the case to date.64
Further, just as this work embraces a holistic conception of human activity involving combined
economic, social, political aspects,65 this work disputes the assumptions made by classical
neoclassical economics with respect to the nature of man, including atomistic utilitarianism,66 and
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atomistic and methodological individualism,67 absolute rationality,68 utilitarian independent
market transactions,69 and the tendency of market prices towards equilibrium values.70
The Firm as Production Function – The “Black Box”
In classical liberal economics, economic activity is much more broadly construed, and includes
production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, also including such activities as
manufacturing and trading. The goods and services thus produced would be consumed or sold,
traded, or bartered for something considered by the producer to be of value. In that classical liberal
model, the economic actor, characterized as “the firm”, is a single actor who acts in the economy,
which is within the private sphere and separate from the public sphere of society and the polity.
The firm is typically characterized by an owner, often an entrepreneur who establishes and
provides capital for its operations, a manager who directs the operations of the firm on a day-today basis (at least if this function is not performed by the owner), and perhaps a few employees of
the owner/firm. On these assumptions, all of the actions and operations of the firm and of its owner,
managers and employees can be analyzed in purely economic terms. Such analysis proceeds by
measuring inputs, often consisting of labour, materials, and capital, and outputs.71
Thus, the analysis of the firm is limited to its role in producing goods and services for use or sale,
most often on a market. The firm is profitable and, ordinarily, successful, in cases in which the
value of the outputs as priced in the market is greater than the value of the inputs in terms of the
price paid by the firm therefor. As such, the firm is a “black box” with respect to which the inputs
and outputs can be determined but which is otherwise uninteresting. Instead, its operations are
principally affected by, and affect, supply and demand.72 As will be noted, this analysis of the firm
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as a production function, or as a supply and demand function, not only occludes what makes the
firm interesting in socioeconomic and political terms, but even “invisibilizes” the firm in toto.73
The legal theory of the corporation and of corporate governance, and academic and public
discourse relating to the same, to date, has, in the main, employed approaches to the nature of the
corporation that are generally congruent with classical economic theory. For example, it has
assumed, frequently without examination, that the corporation is a single actor. It has often treated
the corporation as a “black box”, devoid of organizational attributes.74 Corporate law and corporate
governance have generally incorporated, or, at least, have not significantly contested, such
assumptions. In particular, from the perspective of regulation, corporations have been treated as a
single actor pursuing a single objective of maximization of profit in the short term, and arguably
disregarding or minimizing considerations incompatible with that single objective.75
To be sure, certain aspects of the “input” and “output” of the firm have been regulated by
legislative, administrative, or other legal or regulatory action. For example, certain materials
forming part of the “input” in a manufacturing process may be subject to quality, safety, and other
standards; and certain practices, such as resale price maintenance and other anticompetitive
practices, may be proscribed on the “output” side. With respect to the “human” factors involved
in the “input”, employment and other standards may be applicable as a matter of law. Such
restrictions may be considered as equalizing inequalities of bargaining power, as promoting
competition, or as restraining acts tending to reduce or limit competition; however, such
restrictions may be seen as comporting with the production model of the firm, as envisioned in
classical political economy. This is assumed in the present work for purposes of discussion here.
This work will challenge these conventional assumptions.
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The Firm as a Single Rational Economic Actor and as a Moral Actor
As a single economic actor, modelled on the “firm” as a single entrepreneur, it has generally been
assumed that the actions of a corporation vis-à-vis its external environment are univariate, being
determined solely by a decision of the corporation. Each external activity is undertaken by, and is
determined by, a decision of, “the corporation” acting independently and unambiguously as one
actor, acting rationally, based on full and complete information, with the goal of maximizing profit,
usually assumed to be determined in the short term. In effect, this singularity of action by a
corporation is thought to result, at least in part, from its structure and process as a “top-down” or
“command and control” organization.76 As such an organization, decisions are said to be made at
the top of the corporate hierarchy and are successively communicated “down” to successively
lower levels of the hierarchy.77 It is assumed that all decisions or determinations are made on a
solely economic basis, taking into account only economic benefits to the corporation.
Further, it is assumed that it is possible to identify the makers of particular decisions within the
hierarchy and to identify those charged with implementing those decisions at each successive level
of the hierarchy. It is assumed, also, that those at lower levels of the hierarchy are aware of
decisions and determinations made at levels above them in the hierarchy; and that decisions are
implemented by organizational “fiat” or mandate at successively lower levels of the hierarchy.78
Those at the highest levels of the hierarchy “command” and “control” those at successively lower
levels. Similarly, those persons at a superior level of the hierarchy “command” and “control”
someone at a lower level and may do so even respect to persons at successively lower levels.79
Further, it is assumed that all decisions and determinations made at higher levels of hierarchy are
communicated to all of those lower levels. It is also assumed that decisions and determinations
made at various levels of the hierarchy are decisions or determinations of, and which bind, the
corporation, and those at various levels of its hierarchy. Consequently, it is assumed that failure or
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refusal to act in accordance with decisions made at higher levels of the hierarchy will incur
sanctions, possibly even extending to dismissal. These assumptions are recognized and under
various legal principles, including agency, vicarious liability, and respondeat superior.80
Applicable legal principles, it is thought, generally assume that the firm of classical economics,
the production function firm or the supply and demand function firm, is an accurate description of
the business corporation in modernity; that the firm can act only through agents; and that the agents
enact its business pursuant to authority delegated to them from higher order agents of the firm or
corporation, up to and including the highest authority in the corporation. Such legal principles also
assume, generally speaking, that only actions within such delegated authority (which may, in some
cases, include apparent or ostensible authority) are acts of, and bind, the corporation.
However, many of these assumptions have been challenged in the past century, both in general
and, in particular, with reference to the corporation. One example is rationality. Challenges to the
rationality of human and organizational decision-making has not been limited to those involving
corporations.81 Similarly, assumptions concerning complete information have been challenged by
leaders in various disciplines, again not limited to decisions made by corporations or even by
organizations generally.82 Further, the assumption that all decisions made by an organization
having economic objectives are made in view of economic considerations is only now being
challenged more specifically, including with respect to corporations, and including with respect to
profit, and more specifically short-term, profit seeking. As this work will demonstrate, decisionmakers and decision-influencers within corporations may take into account various other factors
than economic ones and, in particular, short term profit objectives.83
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Often, only scant consideration is given, in law, to the effect of unauthorized actions, including
the question whether the agent or employee is liable for such acts, not only to counterparties
(which, for present purposes, is assumed to include any party affected by an act or omission of the
corporation), but also to the corporation. This lack of full consideration may result from the
inherent difficulties in determining and assigning responsibility for acts or omissions within the
corporation itself, but it may also result from the frequent lack of a readily available means by
which the counterparty or the corporation itself may seek redress. Apart from questions of proof,
and apportionment of liability, including any contributory liability, even in cases in which it is not
difficult to assess the resultant damages, there may be no adequate means of recovering them.
Simply put, the loss may exceed the ability of the agent or agents involved to indemnify the injured
party (the corporation itself) therefor. It may be too great for them to bear.84
As the present analysis will demonstrate, these difficulties are not unexpected or inappropriate, in
theory, since a significant attribute of the corporation, as a matter of law, involves it operating as
a single legal entity, characterized by limited liability and asset partitioning, subject to central
management authority, and surviving changes in ownership and management. In effect, the outer
legal shell of the corporation is intended to internalize the decision-making process and operations
of the corporation among its participants, such that its outward face is that of the corporation itself,
and of the corporation alone.
It is an artifact of corporativity that it presents the following paradox: the same characteristics that
invisibilize the internal workings of the corporation vis-à-vis outsiders allow those outsiders to
reify the corporation and by means of such “entification” to consider the corporation as wholly
separate and apart from the organization by which it is constituted or instituted, and which it
constitutes or institutes. This reification or “entification” permits outsiders to characterize the
corporation itself as possessing moral character, often as being “evil” (or, for those who chose to
do so, as “good”). Only recognition of the corporativity of the corporation will resolve this
paradox.
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Of course, the corporation is, in itself, neither good nor evil, but can be an instrument of either, in
particular circumstances, if by that is meant “performing” acts or omitting to perform acts which
have positive or negative effects, as the case may be. Those acts or omissions are determined and
instituted in accordance with its organizational structure and processes, which may themselves be
conducive to the attainment of some objectives or others. The nature of those objectives may be
assessed by those inclined to do so as “good” or “bad” in the same sense. However, the question
whether an organization, as such, is “good” or “bad” does not appear to be apt for consideration.
In general, corporations are far too numerous, diffuse, and diverse to permit verification of such a
statement.
Instead, a corporation is like any other organization in this respect. Other organizations are not by
reason only of their external legal attributes characterized as “good” or as “evil”. Instead, any such
characterization of other organizations is based on the conduct of the organization in relation to
the society and polity generally and over time, and is not ordinarily determined ab initio by its
particular legal attributes alone. This should be admitted to be true of corporations, as well.
Acts or Omissions of the Corporation
Externalities and the Pursuit of Profit
It can readily be seen that these classical assumptions, however erroneous, are not inconsistent
with the imputation of responsibility to the corporation for acts or omissions emanating from its
activities. In particular, where loss is occasioned in a situation in which corporate actors are
involved, it is often assumed by some that the corporation (as a “bad” actor) has some
responsibility for such loss eventuating. Once that assumption, however justified, is made, it may
be assumed, in turn, that some person or body within the corporation must have done something
which occasioned such loss or failed to do something which might have prevented such loss from
transpiring. The effect of such thinking would be to impose strict liability for all corporate actions.
It is also generally assumed that a corporation, as the sole economic actor, at least in relation to
external parties, is the exclusive beneficiary of such actions or inactions, as measured by immediate
profit generated or immediate cost avoided. Hence, it is often considered that such actions or
inactions attributable to the corporation are motivated solely by greed and the pursuit of private

30
interests of the corporation and its owners,85 and, consequently, that such greed and pursuit of
private interest must be restrained by government action, imposing liability on the corporation and,
in certain cases, on the persons and bodies within the corporation considered to have been
responsible for taking or implementing the relevant decision or decisions.
Group Decision Making, Information, and Responsibility
This work will demonstrate the inadequacy of these assumptions. For example, it will be shown
that the modern business corporation cannot be considered as a “top-down” or “command and
control” organization.86 Of course, all decisions are not made at the highest level of the corporate
hierarchy. Instead, in some corporations, decisions are taken at the lowest possible level of the
hierarchy at which such decisions could effectively be taken; and such decisions are not necessarily
communicated to superior levels of the hierarchy. More generally, often decisions are not
immediately referable beyond the level or group at which, and by whom, the decision is taken, and
thus are not disseminated beyond those affected. In other cases, only a relatively modest
distribution of the decision may be required for purposes of instituting it as an act of the
corporation, implementing it, and giving it effect otherwise. Such distribution may be effected
laterally or hierarchically, and in such case, across or up or down the chain of hierarchy, or both.87
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Frequently, in actual situations “in the real world”, however, it is difficult to determine who is
responsible for making and for implementing a particular decision. Among other things, even in
circumstances in which it is, or is thought to be, reasonably clear by whom, or at what level, a
decision has been made or should have been made (at least in accordance with the rules of the
formal organization), not all decisions are recorded. Such failure to record decisions may arise
deliberately, as a result of the prevalence of higher priorities of time and attention, or as a result of
inattention, inaction, misadventure or negligence.
Consequently, the difficulties of ascribing responsibility for particular decisions to particular
persons, or even to functions, groups, units and sub-units of the corporation, are very often
considerable, even for the corporation itself. That is to say, the diffuse nature of organizational
decision-making and decision-influencing in a complex organization, with its particular structure
and processes, may prevent even those within the corporation from being able to clearly assign
responsibility for particular decisions or to implement positive or negative sanctions therefor.88
Often, where decisions are made at a superior level of the hierarchy, the information presented to
the decision-maker is heavily influenced by the selection of such information by someone at a
lower level of the hierarchy. Information selection can sometimes be determinative of the result of
the decision sought. The selection of information itself involves a decision.89 For such a selection
to be considered rational and likely to produce the “best” decision, the subordinate charged with
presenting the information must select the elements considered to be of greatest salience with
respect to the instant decision.
In turn, the choice of information made by such subordinate may be affected by decisions of others
as to the derivation of such information, including its content, as to its availability, the format and
other conditions in which it is available, and other factors. However, sometimes relevant
information is suppressed, deliberately or otherwise, and, on some occasions, sometimes
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information of lesser relevance or probity to the decision or to the decision that is perceived to be
more desirable (to some, and on some basis) is presented in lieu of information having superior
relevance and utility.90 In other cases, it may not be possible to identify the decision makers and
decision influencers with any real precision.
Making and Implementing Decisions
Similarly, it cannot always be assumed that a decision, once made, will be implemented in
accordance with its terms. In some cases, the implementation of a decision can be delayed or
deferred. In other cases, a real or constructed misapprehension of the nature and effect of the
decision may result in its misapplication or even in its non-application. It is often assumed that
failure to implement properly made decisions of the corporation will invoke sanctions (even
dismissal of employees in appropriate cases) against those who are required to implement them,
but this may not transpire.91
Of course, problems of proof arise. Often, as was noted above, it is difficult to establish that
decisions were made in accordance with appropriate authorities and procedures. A party affected
might argue that the decision was not properly made. Such party might argue that the decision was
not communicated in an appropriate fashion to become known to, and binding upon, the party
involved. A rule may be thought to be inapplicable to the particular group, function, unit or subunit concerned, or, even if applicable to that group, to be otherwise inapplicable, in the
circumstances of the case, such as by reason of extenuating or other circumstances differentiating
the instant situation from that to which the rule applies or for which it was devised.
Individuals and groups making or implementing the decision may appropriate rents from the
decision-making or decision implementation process, deriving benefits to themselves. In so doing,
they are not acting on behalf of the corporation but are acting, instead, on the basis of economic
self-interest.92 Such rent appropriation may take the form of non-economic benefits captured by
the decision-maker or decision implementer. For example, the result of the decision may be to
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increase the prestige or influence of the individual or group concerned. Again, the basis on which
the decision is made or implemented may not involve economic considerations at all, but may
involve considerations of power, prestige, influence, or other social benefits. Considerations of
fairness and justice may also enter into this process.93
As is the case with other types of organizations, whatever the formal organization of the
corporation under consideration, its informal organization must also be considered in seeking to
describe how it operates as a matter of fact. That is to say, against the formal structure and
processes and personnel of the corporation must often (if not invariably) be overlaid a structure,
and processes and personnel of an informal, but no less relevant, nature.94 A complete description
of both formal and informal structure, processes, and personnel, is required to assemble a veridical
characterization of the corporation as it is instituted and operated “in the real world”.
Of course, it is the corporation as instituted and operated in that real world that is, or should be, of
interest to analysts of the ambient economic, social, and political environments, and to promoting
efficacious, and reducing inefficacious, behaviours and results by and from the activities of such
corporations.
Structure and Process of Organizations – Negotiation and Development
As this work will seek to demonstrate, the modern business corporation, like other organizations,
is characterized by considerable complexity, not only with respect to its structure and processes
and those of its participants, but also with respect to its goals and objectives, and those of its
participants. Except in the broadest possible terms, such as seeking to generate surplus value, the
extent to which the overall goals and objectives of the corporation as a whole are shared by and
among its participants may be extremely problematic.95
Intraorganizational Conflicts of Goals and Objectives
As will be seen, the goals and objectives of a particular functional, product, or geographic unit or
sub-unit within the corporation may sometimes conflict with those of other units or sub-units, and
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even, from time to time, with the superordinate, dominant, or “over-arching” goals and objectives
established by, and at, the highest (formal) levels of the corporation and its hierarchy.96 The
salience of those goals and objectives, at the various functional, corporate, unit, and sub-unit levels
may be different as among such functions, units and sub-units and, even within one particular
function, unit or sub-unit, and, furthermore, may be subject to variance from time to time in
accordance with various parameters.97
The actions of individuals situate in a functional, group, or other unit or sub-unit may be subject
to such differing, and even inconsistent, and sometimes even competing, goals and objectives at
other levels.98 The prioritization of such goals and objectives within the functional or other group
or unit, and then within the sub-unit, may or may not be the subject of overt determination by
persons having authority. Indeed, the formal organization may refrain from, or even be incapable,
of making such determinations. Instead, such matters may be decided in accordance with informal
rules, or, as one might say, rules of the informal organization.99
Intracorporate Power
Corporate participants engage in competition, within the corporation, for access to and control of
resources which have varying degrees of scarcity.100 Consequently, the corporation, in its internal
processes, is itself an economizing organization, in the sense of one compelled to employ and
prioritize the employment of the resources available to it.101 The availability of those resources
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may be affected by external factors.102 For example, the size or prestige of a particular corporation
may facilitate its procurement of essential employees or influence in the polity or in society at
large.103 Thus, the corporation is itself a situs of political activity which takes place internally and
is also a participant in political activity externally within the polity and society at large.104
It is sometimes argued that a corporation has a “governing coalition”, a constellation of
individuals, groups, and interests that dominates the decision-making process of the
organization.105 Similarly, it may be argued that units, sub-units, and other finer gradations of
groups within the corporation are characterized by such “governing coalitions”. It is often
maintained, however, that the “governing coalition” is not permanent, but, rather, is fluid and
impermanent, composed of different elements and interests from time to time, and even with
respect to different issues over time or from time to time.106 In this respect, such analysis may be
applicable to organizations of other types and with different objectives, such as labour unions,
educational institutions, administrative apparatus of governments, or religious organizations. 107
As argued elsewhere in these introductory remarks, this “political” analysis of the corporation, and
of organizations in general, emphasizes the degree to which internal contestations may eventuate,
often over access to and control of resources, which are generally not unlimited.108 The power and
influence of a particular individual, group, and functional or other unit, or sub-unit may increase,
be consolidated, and even diminish over time.109 In this sense, the corporation, like any other
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organization, may be analyzed as involving a “political” coalition, which may be operative at
various functional and other levels.110
Negotiation and Power – Constitutive and Continuing
Indeed, the basis upon which participants participate in the activities of the corporation itself may
be considered to involve political, as well as economic action. It can be argued that a participantactor, such as a provider of equity capital or a lender, bargains, implicitly or explicitly, with the
corporation as represented by the board of directors or with the corporation’s agents or, directly or
indirectly, with some or all of the other participants, to establish the basis upon which that
participant-actor will participate in the business of the corporation, including such matters as the
nature of the participant’s contribution, the degree of control by the participant with respect to the
constitution and operations of the business, and the benefits, or basis upon which benefits will be,
distributed to participants, including the subject-actor concerned.111
Notionally, it may be considered that each participant, as participant-actor, will engage in such
negotiations as a predicate activity to becoming involved in the corporation in the relevant
capacity. As noted, however, such “bargains” and such “bargaining” may be subtle and diffuse in
some cases, or deliberate and defined in other cases; and the degree to which such bargaining is
implicit or explicit may be characterized by a kind of continuum.112 Likewise, such “bargains” and
such “bargaining” may be conducted formally or as part of the process and structure of the formal
organization, or informally, as part of the process and structure of the informal organization.113
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Such politicized bargaining may be expected to obtain in various other kinds of organizations, and
not just in those having economic, business or financial objectives.
Depending on the nature and degree of commitment made and resources furnished by a participant,
the prospects of other alternatives, and other relevant factors, it may be, or may become, in his or
her interests, or in the interests of other participants in the coalition which is the organization or
corporation, to re-negotiate such elements of participation at some later stage in the life of the
organization or corporation. In fact, such negotiation may be more than episodic, even regular, and
perhaps even continuous, in some cases.114
Such negotiations or renegotiations may be considered as arising, in part, from the incompleteness
or indeterminacy of the arrangements originally enacted,115 but generally arise, as well, from
changes in the external or internal environment of the corporation concerned.116 Importantly, these
constitutive and continuing negotiations and renegotiations may be considered to involve relational
contracts, in effect, contracts in which legal relationships are supplemented by “organizational”
relationships as posited by Jensen and Meckling, and by Anderson.117 Such relational contracts are
aptly described by Gibbons and Henderson as referring to “collaboration sustained by the shadow
of the future as opposed to formal contract enforced by the courts.”118
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A CORPORATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
Organizational Structure and Process
Adjustment and Readjustment
Considering, in this manner, an organization and, in particular, a modern business corporation, as
corporative illuminates a number of relevant considerations. If the participants in the organization,
in this case the corporation, are engaged, whether constantly or from time to time, in negotiations
concerning the basis and terms of their respective participation in it, it may be expected that certain
observable and non-observable factors affecting or emanating from such negotiations may be
operative. At least to the extent to which such factors are observable, variances may be observed
and even, to some extent or other, predicted, in at least some cases. Other factors may not be
observable, but their variances may or may not remain observable, and, consequently, may or may
not be predictable to some degree.
For example, an increase in market interest rates may encourage a lender to renegotiate the interest
rate on a term or other loan, while it may encourage the borrower corporation to “lock in” at
historical or present levels; or, depending on the increase involved, may motivate the corporation
to seek to raise additional debt in other markets, or to raise additional equity capital. The dilution
effected by the possible issuance of additional equity may be expected to have some effect on the
market price of equity and on dividend policy. Again, a dramatic and unexpected increase in the
profit contribution from one unit or division of the corporation may be expected to lead to that unit
or division demanding additional resources, including compensation.119 If an existing
compensation plan does not sufficiently weight unit or divisional profit contribution, the newly
highly profitable unit or division may be expected to demand a change in the compensation system,
retroactively, by way of bonus or otherwise, and very possibly prospectively as well.120
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As the continuance and terms of the continued participation of one participant are put into question,
so may be those of others. That is to say, a regular, even possibly continuous, rebalancing of the
terms of participation by some or all participants may eventuate. The political nature of such
process may “impossibilize” its continuing effectiveness; in the sense that achieving some steady
state, whether involving Pareto optimality or otherwise, for any or any significant period of time
may simply be impossible.121 If this is perceived by participants in the process, who have a degree
of relevant knowledge and experience not readily available to outsiders, the difficulty that such a
task presents to outsiders may be considered as almost insuperable.
Thus, the structure and process of an organization may be subject to regular, and even continuous,
readjustment. Chester Barnard conceived as organizations and systems of “cooperative human
activities” whose primary functions are the creation, transformation, and exchange of utilities. 122
For a cooperative process to be efficient, Barnard considered that it had to create “a surplus of
satisfaction” for each participant, in order to provide an incentive for cooperation to such
participant. It also had to provide a surplus of satisfaction to the organization itself, generating a
satisfactory exchange.123
Malcolm Salter indicates that such exchanges, whether employment contracts or “deal structuring
between an organization and collaborating parties where “dividing the pie” or sharing benefits and
costs are paramount” require that “some kind of surplus or slack has to be put on the table and
traded so that the eventual return so all contracting parties are mutually satisfying.”124 In addition,
following Barnard, he maintains that “such exchanges require some degree of compromise or
mutual sacrifice in order to achieve "the surplus of satisfactions" that can be efficiently
distributed.”125 Otherwise, “there will be individual or group defections (including shirking of
responsibilities) from the cooperative efforts, which in turn will threaten the continuance of the
organization.”126 Salter notes that “each of these parties have different minimum thresholds of fair
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returns and fair treatment that must be met to keep them as cooperative participants in the
enterprise”,127 or, in our terminology, as “organizational participants”.
Efficient distribution of the “surplus of satisfactions” depends, in turn, upon the integrity of the
cooperative system itself, which is highly dependent upon trust and reciprocity in the underlying
relationships to justify sacrifice by participants today in the expectation of reaping reciprocal
benefits in the future.128 William James acknowledged that a “social organization of any sort
whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust
that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Whenever a desired result is achieved by
this cooperation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the
precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a
commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which
not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted.”129
Following Barnard, Malcolm Salter maintains: “Since cooperative systems need to be continually
adapted to changing conditions, a key executive function is to ensure that the bases of cooperation
(exchanges) continually readjust as necessary to retain the structural integrity of the
organization.”130 Salter argues that “Barnard's and James’s conception of efficient cooperative
systems gives practical relevance to the principal of Pareto efficiency in economics… Pareto
efficiency can be achieved in a number of ways that illustrate the benefits of cooperation and
reinforce the stability of cooperative systems.”131
In our view, such readjustments may complicate the analysis of such structure and process, which
itself becomes “a work in process”. Knowledge of what happens within the organization, such as
knowledge of how to get something done or other “how to” knowledge, involving informal as well
as formal structure and process, may be considered to be essential to comprehending such structure
and process. As noted elsewhere in this Introduction, this presents a formidable task for the
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executives of the organization, which is still more formidable for outsiders.132 Gibbons and
Henderson indicate that such process requires not only task knowledge but also “relational
knowledge”, which they say “may be substantially more difficult to develop than task knowledge,
both because there is much more of it and because its acquisition is contemplated by incentive
problems.”133 Consequently, acquiring, maintaining, and employing relational knowledge is
essential to readjusting the basis of cooperation among participants, or, as we may say, adjusting
the explicit and implicit agreements and understandings among them, which is a key executive
function.
Lack of Universal Structure and Process
This indicates one dimension of instituting and operating, and, accordingly, of regulating, an
organization, such as the corporation: there is no certain way of producing reliable and predictable
results by reason of its operations, nor is there a single method of effectively regulating the
corporation. There is no single universal structure and process which is effective in all
circumstances, and indefinitely, to ensure its effective operations or to ensure its effective
regulation.134
In effect, one consequence of the foregoing is that there is no dependable way of regulating
organizations effectively “from on high”, such as by means of central planning. This has been
commonly observed by organizational theorists, from Weber and Hayek to Berle, Chandler, March
and others. Instead, results, however configured and measured, are affected by many aspects of
the internal structure and processes of the organization in ways not always necessarily or
immediately apparent to insiders (and still less so to outsiders). At the same time, the possible
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consequences of misperception and error with respect to such structure and processes may be
significant, possibly enormous, and perhaps even catastrophic, both to the organization and to the
society and polity in which it is situated.
Consequently, devising a particular combination of participations requisite for success may be
highly individual and situation-dependent. It may vary considerably from one organization or
corporation to another. It seems to depend not only on determining of what “success” would consist
with respect to that organization or corporation, but on deriving a “formula” apt for the instant
organization or corporation, as well as on adjusting that formula from time to time, as required, in
accordance with whatever standards of rationality and information specification are adopted, to
respond to changes in the organization’s external and internal environment. Of course, as “success”
may be a matter of degree, so may the structure and process requisite for its attainment: there may
be various combinations that may be expected to produce different gradients of success, however
determined.
To emphasize the point again, just as the means of instituting and operating a corporation
effectively are necessarily ungeneralizable to a considerable extent, and, even more, are essentially
particularistic to a significant extent, so is promoting the achievement of certain intrinsic and
extrinsic goals with respect to the instant corporation and regulating that corporation in relation to
the same. While not underestimating the importance of regulating corporate behaviour in a
responsive or reflexive manner, such regulation must also be principled, flexible, and relatively
immediate temporally. A “light touch” may also be most effective and least counter-productive.
Short-Termism, Long-Termism, and Organizational Participants
Recent discussions of “short termism” have drawn attention to the fact that, even considering profit
maximization as a dominant, if not the dominant, goal or objective of the modern business
corporation, the determination of whether such profit maximization should be assessed from a
long-term perspective or from a short-term perspective is an issue of considerable importance. Of
course, prioritizing profit maximization, whether in the short-term and long-term, may be seen to
be prioritizing the participation of equity investors in the corporation over the participation of other
participants. Another view that may be taken is that achieving an optimal level of profit that is
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sustainable and balanced over the long-term is conducive to attaining the interests of all
participants.135
Such participants may include employees, suppliers, trade creditors, lenders, holders of financial
instruments derivative of, or based on, investments in the capital of the corporation, whether debt
or equity capital, pensioners, purchasers of the corporation’s products or services, governments
and residents of locations at which the corporation maintains plants or offices, governments having
corporate or other legal jurisdiction over the subject-corporation, and other stakeholders. Some of
these may be regarded as relatively more internal, and others, as relatively more external,
participants. The “internal” participants may be considered as the “real” participants “in” the
corporation in that they may be considered to be “inside” its structure and processes. The “external
participants” may be considered as engaging with the corporation as “outsiders”, or as dealing with
it subject to its external legal attributes. All of these may be regarded, in respect of their economic
participation, at least, as “stakeholders” as that term is used in common parlance today.136
Barnard references, outside the organization, “relationships with other organizations and
individuals not connected with the organization” who interact in ways that are both cooperative
and have utility for each party.137 This suggests that those “unconnected” organizations and
individuals may also be regarded as “connected” in certain respects. Hence, while they may be
considered as outside the subject organization, at least for some purposes, they may possibly be
considered as within some larger organization, at least for certain other purposes. This recalls the
observation by Jensen and Meckling that it “makes little or no sense to try to distinguish between
those things which are “inside” the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are
“outside of it”, and that, instead, what constitutes the organization is simply a “multitude of
complex relationships”,138 which they regarded as purely contractual, but which this work
considers as both legal and organizational. In that sense, the “boundaries” of the organization may
be determined, as just noted, by the salience or intimacy of the relationship or connection, on the
one hand, or, on the other hand, by the purpose for which such boundaries are sought to be defined.
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Financialization
The obscurance or invisibilization of the interests of many such stakeholders has accompanied
what has been characterized recently as the “financialization” of the corporation. Such
“financialization”, in turn, treats the corporation solely in terms of its financial inputs and outputs,
and treats the financial markets themselves solely in terms of financial inputs and outputs. In effect,
the “financialized” corporation is a financial “black box”.139 It remains to be seen whether the
“black box” which is the “financialized corporation” is more or less coherent as a model of the
corporation than is the “black box” which is the “production function corporation’ of classical
economic theory.
However, by “invisibilizing” the organization and its structure and process, “financializing” the
corporation commits a category error which is similar in that regard to treating the corporation
solely as a production function, with production inputs and outputs. Both focus on a single aspect
of the corporation and treat that aspect as the sole significant aspect, element, function, utility, and
even (in some cases) purpose for, and by, which it is constituted, instituted, and operated.
Of course, obfuscation of the organizational aspects of the corporation also occludes recognition
and discussion of its goals and objectives, which this work argues are not simply limited to the
“economic” production of classical and neoclassical economics and, even then, is narrowly
construed in relation to other economic objectives.140 Even more, however, such an approach may
have the result that questions do not arise about the situation of the corporation in social and
political spheres and of the social and political aspects of the corporation which are internalized in
its organization.
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Voluntary Participation and Risk
It is important, of course, to recognize that participants in the corporation “participate” in it, and
in its life and activities, under the influence of various degrees of voluntarism or compulsion and,
in so doing, assume various degrees of risk, in part consequent upon such voluntarism or
compulsion, as well as other factors, in anticipation of some benefit.141 Both risk and benefit are
not limited to solely economic, or financial, elements. The imposition of financial, regulatory, and
other burdens on the corporation should, it is argued, take into account the interests and
circumstances of participation of its various participants and stakeholders, including the relative
presence or absence of voluntarism. These interests and circumstances will include the relationship
between risk and benefit, in all relevant aspects (economic or financial, and non-economic or nonfinancial in all relevant senses of those terms), as perceived objectively and subjectively, as it
relates to participation in the corporation.
It should be noted that some participants in the corporation who may be regarded as “internal” to
the corporation are affected by its external legal attributes.142 For example, in becoming
shareholders of the corporation, such participants rely on the fact that their risk or liability with
respect to the corporation as such a shareholder (that is to say, absent other involvements) is limited
to the amount of their investment. Other “external” participants, such as lenders and trade creditors,
also take the external legal attributes of the corporation into account in considering the risk and
terms of their participation.143 A lender may determine that the limitation of liability principle
otherwise applicable warrants, in the instant circumstances, obtaining some guarantee of a related
corporation or other party. If such a guarantee is secured by assets of the related corporation or
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other party, the principle of asset partitioning may be avoided. Similarly, a lender may require that
one or another business be separated, by external legal attributes, from another which may be less
attractive to it as a borrower.
In substance, the “boundaries” of the corporation, in terms of its external legal attributes may be
subject to some notional adjustment to accord with the arrangements on which participation of
desired parties may be agreed. That is to say, recognition of external legal attributes may
sometimes affect internal, as well as external, participation arrangements.144 For example, the
position of a bank lender to a corporation which is entitled to representation on the board of
directors may be considered to be more “internal” in its relationship to the corporation than
otherwise. Close assessments of its detailed loan agreements, particularly concerning their positive
and negative covenants, may increase the degree to which it is seen as relatively more “internal”
than “external”, which may weaken the bank’s “strict” legal position. In such case, it may be
considered to have opportunities to observe and affect the lender’s compliance with legal
agreements, and, to the extent that it exercises declared or undeclared forbearance from compliance
with their terms, it may be seen as effecting modifications in the legal contract by reason of
relational considerations.145
A corporative approach will facilitate considering the implications of such external legal attributes
on either “inside” or “outside” participants; and on the effect of internal structure and process on
the nature of the participation involved.146 For example, when a lender agrees that the borrower
should maintain a certain level of cash or of reserve for accounts receivable, subject to some
variance not exceeding a certain level as determined by the board of the corporation acting
reasonably, the lender will likely, and would be well-advised to, consider how the internal structure
and processes of the corporation may affect such determination. Similarly, the board, in such a
case, would consider not only the external effect on the lender and the loan, but also what other
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“internal” effect or effects that determination might precipitate or make more likely, possibly
including any consequential or “knock on” effects.
Experience confirms that lenders and borrowers actually engage in such considerations; however,
the corporative element of such considerations may be unnoticed. As a matter of “theorizing the
corporation”, however, these factors must be noticed and taken into account. It is desirable not
only that theory be consistent with experience “in the real world”, but also that it explain or account
for more, rather than less, of what is so experienced or observed.
Participation, Responsibility, and Private and Public Regulation
Changes in the Basis of Participation
It can readily be seen that assignment to the corporation of responsibility for certain actions, as
related to alleged benefits and disbenefits relating to its activities, may have significant effects on
participants in the corporation, whose own participation in the corporation involves a combination
of risk and benefit (considered with respect to all relevant parameters) and their several
assessments of the same, as previously discussed. Indeed, the nature of such participation may
itself be relevant to the effect on a participant and on the allocation of benefits and disbenefits
which is thought to be optimal.147
This kind of cost-benefit analysis may be specific to the corporation in question or may be
generalized at the market level. If such changes in the cost-benefit relationship result or are
perceived to result from changes in “the market”, they may subsequently be translated into
particular corporations indirectly, at which point a more specific cost-benefit analysis may
eventuate.
Changes in expected or actual allocations of such burdens and benefits, either in particular cases
or generally, may contribute to adjustment or readjustment of the cost-benefit analysis of
participants, in terms of their targets, expectations, and assessment of the effect of new
developments, and the effect of the same on their respective expectations, which may lead to
adjustment, readjustment, or realignment of participation arrangements. Those participation
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arrangements, as constitutive and as operationalized, may be considered to be successively
iterative.148
A corporative perspective entails that, when significant changes in the internal or external
environments transpire and require consideration by the corporation as to what responses by it may
be appropriate, suitable attention should be paid to effects of the external change, and of possible
responses to it, on the corporation’s internal organization, in terms of structure, process, and
personnel, as well as to iterative effects of each,149 and their effects on different classes of
organizational participants.150
Private and Public Restraint of Action
It is frequently argued that corporate action may be restrained by private action, through private
litigation and the prospect of such litigation, and by public action and the prospect of such action,
taken by public bodies pursuant to certain legislative and administrative authority. Some comment
on this subject is in order.
In situations involving loss occasioned by the corporation, by way of act or omission, it is often
considered, rather reflexively, that the board of directors of the corporation, as the highest legal
authority within the corporation, must be held responsible for such loss, in some cases, even
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incurring personal liability.151 It is frequently argued that the business judgment rule has
historically protected, and even insulated, boards of directors, and management, of the corporation
from the consequences of their decisions. This work has already argued, and will continue to
maintain, that the assignment of responsibility for decision-making and implementation within the
modern business corporation is such as to make it impossible to prove, or even significantly justify,
imposing liability on the board in many, if not most, and possibly even in almost all, circumstances.
It goes without saying, of course, that a corporative perspective will consider the ways in which
assignment of responsibility affects the corporation’s internal organization, as well as its relations
with external parties. Likewise, it will consider the effect of changes in the assignment of
responsibility in these respects.
Causation
Those favouring the assignment of personal liability have sometimes argued that ascertaining
actual causation in these situations is complex and unnecessary, such that causation and motive
may not be proven, but may be assumed from the relevant circumstances. Those circumstances
would include having actual or ostensible authority over the activity or activities involved in the
loss. This would be determined by the position occupied by the person concerned. In those
circumstances, some commentators argue that personal liability should be imposed upon the
individual having actual or ostensible authority in the circumstances. Some argue that these
directors and officers should incur strict liability in cases where, as a result of their position in the
corporation, they have actual or ostensible authority over the activity or activities involved. The
arguments set forth above indicate that such imposition of strict, and personal, liability will often
be inappropriate and ineffective.152
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Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the persons or bodies having authority and responsibility in
the formal organization “on the organization chart” are able to exercise such authority and
responsibility in reality. Among other things, it is not clear that they have such authority or
responsibility considering the informal organization.153 This is particularly true of officers, whose
title may suggest a more (or even less) comprehensive responsibility than the incumbent actually
exercises.154 Instead, others may share in, or exercise, authority or responsibility informally in
ways not apparent from the organization chart.155 Similarly, others may be able to counteract
certain aspects of official authority, in various ways, formally or informally, often without
assuming any official responsibility for the relevant actions or decisions. In short, it cannot be
assumed that the persons or bodies formally invested as “leaders” actually perform that function
in the organization as instituted and operated.156 The “real” leaders who make and influence
decisions, or at least, those that are important or significant to the organization, may not be the
“official”, but instead, may be “unofficial”, leaders.
Of course, as this suggests, the structure and processes of the informal organization may be quite
different from that of the formal organization. In certain cases, it is argued that informal
organization permits a kind of “institutionalized deviance” from paradigmatic behaviour which
may contribute to the stability of the formal organization and of the organization more generally.157
Thus, possession of actual, apparent, or ostensible authority may not be determinative of “real”,
and not purely positional and formal leadership, decision-making, or decision-influencing ability,
within and in respect of the firm. Of course, sometimes “real” authority will exactly conform to
the organizational characterization and to the “org chart”.
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These phenomena are recognized and taken into account in a corporative perspective on the
corporation. As noted above, such a perspective will take into account both the formal and informal
aspects of the corporation’s internal organization in these respects.
Corporate Culture – “Tone at the Top” or “Tone Throughout”
“Tone at the Top”
In certain cases, the basis upon which commentators argue that those at the highest levels of the
corporation, namely the board of directors, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer,
and other members of its top management team and senior management must be held accountable
for the actions of the corporation, it is that they are responsible for its ethical culture by creating
the appropriate “tone at the top” and ensuring that such tone is prevalent throughout the
organization.158 Accordingly, they argue that legal liability may be imposed on such parties for
deficiencies in such corporate culture.159 Some argue that this justifies imposition of strict liability
for corporate acts and omissions at the “top” level.160
This perspective is complicated by evidence that CEOs and CFOs consider the CEO to be
responsible for corporate culture, with the responsibility of the board being limited to the choice
of CEO.161 The 2018 edition of the UK Corporate Governance Code requires the board of directors
to “assess and monitor culture” and “where it is not satisfied that policy, practices or behaviour
throughout the business are aligned with the company’s purpose, values and strategy, it should
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seek assurance that management has taken corrective action”.162 The concept of “organizational
culture” involves a model of man as a social or, at least, socialized, being.
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As such, it is

considered to involve an ongoing process.164 Paying attention to “corporate culture” has been
found to generate significant benefits. Jillian Grennan finds a link between corporate culture and
firm performance.165 Firm performance is stronger when employees consider top managers to be
trustworthy and ethical.166
The Concept of Corporate Culture
The Financial Reporting Council in the United Kingdom defines corporate culture “as a
combination of the values, attitudes and behaviours manifested by a company and its operations
and relations with its stakeholders [including] shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and
the wider community and environment which are affected by a company’s conduct.” 167 In this
sense, “corporate culture” may be said to reflect its goals and objectives and their means of
achievement. Experts, such as Ashworth, Mael, and Turner, consider organizational culture to
involve the cognitive mechanisms that make group behaviour possible, in effect, as the “shared
understanding of the central, distinctive and enduring character or essence of the organization
among its members”.168 As such, organizational culture is a kind of “binding agent” for
intraorganizational behaviour. Its contribution can be positive, negative, or mixed in its effects.
For example, an organizational orientation towards short-term, rather than long-term, performance
may be expected to have significant effects on intraorganizational decision-making.169 The
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negative effects of a short-term orientation have been evaluated by many “think tanks” as
representing existential threats to contemporary capitalism and to the contemporary business
corporation.170
Corporate Culture and Liability
As noted above, it cannot be assumed that those at the “top” are, or will be, able to translate even
the most beneficent “tone at the top” into an ethical culture throughout the organization which is
reflective of such “tone at the top”.171 Such ability will be dependent, at least in part, on the
effectiveness of certain aspects of the structure and process of the organization itself. 172 It also
involves processes of socialization and integration aimed at securing identification and
commitment of group members.173 Importantly, this also involves aligning incentives so as to
support and encourage behaviours consistent with the corporation’s “purpose, values, strategy and
business model”.174 Jennifer Chatman and her colleagues find that where there is a high consensus
among organizational members across a broad set of culture norms (a “strong culture”) can
contribute to better financial performance, even if in a dynamic environment (one subject to rapid
change) as long as the culture norms intensely emphasize adaptability.175
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Of course, both direct communication (top to bottom or bottom to top) and indirect communication
(including emphasis and incentives) can involve miscommunication.176 Indeed, organizational
culture can be seen as “ultimately being a substitute for explicit communication” or as “an
unspoken language giving directors to the members of an organization.”177 Considered in that
sense, organizational culture provides a context and system of meaning (or sense-making) which
guides the interpretation of explicit and implicit communications.178 Such culture will also be
affected by the personnel of the organization and their general and more particular characteristics,
including the degree of identification with, and commitment to, the organization, and to the
functions, groups, units, and sub-units of which it is composed.179 It is clear that perceptions of the
corporation as a monolithic entity subject to “command-and-control” from top to bottom are not,
at present, realistic.180 Instead, making and implementing (including enforcing) decisions is subject
to diffuse sources and influences.181
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Further, it is not clear that certain elements of an ethical culture are not more rooted in smaller
organizational units than at the level of the corporation itself. The degree to which members of the
organization identify with groups as more or less salient to their personal, social and economic,
situation, objectives, and attributes may be expected to significantly affect their responsiveness to
“top-down” or “commanded and controlled” cultural initiatives.182 Incentives are, of course, highly
relevant to these matters.183 This includes the extent to which incentives are determined and
distributed at various levels of the hierarchy, and the criteria on which they are based, including
the extent to which the incentives are based on corporate, functional, group, unit, or sub-unit
performance.184
The considerable importance attached to the culture of strategic business units (“SBUs” or “BUs”),
particularly in relation to incentives, is illustrated by those analyzing situations threatening the
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continued existence of the subject organization, such as the General Motors ignition switch
crisis,185 the Volkswagen “Dieselgate” crisis,186 and the J.P. Morgan “London Whale” crisis.187
Corporate Liability “At the Top”
While existing research has been able to illuminate many of these issues significantly, at least on
a general level, determining their application in a concrete situation is quite another matter
entirely.188 The effect of the instant structure and processes, formally and informally, is just one of
the relevant factors. Basing legislation and regulation on assumptions as to their effects does not
accord with modern social science methodology and practice. It may also have significant
unanticipated, counterproductive, and unpredictable effects, both within and without the
organization. Recognition of the corporative nature of an organization motivates use of that “lens”
to consider such matters, to generally positive effect. Such use of the corporative “lens” supports
“responsive regulation”.189
Assuming that corporations, or any other organizations, will be able to align their behaviour so as
to avoid the imposition of strict liability “at the top” (although they may attempt to do so) is not
only unscientific but also unrealistic, and not broadly consistent with experience. The effectiveness
of ex post facto imposition of penalties in terms of motivating or restraining behaviour is now
doubted in many fields of regulation, even in criminal law.
In fact, consideration of the matter in principle, now supported by some recent research, suggests
that external regulation may, in some cases, conflict with internal regulation, such as that expressed
in the “culture” of the corporation concerned, and that such conflicts may impair the performance
of the corporation in some respects. The corporative perspective invites further elucidation of how
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the structure, processes, and personnel of the organization may be affected by, and may affect,
internal and external regulatory initiatives, mechanisms, and developments.
Corporative Responsibility
One challenge that presents itself, once it is realized that the corporation is the situs of considerable
psychological, social and political, as well as economic, activity, is to consider the nature of its
responsibility for its undertaking and related activities, consequences, and externalities, whether
psychological, social, political, economic, or otherwise. It is apparent from the foregoing
discussion that liability may be assigned to the corporation; however, assigning liability to specific
persons or groups within the corporation presents difficulties. The sheer numbers of actors and
groups, internally, and the importance of structure and process to this this task complicate any such
an undertaking.190 Such intracorporate undertakings typically involve both positive and negative
sanctions, including, for example, allocation of “bonuses” for performance, as well as imposition
of negative sanctions for non-performance, sub-target performance, or imposition of legal
penalties by external regulators and others with respect to the same, whether criminal,
administrative or otherwise. The intracorporate challenge may be compared to an endeavour to
assign “responsibility” for some action taken by or on behalf of the society or polity at large.
Social and Political Responsibility
The assignment of responsibility for organizational action can be extremely complex indeed. Can
the invasion by one country of another contrary to international law be attributed entirely to the
head of state in a presidential system, or the head of the political function, such as a prime minister
in a Westminster type democracy? While the president of a republic or the prime minister of a
Westminster style democracy may have had a high degree of involvement in the decision-making
process, normally, decisions of such nature involve the involvement of the cabinet and other
advisors, internal and external. We might ask about the nature of the cabinet (and advisors), of its
composition, and of its authority. If it was selected by the prime minister or head of state, we might
ask how that person was selected, perhaps by some party machinery or other, perhaps by some
more deliberately “democratic” process, or perhaps otherwise.
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Can responsibility for an invasion decision be exclusively assigned to the head of state or prime
minister? To the Cabinet? To those who briefed the head of state, prime minister, or cabinet, chose
the information and framed the policy alternatives put before them and thereby influenced or may
have influenced the decision or the decision-maker(s) in some manner or other? Can responsibility
be assigned, in the alternative, or in whole or in part, to the legislature to which the cabinet must
be accountable to some or other degree, or which may even have been required to approve such
action? To some or other legislative committee or committees having oversight of the subject? To
the electorate that elected the relevant decision-makers or decision-influencers? To those within
the polity who influence the choices of personnel, involving, perhaps, “the party”, its leaders and
members, who participated in the selection of the “party leader”? Or those who otherwise affect
the framework and subjects of public discourse? Or those who might prevent realization of the
mandate, whether by means of action or by inaction?
This example, which invites consideration of various formulations of causation, as a matter of law
and otherwise, demonstrates the difficulty of determining causation and of assigning responsibility
in such a complex sociopolitical environment. That description characterizes a large modern
business corporation, just as it does other types of organizations.191
Consideration of the corporation from a corporative perspective facilitates examination of issues
of moral and legal responsibility of the corporation as a legal entity vis-à-vis its external
environment and external actors, and of the corporation as an organization vis-à-vis its internal
constituents.192 The relationship between the corporation as legal actor and the animating or
instituting internal participants cannot be ignored in, or by, a theory of the corporation which seeks
to have integrity and explanatory power.
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Responsibility in a Complex Environment
The conclusion drawn here is that, while it may occur occasionally, it will be relatively
infrequently that the outcome of such political and complex processes in an organization with a
complex structure can be credited or blamed with a high degree of certainty on some one or more
individuals, groups, units, or sub-units. Similarly, this may be expected to be the case with respect
to the reasons, reasoning, and information collection and formation processes forming part of the
overall decision-making process. Further, adjustment and readjustment of structure, processes, and
participation arrangement may result in changes in authority and responsibility from time to time
which, obviously, has the capacity to affect assignment of responsibility in particular situations.
When the corporation operates in a volatile or dynamic environment, particularly one which is
characterized by rapid, discontinuous, and significant change, such a task may become virtually
impossible.
Thus, with relatively rare exceptions, given the range of decisions (and indecisions) made (or
avoided) by and within such an organization, the corporation is the logical party to be assigned the
credit or blame for positive or negative consequences of such decisions and indecisions. In some
cases, it may be possible to justifiably credit or blame the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial
Officer, the top management team or some one or more of its members, senior management or
some one or more of its members, or some other level or function within management, and, in
others, the board of directors, but it is submitted that such cases will, again, be relatively infrequent
on the whole; that is, provided that such allocations are sought to be imposed on some reasonable
realistic basis, rather than on the basis of some absolute, strict, or positional liability.
Objection to this may be taken on the ground that failure to allocate responsibility leaves the
benefits and burdens to be shared among the participants in the corporation in accordance with the
constitutive or other underlying arrangements for such participation, as adjusted from time to time
or otherwise. In this way, the burden or benefit is shared by and among such participants or, at
least, some of them. This may be characterized as an unfair allocation from the perspective of
causation and blameworthiness. But, of course, it is the difficulty attendant on attempting to assign
causation and responsibility which makes such an allocation to the corporation itself, primarily or
exclusively, realistic, even reasonable, and perhaps, in some circumstances, all but inevitable. That
argument may be particularly persuasive where the alternative is allocation of the burden or benefit
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to some uninvolved party, such as the society or polity generally, or to specific groups within the
society or polity.
Of course, it is not only with respect to the assignment of responsibility for actions or omissions
attended by negative consequences or attributes that psychological, social, political, and economic
processes and considerations may be relevant, with respect to the corporation, as well as to the
polity. The case is the same with respect to positive consequences or attributes. Asking who is
responsible for the unprecedented success of a particular corporation has something in common
with asking who is responsible for the unprecedented economic and social well-being of a polity.
Why was Japan such a “success story” in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, but not later? What about
the United States in the period after the Second World War? What about Germany in the later
years of the twentieth century? Surely, the answers to each of the questions in the preceding
paragraphs are complex and diffuse in nature. Assuming that the Chief Executive Officer of a
corporation is wholly responsible for its successes or failures is obviously in some ways as
simplistic and problematic as such assumption would be with respect to the head of state or prime
minister of a modern Westphalian state functions as a Westminster style democracy.
It can be seen from the present discussion that leadership in a modern complex business
corporation, as in a modern society or polity, is multi-dimensional, and multivariate. Important
consequences attend this realization. For example, the composition, and exercise, of “leadership”
within the corporation is not determined solely by the organizational chart of the formal
organization, but may be influenced by informal structures and processes which is not often
capable of being described in this way. Informal “leadership” is not necessarily exhausted or even
concentrated at one or at a relatively few levels of the hierarchy. In fact, real “leadership: may not
be consequent solely or primarily upon position or function, but may be consequent, in whole or
in part, upon personal qualities, such as charisma or some other enigmatic quality.193A corporative
theory of the corporation acknowledges these important considerations.
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A Corporative Analysis of Corporate Behaviour, Success, and Failure
A corporative approach to the corporation acknowledges the extent to which its structure and
processes, like those of any other organization, engage with various aspects of human behaviour,
encompassing both individual and group behaviour. The operations of other organizations and
their effectiveness, whatever their objectives, are affected by interaction by, between, and among
groups, as well as individuals, at different levels, and with respect to different functions, of the
organization. Organizations must recognize and attempt to account for the manifold complexities
of human behaviour in an organization.
Within the corporation is a society and polity that may be compared with the society and polity
within which the corporation is situated. In that sense, the corporation is within society and society
is within the corporation. As such, a corporative approach to the corporation acknowledges not
only that it occupies a space or place within the greater society and polity, but, also, that such
society and polity animates and institutes the corporation as an organization.
By avoiding reductive individualism, while also avoiding sociological reductionism, the
corporative perspective seeks to recognize the social aspects of the human behavior that impact
the behaviour of the corporation as a legal actor in the world. The legal and social construct that is
the corporation as legal entity and institution does not exhaust the aspects with respect to which
its organization is also socially constructed and instituted.
Effects on Participants
The participants in the corporation also occupy spaces or places within that greater society and
polity, as well as within the corporation itself. The participant in the corporation, as an actor, does
not shed other aspects of his or her being as an individual within the world, within a particular
society and within a particular polity when, and by means of, entering into that corporate space,
life, or role. That participant is not just a worker in, supplier to, or customer of, that corporation,
but is also a parent, child, member of social, religious or other groups, a voter, a sports player,
reader, or intellectual. While the corporation provides some measure of identity to the participant,
this must be considered against other measures and species of identity and identification.
For example, when a corporation “blows up”, the identity of its participants is affected: they “lose”
their identity as employee, supplier, or customer. That loss of identity may express itself in a
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variety of ways in the wider society and polity. A high-flying employee at a widely-respected
organization such as Enron and hence someone proud of being “one of the smartest in the room”
may subsequently be subject to criticism for that same involvement. Further, the employee may
not be able to replace such employment or such prestige. Even if this is possible, such employee
must reconstruct his or her package of social identities (perhaps with loss of income, prestige,
physical relocation, work-related friendships and outside activities, or otherwise), while the greater
society and polity may have to engage in some reconstruction, too, as it suffers work force
dislocation, unemployment, and dissatisfaction, and other economic, social, and political effects.
The scale of many modern business corporations is such that when one “blows up”, the effects are
very widespread. Instead of a single “entrepreneur”, as originator of the enterprise and provider of
its capital, with a manager and a few employees, as in the classical model of the firm, the “blow
up” of a modern business corporation may involve equity and debt capital providers, employees,
suppliers, customers, pensioners, municipal, state and national governments, members of
communities in which the corporation operates, accounting, legal, and financial advisors, and
others. For example, the collapse of Enron had enormous effects, including the collapse of one of
the leading “Big Five” accounting firms, Arthur Andersen, thereby affecting its partners,
employees, clients, suppliers, and affected communities, states, regions, and countries.
The probability that all of the participants will be equally well situated after the “blow up” as they
were before then is likely insignificant. Accordingly, the “loss” involved in the corporate blow-up
affects the broader society and polity. In the case of a threatened “blow up” of a very large
influential corporation, whose activities are extensive, widely dispersed and significant, such as
Enron, Worldcom, Bear Stearns, or Lehman Brothers, considerations such as these may be thought
to justify intervention, by the society or polity, to prevent or lessen the likelihood of such a “blow
up” taking place, and to mitigate its effects, if its eventuation cannot be prevented.
Non-Economic Aspects of Corporate Life
It is argued in this work that corporative theory or the corporative perspective involves an
analytical perspective wherein a corporation is not seen as involved only in generating profits for
its owners and others, including members of its senior management. As the discussion here
demonstrates, the function of the modern business corporation is not limited to generating surplus
value or profit in economic terms alone. It is also implicated in many associative, affiliative, social,
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and political activities, at least some of which may be considered as positive aspects of its
operations. A corporative approach would recognize that corporations are not “bad” in and of
themselves. Instead, as well as being economic actors seeking to generate surplus value, they are
organizations and present places and spaces for human action and interaction, which may have
positive, as well as negative, aspects from time to time.
We need not detain ourselves long considering why corporations have been perceived negatively
by many social commentators. The Industrial Revolution in Great Britain and in Europe, in the
last half of the eighteenth century to the middle of the late nineteenth century, provided many
opportunities for criticism, such as offered by Weber, Marx, Hayek, and Polanyi, among others.
Likewise, we need not detain ourselves considering the benefits which the corporation afforded to
social, economic, and even political development, as chronicled by Hayek, Polanyi, Chandler, and
Berle, among others. Criticism of the activities of the “robber barons” in the United States and or
similar actors in other jurisdictions, as well as other factors, motivated changes, over time, in the
social and economic fabric of society and nations, as mentioned below.
However, the time is apt, now, to recognize that the activities of corporations can be highly
beneficial to society and to the polity at large. Recognizing the corporative aspect of these activities
and of the modern business corporation itself should assist in this undertaking and in reconstructing and re-imagining the corporation as a matter of law and governance. This work is but
a single step on the way to this goal.
Corporative Regulation
Cyclical Evolution
Corporate law and corporate governance have sometimes been characterized as involving cyclical
evolution. Significant developments in corporate law and corporate governance have resulted from
crises and related public outcry, especially where these crises have been seen as resulting from
failures of corporate law and corporate governance.194
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The New Deal may be seen by some as a response to the Great Depression. The Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and
the Investment Company Act of 1940 effected major changes in the regulatory landscape for
corporations and, in particular, for publicly traded corporations. The collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management and of the so-called “thrifts” (savings and loan companies) created further
demand for additional regulation in the 1990s. The collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other large
corporations and organizations, such as Arthur Andersen LLP, were attended by the adoption of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The failures of AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers led to a
groundswell of demand for further regulation, which significantly contributed to the adoption of
the Dodd-Frank Act.
In this way, development of corporate law and corporate governance is seen by some as a linear
progression in which crises and failures are seen to result from inadequate penalties, the response
to which crises and failures often takes the form of increased penalties and the imposition of
personal liability. Yet, if the progression is linear, and teleological, it might be expected that the
achievement of the goal would be achieved or more closely achieved as each new stage of
regulation eventuates. If, on the other hand, as seems to be the case, successive iterations of
additional regulation do not necessarily have such results, some explanation must be sought.
Perhaps this explanation lies in the nature of the corporation itself.
Corporative Regulation of the Corporative Corporation
It is argued here that failure to acknowledge the corporative nature of the corporation complicates
its regulation, among other things. The recognition that the inward-facing aspect of the corporation
involves complex psychological, social, and political, as well as economic, behavioural,
processual, and structural considerations, must be essential to any effective regulatory scheme.
Some behaviours may be subject to external influence to various degrees, but others may not; some
may be completely impervious to external influence, but others may not; some may be restrained
only, primarily, or to significant degree, by overtly political processes, or by social dynamic
processes, or by psychological processes, but others may not. A corporative approach invites
commentators, legislators, regulators, and courts, as well as other observers, to consider these
issues in relation to the behaviour of the corporation in its external and legal aspect, as a legal actor
in the economic, social and political realms, as well as in respect of its internal organization.
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What rules, signals, influences, threats, penalties, and other possible means of motivating certain
behaviour may be most beneficial, preferable and even optimal, as measured in relation to
effectiveness and cost, in promoting a desired goal must be considered in relation to the internal
structure and processes, formal and informal, of the target organization or corporation. The
consequences, whether expected or unanticipated, of such “regulation”, both within and without
the organization, must be considered. As always, seeking to eliminate one disbenefit or externality
while possibly contributing to the occurrence of another but more significant disbenefit or
externality is normally sought to be avoided. At another level, the effect on the internal or inwardfacing aspect of the organization, may be critically related to its capacity to create surplus value,
which is highly sought by society and the polity. The diminution of the likelihood of such surplus
value creation may, in some cases, outweigh some or all of the cost of the externally-arising
disbenefit or externality, thereby promoting a solution balancing such benefits and disbenefits.
Historical developments in corporate law and corporate governance, at least in the twentieth
century, have been characterized by a reluctance, in practice, to reassess the fundamental approach
to regulation and governance generally, and to regulation and governance of the modern business
corporation in particular. New theoretical approaches to regulation, such as reflexivity, or
responsivity, applied widely with respect to other areas of regulation have been applied to
regulation of corporations in some concrete situations, but not always broadly and in a
thoroughgoing manner. Some of the failure to apply reflexive or responsive regulation in the
corporate context has been justified in light of the “fact” (contested here) that such regulated
corporations and persons seek only, and their actions are based entirely on, economic self-interest.
Accordingly, public, legislative, and regulatory reaction has taken into account primarily, if not
exclusively, learning from economics, and has failed to apply learning from non-legal fields, such
as organizational behaviour, strategy, management theory and practice, and other business
disciplines, organizational psychology, social psychology, sociology, philosophy, and others. As
we have argued above, such reaction has failed, by and large, to consider to any significant degree,
the extent to which existing forces exist which might moderate the behaviour of corporations, their
participants, and internal structures and hierarchies, both formal and informal, and how these may
be directed, with or without intervention by government mechanisms, towards more positive
outcomes. Such reaction has failed to acknowledge and to take into account the corporative nature
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of the modern business corporation. Instead, regulation of corporations and of corporate
governance has been based largely, if not predominantly, on assumptions, rather than on empirical
evidence, research, and empirically-derived reasoning and theorizing.
Such lack of attention to these disciplines and fields, and to corporativity, and to the lessons thereby
made available in respect of the regulation and governance of corporations, has tended to lead to
regulation at the margin, often dealing only or primarily with “excess”, namely, overt or excessive
greed, outright crime, and fraud. In the absence of detailed knowledge of organizational structure
and process, either generally or with respect to particular industries and corporations, such as might
facilitate amelioration by means of behavioural intervention or influence, there has been a
tendency to adopt “check the box” governance within the corporation, in which apparent process,
as stipulated by regulators, dominates the agendas of boards of directors and senior management,
often at the expense of attention to the structure and process of the corporation itself.
“Deep”, and “Check the Box”, Regulation Distinguished
This “check the box” process is pursued at the expense of seeking to develop a richer process that
might be more effective and more conducive to attaining the objectives of the corporation, the
society, and the polity, generally. A richer process would be attentive to the structure and processes
not just of corporations generally, but of the subject-corporation in particular. Thus, in respect of
regulation imposed on corporations in generally, and in respect of regulation self-imposed by a
subject-corporation itself, more pervasive and nuanced governance and regulation often seems to
go by the wayside.
In one sense, “check the box” regulation has a somewhat perverse effect in that it may persuade
regulators and corporations, as well as the public, that this constitutes effective regulation. In turn,
this may inhibit examining the real issues of corporate regulation and governance, in part, by
challenging conventional assumptions and assessing the “real” position of the corporation itself,
including its structure, process and personnel. Real regulation and governance of corporations “in
the real world”, if it is to be effective, must involve application of the knowledge and
methodologies of all disciplines and fields having something to contribute to the discourse on those
issues.
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In turn, the pursuit of wealth and value creation, however it is to be shared within the corporation,
society and polity, is frequently thereby inhibited. Instead, “good governance” is considered as a
cost to be borne by the corporation and its participants, rather than as a means to achievement.
Corporative Theory, Perspectives, and Alternative Theories
Perspectives
A corporative theory of the corporation must, does, and will, consider the corporation from
perspectives of various academic and practical disciplines and fields, including those just
mentioned. It is considered that such corporative theory will may assist in and encourage
consideration of development and appraisal of encouragement that is thoughtful, as well as, where
appropriate, reflexive and responsive. As well as making it more productive, those applying a
corporative approach will ask how to make the corporation “better”, more responsive to human
needs, more productive of meaning, more beneficial to salient identity; in effect, more effective in
accomplishing the goals and objectives with which it is charged by its participants, including the
society and polity at large.
Those goals and objectives are not exclusively economic, but also relate to society and the polity
more broadly. While Berle’s corporate City of God may be beyond conception in relation to the
corporation, at least as presently envisioned, a more positive image, and certainly a less negative
image, of the corporation may attend a corporative approach to the corporation as a matter of legal
theory. Legal theory should not, alone, be left without resources of other disciplines, as well as
those of the legal discipline, in fashioning such beneficial changes. A corporative approach avails
itself of such resources. Other factors also argue for this approach.
Disintermediation
It is sometimes observed that the modern society and modern polity exhibit significant
disintermediation of the individual and the society or polity, as the case may be, at large. The
individual may lack various associative and affiliative bonds that formerly intermediated the
relationship of a person in his or her position to the society or polity at large. Formerly, labour
union, religious, social and other organizations at various levels of the society or polity furnished
an individual not only with a framework for purely social interaction, but also with a means of
asserting common interests in the larger society or political whole. The individual could consider
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that the “gulf” between that individual and society at large or the nation state (or subsidiary polity)
at large was ameliorated by his or her inclusion in those other organizations.
As those other organizations have apparently increased in scope and significance in society and
the state at large, the benefits of intermediation seem to have been lost, to at least some extent.
Some social commentators call for a resurgence of organized labour, of religious organizations, of
fraternal, social service, or other social organizations. There can be but scant doubt that such
reintermediation might provide significant benefits to individuals. It might provide them with a
further basis of identification with, and identity with respect to, such organizations. However, the
form of organization which we recognize as the modern business corporation, should, at least, be
considered as a source of possible social and political reintermediation.
As noted here and in the main text, the corporative perspective enables such an approach.
Social and Political Salience
As argued here and in the Conclusion, the collapse of a large modern business corporation, whether
from nefarious or other causes, may be catastrophic for many of its participants. The social,
political, and economic dislocation effected thereby is such that many commentators, social,
political, economic, and other, are found to opine that such a collapse cannot be justified as a result
of competitive factors alone; and that boundaries must be established for competition that avoid
such collapses. This apparently recognizes, at least to some extent, that the classical political
economy model of the firm cannot be justified as a model for, and as a basis of action with respect
to, the modern business corporation.
As argued in this work, the modern business corporation is corporative: it is within society and
society is within the modern business corporation. It is intra-social and society is intra-corporate.
Collapses of huge corporations should be avoided, and, if they cannot be avoided, must be
managed to minimize the damage to the society and polity at large. Such loss minimization may
frequently include an assessment of “lessons learned” from such events. This procedure has been
adopted, to some extent, with respect to such catastrophic failures as Long-Term Capital
Management, the “thrifts”, Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers.
It is necessary, however, to recognize that, in the absence of the wealth and surplus value created
by the activities of the modern business corporation, the benefits otherwise created by economic
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activity would be unavailable, not only to the participants in the corporation, but also to the society
and polity at large. Quite apart from questions of distribution of surplus value, modern societies
and polities depend upon corporations, as principal economic actors, to generate surplus value.
Quite apart from economic benefits, the modern business corporation meets other needs and
accomplishes other goals and objectives of the society and polity, many of which are not limited
exclusively to participants in the corporation. A corporative perspective recognizes this.
Extant Legal Theory of the Corporation
This work argues that a legal theory of what the corporation “is” must have a degree of explanatory
and predictive capacity which exceeds conventional extant theorizing. This work establishes that
the “corporative” theory of the corporation meets these requirements, at least provisionally, and
thus is worthy of further exposition, attempted verification, refinement and development, in a
scientific and empirical fashion. Corporative theory has many affinities with the behavioural
theory of the firm of the Carnegie School.195
Consequently, many conventions attending the legal theory of, and many legal theories of, the
corporation must be discarded.196 For example, the notion of “legal personality”197 is “off the
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table”, as lacking significance and predictive capacity, as an analogy to the human person, in
favour of a description of the real interaction of real persons (and groups, and groups of groups, of
such real persons) implicated in the corporation. Comparing the body having ultimate
responsibility for directing the corporation to the “mind” or “brain” of a human person, with the
“body” of such person being constituted by every other human person or group of persons within
the corporation, no longer has any purchase.198 Even if that analogy meant something before the
discovery of the relationship between the brain and other parts of the body, such a simple analogy
is inadequate today. However, an analogy which employed knowledge of modern neurological,
vascular, and other medical knowledge might make the analogy more apt, albeit significantly more
complex. The brain depends on other organs and systems of the body, including its neurological
system, vascular and circulatory, and other systems and organs, not all of which are dependent for
their effective functioning on the brain. Similarly, while the brain might direct certain of the body’s
activities, that is not the case for some other activities.
Symbolist, and collective theories, and realist accounts such as advanced by Dicey, Maitland, or
von Gierke, are to like effect, with respect to their significance and predictive capacity.199 The
concept of the corporation as a “legal fiction” also fails to engage with its content and
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significance.200 “Concession” theory explains only how the outer shell or outward-facing aspect
of the corporation eventuates governmentally.201
The “nexus of contracts” theory is likewise subject to many of these criticisms.202 Perhaps most
significantly, it treats the corporation as a production function, and even arguably as a finance
function, while invisibilizing it, even eliminating it, as an organization, thereby preventing
consideration of many of its most interesting and important features, not all of which relate only
to matters of contract. Further, it does not usually differentiate adequately between “internal” and
“external” relationships or contracts. At least as most often framed, it deals exclusively with
“economic” matters, and does not consider affiliative and associative, as well as other, human
needs. It may be said to rule out such considerations almost ex hypothesi as a result of its
characterization of “economic man”.
Even the theory of team production offers only a partial and incomplete explanation.203 It seeks to
dispense with claims of “shareholder primacy” as a guiding principle of corporate law and
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corporate governance, recognizes the role of participants in the corporation as claimants to
participation in its operations and governance, and views the board of directors as the “mediating
hierarch” adjudicating such claims, which are considered to be purely (or at least primarily)
economic or financial in nature. It also acknowledges and applies learning from disciplines other
than law to theorizing about law, in party by challenging assumptions of the nature of man as
seeking to satisfy only rational self-interest, and recognizing that human beings engage in
“prosocial” behaviour.
In the latter respect, team production theory effects some of the same results as the corporative
theory outlined in this work. However, while it invites consideration of the decision-making
process, it employs, rather than challenges, many of the assumptions of classical and neoclassical
economics concerning the nature of the firm. It also limits its consideration to the economic
objectives and interests of the members of the team. In summary, it fails to challenge economic
assumptions underlying corporate law theory in as thoroughgoing a manner as does the present
work. Thus, it may be thought that it contributes more significantly to the theory of governance of
the corporation than it does to the theory of the corporation as such.
Stakeholder theory,204 similarly, takes into account only (some would argue primarily) economic
objectives and interests of the “stakeholders” identified. Their identification as stakeholders, in
effect, takes into account only their economic, but not their other significant, objectives and
interests. It is often argued that it takes into account ethical and other evaluative considerations;
however, unless those considerations are extended to include non-economic and non-financial
considerations, objectives, and interests, real equanimity in terms of “welfare” or “well-being” in
a more holistic sense may not be promoted. Indeed, without employing such extended criteria or
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considerations, the result may be only to promote a more satisfactory distribution of economic or
financial costs and benefits, without a real increase in aggregate stakeholder “satisfaction”
considered more broadly. Insofar as stakeholder theory recognizes the interests of “stakeholders”
other than shareholders, it may be considered to be in conflict with maximizing shareholder value
and shareholder primacy.205
The theory (or, some would say, doctrine) of “relational” or “incomplete” contracts is not, of
course, a theory of the firm as such;206 however, its analysis of relationships and reasonable
expectations of the parties to such relationships aligns well with corporative theory, as well as with
certain elements of team production theory and stakeholder theory and, to a lesser extent, with “a
nexus of contracts”, contract, or contractarian theory.207
Theories of management dominance and of shareholder dominance may be viewed as conclusions
based on some evidence, at least if derived empirically, or as teleological or moral principles, if
otherwise derived. In the first case, the evidence may be presented to justify the conclusion
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reached. That is not often the case, however. In the second case, no evidence is necessary, other
than argument or appeal to reason or passion, both of which are often presented as experience.
To the extent, however, that a management primacy theory208 or a shareholder primacy theory209
is empirical, it may be regarded by a corporative theorist as a way to characterize corporations
generally, or a particular corporation, in effect, with respect to the dominant coalition, whose
existence and operation depends, in part at least, on internal structure and processes, and in another
part on external legal attributes. The continuing interrelation of those elements, not just those
operating internally, and not just operating externally, affects the existence and effect of such
dominance. If, on the other hand, such dominance by either management or shareholders is
considered to be an expression of what should prevail, the argument is a normative or moral one
which must proceed on a rather different footing. Of course, ascribing dominance to either group
may be factually erroneous, or may be morally and normatively unjustified.
In effect, theories of management dominance and shareholder dominance are not theories of the
corporation, but are descriptions of where power and influence within the corporation does, or
should, reside. Thus, they do not engage with a corporative theory, which is not so derived, but
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which attempts to engage with issues of power and influence within the corporation having regard
to the nature of the “within”, as well as the “without”, with respect to the corporation itself.
Transnational Law
A corporative theory of the corporation also addresses the challenges of transnational law.210 A
concern of international law and of transnational law has been, and continues to be, the extent to
which the adoption, legitimacy and application of international and transnational law, the
legitimacy of representation of people, societies and polities by international and transnational
legal institutions, and their subjection to international and transnational law and legal institutions,
are, and are perceived by their putative subjects as, legitimate. Attempts have been made to justify
subjection of citizens of one country to rules adopted by non-governmental organizations
constituted by that country and others acting collectively, or by organizations such as the United
Nations or the European Economic Community, themselves constituted in such manner. It is
argued that such transnational organizations are legitimized by action by those entrusted with
authority within the country or polity and by delegation of certain authority to the international
(IO) or transnational organization (TO) concerned.
Of course, issues of disintermediation arise in this regard. For example, questions arise about how
a citizen and member of the electorate of Canada makes his or her view known with respect to the
IO or TO concerned; and how that IO or TO takes account of views expressed by the citizenry and
electorate of its member countries. The very remoteness of the IO or TO causes concerns, not only
about the legitimacy of such regulation, but about respect for it and for its enforcement, which
often engages the states and citizens themselves. An IO or TO purporting to embrace states whose
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populations are numbered in the hundreds of millions or even billions may seem very remote
indeed from members of one of those states or populations. Even within the European Union, many
citizens of member countries apparently share such concerns, such as in the United Kingdom,
where they apparently underlay the electoral dissatisfaction which found expression in Brexit, the
proposal that the United Kingdom exit the European Union. Similar expressions of dissatisfaction
have obtained in other member countries.
Consider, then, the modern business corporation. Limiting attention only to employees initially, it
is generally recognized that many large MBCs have tens or even hundreds of thousands of
employees. Many of these modern business corporations are multinational or transnational
business corporations (TNCs), which have employees and operations in a number of different
nation states. Certain aspects of the social identities of many of these employees, retirees, and
pensioners, are related to the corporation.
Often, the corporation provides many employees with benefits which are, to some greater or lesser
degree, fungible or transferable when the employee moves from one state in which it operates to
another. For expatriate or international employees whose employment takes them into a number
of different states over the period of their careers, these benefits and pension rights may be of
greater value to them, perhaps only due to short periods of service in each nation state, than
governmental benefits or pension rights provided by national or subordinate governments of the
jurisdictions in which they have resided over time. Their benefits as “citizen employees” of the
TNC may sometimes approach, rival, or even exceed, those provided by such governments.
Employees of such a TNC may also participate in several social identities within the TNC,
including those related to function (for example, part of the sales or the finance function) or
geography (part of the North American region) or unit or sub-unit (for example, part of the
transformer manufacturing division or, in a different corporation, part of the cable television
division). Of course, as demonstrated above, such individual units and sub-units, and separate
functions, within the corporation may share certain common goals and objectives that are not
coterminous or coextensive with those of the corporation as a whole or with those of other units,
sub-units, and functions. Accordingly, internal political activities aimed at control of resources or
other goals and objectives may transcend domestic national boundaries.
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As might be expected, the nature and degree of such internal political activity may be affected by
the nature and degree of control which each unit, sub-unit or function is able to exercise over its
resources and over its activities generally. Existing research suggests that this degree of control
depends, in turn, upon such factors as the goals, objectives, nature, stage of development, and
timing of the activities of the corporation beyond its centralized base of operations.
Regulation of TNCs should be expected to take these complicating factors into account. This may
present significant difficulties. Again, however, a corporative theory of the corporation makes
apparent, and does not occlude or “invisibilize”, such problems. They may, accordingly, present
themselves for attention by corporative theory, which might not otherwise be the case, to the same
extent, in the same way, or, perhaps, at all.
For example, national laws may affect the relationships between such TNCs and their employees.
In some cases, TNCs may provide benefits at a level greater than that required by local domestic
law. In some cases, TNCs may be required to do so as parties to agreements or arrangements that
are not limited by territorial jurisdiction. For example, a forestry products organization that adheres
to certain common harvesting standards wherever they operate might also provide or insist that its
members provide a common level of employment, pension or other benefits. An agricultural
organization, for example, one involving agricultural producers, might require its members to
adhere to certain other labour standards, such as maximum hours of work, overtime pay, avoidance
of child or unfree labour, and other similar requirements. In the result, employees of a TNC may
be affected by a plethora of rights and restrictions imposed by various schemes. These may be of
considerable importance to the employees concerned. Of course, they may also be of considerable
importance to the TNC employer, as well.
Apart from employment relationships, of course, many TNCs also have public shareholders and
debtholders, lenders, suppliers, trade creditors, customers, landlords, tenants, licensees, and other
stakeholders, including nation state and subordinate level and municipal, and other governments,
in various countries. Compliance with applicable standards, as required, may involve complex and
transnational legal and other considerations.
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Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the Corporation in Legal Theory
A legal theory of the corporation that recognizes its economic and, as well, its other significant
functions, as well as the complexity that may attend its structure and processes, must both examine,
challenge, and criticize, and, also, ameliorate the assumptions of classical and neoclassical
economics that underlie conventional approaches to corporate law and corporate governance, and
must seek new approaches to corporate law and corporate governance involving learning from
other disciplines and fields. This involves a deconstruction and reconstruction of the corporation
as a matter of corporate law and corporate legal theory. The methodology by which this is sought
to be effected in the present work, as well as the justification therefor, is discussed in considerable
detail in this Introduction and in Chapter One.
In effect, this methodology involves, first, asking, in Part 1 of the book, the question: What is? Or,
explained more fully, what is the basic nature of modern corporate law and corporate governance
regimes today? And what does this tell us about the modern business corporation: what it is and
what it does? These questions are sought to be answered by identifying the essential attributes of
the corporation as a matter of law, and by describing and discussing both the interrelationship
among those attributes, no and how those attributes are instantiated in several major modern
business corporation statutes, in general terms in Chapter One and, in greater detail, in Appendix
A, in Chapters A1, A2 and A3. Chapters Two and Three explicate how the corporation takes action
in the real world of human beings and related entities. Thus, Part 1 of the book attempts to describe
what the modern business corporation is, in terms of how it is instantiated in the “real world” and
not simply as a matter of legal theory. That is the data which is sought to be described in Part 1.
Part 2 of the book asks: Why this? Or, explained more fully, what are the assumptions identified
in legal and other relevant discourse which are thought to underlie how the modern business
corporation is perceived by academic and other practitioners and analysts; why is the modern
business corporation perceived in this way; and does this tell us anything about why the modern
business corporation is instantiated in modern corporate statutes in the way that it is. That is the
data sought to be described in Part 2.
The assumptions considered in Part 2 relate to the description of the corporation as a single
economic actor (Chapters Two and Three). Those assumptions, in turn, involve underlying
assumptions (explicated, in order not to burden the main text, in Appendix B) about the place of
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the economy as a sphere of action in relation to the society, the polity, and the state (Appendix B,
Chapters B2 to B3 inclusive); and assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics generally
(Appendix B, Chapters B4 and B5). Such assumptions are identified, explained, criticized and
discussed from a variety of analytical perspectives, including, as might be expected, from the
foregoing discussion, economic, social, political, historical, and philosophical perspectives.
Part 3 of the book asks: How, instead, can the corporation be analyzed? The book identifies and
discusses the essential, as well as other relevant, characteristics of organizations, as identified by
academics and practitioners from various disciplines and fields, including those disciplines and
fields mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph in relation to Part 2 of the book. In this
regard, Chapters Four to Six inclusive discuss the essential and other salient characteristics of
organizations, and endeavour to relate these characteristics to the modern business corporation
insofar as it presents itself as involving a species of organization.
Finally, the book essays an explanation of the possible relationship between and among the
essential legal characteristics of the modern business corporation as a separate legal entity and the
essential characteristics of the modern business corporation as, or as implicating, an organization
(in Chapters Seven through Ten inclusive).
Those chapters explicate the corporative theory of, or corporative perspective on, the modern
business corporation, which is further explicated in the first part of the conclusion of the work.
The second part of the conclusion of the work asks the question: why now? Why is there a need
for a holistic economic/social/political/legal theory of the corporation which better recognizes its
role in the modern world in creating value which is beneficial in economic/social/political terms?
Challenges abound at the present time, both to capitalism, and to the modern business corporation
as the primary vehicle of present-day productive activity.211 Responses to these challenges have
been undertaken by a multitude of groups involved in various economic/social/political, academic,
and other educational and institutional activities many of which have proceeded by more closely
examining how corporations create surplus value by employing various resources, and how they
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report surplus value so created, as well as the resources used in such creation, to organizational
participants and others.212
It is demonstrated there that these initiatives share significant affinities with the corporative
perspective on, or theory of, the modern business corporation.213 In addition to contributing to the
standard of living and the well-being of individuals, groups, societies and polities, the modern
business corporation presents opportunities to improve their intellectual, moral, and psychological
well-being, including contributing to their search for approbation, affiliation, and meaning.214 The
corporative corporation, understood as involving the interaction of both legal elements and
organizational elements, is expected to present new opportunities in this regard. Some of these are
delineated in the present text; others await subsequent development. With that, we start.
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PART 1 – WHAT IS?
CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES TODAY
CHAPTER ONE – CORPORATE ESSENTIALISM
PART A –THE CORPORATION IN LAW AND IN DISCOURSE
As indicated above, this work proceeds from a descriptivist perspective. Rather than proceeding
from a purely hypothetical or theoretical perspective and generating and then seeking to apply a
theory of the corporation and of corporate governance, it proceeds by attempting to describe the
corporation “in the real world” and seeking to generate a theory that is or may be empirically
verifiable.
This procedure differs from others in which, as David Millon says, legal theories of the corporation
assert “what corporations are”, normative implications are derived from such theories, and the
theory of the corporation advanced provides “a standard for evaluating actual or proposed legal
rules”1, and even proposed approaches to regulation, as Horwitz suggests.2 Millon argued that
those assertions are based “in large part on perceptions of what corporations look like”,3 that is to
say, they are based largely on what the theorist in question sees when confronting the idea of the
corporation. Consequently, it can be argued that much legal theory of the corporation seeks to
explain these perceptions, which reflect, in turn, the beliefs of the theorist.
Proceeding, instead, firstly, from a description of those attributes which are generally agreed to be
characteristic of the corporation; and, secondly, from descriptions of the characteristics and
behaviour of what are generally agreed to possess those generally agreed defining attributes;
allows the corporate theorist to attempt to minimize the influence of legal theory, legal doctrine,
and normative assessments of the corporation in occluding the perceptions of the theorist of the
corporation itself, or, to clarify further, perceptions of that which is generally agreed to conform
to these essential or paradigmatic characteristics, and, hence, to be a corporation.
Those attributes, denominated here as “legal essentialist attributes”, are a product of positive or
declarative law,4 as examined, summarily, in this chapter and, in greater detail (so as not to burden
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higher level discussion of these attributes), in Appendix A of the book. It is readily conceded that
it is not likely to be possible to exclude all such occlusive extraneous influences from such
perceptions; however, it is hoped that the effort to do so will fasten attention on the essential
characteristics, and on the essential legal characteristics, of the corporation. In the result, the
attributes identified here as “legal essentialist attributes are demonstrated in this chapter and in
Appendix A, to be instantiated in modern business corporation law statutes.
Corporate Essentialism and Corporate Essentialist Discourse
Attempting to describe the corporation “in the real world” from a legal perspective is both complex
and somewhat problematic. As noted, this book responds to this challenge by, firstly, seeking to
identify those essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or paradigmatic, attributes of the
corporation which are or may be said to be essentially legal in nature, and characteristics emanating
from or relating to the same; and, secondly, by seeking to describe the discourse surrounding those
essential attributes of the corporation which are or may be said to be essentially legal in nature,
and characteristics emanating from or relating to the same.
The first task relates to the determination of what is here denominated as “corporate essentialism”,
and, more particularly, as “corporate legal essentialism” or “corporate essentialism in law”; while
the second relates to what is here identified as “the discourse of corporate essentialism” or
“corporate essentialist discourse”. Each task concerns the examination of data from “the real
world”, albeit the “real world” of law applicable to, and distinctive of, the corporation, in the case
of the first task; and the “real world” of discourse, in the case of the second task. These tasks are
undertaken in Part 1 and Appendix A, in relation to the “real world” of corporate law, and in Part
2 and Appendix B of this book, in relation to the “real world” of discourse, respectively.
Specifically, this chapter summarizes, and Appendix A details, how the legal essentialist attributes
of the corporation are instantiated in declarative law. Chapters Two and Three then describe how
the corporation takes action in the real world, from the perspective of economy theory, and
otherwise (as described by business historians and others), while Appendix B reviews corporate
discourse underlying how such action is taken, and investigates the assumptions and
generalizations, from economic and other fields, which appear to underlie such discourse.
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Corporate Essentialism in Law or Corporate Legal Essentialism
Attributes that are conferred, or recognized, explicitly or implicitly, by law would seem to qualify
as attributes which are “essentially legal in nature”. This would include attributes which are the
subject of specific statutory enactment, as well as others which are the subject of express or implied
rules, practices, and processes of common, or non-statutory, law, “law” where used here in being
generally limited to, man-made law. Consequently, “essential legal attributes of the corporation”
or “essential attributes of the corporation in law”, conferred or recognized in the manner just
described, are those regarded as essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or paradigmatic
attributes that are unique, either individually, or collectively, or both, to the corporation.
Expressed differently, each of the corporation and, most particularly, the modern business
corporation would not be what it is today without those legal characteristics or attributes; nor
would it be what it is today in law, or as a matter of law, without those legal characteristics or
attributes; however, such characteristics or attributes are not found identically and in their totality
in some other form of business organization or in some other business entity. Such characteristics
or attributes “identify” the entity possessing them as a corporation and as a modern business
corporation. They may be described as “corporate essentialist attributes” or corporate legal
essentialist attributes”.
In respect of these characteristics or attributes, this work will proceed, firstly, by identifying what
are generally agreed to be the essentialist characteristics of the modern business corporation, which
are distinctive to it; secondly, by demonstrating their presence, interrelationships and other aspects
of their operations in certain significant statutes providing for the establishment of modern
business corporations in certain significant legal jurisdictions; and, thirdly, by relating such
“corporate essentialism” to “the discourse of corporate essentialism” or “corporate essentialist
discourse”.
Investigating Corporate Essentialism and Corporate Essentialist Discourse
The data involved in the investigation of corporate essentialism differs, in kind, from the data
involved in investigating the discourse of corporate essentialism. The first involves data which are
characteristically “legal” in nature, including statutes, and rules, procedures and processes of
corporate law, common law, and otherwise. For the purposes of this book, data of this nature will
be considered to express “positive law” or “declarative law” in the sense of man-made law duly
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enacted by or pursuant to the authority of a political body having authority to make such law. This
book will assume that courts and regulatory bodies constituted by the polity act pursuant to, and
in accordance with, the authority of the relevant body of the political authority.
This use of the term “positive law” is not intended to adopt any theory about positive law as
opposed to natural law, such as advocated by Thomas Aquinas and others, or about “legal
positivism” as adopted by Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and John Austin, and in later
iterations by Herbert Hart, and Joseph Raz, and others. Consequently, it may be advantageous to
use the alternative term suggested, “declarative law”, as expressing the concept of “law declared
by competent and recognized promulgators or declarants”. Accordingly, to avoid confusion with
legal positivism and otherwise, this work will generally employ the phrase “declarative law”,
rather than “positive law”.
The second investigation, that relating to what is here called “the discourse of corporate
essentialism” or “corporate essentialist discourse” involves data which consist of, are based in, or
otherwise relate to, discourse concerning the essence of the corporation. Discourse concerning the
essence of the firm, which is here called “the discourse of firm essentialism” or “firm essentialist
discourse”, involves data which consist of, are based in, or otherwise relate to, discourse
concerning the essence of the firm, the “firm” being a construct largely derived from economics.
Thus, it is apparent that not all of this latter discourse is necessarily, or even primarily, or perhaps
even significantly, “legal” in its nature. Indeed, this work will argue that much of corporate
essentialist discourse is not principally, or perhaps even, significantly, “legal” in its nature; instead,
it and other related discourse may be said to emanate from, and be characterized by assumptions
and processes of, other disciplines, principally that of economics. However, such discourse may
affect discussion of corporate essentialism, in terms of legislation, administrative rules and
policies, case law, and corporate essentialist and corporate legal essentialist discourse.
“Legal” versus “Non-Legal” Corporate Essentialism and Corporate Essentialist Discourse
To the extent that “the firm” is operationalized in legal fields, rather than economic or other fields,
it may be considered as including, in addition to corporations, other business entities, such as
partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, business trusts, and others.
Accordingly, “the firm” when used in legal discourse, may be considered to embrace business
entities which are recognized as having various attributes as a matter of law, but as all pursuing
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some business, profit, or other economic objectives. The “firm” in law, or “the legal firm”, that is
to say the firm considered, defined, and operationalized, in each case, exclusively from a legal
perspective, has “legal” attributes, arising from declarative law (as such term is used herein)
appropriate to the legal classification specified.
Corporate essentialist discourse and other discourse relating to theorizing of, and about, the
corporation may thus involve assumptions, terms, methods, procedures, and processes that are not
distinctively “legal”, but may involve firm essentialist discourse, which may proceed from other
disciplines, such as economics. Accordingly, our examinations of such discourse cannot be limited
solely to discourse which is “legal” in its nature. Differently expressed, neither corporate
essentialist discourse nor firm essentialist discourse are exclusively “legal” in orientation.
By commencing its account with the “legal” characteristics of the corporation, this book seeks,
among other things, to identify what may be considered to be, when properly considered, “legal”
corporate essentialist discourse, as distinguished from “non-legal” corporate essentialist discourse.
Effecting such distinction involves separating firm essentialist discourse emanating from legal
fields from that emanating from non-legal fields, much of which is unvariegated firm essentialist
discourse.
It is immediately obvious, of course, that the intrusion of non-legal discourse into corporate
essentialist discourse of the legal nature (or, as called, here, corporate legal essentialist discourse),
may thereby introduce assumptions, terms, methods, procedures, and processes characteristic of
those non-legal fields. Simply put, each of those fields may have its own distinctive vocabulary
and grammar. The lexicon and rules of linguistic usage of a field may be well known to its
participants but less well known to participants in other fields. For example, the vocabulary and
grammar of economics, or, more particularly, of classical or neoclassical economic theory, may
be shared among participants in such field, and, as a result, may be susceptible of precise usage in
that field; however, this may not be the case when such “economic” vocabulary and grammar is
employed in another discipline or field, such as that of the law.
This is not, of course, to argue that interdisciplinary discourse should be minimized or ignored;
instead, this book argues quite the opposite perspective. This book’s deconstruction of the
assumptions underlying non-legal corporate essentialist discourse, which are principally
economic, and underlie non-legal firm essentialist discourse, which is largely or significantly
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economic, involves criticism from, and consideration of, discourse from other disciplines and
fields, including their own homogeneous or other assumptions. It is argued that the differences in
lexicon and linguistic usage of heterogeneous academic disciplines or fields should be constantly
and acutely kept in view.
Borrowing the example of linguistics once more, this work maintains that fulsome translations
from one language to another, which may be effected by users of both, benefit from a complete
understanding of the relationship among vocabulary, grammar, and other linguistic subject areas,
and not only with respect to the particular languages at hand, but with respect to languages
generally. In the case of linguistics, of course, much more than vocabulary and grammar are
involved, including phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and
historical (or diachronic) linguistics. For purposes of simplicity, however, the references to
linguistics here are abbreviated here as vocabulary or lexicon, on the one hand, and grammar or
linguistic usage, on the other, but should be understood to include the other subject-matters of
linguistics as well.
It may be expected that similar methodologies may be relevant to a study of the language of the
law, as compared with the language of economics, for example. Legal theorists, academics,
commentators, and practitioners, among others, who seek to apply arguments from other
disciplines, such as economics, must maintain awareness of the “language” differences from one
discipline to another, although arguably not at the level of detail applied in the study of linguistics
as a discipline.
This can be particularized as follows. One of the most important such matters, certainly in relation
to the modern business corporation, is awareness of the assumptions underlying economic theory,
whether classical, neoclassical, or otherwise. For example, a theory of the firm, in economics, may
involve

significant

unarticulated

assumptions

and

other

background

considerations.

Conceptualizing that theory of the firm as, or transforming it into, a legal theory of the corporation
engages assumptions and background considerations that are different as between the two
disciplines. Yet the discourse relating to the economic theory of the firm and the legal theory of
the corporation or, as it is expressed in this work, the (non-legal, or undifferentiated) firm
essentialist discourse from the (specifically) legal corporate essentialist discourse, is often not
sensitive to these differences of vocabulary and grammar. Among other things, this book
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investigates some of these differences. In order not to bring the main text, this investigation is
undertaken primarily in Appendix B.
Many, if not most, of the modern theories of the firm and, to the extent that they exist separately,
modern theories of the corporation, rely significantly upon assumptions that derive from
economics. These include nexus of contracts theory, team production theory, and others. Instead
of explicating separately the modern theories of the firm and of the corporation, and then
identifying, evaluating, and criticizing the assumptions of each, in order to demonstrate the
incompleteness, inadequacies, or fallaciousness of each such theory, an undertaking which would
be of enormous proportions and far beyond the scope of the present work, this work will present
for discussion the assumptions which seem, from a review and analysis of such discourse, to
underlie most modern theories of the firm and of the corporation, and hence which feature
importantly in modern corporate essentialist discourse.
It must be conceded that it would be impossible to review of all items within such body of
discourse, to summarize them cogently into an accessible document, and to incorporate items
within such body of discourse into a viable theory of corporate law. Moreover, for present
purposes, it would be unnecessary. The point of our discussion of the “common” assumptions of
firm essentialist discourse or of non-legal corporate essentialist discourse is not to prove that they
are “common” but, instead, to attempt to prove that various assumptions which many, perhaps
even most, participants would acknowledge are made in such discourse, whether invariably
(doubtful), frequently, or, more simply, often, are problematic, incomplete, inadequate, or
fallacious. In order not to burden the book’s theoretical exposition, this is effected in Appendix B.
Corporate Legal Essentialism to Corporate Legal Essentialist Discourse, to Legal Theorizing
The process by which this work proceeds is to identify attributes that are generally considered to
be essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or paradigmatic attributes of the corporation.
Objection may be taken as to whether the attributes described in this work are accurately identified
and described as such. However, reviews of academic, practitioner, and judicial writings on
corporate law and corporate legal theory too exhaustive to chronicle here seem to be in general
agreement as to the same. This is the task of describing what a corporation is, or the question: what
is that which we refer to as a corporation? It has already been acknowledged in this work that the
lack of empirical rigour which attends such a manner of proceeding must be conceded. However,
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it is also acknowledged that certain basic assumptions or generalizations attend any empirical, or
even theoretical, investigation, which purports to attain any level of utility whatsoever.
Accordingly, the present work asks, empirically and, insofar as is possible, non-normatively, what
a corporation is, and what it can do, as a matter of what is considered here to be declarative law,
that is to say, actual law as presently applied in real circumstances currently obtaining. Providing
some preliminary answer to this question involves examining how the attributes identified here as
those that are essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or paradigmatic with respect to the
corporation are instantiated in the corporate statutory law, and in other declarative law, of
jurisdictions whose corporate law has real factual significance.
This chapter and, in more detail, Appendix A of this book examine how central management is
instantiated and how separation of management from ownership is instantiated in leading corporate
statutes. They establish that the existence of central management, especially when considered in
connection with its separation from ownership, has a myriad of consequences with respect to the
other key attributes of the corporation. This chapter, together with Appendix A, establishes that
the assignment of central management authority to the board of directors (subject to certain
exceptions not usually relevant to publicly traded corporations) is not only accompanied by the
rights and powers of equity owners, shareholders, to approve fundamental changes in the
corporation, but also by rights and powers to question, oppose, or seek variations in, the manner
of exercise of such management prerogatives; and, sometimes, to exercise rights to transfer equity
ownership to the corporation in certain circumstances in which the equity owner disagrees with
the manner of exercise by the board of its rights and prerogatives.
Such rights and prerogatives, whether exercised by the board of directors alone or exercised by it
through officers of the corporation, often collectively referred to as “management”, are often
referred to as “management” rights. Such rights are extensive, however, they are not unlimited;
but, instead, are constrained by shareholder rights as aforesaid. The rights of the board with respect
to the structure, processes, and personnel by which the corporation is managed are shown to be
very extensive. The statutory limitations placed on the board’s rights of management as to these
matters, other than with respect to shareholder reporting and public disclosure, are chiefly those
relating to the board’s duties of loyalty, care and compliance, as chronicled in this chapter.
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Certain statutory provisions relating to management deal with officers, but, for the most part, the
declaratory law affecting other levels of management as a matter of corporate law proceeds from
common law, especially the law of agency. This chapter and Appendix A demonstrate some of the
ways in which such common law rights and obligations affect the duties and responsibilities of the
board of directors and the operation of the corporation as a single legal entity. They also
demonstrate how internal agency relationships within the corporation can affect such matters.
Part 2 of this book, together, in order not to burden the main text, with Appendix B, then seeks to
juxtapose that observed reality of the firm and the corporation with discourse concerning the nature
of the firm and of the corporation, as a matter of law and otherwise, as such discourse emanates
from, or is grounded upon, basic or fundamental assumptions common to current theories of the
firm and of the corporation. It then seeks to propose variations to such discourse and assumptions
which might be more consistent with, firstly, what the corporation has been found empirically to
be, as a matter of positive law or declarative law, and, secondly, the implications of such variations
for its operation and governance, which are further examined in Part 3 of the book. Some of this
corporate essentialist discourse or firm essentialist discourse emanates from, and involves,
assumptions pertaining to disciplines or fields outside law, and outside economics, or, at least,
outside classical or neoclassical economics, which are also discussed in the present work.
This book will then proceed to apply the results of that inquiry to fashioning or attempting to
fashion a new hypothesis or theory of the corporation, denominated here as the “corporative’
theory or as the “corporative” perspective. Consequently, this work is less concerned with
establishing conclusively that the assumptions discussed here are invariable and omnipresent in
discourse than with attempting to prove that, to the extent they are common to various theories of
the firm and to various theories of the corporation, economic or otherwise, and are, accordingly,
reflected in discourse concerning such theories, those assumptions lack explanatory power and
predictive capacity; thereby providing a space or place for consideration and evaluation of
corporative theory and practice.
Thus, this work seeks to generate a corporate essentialist discourse that conforms to what the
corporation is “in the real world”, and which is characteristically “legal” in nature. This process
leads the present work to seek and, ultimately, to unfold, a new theory or perspective that qualifies
as “legal” as so described.
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While the case may, of course, be otherwise, the present author is not aware of any other work
concerning the legal theory of the modern business corporation (or, for that matter, the legal theory
of the firm, or of some other legal artifact) which proceeds in the same manner as does the present
book. In fact, many such works proceed by generating a theory of the corporation and then
applying it as a normative guide to what modern corporate law should be and should do. The
present work proceeds in the reverse direction.
Task and Scope of This Chapter
This chapter attempts to identify, summarily, certain conventional assumptions that have been, or
appear to have been, made in corporate essentialist discourse about the modern business
corporation, its roles and functions, and its relationship to a given society and polity. These are
discussed in greater detail in Appendix B. It then proceeds to review the statutory law applicable
to business corporations in an effort, among other things, to determine if and to what extent this
and other assumptions are embodied in the statutory framework applicable to corporations. This
review of statutory law continues in greater detail in Appendix A. In accordance with these
objectives, this review of statutory law does not attempt to be an exhaustive statement of the
declarative corporate law applicable in those instances. Instead, it ignores aspects of such law that
do not instantiate corporate essentialist attributes. How statutory law instantiates the same is the
principal subject of interest and commentary in this chapter and in Appendix A.
The principal assumption identified in this regard is the assumption that the corporation acts in the
economy as a single economic actor. In connection with the single economic actor assumption,
this chapter and Chapter A1 explore the statutory corporate and related common, principally
agency, law frameworks underlying lawful action by and on behalf of such corporations.
The present book does not deal with corporations that are not “business” corporations, including
not-for-profit corporations, and corporations with mixed business and other objectives, which are
sometimes called “hybrid” corporations or “benefit corporations”. Although such other
corporations may also be usefully analyzed as organizations, they are beyond our present scope.
For the purpose of this work, we have limited our discussion to corporate law in Canada and the
United States, and it is this to which we refer as “Anglo-American law” and to “Anglo-American
corporate law” when discussing such corporate law generally. In a work that concerns itself with
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corporate legal theory as approached from a descriptivist perspective, references to statutes and
common law cannot hope or attempt to be exhaustive.
Instead, such references will often be generic. The principal reasons for this are threefold: firstly,
to do otherwise would engage discussion of levels of detail which are not sufficiently relevant to
our scope and purpose that they should detain us or distract us from the principal matters under
consideration; secondly, detailed examinations of such statutes abound; and, thirdly, while a
detailed examination of such statutes in the light of the arguments in this work might be useful,
this would unduly lengthen the work and can await later exposition.
Detailed references to securities law have been determined to exceed the scope of this work, largely
for similar reasons. References to securities law will normally be generic and by way of general
remarks only. Furthermore, this approach is taken, in part, because in the case of Canada, there is
presently no federal securities law, as a result of which securities law is the purview of thirteen
separate provincial or territorial legislatures, as modified by agreement among the administrators
of such statutes; and in the case of the United States, because of the complexity of the federal
securities law, principally in the Securities Act of 1933,5 which regulates the primary market, and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 which regulates the secondary market; which complexity is
further compounded by “blue sky” or state securities laws in force in the various states; and, in
each of these cases, because of the complexity of the case law.
Where this work does address the detail or text of specific corporate statutes in Canada and in the
United States, these are limited to those discussed in this paragraph. Canada has a federal corporate
statute and each of the provinces and territories have corporate statutes. In the United States, each
state has a corporate statute, but there is no federal corporate law as such. The principal corporate
legislation to which we will refer includes the Canada Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”)7 and
the Ontario Business Corporations Act (“OBCA”)8 in Canada, and the Delaware General
Corporation Act, also known as the Delaware General Corporation Law or the Delaware Code

5

15 USC § 77a et seq.
15 USC § 78a et seq.
7
Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA].
8
Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16 [OBCA].
6
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“DGCL”),9, and the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”)10 in the United States. These
statutes will be those to which we refer when we refer to Anglo-American corporate statutes and
to Anglo-American corporate law or to corporate law without other specification.
The first two are the corporation statutes applicable to many, if not most, of the largest
corporations, and the listed and publicly traded corporations, in Canada. Both statutes were
originally significantly influenced by the company law statutes of the United Kingdom and by the
corporation law of the state of New York. The DGCL governs the largest number of listed and
publicly traded corporations incorporated in the United States. It differs from the other statutes
considered in this regard insofar as its purview is not limited to business corporations The MBCA
was, and continues to be, the model for the corporate law statutes in force in a majority of the
remaining states.
While this initial presentation may seem overly simplistic and lacking in its identification of the
numerous further assumptions and conditionalities that underlie its summary outline, this is
intended to be remedied in later discussions. It is considered, however, for the present purpose that
even an unrefined and tentative outline may be of assistance in providing a framework for further
discussion.
Conclusions on Corporate “Legal” Essentialism, Theoria, and Praxis
This chapter argues that the essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or paradigmatic,
attributes of the corporation which are or may be said to be essentially legal in nature are
interrelated. That is to say, each of these attributes bears some relationship to each of the others.

9

Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del Code, c 1, § 101 [DGCL]. In his extensively cited article discussing
managerial and shareholder power, Lucian Bebchuk discusses only the DGCL and the MBCA, for the same reasons:
See Lucien Arye Bebchuk, “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power” (2005) 118:2 Harv L Rev 833 at 844. The
Delaware corporate statute is variously referred to simply as the "Delaware Code", of which it is Title 8, for that
reason, although this may be considered misleading inasmuch as, strictly speaking, it refers to the whole Code and not
just the specific provision concerning corporations and general corporations; and the Delaware General Corporation
Law, for the heading used in Chapter 1 of Title 8 of the Code, for that reason, although it is nowhere in the statute
referred to as the Delaware General Corporation Law; or the Delaware General Corporation Act. However, this
abbreviation avoids the complications aforesaid and is commonly used, apparently because such nomenclature accords
with that of other state corporation statutes. The relevant provision appears to be most frequently abbreviated as the
"DGCL", which, for that reason, is the one used in the present work.
10
American Bar Association, Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 4th ed, (Chicago: American Bar
Association, 2008) [MBCA]. A useful discussion of the history, development, interrelationship, and comparison of
the DGCL and the MBCA appears in Jeffrey Gorris, Lawrence A Hamermesh & Leo E Strine, Jr, “Delaware Corporate
Law and the Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis” (2011) 74:1 Law & Contemp Probs 107.
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For example, the free transferability of equity interests is accommodated by limited liability and
asset partitioning, as well as by the existence of central management separated from ownership.
Again, the separation of central management from ownership is facilitated by limited liability and
asset partitioning. The attribute which is characterized by the lowest order of interrelationships
and hence by less centrality of, and to, those interrelationships, namely, the possibly indefinite
duration of the corporation, is perhaps the one that developed latest historically, as well as the one
that, according to some commentators, might most readily be eliminated in some circumstances in
corporations existing “in the real world”. However, it also has considerable significance.
Our review of the important statutes discussed in this work will establish that the attributes of the
corporation which are generally considered to be essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or
paradigmatic are, in fact, provided for in the statutes, at least as a default mechanism, if not more
generally. Accordingly, corporate legal essentialism will be proven to obtain as a matter of fact.
This review will also demonstrate that some of these corporate legal essentialist attributes receive
a high degree of attention, while others receive very little attention, in the statutes. The centrality
of management and its separation from equity ownership is obviously extremely important in the
statutes, however, both aspects of that attribute are accorded little direct, but vast indirect, statutory
attention. Providing the board of directors with the power to manage or supervise the management
of the business and affairs of the corporation, or like expression, establishes both the centrality of
management authority and its divorcement from equity ownership per se. The fundamental
relationship between central management, which is given to the board of directors, and “equity
ownership”, in the form of shares in the capital of the corporation held by its “shareholders”,
involves the selection of the highest authority of central management, the board of directors, by
shareholders.
This review will demonstrate the plenary nature of the management powers assigned to the board
of directors; albeit subject to significant commensurate duties; and always subject to certain
powers of the shareholders, including the powers: to elect and remove directors; to approve, or
disapprove, or vary the terms of, certain fundamental transactions; and, in the case of some such
transactions, to force the corporation to “buy them out” of their equity positions at fair value.
Based on our review, corporate legal essentialism does not specifically embrace or expressly adopt
either managerial primacy or shareholder primacy as such terms are usually understood as
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privileging one group vis-à-vis the other in terms of power with respect to the corporation. Instead,
it assigns different rights and duties to the board of directors and others to the shareholders.
However, the assignment of plenary management rights and duties to the board of directors,
subject to certain shareholder rights and (a limited number of) duties does invest the board, often
referred to as “management”, with plenary authority in relation to the ongoing management of the
corporation. This is consistent with “central management” and with the separation of the
management authority and activities from those of the equity owners, those being shareholders,
who, in the case of the public corporation, change from time to time.
One can imagine the difficulties that would attend a system in which the authority of the board of
directors automatically ceased once a certain threshold of equity ownership, say a simple majority
of the shares, changed hands. Without some kind of default rule, there would be a lacuna in
management authority; and the specification of a default rule which might operate in such a case
appears problematic. Moreover, such a rule might cause the membership of the board of directors
to change in situations in which this was not desired by the majority of the shareholders. For
example, all of the “public float” amounting to a majority of the shares might change ownership
gradually over time, but the corporation may be controlled, de facto, by a shareholder whose
shareholdings remained unchanged. In that case, the controlling shareholder might have the
greatest influence in the election of the directors, and might not wish to see any change in the board
at all.
In effect, the division of authority between the board and shareholders may be considered as an
artifact of corporate legal essentialism. If such assignment of management authority to the board
of directors is considered by some to give management “primacy” in relation to its management
and operations, this is simply a consequence or artifact of the essential legal characteristics of the
corporation, or of legal essentialism in relation to the corporation, or of corporate legal
essentialism.
The present chapter and Appendix A to the book summarize some of the manners in which the
essential characteristics of the corporation, as a matter of law, are concretized in corporate statutes
and, to some extent, in the common law of agency as it appears in, and is applied to, the corporation
and its organization. Parts 2 and 3 of, and Appendix B to, the book, will describe how corporate
essentialist discourse, and particularly, corporate legal essentialist discourse, may be implicated in
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the common law, including agency law, and in other legal areas, such as securities and other
regulatory law and policy.
In pursuance of its management rights and duties, the board may, and in some cases is required to,
appoint committees or sub-committees to perform certain delegate duties and responsibilities, and
may also appoint officers. Generally speaking, however, the statutes do not otherwise deal to any
significant degree with the structure and processes by which the corporation is organized and
operated.
As in other respects, as regards its structure and processes, the corporation, generally acting by
and through the board of directors (and in some exceptional cases by the stockholders in the
American statutes), is empowered to adopt structures and processes considered appropriate in that
regard. Consequently, it may be said that the structure and processes by which the corporation is
organized are affected by corporate statutes only at the very highest level, principally concerning
directors and officers and, in certain cases, shareholders, primarily in situations relating to
management of the corporation by the directors and by its officers.
While statute law operates, in effect, only at the highest organizational levels of the corporation,
common law, notably agency law, applies more generally. Indeed, some of the duties and
responsibilities imposed on directors and officers by statute are similar to, and seem to derive from,
the common law of agency. This is demonstrated here and in Appendix A, Chapters A1 to A3.
Those chapters also demonstrate some of the complexities arising from manifold agency
relationships within the corporation and the structure, processes, and personnel of its internal
organization.
The focus of this chapter and Appendix A is on the corporation as a matter of law today. For that
reason, the principal texts discussed in this part are those of the statutes concerned. In order not to
burden the focus on the statutory instantiation of corporate legal essentialism, references to
secondary sources, and, in particular, case law, have been minimized.
PART B – ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE CORPORATION
The question discussed in this section is what assumptions are conventionally made about the
corporation in corporate essentialist discourse, in firm essentialist discourse, and, more generally,
in discourse concerning the corporation and the firm. This question can be explicated in several
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dimensions. The present chapter will introduce these assumptions, without supporting them in the
first instance, with respect to either their existence or their validity as such assumptions, in order
that their relationship to the corporate law statutes constituting and governing the modern business
corporation may be considered while the statutes themselves are investigated. These assumptions
will be explicated and examined further in the chapters following and in Appendix B.
The Economy, and Society, the Polity, and the State
The first principal assumption involves the separation of economic roles and functions from other
functions in a society or polity. That is to say, it is assumed that the production of goods and
services for present or future consumption is intrinsically distinct from other aspects of the social
and political life of a given society or polity, although it may be conceded that the economy has
some relationship to its social and political environs.
A second related assumption is that the economy engages, overlaps with, or is part of, the “private”
sphere. That is not to say that there may not be other spheres of action which are also part of the
“private” sphere, but, instead, may be considered to assert that the economy is fundamentally
“private” in nature. For the present, this can be understood as connoting that it is not so intrinsically
related to that society or polity that it can be regarded as “public” in nature.
It is assumed, further, that in this private sphere, parties interact with considerable freedom, largely
by way of contract in the case of economic matters. Such contracts are essentially private in nature,
relating to matters between the parties, and are essentially unaffected by public interests. It is
considered that as long as the parties have contractual capacity, and contract freely, and meet other
standards stipulated as necessary for contractual probity and efficacy, the arrangements that the
parties devise, by means of contracts or otherwise, should be given full effect within their limits
to accomplish the purposes sought.
This leads directly to the third principal assumption, which is that the private sphere is, and must
be, somehow separate and distinct from the public sphere. Matters of public interest include the
constitution of the political entity or state, and any subdivisions, the manner of its exercise of
authority, and any limitations on it, elections, regulation of crime, and protection of certain human,
political or social rights, including economic rights, welfare rights, and the authorization and
exercise of distributive or redistributive functions, such as taxation and provision of public goods
and services. It is conventionally assumed in classical liberal law and political economy that the
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economy does not engage those matters sufficiently directly to be considered otherwise than as
part of the private sphere. This, in turn, leads to a fourth assumption, namely, that the economy, as
such, can be analyzed in a manner which is distinctive to it, and to the private sphere generally. A
fifth assumption is that the economy, while related to the ambient society and polity, is distinct
from, and its operation is intrinsically independent of, the instant society and polity.
In order not to burden the main text, all of these assumptions are discussed in greater detail in
Appendix B to this work.
The Corporation as an Economic Actor
These assumptions about the economy, the society, and the polity are accompanied by, and are the
foundation for, assumptions about the corporation as an economic actor; that is, as an agent taking
action within a sphere denominated as the economic sphere. These assumptions about the
corporation as economic actor will be identified here, but are explicated and examined further in
the chapters following, especially in Chapters Two and Three, and in Appendix B.
It is assumed, firstly, that the principal actor in the economy, which is usually denominated in
classical liberal economics as “the firm”, acts in the economy as a single actor. In effect, it acts as
an independent entity vis-à-vis other economic actors, each of whom also acts as an independent
entity. This book maintains that such reification or entification of “the firm” or the “corporation”
occludes or “invisibilizes” the organization within the firm or the corporation which institutes and
animates the firm or corporation as an actor vis-à-vis other actors “in the real world”.
Secondly, it is assumed that the firm’s actions are primarily, if not exclusively, in the economic
sphere. It interacts with other participants in the economy, which are primarily, if not exclusively,
other firms.
Thirdly, it is assumed that that the firm’s actions are primarily, if not exclusively, in the private
sphere, which includes, but is not limited to, the economy. It interacts with other participants in
the private sphere, which are primarily, although not exclusively, other firms.
Fourthly, it is assumed that the firm’s actions should be confined, primarily, if not exclusively, to
the economic and to the private spheres.

98
Fifthly, it is assumed that firms pursue only their private economic interests; and that when firms
operate in other spheres, such as the public sphere, they do so only in furtherance of their economic
activities.
These assumptions are discussed in greater detail in Part 2 of, and Appendix B to, this work. These
assumptions, in turn, provide a foundation for the economic model of the firm, which is outlined
in the immediately following section and in Chapters B4 and B5 of Appendix B.
The Economic Model of the Firm
The economic actor, the firm, is modelled in traditional classical economics, politics and theory as
a single entrepreneur who determines to undertake some economic activity, invests capital in
certain means of production or stock in trade, and may hire employees to work for him. This model
will be explicated, for purposes of emphasis, in a number of short paragraphs under the present
heading.
The simplest firm comprises only the entrepreneur. In a more complex undertaking in which a
number of employees are engaged, the entrepreneur may manage the operation personally or may
engage a manager to do so. In such more complex undertaking, the firm is comprised of the
entrepreneur or owner (of the firm), the manager (of the firm), and the employees (of the firm).
The operations of the firm generate revenues. These revenues, after deduction of costs of factor
inputs, such as costs of raw materials, wages of employees, shipping costs, etc., generate profits
(or incur losses) which belong to (are borne by) the entrepreneur exclusively.
The actions of the firm, the entrepreneur or owner (of the firm), the manager (of the firm), and the
employees (of the firm), respectively, are taken in pursuit of purely economic interests and can be
veridically analyzed in purely economic terms.
An analysis of the firm and of its owner, manager(s) and employees can proceed by measuring its
inputs and outputs.
The economic significance of the firm is characterized by those inputs and outputs.
The firm, as such, is a “black box” with respect to which inputs and outputs can be determined,
but which is otherwise uninteresting.
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To the extent that the process of its economic activity is of interest, it is of interest in terms of the
combinatorial factoring of inputs and outputs, and their consequential determination of the profits
and losses of the firm.
The entire objective of every firm is to generate profits and, by such means and otherwise, to
enhance the wealth of its owner(s) or shareholder(s).
Consequently, it may be said that the entire objective of every corporation is to enhance the wealth
of its owners or shareholders.
This objective of wealth enhancement is intrinsically unlimited, in the sense that the owners of the
firm or corporation who pursue it are unrestrained by any intrinsic limitation or self-limitation.
Thus, this objective may be characterized as “greed”. As noted, such greed is not subject to any
intrinsic or owner-internal limitations.
Consequently, the pursuit of wealth by the firm or corporation and by its owners, or their greed,
can be restrained only externally.
Managers and employees may avail themselves of the opportunities to capture “rents”, which are,
broadly speaking, returns to such party that exceed the economic value of what is provided, and,
in effect, divert to the manager or employee returns that otherwise would represent profits to the
owner (s).
In situations in which the firm takes the form of a corporation, it may have a board of directors
(the “board” or “BOD”) that may include persons other than the entrepreneur or owner. In that
event, the board and its members, individually and collectively, or the members, individually and
collectively, may each seek to appropriate rents. In larger firms, there may be more than one
manager, and even several “layers” of managers interposed between the entrepreneur or owner of
the firm and the non-managerial employees. These managers may be described as the
“management” of the firm. Often, directors are referred to as “managers” irrespective of whether
they are engaged in the actual management of the firm. Similarly, the board and the managers are
often conflated in discourse as “management”.
Consequently, it may be said that the corporation, its board, its members, individually and
collectively, its managers, individually and collectively, and its employees, individually and
collectively, may each seek to appropriate rents.
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This objective of rent seeking is intrinsically unlimited, in the sense that the board, the managers
and the employees of the firm or corporation who pursue it are unrestrained by any intrinsic
limitation or self-limitation. Thus, this objective may be characterized as “greed”. As noted, such
greed is not subject to any intrinsic or internal limitations.
Consequently, it is argued that the pursuit of rent seeking by management and the employees of
the firm or corporation, or their greed, can be restrained only externally. This “agency problem” is
considered to be fundamental in economic analysis of the corporation.
All in all, the pursuit of economic interests and greed by the entrepreneurs or owners of the firm,
its management and its employees, must be restrained externally.
Chapters One to Three, together with Appendix A and Appendix B, will demonstrate that the
economic model of the firm, which is highly subject to contestation, as discussed in Chapters Two
and Three and Appendix B, underlies modern corporate essentialist discourse, and firm essentialist
discourse, but is not adopted to any significant extent in corporate law statutes.
The Roles of Government and Economic Actors
The economic model of the economy and the firm, at least as explicated in classical and
neoclassical economics, also involves certain assumptions concerning the role of government,
which exercises certain authority derived from society and the polity, vis-à-vis the firm and other
economic actors.
One assumption made about the role of government is that there is a public interest in certain, if
not all, aspects of the economy. Classical liberal or political economics assumed that this interest
principally involved ensuring that the market operated fairly and without unduly advantaging or
disadvantaging particular participants.
A related assumption is that since the participants in the economy are economic actors who are
motivated principally, if not exclusively, by economic interests, they would not be expected to
take into account any economic interests of other participants in the economy, or any noneconomic interests, whether their own or those of others, including interests of the public at large.
Consequently, it is assumed that the state, or government, must act to safeguard public interests as
against the economic interests of participants in the economy. Those public interests include, but
are not limited to, economic interests. In particular, the role of the state or government is to protect
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the state, government, and society from private economic interests causing damage to public
interests.
This includes protecting the state, government, and society from and against economic actors, such
as corporations, and other private interests, whose pursuit of their own greed and other economic
interests might otherwise cause such damage. Those economic actors are assumed to be indifferent
to damage to others which may be occasioned while pursuing their own economic interests.
It is assumed that only the state or government can so restrain such greed and private interests.
It is assumed, further, that government knows how to implement such restraint.
Finally, it is assumed that such restraint is a proper objective of government.
These assumptions concerning the role of government with respect to economic actors will be
discussed, incidentally, in connection with the more general assumptions identified under the
immediately preceding heading “The Economic Model of the Firm”.
As previously mentioned, the foregoing assumptions with respect to the corporation as an
economic actor will be considered in greater detail in Chapters Two and Three and Appendix B.
PART C - THE CORPORATION AND CORPORATE ESSENTIALISM IN LAW
The Corporation as an Economic Actor in Law
The economic model of the firm of the corporation discussed above under the heading “The
Corporation as an Economic Actor” engages in a highly significant manner with what is here
described as corporate essentialism and, in particular, corporate legal essentialism. This
engagement is worthy of discussion before proceeding to “unpack” how the essential attributes of
the corporation in law are reflected in the corporate statutes selected for examination here.
For the moment, we leave aside the discussion of whether the corporation, as an economic actor
in law, acts differently from how it acts as an actor in some other capacity. The immediate question,
for consideration, then, is how the corporation acts “in the real world” vis-à-vis other actors in that
world.
This chapter has established that the corporation acts as a single legal entity which possesses
certain essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or paradigmatic attributes. The remainder of
this chapter considers how it is that the corporation can, or how it is enabled to, act, legally, as one
actor vis-à-vis other extraneous legal actors. For example, we may ask how a corporation is
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enabled, as a matter of law, to enter into an amalgamation or merger agreement, and to amalgamate
or merge, with another corporation acting as a separate legal actor. This question, and many others
like it, is answered, for the most part, in the relevant corporate statute or statutes.
In general terms, such corporate statute will ordinarily stipulate the precise acts required for the
corporation to enter into an amalgamation or merger agreement and complete an amalgamation or
merger. In many cases, this requires approval of an amalgamation or merger agreement by the
board of directors, its approval by shareholders, and the completion of other governmental
formalities. Approval of the agreement by the board of directors commits the corporation, subject
to shareholder approval, to amalgamate or merge with the other corporation. Approval of such
agreement by the board and shareholders of each corporation generally enables the amalgamating
or merging corporations to file documents with the relevant corporate authority certification of
which generally makes that amalgamation or merger effective. At that point, the amalgamated or
merged corporation constitutes a new legal actor. This is but one example of the legal acts required
to be taken by a corporation vis-à-vis other external legal actors, as well as internally, in order to
effect a particular legal result.
Consequently, the statutory review undertaken in this chapter and in more detail in Appendix A
indicates how a corporation acts, as a matter of law, with respect to other actors, when undertaking
or engaging in acts or activities intended to create legal rights and obligations. That review
demonstrates how acts of a corporation may be legally instituted by it; and, expressed differently,
what acts may be regarded as the legal acts of the corporation. In effect, the investigation concerns
how the corporation may be said to act as a single legal entity as a matter of law.
Corporate Essentialism
Unfortunately, limitations of time and space forestall inquiry into the historical foundations of the
modern business corporation. Similar limitations affect consideration of various alternative legal
theories of the nature of the corporation. Both of these subjects are mentioned only in passing.
However, consideration of both of these subjects, however interesting and valuable, are not in
accord with the “descriptivist” methodology outlined here.
Instead, in accordance with that methodology, our inquiry will begin with a description of how the
corporation presents itself “in the real world”, which involves an investigation of the treatment
accorded to the corporation as a matter of law. In that regard, the first task to be undertaken is to
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describe the attributes of the corporation as a matter of law. It is generally accepted that the
attributes of the corporation as such, without ranking their respective importance, are as
summarized above and as further described below.
As described above, this inquiry proceeds by identifying characteristics or attributes of the
corporation that are considered, in the corporate essentialist discourse and other discourse
concerning the corporation and the firm, as essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or
paradigmatic. In effect, those corporate essentialist attributes will be presented as a hypothesis,
which will then be tested against the selected leading statutes to determine if and to what extent
such attributes are essential to corporate status within those corporate statutes. This chapter,
together with Appendix A, will investigate these matters. They will also investigate the extent to
which those essentialist attributes are complemented by the application of common law, most
especially agency law, principles.
Essential Attributes of the Corporation in Law
In order to determine whether the subject statutes invest a corporation with the attributes
considered to be essential, characteristic, defining, identifying, or paradigmatic of a corporation as
a matter of law, rather than assuming this to be the case which would be contrary to a more
rigourous empirical methodology, it is necessary to investigate in some detail the attributes
conferred upon incorporation. This will require greater attention to the specific terms of the statutes
in some cases than in others.
1. Separate Legal Entity
The corporation is a separate legal entity (“SLE”), that is to say, a rights-and-duty-bearing entity,
a party or an entity that possesses rights and bears duties. These include the capacities to own
property, to enter into contracts, and to maintain and defend legal actions. Its property is free of
any claims of creditors of the shareholders of the corporation. Its shareholders are not generally
liable, as such, for its obligations, or to its creditors. Its capacity to enter into contracts is, at first
instance (absent some specific statutory or other law), generally unlimited. Limitations on the
powers of a corporation may be contained in the statute providing for incorporation or may be
permitted thereby to be contained in its charter documents.
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1) Rights, Powers, and Privileges in English Law
In his excellent review of the subject, “The Company as a Separate Legal Entity”,11 Murray
Pickering lamented the relative lack of attention by writers on English company law to the topic
of separate legal entity and the nature of corporate personality (except for Professor Gower),12 and
suggested that the formulation of the concept of separate legal entity “only in the most general
terms may have very undesirable consequences”.13 However, “corporations, at an early stage in
the development of English company law, were viewed as having general power similar to those
of natural persons”;14 and any chartered corporation, once created, was considered to have full
powers, and clauses defining its objects were not necessary, but only declaratory in effect.15
Pickering explains that the doctrine of ultra vires, which apparently originated in proceedings
instituted in 1720 by the South Sea Company, limited the powers of statutory companies to those
necessary, either necessary or by implication, to enable them to carry out their expressed objects.16
This doctrine was applied to the powers and limitations of powers of registered companies in their
memoranda of association in Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche.17
Street’s treatise on ultra vires explains that references to a corporation as a “legal person” is by
way of analogy, since “this legal person is wanting in much that belongs to a natural person”, and
such person has been “called into being for certain special purposes” and has “all the powers and
capacities, and only those, which are expressly given to it, or are absolutely requisite for the due
carrying out of those purposes.”18 However, as Pickering notes “English law refuses to impute to
companies those characteristics of natural persons which appertain to their human and social
nature, and which may form the basis of a vast range of individual rights and duties.”19 As stated
by Lord Justice Buckley of the Court of Appeal in Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (G.B.) Ltd. v.
Daimler Co., “the artificial legal person called the corporation has no physical existence. It exists
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only in contemplation of law.” Moreover, “apart from its incorporators, it can have neither
thoughts, wishes, nor intentions, for it has no mind other than the minds of the corporators.”20
According to the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane, a company “has no mind of its own any
more than it has a body of its own.”21 Blackstone commented that, lacking any attributes of mind
or body, a “corporation cannot commit treason, a felony or other crime, in its corporate capacity”.22
It was, of course, established in the leading case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.23 in the House
of Lords that a company is “a different person altogether” from its shareholders;24 that a company
is not in law an agent of, or trustee for, its shareholders by reason only of the shareholder
relationship; and that the mere fact of ownership of all of the outstanding shares of a company
does not entail that the assets and liabilities of a company belong to the shareholder or
shareholders. Instead, if the limited company was a legal entity, then “the business belonged to it
and not to Mr. Salomon”; otherwise it was not a legal entity.25 In circumstances in which the sole
shareholder was also the sole director, sole manager, and sole employee of a company, the Privy
Council recognized that each of these involved a separate relationship between the individual and
the company, with the result that the individual’s widow could, and did, succeed in a claim for
workmen’s compensation under relevant New Zealand legislation.26
Equally well, just as the assets and liabilities of the business belonged to the company, so the
property of its shareholders belonged to those shareholders, and not to the company, which had
“no interest in that property”, with the result that shareholder property was not available to satisfy
the claims of creditors of the limited company.27 Of course, in exceptional circumstances,
Pickering concludes that it may be “established substantively”, that is to say, by clear evidence
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that the company is acting on behalf of the shareholders such that the shareholders have legal or
beneficial interests in property in the possession of the company.28
As a separate legal entity, the question arises how a corporation may, firstly, acquire, hold, and
dispose of property; secondly, enter into contracts; and thirdly, initiate, maintain, and defend legal
actions and other proceedings. As will be discussed in more detail in Part 2 of this book, a
corporation cannot act except through one or more individual human actors. Accordingly, an
important question is what actor or actors are authorized or empowered to act on behalf of the
corporation.
The rule adopted in Foss v. Harbottle29 is “that the company’s members have no capacity to act
themselves, or in the company’s name, on its behalf or for its benefit.” In effect, who may act in
the company’s name, on its behalf or for its benefit must be determined by the statute and charter
documents applicable to the instant corporation. As to such matters, it was established in Royal
British Bank v. Turquand30 that “outsiders dealing with the company may rely on its capacity to
act itself as a party to any transaction within its powers and need not inquire as to either the legal
capacity of its members or the regularity of its internal affairs.”31
Further, as established in Foss v. Harbottle and in Mozley v. Alston,32 “the proper plaintiff in an
action in respect of the wrong alleged to be done to a company or association of persons is prima
facie the company or association… itself.”33 Pickering maintains that “the company and the
company alone must act, and be acted against, to enter into and enforce its rights and obligations.
The rule applies to actions by and against the company and vis-à-vis both outsiders and its own
shareholders. It establishes another facet of the concept that a company has an independent and
separate legal existence.”34
This affirms that outsiders contract with “one independent legal person, the company” and not
with the shareholders collectively; such that “the parties cannot deal with, or institute proceedings
against, the members of the company, qua members, and usually have no need to do so, and
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members cannot act, such against third parties. The rights of both, in or against the company, are
separate from and independent of each other and from the rights of the company itself.”35
In effect, as will be shown in more detail later in this chapter and in Chapter A1, powers relating
to owning property, entering into contracts, and maintaining legal proceedings are part of the
general management authority assigned to the board of directors, which, accordingly, is the “firstorder actor” having what might be described as primary authority to take action on behalf of the
corporation.
Pickering indicates that, subject to limitations of their individual objects clauses and ancillary
powers allowed at common law, “all companies possess identical legal capacity or legal capacity
of the same nature” which “exists entirely separate from and otherwise totally unrelated to the
status of the members, either individually or collectively.”36 He maintains, however, that “both the
Legislature and the courts have found it necessary, or desirable, to make certain exceptions and to
deal with some companies for certain purposes as if they were not entity separate from and
independent of their members.”37
Pickering finds that two principles underlie these exceptions. These include exceptions “to the
principles which delimit the scope of the company’s legal capacity” insofar as its lack of “mind or
body or other physical attributes” entail that it cannot be liable “for any tort which requires actual
fault on the part of the tortfeasor or any crime which requires proof of mens rea, or any act
requiring evidence of, for example, intent.”38
In order to achieve a measure of justice “where acts take place which are clearly within the scope
of the commercial or other proper activities of the company but the nature of the act, and the scale
or effect of damage or other resulting consequences, are such that justice cannot be done unless
the company itself is held responsible”, then “either the necessary elements of such acts or offenses
had to be modified when the defendant was a company, or alternatively the state of mind necessary
to establish liability had to be attributed to the company.”39 This abrogation of separate legal entity
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status is more easily done by a legislature, which can define the type of company affected and can
specify precisely the circumstances invoking such action, than by the courts.
The second principle underlying other exceptions involves deeming the members or shareholders
of the company, for the purposes or purposes in question, “to have some interest in the assets,
rights or obligations of the company”, either by treating the company as the agent or trustee of its
members (shareholders),40 or, in the case of legislation, by resorting to an incident of ownership
of members (shareholders) with respect to the company, namely their “control” of the company41
In the case of powers of control, Pickering asserts that the “types of control and the consequences
of their existence can be precisely defined by the legislature when this method is used” such that
“the law does not lose certainty. Rights or obligations can be created with apply with precision
only to some companies and not to others.”42 He cites examples such as various tax, exchange
control, and enemy control, legislation, in which holding companies and subsidiaries or companies
under common control are grouped together. In those cases, “where the relevant legislative
provisions apply, the company is no longer regarded as a legal entity entirely separate and distinct
from shareholders. Instead for certain stipulated purposes the nature of its membership is taken
into account and the company’s rights and obligations altered in consequence.”43
2) Rights, Powers, and Privileges in Modern Corporation Statutes
Most modern business corporations are created by means of general corporate law statutes that
entitle applicants to establish a corporation upon compliance with prescribed conditions. Once
incorporated pursuant to the corporate statute, the corporation possesses the powers stipulated in
the statute. Most modern corporate statutes take one of two alternative approaches to the conferral
of rights, powers, and privileges on the corporation.
One approach is to grant the legal power and authority to do anything that a natural person could
do, whether or not a corporation could as a factual matter, do or perform the act in question, that
is to say, whether or not the exercise of that power or authority is something that, as a matter of
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fact, only a natural person can do (say, jump). Another approach is to enumerate in the statute the
powers that are thereby granted to the corporation established by its instrumentality.
a) CBCA and OBCA
For example, under the CBCA and the OBCA, the corporation has the rights, powers and privileges
of a natural person.44 However, in both cases, the articles of incorporation may restrict the business
that the corporation may carry on. Thus, a corporation has the legal capacity to engage in any
activities which may be undertaken by a natural person. That does not entail, of course, that the
corporation is a person in the view of the law, or that a corporation has legal personality, or that a
corporation is possessed of legal personhood.
Discussion of those matters will have to await exposition later in this text, however, we will not
engage in discussion of the “legal personality” of the corporation or the corporation’s status as a
“legal person”, which we consider to be modes of expression that signify the corporation’s status
as a rights-and-duty bearing entity. Those expressions complicate discussion of the latter, and
focus attention, instead, on anthropomorphic analogies that may personify and animate the
corporation but, by and large, do so speciously and inaccurately or, at any rate, problematically.
As a corporation which has the rights, powers and privileges of a natural person has no inherent
statutory restrictions on its rights, powers and privileges (other than otherwise effected by law that
is otherwise applicable generally, not merely to corporations), then, unless such restrictions are
specifically contained in its charter documents or other applicable provisions, there can be no
question whether certain activities exceed its legal capacity.
Formerly, where a corporation was incorporated to carry on a certain business, the doctrine of ultra
vires held that it could not carry on another business, and that acts which exceeded the powers of
the corporation were not binding upon the corporation.
Leon Getz, citing Brice on Ultra Vires, indicates that the first prominent mention of the doctrine
in cases of equity was in Colman v. Eastern Counties Rly. Co.,45 in 1846, and, at law, in East
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Anglian Rly. Co. v. Eastern Counties Rly. Co.,46 in 1851.47 Getz indicates that the first application
of the doctrine to a company incorporated under the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844,48 which
established the system of incorporation by registration alone, was the House of Lords decision in
Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche.49
The application of the doctrine was gradually restricted commencing with the decision of the
House of Lords in Attorney-General v. Great Eastern Railway Co.,50 limiting the application of
the doctrine by including in the powers of the corporation “whatever may fairly be regarded as
incidental to or consequential upon the specified objects… unless expressly prohibited”,51 adopted,
as Getz says, by the Supreme Court of Canada in Charlebois v. Delap52 in 1896.53 The doctrine of
ultra vires is no longer operative under the CBCA and the OBCA, and in many other jurisdictions
with modern corporate law.54
Although both Canadian statutes employ the term “business corporation” in their names and
otherwise, neither statute defines that term or the term “business”. Instead, s.4 of the CBCA recites
that its purpose is to revise and reform the law applicable to business corporations incorporated to
carry on business throughout Canada, to advance the cause of uniformity of business corporation
law in Canada and, in effect, to subject certain federal companies incorporated under various acts
of Parliament to a common statute, the CBCA. The CBCA is not expressly stated to apply to
“business corporations” but, instead, applies, by virtue of subsection 3 (1) to “every corporation
incorporated and every body corporate continued as a corporation under this Act that has not been
discontinued under this Act.”
With respect to the term “business and affairs”, which is used in both statutes, section 2 (1) of the
CBCA and section 1 (1) of the OBCA, instead, define the term “affairs” to mean, in effect, “the
relationships among the corporation, its affiliates and the shareholders, directors and officers of
such bodies corporate but does not include the business carried on by such bodies corporate”. The
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term “business” is likewise used, but not defined, in both the DGCL and the MBCA. The latter
defines each of the terms “Corporation”, “domestic corporation” or “domestic business
corporation” in section 1.40 (4) to mean “a corporation for profit, which is not a foreign
corporation, incorporated under or subject to the provisions of this Act.” The term “corporation
for profit”, however, is not defined. The inference, then, is that a “business corporation” is one that
seeks profit.
Jurisdictions which do not grant a corporation the powers of a natural person but, instead,
enumerate the powers it possesses pursuant to the relevant statute usually specifically abrogate the
doctrine of ultra vires in the corporate statute. Some statutes provide for exceptional circumstances
in which that doctrine still applies. However, for the purposes of this work, we will assume that
the doctrine of ultra vires has no application to MBCs or to corporations generally.
However, both Canadian statutes permit the articles to restrict the powers of the corporation. The
CBCA states that: “A corporation shall not carry on any business or exercise any power that it is
restricted by its articles from carrying on or exercising, nor shall the corporation exercise any of
its powers in a manner contrary to its articles.”55 This provision prohibits three things: firstly,
carrying on a proscribed business; secondly, exercising a proscribed power; and thirdly, exercising
any of its powers in a proscribed manner, in each case, where such proscription is effected by way
of its articles. One suspects that the third proscription, which may be quite important, is often
overlooked.
For example, it would seem to allow the drafters of the articles of incorporation to create “bespoke”
or “customized” restrictions on the exercise of power in at least three respects; firstly, generally
(e.g., provided that two-thirds of the directors approve); secondly, with respect to a category of
actions (e.g., in allocating shares); and thirdly, in particular cases (e.g., in allocating shares in
circumstances in which such allocation would create or increase the legal or de facto control over
the corporation by any person). The OBCA also permits the articles to restrict the powers of the
corporation, whether in respect of the business carried on or otherwise. Its provisions are
effectively the same.56
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However, both statutes specifically negative the application of the doctrine of ultra vires where
such restrictions are operative. The CBCA provides that “No act of a corporation, including any
transfer of property to or by a corporation, is invalid by reason only that the act or transfer is
contrary to its articles or this Act.”57 The OBCA provision is substantially identical.58
In modernity, generally, a natural person of appropriate age and capacity is considered to be
capable of possessing certain rights and assuming certain duties. Such natural person is a rightsand-duty bearing entity as a matter of law. In fact, John Dewey, in his magisterial 1926 article
“The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” argues that the word “person” as a
legal conception signifies what the law makes it signify,59 and that its legal meaning is,
accordingly, synonymous with “a right-and-duty-bearing unit”.60 In any event, a natural person is
frequently considered to be the paradigmatic rights-and-duty-bearing unit.
Consequently, the recognition that a party or entity has the legal capacity to engage in any activities
which may be undertaken by a natural person must be considered to constitute recognition of the
entity possessing them as a separate rights-and-duty bearing entity in law and, thus, as a separate
legal entity.
b) DGCL
In respect of the powers of the corporation, the CBCA and OBCA provisions are somewhat more
modern than those of the DGCL. In that statute, the certificate of incorporation is required to set
forth “the nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or promoted”; however, that business
or those purposes may be “to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be
organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware, and by such statement all lawful acts
and activities shall be within the purposes of the corporation, except for express limitations, if
any.”61 Of course, the application of the DGCL is not limited only to corporations which carry on
business.
In effect, there is no invariant statutory limit on the nature of the business of the corporation or the
purposes to be promoted or conducted by it, provided only that this is expressly stated in the
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certificate of incorporation. Absent such statement, the business or purposes of the corporation are
restricted to those stipulated in the certificate of incorporation.
The powers of a Delaware corporation are expressed by listing them, rather than by analogizing
them to the powers of a natural person. Such enumeration was formerly effected in Canadian
federal and provincial statutes, with consequent complications. Section 121 of the DGCL provides
that “[i]n addition to the powers enumerated in S 122 of this title, every corporation, its officers,
directors and stockholders shall possess and may exercise all the powers and privileges granted by
[that statute] or by any other law or by its certificate of incorporation, together with any powers
incidental thereto, so far as such powers and privileges are necessary or convenient to the conduct,
promotion or attainment of the business or purposes set forth in its certificate of incorporation.”62
Such grant of powers and privileges expressly granted by the DGCL, any other law, or by a
certificate of incorporation, and its grant of incidental powers “necessary or convenient conduct,
promotion or attainment” of its declared business and purposes must be considered to approach
those of a natural person, except as limited by its declared business and purposes.
It is interesting that the powers and privileges are granted not only to the corporation, but also to
its officers, directors, and stockholders (called “shareholders” in Canadian law and
otherwise).Thus, it is possible to argue that the powers and privileges of, and which may be
exercised by, officers, directors, and shareholders of Delaware corporations are not solely
derivative of those of the corporation itself but actually inhere in those officers, directors, and
shareholders as a result of the terms of the statute itself. This is not the case with respect to CBCA
and OBCA corporations.
Such persons possess and exercise the same powers and privileges as the corporation itself,
although, it must be assumed, each such person, whether officer, director, or shareholder, cannot
possess and exercise alone the full powers and privileges of the corporation. That is to say, those
powers and privileges must be those of officers as a class, directors as a class, and shareholders as
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a class, being collective in nature rather than individual. As such, the powers and privileges of
individual members of each class are not complete or plenary.
Indeed, it is logical to assume that the powers and privileges of each such class cannot exhaust
those of the corporation; and that, instead, the most that could be maintained is that the powers and
privileges of all three classes together exhaust the powers and privileges of the corporation. On the
other hand, perhaps this is not the intent of the statute at all. It may be that the intention, instead,
is to focus attention on the human actors who take action in relation to the corporation or, as we
may say, animate or institute the corporation as an organizational actor. In any event, this
discussion anticipates arguments that we will make later in this and subsequent chapters.
Specific powers are enumerated in the next following section of the DGCL, section 122. These
include the power to “[h]ave perpetual succession by its corporate name, unless a limited period
of duration is stated in its certificate of incorporation”, to “[s]ue and be sued in all courts and
participate, as a party or otherwise, in any judicial, administrative, arbitrative or other proceeding,
in its corporate name”, to “[p]urchase, receive, take by grant, gift, devise, bequest or otherwise,
lease, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, employ, use and otherwise deal in and with real
or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated, and to sell, convey, lease,
exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or mortgage or pledge, all or any of its property and
assets, or any interest therein, wherever situated”, to “[a]ppoint such officers and agents as the
business of the corporation requires and to pay or otherwise provide for them suitable
compensation”, to “[c]onduct its business, carry on its operations and have offices and exercise its
powers within or without this State”, and to “[m]ake contracts, including contracts of guaranty and
suretyship, incur liabilities, borrow money at such rates of interest as the corporation may
determine, issue its notes, bonds and other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by
mortgage, pledge or other encumbrance of all or any of its property, franchises and income”63
These enumerated powers are limited, however, not only to those granted by the DGCL or other
statute or in its certificate of incorporation, together with any powers incidental to such powers,
but are possessed and may be exercised by the corporation only “so far as such powers and
privileges are necessary or convenient to the conduct, promotion or attainment of the business or
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purposes set forth in its certificate of incorporation”. As a result of conferring specific, rather than
plenipotentiary, powers (although with any “necessary or convenient” ancillary powers) the
Delaware statute has to statutorily reverse the common law doctrine of ultra vires, which is done
in Section 124.64
As previously noted, although their construction might be criticized as inelegant, difficult, and
even slightly confusing, a careful reading of the legal powers and privileges so granted
demonstrates their extensive nature, very much like that of a natural person. The corporation
endowed with such legal powers and privileges and such duties and responsibilities is,
consequently, a rights-and-duty bearing entity or party, as a matter of law.
The power to sue and be sued and participate in all manner of legal proceedings and to acquire,
own, hold, and dispose of any property or interests therein, and to enter into and perform any
contracts must be considered to constitute recognition of the entity possessing them as a separate
entity in law and, thus, as a separate legal entity.
c) MBCA
The Model Business Corporation Act is similar in these respects to the Delaware statute. It lists a
number of provisions that the articles of incorporation may (but are not required to) set forth,
including provisions not inconsistent with law regarding the business or purposes for which the
corporation is organized.65
In effect, that corporation may engage “in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set
forth in the articles of incorporation”.66 The MBCA says that every corporation “has perpetual
duration and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individual to do all
things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including with limitation” a
number of specific enumerated powers.
These include power “to sue and be sued, complain and defend in its corporate name”; “to
purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal
with, real or personal property, or any legal or equitable interest in property, wherever located”;
“to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its
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property”; “ to purchase, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire; own, hold, vote, use, sell,
mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of; and deal in and with shares or other interests in,
or obligations of, any other entity”; “to make contracts and guarantees, incur liabilities, borrow
money, issue its notes, bonds, and other obligations (which may be convertible into or include the
option to purchase other securities of the corporation), and secure any of its obligations by
mortgage or pledge of any of its property, franchises, or income”; “to lend money, invest and
reinvest its funds, and receive and hold real and personal property as security for repayment”; “to
conduct its business, locate offices, and exercise the powers granted by this Act within or without
this state”; and “ to elect directors and appoint officers, employees, and agents of the corporation,
define their duties, fix their compensation, and lend them money and credit”.67
The MBCA also eliminates for the most part the doctrine of ultra vires, except in certain
shareholder injunction, and derivative, receivership, trustee and other proceedings.
As in the case of the CBCA and the OBCA, the recognition that an entity has the legal capacity to
engage in any activities which may be undertaken by “an individual” must be considered to
constitute recognition of the entity possessing them as a separate entity in law and, accordingly, as
a separate legal entity.
This is been demonstrated to be the case with respect to each of the statutes discussed.
3) Date, Effect, and Duration of Incorporation
a) CBCA and OBCA
Under the CBCA, one or more individuals (natural persons) or bodies corporate may incorporate
a corporation by signing and filing articles of incorporation in prescribed form68 on receipt of
which a certificate of incorporation is issued. Each individual incorporator must be not less than
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18 years of age, not incapable, and not bankrupt.69 It is then provided that “[a] corporation comes
into existence on the date shown in the certificate of incorporation.”70
The OBCA preceded the CBCA in permitting corporations to act as incorporators. One or more
individuals, bodies corporate or any combination thereof may incorporate a corporation by filing
articles of incorporation and any other required documents and information in prescribed form71
on receipt of which a certificate of incorporation is issued.72 A body corporate is “any body
corporate with or without share capital and whether or not it is a corporation to which [the OBCA]
applies”.
Consequently, both statutes permit a corporation to act as incorporator of another corporation. This
avoids use of fictive incorporators who act upon the instruction of a particular corporation or one
or more corporations. Under the OBCA, an individual may not be an incorporator if less than
eighteen years of age, if found under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 or under the Mental Health
Act to be incapable of managing property or found to be incapable by a court in Canada or
elsewhere, or if such individual has the status of bankrupt. Upon issue, “[a] certificate of
incorporation is conclusive proof that the corporation has been incorporated under this Act on the
date set out in the certificate, except in a proceeding under section 240 to cancel the certificate for
cause.73
Neither statute has any provision terminating the existence of the corporation after any period of
time prescribed in the statute or otherwise; nor any provision specifically declaring, in effect, that
its existence is unlimited as to duration. Instead, both statutes have provisions continuing the
existence of the corporation in other specified manners, such as by way of amalgamation,
arrangement, and permitting its existence to be terminated in other specified manners, such as by
way of liquidation and dissolution winding-up, in both cases whether voluntary or by court order.
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b) DGCL
The DGCL also does not limit incorporators of a corporation to natural persons. Instead, “[a]ny
person, partnership, association or corporation, singly or jointly with others, and without regard to
such person's or entity's residence, domicile or state of incorporation, may incorporate or organize
a corporation under this chapter by filing…a certificate of incorporation which shall be executed,
acknowledged and filed in accordance with [the statute].”74
Consequently, not only individual persons and corporations, but also partnerships and associations
may incorporate and organize a corporation, alone or with others. Further, “[a] corporation may
be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or
purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this State.”75
Consequently, the application of the DGCL is not limited to business corporations. Apart from
conducting any lawful business, a corporation may be incorporated to conduct or promote any
other lawful purposes. This may be thought be underlie the widening of the characteristics of
possible incorporators. For example, an association with some charitable or affiliative purpose,
such as supporting a hospital or facilitating the affiliation and interests of a particular professional
group or one or more such associations together may seek to acquire the benefits of incorporation,
perhaps including limited liability and various readily understood legal characteristics, and so
might directly incorporate a corporation, without the necessity and attendant difficulties of
employing “office” or “accommodation” incorporators.
Importantly, the DGCL applies not only to corporations that issue shares, or “stock corporations”,
but also to corporations that do not issue shares or stock, called “nonstock corporations”. The
DGCL thus permits “any person, partnership, association or corporation, singly or jointly with
others” with “any lawful business or purposes” to incorporate and organize a corporation. This
would include a broad range of religious, fraternal, philanthropic, educational, professional,
business, labour and other organizations. Unlike other modern corporate statutory frameworks, the
DGCL regulates all of these corporations, as well as business corporations, in a single statute.
Many other jurisdictions create separate statutes for non-business corporations.
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Under the DGCL, upon due filing of the certificate of incorporation, “the incorporator or
incorporators who signed the certificate, and such incorporator's or incorporators' successors and
assigns, shall, from the date of such filing, be and constitute a body corporate, by the name set
forth in the certificate, subject to S 103(d) of this title and subject to dissolution or other termination
of its existence as provided in this chapter.”76
Thus, such filing constitutes the incorporator or incorporators as a body corporate. This language
is more traditional than the language used in the Canadian statutes mentioned. It specifically
acknowledges that a number or group of incorporators have combined as a body corporate. In
effect, it stipulates that the incorporators and their successors and assigns are and constitute the
body corporate. Each of the incorporators retain their separate existence but, by filing the
certificate of incorporation, they and their successors and assigns together are, and constitute, a
body corporate subject, among other things, to dissolution or other termination of its existence in
accordance with the statute.
While some legal theories of the corporation may focus on this language as supporting one or other
legal theory of the corporation, for our purposes, it is sufficient to note that this language
recognizes that the corporation is constituted or instituted, as such, by other persons or entities and,
ultimately, by real individual or natural persons, who, alone or with others, may take action in its
name and on its behalf. Delaware law specifically acknowledges this process and this reality.
Accordingly, it draws attention to the nature of corporations as organizations bringing together,
that is, associating, affiliating, or organizing, persons or groups of persons in order to accomplish
some purpose or to attain some result. This recognition, together with recognition of the
corporation as a separate legal entity with particular legal attributes, constitutes what is referred to
here as the “corporative” perspective.
The certificate of incorporation creates a new entity. At the same time, the body corporate is not
constituted only and in perpetuity by the original incorporators, but also by their successors and
assigns. Consequently, changes in the identity of the “incorporators” by means of succession and
assignment do not terminate the existence of the body corporate. However, although the body
corporate continues as an entity unaffected by such successions, its composition as an entity
changes. For example, if none of the original incorporators continue to be shareholders of the
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corporation, their successors and assigns, a wholly new group of parties with B and would
constitute the body corporate. The nature of a body corporate constituted by its incorporators or
originators will be discussed further in due course.
As noted previously, under s. 122 a corporation has power to “[h]ave perpetual succession by its
corporate name, unless a limited period of duration is stated in its certificate of incorporation”.
Consequently, the incorporators may provide for a limited period of its duration, at which point its
existence, separate from that of its incorporators, and without terminating their existence, is
terminated.
c) MBCA
Under the MBCA, one or more persons may act as the incorporator or incorporators of a
corporation by delivering articles of incorporation for filing.77 Since the term “person” is defined
to include an individual and an entity,78 and the term “entity” is defined to include a “domestic and
foreign business corporation; domestic and foreign nonprofit corporation; estate; trust; domestic
and foreign unincorporated entity; and state, United States, and foreign government”79,
incorporation is not available only to natural persons or even only to groups of natural persons.
The MBCA provides that unless a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate existence
begins when the articles of incorporation are filed.80 It provides that unless its articles of
incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its
corporate name. It appears, then, that the incorporators can choose to limit the existence of the
corporation by inserting appropriate provisions in its articles; otherwise, it has “perpetual duration
and succession in its corporate name”. The Official Comment on this provisions notes that “nearly
every corporation today is formed with perpetual duration , but a corporation may elect a shorter
duration under section 2.02(b) (2)(iii)”, which provision permits the articles to set forth “provisions
not inconsistent with law…defining, limiting, and regulating the powers of the corporation, its
board of directors, and shareholders”.
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The words chosen are apt, and may seek, to express the idea that the corporation survives changes
in its shareholders, directors, officers, management and employees. This distinguishes such a
corporation from other forms of business organizations, such as certain types of partnerships.
Moreover, none of these changes require any change in the name of the corporation. Such a
corporation thus presents itself to the outside world as a single legal entity that survives changes
that might be considered by outsiders to be highly significant, if not fundamental.
This summary of leading corporate statutes has demonstrated the import and significance of
characterizing the modern business corporation as a separate legal entity, one separate from parties
who are involved in its constitution and operation, such as directors, officers, management and
employee, and shareholders.
2. Limited Liability and Asset Partitioning
The shareholders of a modern business corporation do not generally incur any liability, as such, in
respect of the corporation’s actions or inactions. That is to say, their ownership of shares in the
capital of the corporation does not in itself impose on them any liability nor does it confer on them
any rights in respect of the property, contracts, or actions or inactions of the corporation. The
liability of the shareholder is said to be limited to the value of the shares held. This is often
expressed by saying that the shareholder enjoys or that the corporation has limited liability.81 The
nature of such limited liability under modern corporate statutes is discussed below.
a) CBCA and OBCA
Section 45 of the CBCA provides that the shareholders of a corporation are not, as shareholders,
liable for any liability, act or default of the corporation except as specifically enumerated in s. 45.82
Section 92 of the OBCA is substantially similar but adds the word “obligation” to the list of items
in respect of which shareholders are not, as such, liable.83
b) DGCL
The DGCL deals with this matter from the perspective of the contents of the certificate of
incorporation. S. 102 (b) (6) provides that such document may contain “[a] provision imposing
personal liability for the debts of the corporation on its stockholders to a specified extent and upon
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specified conditions; otherwise, the stockholders of a corporation shall not be personally liable for
the payment of the corporation's debts except as they may be liable by reason of their own conduct
or acts”. Thus, the DGCL default rule is that shareholders have no personal liability, but personal
liability may be imposed by the certificate of incorporation “to a specified extent and upon
specified conditions”. This permits the incorporators to create a “bespoke” or “custom made”
liability provision which may obviate the necessity for certain contractual or other arrangements,
such as guarantees of bank borrowings or other credit facilities.
c) MBCA
Section 6.22 of the MBCA states that: “unless otherwise provided in the articles of corporation, a
shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except
that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.” The Official Comment
notes that this is “the basic rule of nonliability of shareholders for corporate acts or debts that
underlies modern corporation law.” It says that Section 2.02 (b) (2) (v) “[n]evertheless permits a
corporation to impose that liability under specified circumstances [the actual text says” to a specified
extent and upon specified conditions”, which is the same as the DGCL] if that is desirable.”
Consequently, the MBCA permits the incorporators to vary the normal principle of shareholder
immunity.

The effect of limited liability is, firstly, that the corporation is protected against claims by creditors
of the shareholders of the corporation and against seizure of the corporation’s assets to satisfy
claims by such creditors of shareholders. For example, they cannot seize property of the
corporation in execution of a judgment against any shareholder, by reason only of such
shareholding. However, if the corporation guarantees certain obligations of the shareholder, the
corporation may be subject to execution for those debts. This type of asset partitioning is described
by Hansmann and Kraakman as “affirmative asset partitioning”84 and by Hansmann, Kraakman
and Squire as “entity shielding”.85
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What is commonly referred to as “limited liability” is the principle that the personal assets of the
shareholders of the corporation are not subject to claims of the creditors of the corporation as a
result solely of the shareholder holding shares in the corporation. However, if the shareholder of
the corporation guarantees certain obligations of the corporation, the shareholder becomes liable
for those debts. This type of asset partitioning is described by Hansmann and Kraakman as
“defensive asset partitioning”86 and by Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire as “owner shielding”.87
Hansmann and Kraakman consider that there are different degrees of defensive asset partitioning
but that only complete exclusion of such liability constitutes conventional “limited liability”.88
Because the shareholder has no liability in respect of acts of the corporation, such shareholder’s
liability in respect, or on account, of his or her investment in the corporation is limited to the
amount he or she invested to acquire the shares of the corporation.
However, a shareholder may incur liability in respect of actions he or she undertakes otherwise.
For example, it is common for banks and other lenders to closely held (not publicly traded, or
“private”) corporations to request that shareholders furnish personal guarantees of the indebtedness
of the corporation, in which case the shareholder incurs liability in respect of the guarantee, but
not in respect of his or her shareholding as such. Similarly, if a shareholder takes any action in his
personal capacity which extends beyond exercising rights as a shareholder, he or she may incur
liability. However, he or she does not incur any liability by reason only of holding shares in the
corporation.
Limiting the exposure of the corporation’s assets to its own liabilities seems important to claiming
status as a separate legal entity. As a separate legal entity, the corporation and its assets are not
exposed to liabilities of its shareholders nor are the shareholders of the corporation exposed, as
such, to the liabilities of the corporation. Instead, there is a separation of the liabilities of the
corporation and its shareholders, at least where the subscription amount for the shares is fully paid.
Where statutes, such as the DGCL (in section 156) and the MBCA (in sections 6.20 to 6.22
inclusive, in certain circumstances) allow shares to be issued without being fully paid, the
protection of shareholders from liability is available only in respect of amounts in excess of the
full subscription amount.
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3. Transferable Equity Interests and Capital Lock-In
The common shares of the corporation represent interests in the capital of the corporation. They
confer rights on the holders that may be exercised in accordance with statutory and other corporate
law. These rights typically include the right to vote; the right, if accorded to the relevant class of
shares, to receive dividends (if any, as and when declared by the board of directors); and the right
to receive the remaining property of the corporation upon dissolution.89 As such interests are
subordinate to other claims and possible claims against the corporation, they are considered to bear
the greatest risk of any investment in it, and accordingly, are considered to be part (or, in some
cases, all) of its capital and are often described as “equity” interests or “residual” interests.
Where the corporation has more than one class of shares, each of these rights must be attached to
at least one class of shares, but all such traits are not required to be attached to one class of shares.90
Under the CBCA and OBCA, all such shares are without nominal or par value 91, are nonassessable, and cannot be issued until the consideration therefor, in money or its fair equivalent
(as determined by the directors) in property or past services, is fully paid.92
Section 6 of the CBCA requires the articles of incorporation to set out any restrictions on the issue,
transfer, or ownership of shares and s. 46 make special provisions for constrained shares of
corporations, the constraints upon which relate to attaining and maintaining a specified level of
Canadian ownership or control in order to receive certain benefits or to otherwise comply with any
prescribed law. Under section 41 of the OBCA, where the corporation is an “offering corporation”
as defined in subsections 1(1) and 1(6) as offering its securities to the public, any restrictions on
the transfer or ownership of shares (called “restricted shares”) must be contained in the articles
and must be necessary, in effect, for reasons similar to those applicable to constrained shares under
the CBCA.
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Absent permitted restrictions in the charter documents of the corporation (which are commonly
inserted in the case of “private”, that is to say, “non-distributing” (CBCA) or “non-offering”
(OBCA) corporations), the shares of the corporation are generally freely transferable, as a matter
of corporate law. That is to say, they can be transferred by the shareholder freely and without
incurring any liability as a matter of corporate law, either at the time of transfer or subsequently.
However, the statutes generally permit restrictions on the transfer of shares to be contained in the
corporation’s charter documents.93
The transfer rights of the shareholder may be constrained by applicable provisions of any
shareholders’ agreement or other agreement to which such shareholder may be a party or by
applicable securities laws. Specific obligations may be imposed on majority shareholders in certain
cases, for example, where the corporation whose shares are being transferred is subject to the
corporate law of Delaware, the jurisdiction of preference for the largest number of corporations
incorporated in any of the states of the United States of America.
The funds subscribed by shareholders to the capital of the corporation are intended to be employed
by the corporation in its business and, as such, are “locked in” permanently and cannot generally
be withdrawn as a matter of right.94 Importantly, as Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire argue, this
provides liquidation protection to creditors as the shareholders do not have a unilateral right to
withdraw “their share of firm assets”. 95 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argue that capital lock-in
is important to investment in specialized assets and in development of a specialized organization
whose benefits are expected to be realized over a long term.96 We maintain that capital lock-in and
transferability are concomitants of one another: because the capital subscribed by the shareholder

93

OBCA, supra note 8, s 5; CBCA, supra note 7, s 6(1)(e).
Some statutes permit shares to be redeemed at the option of the holder (often called “retracted”) in which case the
exercise of such retraction rights will be subject to general redemption conditions, such as those relating to solvency.
See, for example, s. 2 (1) of the CBCA, which defines the term “redeemable share” not only to include share
redeemable at the option of the corporation, but also shares “that the corporation is required by its articles to purchase
or redeem at a specified time or on the demand of a shareholder”; and s. 1 (1) of the OBCA to like effect.
95
Supra note 85 at 1341.
96
They have explored these issues in a number of articles written separately and together, two of the most significant
of which are Margaret M Blair, “Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the
Nineteenth Century” (2003) 51:2 UCLA L Rev 387 at 388-89; Lynn A Stout, “On the Nature of Corporations” (2005)
2005:1 U Ill L Rev 255 at 255-6. In her article, Lynn Stout credits Margaret Blair as first using the term in this
connection in the first-mentioned article. Space does not permit a full discussion of this issue; however, it is extremely
meaningful, especially when considered in relation to the other paradigmatic attributes of the corporation, as described
here.
94

126
cannot be removed at the will of the shareholder, the only way that the shareholder can “get out”
of being “locked in” to his or her investment in the corporation is to sell his or her shares.
In turn, limited liability is virtually essential to transferability, otherwise a shareholder who
disposed of his or her shares and thereby terminated the potential gains that might be derived from
such shares would not be relieved of potential liability to creditors of the corporation and, as such,
would continue to be subject to continuing risk of loss. That would require a complex risk-reward
calculation as to whether the benefit that the shareholder expected to derive before selling the
shares would exceed, by a margin sufficient to make the investment worthwhile, the potential loss
during the period in which such shares were held and for a potentially indefinite period afterwards.
The expected gain might have to be very considerable to warrant such an assumption of risk. Of
course, observations to like effect have been made variously in the past.97
Of course, corporations that engaged in certain types of business were permitted to have these
attributes in Great Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth century expansion of its economy
and infrastructure. For example, many banks and insurance companies, and companies developing
canals and railways were permitted attributes similar to the MBCA. These companies were
developing financial and transportation infrastructure thought to be essential to the nation, which
involved the expenditure of considerable sums of money substantially in advance of any returns.
The sums of capital required were much larger than generally had been required previously for
commercial or industrial undertakings of various natures. Consequently, these attributes were
thought to be beneficial to securing such capital. Eventually, these were adopted more generally
in various stages, with limited liability being extended to all incorporated companies in the
Companies Act of 1866.
Important for our purposes is the fact that with respect to corporations which are publicly traded,
including “listed” corporations (which, for our purposes, may be said to mean corporations whose
shares are listed and posted for trading on a stock exchange or regularly quoted on a market having
certain prescribed attributes), the identity of their shareholders may change relatively quickly,
perhaps daily or even more frequently. Thus, the “relationship”, legal or otherwise, among the
corporation and its shareholders, and among the corporation, its shareholders and other
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constituents, may be significantly different from the economic model of the firm which, today, we
would describe as being more like a “closely held” corporation.
4. Central Management Independent of Equity Ownership
Unlike partnerships, in which commonly partners are entitled, and even expected, to take part in
the management of the business of the partnership, the modern business corporation requires no
fixed relationship between those who provide the capital of the enterprise and who may be entitled
to a return from the operation of its business, and the actual operation of that business. In effect,
there is a complete separation between those who provide capital for its operation and those who
manage its business. A shareholder is not entitled, as such, to take part in management of the
business of the corporation, nor is such shareholder expected or obligated to do so; although taking
part in management may entitle the shareholder, as management, but not as a shareholder, to some
compensation, and may result in that shareholder, as management, but not as a shareholder,
incurring some concomitant liability.
Of course, this separation of management from ownership (or “management ownership
separation”) facilitates both the locking-in of capital and the free transferability of shares. Changes
of management do not necessarily result in changes of “ownership” of the business entity, as might
be the case of the general partnership. Likewise, changes in “ownership” do not result in the return
of the capital of the particular owner concerned. Instead, the transfer of shares in the corporation,
whether or not owned by, or involving someone involved in, management of the corporation, does
not necessarily or automatically entail any changes in its management, as such.
The legislation creating MBCs, which term refers in this text only to Anglo-American
corporations, generally provides that the board of directors shall manage or supervise the
management of the business and affairs of the corporation,98 manage or direct such management,99
or simply “direct such management”.100 Section 141 of the DGCL states that unless otherwise
provided in the statute or articles, its business and affairs “shall be managed by or under the
direction of the board of directors”. Section 8.01 (B) of the MBCA provides, in effect, that “[a]ll
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corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the Board of Directors of the
corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the
direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors” subject to limitations in its articles
or in any unanimous shareholder agreement under section 7.32 (which ceases to be effective when
the corporation becomes a public corporation).
The only management rights conferred in the paradigmatic and default case in respect of the
corporation are conferred on the board of directors in its collective capacity, subject to delegation;
and, in such case, shareholders and others have no management authority whatever. Persons who
are shareholders may, of course, act as directors or officers of the corporation, in which case they
have the rights and duties appurtenant to those positions. The shareholders may also limit the rights
of the board of directors by means of a unanimous shareholders’ agreement,101 in which case the
statute may stipulate that, to the extent provided in such unanimous shareholders’ agreement, the
shareholders thereby assume the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of the directors. 102 Such
agreements, even if permitted under corporate law (which is often not the case for corporations
that are “public”), are not normally extant with respect to corporations that are publicly listed or
traded.
The allocation of plenary management rights to the board of directors and its designees, on the one
hand, is subject to the rights of shareholders to elect and replace directors, and to exercise some
general supervisory authority in approving or disapproving of certain fundamental transactions or
changes proposed by the board of directors. We will deal with this subject in more detail below
under the heading “The Organization of the Corporation in Law”.
Indefinite Duration
When a corporation comes into existence is variously expressed in diverse legislation.103 In some
modern statutes, the corporation comes into existence on the date set forth in its articles of
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incorporation.104 Other statutes do not refer to it coming into existence but, instead, simply say that
it is incorporated on that date.105 As noted above, the Delaware statute provides that upon the date
of filing of the certificate of incorporation, the incorporator or incorporators and their successors
and assigns “shall, from the date of such filing, be and constitute a body corporate”.106 The Model
Business Corporation Act states that that unless a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate
existence begins when the articles of incorporation are filed.107
Formerly, it was common for corporate statutes to permit a corporation to have a limited duration
of existence, usually by stipulating in its articles of incorporation that it would cease to exist at a
certain date. Indeed, in some jurisdictions in early general incorporation statues, such provisions
were required.108 For example, Schwartz notes that “early nineteenth-century state corporate
statutes required the certificate of incorporation to include a limited term of corporate existence,
with a maximum term of twenty, thirty, or fifty years.” The State of New York limited the duration
of all business corporations to fifty years.109 In the United States, “[b]y the turn of the twentieth
century, however, legislators amended their corporate law statutes to permit perpetual
existence”.110
However, such has been the change in practice that some modern statutes no longer provide for or
permit limited duration provisions to be contained in the articles. In effect, parties dealing with a
corporation assume that it has an indefinite duration or lifespan, as a result of which imposing an
automatic termination date of which creditors and others might not be aware and which might
operate to their detriment would not be conducive to public expectations of fairness. As discussed
above, both Delaware111 and the MBCA112 permit the articles to limit the duration of the
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corporation. Apparently, such provisions are rare.113 This characteristic of indefinite duration is
not necessarily shared by other legal forms of business entities, such as partnerships, limited
partnerships, business trusts, and others, which may provide for, or for voting by participants with
respect to, termination of the entity’s existence at some point or points in time, or upon the
occurrence of certain stated events.
The existence of corporations in most modern statutes is terminated by means of voluntary or
court-ordered winding up, liquidation or dissolution.114 In effect, these mechanisms endeavour to
ensure equitable treatment of interested parties. This is discussed further below. Absent a limited
duration provision in jurisdictions in which such provisions are permitted, modern business
corporations generally have perpetual existence. One commentator notes that “[today, the
corporate code of every state expressly provides for corporate perpetuity.”115 This potentially
unlimited lifespan is relevant to its other legal attributes, notably capital lock-in and transferability
of shares, as well as centralized management.
One consequence of potentially unlimited life span is that the corporation may survive well beyond
the lives of any of its shareholders. Of course, an attribute of transmissibility would permit the
shares of the corporation to be passed to the heirs or other successors in interest of any individual
shareholder. However, just as the merits or assessment of the merits of an investment in the
corporation’s shares by the individual shareholder might vary over time, the interests of one or
more heirs or successors in interest might differ from that of the original shareholder, and such
interest might also differ as among the heirs or successors in interest as a group.
This might especially be the case if the original shareholder, or one or more of the heirs or
successors in interest, had some involvement in management of the corporation, while others did
not. Accordingly, the potentially unlimited lifespan of the corporation, as one of its legal attributes,
and capital lock-in, as another of its legal attributes, tends to reinforce the appropriateness of share
transferability as yet another such legal attribute. The relationships among the attributes provided
here, of course, are but examples of those which might be cited in this regard.
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The advantage of unlimited life is often contrasted to a partnership. Generally, at common law, a
partnership may be dissolved at the instigation of any partner and is dissolved by the death of any
partner. Most modern statutes provide that subject to any partnership agreement, a partnership is
dissolved by the expiration of any fixed term for which it is entered, by the termination of the
adventure or undertaking for which it is entered, or, if entered into for an undefined term, by any
partner giving notice of intention to dissolve the partnership. In any event, unless the partnership
agreement provides otherwise, every partnership is dissolved as regards all partners by the death
or insolvency of a partner.116
The prospects, at common law, of voluntary dissolution of a partnership, at the instigation of any
partner and of automatic termination of the partnership on the death of a partner meant that the
partnership, as a form of business organization, was not suitable for businesses involving
significant commitment of capital, or of time, in order to recoup and earn a return on the invested
capital. While the capital was locked in, the lack of transferability of a partnership interest meant
that the only way to repatriate one’s capital was to dissolve the partnership, thereby terminating
its rights, as well as its liabilities and obligations (which continued to be borne by the partners
individually).
Instead, as Margaret Blair argues, the corporation provided liquidation protection to creditors
against owners, and enabled owners to lock in their investments without risk of their involuntary
termination by reason of the acts of another such owner.117 This protected each “owner” from
becoming subject to involuntary termination of ownership solely as a result of the action of another
“owner”. It is generally accepted that the unlimited lifespan of the corporation facilitates longer
term investment horizons than would otherwise be possible. Further discussion of this matter
appears below in Part 3 of this book.
Conclusions on the Corporation and Corporate “Legal” Essentialism
As explained above, this chapter, together with Appendix A, explicates what are considered to be
the essential or paradigmatic attributes of the corporation as a legal entity, while Part 2 of, and
Appendix B to, this work relate these attributes to the discourse concerning the “firm” and the
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“corporation” in legal and other disciplines. With respect to the first task, this chapter has identified
these attributes, which have sometimes been described as corporate “legal” essentialism. With
respect to the second task, this chapter has identified some of the assumptions underlying “firm”
and “corporation” discourse in legal and other fields.
Chapters A1 and A2 of Appendix A explain how these corporate legal essentialist attributes are
instantiated in corporate law statutes; including how the corporate legal essentialist attributes result
in a concrete instantiation of management rights in the board of directors, on the one hand, and of
management appointment, monitoring, and other rights in the equity owners, the shareholders, in
consequence of their having no rights, as such equity owners and shareholders, to participate
directly in management of the corporation. They also seek to further develop an understanding of
the interrelationship among the corporate legal essentialist attributes. Chapter A3 examines how
the corporation, as a legal entity, is animated and vivified, as a matter of declarative law, by persons
operating the corporation as a human organization and how its structural, processual, and personnel
aspects are affected by statutory law and common law.
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PART TWO:
WHY THIS? – ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT
THE CORPORATION AS AN ECONOMIC ACTOR
CHAPTER TWO – THE CORPORATION IN ACION
PART A – PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER AND CHAPTER THREE
Chapter One and Appendix A of This Book
Chapter One of this book examined, in brief, and Appendix A examines, in more detail, the essential attributes of the modern business corporation and investigated the ways in which they were
instantiated in several important modern corporate statutes. In effect, it asked the question: What
is the modern business corporation today as a matter of law? The present part of the book, Part 2,
as well as Appendix B, considers the question: Why is the corporation “the way it is” today? How
did this come about? What influences may have contributed to the present stage of its legal development and theorization? These questions involve the discourse and theorization of, and relating
to, the firm, in general, and the modern business corporation, in particular.
As observed previously, such discourse and theorization of, and relating to, the firm and the modern business corporation addresses how the firm and the modern business corporation, as a matter
of law and otherwise, fit into conceptions of: firstly, their macroenvironment: the economy, the
society, the polity, and the state; secondly, conceptions of classical and neoclassical economics
concerning economic action; and, thirdly, conceptions of classical and neoclassical economics
concerning economic actors. These matters are discussed here and, in more detail, in Appendix B.
As previously noted, discourse concerning the firm and, latterly, the modern business corporation,
including legal discourse, has long been significantly influenced by economic discourse, including
generalizations and assumptions (in the “everyday” or “common” sense not only of premises or
hypotheses, but also of beliefs, presumptions and suppositions) proceeding from economic discourse and most especially from classical and neoclassical theory.
Thus, Part 2, together with Appendix B, of this book, constitute an analysis of certain discourse
and theorization of, and relating to, the firm, and the modern business corporation. Although the
discourse and theorization concerning the macroenvironment and microenvironment of the firm
and the modern business corporation are important with respect to understanding conceptions of
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classical and neoclassical economics with respect to their role as economic actors, and alternative
conceptions with respect to the same, investigation of these matters represents a significant digression from discourse and theorization more purely concerned with the firm and the modern business
corporation as economic actors. Thus, the discussions of the classical and neoclassical description
of the macroenvironment and microenvironment of economic actors is left to Appendix B, while
the discussion of conceptions of the firm as an economic actor appears in the remainder of this
Part 2 of the book.
The early chapters of Appendix B, Chapters B1 to B3, deal with five assumptions or generalizations concerning the macroenvironment of the firm, and the modern business corporation, thus
concerning the relationships among the economy, the society, the polity, and the state. Chapter B1
of Appendix B examines three assumptions concerning this macroenvironment: firstly, that economic roles and functions are intrinsically distinct from other functions in a society, polity, or
state; secondly, that the economy engages, overlaps with, or is part of, the “private” sphere, in the
sense that it is fundamentally “private” in nature, as opposed to “public”, in the sense of being
intrinsically related to the ambient society or polity; and, thirdly, that the private sphere is intrinsically separate and distinct from the public sphere, namely, the society and the polity. Chapter B2
of Appendix B considers the fourth assumption, namely, that the economy, as such, must be analyzed in a manner which is distinctive to it, and to the private sphere. Chapter B3 investigates the
fifth assumption, namely, that the economy, while related to the ambient society and polity, is
distinct from, and operates intrinsically independently of, such society and polity. Criticism of
these arguments from various perspectives and fields, as summarized in those chapters of Appendix B, demonstrates that they are highly contestable and problematic, and not suitable for framing
a theory which can be verified “in the real world” of actual experience, whether by strict empirical
testing, or otherwise.
Chapters B4 and B5 of Appendix B examine a number of assumptions or generalizations of classical and neoclassical economics concerning economic action, namely the assumptions that: 1.
Atomistic individuals who are motivated to seek their own good, satisfaction, or utility engage in
economic activity to maximize (or, in some later writing, optimize) their own good, satisfaction,
or utility. 2. Such behaviour proceeds in isolation from, and absolutely independent of, others; and
all economic behaviour can be explained based on these principles. 3. Such individuals are capable,
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acting independently, of determining what will afford them satisfaction, and what will maximize
(or, in some later writing, optimize) their satisfaction. 4. The goals and desires sought to be satisfied, or the utility sought to be derived, from their satisfaction are either identical from one individual to another, in the strong form of the assumption, or similar, in the weaker form of the assumption. 5. The goals and desires of individuals are, that is to say, the utility they seek is, effectively unlimited, subject, however, to any limits imposed by the “law of supply and demand”,
which requires that supply and demand at any particular price must be in equilibrium. As a result,
the goals and desires of consumers may be limited by the availability of their resources to pay for
additional commodities they seek; and the goals and desires of producers may be limited by their
ability to produce additional commodities at prices which purchasers are willing to pay. 6. Such
individuals, whether as consumers or as producers, make their choices independently and rationally, based on relevant and complete information. 7. The results of these choices are sought to be
implemented by such individuals through independent market transactions. 8. As posited by General Equilibrium Theory, supply and demand at each particular price point are equal, that is to say,
in equilibrium, in any particular market at any particular time. Consequently, it may be said that
the “market price” of any commodity is determined invariantly by supply and demand.
These conceptions of the rational, atomistic, asocial, utility seeking individual discussed in those
chapters, like the conceptions of the macroenvironment discussed in the earlier chapters of Appendix B, are demonstrated, by research and theorization in more modern economics, and in other
disciplines and fields, to be highly problematic and unsatisfactory as a basis for theorization and
empirical testing. We may say, speaking broadly, that these assumptions or generalizations of classical and neoclassical economics involve, at the highest level, assumptions of atomism, utility
seeking, rationality, and independence. The atomistic individual seeks utility by making decisions
conducive to that utility in a rational manner, with full information, and independently. When
acting in the economic sphere, alone or with others, this atomistic individual is often referred to in
neoclassical economics as “the firm”.
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This Chapter and Chapter Three
Assumptions or Generalizations Examined
Chapters Two and Three consider, in general, assumptions or generalizations relating to the firm
and the modern business corporation as an economic actor, as follows: firstly, that the principal
actor in the economy, which is usually denominated in classical liberal economics as “the firm”,
acts in the economy as a single actor; in effect, as an independent entity vis-à-vis other economic
actors each of whom also acts as an independent entity; secondly, that the firm’s actions are primarily, if not exclusively, in the economic sphere, and that its interactions are with other participants in the economy, which are primarily, if not exclusively, other firms; thirdly, that the firm’s
actions are undertaken primarily, if not exclusively, in the private sphere, which includes, but is
not limited to, the economy, which entails that it interacts with other participants in the private
sphere, which are primarily, if not exclusively, other firms; fourthly, that the firm’s actions should
be confined, primarily, if not exclusively, to the economic sphere and to the private sphere; and
fifthly, that firms actually pursue only their private economic interests, which entails that when
firms operate in other spheres, such as the public sphere, they do so only in furtherance of their
private economic interests and activities.
Atomism, Methodological Individualism, and the Firm
More generally, however, all of the preceding assumptions assume that the firm, as an economic
actor, behaves in exactly the same way as if it was a single individual person. This assumption is
investigated further in this chapter. Among other things, such assumption ignores the fact that the
firm is an organization which seeks certain goals or objectives, and that the firm is instantiated or
instituted by individual persons, each of whom has his or her own goals or objectives, some of
which may be identical with, or approximate, or may be consistent, to a greater or lesser degree,
with those of the organization itself.
As an economic actor, the firm may have a variety of goals and objectives, some of which are
ultimate goals, some proximate, and others purely instrumental. Classical and neoclassical
economic theory posits that individual persons who are economic actors may find it necessary to
prioritize among their goals and desires. Such theory purports to treat economic actors which are
firms, in the same way as it does economic actors who are individual persons. Thus, it might be

137

expected that firms may also have to prioritize among their goals and objectives. In general, the
assumption of classical and neoclassical economic theory is that firms prioritize in exactly the
same way as do individuals.
In effect, in situations in which the economic actor is only a single individual person, attaching the
nomenclature of the “firm” to that single individual person signifies only that such single
individual person is acting as an economic actor. The use of that nomenclature in economic theory
contributes no further information. However, in situations in which the economic actor, the “firm”,
embraces more than a single individual person, the “firm” is reified or “entified” based on the
model of the individual person. The “firm” is thereby “anthropomorphized”, in the sense that its
goals and desires are expected to be generated, expressed, and operationalized in the same way as
are those of individual persons.
Invisibilizing the Organization
Consistent with the analysis above, this can be seen as involving the fallacy of “atomism” or
“methodological individualism”, and related problems of aggregation, lack of inter-subjective
activity, and goal identity. As more particularly delineated in Appendix B, these problems are both
pervasive and problematic in classical and neoclassical economic theory. It is apparent that
conceptualizing the firm as if it was an individual person “invisibilizes” the “organization” which
itself animates and vivifies the “more-than-one-individual” firm, as discussed previously in this
work, consisting of the structure, processes, and personnel which constitute that “more-than-oneindividual” firm, in effect, as an organization. Yet, more than half a century ago, no less a social
commentator than Adolf Berle observed that: “Corporations are organizations of human beings.”1
Further, he noted that “[l]egalistics aside, any large corporation is first and foremost an
institution.”2 Berle’s reference to “legalistics” should be taken as referring to the legal form and
other attributes of the corporation. Thus, Berle should be taken as acknowledging that corporate
law and corporate legal theory should recognize this dualist nature of the corporation as both a
legal entity and as an organization, as advocated in the present work.
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Adolf A Berle, Jr, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954) at 17.
Ibid at 18.
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Accordingly, for convenience, it will be assumed here, except where noted otherwise, that the
“firm” does involve more than one individual person. The “firm” involving only one individual
person, acting as owner, manager and sole employee, which is usually denominated in law as a
“sole proprietorship”, may not be described, properly, as an “organization”. Such a “oneindividual-person” firm has no goals or objectives beyond those of the individual, and no structure,
process, or personnel, in each case, that survive the one individual person concerned. It follows
necessarily that a “more-than-one-person” firm which is wholly owned by one individual person,
which may be said for that reason to constitute a “sole proprietorship” as a matter of law, but which
may involve many other persons as managers or employees, may properly be described as an
organization.
The anthropomorphization of the firm as a “single individual person” not only “invisibilizes” the
organization, but also “invisibilizes” the consequences of “invisibilizing” the organization. These
include consequences relating to the behaviour of the organization and its constituents, whether
units, subunits, groups, or individual persons. The panoply of consequences so “invisibilized”
include possible conflicts among the goals and objectives of the organization; those of its units,
subunits and other groups within the organization, at whatever level; and those of the individual
persons or groups of persons within the organization, at whatever level.
Virtually all such matters are discussed in the Appendix B in the course of our examination of the
macroenvironment of the economy and the basic assumptions and generalizations of classical and
neoclassical economics. A matter which is not discussed in Appendix B is the role of the firm as
an economic actor, which is, instead, discussed as a separate issue in the present chapter.
Consequently, this chapter and the following chapter consider only the first assumption or
generalization about the firm identified above. This is the assumption or generalization that the
principal actor in the economy, which is usually denominated in classical liberal economics as “the
firm”, acts in the economy as a single actor. In effect, it acts as an independent entity vis-à-vis
other economic actors, each of whom also acts as an independent entity. The discussion below will
demonstrate that this assumption or generalization involves classical and neoclassical economic
principles which may be said to theorize primarily the market, and only secondarily the firm.
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THE NEOCLASSICAL FIRM AS A SINGLE ECONOMIC ACTOR
Introduction
To the extent that “the firm” is theorized at all in classical and neoclassical economics, it is theorized either as a sole proprietorship operated by the entrepreneur alone, or as an entrepreneur possibly hiring a labourer, or hiring a manager and one or more labourers, in order to produce a commodity for sale in the market. Both entrepreneurs and labourers engage in the activities of the firm
or “work” in order to secure their own utility. The evolutionary economist Sidney Winter asserts
that the “dominant view of the firm” in classical economics, reflecting the historical context, was
“that of the small enterprise organized as a sole proprietorship”.3 Winter points out, however, that
for such “orthodox theory of the firm”, even as a theory about individual entrepreneurs, to be
viable, its theory of profit maximization would have to “be adapted to allow for the income-leisure
trade-off of a utility-maximizing consumer whose work is running his business”.4
As noted by Roy Weintraub, neoclassical economics theorizes that “individuals provide labor to
firms that wish to employ them, by balancing the gains from offering the marginal unit of their
services (the wage they would receive) with the disutility of labor itself – the loss of leisure”, while
“[f]irms also hire employees up to the point that the cost of the additional hire is just balanced by
the value of output that the additional employee would produce.”5
The present section considers the proposition that the classical or neoclassical firm within the classical or neoclassical paradigm constitutes a single economic actor. This section argues that this
generalization or assumption is a logical consequence of the conception of the firm in classical and
neoclassical economics. The present discussion under the heading “The Neoclassical Firm As A
Single Economic Actor” advances arguments which are relatively unencumbered by discussions
of sources and by footnotes in order to get these arguments “on the table” preparatory to discussing
sources and texts, with appropriate footnotes, which takes place primarily in Chapter Eleven and
employs concepts, services, and text explicated in greater detail in Appendix B, in Chapter B5.
Sidney G Winter, "On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation" (1988) 4:1 JL Econ & Org 163 166. Winter’s major
work, of course, co-authored with Ralph Nelson, is RR Nelson and S G Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982).
4
Ibid at 167.
5
E Roy Weintraub, "Neoclassical Economics" in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, available at:
http://wwweconlib.org/library/Enc1/Neoclassical Economics.html.
3
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The “Black Boxes” of Economic Theory
In this regard, we may recall Terry Moe’s statement that, “[t]he neoclassical theory of the firm is
not in any meaningful sense a theory of economic organization”6 but, instead, “[t]he model firm is
simply a black box that produces optimal choices automatically as a function of any given environment.”7 The present work maintains that such a perspective ignores or “invisibilizes” what
happens in “the firm” which is, instead, seen as a “black box” into which inputs (economic factors
of production) are introduced and from which outputs (products for sale, or commodities) emanate.
Moe suggests that “[a]ssumptions about the firm and perfect competition are simply vehicles by
means of which these ends [deriving formal implications for market prices and outputs, resource
allocation, equilibria, and other aggregate properties of economic systems] are pursued.” 8 Thus,
the formal and mathematical reasoning of neoclassical economics generally takes no account of
the process by which economic results are effected by the firm. Indeed, as observed by Fligstein
and Dauter, neoclassical economics treats such major elements of the economic process as production, exchange, and competition as other “black boxes”9 that are also not “unpacked” by neoclassical theory.
Sidney Winter maintains that while orthodox economic theory “recognizes two aspects of coordinating economic activity, the interfirm aspect and the intrafirm aspect”, and posits markets as the
answer to the first aspect, it does not explicitly address the answer to the second, intrafirm, aspect.
Accordingly, “textbook orthodoxy provides no basis for explaining the organization of economic
activity.”10
As economic activity is, ipso facto, “activity”, it is therefore irrelevant to a theory that ignores or
“invisibilizes” all “activity”. Consequently, economic activity, as activity, is not usually considered to be a proper subject of investigation for neoclassical economic theory. Ex hypothesi, processes, which do involve activity, must, therefore, also be beyond its purview. In consequence,
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many of the questions that arise for consideration in connection with economic activity are questions not readily amenable to answers, or even to investigation, within neoclassical theory, and, in
particular, within the neoclassical theory of the firm.
This lack of attention to, or “invisibilization” of, process reduces the predictive efficacy and utility
of such a theory, not only at macro-economic, but also at micro-economic, levels. Indeed, a signal
criticism that can be made of neoclassical economic theory is that, in general, it ignores the
processes by which its theorized assumptions may be said to be operationalized. Surely, the failure
to explicate processes of such importance to economic theory demonstrates the lack of
completeness, predictive capacity, and salience, of such theory.
Theory and Empirical Investigation
We would note, however, that the exclusion of processes, ex hypothesi, from neoclassical economic theory is not in any way characteristic only of “the firm”. For example, the theory does not
attempt any explanation, beyond aggregation, of how demand arises, or of how suppliers choose
what level of production to achieve in an environment in which there are many possible suppliers.
The posited achievement of, or tendency towards, equilibrium does not sufficiently explain how
producers of goods act so as to maximize their respective profits in the presence of other alternative
producers seeking the same result. Consequently, the failure to explain the means by which the
firm engages necessary inputs, including raw materials and labour, and employs them to generate
equilibrium outputs, in order to maximize profit, is not the only failure to explicate process that
characterizes neoclassical theory.
It is interesting that theory, in other social sciences and cognate disciplines, is not generally elevated to such a level of dominance that it is considered to preclude consideration of how such
theory may be applied “in the real world”. For example, a political theory is frequently subjected
to analysis in terms of its predictive efficacy and utility. This is also the case with respect to social
theory, whether in philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, or psychology; or in
more specific fields of investigation such as business strategy, organizational behaviour, management, strategy, and other business and management disciplines. Instead, those social sciences and
organizational and business disciplines maintain some equanimity between theory, on the one
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hand, and activity, including process, on the other. In such disciplines and fields, activity and process are thought to be proper subjects not only for theorizing, but also for empirical investigation
and, in accordance with scientific method, to further refinement and testing of theory, in effect, as
an iterative process.
A common view in those disciplines is that theory without empirical investigation of the subjectmatter (so as to frame the questions for theoretical analysis) and testing of the theory at hand is
without significant merit, other than as an analytic exercise, as it generates no actions (other than
logical analysis, debate, and further theorizing), verifiable or otherwise, in the academic sphere;
and thus generates no resulting actions “in the real world”; and, accordingly, is without consequences or, at least, significant meaningful consequences, in the real world. Analysis without verification is a logical, but not a practical, course of action. At the same time, it must be recognized
that analysis of real world phenomena must proceed to at least some degree from some examination of real world phenomena, and not from pure logic alone.
It is obvious to even a neophyte observer, however, that empirical investigation without theory is,
if not impossible, then at least somewhat pointless, since even the performance, categorization,
and retention of the proceeds of such investigations must proceed according to some rational and
theoretical taxonomy. That is clearly the case with respect to the derivation of conclusions, testable
hypotheses, and specification of questions for further research.
It may be argued that it is almost beyond credulity to maintain that a theory which is, by its own
terms, incapable of advancing beyond theory, is satisfactory. Such a theory may be interesting
from analytical, logical, coherence, and argumentational perspectives, but if it lacks explanatory
power, it is highly unsatisfactory as a guide to living in the real world. It can readily be seen that
humans regularly compare theory and theoretical constructs to their experience in the real world.
Even many of the most abstract discussions by philosophers make reference to “real world” experience.
The Model of the Firm and Its Lack of Organizational Attributes
The present work has already suggested that the assumption that each economic actor is an “atomistic individual” acting alone ignores or “invisibilizes” the firm as a social construct; thereby ignoring or invisibilizing social activities and processes both within and without “the firm”. When
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that atomistic individual or entrepreneur acts monadically in the economy as a “firm”, such atomistic individual person is reified or “entified”. The reified individual or entrepreneur, now a “firm”,
which results from this process is, however, devoid of personal or social attributes. This is surely
fallacious, even on neoclassical grounds alone.
In this process of reification, the atomistic individual who seeks to satisfy or satisfice his or her
own wants and needs seems to disappear. Yet it is still the wants and needs of that atomistic individual that are said to motivate the behaviour of the neoclassical “firm”. Somehow, those wants
and needs do not continue in the firm as simple wants and needs of the individual concerned, but,
instead, the single concept of “profits”, alone and without accompaniment or qualification, stands
in for them, in terms of the desiderata of the individual who is now reified as “the firm”. While
individuals may seek to maximize or optimize the satisfaction of their wants and needs, or their
“utility”, it is not those wants and needs that become the object of economic action by the firm
which is, instead, profit, and only profit, in neoclassical theory. Armen Alchian, an early leader in
evolutionary economics and new institutional economics, differs from the neoclassical position in
concluding that the proper object of the economic activity of the firm, in the face of uncertainty,
is not profit maximization or utility maximization but, instead, is, simply, the generation of positive
profits.11
Somehow, as the individual becomes reified as “the firm” in neoclassical theory, the multiplicity
of that individual’s wants and needs become unified, homogeneously, as “profit”. Thus, it becomes
unnecessary and even impossible to prioritize or to attach different weightings to the individual’s
wants and goals, as might have been the case if one were considering such several wants and needs
as appurtenant only to the individual concerned. Similarly, in neoclassical theory, other distinctions among an individual’s wants and goals may be eliminated and, instead, treated as homogeneous when considered at the aggregate level.
For example, an individual may express wants or goals that are intrinsically physical or personal,
such as reducing weight, improving strength or conditioning, learning to play a musical instrument,
learning a new language, or achieving a working comprehension of behavioural economics. The
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mere aggregation of these wants and goals, as a single goal, namely, utility, even if considered
solely in relation to economic matters, namely, as “profit”, may not adequately address the individual’s wants and goals.
In fact, even an aggregation of these wants and goals, not just in terms of economics, but quantified
in terms of overall “utility”, that is, the aggregate number of “utiles” received or expected or contemplated to be received by that individual, may not satisfy his or her wants and goals in any
meaningful sense. The individual may evaluate certain particular wants or goals as being of independent importance. However such determinations may be evaluated at the level of the individual,
when that individual is reified as “the firm” whose only object, ex hypothesi, is the pursuit of profit,
such considerations disappear.
The result may be the same when an individual’s wants or goals are teleologically distinct. Some
wants or goals may be instrumental, in the sense that they are conducive to the attainment of certain
higher order wants and goals; however, the individual may also derive some satisfaction from the
realization of the instrumental goal which is independent of the achievement of the higher order
want or goal. In this way, aggregation of wants and goals at a high level may not produce the
result(s) sought by the individual concerned; instead, disaggregation may be more representative
of such result(s).
Admittedly, since the ultimate want or need of an atomistic individual is self-preservation, which
utilitarians consider necessary for the satisfaction of all other wants and needs, then consequent
upon the reification of the individual as the “firm”, it might be thought that the continued perpetuation of the firm would be a prerequisite for its generation, and hence maximization or optimization, of profit(s). The continuous objective of self-perpetuation is, of course, a feature that is observed in connection with most, if not all, organizations and institutions.12 The continued existence
of the firm, as a reified atomistic individual person, may, however, raise questions that would be
difficult for neoclassical economics to consider, let alone answer.
Of course, since the firm, ex hypothesi, is not considered as an aggregation of individuals (even of
those individuals who participate in its operations), the aggregation of the wants and needs of such
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atomistic individuals, which are considered in political and social contexts, such as with respect to
political pluralism and Parsonian sociology, does not properly or logically arise for consideration
in the neoclassical economic theory of the firm. Thus, the personal and social characteristics of the
atomistic individual who enters into economic activity as an entrepreneur cannot be attributed,
logically, to the firm, which is, in the case of a sole proprietor working alone, purely the reified
self of that entrepreneur.
Instead, his or her reification, in the form of the firm, is devoid of personal and social attributes,
including, for example, any relating to gender (as word usage in this sentence implies). It can be
readily seen that this eliminates consideration of the firm as an organization for economic purposes, although perhaps not necessarily for other purposes. The divorcement of neoclassical economics from politics and society would thereby be assured.
Fortunately, as we have shown, even those who are regarded as the founders of classical, neoclassical, and liberal economics have not been so thoroughgoing in their exclusion from the motivations driving individuals of the personal and social wants and needs of individuals, or in the purity
of their “atomistic” assumptions. This is demonstrated in the discussion in Appendix B, in Chapter
B2, under the headings “Thomas Hobbes’s Conception of Man” and “Adam Smith’s Conception
of Man”.
More recently of course, economists of varying degrees of orthodoxy have taken it upon themselves to consider the “organization” of business activities in terms of both interfirm and intrafirm
aspects, in Sidney Winter’s terminology,13 or extraorganizational and intraorganizational aspects,
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as discussed in the present work. Such economists notably have included Coase,14 Alchian,15 Alchian and Demsetz,16 Williamson,17 Grossman and Hart,18 and Hart and Moore,19 each in enormously influential works. The emphasis of the present work, of course, is on classical and neoclassical economics and theory of the firm, which has underlain relevant discourse in various disciplines and fields, legal and other.
The Entrepreneurial Model of the Neoclassical Firm and Economic Action
Again, the neoclassical theory of the firm, as Terry Moe indicates, “centers around the entrepreneur, a hypothetical individual who, by assumption, makes all decisions for the firm and is endowed with a range of idealized properties defining his knowledge, goals, computational skills,
and transaction costs”20 As we have already indicated, by definition, such an atomistic rational
individual does not constitute an “organization” and, as such, the processes of making and implementing decisions within an organization do not even arise for consideration. In the result, only
circumstances relating to decision-making by individuals are apt for consideration in relation to
decision-making by such a firm. As indicated in this work repeatedly, such a procedure, ex hypothesi, excludes inter-subjective, subject-to-group, and group-to-subject dynamics.
That the firm acts in the economy as a single economic actor follows, ex hypothesi, from the neoclassical model of the firm. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the firm of neoclassical economics
is a representation, reification, or entification of the single individual person taking economic action, that is to say, acting in the economic sphere. Thus conceived, it is logically impossible for
“the firm” to take economic action otherwise than singly, or as a single economic actor. To say
that that the firm is a single economic actor is, effectively, to express a tautology.
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The present chapter and the following chapter will further criticize the neoclassical model of the
firm as economic actor and will contrast this with alternative explanations of that role.
The Example of Competition
Similarly, neoclassical economics assumes that firms act independently of each other in the market. As Terry Moe mentions, “[i]ndustries are assumed populated by large numbers of firms that
take prices as given and make choices without any reference to the behavior of others.” Instead,
following Demsetz, he says that the neoclassical theory of perfect competition “is less a theory of
competition than a theory of decentralization - that is, a theory of how atomized decisional units,
without any mechanism of central coordination other than the free-market system of prices, can
produce outcomes that are optimal for the collective. The lessons to be learned are lessons about
prices and markets, not about competition.”21 That competition may involve interaction among
market participants, whether between buyers on the one hand and sellers on the other, or among
buyers among themselves or sellers among themselves, is assumed, ex hypothesi, to be beyond
consideration.
Markets and competition are examined by Harrison White in his much-cited 1981 article “Where
Do Markets Come From?”22 To answer this question, he proposed “embedding economists’ neoclassical theory of the firm within a sociological view of markets.”23 White finds that production
markets have two sides, producers on one side and buyers on the other side, and that each side
“continually monitors reactions of the other through the medium of a joint social construction, the
schedule of terms of trade.”24 As White maintains, this is consistent with the “signalling” theory
of Nobel laureate George Akerlof.25
White argues that each individual producer, however, acts purely on self-interest to determine its
own volume of production based on observations of the volume of production of other producers
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as observed in a constant feedback process, which is summarized in a “terms-of-trade schedule”
which includes, but is not normally limited to, price. In this way, each individual producer takes
action, independently and rationally, based upon information then available, and adjusts future
individual actions in accordance with the actions of other individual producers, also acting independently and rationally, based upon information then available to them. This results in an iterative
process involving action by economic actors and reaction by them to the actions of other economic
actors, a process which is not, however, identified or explicated by neoclassical theory.
As White explains, “pressure from the buyers creates a mirror in which producers see themselves
not consumers. Heterogeneous producers with their differentiated products may find and maintain
stable rules or niches”, based on self-interested optimizing by each producer, and in accordance
with trade-offs between costs and tastes. “Thus markets are shaped by trade-offs between dispersions, not by averages as suggested by the cliché that supply equals demand.”26 Correspondingly,
it could be argued that any hypothesized equilibrium would be an equilibrium of dispersions, not
of averages, of prices and quantities of the relevant products or services. This argument was discussed in Appendix B, in Chapters B1 and B2, in relation to Assumptions One and Four, under the
headings “The Problem of Aggregation” And “Identity or Similarity of Desires and Utility”, respectively.
The Neoclassical Firm and the Market
Consequently, says White, the “market emerges as a structure of rules with a differentiated niche
for each firm” such that each firm has a “distinctive product”.27 In effect, a variety of attributes,
such as product quality, location, and plant investment, may distinguish one producer from another
in terms of cost structures and in terms of attractiveness of their products to buyers.28 White explains that “a market is an “act” which can be “got together” only by a set of producers compatibly
arrayed on the qualities which consumers see in them.”29
That description of the market, which is based on empirical investigation, is quite different from
the description of the market in neoclassical economics. Whether or not such consciousness is
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actually attributed to the firm, or is considered simply to inhere in the model itself, each firm may
be said to “learn” from instantiations of action by others, and to “learn” to anticipate their possible
actions to actions by the subject firm itself, on a recursive or iterative basis.
In one sense, White’s description of the market advances a description which might be considered
as Darwinist, evolutionary, or, at least, developmental, insofar as it concerns the firm itself. In
order to generate profit and hence to ensure itself of survival, the firm seeks a product, quality, and
price “niche” or intersection at which the type of product, having a certain level of quality and
certain other attributes, which it offers for sale, is one which it is able to produce, offer for sale,
and sell at a price generated “in the market” which is, moreover, ideally one that will ensure its
survival. In this way, White’s analysis of the firm and of the market represents an advance on
classical and neoclassical economic theory.
Conclusion
The argument advanced in this section is that the proposition that the firm acts, vis-à-vis other
economic actors, always and only, as a single economic actor is largely, if not exclusively, a consequence of the neoclassical concept of the firm. As Terry Moe maintains, the neoclassical firm
“is simply a black box that produces optimal choices automatically as a function of any given
environment”.30 Fligstein and Dauter take this further, arguing that neoclassical economics also
treats major elements of the economic process, such as production, exchange, and competition, as
“black boxes” that are not “unpacked” by neoclassical theory.31 Just as the “neoclassical theory of
the firm is not in any meaningful sense a theory of economic organization”32, as Moe maintains,
neoclassical theory fails to provide an adequate theory of the economic process generally.
This section has maintained that the neoclassical “black boxes” identify elements of economic
“input” and “output”, but do not identify or explicate what transpires inside each “black box” beyond making generalized assertions of neoclassical theory, such as the posited interactions of supply, demand, price, quantity, and asserting the existence of an equilibrium. On the one end, the
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neoclassical firm engages in interaction by means of supply and demand with suppliers of production inputs, while, at the other end, it engages in interactions by means of supply and demand with
purchasers of the firm’s production outputs.
Such interaction, “at the back end”, however, is limited to stipulation of the prices and quantities
of goods. Similarly, “at the front end” such interaction is also limited to stipulation the prices and
quantities of goods. In neoclassical theory, however, some combination of this double-ended and
extremely limited “interaction”, however, effects the assumed equilibrium at both ends of the production and sale process. The details of how products are produced by the firm and offered for sale
and sold by it to generate profit and continue carrying on business are ignored, or, as is maintained
in the present work, “invisibilized”, as if they are of no interest to neoclassical economic theory.
In this regard, Harrison White’s “embedding” the “economists’ neoclassical theory of the firm
within a sociological view of markets”33 seeks to provide some guidance in “unpacking” these
actions and interactions and, in particular, “unpacking” the nature of markets.
In effect, then, the present section maintains that neoclassical theory “invisibilizes” the processes
or activities of the economy: not only the processes or activities which are carried on within the
neoclassical “firm”, such as those involved in manufacturing or producing some good or in producing some service, but also those which are carried on without the neoclassical “firm” in selling
its products or services and in competing with other suppliers of similar products or services, and
in competing more generally with suppliers of all other products and services for allocations of
funds available for purchases of goods and services in general.
In modelling the neoclassical “firm” as an atomistic individual entrepreneur, neoclassical theory
reifies or entifies the atomistic individual who acts independently and monadically. Thus reified
or entified, the “firm” is devoid of personal or social attributes except those attributed to the atomistic individual in neoclassical economic theory. Those attributes include not only atomism and
independent action, but also rational action based on perfect information, and perfect knowledge
of all available alternatives, and the respective likelihoods of their eventuating, and the concomitant risks of the same.
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In other words, the entrepreneur as firm does not possess or, as a result of aggregation, acquire any
additional attributes that reflect its aggregation of atomistic individuals, in their several capacities
as entrepreneur, manager, employee, and so on, their interaction as individuals with others as individuals, the interactions of each individual with groups within the firm, the interactions of each
individual with each other individual as members of such groups, and the respective interactions
of groups, as such, with other groups, as such.
As argued in this section and elsewhere in this work, such a hypothetical with respect to, and such
analytical construction of, the firm not only occludes or invisibilizes its operations, including its
structure, processes, and personnel, but also occludes or invisibilizes any characteristics or attributes that are distinctive as a result of its aggregation of individuals in performing economic actions.
As mentioned here, these include intra-firm and inter-firm actions.
As has also been noted here, the identification of “utility” for the individual with “profit” for the
firm thereby eliminates the operation of multiple, complementary or conflicting, instrumental, and
non-firm-level goals. Thus, for example, such a hypothetical and construction of such a model
eliminates, logically, the possibility that a division, department, or function within the “firm” might
have goals distinctive of or peculiar to that division, department or function, which might be held
and pursued independently of the firm-level goals and which might be pursued at different levels
of congruity with firm-level goals.
As discussed earlier in this section, the neoclassical theory of the firm and of economic action
generally contemplates its advancement by logical and mathematical investigation, rather than by
means of the “scientific method” of empirical investigation involving advancement of hypotheses
which are then subjected to testing, recording and observation results, and any necessary refinement, alteration, or rejection, by means of an iterative process. In this regard, the investigative
procedure adopted by Harrison White with respect to competition and markets provides a salutary
example.
Not only does his analysis represent an advance on neoclassical theory but, even more importantly,
for our purposes, his analysis contrasts with the neoclassical “model’ of the firm and of non-iterative action by the firm, neither of which, of course, accord with an investigation of the economy,
and of the firm, which proceeds empirically, rather than purely abstractly. In this respect, we must
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agree with Polanyi that some investigation of such phenomena, as is the case generally, is in order
before the processes of categorization, consideration, and analysis can effectively proceed. To this,
we turn in the next section.
EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION OF THE FIRM IN ACTION
We now proceed to examine whether observations support the propositions that the actors in the
economic sphere are firms, that firms act as in the economy as a single actor, and that these firms
act independently of each other. This is in accordance with our declared descriptivist methodology
and our investigations up to this point.
In this regard, Chapter One and Appendix B of the book examined various generalizations and
assumptions advanced in academic literature and otherwise concerning the essential attributes of
the firm, and, more specifically, of the modern business corporation, as a matter of law. It then
considered, as an empirical matter, whether and to what extent those essentialist legal attributes
were instantiated in modern corporate law statutes. In effect, the aim of this procedure was to
determine whether what was advanced in the literature as essentialist legal attributes really were
regarded and adopted as such in modern corporate law statutes.
As explained earlier, this part, Part 2, together with Appendix B, examines discourse concerning
the firm and concerning the corporation, including, in particular, discourse from classical and neoclassical economics, as well as from other disciplines and fields, in that behalf. As noted above,
Chapters B1 through B3 of Appendix B examine the macroenvironment of the firm and the modern
business corporation as related to society, the polity, and the state, while Chapters B4 and B5
consider a number of generalizations and assumptions advanced in economic and other discourse
concerning what might be described as the “microenvironment” of the firm and the modern business corporation, in the sense of the immediate environment in which the firm and the modern
business corporation take economic action. Those chapters are commended to the reader’s attention, at least as highly important background for the present discussion, but their reading should
not be absolutely necessary to understanding the basic presentation of this chapter and the following chapter.
The present chapter and the next chapter examine whether, and if so, how, these generalizations
and assumptions have been instantiated in the recent past and currently. In a work of such a nature
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as the present one, such examination must, necessarily, rely on summaries and reviews of empirical
research, some in the nature of literature reviews, and some in other forms. As in the case of this
work’s consideration of relevant discourse, this will include, but not be limited to, economic discourse, and will include, but not be limited to, corporate legal essentialist discourse.
As explained in further detail below, it is both appropriate and useful to this purpose to consider
some history of the firm, of the corporation, and, in particular, of the modern business corporation,
in this regard. This investigation is intended to place the current instantiation of the modern business corporation, as a matter of corporate law and otherwise, and the current state of discourse
concerning the firm and the corporation, in some historical context. In this regard, limitations affecting the present work require the use of works of business history.
Consequently, this examination will proceed by considering the observations made by the eminent
(and, arguably, founding) business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., with respect to the development of business organizations, primarily in the United States, beginning about 1850. Among other
things, Chandler chronicles the development of integration, geographic expansion and diversification; multi-level management in unitary corporations; multi-divisional (or “M form”) corporations;
strategy, as a business method and as a management discipline, including the separation of strategic and operational decision-making, and the relationship between strategy and structure; and the
importance of management activities to organizational performance.
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We will then proceed to examine further refinements, challenges, and theorizations by later commentators from management34, political35, sociological,36 anthropological,37 economic,38 and legal39 perspectives. Among other things, this examination will reveal the ways in which business
units (“BUs”) function in relation to their controlling organization and in relation to each other;
and the ways in which internal competition and cooperation may develop among them; the ways
in which strategic objectives influence the organizational structure of the overall enterprise; the
political nature of internal behaviour of organizational constituents within the organization itself;
and the ways in which corporations function as social organizations.
As our present concern is whether or not the firm acts as a single economic actor and independently, we will leave for later consideration issues relating to the distribution and exercise of
power, as well as their effects, within the firm; issues relating to employment within the firm,
including the nature of the relationship between employees and the firm; the differences between
actual and apparent authority; the differences between actual and apparent positional authority and
power; and similar issues.
PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF BUSINESS HISTORY
A Note on Methodology
In keeping with the purpose and scope of the present work, it will not undertake a methodological
survey of descriptions of the modern business corporation; but, instead, will assume that readers
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share a general familiarity with the modern business corporation. Of course, this general familiarity may have been amplified by the discussion, in Part 1, of the essential attributes of the modern
business corporation, and how they have been instantiated in four major corporate law statutes.
For present purposes, the work also will not chronicle the development of business organizations
prior to modern times. Instead, it is proposed that a subsequent work would set forth some of the
historical background to modern business corporations research which has assisted in corroborating preliminary conclusions as to the associative or corporative nature of the modern business
corporation that are enunciated in the present text.
Of course, many histories of the development of business organizations commence with the Industrial Revolution and the Second Industrial Revolution in Great Britain and elsewhere, while
others start their review with the charter or monopoly companies established to undertake exploration and trading on behalf of their respective monarchs. Still others initiate their discussions with
the development of guilds, trading markets and the development of the lex mercatoria in the Middle Ages.
It is the considered estimate of this author, based upon extensive review of secondary sources,
many of which involve extensive consideration of primary source materials that business organizations, having many, if not all, of the features of the modern business corporation are much more
ancient than many conventional reviews suggest, and that such business enterprises were operative, at least, by Ancient Roman times. Indeed, it can be conjectured based on available evidence
discussed in relevant literature that such business organizations may have operated in Ancient
Greece and even beyond those times to even older Ancient Middle Eastern civilizations. It is also
the considered opinion of this author, based upon extensive review of secondary sources, that the
historical record as explicated to date corroborate the author’s view as to the associative or corporative development and constitution of modern business organizations, including the modern business corporation.
Business History and This Work
Consistent with the purpose and scope of this work, however, it will not seek to examine the historical development of business organizations from earliest times to the present. Instead, it will
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consider the development and present state of the modern business corporation or MBC as described by one its foremost expositors and historians, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. At present, we will
limit this examination to matters that affect or may affect the issue of whether the modern business
corporation acts as a single economic actor. However, many of his insights with respect to other
matters will be mentioned in Part 3 of the book, especially insofar as they relate to other assumptions of modern corporate law and corporate governance theories.
Chandler is generally credited with having been a pioneer in organizational studies and, in particular, with having conducted the first real empirical studies of modern business enterprises, especially modern business corporations, by means of his study of the history of the development of
the modern business corporation. The first of his two major works, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise40, was published in 1962. A poll of the Fellows of
the Academy of Management placed it as the eleventh most influential management book of the
twentieth century, 41 cited in more than 20,000 academic works.42
This chapter will review Chandler’s empirical work for three principal purposes: firstly, to ascertain the principal features of the modern business corporation “in the real world” in recent history
and today, as an economic actor and otherwise; secondly, to compare and contrast Chandler’s
observations with classical and neoclassical economic models of the firm; and, thirdly, to examine
the relationship between the modern business corporation as instantiated “in the real world” and
corporate essentialism, particularly corporate legal essentialism, as instantiated in modern corporate law.
This procedure is in accordance with the overall “descriptivist” or “empirical” orientation of the
present work. This work began with an exposition of the features of the corporation, as a single
legal entity or “rights-and-duty bearing” entity, which have been generally considered to constitute
its principal attributes: limited liability or assets partitioning, transferable equity interests, capital
lock-in, central management independent of ownership of “owners”, and indefinite and possibly
unlimited duration. Chapter One and Appendix A of this work then examined the extent, if any, to
40
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which those principal attributes were instantiated in modern corporate law. In this way, it considered the question: what, as a matter of law, is the corporation?
The preceding part of the present chapter, together with Appendix B, considers discourse from
various academic disciplines or fields concerning the firm and, where applicable, the corporation
and the modern business corporation, in relation to the economy, the society, the polity, and the
state. In this way, that part of the book considers the discourse relating to the macroenvironment,
as well as the microenvironment, of the firm or the corporation. Thus, it endeavours to ascertain
the extent, if any, to which such discourse might be expected to influence the firm and the corporation, as a matter of law, and otherwise. That part of the book proceeds in this investigation by
considering generalizations or assumptions of relevant discourse and by subjecting them to examination, criticism, comparison, and assessment of their explanatory and predictive values. Thus, it
has a somewhat different purpose than the remainder of this Part 2 of the book. Hence, the chapters
in Appendix B can be read somewhat discretely from the balance of Part 2.
The remaining section of Part 2 of this work, being this chapter and the next following chapter,
bears comparison with Part 1 and Appendix A of this work inasmuch as the present chapter and
Appendix B investigate the question: what is the modern business corporation today? Put another
way, what are its features as we experience them “in the real world”? How does that description
and how do those features compare with the essential legal attributes of the corporation discussed
in Part 1 and Appendix A of this work? At the same time, the present section, together with Appendix B, compares the empirical description of the modern business corporation with relevant
academic discourse, including discourse concerning the essential attributes of the firm and the
essential legal attributes of the corporation, most particularly, those of the modern business corporation.
The ambition of the present work is to demonstrate: what the corporation is, in reality, including
“legal reality”; and in discourse, principally in relation to economic, organizational, social, and
political theory; what it is that a legal theory of the corporation must seek to explain; and to advance
a legal theory of the corporation that takes the foregoing considerations into account.

158

HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN BUSINESS CORPORATION
Strategy and Structure
While now more than fifty years old, Strategy and Structure is still considered a seminal work in
the study of the modern business corporation and the classic, albeit not unchallenged, exposition
of the history of its development. As an introduction to an empirical examination of the modern
business corporation and many of the issues we seek to examine, it has an extremely high level of
utility.
Post-Civil War Vertical Integration and Diversification
A previously unpublished paper that Chandler presented to the 1959 meeting of the Business
History Conference the University of Illinois, which was published in 1990 as “Integration and
Diversification as Business Strategies – An Historical Analysis”,43 gives some indication of his
prior thinking on the development of American industry. There, Chandler defines strategy as “a
company’s basic business objectives and policies” and refers to it as being defined by the answer
to the question “what exactly is our business or what should it be?”44
Chandler maintains that American industrial companies since their beginnings in the years after
the American Civil War had followed four types of business strategies: first, vertical integration
(whether only to market or also to distribute, and control, its supplies), which was then, followed
by three sorts of diversification, which he called full-line (selling more than a single line of
products, for example, not just tires but rubber products generally); which was sometime extended
to multi-line (for example, selling not just rubber products, but also chemical products); and finally
the policy of continuing product turnover (introducing new products based on continuous and
systematic research).45 He suggested that the tactics and routine activities, as well as the
Alfred D Chandler, Jr., "Integration and Diversification as Business Strategies – An Historical Analysis" (1990) 2
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management structure, of each company reflected the company’s basic strategy and its evolution,
and that its strategic shifts seemed to respond, in each case, to fundamental changes in the nation’s
economy and technology.46
Chandler sought to demonstrate that producers seeking to increase their profits pursued quite distinct strategies. It is clear that achievement of optimal cost, profit, production, and profit levels are
of concern in “the real world”. However, beyond seeking profit, lowering cost, and achieving input
costs and output prices and a level of output that will achieve an optimal quantum of profit and
cost, the details of strategy are not, ex hypothesi, addressed in neoclassical theory. While some
later developments attempt to deal with such matters, such refinements are not part of the classical
and neoclassical model extant at the time at which modern corporate law and legal theory and
related corporate governance theory and practice developed and upon which they may still rely.
Innovation and Organizational Complexity
Chandler seeks to derive some lessons from the divergent methods of strategy pursued by his exemplar companies and asks: “What then do changes in strategy suggest about America's industrial
past?”47 He identifies three principal developments that are so suggested. The first concerns the
“major underlying innovating forces in the industrial economy”, considering “innovating in
Schumpeter's sense of encouraging the creation of new products, processes, markets, supplies, and
forms of organization.” He identifies those major forces as “successively, the creation of the national and increasingly urban market, the coming of new sources of power, and the application of
science to industry.”48
The second development which he identifies is the change in entrepreneurial decision-making and
organizational structure as a result of these social and technological developments. According to
Chandler, the task of industrial entrepreneurs prior to the growth of a national market was thought
the reason is not an accumulation of "so many good observations about how firms work that we do not need any
more." See supra note 3 (1988) at 168-9. Winter opines that Coase was right in maintaining that the boundaries, and
hence inner workings, of firms are within the purview of economics. Similarly, Coase evinced an appreciation for the
"realism of assumptions" with respect to the theory of the firm. Of course, Chandler's doctoral dissertation was
submitted in history.
46
Supra note 43 at 66.
47
Ibid at 73.
48
Ibid. Criticism of Chandler as treating development of market demand and an increasingly urban and national market
as completely endogenous, rather than “furthered”, “developed” or even "created” by manufacturers is beyond our
present scope. Instead, we focus on the implications of such developments upon management of the enterprise.
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to involve primarily manufacturing for an impersonal market over which the entrepreneur had little
control. Pursuing a strategy of vertical integration, however, involved the entrepreneur not only in
the manufacturing function, but in other industrial functions as well, including “the needs and ways
of the purchasing and production of raw materials, of the distribution and marketing of finished
products, and of finance and organization”, as well as working out “the ways and means for carrying on a new economic function of coordinating product flow.”49 A strategy of diversification
extended the entrepreneurs’ horizons still further, from multi-functional to multi-industrial, and
from national industry to the national economy. As such, “[i]n time his decisions became primarily
to determine what businesses his firm should enter, which it should leave, and which it should
maintain.”50
Chandler identifies the third major development as a change in the structure of the industrial corporation arising from diversification, namely, decentralization.51
Chandler seeks to investigate how innovation occurs. We have seen that such a question does not
readily arise, nor is it readily a subject for discussion and, as such, for resolution, in the neoclassical
paradigm. Still less does the question arise how producers respond to demographic and technological developments in seeking to develop their strategy and to structure the organization to best
effect. It is not necessary for this purpose to inquire whether the innovations Chandler describes
resulted from entrepreneurial activity; instead, the comments he makes above focus attention on
the challenges that such innovations present to the “industrial entrepreneur”.
At this point, Chandler is considering only the “industrial entrepreneur”, who is much like the
neoclassical owner-manager, and he has not yet introduced the complexities of an organization
embracing hundreds, thousands, or hundreds of thousands of individuals, and of coordinating their
activities. Even at this point, however, it can be seen that the complexity of the information relevant
to, and required to be considered in connection with, the decision-making Chandler describes as
required to be made by the “industrial entrepreneur” is massive indeed.
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It would be impossible for the “industrial entrepreneur” to have perfect information concerning all
these matters and to be able to apply such information cogently and rationally. Chandler’s readers
may infer that the industrial entrepreneur will have to make decisions with imperfect information,
under conditions of uncertainty, from some one or more perspectives, including the background
and experience of the relevant decision-maker, which perspective(s) may introduce bias and further indeterminacy into his or her decision-making. Thus, the neoclassical assumption of perfect
rationality is not seen as obtaining outside of theory.
Chandler finds, then, that the strategy of industrial companies in the United States responded to
changes in their external environment, including the development of new technology and other
resources requisite or appropriate to their business, and that their responses changed the nature of
decision-making in, and the structure of, the organization itself. In effect, his “entrepreneur decisions” (discussed further below) and their implementation became vastly more complex and, we
may conjecture, required vastly greater (albeit imperfect) information, and presumably much more
in the way of management, entailing a more elaborate and specialized management structure.
These findings seem to be based upon the research which Chandler had been conducting which
was later reflected in his book Strategy and Structure.
Separate Development Trajectories
In Strategy and Structure, Chandler published the results of his investigations of organizational
innovation in four major companies: E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., General Motors Corporation,
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), and Sears, Roebuck and Company, concluding that they
developed independently of each other, and without imitation, seeking solutions to problems that
each considered unique, and producing what each of them thought to be genuine innovations.52
His investigation disclosed a number of important facts. The first of these was that “a meaningful
analysis of the creation of the new administrative form called for accurate knowledge about the
firm's previous organization and in fact about its entire administrative history.”53 Thus, apart from
issues of path dependence, he concluded that the present organizational structure of a corporation
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could not be understood without appropriately individuated historical context. The second, but
related, point was that “changes in organizational structure were intimately related to the ways in
which the enterprise had expanded”, an evaluation of which “demanded a detailed understanding
of the company's methods of growth.”54 This points to the importance of organizational history as
an element of overall business history.
Chandler’s remaining points related to “the history of the American business economy”.55 The
third point was that the patterns of growth of each company “reflected changes in the over-all
American economy, particularly those affecting the market or demand for the enterprise's products.” His fourth point was that the changes made in the organization of the company concerned
“were influenced by the state of the administrative art in the United States at the time they were
being carried out.”56 That is to say, just as technological developments affect strategic orientation,
so developments in organizational methodology across a broad spectrum may affect changes in
the organization of a particular business enterprise.
Changes in structure, according to Chandler, reflected not only changes in strategy, by means of
which the company adapted to changes in demand, the market, and in the economy generally,
which we may describe as changes in the external environment; but also changes in administrative
demands, methods, and capabilities, which may involve, at least partly, changes in the internal
environment of the organization. While beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm, evolutionary
theory in economics, as developed by Nelson and Winter, recognizes “the firm within established
routine possesses resources on which it can drop very helpfully in the difficult task of attempting
to apply that routine on a large scale”;57 and, this author would maintain, in other circumstances
to which such routine might be relevant.
As mentioned earlier, we would characterize some of these as changes in resources. They also
involve processes and their analysis, implementation, assessment, and monitoring, which we have
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seen to be absent from the neoclassical model of the firm. Such processes may themselves be
considered to constitute resources of the subject-corporation.
Further, we may infer from Chandler’s description that the multiplicity of influences on the enterprise, the extent and salience of such influences, and the nature, effectiveness, and quantum of
responses to them create a pattern of development of the enterprise that has a certain individuality
or even “uniqueness”. This developmental “footprint”, in turn, may be said to exhibit a tendency
towards some kind of path dependence. Slight differences in the nature or impact of these four
influences might be expected to have a significant effect on the future path of development of the
organization concerned.
Enterprise Development and the Economic Model of the Firm
Chandler demonstrates that the development path or trajectory of one corporation may be uniquely
different from that of another, even if they are operating in the same industry and geographic area.
In turn, this suggests that previously determined methods of analyzing organizational development, at least those which are based on strategic congruence within companies in the same industry
(“industry dependence”), may not yield accurate results in the case of any particular enterprise
concerned. Such patterns of development, of course, since they relate to characteristics of the organization and structure of the firm, are, in consequence, external to neoclassical assumptions.
Chandler was sensitive to actual and possible effects that the nature of business conducted by the
corporation might have on its methods of organization. As he studied only four major industrial
corporations in depth, he purported to limit his conclusions to the industrial enterprise, which he
described as the “large private, profit-oriented business firm involved in the handling of goods in
some or all of the successive industrial processes from the procurement of the raw material to the
sale to the ultimate customer”,58 thereby excluding utilities and companies involved in transportation, and purely financial, activities.
While Chandler studied in detail only four major industrial corporations, he “briefly examined”
the administrative histories of close to one hundred of America’s largest industrial enterprises,
including the fifty with the largest assets in 1909 and seventy of the largest by assets in 1948.59 In
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order that the sample might reflect a broader range of industries, he included an additional twenty
of the next largest companies. Consequently, his study involved considerable breadth and depth.
Chandler treated industrial enterprises as a subspecies of capitalistic enterprise, as defined by the
German economist and sociologist Werner Sombart to mean “an individual economic organism…
created over and above the individuals who constitute it” which “entity appears as the agent [in
the sense of “actor”] in each of these transactions and leads, as it were, a life of its own, which
often exceeds in length that of its human members.”60 Without digressing to consider the exact
meaning and history of the words “individual economic organism” in this context, it is clear that
it is considered to be: an entity, which itself takes action; which is separate from the individuals
who create or constitute it; which is constituted, represented, or, as we might say, “animated” or
“vivified” by human individuals; which exists separately from those individuals; and which may
continue to endure beyond the lifetime of any such individuals.
These characteristics conform to our discussion of legal essentialist attributes in Chapter One and
Appendix A of the present work. Although not specifically discussed, the transferability of shares
and the prospect of wholesale replacement of shareholders, and even employees, over time, and
from time to time, are consistent with Sombart’s and Chandler’s other descriptive elements of the
modern business corporation, especially separate existence and indefinite duration. Their lack of
discussion of the principles of asset separation (or asset partitioning) as between the corporation
and its shareholders is not critical to recognizing such general consistency and may be thought to
be, at least in part, reflective of the time at which they were writing.
Importantly, however, this description acknowledges, as a matter of business management and
business history, the existence of a relationship between the enterprise, or the “firm” of the economists, and the individual persons who create and constitute it. It may be expected, accordingly,
that the perspective advanced by Chandler will be, to at least some extent, in accordance with the
corporative perspective which is advanced in the present work.
Chandler, implicitly, at least, acknowledges the separation between the corporation, as a legal entity, on the one hand, and as an organization, on the other. Indeed, he considers the organization
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so important to the continuance of the legal entity that “[w]hile the enterprise may have a life of
its own, its present health and future growth surely depend on the individuals who guide its activities.”61 At the highest level of the enterprise, these individuals are the executives or, as Chandler
calls them, the “entrepreneurs”.
Chandler thus recognizes that his “enterprise”, the “firm” of the economists, or the “corporation”
as a legal entity, is dependent for action, including executive and managerial action, upon individual persons, and may be affected, as such, by certain characteristics, and other aspects, of their
behaviour. Such recognition is not generally part of neoclassical economic theory, but is endemic
to corporative theory. It is important to emphasize, however, that, while business, management,
and organizational disciplines may concentrate a great deal of attention on organizational aspects
of the business entity, the legal aspects of the business entity, and the importance of the same, are
also acknowledged by academics and practitioners in those disciplines.
Functions and Activities of Management
The complexity of managing such an enterprise may be enormous, involving many different functions and activities. Consequently, we may conclude that the multiplicity of influences on the enterprise, and the extent and salience of such influences, and the nature, effectiveness, and quantum
of possible responses by management of the enterprise to such influences may have significant
effect on the health, growth or decline, and duration or longevity, of such enterprise. Management
of such an enterprise must regularly, if not continuously, adapt to changes in the external environment, including adapting its strategy and structure, as well as processes, accordingly. Chandler is
generally credited with originating such perceptions.
Chandler maintains that “the functions of the executives responsible for the fortunes of the enterprise… [are to] “coordinate, appraise, and plan”, which, in many cases involves administering the
duties of other executives.62 As to the first and third such functions, in “planning and coordinating
the work of subordinate managers or supervisors, [the executive] allocates tasks and makes available the necessary equipment, materials, and other physical resources necessary to carry out the
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various jobs.” The second function, appraisal, involves deciding “whether the employees or subordinate managers are handling their tasks satisfactorily” and, if the answer is in the negative, “[the
executive] can take action by changing or bringing in new physical equipment and supplies, by
transferring or shifting the personnel, or by expanding or cutting down available funds.”63 Of
course, the executive level controls and allocates resources. Here, Chandler draws attention to the
effect that supplying additional resources or removing existing resources may have on the capabilities, scope of activity, authority, actions, and conformity to executive direction, of the manager
and his subordinates. Changes in resources may also be used to discipline managers.
Resource allocations are prerogatives of the executive of the enterprise. Chandler explains that the
“term, administration, as used here, includes executive action and orders as well as the decisions
taken in coordinating, appraising, and planning the work of the enterprise and in allocating its
resources.”64 Thus, Chandler finds that functional actions, such as selling or manufacturing, are
separate from administrative actions. As to the latter, some executives coordinate, appraise and
plan, while others administer the duties of other executives. Some executives do both.
When Chandler says that the top-level executives who guide the activities of the enterprise are
responsible for the fortunes of the enterprise, it is not immediately clear whether he is saying that
the nature of such guidance determines the fortunes of the enterprise, or that such guidance falls
to those responsible for its fortunes, or whether he is making both statements.
Whatever interpretation is placed on these observations, however, it is immediately apparent that
the observed industrial corporation is significantly more complex than the neoclassical model of
the firm; which cannot be seen as having any descriptive relevance to such corporation. As suggested here, the modelled single-person economic actor, the firm, does not require much in the
way of internal activities or processes other than individual decision-making, the parameters of
which are dealt with in its assumed parameters. Consequently, the abilities of the leaders and others
involved in administrative and functional roles, and differentials within them, at differing levels
of the organization, and as compared with those in other organizations, are not relevant to the
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neoclassical model assumptions. In that model, there simply are often no others other than the
entrepreneur.
Executive Management and Senior Management Roles
As we have seen, Chandler distinguishes between functional activity and administrative activity.
Functional activity involves essential tasks in the manufacturing process which are typically left
to employees in functional areas, such as buying (buyers), selling (salesman), advertising, accounting, manufacturing (production supervisors and foremen), and engineering and research (engineers, designers, and technicians).65 Administration, on the other hand, is an identifiable activity
distinct from functional work. In a smaller company, the same individuals or groups of individuals
may perform both administrative work and functional work; in a large company, however, “administration usually becomes a specialized, full-time job.”66
Administration, that is to say, coordinating, appraising, and planning the activities of the enterprise, says Chandler, involves two types of administrative tasks: firstly, defining basic goals and
the course of action, policies, and procedures necessary to achieve them, which activity focuses
on long term planning and appraisal and the long-run health of the company; and, secondly, activity focused on the smooth and efficient day-to-day operation of the business, meeting both anticipated problems and needs and unexpected contingencies or crises, all in accordance with the
broader framework of goals, policies, and procedures directed towards long-term success.67 He
says that in real life the distinction between these two types of activities or decisions is often not
clear cut, such that some activities and decisions involve both aspects, and in differing degrees.
Chandler acknowledges that even in small firms, coordination, appraisal and planning are essential
activities. However, in the larger industrial enterprises he examined, those activities, which he
calls “administration”, may become so specialized and intensive that it may engage the whole time
and attention of the highest level of management.68 These activities, which we may consider as
meta-activities (although not so denominated by Chandler), determine, facilitate, and enable the
other activities involved in the day-to-day work or operations of the business.
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In addition, planning, coordinating and appraising takes place on long-term, medium-term, and
short-term temporal horizons, and at different management levels. It is then executed in accordance
with long-term, medium-term, and short-term implementation and measurement horizons. It is
apparent from this that the nature of the task of Chandler’s “administration” or management may
depend to a significant degree upon such factors as the age, size, and scope of the business enterprise concerned.
Goals must be prioritized and their achievement planned, coordinated, and appraised. Some of
these tasks may be viewed as strategic, and others as tactical. Presumably, this entails, in some
cases, re-prioritizing goals, whether long-term, medium-term, or short-term, over time as may be
appropriate. Some goals may be instrumental, in the sense of being intermediate, as being necessary to or facilitative of higher order goals.
Administration also involves responding to immediate problems and needs, and to unexpected
contingencies or crises. It is apparent that these tasks involve complex decision-making and implementational processes. Chandler’s description would lead us to expect that the actual division
of, and time spent on, long-term planning and appraisal activities, as opposed to day-to-day operating activities, will vary with the size of the organization and the level of the administrator or
executive.
Administrative Levels and Activities
Rather than the owner-manager of neoclassical theory, the modern corporation engages a great
many managers, who are situated at different levels, which are also differentiated by task, authority
and means of control. These managers engage in activities and processes relevant to the business
of the organization. They occupy “positions” or “offices” within the organization, which can be
identified on the corporation’s “organizational chart” or “org chart”, a chart depicting how the
corporation is “organized” to carry on its business, which may involve various levels of subsidiary
corporations. Such organization of business may be highly dependent upon legal structure or relatively independent of the same; that is to say, in terms of how the presence of separate corporations, as separate legal entities, affects the organization by which the ultimate parent corporation
carries on its business. The legal structure of the overall enterprise is not expressed by Chandler
as being significant, but, of course, his objective is to describe the operating business, not the legal
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forms employed in such operations. Consequently, our discussion of the effects on business organization of the legal forms by which business may be carried on (and vice versa) must await
later discussion, principally in Part 3, in Chapters Seven through Ten inclusive.
Chandler finds that executives in a modern “decentralized” company carry out their administrative
activities from four different types of positions, each type having a different range of administrative activities and being on a different level of authority.69 “The four types of administrative positions in a large multidivisional enterprise are thus: the field unit, the departmental headquarters,
the division’s central office, and the general office.”70
At the top is a general office, “head office”, or headquarters, where “general executives and staff
specialists coordinate, appraise, and plan goals and policies and allocate resources for a number of
quasi-autonomous, fairly self-contained divisions.”71 It may deal with several industries or with
one industry in several broad and different geographical areas.72
Each division “handles a major product line or carries on the firm’s activities in one large geographical area” and its divisional central office administers a number of departments. 73 It deals
with one industry, rather than one function, and thus is concerned with “all the functions involved
in the over-all process of handling a line of products or services.” Consequently, the professional
horizons and contacts of such managers are determined by industry rather than by functional interests.74
Each department “is responsible for the administration of a major function – manufacturing, selling, purchasing or producing of raw materials, engineering, research, finance and the like”,75 generally on a broad regional or on a national scale. Their frames of reference, contacts, and sources
of information are normally related to that specialized function.76 “The departmental headquarters,
in its turn, coordinates, appraises, and plans for a number of field units.”77
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The lowest level, the field unit or field office, deals with a single function, such as marketing,
manufacturing, and engineering, only in one local area.78 It “runs a plant or works, a branch or
district sales office, a purchasing office, an engineering or research laboratory, an accounting or
other financial office, and the like.”79 Only at this level are the managers primarily involved in
carrying on or personally supervising day-to-day-to-day activities.80 However, if the volume of
activity is large, they may spend much of their time on administrative duties. These are “largely
operational, carried out within the framework of policies and procedures set by departmental headquarters and the higher offices.”81
Distribution of Decision-Making Authority
As described by Chandler, the head office “makes the broad strategic or entrepreneurial decisions
as to policy and procedures and can do so largely because it has the final say in the allocation of
the firm’s resources – money, men, and materials – necessary to carry out these administrative
decisions and actions and others made with its approval at any level.82
The departmental and divisional offices “may make some long-term decisions, but because their
executives work within a comparable framework determined by the general office, their primary
administrative activities also tend to be tactical or operational.”83
He explains that field offices deal with one function; that department offices deal with one function
on a regional or national scale; that division offices deal with one industry, rather than a function;
and that the general (or head) office may deal with several industries or with one industry in several
broad and different geographical areas, with the result that “their business horizons and interests
are broadened to range over national and even international economies.”84
According to Chandler’s findings, functions performed at lower levels are subject to policies and
procedures established at higher levels. At higher levels, decisions vary in their effect as between
those having short term, and those having long term, effects; and the higher the level, the greater
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the quantum (or, we may say, percentage) of decisions having long term effects. Chandler distinguishes the nature of such decisions further, as strategic or tactical, as described in the next section.
Strategic Decisions and Tactical Decisions
Chandler distinguishes between strategic decisions, which “are concerned with the long-term
health of the enterprise”, and tactical decisions, which “deal more with the day-to-day activities
necessary for efficient and smooth operations.” Strategic plans may be formulated at lower levels
of the enterprise, however, because they “usually require implementation by an allocation or reallocation of resources – funds, equipment, or personnel”, which is effected by a higher office, the
head office is in control of strategic decisions. Tactical decisions also require allocations of resources, however, executives at the lower levels carry out tactical decisions, provided that they are
in accordance with the broad policy outlines, and the allocation of resources, which are determined
by the head office.85
Chandler distinguishes between executives and managers on the basis of the nature of the decisions
which they make. The key personnel in any enterprise are the executives, who actually allocate
available resources. Because of this “critical role in the modern economy” he denominates them
as “entrepreneurs” and, accordingly, denominates as “entrepreneurial decisions and actions” those
decisions and actions “which affect the allocation or reallocation of resources for the enterprise as
a whole.”86 He denominates as managers “those who coordinate, appraise, and plan within the
means allocated to them”. They make operating decisions and take operating actions, which are
defined, respectively, as decisions and actions “which are carried out by using the resources already allocated”.87
From this, it may be concluded that strategic decisions will tend to be made at higher levels of the
enterprise than tactical decisions, although some tactical decisions may be made at higher levels
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of management. While decisions even at the field office may involve certain commitments of resources, as decisions proceed to successively higher levels, the commitments of resources involved
in the bulk of decisions made at such levels increase concomitantly.
For present purposes, we will adopt the view that the distinction between strategic and tactical
decisions is best modelled as a continuum, as is the level of resources engaged in decisions. At the
extreme, some decisions that are highly strategic may involve a very high level of resource commitment, while others that are highly tactical may involve a very low level of resource commitment.
Resource Allocation and Entrepreneurial Activity
Chandler thus considers the distinctive function of the highest level of decision-making to be, not
only formulating strategy at the highest level, but also allocating resources at the highest level. He
denominates the resource allocation decision as “entrepreneurial”. Thus, he says that the performance of entrepreneurs, in the sense of executives allocating and reallocating resources for the
enterprise as a whole, may vary considerably and may impact the success or failure of the enterprise. He considers that such high level or entrepreneurial activity has a significant effect on the
economy:
Just because the entrepreneurs make some of the most significant decisions in the American economy, they are not all necessarily imbued with a long-term strategic outlook. In
many enterprises the executives responsible for resource allocation may very well concentrate on day-to-day operational affairs, giving little or no attention to changing markets,
technology, sources of supply, and other factors affecting the long-term health of their
company. Their decisions may be made without forward planning or analysis but rather by
meeting in an ad hoc way every new situation, problem, or crisis as it arises. They accept
the goals of their enterprise as given or inherited. Clearly wherever entrepreneurs act like
managers, wherever they concentrate on short-term activities to the exclusion or to the
detriment of long-range planning appraisal, and coordination, they have failed to carry out
effectively their role in the economy as well as in their enterprise. This effectiveness should
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provide a useful criterion for evaluating the performance of an executive in American industry.88
The necessity of a strategic outlook is immediately apparent. A strategic outlook facilitates coordination of decision-making in accordance with goals and objectives, whether long-range, medium-range, and short range, and a corresponding allocation of resources. Decision-making which
lacks such forward planning and analysis may result in misalignment of short-, medium-, and longterm goals and objectives with each other and a corresponding misallocation of resources. Decision-making which is not strategically aligned in these manners may increase the number of nonstrategic, or tactical, decisions required to be made at successively higher levels of the enterprise;
may also increase the number of such decisions required to be made in general; and, in part as a
result of the foregoing, may also fail to provide sufficiently rational grounds to guide such decision-making. All of the foregoing circumstances create opportunities for error.
As Chandler has indicated, the decisions made by such entrepreneurs, including prioritizing shortterm or tactical issues over longer-term or strategic issues, or vice versa, or, in effect, balancing
such considerations in some optimal or other satisfactory way may determine whether the enterprise involved continues or fails. As he says, failures of entrepreneurship may have an effect on
American industry and on the overall economy, and, the present writer would suggest, in appropriate cases, on the society and polity at large. We would hasten to note that not all these “entrepreneurial” decisions are of this nature, implicating success or failure of the organization. Indeed,
there may be very few decisions that are of this nature, considered in themselves. Similarly, there
may be many decisions that, when aggregated with others, are highly relevant to organizational
success or failure.
Chandler says that entrepreneurs must determine the strategy of the enterprise and allocate and
reallocate resources so as to effectuate it. In the present author’s opinion, one may consider the
structure, processes, activities, and personnel involved in the enterprise as resources in this regard.
Thus, the allocation of structure, processes, activities, personnel, and other resources within the
organization must be aligned and realigned as often as necessary to the strategy. In short, one must
88
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align structure, processes and personnel with each other and with strategy, including the external
environment and changes within it as they may be expected to affect, may affect, or may, sooner
or later, come to affect the enterprise.
Strategy and Tactics
Chandler’s study of the history and development of four major enterprises led him to conclude
that: “Strategy can be defined as the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of
an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for
carrying out these goals.”89 Such goals and objectives may include expanding the volume of the
enterprise activities, setting up distant plants and offices, entering into new economic functions,
and diversifying along some or many lines of business. Development of such new strategy may
require determination of new courses of action and allocation and reallocation of resources “in
order to achieve these goals and to maintain and expand the firm’s activities in the new areas in
response to shifting demands, changing sources of supply, fluctuating economic conditions, new
technological developments, and the actions of competitors.” Chandler thus emphasizes that a new
strategy may require regular, frequent, or even continuous readjustment of action plans and resource allocations. Thus, “[a]s the adoption of a new strategy may add new types of personnel and
facilities, and alter the business horizons of the men responsible for the enterprise, it can have a
profound effect on the form of its organization.”90
Of course, strategy is dependent on the availability of resources to the enterprise, as Jeffrey Pfeffer
and Gerald R. Salancik have demonstrated.91 Such resources may be external or internal to the
enterprise. As noted here, such resources may include administrative, informational, technological,
personnel, and other resources and capacities. It would appear even to casual observers that accessing either internal or external resources must involve some knowledge as to the existence,
extent, and nature of such resources, and of the processes and procedures required to be pursued
in order to access those resources. This is assumed by “rational” decision-making in economics
and otherwise. For Chandler, this is part of what he denominates as “structure”.
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Structure
Chandler asserts that: “Structure can be defined as the design of organization through which the
enterprise is administered” and he indicates that this design can be defined and effected either
formally or informally.92 The latter suggests, at least, that structure may evolve in such a way that
it lacks formal definition; that is to say that, that while social structure is acknowledged, it may
never have been formally adopted or otherwise formally recognized by or within the formal organization, at least by those having formal authority over such matters, but, nevertheless, still
characterizes the actual organization.
Chandler’s comment may also be taken, however, to suggest that in addition to a structure that has
been formally adopted, there may also be a kind of informal structure which is operative, one may
say, outside of, or alongside, the formal structure, which does not appear on any formal organizational charts, and which, therefore, may not be accorded specific “legal” recognition, which ordinarily concerns itself with “formal” or “legal” structure. Yet it may be important in how the overall
organization operates and to its compliance with applicable legal requirements. While Chandler
does not explicitly suggest this, such a suggestion has, of course, been made by other organizational theorists. Indeed, it may be contended that the formal/informal dichotomy may reach the
point at which it can be cogently observed that outside of, or alongside, the formal organization
there may often be a type of informal organization. The relative importance of the formal and
informal organizations may depend upon a number of relevant circumstances.
Chandler says that structure has two aspects: firstly, “the lines of authority and communication
between the different administrative offices and officers”; and, secondly, “the information and data
that flow through these lines of communication and authority.” Both aspects of structure “are essential to assure the effective coordination, appraisal, and planning” and the development and allocation of resources necessary to carry out the basic goals and policies of the enterprise. Chandler
notes that “[t]hese resources include financial capital; physical equipment such as plants, machinery, offices, warehouses, and other marketing and purchasing facilities, sources of raw materials,
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research and engineering laboratories; and, most important of all, the technical, marketing, and
administrative skills of its personnel.”93
The present author would argue, again, that structure may also be described as a species of resource. The design of the organization, the lines through which authority and communications
flow, and the methods of collecting, processing, and evaluating, information, and employing it in
decision processes provide essential resources to, and constitute an essential resource of, the enterprise.
Because Chandler’s concept of “structure” involves not only the lines of authority and communication, but also the content of such communications, it is clear that Chandler’s “structure” of the
organization may also be taken to comprehend, at least, the processes by which authority is exercised and communicated, and by which information is generated and transmitted. In fact, the processes endemic in structure may be much more far-reaching than this. Of course, all such activity
involves the personnel of the organization. Importantly for our purposes, both the lines of authority
and the lines of communication may affect the possibility of assigning legal responsibility for particular decisions, just as those factors affect the imposition of sanctions, both rewards and punishments, by the organization itself. These factors, of course, are not the only ones that affect collective decision-making, or even individual decision-making within organizations.
Accordingly, we may conclude that Chandler’s outline of the business enterprise, as an organization, comprehends structure, process, and personnel. This work will maintain that these three elements, namely, structure, process, and personnel, characterize organizations generally, and the
modern business corporation, in particular. These matters will be further discussed in Part 3 of this
work.
However, as discussed already, neoclassical theory of the firm, consisting of an entrepreneur or
owner, perhaps a manager, and possibly one or more worker-employees, does not inquire into the
nature, structure, processes, operations, or personnel of the firm. Consequently, it ignores or invisibilizes some of the most important issues of economic organization. Similarly, it does not inquire
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into the strategy of the firm. Instead, behaviour of firms, as previously discussed, is treated as a
function of the market, and of supply and demand.
As noted, structure, for Chandler, involves authority, communication, information, and decisionmaking, also involves the organization and operation of processes. As observed previously, processual issues are excluded from the neoclassical theory of the firm. Thus, questions as to the
relationship, if any, between strategy and structure, do not arise in neoclassical theory of the firm.
However, Chandler observes such relationship at work, as indicated in the immediately following
section.
The Relationship between Strategy and Structure, and Performance
Chandler indicates that “[t]he thesis deduced from these several propositions is then that structure
follows strategy and that the most complex type of structure is the result of the concatenation of
several basic strategies.”94 Administrative offices to handle a single function in one locality resulted from a strategy of expanding volume. A departmental structure and departmental offices to
administer several field units arose from a strategy of growth through geographical dispersion. The
strategy of expanding into new types of functions, which he describes as “a strategy of vertical
integration”, gave rise to the adoption of a central office or head office, and a multidepartmental
structure. The strategy of achieving growth by developing new lines of products or by geography,
this time on a national or international scale, which he describes as “a strategy of diversification”,
led to the creation of the multidivisional structure with a general office (today, generally called a
“head office”) to administer the various divisions.95
Chandler thus argues that when the organization makes a choice among different strategies, such
choice has implications for its structure. As he shows, growth effected by different means in accordance with different strategies requires different organizational adjustments. As previously observed, “structure”, for Chandler, includes the organization and operation of processes and of personnel. Accordingly, it is suggested here, and it is reasonably clear, that the interposition of additional structural elements and levels will usually require some adjustment to the process of the
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organization, and to its personnel, at least in terms of requiring additional staffing, and often requiring different talents and experience.
As noted, neoclassical theory of the firm precludes consideration of strategy (beyond such matters
as interfirm competition) and of process (beyond the operation of interfirm markets and related
matters), which entails that questions concerning the relationship of strategy and structure do not
even arise within it. The assumptions of neoclassical economics and, in particular, of its theory of
the firm, ignore or invisibilize considerations of individual and social action and behaviour. In fact,
Chandler’s work advanced criticism of neoclassical economics on this footing significantly. In a
later work, Chandler observed that “[t]he neoclassical theory views the firm as a legal entity with
a production set (a set of feasible production plans) from which a manager, acting rationally with
full information, chooses the set most likely to maximize profits or present value of the firm.”96
The “process” of decision-making is reduced to price/volume interactions by market participants
in the market.
Organizational Structure, Legal Structure, and Performance
Chandler’s work thus represents a significant advance in the theory of the firm, by theorizing it as
involving an organization. As noted previously, as Chandler still acknowledges the corporation as
a legal entity carrying on the enterprise, he simultaneously recognizes both its organizational and
its legal status.
Oliver Williamson, Nobel laureate and principal mover of transaction cost economics, including
its theory of the firm, conceded the accomplishments of, and his indebtedness to, Chandler’s Strategy and Structure.97 He observed that “Chandler clearly established that organization form had
important business performance consequences, which neither economics nor organization theory
had done (nor, for the most part, even attempted) before. The mistaken notion that economic efficiency was substantially independent of internal organization was no longer tenable after the book
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appeared.”98 Williamson claimed that this concept was revolutionary.99 He indicated that “the latent lesson” of the book was that “[i]f organization form was a decision variable, then provision
for that should thereafter be made in the theory of the modern corporation.”100 The revolutionary
nature of this lesson is indicated by Williamson’s observation that “[i]n many respects [Chandler’s]
historical account of the origins, diffusion, nature, and importance of the multidivisional form of
organization ran ahead of contemporary economic and organization theory.”101
Williamson thus credits Chandler with demonstrating: firstly, that organizational performance and
organizational structure were closely related; secondly, that organizational form is a decision variable; and, thirdly, that the theory of the modern corporation must provide for the form of the
organization. Indeed, Williamson may even be interpreted as saying that modern corporate theory
must provide a theory of organizational form.
This is important for the legal theory of the corporation. If organizational (including, legal) form
is a decision variable relevant to organizational performance, then matters affecting such legal
form would, ipso facto, be relevant to such performance. Consequently, it is possible that choices
made concerning the legal consequences attendant upon a particular legal form may affect the
performance of such form of organization, and the organizations adopting such legal form. One
such organizational form, of course, is the corporation. Thus, Chandler and Williamson may be
taken to support the argument made in this work that the incidence of legal attributes may have
consequences for the performance of corporations, which should, accordingly, be considered by
those assigning those legal attributes. Those legal attributes, of course, include, but are not limited
to, legal essentialist attributes. Chandler and Williamson can, therefore, be cited in support of the
proposition that the merits or demerits of various legal attributes can be assessed, at least in part,
in terms of how such legal attributes affect corporate structure (including process and related matters) and corporate performance.
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Classical Economic Theory, Organization Theory, and Transaction Theory Compared
Chandler’s exposition thus provides useful empirical information, as well as theory, concerning
the nature of the modern business corporation. As demonstrated in this work, classical and neoclassical economic theory effectively ignored the organization of the firm as a subject of discussion. As we have noted, instead, economic theory “invisibilized” such organization. In his examination of economic history, Chandler furthered the discussion of organizational structure as a subject relevant to economic performance and, in that behalf, relevant to economic theory. Williamson, with his theory of managerial discretion, contributed to this. His discussion of managerial
discretion at least made some effort to open the “black box” of the firm in that respect.
In turn, Chandler paid tribute to Williamson’s contribution when he later noted that “[t]ransaction
cost theory is more relevant to the historical story and explanatory concept of organizational capabilities [than neoclassical theory or agency theory] because it does incorporate investment in
facilities and skills”102, as well as its employment of external resources by means of contracts with
outsiders. Indeed, it may be observed with considerable accuracy that organizational capabilities
are not addressed in any significant way by classical and neoclassical economic theory, although
they are recognized in institutional economic (and other) theory, evolutionary economic (and
other) theory, and otherwise. Yet the position that organizational capabilities affect organizational
performance is easily accepted by many organizational theories and theorists. Such capabilities
determine, at least in part, the extent to which the organization is capable of identifying, and capable of addressing, by concrete action, inaction or otherwise, changes and threats to its continued
operations and its very existence. A simple thought experiment can persuade observers that certain
developments in a corporation’s environment may be beyond its capacity to meet, and hence to
survive. Another simple thought experiment can persuade observers that developments in the corporation’s environment may include legal developments, and that some legal developments may
threaten its continued viability and its existence.

102

Supra, note 96 at 489. Evolutionary economic theory also acknowledges the facilities, skills, and knowledge, often
incorporated into operational routines, and the ability to adjust the same, which inhere in a modern business enterprise.
See Winter (1988), supra note 3 at 174-179, especially at 177. Winter also rejects the notion of the transaction as the
unit of analysis, for somewhat similar reasons, also at 177.

181

However, Chandler claims that he parts ways with Williamson concerning the “basic unit of analysis” which is, for Williamson, the transaction, while, for Chandler, “it is the firm and its physical
and human assets.” This has important consequences: “If the firm is the unit of analysis, instead
of the transaction, asset specificity still remains significant; but the specific nature of the facilities
and skills are more significant than bounded rationality and opportunism to the shaping of decisions as to internalizing transactions and, therefore, in determining the boundaries between firm
and market.”103 Of course, the firm may also provide means by which the boundaries of rational
decision making may be extended, including facilitating generation and communication of information requisite or appropriate in that behalf, as maintained by other organizational theorists.
Chandler maintains, then, that organizational capacity, including such aspects as physical and human assets, is relevant to determining whether to internalize transactions within the business enterprise itself or to continue with market transactions instead. Such organizational capacities are
also highly relevant to the future course and prospect of success of such enterprises, he maintains,
based on his historical review (in all of his main works). He argues: “Thus in analyzing the continued development of existing industries and the building of new ones, the firm would seem to be
a more promising unit of analysis than the transaction, and the concept of the organizational capabilities that permit it to remain competitive, and therefore profitable, in national and international
markets more pertinent than those of bounded rationality and opportunism.”104
Thus, while transaction cost analysis, like agency theory, may discard the assumption of perfect
rationality in favour of one of bounded rationality, and also acknowledges opportunism, which
Chandler concedes are improvements over neoclassical theory, he maintains that transaction cost
analysis, like agency theory, fails to provide an account of productive and decision-making processes, of resource utilization, and of competition.
Aligning Strategy, and Structure, and Growth
As Chandler notes, in the enterprises he surveyed, developing strategy involved a complex process
of decision-making. He explains that changing population, income and technology in the period
under review created opportunities and needs to employ existing resources more profitably, and to
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increase resources to be so employed as well, awareness of which might lead to development of a
new strategy which might entail growth. He found that such new strategy and consequent strategic
growth in the size of the enterprise required “a new or at least refashioned structure if the enlarged
enterprise was to be operated efficiently.”105
Chandler considered it a mistake to ignore the necessity of such possible changes, saying that
“growth without structural adjustment can only lead to economic inefficiency. Unless new structures are developed to meet new administrative needs which result from an expansion of a firm’s
activities into new areas, functions, or product lines, the technological, financial and personnel
economies of growth and size cannot be realized. Nor can the enlarged resources be employed as
profitably as they otherwise might be.”106
Chandler maintains that such expansion requires an administrative office or head office to coordinate operations, without which the individual units, whether field units, department, or divisions,
might be as efficient or more efficient if operated as separate independent units. “Whenever the
executives responsible for the firm fail to create the offices and structure necessary to bring together effectively the several administrative offices into a unified whole, they fail to carry out one
of their basic economic roles.”107 That role seems to consist, at least in part, of realizing the technological, financial, and personnel economies of growth and size.
According to Chandler, then, in order to be successful, strategic adaption of the enterprise has both
an external (we may say, more clearly extraorganizational or extralegal) and an internal (intraorganizational and intracorporate) aspect; and neglect of the latter may negatively affect success of
the strategy itself, however sound may be its implications externally. Chandler says that, in his
observation of the subject enterprises, the “failure to develop a new internal structure, like the
failure to respond to new external opportunities and needs, was a consequence of overconcentration on operational activities by the executives responsible for the destiny of their enterprises, or
from their inability, because of past training and education and present position, to develop an
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entrepreneurial outlook.”108 Chandler’s “entrepreneurial outlook” requires not only that the entrepreneur engage adequately with strategy, but also that the entrepreneur ensure continuous alignment between strategy and structure, including within the latter both processes and personnel.
Entrepreneurial Strategy and Resourcing
Chandler leaves no doubt that management of such enterprises involves the fulsome application
of the talents and abilities of the entrepreneurs concerned. As we have seen, among other things,
these involved two types of administrative decisions: firstly, strategic, which “dealt with the longterm allocation of existing resources and the development of new ones essential to assure the continued health and future growth of the enterprise; and, secondly, tactical, which “was more involved in ensuring the efficient and steady use of current resources whose allocation had already
been decided.”109
Consequently, tactical decisions would not necessarily or invariably entail any adjustments to administrative structure or process. However, as indicated under the preceding heading, with respect
to strategic decisions, at least some of them, namely, those which involve strategic growth, may
require such adjustments. “If the need to use resources provided the dynamic force that changed
structure and strategy, the nature of the investment in these resources helped to determine the
course and direction of growth and of subsequent structural change. The type of investment, in
turn, depended on the technology of production and the techniques of marketing of the individual
companies' original product line or lines. Finally, the rate of growth and the effectiveness in the
use of the enterprise's resources rested on the ability and ingenuity of its administrators to build,
adjust, and apply its personnel and facilities to broad population, technological, and income
changes.”110
In the conclusion of Strategy and Structure, Chandler’s observations recall those made earlier in
his text about the health and growth of an enterprise depending on the ability and ingenuity of its
entrepreneurs and administrators. He says: “Although the enterprise undoubtedly had a life of its
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own above and beyond that of its individual executives, although technological and market requirements certainly set boundaries and limits to growth, nevertheless, its health and effectiveness
in carrying out its basic economic functions depended almost entirely on the talents of its administrators.”111
As indicated above, ability and ingenuity, individual or collective, of management, as with management itself, is not within the purview of the neoclassical theory of the firm, yet Chandler’s
investigations convinced him that such ability and ingenuity is critical to the health, growth, and
even survival, of the subject enterprise. Arguments about the methodological effectiveness and
limitations of case studies generally and in this case in particular notwithstanding, Chandler’s empirically-derived observations resonate with us even today.
Conclusion
Chandler’s 1959 study, “Integration and Diversification as Business Strategies – an Historical
Analysis”,112 identified vertical integration (whether only to market or distribute its products, or to
control its sources of supply), followed by one or more of three types of diversification, as characterizing the development of American industrial companies since the American Civil War. He
identified the major innovating forces which spurred these developments as the creation of a national and increasingly urban market, new sources of power, and the application of new technology
to industry. These changes in the external environment of the enterprise and in the resources available in that environment to the enterprise, and to its actual and possible competitors, might be
expected by the resource dependence perspective113 to constrain the operations of an enterprise
and, as a result, to affect its strategy, at least if it is acting or seeks to act prudently.
Chandler found that, by pursuing vertical integration, entrepreneurs gained greater control over
manufacturing and industrial functions, while by pursuing a strategy of diversification, the entrepreneur’s functions were extended dramatically by means of one or more of three diversification
strategies, namely, extensions to full-line, multi-line, and continuous new product, offerings. Such
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integration and diversification required changes in entrepreneurial decision-making and organizational structure, including decentralization.
In effect, Chandler was able to observe changes that had taken place in American business enterprises in response to both externally generated and internally generated developments. He attempted to chronicle each of these types of developments and to endeavour to explain their interrelationships. Chandler’s description of these enterprises indicates the complexity of the information affecting entrepreneurial decision-making in these circumstances. Among other things, he
found that entrepreneurial responses to changes in the external environment significantly involved
making changes to the structure and decision-making processes of the organizations concerned.
The additional span of activities internalized within the enterprise necessitated additional management capabilities, structures, and processes, as well as a much greater body of personnel.
Chandler’s extensive research for his groundbreaking study, Strategy and Structure,114 led him to
conclude that an appreciation of the current state of a subject-corporation’s administration had to
be based upon complete knowledge concerning its past administrative history, and its methods of
growth, which, in turn, affected its administrative or organizational structure. We would say that
it similarly affects its processes. Further, he concluded that the patterns of growth of the corporations which he studied reflected changes in the overall economy, which we would say forms part
of its ambient external environment. In turn, adaptation of the corporation’s structure (and, we
would say, processes, and personnel) to its methods of growth in response to such external economic changes was necessarily affected by the state of development of administrative or organizational methodology at the relevant times.
Chandler demonstrated that the development path or trajectory of corporations operating in the
same industry and geographic area might be uniquely different from one another, and that these
differences were affected by strategies for growth, the methods and timing of such growth, and the
methods of administration and organization prevailing at the relevant times. The very consideration of these matters, of course, falls outside the boundaries of classical economics, its theory of
the firm, and its theory of price-quantity-equilibrium determination which constitutes its explication of economic action.
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Thus, Chandler’s work acknowledges the necessity to explain economic action and the economic
actors, economic processes, and the economic structure, both in terms of the structure of market
or other action, as between economic actors, and in terms of the structure of action within the firm
as economic actor, which are relevant to each of the same. Chandler’s willingness to investigate
the internal structure and processes, as well as the personnel, of the enterprise or economic actor
represents, among other things, a recognition that the “firm” posited by neoclassical economics as
a single economic actor acting monadically in pursuit of a single goal, namely, profit, offers no
meaningful explanation of economic action and processes, and no meaningful explanation of how
individual persons interact with, or on behalf of, the “firm” or enterprise, in order to effect economic results.
Chandler clearly distinguishes between the enterprise and the individual human persons of whom
it is comprised and by whom it is made active. He maintains that, although the enterprise “may
have a life of its own, its present health and future growth surely depend on the individuals who
guide its activities”.115 Thus, he recognizes that the business enterprise is, or, at least, involves, an
organization of individual human persons who are not themselves, as such, the business enterprise
as a legal entity, but are essential to its operations and activities. He also recognizes that the life of
the business enterprise might be expected to extend well beyond the lives of the individual human
persons concerned in it at any particular time or times.
All in all, Chandler clearly recognizes the significance of the “organization”, apart from the legal
form, of the business enterprise. In Strategy and Structure, his focus is on the organization of the
enterprise, and on the history of its development. In terms of what has been described in this book
as the essentialist attributes of the corporation as a matter of law, his focus is on the centrality of
management, the respective durations of particular management teams and of the corporation itself, and on management’s construction of corporate goals. Discussion of other legal essentialist
attributes of the corporation, particularly the separation of management from ownership and the
transferability of equity ownership appears in his later work. In such later work, he makes much
of the extent to which the separation of management and ownership result in the concentration of
practical power and authority over the corporation in the hands of its management.
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Importantly, Chandler devotes considerable attention to the structure and processes by which the
business enterprise, as an organization, seeks to conduct its activities in order to achieve desired
goals. He describes the nature of the hierarchy concerned, in terms of head offices, divisions, departments, and field offices; the nature of the work conducted by managers at each level; the types
and relative dispersion of decision-making as between strategic decision-making, and tactical decision making; and the flows of information relevant to such decision-making.
Chandler’s basis of differentiation between executives and managers involves the distinction between strategic decisions, which are made in the exercise of executive authority, and tactical or
operating decisions, which are made in the exercise of managerial authority. Strategic decisions
involve the allocation or reallocation of resources of the enterprise, while tactical or operating
decisions are made within, and subject to, existing resource allocations. Chandler recognizes, however, that decisions not involving the allocation of resources may be distributed throughout various
levels of the hierarchy of the subject enterprise.
Likewise, functional decisions and administrative decisions may be required to be made at various
levels in the hierarchy. Functional decisions relate to essential tasks in the functional areas of the
manufacturing process. Administrative decisions relate to both defining basic long-term goals and
implementing strategies, policies and procedures to achieve them; and, as well, conducting the
short-term operations of the business in accordance with prescribed goals, policies and procedures.
Again, Chandler notes that some activities and decisions partake of both functional and administrative aspects and to differing degrees.
The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
Chandler’s second great work was The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American
Business,116 for which he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in History.
Enterprise Coordination Replaces the Market
Chandler introduces the subject of this book as follows: “The theme propounded here is that modern business enterprise took the place of market mechanisms in coordinating the activities of the

116

Alfred D Chandler, Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass.,
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977).

188

economy and allocating its resources. In many sectors of the economy the visible hand of management replaced what Adam Smith referred to as the invisible hand of market forces. The market
remained the generator of demand for goods and services, but modern business enterprise took
over the functions of coordinating flows of goods through existing processes of production and
distribution, and of allocating funds and personnel for future production and distribution.”117
When Chandler says that “the visible hand of management replaced…the invisible hand of market
forces”, this seems to indicate that “modern business enterprise acquired functions hitherto carried
out by the market” not as to generating demand, but, in effect, as to supplying that demand, and,
perhaps, as to stimulating demand or creating additional demand. According to Chandler, it was
the coordination and allocation functions of the market posited by neoclassical economics that
were replaced by this “visible hand of management”.
This can be seen as a clear rejection of the neoclassical model, as Chandler seems to be arguing,
implicitly, at least, that supply is not mechanically derived from input cost and output price calculations, but involves processes within and without the particular supplier, including access to, and
competition for, resources the availability of which is restricted (contrary to neoclassical theory),
and also involves the method of employing such resources to derive the product concerned.
Equally, it can be argued that, while Chandler acknowledges that the market generates demand for
goods and services, his account, in both books, suggests otherwise, at least in part. He describes
how producers were able to stimulate demand or, in effect, to “create” additional demand, by the
use of technology, such as railway transportation and communications, and by pricing their products advantageously, as a result of such improved transportation and communication methods, and
by employing mechanically assisted production methods.
Further, Chandler’s replacement of the invisible hand of the market by the visible hand of management does not necessarily entail that all of the functions of the market were “internalized” in
the corporation or, in a word, “replaced” by the hierarchy of the firm as Oliver Williamson suggests.118 In fact, Chandler’s comments about the ways in which production, distribution, and financial, personnel, and other resources were coordinated by “the visible hand” seem to suggest
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that inter-firm allocation might also be involved in these processes. In effect, he may be implying
that extra-market coordination of such matters involving determinants otherwise having an effect
in the market implies that more than one “visible hand” might be operative. This may also be
implied by the rise of what Chandler calls “managerial capitalism”, a subject which is discussed
further below.
Post-Civil War Developments in Business Organization
In the first part of the work, Chandler chronicles the development of business enterprises in the
United States between the post-colonial years of the 1790s and the 1840s, prior to the American
Civil War, in commerce, manufacturing, and agricultural production. He found that between 1790
and 1840, the size and nature of business enterprises changed little, being mostly small, singleunit enterprises that were personally owned, and personally managed.119 In fact, he cites evidence
that the forms of organization and management by which merchants then carried on business “relied almost entirely on practices and procedures invented and perfected centuries earlier by British,
Dutch, and Italian merchants”.120 In addition, of course, such commercial devices as bills of exchange, bills of lading, and letters of credit had also been the subject of judicial adjudication, as a
result of which established legal precedents were available to guide business parties and courts in
their conduct.
Chandler indicates that “[b]efore the 1840s there was no revolution in the ways of doing business
in the United States”; instead, inherited practices remained quite satisfactory.121 These included
corporate and commercial law. “They made increasing use of the incorporated stock company
developed in the sixteenth century by the British to promote overseas trade and colonization and
used in the eighteenth century to manage ancillary or utilities operations such as docks, water
works, and the like.”122 They also refined, but did not fundamentally alter, traditional forms, and
“practices, instruments and institutions of commercial capitalism which had evolved to meet the
growth of trade and the coming of market economies in the Mediterranean basin in the twelfth and
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thirteenth centuries.” They also adjusted commercial law “to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding
economy and a federal polity.”123
However, Chandler found that: “The great transformation was to await the coming of new technologies and markets that permitted a massive production and distribution of goods. Those institutional changes which helped to create the managerial capitalism of the twentieth century were as
significant and as revolutionary as those that accompanied the rise of commercial capitalism a half
a millennium earlier.”124 Chandler underlined its significance and revolutionary nature by using
the phrase “the great transformation”, as Polanyi had done before him.
Administrative Responses to Technological Developments
As in Strategy and Structure, in The Visible Hand Chandler attributes much of the development
of business practices in the fifteen years immediately preceding the Civil War to advances in technology, transportation, and communications.125 Also of great importance, however, was the expansion of markets, both in terms of the rapid growth and spread of population over great distances,
and in terms of expansion of demand by reason of increasing per capita income.126
Chandler explains that the increased availability of, and ability to use, coal as a result of improvements in technology provided abundant sources of energy which, among other things, facilitated
the operation and expansion of railways. The development of the telegraph provided a new means
of fast and dependable communication. Together, they transformed the processes of production
and distribution.127 They facilitated the flow of raw materials into, and the flow of finished product
out of, the factory site steadily, reliably, in volume, and on schedule. This allowed the factory to
maintain steady, even continuous, and high, levels of production. The railroads facilitated distribution of goods in unprecedented volume and at unprecedented speed to jobbers, other middlemen,
and marketers, and by them to others.128
In summary, Chandler finds that “[t]he new sources of energy and new speed and regularity of
transportation and communication caused entrepreneurs to integrate and subdivide their business
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activities and to hire salaried managers to monitor and coordinate the flow of goods through their
enlarged enterprises. The almost simultaneous availability of an abundant new form of energy and
revolutionary new means of transportation and communication led to the rise of modern business
enterprise in American commerce and industry.”129
As can be readily appreciated, these changes in production and distribution required significant
adjustments to the administration of the enterprises concerned. Administration became a highly
necessary and specialized function, eventually involving coordinating, controlling and evaluating
operating units which were not only numerous, but also physically disparate. Chandler indicates
that such activities were made possible by the new transportation and communications facilities.
The Advent of the Multiunit Managerial Corporation
Of course, the creation and operation of railroad and telegraph systems themselves necessitated
significant advances in the administrative capacities of those enterprises if they were to be established and operated effectively. As Chandler explains, it was not only that “[t]he railroad and the
telegraph provided the fast, regular, and dependable transportation and communication so essential
to high-volume production and distribution – the hallmark of large modern manufacturing or marketing enterprises”, but also that the far-flung operations of railroad and telegraph systems and the
need for safe, dependable, cost-effective, efficient, and effective operation of such systems required a high degree of administrative coordination.130
Consequently, “the rail and telegraph companies were themselves the first modern business enterprises to appear in the United States”, and “the first to require a large number of full-time managers
to coordinate, control and evaluate the activities of a number of widely scattered operating
units.”131 Accordingly, “they provided the most relevant administrative models” for enterprises
which sought to produce and distribute goods and services across widely extended geographical
areas and through a number of business units, employing such rail and telegraph networks.132
The application of these new administrative models contributed significantly to revolutionizing
production and distribution of products, and to integrating mass production and mass distribution,
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leading eventually to the development of modern industrial enterprises, as chronicled in The Visible Hand. Chandler mentions, as leading examples, two of the companies mentioned in Strategy
and Structure: Standard Oil Trust, and the E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Company, and two
new examples, General Electric Company and United States Rubber Company, replacing General
Motors Corporation and merchandiser Sears, Roebuck and Company from his previous review.
Each of these companies developed as a “multiunit enterprise administered by a set of salaried
middle and top managers”,133 a modern development which, although it did not exist in the United
States in 1840, had become “the dominant business institution in many sectors of the American
economy” by World War I.
In fact, the scale of this development was enormous, as Chandler chronicles: “By the middle of
the twentieth century, these enterprises employed hundreds and even thousands of middle and top
managers who supervised the work of dozens and often hundreds of operating units employing
tens and often hundreds of thousands of workers. These enterprises were owned by tens or hundreds of thousands of shareholders and carried out billions of dollars of business annually. Even a
relatively small business enterprise operating in local or regional markets had its top and middle
managers. Rarely in the history of the world has an institution grown to be so important and so
pervasive in so short a period of time.”134 The development of this type of multiunit enterprise and
of the related phenomenon of “managerial capitalism” is further chronicled in The Visible Hand.
Chronicling the Development of the Multiunit Managerial Corporation
In The Visible Hand, Chandler reviews the history of business, and its development, in America.
His study commences with the review of traditional processes of production and distribution, proceeds to discuss the “revolution” discussed above in transportation and communication, goes on
to discuss that revolution in terms of distribution of production, and then describes the integration
of mass production and mass distribution.
In his description of the management and growth of modern industrial enterprise, he discusses the
function and structure of top management, the function and structure of middle management, and
what he describes as the “maturing” of modern business enterprise since World War I. Many of

133
134

Ibid at 3.
Ibid at 3-4.

193

the elements of his conclusion, denominated as “The Managerial Revolution in American Business” have been discussed earlier in this chapter. Accordingly, even if alternatives were available,
Chandler’s treatment of the history and development of the modern business corporation recommends itself to the attention of readers for a number of reasons, including the breadth and depth of
his review. To some of his conclusions we now turn our attention.
Administrative Development and Business Expansion – Fundamental Observations
Consequent upon his review, Chandler derives a number of propositions, including those in the
following quotations, which are here immediately followed by the present author’s comments:
The first proposition is that modern multiunit business enterprise replaced small traditional
enterprise when administrative coordination permitted greater productivity, lower costs,
and higher profits than coordination by market mechanisms.135
As discussed further above, it was not only advances in administration that enabled business enterprises to operate through more than one unit, but also other technological advances, such as in
transportation, energy, communications, and machinery; however, administrative coordination facilitated taking advantage of these other advances and, without it, the other advances alone would
not have generated greater productivity, lower costs, and higher profits, as compared with market
transactions. Chandler thus explains how changes in administration, or organization, affect supply
and demand, thereby opening the black boxes of the neoclassical economist. In summary, these
changes alter the supply curve.
The second proposition is simply that the advantages of internalizing the activities of many
business units within a single enterprise could not be realized until a managerial hierarchy
had been created.136
Like external or market transactions, internal activities incur a cost, attributable not only to the
activity itself, but also to the coordination and planning made necessary when that activity is internalized. The costs attendant upon, and hence the choice between, “market or hierarchy” for a
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particular product or service, is, consequently, affected by the availability of suitable means of
administration, as Chandler calls it.
The third proposition is that modern business enterprise appeared for the first time in history when the volume of economic activities reached a level that made administrative coordination more efficient and more profitable than market coordination.137
The cost of administrative coordination must be included in the cost of the product or service, and
must be distributed, like other costs, among the quantity of products or services sold. According
to Chandler, and, of course, Williamson,138 it is only when the aggregate of those (hard) costs and
all other costs are lower than the costs of transacting in the market plus those (hard) costs, when
distributed among the forecast volume of production, that a certain economic activity will be expected to, or, more correctly, should, be internalized. Of course, there may be cases in which forecast demand and production may make such internalization advantageous in the near term in order
to adjust to anticipated demand and production before their eventuation, and, as such, this alone
may justify internalization at an earlier stage.
The fourth proposition is that once a managerial hierarchy had been formed and had successfully carried out its function of administrative coordination, the hierarchy itself became
a source of permanence, power, and continued growth.139
While this is explicated in greater detail below, it may be said that the more effective and efficient
is the administrative capacity and operations of an organization, the greater is its opportunity to
generate profits, over various time horizons, to maintain and enhance its competitive position, to
grow, and to sustain its existence. As Chandler explains, this also accrues power to the hierarchy.
The fifth proposition is that the careers of the salaried managers who directed these hierarchies became increasingly technical and professional.140
As the ambit of the organization’s activities increased, Chandler says that its management became
increasingly specialized, functionally and otherwise. Managers were elevated to successively
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higher levels of the organization based, at least in part, on possessing the necessary technical and
professional education and experience. Technical and professional considerations thus become
part of the administrative and decision-making process, and accordingly, a source of power.
The sixth proposition is that as the multiunit business enterprise grew in size and diversity
and as its managers became more professional, the management of the enterprise became
separated from its ownership.141
As noted below, the diversity of such an enterprise, and of the skills necessary to manage it, were
such that an owner or owners could no longer be expected to possess the necessary skills, and,
consequently, to undertake such management themselves. Specialist skills and experience, including that involved in coordinating the activities of other managers, were required.
The seventh proposition is that in making administrative decisions, career managers preferred policies that favored the long-term stability and growth of their enterprises to those
that maximized current profits.142
As noted below, organizations generally seek their continuance; however, Chandler also makes
the point that changes in strategy, at least, and, perhaps, other matters of high policy, may require
changes in the structure and processes of the organization which, in turn, incur costs that must be
defrayed based on current and anticipated activities. In addition, planning and coordination are
facilitated by predictability. Successfully managing the enterprise may thus involve prioritizing
“steady” and predictable growth and profits over higher levels of growth and profits involving
greater volatility, particularly if the latter may be expected to incur periodic declines, and,
especially, declines of significant magnitude.
The eighth and final proposition is that as the large enterprises grew and dominated major
sectors of the economy, they altered the basic structure of these sectors and of the economy
as a whole.143
Of course, these consequences are outlined in greater detail in Chandler’s work. As activities previously subject to the market are internalized, and as the benefits of internalizing costs reduce the
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number of competitors in the market, and perhaps subject all or most competitors to cost structures
that differ from those to which they might have been previously subject, the scope and nature of
operation of the market may be expected to be affected.
As Harrison White indicates and as discussed above under the heading “The Entrepreneurial
Model of the Neoclassical Firm and Economic Action”, this may sometimes involve market participants seeking out particular niches in which they might have certain advantages over others,
the observation of which affects the strategy and actions of other market participants. In this way,
the “visible hand” may affect markets and competition.
One might attempt to apply Chandler’s analysis of the relationship between strategy and structure
to sectors of the economy. In doing so, one might expect Chandler to say that the structure of a
sector of the economy may be expected to adjust to the strategy of that sector. If one considers the
strategy of the sector to involve the strategy of participants in the sector in some way, it may be
expected that the strategy of significant participants may determine the structure appropriate to the
operations of the sector, and, concomitantly, that a failure to adjust the structure to the operations
of the sector would affect the viability of the sector itself. Of course, one could also seek to apply
Chandler’s strategy-structure mantra to the economy as a whole, using sectors of the economy as
units of analysis.
Recapitulating Historical Analysis of Administrative or Organizational Development
In his Conclusion, Chandler reiterates that: “This study does more than trace the history of an
institution. It describes the beginnings of a new economic function – that of administrative
coordination and allocation - and the coming of a new subspecies of economic man - the salaried
manager - to carry out this function. Technological innovation, the rapid growth and spread of
population, and expanding per capita income, made the processes of production and distribution
more complex and increased the speed and volume of the flow of materials through them. Existing
market mechanisms were often no longer able to coordinate these flows effectively. The new
technologies and expanding markets thus created for the first time a need for administrative
coordination.”144
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The matter could be put another way, namely: the complexity of coordinating certain principal
activities became too great to sustain the risk of market abnormalities, irregularities, dysfunctions,
discontinuities, and even market failures. The principal activities required to be coordinated
involved, at least, the following: firstly, the supply of inputs, including labour, materials, and
capital; secondly, the production process itself; thirdly, the distribution process; fourthly,
managing the collection, control, accounting, reporting, treasury, and other financial processes
associated with all of these principal activities; and, fifthly, the strategic and tactical process. In
many cases, the activities of the enterprise extended beyond one region or one country.
In the result, “[t]o carry out this function entrepreneurs built multiunit business enterprises and
hired the managers needed to administer them. Where the new enterprises were able to coordinate
current flows of materials profitably, their managers also allocated resources for future production
and distribution. As technology became both more complex and more productive, and as markets
continued to expand, these managers assumed command in the central sectors of the American
economy.”145 Chandler might have said, aphoristically, that complexity begat managerial
capitalism.
The success of a multiunit business enterprise generated opportunities for, and challenges to, continuing its growth. Chandler says that “[o] nce such a hierarchy had successfully taken over the
function of coordinating flows, the desire of the managers to assure the success of their enterprise
as a profit-making institution created strong pressures for its continuing growth.”146 As with other
types of organizations, as discussed previously, the continuance of the organization becomes a key
goal or objective.
To respond to such pressures for growth, corporate managements engaged in “two quite different
strategies of expansion. One [, which] was defensive or negative… [and] stemmed from a desire
for security [sought] to prevent sources of supplies or outlets for goods and services from being
cut off or to limit entry of new competitors into the trade. The other strategy [, which] was more
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positive [, aimed] to add new units, permitting by means of administrative coordination a more
intensive use of existing facilities and personnel.”147
Chandler found that negative or defensive growth was generally “nonproductive expansion” and
rarely lowered unit costs, but that positive growth, which might be considered as “productive expansion”, normally did increase productivity by lowering unit costs.148 Of course, that is not to say
that even nonproductive expansion might not be effective in ensuring the survival of the enterprise,
for example, by securing sources of supply, denying such sources to other competitors, or by establishing barriers to entry into the relevant market. Chandler indicates that expansion of marketing
enterprises was generally productive not defensive, but that backward integration into acquiring
control of materials was generally motive more by defensive than productive considerations.149
Administrative or Organizational Development and Economic Theory
Chandler maintains that “[a]lthough administrative coordination has been a basic function in the
modernization of the American economy, economists have given it little attention.” Instead,
“[m]any have remained satisfied with Adam Smith's dictum that the division of labor reflects the
extent of the market. Like George Stigler, they see the natural response to improved technology
and markets as one of increasing specialization in the activities of the enterprise and vertical disintegration in the industries in which these enterprises operate.”150 He argues that for increased
specialization to be successful, a high volume of output is required which, in turn, requires “more
carefully planned coordination” of the activities of the enterprise.
Chandler shows that specialization of economic activities did not entail that they could not be
undertaken by firms that integrated specialist operations into one enterprise; instead, advances in
what Chandler calls “administrative coordination” made this possible. This aspect of firm activities
has also been ignored, he says, in the theory of the firm: “Economists have also often failed to
relate administrative coordination to the theory of the firm.”151 The firm is highly dependent upon
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such administrative coordination of its activities, including, but not limited to production and distribution. Consequently: “any theory of the firm that defines the enterprise merely as a factory or
even a number of factories, and therefore fails to take into account the role of administrative coordination, is far removed from reality.”152
While acknowledging that the speed, regularity and method of organization of production and
distribution affects the volume and unit cost of goods, he maintains that “[u]ntil economists analyze the function of administrative coordination, the theory of the firm will remain essentially a
theory of production. The institution through which the factors of production are combined, which
coordinates current flows, and which allocates resources for future economic activities in major
sectors of the economy deserves more attention it has yet received from economists.” 153
Thus, Chandler maintains that economists do not advance a theory of the firm, but only a theory
of production. It is the institution or organization, the firm, which combines factors of production,
coordinates it, and allocates resources not only for present, but also for future, economic activities.
Thus, he maintains that a theory of the firm that does not address these issues, is not a theory of
the firm in any meaningful sense.
Ascension of Managerial Capitalism
Chandler chronicles the ascension of managerial capitalism over family and financial capitalism
over the twentieth century, both in The Visible Hand154, and in his later article, “The Emergence
of Managerial Capitalism.” 155 In particular, he describes how family or entrepreneurial capitalism,
in which a founding family or entrepreneur or family or such founder or entrepreneur exercised
control of an enterprise, and financial capitalism, in which financiers did so, gave way to managerial capitalism, in which managers made the most important decisions. This resulted, in large part,
from the complex nature of multiunit business enterprises.
Chandler explains that in “such large, complex organizations, decisions as to both current production and distribution and the allocation of resources for future production and distribution came to
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be made by full-time salaried managers”.156 He indicates that by World War I “owners who still
worked on a full-time basis with their hierarchies continued to have an influence on such decisions” but by World War II further increases in the size and complexity of the enterprise and further
dispersion of stock ownership resulted in a situation in which “owners rarely participated in managerial decisions”.157
In effect, then, by the First World War, neither the founder or entrepreneur nor their families, on
the one hand, nor the financiers of the enterprise, who supplied funds for its facilities and growth,
on the other, were able to make, or even to influence, managerial decisions. In fact, Chandler says
that: “Even in top management decisions concerning the allocation of resources, their power remained essentially negative. They could say no, but unless they themselves were trained managers
with long experience in the same industry and even the same company, they had neither the information nor the experience to propose positive alternative courses of action.”158
Chandler maintains that only founders, entrepreneurs or other controlling or significant shareholders, or financiers, who had long experience in the same industry, and (ideally) in the subject-company, could effectively propose alternatives to the courses of action proposed by top management.
In fact, the applications of Chandler’s assertion are even broader than that: namely, that without
such training and long experience, as well as information, such enterprise capitalists or financing
capitalists would not even be able to make a rational decision between or among alternatives presented by management. Thus, the owners or financiers would have only a limited capacity to judge
proposals put forward by top management. Accordingly, their decision-making capacity would, in
effect, be limited to deciding whether to accept or to reject a particular proposal made by top
management.
At the same time, the influence of the “owners” or the “financiers” began to be exercised on a less
continuous and immediate basis. Instead of consulting directly with the owners or financiers, as
needed, with respect to managerial decisions, top management presented high level matters to the
board of directors for their approval on a much less frequent basis.
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Chandler indicates that, although the “owners” were, or were represented by, “outside” directors
who met with the “inside” or “management” directors between four and twelve times a year, this
did not reflect a real distribution of power and authority. Instead: “For these meetings the inside
directors set the agenda, provided the information on which decisions were made, and of course
were responsible for implementing the decisions.” Accordingly, while the outside directors still
had veto power over such decisions, “they had neither the time, the information, nor the experience, and rarely even the motivation, to propose alternate courses of action.”159 Chandler concludes that by World War I, managerial capitalism had become firmly entrenched in the major
sectors of the American economy.
In The Visible Hand, Chandler attributes significant shifts in power within the corporation and
within the economy as a whole to the acquisition by modern business enterprises of allocative
functions previously carried out by the market, with the result that the “rise of modern business
enterprise in the United States, therefore, brought with it managerial capitalism.”160
Mid-Managerial Capitalism
Even more than this, however, the same observation might be made with respect to top management decisions vis-à-vis top management and its immediate subordinates. The complexity of the
organization might be such that top management, because of specialization or otherwise, might
lack the training and experience in the fields relevant to the decision at hand which might be possessed by the immediately lower management level or levels. At the same time, although perhaps
circumscribed by training and experience, top management would also be dependent upon that
reporting management level for information requisite to top management decision-making.
The inference, although not explicitly drawn by Chandler, is that managerial capitalism, even by
that time, may have already become “mid-managerial capitalism”, insofar as efforts to actively
manage the enterprise, and proposals with respect to the same, were reliant upon information and
experience of managers at levels subordinate to the top or executive level.
In reality, the exercise of authority at successively higher levels of the enterprise depended upon
information and analysis generated at subordinate levels. Thus, the decisions made at higher levels
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could be shaped and influenced by decisions made at lower levels of the enterprise. Among other
things, this suggests the possibility that subordinate level decisions might be made according to
criteria not specified or not shared by the enterprise as a whole.
While this will be pursued in later discussions, we must notice that the very structure and processes
of organizations and organizational decision-making introduce the possibility of internal conflicts
between different levels and functions of the enterprise. This logical possibility may, in some
cases, lead to different segments of the enterprise pursuing different, and, in some cases, even
conflicting, objectives.
Managerial Capitalism Matures
Chandler indicates that by the middle of the century the descendants of the founders and early
investors of major industrial enterprises were the primary beneficiaries of managerial capitalism
but were not participants in operating the enterprise, while the involvement of financiers, who were
influential when funds were needed, also eventually abated. He concludes that by “mid-century
even the legal fiction of outside control was beginning to disappear. A study of the 200 largest
nonfinancial companies in 1963 indicates that in none of these firms did an individual, family, or
group hold over 80 percent of the stock. None were still privately owned. In only 5 of the 200 did
a family or group have a majority control by owning as much as 50 percent of the stock. In 26
others a family or group had minority control by holding more than 10 percent of the stock (but
less than 50) or by using a holding company or other legal device.”161
In effect, Chandler asserts that the lack of majority control of the ownership of shares of a public
corporation rendered such a corporation subject to control by its management, although such control might be considered to be “soft” control in the sense of management capacity to influence
voting by shareholders. Chandler boldly concluded that in “1963, then, 169 or 84.5 percent of the
200 largest nonfinancial companies were management controlled.” He concluded that thus, “by
the 1950s the managerial firm had become the standard form of modern business enterprise in
major sectors of the American economy. In those sectors where modern multiunit enterprise had
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come to dominate, managerial capitalism had gained ascendancy over family and financial capitalism.”162
Chandler describes how the mobilization of the war economy in World War II involved one of the
most complex pieces of economic planning in history,163 by federal government bodies and agencies. He indicates that managers of large enterprises were recruited to government for this purpose,
but Chandler fails to conclude that the scale and scope of the administrative activities required, in
aggregate, may have significantly enhanced the development of administrative processes and capacities that could later be employed in such private enterprises. It might be suggested, further,
that the experiences of such recruited managers may have enhanced their capacity to contemplate
broader international operations after, as compared to prior to, World War II, however, Chandler
does not actually suggest this.
Chandler explains that managers of large enterprises might wield significant power in society and
in the political realm, but that such managers were not required to explain or be accountable for
their uses of such power.164 Indeed, we would maintain that the diffusion of power as a result of
diffusion of decision-making inputs and authorities might entail a lack of accountability of managers in their several exercises of decision-making power and authority even within the enterprise.
Chandler argues that managerial capitalism, involving the growth of the modern business enterprise, had little political support and, in fact, met public and government opposition, both because
of the concentration of economic power and because of a perceived dampening of entrepreneurial
opportunity in many sectors of the economy.165 He maintains that the, of modern business enterprise “brought strong political reaction and legislative action”, especially with respect to the control and regulation of railroads, mass retailers, and large industrial enterprises, to such an extent
that “in the first decade of the twentieth century, the control of the large corporation was, in fact,
the paramount political question of the day.”166
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Berle and Means engaged in their famous debate concerning the objectives and powers of modern
business corporations.167 Legislation restraining trusts and other anticompetitive devices was
adopted and, following the Great Depression, the “New Deal” legislation sought to regulate investment, as well as utilities, holding companies, and to regulate the issuance, and secondary market trading, of securities.168
In this sense, Chandler’s allusion to Polanyi’s “great transformation” may have been particularly
apt: Polanyi’s “double movement” of the “marketization” of the economy, including the commoditized nation of non-commodities, was considered by him to be accompanied by the introduction
of legislation intended to ameliorate the worst excesses of those practices.169 Chandler’s “great
transformation” involved a “double movement” in which the growth of the modern business enterprise and the related rise of managerial capitalism also encountered social and political initiatives to moderate their adverse effects. Chandler’s “great transformation” and “double movement”
may be considered to continue to the present day.
Conclusion
In The Visible Hand, Chandler chronicled the “great transformation” of the economy and of business enterprise commencing in the latter half of the nineteenth century as new technologies and
markets permitted the production and distribution of goods on a much greater scale than ever before as a result of a transformation which he described “as being as significant and as revolutionary
as that those that accompanied the rise of commercial capitalism a half a millennium earlier.”170
In this great transformation, “the visible hand of management replaced what Adam Smith referred
to as the invisible hand of market forces” as modern business enterprise took over the function of
167
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the market in coordinating production and distribution and allocating funds and personnel for future production and distribution.171 Chandler says that this originated a new economic function,
namely, administrative coordination and allocation, and, in addition, “a new subspecies of economic man – the salaried manager – to carry out this function.”172
It may be, of course, that the new “great transformation” was not as significant and as revolutionary
as the rise of commercial capitalism but, on the other hand, it may be seen as having similar significance to the great transformation described by Polanyi in so far as it concerns what Polanyi
regards as the disembedding of the market from the economy and society, the creation of “artificial
commodities”, and the “marketization” of the economy in the sense of the market achieving dominance over the economy, society, and the polity. Instead, it may be more reasonable to regard
Chandler’s “great transformation” as a significant modification to, or even as the complete or partial abrogation of, the dominance of the market posited by Polanyi.
As has been argued here, Chandler describes the displacement of the allocative mechanisms of the
market, the “invisible hand” posited by Adam Smith, by managerial action, the “visible hand” of
management, and even, as we have maintained here, the several “visible hands” of management
of a plurality of business enterprises in their several capacities as market actors. The actions of
such “visible hands” with respect to the market and competition invites comparison with Harrison
White’s theories of the firm and of the market.
Expressing Chandler’s “great transformation” alternatively, one may say that the overt, open, or
visible action of the market, the “invisible hand” posited by Smith in the late eighteenth century,
and contemplated by Polanyi as dominating the economy and society from and after the late nineteenth century, is considered by Chandler to have been replaced, in the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century, by the somewhat more covert, less obvious, or less visible action of corporate managers, the “visible hand”. Chandler’s choice of unit for examination, the firm, has some
effect on this perception, particularly when compared with neoclassical theory.
Chandler explains that increase in population, its dispersion more widely across the United States,
and an increase in per capita income resulted in dramatically increased demand. At the same time,
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improvements in technology, such as the advent of the telegraph, and methods of mining and employing coal which facilitated the operation and expansion of railways, as well as manufacturing,
permitted communication and distribution of goods over long distances. In turn, this permitted the
flow of raw materials into, and the flow of finished product out of, production facilities reliably,
in volume, and on schedule which, in turn, permitted factories to sustain reliable, steady, and high
production levels, and permitted distribution of goods at speeds, in volume, and over distances,
that were previously not possible.173
Such activity required a high degree of administrative coordination. This is the case, in particular,
with the rail and telegraph companies which became the first modern business enterprises in the
United States. They developed large numbers of full-time managers to coordinate their fire-flung
operations in a manner that was safe, dependable, cost-effective, efficient, and effective. Among
other things, this require them to coordinate, control and evaluate the operations of a number of
widely scattered operating units.174
Such transportation and communication companies became models for other business enterprises.
The scale and scope of their operations and of the business enterprises whose operations they facilitated was such that modern business enterprises became characterized by extremely large workforces, extensive numbers of management personnel and levels of management, large numbers of
units within business enterprise, and vast numbers of shareholders.175
The managerial hierarchy became a source of permanence, power and continued growth and its
need for specialized expertise was such that its members increasingly possessed technical and professional qualifications and experience, which contributed to the separation of management of the
enterprise from its ownership. The decision-making of such career managers was observed to favour long-term stability and growth, rather than maximizing current profits.176
In effect, innovation, in the form of the advent of new (and, in a sense, disruptive) technologies in
mining, communications, and transportation, enabled new production and distribution processes,
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which increased the scale, scope, and geographic dispersion, of the operations of business enterprises, thereby requiring administrative coordination which was some orders of magnitude greater
than previously required. Such coordination required a panoply of personnel, and levels of, management whose primary objective was the continuity of the business enterprise, and whose significant subordinate objectives, to that end, included its long-term stability and growth.
The priority of objectives of this professional management are quite consistent with those of longestablished family-owned enterprises. Chandler notes that the longer time span over which British
enterprises adopted such professional management, as compared with American enterprises, allowed American enterprises to accelerate their growth and market participation, as compared with
British companies.177
Professional management and new management structures also permitted increases in the number
of business units which might be administered by the new modern business enterprise. This permitted it to pursue both positive, and negative (i.e. defensive) growth strategies,178 in an effort to
secure the stability, growth, and continued existence of the enterprise.
The need for relevant and specialized training and experience disadvantaged management by
founding families or entrepreneurs, or by finance providers, whether providing debt or equity.
Professional management of this nature also had the result that management decisions became
difficult, if not impossible, for founding families or entrepreneurs, or for finance providers, to
controvert and, accordingly, rendered management decisions effectively final with respect to the
enterprise as a whole.179
Chandler considered the non-continuous or intermittent review of high-level management decisions by the board of directors to be largely inefficacious due to the fact that normally management
failed to present any alternatives to its proposed course of action, and due to the board’s lack of
information and expertise to evaluate management’s proposal and any posited alternatives.180 Accordingly, he considered that entrepreneurial capitalism and finance capitalism had been replaced
by managerial capitalism.
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Chandler’s exposition of the rise of managerial capitalism is revolutionary in a number of respects.
He endeavours to relate innovation, in terms of the development of technology, not only to an
increase in demand, but also to the dependence of the business enterprise upon resources. As technological developments in mining, communications, transportation facilitated access to greater
resources in the form of external production inputs, thereby enabling a business enterprise to increase its scale and scope, that increase in scale and scope required specialized technical and professional expertise, an input resource of a somewhat different nature, and one which was generally
internalized, within the business enterprise itself.
The development of that resource accelerated the ability of the business enterprise to engage in
various growth strategies, but the need to maintain access to such internal management resources,
as well as external resources, facilitated the prioritization of longer-term objectives, such as continued existence, stability, and growth, over shorter-term objectives, such as maximization of
short-run profits.
As Chandler himself observed in a somewhat later work, his unit of analysis was not the transaction, as it was for Williamson, but “the firm and its physical and human assets”.181 Similarly, of
course, his unit of analysis was not the monadic individual of neoclassical economics, whether as
consumer or producer, reified in neoclassical economic theory as “the firm”, completely devoid of
personal or organizational attributes. Instead, Chandler’s firm is a business enterprise, a legal entity
which possesses physical and human assets, and other attributes, and which acts by means of, and
through, its human assets, who conduct its operations, including making its decisions.
Consequently, Chandler’s firm has organizational attributes. It pursues certain goals and objectives, strategic and tactical, and instrumental and otherwise, having differing temporal proximities,
and aligning its structure and processes to such strategies. Its operations involve different functions. Such firm is also organized into many units and sub-units, and has a complex hierarchy
consisting of many levels, including field offices, department offices, divisional and functional
offices, and head office, each of which may have their own respective combinations of goals and
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objectives. For example, a field office may have its own goals and objectives, but may also participate in the goals and objectives of each superior hierarchical level, namely, departments, divisions
and, the enterprise or head office.
Conclusion – Theory of the Firm, and Development of the Modern Business Corporation
This chapter has considered the proposition of neoclassical economics that the firm, as theorized
therein, acts in the economy as a single actor. This chapter is maintained that this proposition is,
in effect, tautologous, as a result of the way in which the firm is conceptualized and neoclassical
economics. In effect, the firm of neoclassical economics is a “black box” into which inputs are
introduced and from which outputs emanate.
At the same time, such major elements of the economic process as production, exchange, and
competition are also treated as “black boxes” that are not “unpacked” by neoclassical theory. Market exchange is theorized in terms of the interaction of supply and demand and the derivation of
an appropriate equilibrium. Competition is largely theorized in terms of comparative cost of the
factors of production. Production is considered in terms of the cost of input factors and the production process, to the extent that it is theorized, is considered in respect of how to reduce the cost
of input factors, so as to generate, or increase, profit. These subjects are considered in greater detail
in Appendix B.
It has been argued here that such a perspective ignores, obscures, or invisibilizes economic activity,
as a result of which questions or concerns which arise for consideration in connection with such
economic activity are not readily amenable to investigation or solution within neoclassical theory
and within the neoclassical theory of the firm. To the extent that the firm is theorized in neoclassical theory, it is as a reification of the atomistic individual, devoid of social or personal attributes,
acting completely independently, and completely rationally, in pursuit of his or her own utility.
Accordingly, the neoclassical firm lacks organizational attributes.
It is argued, in this chapter and, in greater detail, in Appendix B, that methodological individualism, the focus on the individual as the unit of analysis, imposes certain consequences, many of
which are disadvantageous, upon neoclassical theory. Accordingly, this chapter has compared neoclassical theory with other theorizations of markets, and of the firm, that impose less stringent
limitations upon the monadism of the individual and the choice of such individual as the basic unit
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of analysis. In keeping with the descriptivist or empirical nature of the present work, this chapter
then turned to the examination of the firm, and, more particularly, the modern business enterprise,
as undertaken by the signally important business historian, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.
Chandler employs the firm as the unit of investigation, and of analysis. While acknowledging the
firm as a rights-and-duty-bearing entity, separate from the individuals who constitute it, Chandler
also recognized it as animated as an organization, one having economic objectives, by the individuals who create and constitute it. Chandler’s description of the modern business corporation accords generally with the discussion of legal essentialist attributes in Chapter One and Appendix A
of this book.
In Strategy and Structure, Chandler provides evidence that the goals and objectives of a business
enterprise, as an organization, have implications for the strategy of their attainment and for the
structure and processes of the enterprise as an organization. In particular, these goals and objectives influence the resources required for their accomplishment, the allocation of such resources,
and the structure and processes by means of which they are pursued by the organization. Pursuing
those objectives involves both functional work and administrative work. The latter involves coordination, appraisal, and planning the work of the enterprise and the allocation of its resources. 182
Allocations of resources are the prerogative of the executive level of management.
The primary task of the executive in terms of administration is to define basic goals and the course
of action, policies, and procedures necessary to achieve them; while a secondary task of administration is to focus on smooth and efficient day-to-day operation of the business in accordance
with its long-term goals, policies and procedures, and, as well, responding to both anticipated and
unanticipated problems and needs.183
Chandler describes how the development and execution of various growth strategies resulted in a
management hierarchy with the head office at the apex, divisional offices, department offices, and
field offices, each reporting to the level above, with different balances of functional decision-making and administrative decision making, shifting towards more and more administrative decision
making at higher levels of hierarchy. He also described the difference between strategic decision-
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making, which involves the allocation or reallocation of resources, and tactical or operating decision-making, which involves making decisions within, and subject to, existing resource allocations.
In The Visible Hand, Chandler describes the replacement of the market as a mechanism for the
coordination and allocation of financing, personnel, and other resources, and the coordination and
allocation of goods and services by the “visible hand” of management of the modern business
enterprise, thereby giving rise to “managerial capitalism”.184
It is clear that Chandler’s methodology is not monadically individualistic, as is neoclassical economics, but, instead, endeavours to take the organization or, in the case of a business enterprise,
the firm or corporation, as the basic unit of analysis. Chandler’s methodology, unlike methodological individualism, is not reductionist at the firm level but, instead, permits examination of data at
successively lower levels of disaggregation, including, ultimately, to the individual. In this sense,
Chandler may be said to adopt some type of social unit as the basic irreducible unit of analysis at
a more granular level than that of the firm but at a higher level than that of the individual. Appendix
A be consulted for a discussion of the advantages of Chandler’s method of proceeding.
Chandler’s exposition of the history of the development of, and the present state of, the modern
business enterprise acknowledges the duality of the corporation as a legal entity and as a species
of organization; however, in consequence of its objectives, its description emphasizes the latter
more than the former. The next chapter will consider the modern business enterprise, as described
by such business history, from the perspective of organizational theory.
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CHAPTER THREE
ASPECTS OF THE CORPORATION IN ACTION
BARRIERS TO UNIFIED ACTION
Diffusion of Rationality, Information, and Decision Making
As our investigation of Chandler’s research has demonstrated, decision-making as to strategy and
tactical matters inheres at different levels of the organization. In a simple unitary enterprise
structure, decision-making takes place at field, department, division, and head office or general
office levels. In some cases, decision-making authority may also be diffuse, in that certain aspects
of a decision may be the purview of one individual, group or organizational level or function, while
other aspects of the same decision may be the purview of others. This may make it difficult, if not
impossible, to impute a particular decision to particular individuals (or groups of individuals), to
a particular level, or to a particular function.
Again, these considerations are not part of neoclassical theory, nor, are they necessarily only
limited to economic theory or theory of the firm. All complex organizations specify and adopt
processes and structures that recognize limitations on decision-making by individuals. For
example, Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson concedes that “complex organizations of all kinds corporate and noncorporate, capitalist and noncapitalist, within and between nation states and
political systems, and over time - discloses strong common features that are increasingly generally
acknowledged.”1 He identifies these, in effect, as: (1) the need to come to terms with the attributes
of human nature as we know it; (2) institutional structures, which differ but may be compared by
institutional analysis; (3) hierarchy, which promotes efficiency; (4) the need for system integrity,
which is promoted by separating operating from strategic decisions and controls; (5) the need to
identify relevant dimensions with respect to which transactions differ, and of which dimensions
asset specificity appears to be the most important; and (6) the efficacy of competition in the capital
market is conditional on organization form.2
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As Williamson indicates, complex organizations, including, but not limited to economic
enterprises, employ a knowledge of the attributes of human nature, a hierarchy, a separation of
strategic and operating decisions, and the application of controls, in fashioning their decision
making and implementation structure and processes. Of course, these findings do not align with
neoclassical economic principles which, as demonstrated here, generally fail to identify and
consider attributes which are common to all organizations, not only those with economic
objectives, including hierarchies of goals, structure and process.
Williamson said that the propositions “that organization matters and that it is susceptible to
analysis were long greeted by scepticism by economists”,3 saying that one reason for this “is that
it is much easier to say that organization matters that it is to show how and why” while another is
“the prevalence of the signs of choice approach to economics”.4
Considering the development of neoclassical theory over the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Oliver Hart described it as viewing “the firm as a set of feasible production plans”,
admitting that “to many lawyers and economists, this is a caricature of the modern firm; it is
rigourous but rudimentary” in describing how firms function, and conceding that it “contributes
little to any meaningful picture of their structure.”5
Complex and Multiple Goals
Although economic organizations may have goals that are specific to economic functions, all
organizations, whatever their goals must engage in certain activities. Charles Perrow, a leading
sociologist of organizations, drew attention to these in 1961, as Chandler was writing: “Every
organization must accomplish four tasks: (1) secure inputs in the form of capital sufficient to
establish itself, operate, and expand as the need arises; (2) secure acceptance in the form of basic
legitimization of activity; (3) marshal the necessary skills; and (4) coordinate the activities of its
members, and the relations of the organization with other organizations and with clients or
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consumers.”6 He notes that the relative of importance of these tasks: (1) may differ; (2) may change
over time; (3) will vary with (i) the nature of the work the organization does, and (ii) the technology
appropriate to it, and (iii) the stage of development within the organization.7
As our examination of Chandler’s work showed, these tasks involve securing internal and external
resources, including personnel and structure, which are necessary or appropriate to the goals
pursued by the organization, and to the strategy by which those goals are pursued, adopting tactics
conducive to those goals, and adapting the strategy, tactics and resources, including structure, over
time. Perrow suggests that reducing or controlling dependency upon the environment may increase
the power of the organization, such as by maintaining a favorable image of the organization in the
salient publics, which may enable it to more easily attract personnel, influence relevant legislation,
wield informal power in the community, and insure adequate number of clients, customers, donors,
or investors.8 As Perrow’s language suggests, this resource dependency, and the effect of such
prestige on resource dependency, is shared by all types of organizations, including social
organizations, educational institutions, and even government institutions.9
Official Goals and Unofficial Goals
Perrow indicates that all organizations, including business enterprises, have official goals, which
“are the general purposes of the organization as put forth in the charter, annual reports, public
statements by key executives and other authoritative pronouncements”, such as, for a business
corporation, “to make a profit or adequate return on investment, or provide a customer service, or
produce goods.”10
Official goals may be relatively uninformative by themselves, as they do not necessarily identify
or prioritize all goals, which we (but not Perrow, at least here) will distinguish as either
“superordinate” or as “subordinate”, and the means of achieving such goals (which we will call
“instrumental” goals): “Official goals are purposely vague and general and do not indicate two
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major factors which influence organizational behavior: the host of decisions that must be made
among alternative ways of achieving official goals and the priority of multiple goals, and the many
unofficial goals pursued by groups within the organization.”11 In effect, following Perrow, it may
be said that often only superordinate goals will be considered to be among the organization’s
official goals. Subordinate and instrumental goals may frequently not be included among the
official, but only among the unofficial, goals.
Importantly, Perrow observes that “groups within the organization” may pursue their own
unofficial goals. We may note that officially recognized groups, such as those recognized by the
organizational hierarchy, for example, field offices, departments, functions, divisions, may be
assigned certain official goals, which may be superordinate goals for them, but which may be
subordinate goals in terms of the organization as a whole. However, like the organization as a
whole, they may also adopt different, often standardized, ways of achieving official goals, and, in
that regard, may also adopt instrumental goals, that is to say goals whose achievement is
instrumental to the achievement of official, superordinate, or high level, goals. These processual
standards and instrumental goals may be considered to be unofficial goals of the relevant
hierarchical level.
It is also possible, of course, that not all groups within the organization may be characterized by
hierarchical or other official criteria. For example, the organization may be characterized by the
presence of “professional” groups, such as lawyers, accountants, engineers, and actuaries, who
may be engaged in various hierarchical levels and functions, whose unofficial goals may include
adherence to professional standards of competence, integrity, and other matters. This may also be
the case with respect to individual members of such professions vis-à-vis their participation in an
instant group: their adherence to professional standards may be considered as unofficial goals visà-vis their membership in the group. In fact, it is possible that such external “professional”
standards may be superordinate goals for them personally, as being necessary to maintain their
professional affiliations.
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Perrow says that the means of achieving official goals, and the relative priority of such goals, are
addressed by means of "operative goals": “Operative goals designate the ends sought through the
actual operating policies of the organization; they tell us what the organization actually is trying
to do, regardless of what the official goals say are the aims. Where operative goals provide the
specific content of official goals they reflect choices among competing values.”12 Such operative
goals provide the “specific content” of official goals, which are often are often vague or expressed
at such a high level of generality as not to be very meaningful.
Reflecting “choices among competing values”, they may involve choosing among goals at
different levels of importance or generating or applying “instrumental” values, some of which may
be processual in nature. That is to say, operative goals may reflect the way in which the
organization goes about pursuing its goals. Adherence to such processes, as an operative goal, may
be ranked according to priority and, as such, may be superordinate, subordinate, instrumental, or
otherwise.
Perrow says that operative goals “may be justified on the basis of an official goal, even though
they may subvert another official goal. In one sense they are means to official goals, but since the
latter are vague or of high abstraction, the "means" become ends in themselves when the
organization is the object of analysis.”13 While the level of abstraction at which official goals are
expressed may not make this apparent, the infusion of specific content into those official goals
may reveal the incoherence of those official goals, when considered collectively. Unofficial goals,
by providing such content for official goals, may thereby seek to resolve such incoherence by
ordering the official goals in some way. This may frequently have the result of masking conflict
over such goals.
In this regard, Perrow explains that with respect to an official goal of making a profit, operative
goals will “specify whether quality or quantity is to be emphasized, whether profits are to be short
run and risky or long run and stable, and will indicate the relative priority of diverse and somewhat
conflicting ends of customer service, employee morale, competitive pricing, diversification, or
liquidity. Decisions on all these factors influence the nature of the organization, and distinguish it

12
13

Ibid.
Ibid.

217

from another with an identical official goal.”14 Unofficial operative goals, on the other hand, are
tied more directly to group interests and while they may support, be irrelevant to, or subvert,
official goals, they bear no necessary connection with them.15
It may be expected that persons and groups within an organization generally adopt its official, or
principal official, goal or goals, and that they would be expected to adhere, if not to actually accept,
internalize, or “believe in” its operative goals, or most of them. However, because such operative
goals are often means to official goals, or generate or apply means of prioritizing among official
goals, they reflect choices among competing values, which may not be unanimously shared among
constituent individuals and groups within the organization.
Consequently, while it may be expected that official, operative, or instrumental goals will be
shared by all constituent individuals and groups, this may not be the case. Still less may it be the
case with regard to unofficial operative goals. Perrow notes that unofficial operative goals may
support, or subvert, or be irrelevant to, the official goals of the organization. Accordingly, some
constituents of an organization may be committed to operative goals, official (that is to say,
declared) or unofficial, that conflict with those of other organizational constituents. It can readily
be seen that such goal conflict may lead some members of the organization to select means to other
goals that will be conducive to the operative goals of such members, but inimical to the operative
goals of other members. Considered in the abstract, this goal conflict may inhibit attainment of
certain official or unofficial goals, depending on their nature and adherents.
As our examination of Chandler’s work has shown, changes in resources, technology, or growth,
may make necessary the adjustment of some aspect of the organization’s structure. Such
adjustments may also be required as a result of changes in goals. As to these, Perrow says, that
there “are many critical variables influencing the selection of key problem areas and thus the
characteristics of the controlling elite and operative goals. They will be applicable to the analysis
of any complex organization, whether business, governmental, or voluntary.”16 Perrow’s examples
of these variables relate primarily to business organizations, including capital needs and
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legitimization, the amount of routinization possible, adaptability of technology to market shifts
and consumer behavior, possible or required professionalization, and the nature of the work force.
The choice of operative goals and ways in which they are pursued within an organization may be
affected by many factors, including the breadth, depth, and dispersion, of their acceptance in the
organization, most especially at higher and other critical levels of its hierarchy. Some levels of the
hierarchy or units within an organization may pursue operative goals that are not generally shared,
or, as we have suggested, that are inconsistent with strategic or higher order operative goals.
As a purely theoretical matter, it can be readily seen that this may entail that certain parts of the
organization may act separately in the organization’s external environment. For our purposes, it
may be that the firm, as such an organization, does not act completely unequivocally in the
economy as a single actor. That this is at least a logical possibility compels the admission that this
particular assumption of neoclassical economics may not be readily conceded. As a matter of fact,
empirical verification substantiates that this logical possibility is observed in “the real world”.
Some salient research concerning these matters is reviewed in Part 3 of the present work.
ORGANIZATIONS AS POLITICAL SYSTEMS
We have already introduced the notion that units and sub-units of organizations, including the firm,
may operate in a coherent fashion within the organization. A division of a large corporation often
pursues its strategic and operative goals with a relatively high degree of independence from what
Chandler has called the general or head office of the corporation.
We will discuss particular forms of this in more detail below; however, for the present, we will
note that groups, however situated within the corporation, may interact as groups with other groups
within the focal group. This intragroup interaction within the focal group may be seen as engaging
social and political considerations that may be quite distinct from the intergroup action of each
particular group outside the focal group. Just as the goals sought by, and actions taken within, a
particular group within the organization, such as a corporation, cannot be accurately described by
merely aggregating goals and actions of individual members of the group, the goals sought by, and
actions taken within, the larger organization, including the firm or corporation, cannot be
accurately described by merely aggregating goals and actions of groups constituting the
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organization as a whole. As discussed below, this associative effect may arise in connection with
the very nature of association, or engagement in social intercourse.
Early discussions of this subject appear in the work of the organizational theory leader James G.
March, a founder of the Carnegie School.17 He and his colleagues developed a behavioural
approach to organization theory18, which was expounded in his seminal work with Richard Cyert,
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, in 1963.19 At this point, we will not engage in a general
discussion of such approach, but will limit the discussion to matters affecting whether the firm acts
in the economy as a single actor.
Firms, The Polity, and Economic Theory
In James March’s seminal 1962 article, “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition”,20 he
maintains that “[t]he modern business firm is an organization for making and implementing
decisions within a market economy.” He says: “In most major industries of well-developed
economies, most firms are large, complex organizations. These organizations render a set of key
decisions for the economy. They establish prices, determine outputs, make investments, and
allocate resources. These decisions and the consequences ensuing from them are the focus for the
economic study of the firm. The economic theory of the firm attempts (1) to specify the decisions
that business firms will make (as a basis for more aggregate predictions of the economy) and (2)
to prescribe appropriate decision rules for a rational firm operating in a market economy.”21
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In pleading for less “division of labour” between economics and political science, March argues
that economists have generally ignored political systems except as they impinge on the market,
while political scientists have excluded business firms from their domain, in both cases to the
detriment of understanding the firm, predicting its activities, and exercising political control and
direction over the firm. He maintains that “the business organization is properly viewed as a
political system and that viewing the firm as such a system both clarifies conventional economic
theories of the firm and…suggests some ways of dealing with classical problems in the theory of
political systems generally.”22 These arguments supporting close examination of March’s political
coalition theory of the firm, to which the text will now turn.
The Firm as a Socio-Political Conflict System
March claims that “some recent work in organization theory seems to indicate the utility of
applying political concepts to the study of economic systems, particularly to the study of economic
organizations”, including some of his earlier work, with Herbert Simon23, and also with Richard
Cyert24, saying that such works, in many respects, “view the business organization as a sociopolitical conflict system subject to economic constraints”.25
March describes a conflict system as a system which lacks a preference ordering. In effect, it is
one in which preferences conflict, and in which the system seeks a resolution of such conflict,
either by means of adherence to a superordinate goal, such as “profit”, as in the case of theories of
business firms, or by means of adherence to a superordinate process of conflict resolution not
involving an explicit comparison of utilities, as in the case of theories of political coalitions.
Conflict arises when the preference orderings of the basic units are mutually inconsistent relative
to the resources of the system, such that the most preferred state chosen by all elementary units
cannot be simultaneously realized.26 March indicates that these postulates underlie “a wide variety

22

Ibid at 663.
James G March and Herbert A Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958). As at May 28,
2017, this book has reportedly been cited 5319 times. Bedeian and Wren, supra note 19, report that it was ranked as
the seventh most influential management book of the twentieth century.
24
Supra note 19.
25
Supra note 20 at 666. March also references, as another example, VA Thompson, Modern Organization (New York:
Random House, 1961).
26
Supra note 20 at 663.
23

221

of theories about conflict resolution, choice, or the allocation of scarce resources”, including such
situations as “the behavior of individuals in a simple learning experiment, the internal dynamics
of a small group solving a problem, the interaction of parties and pressure groups in a legislative
setting, or the pricing of commodities in a market system”.27
March says that a superordinate goal can be imputed based on two assumptions: firstly, that there
exists a joint preference ordering for the system at any particular point in time (in effect, a
“resolvability” or “satisfiability” assumption); and secondly, that the system always chooses an
alternative which is not less good than others, in effect, the most preferred alternative. 28 March
explains that the process approach to a conflict system, on the other hand, does not attempt to
“identify a joint preference ordering with respect to the ultimate decision” but assumes, instead,
firstly, “that the ultimate decision results from a series of elementary decisions”; and, secondly,
“that some sort of joint preference ordering exists for the elementary decisions”.29 We may note
that both the superordinate goal and the superordinate process methods of joint preference ordering
assume that the joint preference determination operates in a manner which is, generally speaking,
rational, colloquially and otherwise, although not necessarily without other relevant influences.
March explains that a theory of conflict systems must, firstly, treat elementary decision processes
as consistent basic units and, secondly, be susceptible to investigation by analytic procedures.30 In
this sense, the level of analysis is highly significant: “One feature of studies of conflict systems
that is puzzling from the point of view of the postulates of conflict is the extent to which the
elementary units in one study are the conflict systems of another. The individual is treated as the
system in some cases (e.g., in learning) and as the elementary unit in other (e.g., studies of small
groups). Similarly, small groups are treated both as systems and as elementary units (e.g., in studies
of organizations).”31
March’s point here is a methodological one: the same study cannot consider a unit as both an
elementary unit and as a conflict system. Instead, he maintains that it must treat a unit as either an
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elementary unit within a conflict system, or as a conflict system on its own right. This has
considerable logical coherence. For example, a division of a corporation might be considered to
be an elementary unit within the conflict system constituted by the corporation as a whole. When
considering the division of the corporation as a conflict unit itself, other units must be identified
as elementary units, which might be departments or functional units within the division.
However, March argues that “[s]ince the first postulate of conflict is essentially that the basic units
themselves not be conflict systems, it seems awkward to be able to view a single system as either
an elementary unit or a conflict system depending on the level of aggregation involved.”32 At the
same time, however, adherence to this “first postulate” disables an investigator from investigating
anything but “primary level” conflict systems. This approach is neither efficacious nor commonly
adopted, for March concludes that “[i]n fact, most systems studied in the social sciences are
apparently conflict systems of conflict systems.”33
As noted above, conflict may arise in an organization where the resources available to the
organization do not permit attainment of the goals of all component units. Such conflict may arise
with respect to unit goals even though there may be agreement on organization-wide goals. Such
unit may pursue such unit goals both internally and externally. In the case of a business
organization, the latter may result in the organization, the firm, or the corporation, acting in the
economy as more than one actor. This presents problems not only for economic theory, but also
for conflict system theory.
The Firm as a Conflict System for Internal and External Conflicts
March argues that economic theory does not permit investigation of the firm as a conflict system:
“The assumption of consistent basic units is justified by asserting either of two other characteristics
of the macro-system involved. We may assert that the preference ordering of the subsystem (which
we wish to identify as the elementary unit) is causally antecedent, and independent of, the decisions
of the larger system. In such a case, we treat the preference ordering of the subsystem as given
without considering the way in which that ordering is derived.”34 The immediate practical effect
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of this assertion is that it ignores the way in which decisions as to preferences are reached within
the subsystem or elementary unit. Another practical effect is that it ignores even the possibility of
any interaction between preference ordering at the subsystem or elementary unit level and
preference ordering at the macro-system or focal unit level. We comment on this further below.
March says: “Alternatively, we may assert that variation in system behavior due to conflict within
the subsystem is trivial because of scale differences between the conflict within the subsystem on
the one hand and conflict among subsystems on the other. In such a case, we take the preference
ordering of the subsystem as subject to some minor error without attempting to eliminate the error
entirely.”35 In effect, on this argument, joint preference ordering operates independently of the
content of the preference concerned, and, perhaps, also independently of the absolute or relative
prioritization, or weighting, of the preference concerned by the subsystem members.
On this latter assumption, discrepancies between the joint preferences generated by the macrosystem, as opposed to those generated by each subsystem, are purely scalar or quantitative, rather
than qualitative. Accordingly, on this assumption, joint preference ordering can proceed by simple
aggregation of subsystem preferences. The nature of such aggregation is similar to the generation
of demand curves in neoclassical economics by aggregating the demands of individual consumers.
In both cases, the subject of such aggregation can be treated purely quantitatively, which is to say,
mathematically.
Both of these arguments, March suggests, are suspect, in view of the complexities of interaction
between the resolution of conflict within the subsystems and the resolution of conflict within the
larger system.36 In consequence, he finds that the “assumption of consistent basic units” is
problematic. The extent to which this assumption relies upon further assumptions or
generalizations relating to methodological individualism are discussed in the section following.
For present purposes, we may take the assumption of consistent basic units as indicating, at least,
that any interposition of units of a firm (sub-units within a conflict system, the firm) into the
economy “outside” the firm (a different, and higher order, conflict system) would likely complicate
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both the internal resolution of conflict among units inside the firm as the immediate conflict
system, and the resolution of conflict in the economy (the higher order conflict system) generally.
This might occur if the sub-unit of the firm was to pursue its economic and any other goals among
economic actors, including the firm under consideration, in the economy generally. The sub-unit
of the firm could be considered to be competing among such economic actors, including with the
firm of which it is a sub-unit.
Among other things, the resources sought by such sub-unit may be sought by it on its own right,
and not simply as part of the firm. Thus, the sub-unit of the firm seeks resources within the firm,
as to which it may compete with other sub-units, but also seeks resources and profits outside the
firm in the overall economy, as to which it may compete with other economic actors in the
economy generally. Such sub-unit is still, however, ultimately affected by resource allocation
within the firm. This is not the case with competitors outside the firm, or at least those which are
not units or sub-units of other economic actors. The competition for resources and customers is,
by hypothesis, purely external to the firm, in the overall economy, or in the market. The internal
unit may, in some cases, thus be subject to, or, in others, may avoid, constraints arising from the
nature of the organization itself, and which are not shared by outside organizations with which it
interacts in the higher order conflict system.
The exposition advanced here gains support from March’s criticism that “[e]conomic treatment of
the firm as a conflict system is heavily influenced by the fact that the firm in economic theory is
more commonly treated as the basic unit of a larger conflict system (industry, market, economic
system) than as a conflict system itself.”37 The present work has demonstrated the accuracy of this
remark in regard to neoclassical theory. It can be seen that such theory would disregard preference
ordering within the firm itself, considered as a sub-system, or basic unit, of the larger economic
system. This permits the invisibilization of the process of determining joint preferences within the
firm itself. Analysis of the firm as a conflict system, however, would not permit this.
As a result of ignoring the firm as a conflict system, March says, “the economic theory of the firm
is almost invariably constructed by explicitly imputing a superordinate goal to the conflict system
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represented by a business firm. In its classic form the theory asserts that the objective of the firm
is to maximize long-run expected profits. The objective is accomplished by determining an output
to be produced given a production function, a cost function, and a price. Given a set of factor
prices, the firm determines the minimum cost factor mix and the optimum output.”38 Criticism of
the neoclassical economic theory of the firm in this regard has been considered earlier in this work.
It can still be seen that neoclassical theory of the firm asserts, as a characteristic of the economic
system, that the preference ordering within the firm, as a sub-system or basic unit of the macrosystem, “is causally antecedent, and independent of, the decisions of the larger system”39, and that
the preference ordering of the firm, as a sub-system, can be treated “as given without considering
the way in which that ordering is derived.”40 This is the first of the two alternatives which March
says are used to justify the assumption that a conflict system involves consistent basic units,
discussion of which begin the present section. Again, this occludes recognition of the behaviour
of the firm as involving decisions and processes relating to the determination of goals and
objectives.
Joint Preference Ordering in Economic Theory
Whether the joint preference ordering for the firm is expressed in the economic theory of the firm
as profit maximization, a more general utility function, or as some other goal, such as revenue
maximization, March observes that: “For the most part, the theory suppresses as outside its domain
the process by which an organization composed of a rather complex mixture of people with
considerable heterogeneity of individual goals generates a single preference ordering. It is assumed
that conflict is resolved by the employment contract, or – more generally – by the factor prices and
that the result is a joint preference ordering of some sort or other.”41 The present work has criticized
this approach, in part by presenting criticisms from the perspectives of other commentators. It has
been emphasized here that this perspective represents a failure to explicate the processes by which
economic determinations are made, by economic actors and otherwise, such as by the economic
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system itself, and thereby fails to instantiate the means by which such theory is interpolated into,
or instantiated in, reality.
The assumption which March makes concerning the economic theory of the firm is one which has
been described here as critical to neoclassical theory generally, namely, methodological
individualism. Methodological individualism as applied in neoclassical theory holds that the basic
unit of economic analysis is the monadic individual, lacking individual characteristics, acting
independently, with complete rationality, and with complete relevant information, making
decisions solely on the basis of his or her personal utility. As argued earlier in this work, this
assumption or generalization raises such difficulties that it cannot be maintained, at least as a guide
to actual human behaviour, whether expressed in terms of economic behaviour or otherwise,
including with respect to social and political theory and behaviour.
It is easy to see, however, that March’s description of the economic theory of the firm considers
the individual, as just described, as the “basic unit” of “the firm”, acting as a conflict system. His
description is consistent with the critique of aggregation of individual supply, or individual
demand, as the case may be, generating aggregate supply or demand, as the case may be, and
producing equilibrium. As argued in the present work, especially in Appendix B in Chapters B4
and B5, such methodological individualism, at least in the form in which it is employed in
neoclassical economics, ex hypothesi occludes or invisibilizes observation of one economic actor
by another, as well as any other interaction among such economic actors. Such methodological
individualism and such simple generation of supply and demand by means of aggregation alone
have each been criticized earlier in this work.
In the case of the firm, employment of the monadic individual as the invariant unit of analysis
affords no possibility of interaction among individuals, or of intermediation of behaviour at some
“group” level between the individual and the firm, or among such groups. Instead, March suggests
that the firm is an organization “composed of a rather complex mixture of people”, thereby drawing
attention to the fact that the individuals within the organization possess distinctive characteristics,
and implying that such heterogeneity may have some effect on generating a single preference
ordering for the firm. Indeed, he states that the individuals composing the firm may be expected
to have “considerable heterogeneity of individual goals”. In other words, the heterogeneity of goals
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possessed by such a complex mixture of individuals may be considerable and, as such, may require
complex processes in order to resolve conflicts among these diverse goals.
March says that economic theory simply assumes that joint preference ordering takes place,
without explaining how this is effected. Of course, if the posited single joint preference ordering
is not achieved, either fully or partially, there may be more than one preference ordering, at the
firm level or at other levels within the firm. For example, a single preference ordering may be
generated in respect of the most general level of preference, the superordinate goal of the firm at
the firm level, but not at lower levels of preference, such as those concerning operative or
instrumental goals, or at organizational levels below the firm level, in effect, at the level of subsystems within the firm level meta-system. At such levels, joint preference ordering may be said
to be incomplete or indeterminate, inasmuch as several preferences may enjoy support among
various organizational constituents at the relevant level, requiring further joint preference ordering
by political action, including use of influence processes, coalition building, bargaining, or
otherwise.
Similarly, a single preference ordering at the most general operative level may be generated at the
highest level of the firm or, but not at other, subordinate, levels. In effect, those at subordinate
levels of the firm may not share the single preference ordering of operative goals at the most
general level of the firm as a whole. In turn, this may have the effect that some individuals or
groups at that subordinate level may determine to pursue their own collective goals. The logical
possibility thus arises that some of those goals may be expressed outside the firm, that is, by
economic action in the wider economy or economic meta-system; in short, that the goal conflict
may result in the firm not acting outside the firm as a single actor, as posited by economic theory.
Although we have not in this work previously considered the firm expressly as a conflict system,
we have previously noted that processes within the firm, including goal derivation and
harmonization, although not dealt with by neoclassical economic theory, are worthy of
investigation. March argues: “This implicit assumption that the firm represents a conflict system
susceptible to useful description in terms of a superordinate goal (whether profit maximization or
some other) is shared by most economists. It is apparently convenient for the construction of
theories of macro-economic systems. Most economic theories build upon it (although not all
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necessarily depend upon it). It is relatively amenable to theoretical manipulation. It lends itself to
the geometry and calculus familiar to economic thought.”42 It is not, he says, that economics fails
to recognize the firm as a conflict system, which is assumed. What is left unsaid by March is that
because the nature of the firm as a conflict system is an implicit, rather than an explicit, assumption
held by most economists, it is insufficiently analyzed, operationalized, or explained, in theory and
in practice.
In addition to the criticisms advanced by March which are discussed above, he advances a signal
criticism of profit as the superordinate goal of the firm, as follows: “Nevertheless, the assumption
is almost certainly wrong as a micro-description of a business firm. It was proved extremely
difficult to define a superordinate goal for a business firm that meets the two technical
requirements of stability and meaningfulness as well as the empirical requirement of validity.
Generally speaking, profit maximization can be made perfectly meaningful (with some
qualifications); but when made meaningful, it usually turns out to be invalid as a description of
firm behavior. To achieve validity, we can substitute utility maximization; but this turns out to be
either not stable or not meaningful.”43
As an example of this, March cites Machlup’s attempt to generalize, by construing profit as utility
maximization, the assumption that firms seek to maximize profit, but claims that this “ended by
reducing it largely to a definition insofar as a micro theory is concerned.” March concludes that
“[w]ith few exceptions, modern observers of actual firm behavior report persistent and significant
contradictions between firm behavior and the classical assumptions.”44 As has been seen, March’s
conclusion is shared by many other commentators.
March reports, then, that observations of the behaviour of firms is not consistent with the
superordinate single goal of profit maximization. However, he concludes that “[d]espite their
inadequacies, the assumptions have persisted... for a simple but compelling reason. The alternative
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mode of theory - the process description of a conflict system – also has generally failed to satisfy
its technical requirements.”45
March builds a case for examining the internal processes of the firm and, in these excerpts, at least,
for investigating the goals that the firm pursues and how it resolves conflicts among its internal
units. Writing at a time, in the early 1960s (published in 1962), when Chandler was writing his
Strategy and Structure, (also published in 1962), and making an early attempt to outline the
development and structure of the business corporations then dominating the American economy,
March began to explore the implications of decision processes within the firm.
As he says, while empirical investigation and description of those decision processes was not at
that time entirely absent, an analytical apparatus was absent. The implication, he says, is that if an
analytical apparatus to delineate the implications of the process could not be devised, a revised
process-theoretical model of the firm could not be built, with the further result that “a revised
theory of the firm could not satisfactorily be grafted to existing economic theory”.46 It is not clear,
even at the present, that such grafting has eventuated.
For present purposes, however, we must take notice that March certainly identifies the possibility
that the firm might not always act “as a single actor” with respect to those outside of the firm. Lest
it be thought that only units or sub-units of “the firm” may pursue goals that are not uniformly
those of “the firm” as a whole, some reference to organizations of a different nature may be useful.
Organizations as Polities
Meyer Zald’s 1966 article, “Organizations as Polities: An Analysis of Community Organization
Agencies”,47considered community organization (CO) agencies, such as welfare councils,
neighbourhood block clubs, settlement houses, community centers, adult education centres, family
service agencies, research agencies, and health agencies, and analyzed them as “miniature
polities”, considering the distribution and utilization of authority and influence and how subgroup
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loyalties and power affected their operations.48 Such community organizations, of course, are not
primarily engaged in economic activity, and are not business organizations, but are, instead,
organizations with various goals and objectives that can be considered to be of a broadly social or,
perhaps, political, nature.
Zald avers that he employs the general approach of organizational analysis, which “takes the total
organization, not some subpart, as its object”.49 Characteristic of this approach, he says, is a focus
on “the relation of goals to structure and the pressures to change goals arising from both the
environment and the internal arrangements of the organization”, and “on the allocation of power
to different groups and the manner in which subgroup loyalties and power affect the operation of
organizations.”50 The ways in which the structure and processes of organizations are adapted in
view of, and to reduce, or organizational dependencies on external and internal resources have
been discussed earlier in this work. In the organizational analysis approach, “organizations are
seen as developing distinctive characters — styles and strategies of coping with recurring
problematic dilemmas of the organization.”51 As Zald says, its recursive dilemmas include
resource dependencies.
As Zald’s references to organizational analysis indicate, the relationship between an organization,
its requisite resources and other environmental considerations, on the one hand, and the
relationship between its goals and its organizational structure, on the other hand, are not essentially
affected by the “nature of the organization”, considered in the sense of the goals which it pursues.
However, although not mentioned by Zald, it is likely that the expressed preference ordering of a
CO agency may be more amenable to variance than that of a business enterprise. This depends, of
course, on the manner in which that preference ordering is expressed.
As March indicates, preference ordering in term of profit maximization is not likely to be
meaningful as a basis for decision-making. Some lower level objectives may perform this function.
The superordinate goals of a CO agency, on the other hand, may be more readily employable as
decision-making determinants. Zald maintains that an organization has a constitution, which
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“represents its social contract — the basic purposes and modes of procedure to which the major
supporters and staff of the organization adhere”52, which constitution “is made up of the agency's
commitments to major programs and modes of proceeding (goals and means).”53
Zald explains that such constitution “is, of course, more than just the formal or written statement
of goals and procedures, for these may have little to do with the organization's actual constitution.
On the other hand, many patterned aspects of agency operation may not be part of the constitution,
for these patterns may not deal with basic agreements about goals and means.”54 Thus Zald seems
to recognize that the formal constitution, and the informal, or operative, constitution may co-exist.
As with Chandler and Perrow, Zald distinguishes official or stated strategies (Chandler) or goals
(Perrow) from operative or actual goals, and superordinate goals from subordinate goals, including
instrumental goals or means of attaining goals. Like Chandler and Perrow, he claims that changes
in strategies or goals require corresponding adjustments in structure: “Organizations come into
being to pursue collective ends. A central part of the constitution of any organization is the sets of
agreements about goals that are understood by major constituents. Not only do goals represent a
set of constituting agreements, they focus organizational resources on a problem field. That is,
organizational goals along with beliefs about how to attain them set tasks and problems for agency
personnel.” 55
Accordingly, changes in organizational resources, including the extent to which the organization
is dependent with respect to such resources upon external or internal sources, may affect its ability
to achieve its goals and objectives as the organization is constituted of the relevant time, which
may require some adaptation of its structure and processes. In some cases, it may be necessary to
refocus, re-emphasize, de-emphasize, or re-prioritize, certain subordinate goals or objectives. As
organizations pursue shared goals or objectives, when considered in their political aspect, as
“miniature polities”, it can be seen that “attempts to shift the objectives of the organization can
threaten its body politic”.56
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For Zald, then, the constitution of an organization involves not only agreement about goals, or, at
least, about a superordinate goal or goals, but also agreement about the means or processes of
attaining such goals. As in the case of statal polities, some processes or means of attaining goals
may be approved or explicitly authorized, while others may be prescribed, in whole or in part, or
reserved for only certain exceptional circumstances.
The agreement about the means or processes of attaining the organization’s goals and objectives
may obtain only at a very high, that is, “constitutional” or, at least, “strategic” level, and may not
extend to intermediate and lower, that is to say, tactical or functional, levels. This, of course,
introduces the possibility, logically, at least, if not otherwise, that some of the constituents or
groups of constituents, may agree with very high order principles respecting the means or
processes of attaining the organization’s goals and objectives, but may not agree with medium or
lower order principles concerning such means and processes.
As with other organizations, continuance of the organization becomes a goal or objective of CO
agencies. Zald says that “[a]s a working assumption it is reasonable to assert that most
organizations will attempt to maintain autonomy and increase their scope” even, in the case of
COs “when it is obvious that one agency is more capable of achieving a shared goal than another”,
which is rare.”57 He claims that “[o]ne of the basic premises of organizational analysis is that only
under very special conditions do organizations purposely attempt to decrease their scope, actually
admit that they are ineffective, or willingly give up ‘turf’”, for example, where staff of the
organization has a low ideological or career commitment to it, where fund raising becomes
increasingly difficult, or where the organization’s constituency increasingly finds better alternative
uses of time and money.58
An organizational theorist or practitioner might endeavour to apply similar observations to units
of an organization, which may normally be expected to seek to maintain their existence, purview,
and influence with respect to the organization as a whole.
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Competing Preferences Within the Firm, and Formation of Coalitions
In the sections above entitled “The Firm as a Socio-Political Conflict System” and “Organizations
as Polities”, the subject-matters referenced were discussed with a particular focus on the
perspectives of March and Zald, respectively. March indicated that theories of business firms
claimed that such firms resolve conflict by means of and adherence to a superordinate goal, namely
“profit”, whereas theories of coalitions in politics generally adopted the alternative method of
conflict resolution, namely, adherence to a superordinate process of conflict resolution not
involving an explicit comparison of utilities.59
March argues that analysis of polities as conflict resolution systems face the same problems as in
the case of business and other organizations, namely, that of seeking to derive a superordinate goal,
such as the “public interest”, which is simultaneously meaningful, stable, and valid.60 He indicates
that, accordingly, studies of conflict resolution in political systems became focused on process
descriptions such that “the basic outline of a process-oriented political theory of conflict resolution
can be detected”, in effect, theorizing conflict resolution by means of a superordinate process,
rather than by means of a superordinate goal.
March explains that the theory assumes that: various interest groups exist within the system; and
make various demands with respect to the allocation of the system’s resources; decisions as to
which allocations are made by coalitions of interest groups; that various potential coalitions of
interest groups may have a certain degree of potential control over the system; with respect to
which a broker, the politician, attempts to organize a coalition of interests that is viable in the sense
that it allocates no more resources than are available to the system.61 Of course, we would argue
that in order to maintain this theory, it is not necessary to assume that all resource allocations are
determined by one macro-coalition which subsists over time. Instead, bargaining may take place
among one or more macro-coalitions. Further, any macro-coalition may be subject to regular, or
even continuous, recomposition and realignment. Decisions as to the allocation of sub-sets of
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system resources may be made by coalitions other than the macro-coalition which is dominant at
the particular time.
March distinguishes this theory from descriptions of political systems which emphasize power,
internal struggle, and expediency, and de-emphasize order, cooperation and problem solving, and
claims that this interest group theory of political decision making “ordinarily highlights
phenomena such as bargaining, compromise, negotiation, inconsistency, and more or less
continual conflict.”62 He describes it as “a theory with modest analytic pretensions but rather
impressive generality as a framework for observation” which is well accepted in one form or
another by students of political organizations “despite the obvious fact that the theory neither is
particularly well-defined nor has a particular powerful language.”63 March’s description of the
interest group theory of decision-making in politics is useful insofar in the present context as he
relates it to organizations pursuing other objectives, such as the firm, or the corporation.
March’s 1962 article goes on to examine the ways in which competing preferences operate within
the firm. He relates those competing preferences to the theory of the firm employed in the seminal
1958 work that he co-authored with Robert Cyert 64, which assumes, firstly, that a business firm is
a political coalition; secondly, that the executive in the firm is a political broker; thirdly, that the
composition of the firm is not given but, instead, is negotiated; and, fourthly, that the goals of the
firm are not given but, instead, are the result of bargaining.65 In this regard, March maintains that
profit must be rejected as a superordinate goal of the firm in resolving conflict because it lacks
meaning, stability, and validity; and, consequently, he proposes examining a processual goal as a
superordinate goal of the firm, instead.
This theory assumes that potential participants in the firm initially include “such classes of
potential participants as investors (stockholders), suppliers, customers, governmental agents, and
various types of employees” but may be extended to include investment analysts, trade
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associations, political parties, and labor unions.66 On this analysis, “[e]ach potential participant
makes demands on the system”, which “are essentially the price required for participation in the
coalition”; and that these demands “are partly in the form of payments commonly assumed in
economic theories (e.g., money) but they also are partly in the form of demands for policy
commitments, personal treatment, etc.”67 Where these demands are quantified monetarily, or
monetized, their valuation and comparison with other such demands may be greatly simplified, as
compared with demands relating to policy, or personal treatment or status.
Importantly, “each set of demands can be characterized as having some degree of consistency with
each combination of other demands. Some pairs of demands may be strictly inconsistent (under
no circumstances can they both be satisfied). Some pairs of demands may be more or less
consistent depending on external conditions (e.g., so long as the resources available to the coalition
are substantial they may be consistent). Some pairs of demands may be completely complementary
(e.g., if one demand is satisfied so also is the other one necessarily and without additional resource
expenditure). As a result of this complementarity, we can describe the marginal "cost" of any
participant to any given coalition.” 68
March’s description of this perspective reveals that the commitment made by firm with its
constituents, or by the constituents of the firm with each other, are not only monetary, quantified,
or even quantifiable. Commitments made by the “system” in response to demands for policy
commitments or certain personal treatment, two of the examples which March gives, are of this
nature. Moreover, such commitments are both incomplete, in as much as they require further
stipulation in order to be actionable, and executory, insofar as they are required to be performed
over a period of time.
The completion of such general commitments, on the one hand, and their effectuation or execution,
on the other hand, may be expected to give rise to differences of opinion as to whether those
commitments have been satisfied. These differences of opinion may be expressed as conflicts, but
also may give rise to secondary, that is to say, perceived or operative, commitments not necessarily
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shared by all members of the firm or coalition. As we have argued, these may, in turn, be
operationalized by being independently pursued by the individual or group, unit, or sub-unit, selfconsidered as the beneficiary of such commitment. This operationalization may take the form of
action within or without the firm separately from the firm as a whole, that is to say, as a separate
economic actor.
Continuing the Coalition
It may be said that the commitments made in connection with forming the coalition, participating
in the system, or establishing the firm are not only incomplete, generalized or diffuse, often
requiring further particularization, and are often also executory in nature, requiring performance
over a period of time, but such commitments are also subject to change, as a result of internal as
well as external factors. In particular, March assumes that the level of demands of the potential
participants shifts “in response to experience (both actual and vicarious)” and that the extent to
which demands receive attention or are seen as relevant to action “shifts in response to the
perception of problems.”69 March assumes, in turn, that each possible coalition of participants can
gain a certain return from its environment, which represents the “value” of the coalition with
respect to such environment.
Discussing the value of such a coalition in a polity, March suggests that “an over-simple model of
a governmental coalition in a parliamentary democracy might assume that any coalition including
more than 50% of the voters would be able to do anything permissible within the system (thus
would have maximum power) and that any coalition including less than 50% of the voters would
be able to do nothing (thus would have minimum power).”70 This example suggests that March
assumes that each possible coalition has a single superordinate goal, namely, the achievement of
maximum possible power, instead of a single superordinate processual goal, namely, the maximum
(or optimal) satisfaction of the aggregate goals of coalition participants. In a sense, although March
argues that political systems themselves do not have single superordinate goals, he attributes that
characteristic to participants in the political system. This conflicts with his stated position that
modern political systems, in which disparate interest groups each seek their own objectives, seek
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to attain some goal which is at once meaningful, stable, and viable; namely, some sort of effective
coalition.
It is arguable that March maintains a similar position with respect to business coalitions when he
says that “[i]n a similar way, alternative business coalitions can gain different returns from the
economic system in which they operate; and we can (at least approximately) specify the marginal
value of a particular given participant to a particular given coalition.”71 March appears to be
maintaining not only that a particular given coalition has a specific “value” in terms of the return
which it can derive from its environment, but also that the “marginal value of a particular given
participant to a particular given coalition” can likewise be ascertained. These arguments are more
readily maintainable if all possible economic organizations are considered to have a single
superordinate goal, for example, profit, a view which March criticizes elsewhere, as noted above.
Notwithstanding the merits of these arguments, however, it must be conceded that there is
considerable utility in considering a firm, that is, a modern business corporation, as notionally
involving a coalition of participants the selection of whom, and the basis of whose participation is
determined, as a result of bargaining among the possible participants concerning their respective
demands. It is recognized, of course, that any such notional bargaining takes place seriatim, and
sequentially, rather than contemporaneously and multilaterally. The utility of the theory is
enhanced if it is recognized as purely “notional” or conjectural; that is to say, it is considered that
the “bargaining” is idealistic or typological, and that the “bargain” is, more realistically, implicit
and tacit, rather than explicit and overt.
As noted previously, once such enterprise is actually operating, the performance of executory
bargains and other factors, including, changes in participant demand, may be expected to transpire.
Accordingly, as the demands of participants are required to become more concrete or definite in
order to ascertain whether or not they are satisfied, and as commitments are required to be satisfied
over a period of time, the salience of certain demands and commitments may be, may be required
to be, or may be perceived to be required to be, adjusted; not only to conform to actual, expected
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future, and possibly even possible future experience, but also to the requirements of the
organization itself, including changes in resources, strategy and structure.
March suggests some of these considerations can be assessed from the perspective of the executive
(or, in the present author’s supposition, the executive group), who wishes to maximize his own
utility as a result of his participation in the organization, whose “problem then is (insofar as he is
able) to select a coalition so as to maximize the difference between the demands of his coalition
members and the potential return from the environment of the coalition.”72 In this way, he might
hope to appropriate that difference by way of return to him for his “executive” participation, by
way of appropriation of “rent”, or by way of some combination of the two.
In order to generate this surplus or return, “[o]n the one hand, he must select a coalition that has
relatively low "costs" of maintenance and relatively high returns from the environment. On the
other hand, he must so structure the payments made to coalition members as to make the shifts in
demands conducive to increasing the difference between total demands and total resources.”73
March indicates that the further definition of the theory requires specification of “the dimensions
of participant demands, some measure of their complementarity, the functions by which they
change over time, and the short run internal constraints on the bargaining process by which goals
are formed.”74
March’s “executive” is reminiscent of the single owner-manager of neoclassical theory. Rather
than a single individual, an owner-manager in neoclassical theory, and an “executive” in March’s
theory, March’s executive may be a team of individuals, or an executive team. His executive
functions as a broker of the demands of potential coalition participants.
In addition, the executive must continue to broker the demands of actual coalition participants,
taking into account the matters we have identified here, including the incompleteness, executory
nature of such commitments, as well as the varying actual and potential salience of the resources
supplied by the participant to the firm and the returns it derives from the deployment of all of its
resources and the alternative employment of the same or similar resources by the firm. As such, it
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may be expected that an important function of March’s executive (or delegate) will be to minimize
or resolve conflicts among all these commitments and related imperatives.
Of course, coalition formation and maintenance can be assessed from the perspective of coalition
participants other than the “executive” or “entrepreneur”. Indeed, the coalition theory is not
necessarily incompatible with someone other than the executive or entrepreneur acting as the
broker of demands made by potential and, later, actual coalition participants. March’s theory does,
however, involve the executive or entrepreneur acting as broker.
Business Coalitions and the Economic Theory of the Firm
March explains that there are four critical ways in which this theory of business coalitions,
although close to economic theory, deviates from conventional economic views in the direction of
a more "political" treatment. “First, the focus of attention shifts from the owners (and their
objectives) to the actual, operating organizers of the coalition - whoever they may be. In general,
we view stockholders much as a theory of political systems might view citizens. Their demands
form loose constraints on the more active members of the coalition. Their initiative in policy
formation and in determining the nature of the coalitions is small.”75
The analogy, of course, is somewhat imperfect. The citizenry of a particular polity may be said to
be much more tightly bounded than the shareholder body of the corporation. Shareholders “selfselect” to a much greater degree than do citizens. Citizenship qualifications may include such
matters as family history, place of birth, residence, immigration, and various other legal
determinants. These qualifications for citizenship are likely to be much more restrictive than those
relating to those relevant to holding shares in a particular corporation. Interestingly, these
shareholder qualifications may be most restrictive in circumstances in which citizenship or
residence is relevant, such as in the case of requirements for majority ownership of companies
operating in certain cultural, military, or national security industries.
Part 1 of this work demonstrated the types of constraints imposed by shareholders on management
of a corporation and on the corporation itself; generally relating to the ability to approve or reject
certain management initiatives, to bring certain proposals to the attention of management and other
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shareholders, to organize with respect to the election of directors and other matters requiring,
facilitated by, shareholder attention, and to transfer, or to require the acquisition by the corporation
of, shares held by the particular shareholder. The price at which transfers of shares can be effected
significantly affects the exercise of such rights. As previously discussed, holders of shares of a
corporation are, as such, are highly susceptible to substitution, even wholesale or complete
substitution.
Such a possibility is much reduced in the case of an electorate. While shareholders may enjoy
heightened influence with respect to the corporation from time to time, such as with respect to an
initial public offering of its equity securities, at which time shareholders may be said to engage in
some meaningful “bargaining”, even if intermediated by the capital markets, it may be difficult to
identify a similar situation of engagement with respect to an electorate, except perhaps with respect
to the adoption, or amendment of, a constitution for the polity, or with respect to constitutionally
required referenda. Nevertheless, the remoteness from power of those whose interests are
purportedly represented by the governing bodies of the association or organization are not entirely
dissimilar as between a public corporation and a polity constituted as a democracy.
The second way in which the coalition theory differs from conventional economic theory is that
the coalition theory “emphasizes the non-uniqueness of short run solutions to the coalition
problem. At any point in time, there are a number of possible coalitions that are viable (that is,
their total value exceeds their total cost of maintenance).”76 Immediately relevant to this
observation are two questions: the first relating to what the expression “short run” signifies for this
purpose; and the second relating to what viability signifies in this regard.
Presumably, the duration of solutions to the coalition problem will be affected by the respective
demands of possible coalition participants as they are instantiated temporally and otherwise. One
can speculate that points of disjuncture or fissure may arise at which the coalition at hand might
fracture and be replaced, in whole or in part, by some substitute or alternative coalition. Likewise,
viability may be assessed in terms of the degree of satisfaction of the demands of the relevant
participants at a particular point in time and obtaining over some duration of time. Nonetheless,
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identification of these two problems, non-exhaustively, does not thereby eliminate the utility of
the theory.
Perhaps even more persuasive is March’s third critical difference; namely, that “the theory does
not solve the problem of conflict by simple payments to participants and agreement on a
superordinate goal. Rather it emphasizes the importance of policy demands and payments and of
sequential rather than simultaneous mediation of demands.”77 Thus, the coalition theory does not
pretend to resolve conflicts by reference to the superordinate goal of maximizing profit; instead, it
seems to adopt a more processual goal, namely, seeking to attain an optimal level of achievement
of participant objectives.
This is in accordance with our discussion of March’s overall discussion of conflict systems in the
immediately preceding section of this work under the heading “Competing Preferences Within the
Firm, and Formation of Coalitions”. Accordingly, an overall commitment to address participant
demands and interests, whether or not all “put on the table” simultaneously or otherwise, permits
participants whose demands and interests are not immediately addressed to maintain some
confidence that their demands and interests will be addressed appropriately and “in due course”.
In turn, that might permit demands and interests that are more immediate or, if not more immediate,
then at least more susceptible of being addressed and resolved more immediately, to be resolved
at an earlier point in time, and thereby permitting some rational and orderly approach to resolution
of these conflicts.
Fourthly, March argues that the coalition theory “emphasizes the importance of institutional
constraints on the solution of the coalition problem” and, most conspicuously “constraints imposed
(1) by the institutionalization of commitments through the organizational structure, precedents,
and budgetary agreements, (2) by the reification of attachments through identification and
indoctrination, and (3) by the limitations in coordination and control imposed on an executive”.78
The first point, the institutionalization of commitments, refers to ways in which commitments are
instantiated in the structure and process of the organization. For example, revenue or profit targets
of a particular division or business unit may be considered to be “stretch targets” aimed at
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motivating the division or unit but considered to be realizable in ideal conditions, or they may be
considered to be “soft” or “hard” commitments, failure to realize which may result in actions of
different intensity, perhaps expressed in top-down imposition of remedial efforts, and perhaps
expressed in actions of a more penal nature.
The reference to reification of attachments through identification and indoctrination addresses
means of securing commitment of individuals and intra-organizational groups, such as divisions
or business units, to more and less immediate reference groups. March’s reference to the
limitations on an executive’s ability to exercise coordination and control refers not only to bounded
rationality itself but also to the boundedness implied by information asymmetries as between one
organizational level and another, including the “filtering” of information by information providers
and the failure of information seekers to identify adequately the information being sought.
March’s coalition theory implicates the nature of human action in ways in which the neoclassical
model of the firm does not. The firm is constituted by individuals, members of a coalition, not just
by a reified atomistic individual. Assumptions of complete rationality and full information, while
not excluded from this model, are not explicitly included, and may be considered to be implicitly
absent. Hierarchies of demands and goals are implicitly recognized. Social interaction is not only
not irrelevant to this model, but is actually assumed.
Bargaining may take into account non-monetary considerations: that is to say, it is recognized that
non-economic goals and objectives may motivate the behaviour of actual and potential coalition
participants. In fact, these goals and objectives may include “personal treatment” and possibly
other “personal” considerations. These may even extend to social or affiliative motivations,
including desires for social association, and for the formation and continuation of personal and
professional relationships.
We have previously remarked upon the logical gulf between neoclassical theory of the firm and
empirical observation of the firm, or, as we may say, between the firm as theorized and the firm in
action. March claims empirical support for the coalition theory, indicating that it is “more
consistent than other available theories with the following widely observed attributes of business
decision making”, indicating that “1. Organization goals seem to be a series of more or less
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independent constraints.”79 This suggests that many organizations do not appear to have
superordinate goals, but, instead, appear to have a number of official and operative goals, as well
as instrumental goals, without necessarily appearing to be obviously arrayed in some more or less
permanent hierarchy. As discussed, some of these goals may appear or disappear or require greater
or lesser salience over time.
Indeed, March’s second claim, which he asserts provides support for the political coalition theory,
is that “2. Business firms seem to tolerate a rather large amount of apparent inconsistency in goals
and decisions, both over time and from one part of the organization to another.” Further, “3. Goals
and decisions tend to be paired and decentralized with loose cross connections.” That is to say,
goals and decisions purportedly made in pursuit of the same are often goals of, and decisions
relating to, the subject-group under consideration. In short, various intraorganizational
components and constituents may adopt goals and may take decisions in behalf of such goals that
are not shared by the organization as a whole, by higher-order components and constituents, at
least widely, perhaps, or that may be shared only by components and constituents having direct
contact with the subject-group, either by responding to, or having responsibility for, the sharing
group (i.e., immediately above or below it in the hierarchy), or on the same level in the hierarchy.
March also draws attention to a subject already identified in our discussion: “4.The extent to which
decisions within the firm involve extensive conflict and "marginal" decisions varies with the
munificence of the environment.” Again, as we have observed previously, resources which are
more widely in demand by organizational components and constituents are likely to be the subject
of greater contestation than others.
Finally, March notes that “5.The goals and commitments of business firms shift slowly over time
in response to shifts in the coalition represented in the firm.” In other words, changes in goals and
commitments tend to be made incrementally, as expressions of shifting consensus of the relevant
coalition. For example, an increase in the power of one component or constituent group, perhaps
by reason of its control of a resource of critical and increasing importance to the firm, may result
in a change in goals and commitments that might be amended or reversed if that resource ceases
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to be controlled by the instant group, or if the importance of that resource the firm reduces, or if
that resource ceases to be critical to the firm.
March concludes that “The fact (if it is one) that a description of a business firm as a political
coalition is a more valid description than the classic economic description of the firm as an
entrepreneur does not, however, solve the theoretical dilemma posed by the classic problems of
analysis. For many years, economists as well as others have belabored the point that firms are
organizations rather than entrepreneurs; only in the last few years have such strictures had any
impact on the theory of the firm.”80 In effect, more than fifty years ago, March was lamenting the
failure of the theory of the firm to incorporate organizational analysis.
March avers that “we are now in a position to explore the implications of viewing the firm as such
a coalition” by means of process-descriptive models (often computer-based modelling) and to
“introduce such ‘political’ features as unremediated conflict, multi-dimensional goals, and
sequential attention to sub-unit pressures.”81 In his view, at that time, analytical and computational
tools had become available to investigate the internal processes of the firm. Of course, the political
coalition model advanced by March has some similar elements to the “nexus of contracts” 82,
evolutionary economics,83 and “team production”84 theories of the firm advanced by later authors;
however, these are beyond our present scope of discussion.
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FORMS OF CORPORATIONS – LEGAL AND ORGANIZATONAL VARIANTS
Chapter Two investigated the origins, development, and characteristics of the multidivisional
corporation, sometimes referred to as the “multidivisional enterprise”, the “M-form corporation”,
and as instantiating the “M-form” characterizing many modern business corporations. The earlier
part of the present chapter has considered the extent, if any, to which those descriptions conform
to neoclassical and classical economic theory of the firm. Alternative social and political
perspectives have been considered, by way of comparison to the economic theory of the firm and
otherwise, in an attempt to determine the extent, if any, to which such alternative theories of the
firm conform with the description of the modern business corporation and, in particular, the MDC,
presented in the previous chapter.
A work such as the present one cannot hope to do justice to the various theories which have been
developed to date concerning the operations of the modern business corporation and the research
related to various theoretical streams which has been conducted to date. However, some of these
theoretical and research streams are mentioned below for the purpose of demonstrating the
underpinnings of the theory or perspective advanced in this work, namely, that which is referred
to here as “corporative theory” and as “corporative governance”. This perspective, which will be
more fully addressed in the next chapter, acknowledges that the corporation as a separate legal
entity is, at the same time, a grouping of human beings, that is, an organization, which adopt certain
structure and processes in an effort to accomplish certain goals and objectives.
Unitary or U-Form Corporations
Unitary Corporations and Economic Theory
The basic “form” of the firm and the one closest to that posited in neoclassical theory is the unitary
corporation. Sidney Winter, a leading exponent of evolutionary economics, discusses what he
identifies as the “orthodox view” of the firm,85 a perspective of orthodoxy employed in the book
that he co-authored with Richard R. Nelson,86 namely, that: "Orthodox economic theory is the
theoretical view that dominates the leading textbooks of intermediate microeconomics, together
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with the extensions and elaborations of that basic viewpoint found in more advanced work.”87 This
definition of “orthodoxy” is similar to the rough working perspective adopted in the present work,
as is his summary of the orthodox view of the firm.
Winter identifies the basic elements of that orthodox view of the firm as follows: “Firms are
characterized by the technological transformations of which they are capable - formally, by
production sets or production functions. Like consumers, firms are unitary actors and are
economically rational; more specifically, they maximize profit or present value. They deal in
markets for homogeneous commodities; in almost all cases these appear to be contemporaneous
spot markets for inputs and outputs. Contractual arrangements and other institutional supports for
the functioning of the business firm are, one infers, assumed to be sufficiently close to being
flawless and costless so as to justify the virtually total absence of discussion of these topics.”88
As previously mentioned in this work, this classical or neoclassical, that is to say, “orthodox”,
view of the firm is, in essence, an explanation of the production function. It relates to the generation
of the “supply” curve in orthodox economics. Winter arrives at a similar conclusion, observing
that “[t]he discussion focuses on how firms, guided by market forces, make the production
decisions that form a part of the answer to the overall social resource allocation problem. It is about
inputs and outputs and how they relate to the given technology, to each other, and to market
forces.”89 As maintained previously in this work, this emphasis on input and output factors
generally excludes attention to organizational structures and processes. It should be noted,
however, that even that “production function” explanation of the firm has to take account of
technological development, certainly a human artifact.
A slightly different perspective is taken by Harold Demsetz, who focuses on the importance, to
the point of preoccupation by economists, he says, of traditional price theory to the theory of the
firm.90 He argues: “[The] “Firm” in the theory of price is simply a rhetorical device adopted to
facilitate discussion of the price system”, in which the only real task of management, “which is the
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focus of attention in the firm of traditional price theory, is the selection of profit-maximizing
quantities of outputs and inputs”.91 These subjects have been discussed in previous chapters and,
in more detail, in Appendix B.
The present section investigates the assumption that firms are unitary actors. It has been argued,
inter alia, that this assumption is integral to the assumption of neoclassical economics, or as what
Nelson and Winter describe as the “orthodox viewpoint in economic theory”, namely, that firms
are, in effect, or, at least, may be treated for analytical purposes as if they were, reified individuals.
We have previously argued that an assumption of atomistic individuals rationally pursuing their
own needs and desires constitutes a formidable barrier to considering individual behaviour as
involving associative or affiliative aspects and aspirations. We have argued that authors making
such an assumption often cite utilitarian sources; however, we have provided arguments that cast
doubt on the veracity of such authority. We have argued that even Hobbes, Locke and other
utilitarians did not deny or even doubt that humans need the society of others.
Our arguments find support from Winter and others. Winter claims that Western economic thought
generally adheres to the principle of methodological individualism, which “disallows, or at least
warns against, the practice of grounding theories on assumptions about the behavior of social
groups, organizations, or institutions.”92 He cites as a “careful and restrained explication of the
principle” the fact that “Although in modern economics, collections of individuals are sometimes
treated as “entities” for analytical purposes (examples of "the household," "the firm," and even
occasionally "the state" spring to mind) the ultimate unit of analysis is always the individual; more
aggregative analysis must be regarded as only provisionally legitimate. In other words, the
economist is always sensitive to the possibility that the holistic treatment of groups of individuals
may mislead greatly, or involve overlooking dimensions of reality that are extremely important.”93
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In the result, economists generally consider group demand to be the aggregate of the individual
demands of the individual members of the group. Criticisms of methodological individualism and
the difficulties which it presents in relation to aggregation of demand are discussed above. Winter
argues that economists routinely avoid discussing the demand behavior of “the household”,
presumably as an aggregation of consumers who are its members, preferring instead to discuss that
of “the consumer”. However, he maintains that “[i]n the case of the firm, however, the opposite
choice is made and often with little or no apology”, saying that “[t]his dedication to methodological
individualism - and, relatedly, to the study of noncooperative equilibria - is abruptly suspended
when the workings of the firm itself are discussed. There, fully cooperative relations among the
diverse economic interests organized in the firm are routinely, though implicitly, assumed to be
easily achieved through voluntary exchange.”94
The present work has objected to exactly this aspect of neoclassical theory. If the firm is only the
individual operating in the economic sphere or with respect to economic activities, then we have
asked why a separate identity should be created for that person in that sphere or with respect to
such activities. Of course, we have previously critiqued the notion that the economic sphere of
activities is distinct from other spheres of activities, including social and political activities.
Why should A be considered as AA or as B when the only logical distinction that can be identified
is the sphere or field in which that person acts? And if this is the case with respect to the economic
sphere, one might expect it to be the case in each separate sphere or with respect to each activity
in which the individual concerned may be said to act. This conflicts not only with the principle of
self-identity, but also philosophical economy (Ockham’s razor) and runs the risk of abandoning
abstraction and generalizable knowledge in favour of nominalism.
The Sole Proprietorship, the Monadic Individual, and the Theory of the Firm
Winter points to a particular trajectory in the development of the concept of the firm as a result of
the historical dominance of methodological individualism: “In classical economics, individualism
reigned supreme in the theory of the firm as it did elsewhere. The dominant view of the firm,
reflecting the historical context, was that of the small enterprise organized as a sole proprietorship
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– or, if not that, at least in a form in which "the firm" is no more problematic in its relation to
individualism than is "the household." As much care was taken in uncovering the different
economic roles that might be combined in "the entrepreneur" as in discussing the problems that
arise if the roles are divided among many individuals.”95
In effect, the dominance of the sole proprietorship as a form of business enterprise over many years
made it so difficult to conceive of the "separation of ownership and control," that Winter says that
“there was so much skepticism regarding the viability of such arrangements as to make detailed
discussion of them unnecessary.” 96 As an example, he references John Stuart Mill, who said that:
“Management, however, by hired servants, who have no interest in the result but that of preserving
their salaries, is proverbially inefficient, unless they act under the inspecting eye, if not the
controlling hand, of the person chiefly interested: and prudence almost always recommends giving
to a manager not thus controlled a remuneration partly dependent on the profits; which virtually
reduces the case to that of a sleeping partner”. Winter encourages readers to “[n]ote that it is the
owner who becomes the "sleeping partner," and the enterprise itself is thus associated directly with
the individualistic interests of the hired management.”97
Of course, as indicated previously in this work, the suspicion, not to say hostility, of utilitarian and
related theorists towards non-manager owners of firms and towards nonowner managers of firms
pre-dates John Stuart Mill, and extends at least as far as Adam Smith, whose remarks on the subject
accord with the quotation above. It will be recalled that he expressed a similar concern about joint
stock companies.98
Winter’s comparison of the relationship between the individual (who is not a sole proprietor) and
the firm with that obtaining between the individual and the household is telling. The ways in which
the term “household” are employed, as previously discussed, suggest that the term refers to more
than one individual, with the result that a household cannot be composed of a single individual;
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however, the very concept of “the firm” in neoclassical theory suggests exactly the opposite. It as
if some subtle elision of meaning was involved.
In terms of what Winter calls the orthodox view of the firm, he argues that: “No major technical
difficulty stands in the way of developing the theory of the firm explicitly as a theory about
individual entrepreneurs. There are a few unfamiliar issues to be dealt with – such as how the idea
of "profit maximization" is to be adapted to allow for the income-leisure tradeoff of a utility –
maximizing consumer whose work is running his business. Minor modifications to the familiar
structure of general equilibrium theory would be required. Production sets would enter the theory
associated with consumers; presumably there would be an axiom denying the possibility of output
without an input of some of the consumer's own time - that is, without a positive level of
"entrepreneurial activity" by that consumer.”99 This certainly involves significant complexity as
compared with the simple device of reification of the individual entrepreneur as the “firm”. Of
course, that is not to say that it is not more efficacious.
In final, Winter concludes that “[t]his development of the theory of the firm would be consonant
with methodological individualism – not to speak of the nonmethodological aspects of economic
theory's association with individualism.”100 Thus, consistently with his evolutionary economics
perspective, Winter asserts that the theory of the firm could have developed as a theory about
individual entrepreneurs.
In that case, the behaviour of the firm could have been readily attributable to the individual and
there would have been no need to assert a separate identity to that individual when acting in the
economic sphere. Moreover, the assumptions of perfect rationality and complete information could
have been more readily questioned. A supposition that individual entrepreneurs hired employees,
or that individual entrepreneurs, acting as owners, hired other individuals to act as managers and
as employees might also have more readily surfaced questions about the nature of the relationship
between owner and manager, between manager and employees, and between owner and
employees. Questions about firm behaviour, and about the boundaries of the firm, might have been
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simplified by such an approach. However, such approach did not find favour sufficiently widely
to become generally accepted; instead, neoclassical theory dominated.
Characteristics of the Unitary or U-Form Corporation
It is clear, however, that neoclassical theory does not assist much in interpreting the behaviour of
even a relatively simple firm. The “unitary corporation” or “U-form corporation”, as described by
Alfred Chandler101 and Oliver Williamson102, is an enterprise that operates in a single product line,
or in multiple but related product lines. As described in Chandler’s studies, it is vertically
integrated and has a structure that involved central administration through various functional
departments.103 As we have observed previously, even Chandler’s empirical characterization of
such a relatively simple corporation engaged such concepts as administration, strategy, structure,
and processes, which are outside the purview of neoclassical economics, or of Winter’s “orthodox
viewpoint” of the economic theory of the firm.
A simple corporation might be expected to have field units, department offices, divisional offices,
and a general or head office. The separate functions, such as manufacturing, sales and marketing,
purchasing, engineering, research, finance, might have separate field units or some one or more of
the separate functions may be co-located with others in a local office. These functions may have
departmental offices at a higher level. Similarly, they may have divisional offices based on
geographic considerations, for example, country or regional (more than one country) offices.
Neil Fligstein treats organizations that are divided functionally or geographically as distinct from
simple unitary forms, saying: “The unitary form implies an organization divided into
manufacturing, sales and marketing, and finance departments. Functional organization implies
departmentalization along discrete task lines. An example is oil companies, which were often
organized into drilling, shipping, refining, and retail departments which reflect the flow of the

Neither expression is used in either of Chandler’s two main works.
Oliver D Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (New York: The Free Press,
1975).
103
While described by Chandler in his earlier works, Chandler credits Oliver Williamson as originating the expressions
“unitary corporation” or “U-form”, in Chapter 3 of his book Markets and Hierarchies, supra note 53. See Alfred D
Chandler, Jr, "The M-Form: Industrial Groups, American Style" (1982) 19 European Economic Rev 3 at 5. That article
contains a useful discussion of what Chandler describes as a variation on the M-form: the conglomerate.
101
102

252

product through various stages. Geographical forms reflect businesses demarcated into
departments along geographical divisions.” 104
Accordingly, the considerations of goal differentiation and goal congruity among different levels
and functions of the organization are significant even with respect to the simple unitary or U-form
corporation. Still more significant are they with respect to M-form corporations, to the discussion
of which we now turn.
M-Form Corporations
Characteristics of M-Form Corporations
Writing in 1985, and surveying the development of multidivisional corporations during the period
from 1919 to 1979, Fligstein presented evidence that the multidivisional form, or M-form,
corporation had become the “preferred organizational form for the large firms that dominate the
American economy”.105 About it, he said: “The multidivisional form (hereafter “MDF”) is a
decentralized management structure. Firms are organized into product divisions and each division
contains a unitary structure. There also exists a central office where long-range planning and
financial allocations are located. These are, of course, ideal-typical descriptions and some firms
contain multiple structures, for instance, functional and divisional or geographic and divisional.”106
That is to say, in an MDF or M-form corporation, each division is organized into functional
departments such as, manufacturing, sales and marketing, and finance, as if each division was a
separate unitary corporation, but not necessarily possessing separate legal form.
Fligstein neatly summarizes Chandler’s observed relationship between strategy and structure,
saying that “Chandler identifies three basic strategies: horizontal: vertical: and diversification (of
which there are two types, product related and unrelated). A horizontal strategy implies growth in
markets which can be local, national, or multinational. A vertical strategy implies absorbing
functions that are either backwards toward suppliers or forwards toward ultimate consumers.
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Diversification is the decision to enter into related or unrelated markets. Chandler's thesis is that a
horizontal strategy produces a unitary structure, while a vertical strategy produces a functional
structure. Finally, the decision to enter into related or unrelated product lines produces the
multidivisional structure.”107
Historical Development of M-Form Corporations
Chandler had described the advent of what he called “the multidivisional enterprise” (which we
will sometimes abbreviate here as “MDE”) and is often, today, called “the multidivisional
corporation” (or “MDC”)), largely by reference to the expansion of, and advances in, technology,
including power generation, transportation and communications, expansion of urban concentration
of population, and continuous process manufacturing. “In these new industries (the electrical
automobile, chemical and electronic) and in the older industries which were revolutionized by
changing population and technology (the rubber, petroleum, agricultural implement and other
power machinery, and the chain-store and mail-order businesses), the leading enterprises became
faced with increasingly complex administrative problems. And it was in these industries that the
leading firms turned to managing their activities through the new multidivisional, "decentralized"
structure.”108
Chandler indicated that the “inherent weakness in the centralized, functionally departmentalized
operating company” involved the resulting increase in the administrative load placed on senior
executives “to such an extent that they were unable to handle their entrepreneurial responsibilities
sufficiently”. He claims: “This situation arose when the operations of the enterprise became too
complex and the problems of coordination, appraisal, and policy formulation too intricate for a
small number of top officers to handle both long-run, entrepreneurial, and short-run operational
administrative activities.”109 Accordingly, “the innovators built the multidivisional structure with
a general office whose executives would concentrate on entrepreneurial activities and with
autonomous, fairly self-contained operating divisions whose managers would handle operational
ones.”110 Removing them from operational duties gave the executives “the time, information and
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even psychological commitment for long-term planning and appraisal” for the organization as a
whole, and changed the lens through which such executives viewed the corporation as a whole,
for: “Relieved of operating duties and tactical decisions, a general executive was less likely to
reflect the position of just one part of the whole.”111
These leading companies, of course, were closely studied and their development described in
Strategy and Structure. As Chandler indicated there: “In those industries most affected by the new
markets and new technology, growth came more by going overseas and still more by
diversification. Of these two strategies, diversification was far more responsible for the adoption
of the "decentralized" structure than overseas expansion. Diversification came when leading
companies in these technologically advanced industries realized that their facilities and the
scientific knowhow of their personnel could be easily transferred into the production and sale of
new goods for new markets. For those enterprises whose energies were concentrated primarily in
merchandising, diversification came because of the changing markets in the city and then in the
suburbs.”112
Here, Chandler asserts that leading companies responded to changes in the environment; however,
he also advances the theory that these leading companies developed demand in order to facilitate
the continuous production of which their factories were then capable, and to derive concomitant
efficiencies. As we have previously noted, he described how: “Growth through diversification into
several lines increased the number and complexity of both operational and entrepreneurial
activities even more than a world-wide expansion of one line. The problems of obtaining materials
and supplies, of manufacturing and of marketing a number of product lines for different types of
customers or in different parts of the world made the tasks of departmental headquarters
exceedingly difficult to administer systematically and rationally. The coordination of product flow
through the several departments proved even more formidable.”113
As well as coordinating resource operations, manufacturing, sales and distribution, higher order
management activities, such as analyzing and improving operational performance, which he refers
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to as “appraisal”, also became requisite and much more complex: “Appraisal came to involve not
only a constant intelligent analysis of the operating performance in the different economic
functions, including engineering and research as well as production, distribution, transportation,
the procurement of supplies, and finance, but the making of these appraisals in several very
different industries or lines of business. Long-term strategic planning not only called for decisions
and action concerning the future use of existing facilities, personnel, and funds, and the
development of new resources in the company's current lines, but also involved decisions on
entering into new lines of products and dropping or curtailing old ones.”114
Chandler draws attention to the fact that what he calls “appraisal”, or analysis of operating
performance, came to embrace, in the case of the MDE, not only different functional areas, but
also different lines of business and even different industries. Consequently, it required highly
developed and specialized skills. This is also the case with respect to strategy. Not only were
decisions required with respect to the application of existing, and acquisition of new, resources,
but also with respect to products, lines of business, and industry exposure. Development of strategy
progressed to the level at which management and Board of Directors had to consider the threshold
question: what business or businesses should we be in?
Despite these challenges, “by placing an increasing intolerable strain on existing administrative
structures, territorial expansion and to a much greater extent product diversification brought the
multidivisional form. Du Pont, General Motors, Jersey Standard, and Sears, Roebuck first devised
the new type in the 1920's.”115 Chandler indicates that adoption of this structure became
widespread in the massive economic expansion following World War II.
Development as Organizational Response to Bounded Rationality
In effect, Chandler indicates, without specifically identifying the mechanisms concerned, that this
development, the MDF, responded to limitations of human behaviour, both individual and
collective. The atomistic perfectly rational entrepreneur possessing all relevant information and
acting upon it with full knowledge of how to maximize his profits (or utility) posited by
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neoclassical economics had been left well and truly behind in the instantiation of “the firm” in the
empirically observed economy by the time Chandler wrote. Chandler forecast, in 1962, the
extension of some variation of the multidivisional structure to many large American enterprises.
This actually eventuated, as Fligstein demonstrated.
Putting aside for later discussion the complications introduced by operating in different countries,
as many M-form corporations actually do, we may observe that other explanations have been
introduced for the introduction and spread of the M-form corporation. Fligstein investigated these
and found that the most likely explanation was that “those in control of large firms acted to change
their organizational structures under three conditions: when they were pursuing a multiproduct
strategy; when their competitors shifted structures; and when they had a background in the
organization such that their interests reflected those of the sales or finance departments.”116
Fligstein concluded that Chandler’s view was supported by his results, but thought that Chandler
underestimated the role of actors within an organization in advancing a particular model of its
growth; that he overestimated the ability of actors to interpret the external environment and
develop rational and efficient responses; and that he ignored the tendency of organizations
operating in a particular environment to examine others and to adopt similar responses.117 In effect,
Fligstein argues that the expansion of the MDF depended, in part, on something which Chandler
would consider to be part of the structure of the organization, namely, the lines of authority,
communication, information, and decision making, which we have described here as involving the
organization, implementation and operation of processes.
Again, such analysis of empirically derived observations suggests that there are multiple actors
within the firm, interpreting information, and generally acting, with limited or bounded rationality,
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and exercising power or authority, in order to effect a preferred result. The options for action and
for organizational change that are available to these organizational actors will, among other things,
position the organization, as a matter of interpretation, within its environment: “First, someone in
the organization must interpret the internal and external environment of the organization…
Second, these actors' interpretations will reflect their structural positions, and their solutions will
reflect the interests of those structural positions... Third, the actors must have some resource base
either within the organization or the environment whereby they have the power to enforce their
solution in the organization.”118
It is apparent that interpretation of the internal and external environment may not be entirely
veridical: this is assured by limitations on perfect rationality, including limitations on information
and calculative capacity. Further, the structural positions of relevant actors affects not only the
information available to them, but also their interpretation of such information, including their
respective biases and interests. For example, Chandler mentions background and interests as one
of the three determinants of the likelihood of adoption of the M-form structure. Fligstein indicates
that this “model of organizational change does not imply that the most important organizational
problems are being solved. Instead, it suggests that actors have to construct such problems, have
the claim to solve those problems, and be able to implement their solutions.”119
In effect, the background and experience of participants in the relevant decisions may affect the
interests that they seek to advance or accommodate in connection with the decision. Someone has
to interpret internal and external environments, decide when the organization should take some
action, and determine what action to take. These observations indicate the necessity of considering
the dispersal of power and influence within the organization, which topic is left for later discussion.
Mimesis and Institutional Isomorphism
One factor which Fligstein mentions as conducive to the spread of the MDF was the adoption of
that form by competitors. It is often considered that adoption of certain practices widely within a
particular industry may represent a determination as to the appropriateness of the particular
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practice in that industry, such that departure from that practice may be seen as idiosyncratic or
aberrant behaviour, and which may, in turn, affect widely held perceptions as to the quality of
management. In their classic work, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”,120 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell described
how this mimetic tendency among organizations would often lead to what they called “institutional
isomorphism”.
Fligstein neatly summarizes their position as arguing “that large organizations are likely to come
to resemble one another due to three kinds of pressures in their environments. First, organizations
may be forced to conform structurally because of the cultural expectations of competitors,
suppliers, or the state. Second, when organizations face uncertainty in the environment, they may
self-consciously mimic other, more successful, organizations. Finally, the professionalization of
managers tends to create a particular world view of appropriate organizational behavior. This could
act as a force to produce organizational homogeneity.”121
DiMaggio and Powell’s “institutional isomorphism” thesis also receives support from Fligstein’s
research, particularly as to the behaviour of key actors. He claims: “Any theory of organizational
change must also take into account the fact that the leaders of organizations watch one another and
adopt what they perceive as successful strategies for growth and organizational structure. The
picture one obtains is that organizational change will occur in a murky environment guided by
what key powerful actors perceive and their abilities to implement change. Their ideas will be
disseminated if key actors in other organizations perceive that the innovation is successful.”122
In effect, the information considered by leaders of organizations in assessing the environment,
identifying changes in the environment requiring a response, and in deciding the nature of the
response, including possible changes in the strategy and structure of the organization, includes
information relating to how leaders of similar organizations, then successful, are adapting their
organizations to similar ambient changes. One leading interpreter of Chandler’s work, Mira
Wilkins, attributes the diffusion of the M-form partly to American management consultants
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familiar with it.123 Fligstein also notes that the MDF became the accepted form of organization for
large corporations, and that business schools taught the MDF as an important organizational
tool.124 In effect, the MDF was seen as having contributed to the success of leading organizations
and was emulated for that reason.
Fligstein’s study of the dispersion of the M-form from 1919 to 1979 showed that while the
percentage of the largest American firms which had adopted the MDF reached 84.2 percent by
1979,125 the rate of its adoption varied by decade and by industry. Thus: “The relationship between
the spread of the MDF and Chandler's argument is confirmed. Industries where product-related
strategies dominated, like machine, chemical, and transportation industries, adopted the MDF in
large numbers relatively early; while industries that were more likely to be vertically integrated,
like mining, metalmaking, lumber and paper, and petroleum, adopted the MDF later and to a lesser
extent. Except for mining, metalmaking, and miscellaneous industries, all industries had high rates
of adoption by 1979…. Food, lumber and paper, and petroleum industries all adopt the MDF,
though they do so at a later date.”126 Fligstein concluded that his evidence supports the conclusion
that “organizations actually come to resemble those around them” and that further “empirical
analysis should establish whether the causes of the shift are due to strategy or mimicry.”127
At least with respect to such a fundamental change as the adoption of an M-form structure, there
is reason to believe that perfect rationality is not operative, but that, instead, decisions within the
organization are affected by various aspects of human behaviour, included limited or bounded
rationality, often operationalizing itself as mimesis, or either spontaneous and unconscious, or
conscious, parallelism.
The Headquarters-Strategic Business Unit Relationship
This chapter has maintained that organizations, including firms, or business corporations, may
adopt formal and informal goals and objectives which are accepted by organizational constituents
to varying degrees. In particular, groups within the organization may generate their own goals and
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objectives which are, again, accepted by group members to different extents. This may also be the
case with respect to subgroups.
In the case of a corporation which has adopted a functional form of organization, the various
functions and subfunctions by which the corporation is organized into departments may be
characterized as groups or subgroups. In the case of a corporation which has adopted a
multidivisional form, each component strategic business units (“SBU”) or business unit (“BU”)
may be characterized as a group within the organization, and the various functions and departments
within the SBU may be characterized as subgroups, perhaps arrayed at various levels of the
organization’s hierarchy. While a work such as the present one cannot thoroughly investigate
organization-group-subgroup interaction, the discussion here of organizations as polities, joint
preference determination, and of social and political action within organizations seems to require
that at least a few modest examples be presented.
In this regard, a question which arises in respect of the management of an MDC concerns the
optimal relationship between headquarters and individual SBUs. A related question concerns the
optimal relationship among the SBUs as such. A 1987 study by Anil Gupta examined the
relationship between different strategies pursued by SBUs and the nature and effectiveness of
different relationships between the corporate or HQ level and the SBU level.128 In effect, the study
found that a decentralized relationship between the corporate level and the SBU was positively
associated with SBU effectiveness, regardless of what strategy the SBU was pursuing. However,
Gupta also found that the extent of the contribution of decentralization to performance was affected
by the nature of the SBU strategies. That is to say, decentralization, while generally positive, could
be more or less positive, depending on the strategy pursued by the SBU.129
Greater openness and transparency in the relationship between the corporate or HQ level and the
SBU level, and greater subjectivity in the assessment of SBU performance (that is, not wholly
quantitative but, rather, more qualitative, and nature) were factors found to be positively associated
with SBU performance if the SBU was pursuing a competitive strategy of building market share
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or of pursuing differentiation within the market. Where the SBU’s strategy was to maximize shortterm earnings or to pursue low cost, openness and subjective performance assessment were
negatively associated with SBU performance.
These results suggest that a decrease in control over the SBU by HQ may often have positive
results, while excessive control may produce negative effects. Similarly, where corporate
executives find it difficult to fine-tune the degree of openness across all SBU so as to match the
strategic context of individual SBUs, the results suggest that it is preferable to adopt a greater,
rather than lesser, degree of openness across the board.130 At the same time, because performance
assessment and bonus determination is sensitive to the strategy of the SBU, the mix of formulabased assessment and subjective assessment should be fine-tuned with respect to each SBU. The
present author suggests that a decrease in centralized control, signalling a greater level of
autonomy and responsibility, particularly when combined with powerful SBU level incentives,
may produce a high degree of motivation in the SBU to achieve a high level of performance in
terms of results for BU goals, which are likely more immediate and the subject of greater
identification by BU members.
Importantly, the present writer suggests that the business strategy assigned to, or selected by,
management of the SBU may be a more important determinant of the optimal relationship between
the SBU and HQ than is the preference of corporate or HQ level management. These results also
suggest that overall corporate strategy may have some influence upon, but need not (and, often,
should not) determine the strategy of each individual SBU. A corollary of this is that the particular
strategies pursued by individual SBU’s may not, and, perhaps, should not, be the same. As
previously discussed, that SBU strategy must be responsive to the internal and external
environment in which it is situated.
Relationships among SBUs
SBU Cross-Collaboration
In 2010, Jeffrey A. Martin and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt reported on their study of six publicly-held
software firms, each with multiple BUs (between two and six), with two firms in each of the three
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industry segments: consumer, enterprise (business to business, or “B2B”), and infrastructure.131
One of their key insights was that high-performing MDCs operate as complex adaptive systems in
which effective collaborations emerge from small events within BUs, which are then honed by
self-interested BU managers, and then implemented by loosely coupled modules. They say that
this “rewiring” is likely to yield high-performing cross-BU collaborations.132 That is to say, one
ingredient in the success of MDCs is often that they function as highly effective learning
organizations.
They found that a complex adaptive system of modular, unique, and partially connected BUs can
be advantageous, especially in environments in which the pace of change normally occurs a
relatively high level (“high-velocity environments”). This enables executives and MDCs to adapt
to changing markets by adding, removing, and recombining resources of the corporation, both as
the individual BUs evolve, and as corporate executives create new BUs, to shift mandates between
BUs, and to eliminate, split, and combine existing BUs. It was found that cross-BU collaboration
can facilitate this type of adaptation.133
Martin and Eisenhardt found that the most successful BU collaborations involved multibusiness
teams of general managers, rather than HQ executives, as previously thought. HQ executives
tended to propose multibusiness collaborations that addressed firm-wide issues, which are likely
to provide less motivation to BU general managers than issues of more immediate concern to their
own BU.134 These general managers are motivated by formal incentives which reward BU
performance and, as such, are relatively high-powered incentives, rather than firm-wide incentives,
which reward performance at the corporate level and, as such, are relatively low-powered
incentives.135 They also found that positive social relationships among BU general managers aided
in cross-BU collaboration but were not sufficient to ensure such collaboration. The same general
managers participated in both high-performing and low-performing collaborations.136
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Collaborative ideas that originated in a particular BU worked better. Often, they involved
developing solutions to specific issues in their own business units. They were seen to improve
quality, increase motivation, and improve the nature of the collaboration decision.137 Among other
things, unlike corporate executives, BU general managers lacked authority to “order” other BU
general managers to collaborate and, accordingly, have to build support for collaboration in order
for it to occur. Martin and Eisenhardt found that decisions to collaborate which are chosen by a
decentralized multibusiness team are more likely to be high-performing. Similarly, collaborations
which are implemented by a reconfigured team with few ties to particular BUs are more likely to
be high-performing, as participants are highly motivated, and are able to refocus their attention
from the BU to which they were previously attached and to the new collaborative team. These,
and other factors improve collaboration quality and decision-making.138
Corporate, or HQ, executives were not effective in leading collaborations, although they
contributed to collaboration where they removed barriers to collaboration, such as by contributing
additional resources, or by eliminating incentives that pitted the general managers against each
other.139 Collaborations led by multibusiness teams of BU general managers played a central role
in creating high-performing cross-BU collaborations, contributing not only the most current and
relevant information, but also collective authority to lead such collaborations.
For purposes of the present work, this study is useful insofar as it demonstrates that superior
hierarchical authority is not necessarily determinative of results. Orders “from on high” to
collaborate were less effective than collaborations proposed by BU general managers. The study
also shows that sub-corporate level goals and objectives, at least where related to compensation,
can be much more effective determinants of sub-corporate level group behaviour, that is to say,
BU behaviour, than corporate-level goals and objectives. Instead, it cannot be assumed that
directives issued by higher organizational levels will necessarily be implemented in accordance
with their terms at subordinate levels. Among the factors that may contribute to non-
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implementation are differences in goals and objectives at group and sub-group goals, and
differences in motivations and incentives at the focal levels.
SBU Coordination and Competition
As has been suggested previously, BUs, in most cases, compete with other BU’s in the instant
MDC for resources, extensions of their mandates, certain types of exclusivity, and in other
respects. However, MDCs often find it appropriate to coordinate BU activities in certain respects,
including, as indicated in the previous section, sharing knowledge among BUs. As mentioned here,
in some cases, in addition to competition for resources, BUs actually compete with other BUs
within the same MDC for customers. This raises the question as to how external competition
among BU’s affects intraorganizational knowledge sharing.
Of course, it is not possible to investigate this matter thoroughly. However, a 2002 study by
Wenpin Tsai may permit a glimpse of some of the issues involved.140 His investigation involved a
large MDC comprised of twenty-four BUs, in a variety of businesses. He found that formal
hierarchical structure, represented by centralization, had a negative impact on intrafirm knowledge
sharing, and, in particular, that the more control HQ exercised on its BUs, the less those BUs were
willing to share knowledge with other BUs.141
This contradicted conventional wisdom that centralization enables coordination and integration
throughout the organization and that, in a vertical structure, most information flows are mediated
at the corporate or headquarters level. Tsai found that centralization imposed certain identifiable
costs on the MDC, including, firstly, a tendency towards excessive or inappropriate headquarters
intervention; secondly, a reduction in organizational productivity, due to the amount of time and
effort required to be spent in influencing activities (that is, primarily in attempting to influence
HQ); thirdly, poor decision-making due to the distortion of information in connection with
influencing activities; and, fourthly, a loss of efficiency associated with the adaptation of structure
and policies to increase control activities.142
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As previously noted, where lower levels in a hierarchy are charged with selecting, organizing, and
transmitting information to superior levels, such as from a BU to HQ, or from a division to HQ,
this information collation activity may have a significant effect on decision-making at the superior
level. In this case, Tsai suggest that BUs not only expend time and effort in efforts to influence
HQ towards the BU-preferred decision, but, as part of the process of influencing HQ, may also
distort the information supplied to HQ, no doubt by selecting or emphasizing information
favourable to the BU-preferred decision or by suppressing information unfavourable to such
decision.
We can speculate that such BU preference may be expected to align in BU-preferred ways with
BU goals and objectives and with high-powered incentives provided to BU members and
managers, such as bonuses significantly focused on BU performance, rather than corporate level
goals and objectives and lower-powered incentives intended reward performance of the corporate
level. Again, we note that formal hierarchical power and authority may not always achieve the
results anticipated, either by actors at the superior level, or by external observers and regulators.
Tsai also found that “informal lateral relations manifested in inter-unit social interaction show a
significant positive effect on inter-unit knowledge sharing. Organizational units that interact with
each other socially are likely to share knowledge with each other. The results confirmed the
importance of inter-unit social interactions as an effective coordination mechanism in a multiunit
organization.”143 He indicates that sharing information or knowledge require social interaction to
promote trust, increase cooperation, and reduce uncertainty about the merits of providing the
knowledge of other units or acquiring new knowledge from other units.
Personal relationships between or among general managers of BUs participating in collaborations
may facilitate relationships between or among such BUs, that is to say, such personal relationships
may foster intraorganizational relationships. As has been observed in other studies discussed here
such relationships may tend to diminish uncertainty in the instant situation, as well as in future
situations, concerning the likely actions and motivations of such other BU general manager (s).
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The study also investigated whether competition between or among BUs for internal resources and
competition in the market external to the MDC had different effects on knowledge sharing. It found
that intrafirm knowledge sharing in a decentralized environment was significantly strengthened by
external (market) competition between BUs, but that centralization decreased knowledge sharing
between such BUs.
We may observe that this might be expected, since the corporate level would lack proximate
knowledge of the relevant bases on which the BUs compete and, thus, might share or “give away”
BU knowledge that is relevant to those factors, thereby making it more difficult for the BU
possessing such knowledge to compete with the knowledge-receiving BU. The BU possessing
such knowledge may regard it as self-generated and, to that extent, proprietary to it alone. Further,
the disclosure of such knowledge may adversely affect the knowledge-possessing BU’s
performance and consequent receipt of incentives. On the other hand, BU-level determination as
to what knowledge to share with other BU’s would not present this problem. The informationpossessing BU would likely be in a better position than HQ to assess what information is already
possessed by the BU proposed to receive such information, and, accordingly, what results may
arise from disclosure of such information on the disclosing BU’s performance and incentives.
On the other hand, Tsai found that internal competition for resources of the MDC did not
significantly affect coordination and intrafirm knowledge sharing, perhaps because in a highly
diversified company, the knowledge of a particular BU concerning the extent of competition for
internal resources may be less relevant to that BU than the factors affecting that BU and one or
more other BUs in competing in the external environment. In effect, he found that MDCs,
especially if highly diversified, “have to pay more attention to coordinating external market
competition into coordinating internal resource competition.” 144
Tsai indicates that “this research represents one of the first attempts to provide a structural view of
coopetition and to explore the role of such coopetition in the context of a multiunit organization”
which is itself conceptualized as a “social structure of coopetition”. Indeed, he maintains that
scholars “have yet to carefully examine the structure of competition within firms”, that his research
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as an initial step in this regard, and that the history and strategic priorities of the relevant
organizations may affect the relative importance of external market competition versus internal
resource competition.145
For the purposes of the present work, Tsai’s study is notable in that it acknowledges that both
competition and collaboration between or among business units are influenced not only by the
formal structure of the MDC, as an organization, itself, but also by formal and informal structures
and processes as between or among separate business units. As such, it acknowledges that MDCs
are not commonly successful when they issue “top-down” or “command and control” type orders
from the headquarters or corporate level, which are highly dependent upon social structures and
processes, including cooperation and other forms of social interaction at the business unit level.
Instead, as demonstrated by the Gupta, Martin and Eisenhardt, and Tsai studies, the goals and
objectives of the several business units significantly impact the implementation of “orders from
above”, which is to say from the headquarters or corporate level.
Of course, an important factor relevant to the degree of deference shown by a business unit to the
headquarters or corporate level of the organization is the power of the business unit with respect
not only to the headquarters of corporate level, but also with respect to other business units. This
factor will be discussed in the following section.
Power and SBUs
The power which a business unit enjoys within the corporation as a whole, as well as its influence
with respect to the corporate or headquarters level, and with respect to other business units, has
been shown to depend upon a number of variables. As demonstrated previously, the power of a
particular business unit is affected by the extent to which it exercises control over one or more
resources critical to the corporation generally or to one or more other business units. The power of
the particular business unit affects the extent to which the business unit can pursue its own goals
and objectives while simultaneously pursuing those of the corporation as a whole. That is to say,
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groups or subgroups within the corporate organization may exhibit behaviours observed with
respect to groups or subgroups within other types of organizations.
Thus, as maintained by Bouquet and Birkinshaw, a multinational enterprise or MNE can be seen
as “an economically integrated economic institution that encourages members to continuously
justify their existence within an emerging global hierarchy” and, the same time, as “a socially
constructed community of subsidiary members that can only advance their cause with corporate
headquarters if they are believed to adhere to a common set of strategic goals, norms, and
values.”146 It goes without saying that, generally speaking, a multinational corporation is normally
a multidivisional corporation which has operations in jurisdictions other than that in which the
multinational parent corporation is situated. Accordingly, it is expected that this characterization
of the MNE would also apply, in general, to an MDC.
Bouquet and Birkinshaw, considering data with respect to 283 subsidiaries of multinational
enterprises, investigated how business units weight goals, take initiative, pursue relationships, seek
resource allocations, and change priorities, by seeking and attaining attention, power, and
influence in ways similar to those employed by individuals in groups. They found that decisions
of the corporate or headquarters level to “pay attention to” a subsidiary are based upon: firstly, the
structural position of the subsidiary unit within a corporate system, which they call its “weight”;
secondly the effectiveness of the subsidiary and exercising its own “voice” to attract attention at
the corporate or headquarters level; and, thirdly, the moderating effect of the historical situation of
the subsidiary, in terms of geographic distance and downstream competence, upon that voiceattention relationship.147
The first element, key components of the subsidiary’s weight in the MNE power structure are
considered the strategic significance of its local market and the strength of the subsidiary within
the MNE network.148 As discussed, in an MDC which is not an MNE the strategic said significance
of the “local” market served by the subsidiary may not be significant; instead, other factors may
be relevant. The second element, voice, refers to the voice which the subsidiary is able to use in
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its relationship with headquarters to more significantly position its achievements within the
corporate system, irrespective of weight considerations.149
Bouquet and Birkinshaw employ the concept of “positive headquarters attention” which they
define as the “extent to which a parent company recognizes and gives credit to a subsidiary for its
combination to the MNE as a whole”.150 They found that this positive attention had three aspects:
firstly, “relative attention”, which is “the perceived level of recognition and credit given to a focal
subsidiary relative to the level given to other subsidiaries in an MNE” (often seen as a competition
in a zero-sum game); “supportive attention”, namely, “the provision by a corporate parent of
discretionary resources as a way to facilitate a subsidiary’s development”; and thirdly, “visible
attention”, which is the “explicit recognition from its corporate parent of a subsidiary’s existence
and achievements, expressed in media that are transmitted to a broad body of stakeholders.”151
They found that positive attention is likely to be more subjective and less stable than the strategic
role of the subsidiary, defined as “activities a subsidiary performs and has responsible for within
an MNE… [which] is typically established over a number of years, is widely communicated and
understood in the organization, and changes relatively rarely”.152 While there would be expected
to be some correlation, on some occasions, a subsidiary might receive more or less attention than
would be expected in view of its formal role within the organization, “perhaps because of recent
changes in the subsidiary’s marketplace, or because of the specific initiatives it is pursuing”. Such
positive attention can be distinguished from headquarters attention, generally having negative
connotations, with respect to control and compliance. They also noted that “the subsidiary may
receive too much attention”.153
They identified two complementary processes which shape headquarters attention: “a top-down
structural process whereby attention is allocated according to a subsidiary’s weight in an MNE,
and… a bottom-up relational process whereby attention is earned according to the subsidiary’s
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voice in the MNE.”154 They also found that “to be successful in shaping the perception that it is a
reliable, credible, and trustworthy actor in an MNE organization, a subsidiary not only needs to
maintain a basic track record of success, but also needs to reaffirm its commitment to the parent’s
objectives; and then, finally, it needs to take deliberate steps to manage impressions with power
brokers at the head office. Achieving all three sets of objectives is by no means straightforward.”155
Allocation of headquarters or corporate level attention, according to Bouquet and Birkinshaw, like
other MNE (or, as we would say, MDC) resources, is effected only partly on a rational basis, and
is also affected by political and other considerations, including power, influence, and their
judicious employment by the relevant subsidiaries. In this regard, they analogize the HQ or
corporate level allocation function to a brokerage function, assessing, among other things, the
needs and demands of subsidiaries as components of the organization, their perceived entitlements,
and the strategic considerations relating to the same. This puts one in mind of the political or
processual method of conflict resolution described by March as taking place with respect to the
overall organization as a whole.
As organizational components, subsidiaries may not be as free as are many organizational
participants ex ante to “opt out” of the process of bidding with respect to the terms and conditions
to be attached to their participation in the overall enterprise. However, in some circumstances, they
may be free to seek their own divestment by the MDC or MNE, to exercise influence in that regard
(whether by shortfall from corporately imposed objectives or otherwise), or, as in the case of a
management buyout, to actually “bid for” the withdrawal of their participation and exit from the
overall enterprise. Thus, while continued subsidiary participation can normally be assumed, at
least as long as it is desired by the overall enterprise, this may not always be the case.
Power, MDCs, and MNEs
The previous section has presented the argument that the relationship between business units of
multinational enterprises and the parent, corporate, or headquarters level of the MNE can be
affected by action by the BU and by action at the HQ level. Of course, in the case of MNEs, the
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scope of the business units may be determined geographically, rather than strategically or
functionally (generally speaking, “SBUs”).
It should be noted, however, that, like other multidivisional corporations, multinational enterprises
often adopt a “matrix” structure in which divisional relationships may be, at the same time,
strategic or functional and also geographic. That is to say, a country manager of an MNE may
report to a superior in a division to which the local operation is assigned in relation to strategic or
functional matters in respect of those matters and, simultaneously, to a superior in any division to
which the local operation is assigned as a result of its geographic location, although linguistic and
other cultural factors may also be relevant to such assignment. Matrix reporting may also be
instituted in MDCs which are not MNEs, but, of course, the “matrix” would be determined in
accordance with other factors, for example, industry, on the one hand, and function, on the other
hand.
While a significant discussion of matrix reporting is beyond the scope of this work, it is important
to note that the business unit concerned is subject to the authority of two different “higher” levels,
raising the possibility that instructions issued pursuant to such authorities may be consistent or
may be partially or wholly inconsistent with each other unless, of course, some coordination
between the two higher levels is implemented and eventuated. The possibility of inconsistent
instructions raises the possibility, in turn, that the business unit may either seek further instructions
to resolve any consistency or may, on the other hand, make a determination itself. That
determination may involve ignoring both sets of instructions, for example, on the grounds that they
cannot be deconflicted in the time available. This may result in an increase in the power of the
business unit concerned when compared with a business unit at a similar level in the hierarchy
which is not subject to matrix reporting, that is to say, which reports only to one superior in the
organization.
As indicated otherwise in this work, it cannot be assumed that higher-level instructions by the
relevant subordinate level will always be observed. In the result, it can readily be seen that
circumstances attendant upon matrix reporting will prevent accurate assignment of responsibility
for the actions taken and for the consequences, either with respect to the business unit itself or with
respect to the two different levels superior to the business unit but in different respects.
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Power and SBU Evolution
As previously discussed, business units may have some flexibility in pursuing their own goals and
objectives and in pursuing the goals and objectives of the organization as a whole. Julian
Birkinshaw and Neil Hood considered this issue in 1998 by way of extensive literature review and
theory development in connection with the evolution of multinational subsidiaries.156 Accordingly,
their review affords access to a range of research in theorization.
While their review is limited by its terms to multinational subsidiary evolution, many of their
observations also relate to MDCs generally. For these purposes, they considered a subsidiary as “a
value-adding entity in a host country”, in effect, as a totality of the MNC’s holdings in a host
country, regardless of whether the subsidiary was a separate legal entity or, in effect, a division or
branch of the MNC, and whether or not it involved more than one enterprise or holding, and
whether or not it involved a single activity or an entire value chain of activities.157
In a work such as the present which concerns the modern business corporation as a legal entity and
as an organization, it is particularly noteworthy that the legal attributes of the business unit,
namely, whether it operates as a division or branch of the MNE or is actually a separate legal entity
having the status of a corporation in its own right, are so occluded or eliminated for these purposes.
In effect, for the purposes of examining the structure and operations of the organization, internally,
whether or not business units possess the status of separate legal entities is considered to be quite
unimportant to organizational analysts and theorists. In this respect, they differ from legal analysts
and theorists. For the time being, in order to benefit from the insights of the former, the latter must
accede to their perspectives. Indeed, this is a fundamental argument of the present work.
Birkinshaw and Hood indicate that evolution of a subsidiary involves both the enhancement or
atrophy of subsidiary capabilities over time and the explicit establishment or loss of the
subsidiary’s charter, which are closely tied to the subsidiary’s capacity to add value. They consider
the charter of the subsidiary as “the business or elements of the business in which it participates
and for which it is recognized as having responsibility within the MNC… [which] can be defined
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in terms of markets served, products manufactured, technologies held, functional areas covered,
etc.”158
They note that where there are several subsidiaries in a particular country, they may function
independently of each other, and may have separate evolutionary paths. Further, the development
of a particular subsidiary may not always be in the interests of the MNC, which may prefer to
expand operations elsewhere, however, “our definition of subsidiary evolution accounts for the
possible lack of alignment between subsidiary and parent company goals.”159 They indicate that
three broad mechanisms interact to determine the role of a subsidiary at any given point in time
and the changes in its role over time: firstly, assignment of roles by head office; secondly, choice
by the subsidiary; and thirdly, local environment determinism: the constraints and opportunities of
the subsidiary in the local market.160 For the purposes of the present work, it is noteworthy that the
authors specifically include in subsidiary evolution types of evolution which are not aligned with,
and we may suggest might even, in some ways, disfavour MNC interests, as a whole, or as
expressed at its top levels.
Assignment of roles by headquarters is explained in terms of two models. The first is the product
life cycle model, in which the MNC produces at home for domestic consumption and export to
certain foreign markets, with demands for low-cost production arising as the product matures,
leading to overseas production initially for host country, and later for export, markets, and
eventually possibly eliminating production in the home market in favour of lower-cost host country
or countries.161 The second is the internationalization process model, in which firms move beyond
their national borders as they increase their levels of knowledge about and existing commitment
to the foreign market, and then make further decisions about additional commitment to the market.
This commitment decision is based, firstly, on market knowledge of the subsidiary’s strengths and
weaknesses in the market and, secondly, on market commitment, the desire to increase the quality
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of investment in the relevant country.162 The second model is founded on assumptions about the
cognitive limitations and behaviour of individual managers.
With respect to subsidiary choice, Birkinshaw and Hood identify two models: a network model,
which relates to resource dependence and power; and a decision process model, which, again,
involves assumptions of bounded rationality on the part of individual managers. The network
model recognizes that subsidiaries often develop specialized capabilities on which the rest of the
MNC depends, such that its growth of valuable and distinctive resources lessens its dependence
on other subsidiaries and increases control of its own destiny and in which decline of such
resources increases dependence and reduces self-control, during all of which times other entities
in the MNC, including the MNC itself, attempt to enforce their will on the subsidiary.163
The degree of dependence of, or higher level of control by the subsidiary may vary from one to
another. In some cases, Amit and Schoemaker say that a subsidiary may be able to collect a
sustainable economic rent, which they denominate as “organizational rent” (which Birkinshaw and
Hood follow), and which is “shown to stem from imperfect and discretionary decisions to develop
and deploy selected resources and capabilities, made by bountifully rational managers facing high
uncertainty, complexity and intrafirm conflict.”164 The asymmetries upon which such
organizational rent depends would include information available to headquarters as to the
resources and capabilities of the relevant subsidiaries as compared with the information available
to such subsidiaries, and other limitations on their rationality, again, as compared with the
limitations affecting management of the relevant subsidiaries.
Birkinshaw and Hood define capabilities as “a subsidiary’s capacity to deploy resources, usually
in combination, using organizational processes to effect the desired end.”165 They indicate that
“the subsidiary’s capabilities are, to some extent, distinct from the capabilities of the headquarters
operation and its sister subsidiaries. In other words, the particular geographical setting and history
of the subsidiary are responsible for defining a development path that is absolutely unique to that
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subsidiary which, in turn, results in a profile of capabilities that are unique.” Such capabilities,
which develop over time as a result of past experiences, they say, are “sticky” and “cannot be
easily transferred from one subsidiary to the next, even when the transfer is undertaken willingly”
but, instead, are subject to path-dependent trajectories.166
They note that the network perspective recognizes that each subsidiary is part of a network which
involves the parent company and other subsidiaries, and is not engaged only in a dyadic
relationship with the parent company.167 The decision process perspective is based on the bounded
rationality of individual managers and their ability to exert control over subsidiaries. It recognizes
that subsidiaries operate independently and are capable of autonomous behaviour.168
Both perspectives on subsidiary choice assume that strategic behaviour often occurs beyond top
management levels in an MNC or MNE, that sometimes the internal growth of an MNC subsidiary
may only be controlled loosely by HQ, and that sometimes the development and strategic
behaviour of a subsidiary may eventuate in ways not actively encouraged by top management.169
These assumptions were demonstrated by Robert Burgelman in a series of studies published
between 1983 and 1996.170 The present work has repeatedly averted to business units
independently pursuing their several and individual goals and objectives, as distinct from overall
organizational goals and objectives. Burgelman and others have repeatedly demonstrated this.
Birkinshaw and Hood indicate that the charter of the subsidiary “defined as the business – or
elements of the business – in which the subsidiary participates and for which it is recognized to
have responsibility within the MNC”171 is the subject of a shared understanding between the
subsidiary and headquarters. Where such charter does not change over a long period of time, its
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charter and capabilities may mirror each other; however, changes in its resource base, charter, or
market conditions may result in mismatches between the two.
They emphasize that “in most corporations there is internal competition for charters”,172 both with
respect to charters and responsibilities held by other subsidiaries and for new charters and
responsibilities. That is to say, one subsidiary may endeavour to take over the charter or
responsibility of another. This assumes that the competing subsidiaries have some similarities in
terms of capabilities. Further, they indicate that “not all charters are “contestable” in this fashion.
Some charters are country specific and so are inextricably to the local subsidiary operations; others
are tied to large immobile assets (e. g., an auto plant) so they cannot easily be shifted to another
location”. However, where the underlying resources are relatively mobile, the charter may be
highly contestable. In fact, such contestation is regarded as “one of the fundamental drivers behind
the subsidiary evolution process.”173
In effect, this charter competition is one aspect of internal competition over the allocation of
corporate resources. It is apparent that the charter or responsibility of the subsidiary implicates
certain allocations of resources. In this sense, we may consider the charter or responsibility of the
subsidiary to constitute one such resource. More generally, the corporation may permit bids for
new investments or may even create a system through which resources can be challenged as to
their allocation by other business units.174 Such a system of bids or challenges “increases
awareness of the relative capabilities among subsidiaries and provides a motivation for them to
continually upgrade their capabilities”, which distinguishes it from a central planning process, in
which capabilities and knowledge of them by the parent may remain static over relatively long
periods of time.175
With respect to the attributes of a particular subsidiary, Birkinshaw and Hood assert that “the most
critical factor affected subsidiary evolution is its track record – that is, the extent to which it has
delivered, over the years, results at or above the expectations of the parent company.”176 This
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record of past success reduces the uncertainty concerning whether it will attain future success and
also provides a legitimate justification for such decision if it should prove to be wrong. They also
indicate that the quality of the parent-subsidiary relationship, namely, the informal ties between
key decision-makers at the head office and senior management of the subsidiary is an important
factor impacting the subsidiary evolution process,177 for similar reasons. The importance of such
personal ties, contributing, as they do, to a perception that they eliminate some uncertainty, have
been discussed previously in this chapter.
Birkinshaw and Hood indicate, as well, that research has demonstrated that the assessment of
initiatives is affected more by perceptions of the qualities of the individuals putting them forward
than by the merits of the initiatives themselves. Thus, initiatives put forward by individuals well
known to parent company decision makers will be far better received than those put forward by
relatively unknown managers.178
Multinational Enterprise Organizational Structure
In our discussion of strategy and structure, it is become apparent that even enterprises with single,
or multiple but related product lines, or several unrelated product lines, as well as enterprises
having several divisions (called here “multidivisional corporations” or “MDCs”) may take various
strategic initiatives which have structural implications, such as operating a number of plants
geographically dispersed within a single jurisdiction (a “uninational corporation”) or within more
than one jurisdiction (a “multinational corporation” or “MNC”). Theodore Herbert considered the
research and theoretical work concerning multinational corporations in an article which appeared
in 1984,179 but which is still useful, not only by way of a summary of both literatures for present
purposes, but also as a source of description of such organizational forms as actually observed.
MDCs and MNEs
Herbert noted that: “Strictly speaking, the differences between the multinational and uninational
but geographically dispersed corporation are of degree rather than of kind. Both encounter

177

Ibid at 789.
Ibid.
179
Theodore T Herbert, "Strategy and Multinational Organization Structure: An Intraorganizational Relationships
Perspective" (1984) 9:2 Academy of Management Rev 259.
178

278

management, technical, and operations difficulties, a direct and inevitable result of separation of
operations in space. In this view, the MNC is simply the extreme case of the dispersed firm, the
components of which happened to be located in a number of autonomous political units".180 The
MNC is not homogeneous, but heterogeneous, with respect to jurisdictional operations and,
accordingly, the management of its business is affected by variations and differences in
requirements of the macro-political/economic systems across which it does business. These may
include monetary and exchange risk, expropriation and regulatory system hazards, divergence of
host country and business interests, government-subsidized competitors, cultural differences, and
restrictions based on social or economic impact; differences which require considerable advance
consideration as part of the development of an international strategy.181
While Herbert’s article is directed towards assessing the impact of such variations on the strategic
and structural development of MNCs, it is important to note that his focus on intraorganizational
development is not limited to those types of corporations, but also extends to MDCs. Many of his
observations apply to both. Among other things, he demonstrates how the structure of the
organization evolves and how that structure is, or should be, related to its evolving strategy. This
is important for our purposes.
His review of the research confirms theoretical arguments that formal authority is subject to change
over time, at least insofar as such formal authority is reflected in the formal intraorganizational
structure. It is apparent that informal structure and informal authority may also adapt over time,
for example, in order to “take into account” developments in formal structure and authority.
Consequently, such developments would be expected to affect assignments of responsibility for
organizational, as well as for legal, purposes.
MNC Development
Herbert discusses structural design criteria which relate to the strategy and structure of operations
dispersed across jurisdictional boundaries as including: firstly, the technical nature of the
operations; secondly, the extent of foreign product diversity and the relative size of foreign sales;
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and, thirdly, the percentage of foreign sales supported by foreign manufacturing.182 He indicates
that there are four principal generic strategies that lead to internationalization, namely: 1.volume
expansion, which is likely handled initially by an export manager or international department at
headquarters, who have neither line authority nor responsibility, which can create problems; 2.
resource acquisition, in which necessary resources are obtained in a jurisdiction other than the
home jurisdiction for use in the home jurisdiction and otherwise; 3. reciprocity, in which there is
a two-way flow of benefits, such as the transfer of resources to the home jurisdiction and supply
of finished products and financing to the foreign jurisdiction; and 4. integration, in which
operations in each world or regional market are largely self-contained.183
Herbert indicates that resource acquisition and reciprocity strategies often lead to wholly-owned
subsidiaries or joint ventures, and then later to international divisions organized by either: 1.
geography, where there are few product lines in a given area or country, which facilitates
adaptation to local conditions, enables decentralized decision-making, and often involves acting
as a separate profit centre; or 2. product line, where the products are technologically complex, and
the focus is on high-potential markets where an immediate effect can be achieved, albeit sometimes
at the expense of long-term strategy; or 3. function, like the parent company’s organization, which
is often appropriate where functional superiority represents a significant competitive advantage,
perhaps including high manufacturing efficiency, in-depth marketing services for clients,
production innovation, and the ability to actualize short turnaround and delivery commitments.184
Herbert describes integration as the most internationally-oriented structure, which treats foreign
and domestic markets more or less identically, as the market itself determines the manner of
development and provision of goods and services, which may lead to some differences from the
parent structure. “Each regional organization is more or less self-sufficient and independent. Loose
coordination or broad strategic guidance is the function of an international headquarters.
Worldwide staff activities may be located centrally, to avoid duplication of effort, achieve
economies of scale, or ensure uniformity procedures.”185 Full responsibility for production and
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marketing is assigned to regional managers, who normally report of the CEO of the overall
organization. This structure “encourages decentralization of authority, the identification of
responsibility for performance, and the development of managerial talent worldwide.”186
Herbert identifies a number of implications of the relationship between strategy and structure, as
follows: firstly, each resource strategy is best carried out in a different structural configuration;
secondly, mismatches of strategy and structure may be expected to create certain particular
difficulties; thirdly, potential difficulties may be expected even where the strategy and structure
are appropriately matched; and fourthly, the relationship of the subsidiary with the host country
may be affected by the resource strategy, the structural framework, or both.187
Herbert indicates that each strategy tends to have implications or consequences, which can actually
be observed, with respect to the type of structure, the degree of formalization, the locus of decisionmaking, the size and nature of local staff, the nature and direction of communications, the extent
of control, the metrics used to measure performance, the size and nature of managerial personnel,
the relationship with the home office the nature and quantity of the products produced, and the
nature of the investment, profit, and capital policy and its division as between headquarters and
the local operation. For example, considering just resource acquisition, reciprocity and integrated
operations strategies, the degrees of control range from tight to looser to more general, the
performance measures range from highly quantitative and cost-centred to less rigid and
quantitative to profit and return on investment, and the characteristics of managerial personnel
range from almost entirely expatriates, to an mix of expatriates and local personnel with a larger
administrative component, to largely local personnel.188
As previously noted here, these implications are also relevant to MDCs and, except for the last
item, even to MDCs which are uninational. That said, Herbert concludes that an
extraorganizational dimension, namely, that of host-country relations may significantly affect the
effectiveness of a particular strategy.189
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Matrix Organizations
Herbert argues that some of the disadvantages of operating as an international division, on the one
hand, and of fully integrating international and domestic operations, on the other hand, can be
reduced by adopting a matrix form of organization. For example, the foreign subsidiary may be
required to account, simultaneously, to a geographic regional office and to a divisional office to
which the foreign subsidiary is assigned by reason of its functional or product/service attributes.190
In particular, he references research conducted by Stanley M. Davis in this regard.191
Davis’s work (in this case conducted with Paul Lawrence) indicates that matrix organizations
became popular in the 1970s, particularly in large diversified organizations in which many
complex and conflicting interests must be balanced and to deal with high degrees of complexity
and ambiguity.192 These are very different organizations from the woollen mills and iron factories
of Great Britain which employed and, according to some sources, even innovated, the hierarchical
“command and control” industrial structure.193
In a 2005 study involving 294 top-level and mid-level managers from seven major MNCs in six
different industries, Sy and D’Annunzio identified five major challenges of the matrix
organizational form: 1. misaligned goals; 2. unclear roles and responsibilities;3. ambiguity with
respect to authority; 4. lack of a matrix guardian, namely, someone having sufficient authority and
responsibility to resolve some of the preceding issues; and 5. employees focused on their own
organizational silos.194
They compared respective strengths and weaknesses of the matrix form. The strengths include
leveraging economies of scale, while remaining small and task focused; focusing employees on
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multiple business goals; facilitating innovative solutions to complex technical problems;
improving employees’ companywide focus through increased responsibility and decision-making;
allowing for quick and easy transfer of resources; increasing information flow through the creation
of lateral communication channels; and enhancing personal communication skills. They identify
the weaknesses as violating the principle that authority should be commensurate with
responsibilities; violating the principle that each subordinate should have only a single boss;
creating ambiguity and conflict; increasing costs due to increased need for additional management
and administration; and increasing the likelihood of resistance to change, as employees may
associate the matrix with loss of status, authority, and control over traditional domain.195
Headquarters Functions, Strategy, and Structure
Alfred D. Chandler examined the functions of the headquarters of multidivisional corporations in
a 1991 article entitled The Functions of the HQ Unit in the Multibusiness Firm,196 in which he
concluded, among other things, that in which he concluded, among other things, that “the decisions
made by the senior executives at their headquarters have been absolutely critical to the
performance of such multinational and multiproduct companies. For those corporate executives
not only monitor the current performance of their several businesses but also determine and
implement investment in facilities and personnel required for future production and distribution in
the different product and geographical markets they serve. On such decisions depend the
competitive success or failure of their enterprises and the national industries in which they
operate.”197
Chandler indicates that during the interwar years, American companies adopted some version of
the M-Form with a corporate headquarters (also called a corporate office or HQ unit), and
integrated product or geographical divisions, when senior managers in centralized, functionally
departmentalized U-Form structures “realized that they had neither the time nor the necessary
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information to coordinate and monitor day-to-day operations, or to devise and implement longterm plans for the several product lines.”198
Accordingly, they created a headquarters which engaged in two related functions. One was
entrepreneurial or value-creating, namely, “to determine strategies to maintain and then to utilize
for the long-term the firm’s organizational skills, facilities and capital and to allocate resources –
capital and product-specific technical and managerial skills – to pursue the strategies.” This work
maintains that this task is absolutely critical: it aims at advancing the business and thereby creating
value. Thus, structure, processes and personnel must be adopted and adapted to this end.
The objective of the second function involved administration and loss-prevention, namely, “to
monitor the performance of the operating divisions; to check on the use of the resources allocated;
and, when necessary, redefine the product lines of the division so as to continue to use effectively
the firm's organizational capabilities.”199 In Chandler’s view the monitoring role was intimately
related to strategic planning and resource allocation, which he regarded as a classic entrepreneurial
function. Monitoring provided essential information about changing technology and markets, the
nature and pace of competition in the different businesses, the performance of divisional operating
managers, and facilitated their continuing development of product-specific, firm-specific, and
more general managerial capabilities.200 It can readily be seen that Chandler’s “monitoring”, which
operates in aid of the first, value-enhancing, function, is quite different from economic monitoring.
By the 1970s, in most large MBEs, planning and administrative offices existed at the business unit
level which normally operated through a functional U-Form structure and at the divisional and
corporate offices, which usually operated through a version of the M-Form structure with each
level having its own staff and senior executives responsible for profit, market share, and other
measures of performance.201
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Financial Control, Strategic Control, and Strategic Planning Models
Chandler relied on Michael Goold and Andrew Campbell's 1987 study “Strategies and Styles: The
Role of the Centre in Managing Diversified Corporations”202 for information concerning 16
carefully selected British diversified and conglomerate firms, as well as his own information
concerning American conglomerates and multibusiness firms.203 Goold and Campbell identify
three main management styles used at corporate headquarters, which they denominate as Strategic
Planning, Strategic Control, and Financial Control, and which they describe as leading to different
strategies and different results.204 Chandler argues, instead, that “in these three styles, like the
internal organization of the headquarters, result from different paths of growth, and therefore from
different patterns of investment and from different sets of organizational capabilities… [which]
capabilities, in turn, reflect the different characteristics of the businesses in which the firms
operate” and says that successful adaptation of these styles to their industries’ characteristics
determine the effective size and boundaries of their enterprises.205
Applying this analysis, he found that the strategic planning companies “are by and large the least
diversified, operate the smallest number of businesses, have the highest linkages between divisions
and the highest overlap between business units within divisions”; that the strategic control
companies “operate more businesses, have fewer overlaps between the divisions and have less
synergy between business units”; while the financial control companies “are the most diversified…
have the lowest linkages between divisions, and have the lowest overlap between units within
divisions.”206
Financial control companies generally grew almost entirely by acquisition rather than direct
internal investment, often acquiring businesses and unrelated industries. A relatively small
corporate office includes a few general line officers, almost no executives in functional areas, and
divisional managers, who perform a linking and surveillance role between the units and the centre.
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Corporate executives may suggest, but the business units within the divisions define and
implement, business unit strategy.207
The budget, the goal of which is normally short-term profit, “is considered a contract between the
corporate office and the business unit” against which current financial performance, which is the
critical measure of achievement, is assessed monthly and quarterly and failure to meet financial
targets often results in a change in management of the business unit.208 The corporate office adjusts
the portfolio businesses accordingly, selling off weak performers and making new acquisitions,
usually avoiding “technologically complex, capital-intensive industries where product and process
innovations require long-term investment and associated risks.”
The development and implementation of strategic plans and controls were generally similar as
between strategic planning companies and strategic control companies, with strategy initially
determined by the business units subject to review by divisional headquarters, and then
subsequently by corporate headquarters, involving annual planning cycles of preparation of annual
business plans and operating plans involving extensive staffs at business unit, divisional, and
headquarters levels, and producing budgets linked to long-term strategic plans and annual business
plans.209 In strategic planning companies, the head office played a more decisive role, but it was
less decisive in the case of strategic control companies, where the divisional office was more
involved in planning.
With respect to strategic control companies, the divisional headquarters had a much greater role,
generally initiating capital projects and proposals for new businesses, while headquarters generally
initiated closures and divestitures. Financial budgets and goals were regarded as targets to be met,
not as subjects for discussions of the extent of, reasons for, and proposals to remedy, divergence.
Instead, budgets and goals formed the basis of allocations of incentives and sanctions, much as
with respect to financial control companies.210 Although guided by the corporate office, the
divisional headquarters in strategic control companies carried out most of the functions of carried
out by headquarters in the case of strategic planning companies. This sometimes meant that long-
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term gains were sacrificed for short-term gains or that some opportunities were lost which might
have been better recognized as a result of greater attention by headquarters.211
Because strategic planning companies regarded their divisions and business units as portfolio
investments, corporate executives reviewed strategic themes against their own portfolio mix and
against the dynamics and suggestions of the individual business units. Proposals for large scale
capital allocations and entries into new businesses could arise at business unit and corporate levels
but required corporate sponsorship if they were major new initiatives. Agreed-upon plans were
expressed in long-term and short-term goals against which actual results were monitored, not as
contracts directly impacting incentives, such as bonuses, or sanctions, such as management
removal, but as the basis for discussions concerning progress towards long-term strategic and
financial goals.212
Development of Corporate Level Functions
Chandler’s examination of IBM, GE and DuPont, particularly in the last half of the twentieth
century, with even more focus on the 1970s and 1980s, let him to a number of conclusions
concerning the capacity of the headquarters or corporate office. One such conclusion was that a
multinational corporation could not enter new businesses based on existing capabilities alone;
instead, such existing skills and facilities would have to be supplemented by developing other new
complementary skills and facilities. Further, the sizes and boundaries of enterprises were not
determined only by existing capabilities, and by success in developing additional supplementary
capabilities, but were “also determined by the ability of the corporate headquarters to carry out
both its basic functions – entrepreneurial and administrative.”213
Moreover, the nature and performance of such entrepreneurial and administrative functions were
affected by the characteristics of the industries concerned, including such matters as the types of
products and services produced and distributed. For example, in “industries in which new product
development is a critical component of intrafirm competition, where R&D expenditures are high,
state-of-the-art facilities costly, and marketing records specialized skills, the corporate office needs
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to concentrate on the entrepreneurial (value-creating) function”, including playing a strong role in
the strategic planning process in order to fully utilize competitive strengths, and to determine
pathways for new product and process development.214
On the other hand, in mature industries, with a stable final product, where R&D is important to
improve the product and to cut costs, and where both facilities, although costly, and marketing
skills, although complex, are already highly developed, “the corporate office can more easily
delegate strategic planning to the operating divisions, and maintain strategic control by setting
targets and establishing long-term goals for the corporation as a whole.”215 Where the products
and services remain much the same, production technology is not complex and does not require
expensive facilities, but where competition is more dependent upon advertising, marketing and
distribution, then “financial controls alone have been usually enough to prevent losses and
maintain profits in multibusiness enterprises.”216
CONCLUSION
This work began by addressing, in Part 1, the question: What is? What corporate law and
governance regimes exist in modern corporate law today? In keeping with the descriptivist
methodology of this work, Part 1 identified what are generally considered to be the legally
essentialist characteristics of the modern business corporation and examined how those
characteristics are instantiated in statute law and other declarative law enacted or proposed as a
model for enactment in several leading jurisdictions.
Part 2 of this work considered the question: Why this? It sought to examine assumptions about the
corporation that have influenced, might have influenced, or might in the future influence
theorization about the corporation and the legislation, regulation, jurisprudence and judicial
treatment, and practice relating to the corporation and corporate law generally.
The assumptions examined related principally to those made by classical and neoclassical
economic theory in general, and theory of the firm, in particular. Assumptions about the
relationships among the economy, society, the polity, and the state, were reviewed and critiqued
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from other economic perspectives and from the perspectives of disciplines and fields other than
economics. Then, assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics related to economic action
at the micro-economic level were examined and critiqued from similar perspectives.
The preceding chapter and the present chapter have considered assumptions relating to the
corporation as an economic actor and, continuing the descriptivist methodology of this work, the
instantiation of the corporation as observed in action in the “real world”. This involved, in the
preceding chapter, an examination of the history of development of the modern business
corporation, principally in the United States and Great Britain, over much of the past two centuries,
as chronicled by Alfred Chandler, and variously critiqued and chronicled by others.
The present chapter identifies several barriers to unified action within the corporation, including
limitations, and diffusion, of rationality, information and decision-making and the problem of
resolving conflict within and without the corporation. Problems of dealing with complex and
multiple goals, official and unofficial goals, and intraorganizational groups, coalitions, and
organizations also arise. This chapter discusses the corporation, like other organizations and the
polity and the state generally, as a political system. In particular, it is examined as a socio-political
conflict system seeking to achieve some ordering of collective preferences in accordance with
superordinate goals or superordinate processes.
The present chapter continues to investigate the principal modes of organization of the activity of
large modern business corporations; namely, unitary or U-form corporations, and multi-divisional
or M-Form corporations (“MDCs”); and briefly describes multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) and
matrix organizations. In addition to addressing problems of bounded rationality and imperfect
information, and multiple and complex goals, these organizational forms must also take into
account the bases, and dispersion, of power and influence within the organization and its
constituent components. In effect, this continues the descriptive methodology of the present work
and, by examination of how the modern business corporation is instantiated in present day reality,
leads to the investigation of organizations generally and the ways in which the organizational
“lens” can contribute to knowledge and theorization of, and about, the modern business
corporation. This is the focus of Part 3 of this work.
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Ultimately, this leads to the consideration of the dual aspect of the corporation, combining legal
entity attributes, particularly notable in its external or outward focus, and organizational attributes,
particularly notable in its internal or inward focus. This work denominates this as the “corporative”
perspective on, or the “corporative” theory of, the corporation. To this we now turn.
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PART 3 – HOW, INSTEAD, TO ANALYZE THE CORPORATION: A CORPORATIVE
THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
SECTION A – THE ORGANIZATION
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PARTS 2 AND 3 OF THIS BOOK
Purpose and Scope of Part 2
The modern business corporation is in society, and society is in the modern business corporation.
Expressed differently, the corporation is intra-social, and society is intra-corporate.
As demonstrated in Part 2 and Appendix B of this book, considered from an internal perspective,
the corporation is social, in the sense that its function and operations are constituted, at least in
part, by individual human beings interacting with other individual human beings, by individual
human beings interacting with various groups of individual human beings, and by groups of
individual human beings interacting with other groups of human beings.
Consequently, in its internal operation and functions, it may be said to be a situs of interpersonal,
social, and political behaviour among individuals and groups, a situs of interpersonal, social, and
political interaction, of group interaction, of social and personal identity, of search for meaning, of
economic attainment, and of many other species of human behaviour. As also demonstrated in Part
2 and Appendix B of this book, considered from an external perspective, the corporation as a legal
entity can act towards external actors only through and by means of individual human beings.
This work argues that corporate legal theory, corporate law, and corporate governance practices
give insufficient recognition to these aspects of the corporation, concentrating, instead, on
economic principles of venerable, if now doubtful, application. This work, instead, has, up to this
point, attempted to address, and henceforth will attempt to address, those often-ignored issues.
The corporation may be analyzed as an organization. The immediately preceding part of this book,
Part 2, which, together with Appendix B, discusses the discourse concerning, and the theorization
of, the firm and the corporation, principally from perspectives other than law, has referred to
various salient aspects of organizations, both internally and externally, including the firm and the
corporation.
In the course of considering the firm as a single economic actor, the final chapter of Part 2, Chapter
Three, examined various alternatives to the perspective of classical and neoclassical economics.
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Among other things, it examined the firm as a political system, and as a socio-political conflict
system, as a system of achieving joint preference ordering, and, in general, as an organization, and,
in particular, as an organization with significant economic objectives.
Purpose and Scope of Part 3
Among other things, Part 2, together with Appendix B, provides some background for this part of
the book, Part 3, which more formally investigates research and theorization concerning
organizations, including aspects of organizations relevant to business organizations, particularly
the modern business corporation. In this respect, Part 3 outlines some of the theory and research
upon which are based certain general statements and criticisms made previously in the text. As in
other sections of the text, the scope of the present work renders it advisable to closely examine
certain principal texts, while addressing comments and criticism from other texts somewhat less
closely.
As noted earlier, in order to facilitate an orderly progression of exposition, it was necessary to
defer investigation of research, theoretical and empirical review, and theorization underlying and
supporting some of this work’s statements and criticisms until a later point in the narrative. That
point has now been reached.
Accordingly, this chapter and the following two chapters consider, in broad terms, the definition,
and characteristics, of organizations generally, while also situating the corporation within the
broader universe of organizations. The final chapters in this part, Part 3, integrate the analysis of
the corporation as an organization with its status as a legal entity, and present the corporative
theory of, or corporative perspective with respect to, the modern business corporation.
CHAPTER FOUR – THE ORGANIZATION - DEFINING AND OTHER ATTRIBUTES
WORKING DEFINITIONS AND FORMAL DEFINITIONS
Working Definitions
Up to this point in the present book, we have been content to employ a rough working definition
of the term “organization”. In that regard, we may say that an organization is a social unit
structured and managed in such a way as to meet one or more particular needs or to pursue or
accomplish one or more collective goals or purposes. Another way of expressing this would be to
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say that it is a group of people working together in an organized way to meet, pursue, or accomplish
one or more collectively shared needs, goals or purposes.
Since satisfaction of a need may be considered to amount to a “goal or objective”, the present text
will generally not mention need satisfaction or attainment of a need separately from “goals” or
“objectives”. It will likewise be assumed that “goals” and “objectives” are more or less
interchangeable terms, with the result that use of one or more of such terms generally means and
includes the other. We will consider various authorities in support of these propositions.
It can immediately be seen that these working definitions involve three principal components:
firstly, the notion of “social unit” or “group of people”; secondly, the notion of structuring,
managing, or applying rationality to, the collective activities of such social unit or group of people;
and thirdly, the notion of collective, or shared, needs, goals or purposes. These components will
be analyzed in due course.
Formal Definitions
For this purpose, three definitions advanced by social theorists will be considered here: those
advanced by Philip Selznick, Egon Bittner, and Meyer Zald.
Philip Selznick Definition
In a highly influential and oft-cited article published in 1948, “Foundations of the Theory of
Organization”, Philip Selznick begins by observing: “Trades unions, governments, business
corporations, political parties, and the like are formal structures in the sense that they represent
rationally ordered instruments for the achievement of stated goals. “Organization,” we are told, “is
the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed purpose through
the allocation of functions and responsibilities.” Or, defined, more generally, formal organization
is “a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons.”1 It is clear
from this that a single individual, such as a sole proprietor, cannot qualify as an “organization”;
and that a firm as an organization must comprehend more than one individual. In effect, the
economic model of the firm as single individual and sole proprietor itself excludes consideration
of its “firm” as an organization. Thus, it invisibilizes what is inside the “black box” of its “firm”.
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Selznick says that “formal organization is the structural expression of rational action. The
mobilization of technical and managerial skills requires a pattern of coordination, a systematic
ordering of positions and duties which defines a chain of command and makes possible the
administrative integration of specialized functions.”2 One might say that an organization is more
than a social group, but, instead, is a social group having certain needs, goals or purposes, and
having certain structure and processes developed in an intendedly rational manner in view of those
needs, goals or purposes.
It is implicitly assumed that the satisfaction of such needs or the attainment of such goals or
purposes requires the effort of a group of persons, rather than that of a single person. This may be
because the group possesses resources not available to any one person or, at least, to any one
person within the group under consideration.
Selznick’s examples of organizations include governments, trade unions, business corporations,
and political parties. This indicates that the goals that are sought by organizations may be variously
described as political, social, and economic in nature. Some organizations may pursue goals that
are exclusively in one such area, while others may pursue various goals that are in more than one
such area.
The allocation of functions and responsibilities within the organization involve both delegation,
most notably at the outset, and coordination, on an ongoing basis, and without consideration of the
identity of the persons involved. Selznick opines that: “In this context delegation is the primordial
organizational act, a precarious venture which requires the continuous elaboration of formal
mechanisms of coordination and control. The security of all participants, and of the system as a
whole, generates a persistent pressure for the institutionalization of relationships, which are thus
removed from the uncertainties of individual fealty or sentiment. Moreover, it is necessary for the
relations within the structure to be determined in such a way that individuals will be
interchangeable and the organization will be free of dependence upon personal qualities. In this
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way, the formal structure becomes subject to calculable manipulation, an instrument of rational
action.”3
Within the group, a structure is developed, involving positions that are largely, if not completely,
independent of the identity of the incumbents, relationships among the positions and their
incumbents that are likewise independent of the identity of the incumbents, but, rather, in both
cases, express some rational determination as to the means of satisfying the relevant needs, goals
or objectives. Similarly, the positions developed may relate to the various functions required to be
performed that are independent of the membership of the organization or the incumbents of
particular positions at any particular time.
In that sense, the organization is conceived as having some permanence and stability, as enduring
beyond its present membership, and as being independent of that membership. In this way, the
relationships, structure, and process instituted may be said to become institutionalized, and the
organization may be said to become an “institution”. The organization is perceived to have a life
separate and apart from, and beyond, that of its present members and, as a matter of fact, beyond
its past, present and future members. This, of course, is a principal characteristic of a corporation
as a matter of law.
It is important to note that the structuring of the organization, also involving delegation and
concomitant coordination, may itself create groups or sub-groups within the organization. For
example, the creation of a marketing function within the organization, the delegation of certain
duties in that behalf, and the requirement for ongoing coordination of its activities within the
marketing function itself, and within the organization as a whole may be considered to create a
group within the organization. The question arises, for later discussion and investigation, whether
that group (or subgroup) within the organization may itself satisfy the requirements to constitute
it as an actual organization, albeit within or “nested” in the higher-order organization.
For example, while the focal group may have superordinate goals and objectives which are those
of the organization at the highest level, it may also have discrete goals and objectives which may
not be shared by the whole organization, or by all parts of the organization, or which may even be
completely unique to that particular intraorganizational functional or other group. As has been
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demonstrated in the present work, there is considerable evidence concerning the independent
nature of certain goals and objectives of intraorganizational groups.
The processes and ways of proceeding within that group or function may, likewise, range along
some continuum of identity and diversity as compared with those of the organization as a whole.
Other considerations, of course, such as stability, may contraindicate the existence of such
intraorganizational groups as organizations per se. While this argument need not detain the present
work, it is worth keeping in view as the analysis here proceeds.
Egon Bittner Definition
The sociologist Egon Bittner opines that the term “organization” as used in relevant conventions,
applies correctly to “stable associations of persons engaged in concerted activities directed to the
attainment of specific objectives. It is thought to be a decisive characteristic of such organizations
that they are deliberately instituted relative to these objectives.” He says that organizations which
are, in this sense, “implementing and implemented programs of action that involve a substantial
dose of comprehensive and rational planning…are identified as instances of formal or rational
organization in order to differentiate them from other forms.”4
Bittner, like Selznick, focuses on stability and rationality in his explication of the use of the term
“organization”. Consequently, a group which is relatively stable, or even completely static but
which does not pursue its common objectives in a manner which is considered, even if only by the
members of the group, to be deliberate and rational cannot be an organization, and cannot be said
to have a formal or rational organization.
Similarly, a group whose membership is constantly changing does not constitute a stable
association of persons, and, accordingly, cannot be an organization. Of course, the requisite
“stability” required to constitute the group as an organization may not be limited only to
membership, but may also relate to the qualifications for, and the nature and process of, such
continuing association.
Even if deliberation is not required in the formation of the organization, which Bittner says is
usually assumed to be decisive as to whether the group constitutes and is “instituted as” an
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organization, the pursuit of its objectives involves rationally planning, and implementing,
programs of action. The latter seem to require a certain degree of stability.
At this juncture, it is important not to assume that the “formal” organization exhausts the content,
either of the term “organization”, or of its structure and processes. Instead, many practitioners and
theorists of organizations explicitly acknowledge either that an “informal” organization may exist
alongside the “formal” organization, or that some “informal” structure or structures, and processes
may exist within the “formal” organization and processes, but that such “informal structure and
processes” subsist separately and apart from its “formal” structure and processes. Selznick explains
that the informal structure that exists in every organization will modify its goals, in the sense of
causing abandonment, deflection, or elaboration of, such goals.5
This is true whether the organization has political, social or economic goals, or, expressed
differently, has goals that sound (primarily or exclusively) in the polity, society or economy. In
the case of the corporation, Chapter Five of the present text considers a number of issues relating
to the relationship between formal organization and processes, and the one hand, and informal
organization processes, on the other.
Meyer Zald Definition
In a different setting, involving a study of community organization agencies, Meyer Zald, a
sociology and organizational behaviour theorist and practitioner, described organizations as
follows: “Organizations come into being to pursue collective ends. A central part of the
constitution of any organization is the sets of agreements about goals that are understood by major
constituents. Not only do goals represent a set of constituting agreements, they focus
organizational resources on a problem field. That is, organizational goals along with beliefs about
how to attain them set tasks and problems for agency personnel.”6
Selznick characterizes an organization as both an economy and an adaptive social structure, saying
that: “Considered as an economy, organization is a system of relationships which define the
availability of scarce resources and which may be manipulated in terms of efficiency and
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effectiveness.”7 The employment of such resources is a key determinant of organizational
effectiveness. That employment of scarce resources is affected by the structure of the organization,
systems of coordination, including delegation and control, stability of authority, and the
effectiveness of inducements to individual participants.8 This comports with Zald’s comments
above. Again, these issues are explored in Chapter Five of the present work.
Zald says: “Central to organizational analysis, but often only implicitly treated, is an analysis of
the polity of organizations—the patterned distribution and utilization of authority and influence.”9
In this sense, every organization may be said to have or to be a “polity”, or to have or to be a
political system, and, therefore, to have, and to be susceptible to, its own internal politics. As Zald
notes, certain classes of organizations open (such as community organization agencies) display
goals that are often in flux, patterns of power and influence that ebb and flow, constant overt or
implicit conflict, and, often, unstable relationships with their external environments.10 The
immediately preceding Chapter Three discussed the corporation as a polity.
Zald observes that “[i]n a sense, the constitution of an organization represents its social contract—
the basic purposes and modes of procedure to which the major supporters and staff of the
organization adhere. When attempts are made to change the constitution of an organization, the
agency can expect conflict and disaffection, unless clear benefits adhere to the major supporters.”11
This “social contract” with respect to community organization agencies that Zald mentions may
be analogized to the socioeconomic and political contract within a state or polity, or within a
society, or within a corporation or other organization having business or economic objectives.
For Zald, this “constitution” includes not only the organization’s goals but also commitments to
certain means or methods of proceeding, as expressed formally or in writing, and otherwise.12
Thus, the constitution, for him, includes not only aspects of the formal, but also of the informal,
organization under consideration. Not part of this “constitution”, but important to the conduct of
the operations of the organization, are “many patterned aspects of agency operations” that do not
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involve basic agreements about goals and means. They may, however, represent, or be derived
from, higher order commitments as to process and procedure. This will be further discussed below.
It is apparent that all of these definitions of the term “organization” encompass the corporation. Of
course, it is respected convention to refer prominently to the perspective of Max Weber in any
discussion of the nature of an organization, and, in particular, of bureaucracy. This warrants an
examination of some of his writing on the subject. Among other things, this examination will make
it apparent that Weber considers business firms and corporations as organizations.
PART A – GROUPS OF PEOPLE OR SOCIAL UNITS
Max Weber on Organizations and Related Matters
Organization as Social Relationship
Weber’s magisterial work Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology13, was first
published (in German) in 1922, after his death, although it was not translated into English until
1968. However, Part I of the book, translated by Talcott Parsons, was made available to English
readers in 1947, under the title The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.14 In order to
understand, and to be able to assess, his foundational contribution, it is necessary to review the
“building blocks” in this foundation, which will require some extensive reference to his text. This
close attention will be repaid, however, as this work proceeds to further explicate other
organizational theory and research.
Weber states that: “A social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission of outsiders
will be called an organization (Verband) when its regulations are enforced by specific individuals:
a chief and, possibly, an administrative staff, which normally also has representative powers”,
which may be understood to mean the power of representing the organization and acting on its
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behalf, apparently with respect to both internal matters, such as enforcing its regulations, and
external matters, in relation to extraorganizational actors.15
Weber’s organization, which he insists is a “social relationship”, is evidently a species of
relationship which is not exhausted only between or among its members, or by admission of new
members. Such a social relationship may be considered to be qualitatively different from other
social relationships or types of social relationships. In fact, it seems to consider the focal
organization as a “type” of relationship, which is reiterable or may be instantiated, at least, among
the organization and each of its members, and perhaps among the organization and the totality of
its then-existing members. Such a “type” relationship may be considered as notionally distinct
from an apparently individuated or “one-off” relationship. That distinction is further emphasized
by Weber’s observation that such social relationship can be represented both internally, vis-à-vis
its own members (the composition which is subject to change), and externally, vis-à-vis
extraorganizational parties, generally or subject to some specification.
Such characteristics are not normally considered to be attributable to purely “social relationships”
(rather than primary, usually familial or intimate, relationships), except insofar as those social
relationships are expressed in some collective undertaking having at least notional reality, whether
as a formally constituted association or as a partnership, joint venture, or corporation. It would
normally be expected that such matters as possession and enforcement of regulations, and
representation and acting by means of representation through representatives would be attributes
of some notional or other entity, rather than of some social relationship. That is to say, such
characteristics might be connected, logically or otherwise, with the reification or entification of
the social relationship concerned. For example, the discussion of the corporation in the present
work has demonstrated that the corporation fulfills the necessary elements of Weber’s
“organization”.
Weber says that, in addition to representative powers, the “incumbency of a policy-making
position or participation in the functions of the staff, constitute "executive powers"
(Regierungsgewahen). These may be appropriated, or they may be assigned, in accordance with
the regulations of the organization, to specific persons or to individuals selected on the basis of
specific characteristics or procedures. "Organized action" is (a) either the staff's action, which is
15
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legitimated by its executive or representative powers and oriented to realizing the organization's
order, or (b) the members' action as directed by the staff.”16 Of course, what Weber means by
“organized action” is, simply, action taken by or on behalf of the organization.
In this regard, it may be noted that Alfred Chandler and others have specifically identified
“executive powers” or “executive functions” and have distinguished them from other types of
administrative functions. Indeed, Chandler identifies an “entrepreneurial function”, which consists
in the determination of the corporation’s strategy and in the allocation of resources in relation to
the same. Weber’s “executive powers” extend beyond policymaking to participation in operations.
The term “organization”, for Weber, does not primarily identify an entity or a “thing” apart from
human individuals, but, instead, is a certain kind of social relationship, one aspect of which is that
it is “ordered”. Weber says that the order governing the organization may be established by the
members on their own authority (viz. autonomously) or imposed by an outside agency
(heteronomously).17
Further, Weber asserts that an “association's enacted order may be established in one of two ways:
by voluntary agreement, or by being imposed and acquiesced in. The leadership in an organization
may claim a legitimate right to impose new rules. The "constitution" of an organization is the
empirically existing probability, varying in extent, kind and conditions, that rules imposed by the
leadership will be acceded to. The existing rules may specify that certain groups or sections of the
members must consent, or at least have been heard. Besides this, there may be any number of other
conditions.”18 Of course, the language Weber employs here is, at least arguably, more syntactically
consistent with an “association” or “organization” as an entity than as a relationship.
In effect, having defined the organization as a particular species of relationship, Weber,
consistently therewith, defines the constitution of the organization in empirical or probabilistic
terms with respect to certain expectations concerning the relationship. Such a constitution has in
view whether the parameters of the relationship which constitutes the organization permit further
subsequent accepted rulemaking, whether subsidiary or otherwise. Weber’s definition of
“constitution” may, perhaps, be better understood as having in view goals and objectives, and
16
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rules, methods and procedures, and even values, consistency with which is likely to meet with the
acceptance of the members of the organization. These rules of the organization may relate either
to organized action (an administrative order) or other kinds of social action (a regulative order).19
Typology of Organizations
Weber maintains that organizations may also be distinguished in that: “Continuous rational activity
of a specified kind will be called an enterprise; an association with a continuously and rationally
operating staff win be called a formal organization. An organization which claims authority only
over voluntary members will be called a voluntary association (Verein); an organization which
imposes, within a specifiable sphere of operations, its order (with relative success) on all action
conforming with certain criteria will be called a compulsory organization or association
(Anstalt).”20
It appears that the “activity in which an enterprise engages” is business, which appears to include
“business conducted by political and ecclesiastic organizations as well as by voluntary associations
insofar as it has rational continuity.”21 Although Weber does not use or define the expression
“informal organization” where used here, his use of the term “formal organization” would suggest
that an informal organization is one which lacks a continuously and rationally operating staff. It
would appear that both formal organizations and informal organizations can also be characterized
as either voluntary associations or compulsory associations.
Weber’s definitions make clear that he considers state and religious bodies as “organizations”. A
"ruling organization" is "political", he says, “insofar as its existence and order is continuously
safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the
part of the administrative staff.” Famously, he stipulates that a “compulsory political organization
with continuous operations (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a "state" insofar as its
administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force in the enforcement of its order”; and he says that “social action, especially organized
action, will be spoken of as "politically oriented" if it aims at exerting influence on the government
of a political organization; especially at the appropriation, expropriation, redistribution or

19

Ibid at 51.
Ibid at 52 [emphasis in the original].
21
Ibid.
20

302
allocation of the powers of government.”22 Weber identifies as a "hierocratic organization" one
“which enforces its order through psychic coercion by distributing or denying religious benefits
("hierocratic coercion"). A compulsory hierocratic organization will be called a "church" insofar
as its administrative staff claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of hierocratic coercion.”23
Weber, then, considers voluntary and compulsory associations, (capitalist and non-capitalist)
enterprises (associations carrying out continuous rational business activity), states and their
subdivisions, political parties, and churches, including the Roman Catholic Church, to be
organizations. In other contexts, he also includes armies, clubs, and other private associations.24
Of course, as can be seen from his definition of the term “organization”, for Weber, an organization
is, or implicates, a social relationship with certain attributes, and, in particular: “The term “social
relationship” will be used to denote the behavior of a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful
content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms. The
social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a probability that there
will be a meaningful course of social action – irrespective, for the time being, of the basis for this
probability.”25 This predictability, which is key to Weber’s concept of relationship, is not
inconsistent with the formal definitions of the term “organization” considered above.
Organizations and Expectations of Social Action
Accordingly, Weber considers a social relationship to exist when the probability of certain social
action exists. The existence of the social relationship is not determinative of the social action, but,
instead, the social relationship may be inferred from the probability of certain social action. Weber
explains that the orientation of each to the others, and hence their relationship, need not be
cooperative, but may even be competitive or otherwise, in terms of social action. However, the
relationship is defined in terms of this likelihood of behaviour, since: “Even in cases of such forms
of social organization as a state, church, association, or marriage, the social relationship consists
exclusively in the fact that there has existed, exists, or will exist a probability of action in some

22

Ibid at 54 [emphasis in the original].
Ibid.
24
Ibid at 318.
25
Ibid at 26-7.
23

303
definite way appropriate to this meaning. It is vital to be continually clear about this in order to
avoid the “reification” of those concepts.”26
As mentioned above, it is open to question whether even Weber has avoided such reification when
he talks in this way about “forms of social organization”. Alternatively, it can be argued that what
are conventionally described as “organizations” do, as Weber argues, implicate or describe forms
or modes of social relationships. Perhaps it is in seeking to develop a typology or taxonomy of
social relationships that they are concretized, reified, or entified.
It is clear, however, that describing organizations in terms of the relevant social relationships,
implicit or explicit, does direct attention to the instantiation of “relationships” in terms of actual
behaviour; or that, expressed otherwise, patterns of instantiation of behaviour may be described as
social relationships which, in some cases, may involve a social “organization”. Similarly, the
actual behaviour of the parties to the social relationship may change, implicitly indicating a change
in the nature of relationship, and, correspondingly, in the nature of the organization.
As has been, and will be, demonstrated further in the present text, many social theorists follow
Weber in seeking to characterize organizations in terms of relationships, while simultaneously
characterizing organizations as what Weber calls “forms of social organization”; that is to say, as
something that obtains or exists separately from the instantiation of actual relationships between
and among parties to those relationships, which parties may be described as participants,
constituents, members, or by like terms vis-à-vis the form or vis-à-vis the instant case of social
relationship to which they are parties.
By way of example, Weber refers famously to the state, which “ceases to exist in a sociologically
relevant sense whenever there is no longer a probability that certain kinds of meaningfully oriented
social action will take place. This probability may be very high or it may be negligibly low. But in
any case it is only in the senses and degree in which it does exist that the corresponding social
relationship exists. It is impossible to find any other clear meaning for the statement, that, for
instance, a given “state” exists or has ceased to exist.”27
Certainly, the modern expression “failed state” is understood to describe a state which no longer
functions in that capacity, which may also be taken to indicate that the social relationships
26
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appurtenant to a state no longer exist. For example, the relationship between the state and a citizen
no longer obtains in a failed state, as indicated by a number of criteria, including whether the state
can expect loyalty from a citizen, whether a citizen can expect protection from the state, and
whether other normal incidents of citizenship continue to obtain.
As Weber explains, a social relationship need not be reciprocal or symmetrical, but must involve
mutual orientation such that one party, correctly or incorrectly, presumes a particular attitude or
expectation of behaviour from the other to which the presuming party orients his own behaviour.
Without this perceived attitude on the part of the other, which gives rise to an expectation of the
other’s behaviour by the presuming party, there is no social relationship. Consequently, it is only
where both parties are perceived by the other to have a particular attitude and where, as a result,
both parties have an expectation as to the behaviour of the other that a social relationship exists in
Weber’s terminology.28 It is not necessary for this purpose, on Weber’s definition, that the
relationship be “objectively symmetrical” in the sense that each party to it has the same expectation
of the behaviour of the other as the other does of the other party’s behaviour, that is to say, that the
relationship “means” the same to both parties, but there must be some mutual orientation.
Weber asserts that the “meaningful content” that remains relatively constant in a social relationship
may be capable of formulation in terms of maxims to which the partners to the social relationship
are expected, on average and approximately, to adhere. The more rational an action is in relation
to values or given ends, the more likely it is to be expressed in such maxims.29
As mentioned, an organization, for Weber, involves a social relationship of some stability,
however, not all social relationships may be so characterized: “A social relationship can be of a
very fleeting character or of varying degrees of permanence. In the latter case, there is a probability
of the repeated recurrence of the behaviour which corresponds to its subjective meaning and hence
is expected. In order to avoid fallacious impressions, let it be repeated that it is only the existence
of the probability that, corresponding to a given subject meaning, a certain type of action will take
place which constitutes the “existence” of the social relationship. Thus that a “friendship” or
“state” existed or has existed means this and only this: that we, the observers, judge that there is
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or has been a probability that on the basis of certain kinds of known subjective attitude of certain
individuals that will result in the average sense of a certain specific type of action.”30
Of course, it is only logical to conclude that attitudes of a party or expectations of the behaviour
of that party by the other, and vice versa, will alter over time, in part in relation to the extent to
which such attitudes or expectations continue to obtain. In this way, the social relationship, and,
by way of instantiation of a social relationship, an organization, may be characterized by regular,
if not actually continuous, development and realignment. A social relationship may even transition
into a political relationship, which may be considered to be a continuance of the same relationship
or a “new” relationship.31
Weber asserts that in a social relationship involving promises of future behaviour towards each
other or towards third parties, each party premises his or her actions on the meaning of the
agreement as the person acting understands it, but may also be motivated by a sense of duty to
observe the terms of the agreement.32 This may be considered to introduce some degree of stasis
into the relationship. Such stasis may be relative and partial, or may be more enduring.
Organization as Relationship, as Scheme or Structure, and as Social Unit
As will be shown, in employing the term “organization”, social and organizational theorists and
practitioners, including Barnard, Chandler, Simon, and Selznick, often fail to distinguish,
imprecisely distinguish, or are confusing in attempting to distinguish, between “organization” as
a scheme or method, on the one hand; and “organization” as a social unit or group of persons
separate from its membership at any particular time, which is frequently characterized as an entity
or “thing”. This may be considered to evidence a certain duality in cognitive, phenomenological,
actual, and other terms. As noted below, those who, like Weber, seek to characterize an
organization in terms of social relationship, may also be employing the term “organization” from
a third perspective or in a third respect.
As has been demonstrated, and will be further demonstrated, in the present work, this categorical
and conceptual difficulty is both shared and attenuated in the case of organizations which are
recognized as entities in law, including the modern business corporation. Organizations which are
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recognized as legal entities are characterized, firstly, not only by a “scheme of organization”
involving certain structures and processes thought to be rationally conducive to the attainment of
the goals and objectives; but also, secondly, as a social unit or group existing separately and apart
from its current membership, that is, as a kind of “entity” or “thing”; and also, thirdly, whatever
the Weberian “order” pursuant to which it is established, is also “established” within the legal
order, and recognized within the legal order, as having specific “legal” attributes. In effect, rather
than a duality, legal entities may be said to exhibit a triality, at least, in cognitive,
phenomenological, actual, and other terms.
While other social and organizational theorists and practitioners exhibit various means of dealing
with such duality or triality, this work typically attempts to separate the scheme of organization or
organizational structure, on the one hand, from the social unit or group characterized by such
scheme of organization or organizational structure, and, on the other hand, to separate both from
the “legal” scheme of organizational structure instantiated by law with respect to the relevant social
unit or group.
While more expert social and organizational theorists and practitioners appear to have experienced
substantial difficulties in accurately specifying the duality of the phenomenon which they
characterize in terms of “organization”, the present author, less expert in such matters, must admit
to perhaps even greater difficulties than they experienced in specifying the triality which is
characteristic of the “legal entity” organization, which is often expressed here as the organization
of, attaching to, or accompanying, the legal entity; or expressed otherwise, as the legal entity of,
attaching to, or accompanying, the relevant social unit.
Of course, social and organizational theorists and practitioners, like Weber, who characterize the
organization as expressing, exclusively or principally, a social relationship may already be thought
to be employing a triality in the definition of organization: that is, as relationship, as “scheme” or
structure, and as a social unit or group. In that case, the addition of the legal form of organization
might be considered to generate a quadrality of organizational referents.
With this attempt at disambiguation or classification of the senses in which the term “organization”
is used, the sense of organization as social relationship can now be further investigated.
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Typology of Social Relationships
Weber distinguishes between social relationships as either “communal” or “associative”, on the
following basis: “A social relationship will be called “communal” (Vergemeinschaftung) if and so
far as the orientation of the social action – whether in the individual case, on the average, or in the
pure type – is based on the subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that
they belong together.” On the other hand, “A social relationship will be called “associative”
(Vergesellschaftung) if and insofar as the orientation of the social action within it rests on a
rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement, whether the basis
of rational judgment be absolute values or reasons of expediency.”33 However, “[i]t is especially
common, though by no means inevitable, for the associative type of relationship to rest on a
rational agreement by mutual consent. In that case the corresponding action is, at the pole of
rationality, oriented either to a value-rational belief in one’s own obligation, or to a rational
(zweckrationale) expectation that the other party will live up to it.” Examples of communal
relationships are, according to Weber, a family, an erotic or amatory relationship, a relation of
personal loyalty, a religious brotherhood, a national community, or the esprit de corps of a military
unit.34
Weber says that social relationships that have common ends which are not immediately achievable
and hence involve relatively permanent social relationships between the same persons are at least
partly communal in nature, but may also be characterized by considerations of expediency.35 This
may even be true within the family. He maintains that, while such relationships may be thought to
be the radical antithesis of conflict, conflict and even coercion may be present even in such
relationships.
Weber’s “associative relationships”, on the other hand, are considered to be exclusively based on
rational grounds and, often, are based on mutual consent. The consent may express a congruity of
values, in which case the associative relationship itself may be instrumental in pursuit of such
values. Weber notes that “[a]ssociative relationships, on the other hand, very often consist only in
compromises between rival interests, where only a part of the occasion or means of conflict has
been eliminated, or even an attempt has been made to do so. Hence, outside the area of
33
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compromise, the conflict of interests, with its attendant competition for supremacy, remains
unchanged. Conflict and communal relationships are relative concepts. Conflict varies enormously
according to the means employed, especially whether they are violent or peaceful and to the
ruthlessness with which they are used.”36
Weber says: firstly, that communal relationships are based on a feeling of “belonging together”;
secondly, that associative relationships are based on rationality and, often, on mutual agreement;
and, thirdly, that conflict and communal relationships are “relative concepts”. These remarks are
consistent with the suggestion that, just as there may be conflict in communal relationships, a
feeling of “belonging together” to some extent, however limited or expansive, may sometimes
come, over time, to characterize associative relationships.
That is to say, even though the origination of the associative relationship was determined rationally
and often voluntarily, some affective relationship may develop thereafter; and that such affective
relationship may mitigate conflict and promote the continuity of the relationship. While this is not
exactly what Weber says in the passage just quoted, this interpretation is consistent with his
remarks. It is also consistent with empirical findings concerning business enterprises and other
types of organizations some of which will be described under the next major heading “A Social
Unit or Group of People”.
The existence of common qualities, a common situation, common modes of behaviour, a common
language, a common biological inheritance, a common “feeling” about a situation and its
consequences do not, for Weber, indicate a communal relationship; which is exhibited, instead,
only when this common factor leads to a mutual orientation of the behaviour of the parties to each
other and involves “feelings of belonging together”.37
It can readily be seen that the existence of a social relationship, whether communal or associative
in Weber’s terminology, does not predict a complete unity of interests or the absence of conflict
or coercion. Thus, the organization associated with certain social relationships should not be
expected to feature a complete unity of interests, or the absence of conflict or coercion.
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Instead, we might expect that a more complete unity of interests or absence of conflict or coercion
might be characteristic of a more communal organization and less characteristic of a more
associative organization. We might expect that organizations in reality might not conform to an
ideal type of either, but might be arrayed on a continuum between more communal and more
associative, with a similar dispersion with respect to the presence of unity of interest and conflict
and coercion, and with respect to the presence of the subjective feeling of belonging (together). As
just demonstrated, to some extent Weber may even have anticipated this characterization.
Open Relationships and Closed Relationships
It is also possible that the dispersion of characteristics along these continua may be affected by
another important binary mentioned by Weber; namely, whether the relationship, whether
communal or associative in character, is “open” or “closed”, in each case, to outsiders. For Weber,
a social relationship is “open” to outsiders “if and insofar as its system of order does not deny
participation to anyone who wishes to join and is actually in a position to do so”, but is “closed”
against outsiders “so far as, according to its subjective meaning and its binding rules, participation
of certain persons is excluded, limited, or subjected to conditions.”38
Weber indicates that: “Whether a relationship is open or closed may be determined traditionally,
affectually, or rationally in terms of values or of expediency for example, where it provides “the
parties to it with opportunities for the satisfaction of spiritual or material interests, whether
absolutely or instrumentally, or whether it is achieved through co-operative action or by a
compromise of interests.” The “open or closed” determination is based solely on interest: “If the
participants expect that the admission of others will lead to an improvement of their situation, an
improvement in degree, in kind, in the security or the value of the satisfaction, their interests will
be in keeping the relationship open. If, on the other hand, their expectations are of improving their
position by monopolistic tactics, their interest is in a closed relationship.”39
Weber says that a closed social relationship may generate advantages that are appropriated by
individuals or sub-groups on a permanent basis, called “rights”, and that appropriated rights which
are enjoyed by individuals through inheritance or by hereditary groups, whether communal

38
39

Ibid at 43.
Ibid.

310
associative, are called the “property” of the individual or groups in question.40 Again, we would
suggest that the “open” and “closed” feature of an organization may also be arrayed along a
continuum ranging from completely open to completely closed. It might also be inferred that the
subjective feeling of belonging may be affected by the position of the relevant organization on the
open/closed continuum and other relevant continua.
In terms of Weber’s analysis, business enterprises, when characterized as social relationships, and
within that characterization as “associative relationships”, may demonstrate some variability as to
whether, and to what extent, they are “open” or “closed”. In turn, this may be affected by the order
pursuant to which they were instantiated. For example, a partnership, normally constituted
voluntarily, would be “closed” according to Weber’s definition, as participation of certain persons
is excluded, limited, or conditional. A limited partnership would be considered to be closed vis-àvis general partner status, but might be considered to be more open vis-à-vis limited partner status.
That limited partnership might be considered to be instituted by legal order, in addition to voluntary
order. A modern business corporation would normally be instituted in like manner. It seems that
it would be considered “closed” vis-à-vis directors, officers, managers, and other employees; but
that it might be considered to be “open” vis-à-vis shareholders if its shares are freely transferable,
especially if they are listed and posted for trading on a recognized stock exchange.
Consideration of these examples leads to the suggestion that at least some types of organizations
may be “open” in certain respects, but “closed” in other respects. In that case, the relevant
categorization may depend upon, or at least be affected by, the purpose for which categorization
is undertaken. We would expect that such observation might also apply to many organizations
which are not corporations or other forms of business enterprises.
Mutual Responsibility and Representation
Another characteristic of an organization, for Weber, is representation and mutual responsibility,
for: “Within a social relationship, whether it is traditional or enacted, certain kinds of action of
each participant may be imputed to all others, in which case we speak of “mutually responsible
members” or the action of certain members (the “representatives”) may be attributed to the others
(the “represented”). In both cases, the members will share the resulting advantage as well as the
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disadvantages.”41 Weber says that the power of representation may be completely appropriated by
a particular, often self-appointed, authority; or it may be conferred, for a limited time, or
permanently, in accordance with particular characteristics; or it may be conferred by specific acts
of the members or outside persons, in which case such power is “derived” or “delegated”.42
Whether social relationships involve mutual responsibility or representation is not determined by
whether the relationships are communal or associative. Such mutual responsibility or
representation may be related to the degree of closure against outsiders, says Weber, but this is not
always the case. Mutual responsibility is often associated with household or kinship units, and
with business partnerships, while representation is most frequently found in associations devoted
to specific purposes and in legally organized groups.43
Recalling Weber’s treatment of communal and associative relationships, and their relations to
feelings of togetherness and rational agreement, respectively, and the interpretation here that such
characterizations need not be exclusive but may be partial, it might have been expected that Weber
would have argued that mutual responsibility and representation need not be exclusive, but may
be partial. In effect, some relationships might involve a combination of the two: for example,
mutual responsibility with respect to one particular set of activities, but representation with respect
to another particular set of activities. For example, a partnership would involve mutual
responsibility, but a limited partnership would involve mutual responsibility only with respect to
each general partner and representation vis-à-vis the general partners and limited partners.
Of course, for Weber, the social relationship is characterized by an expectation of behaviour
commensurate with the relationship. The representation of the organization by its “representatives”
is one aspect of this predictable behaviour. Both the representative and the organization expect
that the other party will behave in the future in a certain predictable manner in relation to the
subject-matter of the representation: “The primary factor underlying representation is that the
action of certain members of an organization, the “representatives,” is considered binding on the
others or accepted by them as legitimate and obligatory”.44
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As is implied by the “social” nature of such relationship, both the organization and the
representative have certain expectations of the other party in regard to the relationship.
Presumably, the acceptance by the members of the actions of the representative as binding,
legitimate, and obligatory is predicated on the assumption that such representation will be
exercised properly and responsibly; while the willingness of the representative to undertake such
representation is, in turn, predicated upon the assumption that the proper exercise of such
responsibility will be considered as binding, legitimate, and obligatory with respect to the
members. In this regard, it may be suggested that these duties and responsibilities are founded
upon a relationship which is both “social” and “associative” in nature; and, further, that perceptions
of the representative, on the one hand, and of the organization, on the other, may or may not be
symmetrical vis-à-vis the other. That is to say, the expectations of one party need not completely
accord with those of the other.
While perhaps not intended by Weber as a complete explication of the nature of the rights and
duties arising in consequence of a relationship in which one party represents another, Weber’s
remarks do admit of interpretation as a “social relationship” theory of rights and duties in that
behalf. For example, with respect to the corporation, the representation of the corporation by duly
authorized parties may be said, following Weber, to rest upon the mutuality inherent in a social
relationship, in this case between the corporation and the parties to whom it grants authorization.
This may also be considered to be true with respect to the representation of the “corporation” in
its decision-making by the board of directors and other authorized parties, considering, in this case,
the relationship to be between the corporation, on the one hand, and the board of directors and
other authorized parties, on the other hand.
Weber maintains that, within the structures of domination, representation takes a variety of typical
forms. These forms, according to Weber, include appropriated representation, estate-type
representation, “instructed” representation, and free representation. In the case of appropriated
representation, the chief or a member the administrative staff holds appropriated rights of
representation, which traditionally have limited scope. This is common in all kinds of patriarchal
and charismatic groups, clans, tribes, castes, sects, hereditary monarchies and similar patriarchal
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or patrimonial organizations.45 Thus, he indicates that it would include many forms of religious
organizations, such as the Roman Catholic Church.
Weber explains that estate-type representation (which is derived from and includes the estates of
the late Middle Ages in Germany and the estates-general in early modern France) does not
constitute a representation insofar as it is a matter of representing and enforcing appropriated rights
or privileges but does constitute a representation insofar as the decisions of such bodies as estates
extends beyond the personal holders of privileges to the unprivileged groups.46
“Instructed” representation involves the choice of representatives in some manner to exercise
powers of representation which are strictly limited by an imperative mandate and the right of recall.
His examples include the communes in France and the Soviet type of republican organization.
Today it might include the governorships of certain states in the United States of America. Free
representation applies where the representative is not bound by instruction but is in a position to
make his own decisions. He is obligated only to express his own genuine conviction, and not to
promote the interests of those who have elected him.47 Modern parliamentary representation is an
example.
Weber also identifies a fifth type of representation, which is “that by the agents of interest groups.
This term will be applied to the type of representative body where the selection of members is not
a matter of free choice, but where the body consists of persons who were chosen on the basis of
their occupations or their social or class membership, each group being represented by persons of
its own sort. At the present time the tendency of this type is to representation on an occupational
basis.”48 Weber specifically mentioned as an example of this type a state of Soviets.
As we have shown, organization theorists, including Weber, Parsons, Gaus, Blau, Selznick, Zald,,
Bittner, and Etzioni, generally consider, in broad terms, an organization to be a social unit or group
of individuals working together in an organized way to meet, pursue or accomplish one or more
collectively shared needs, goals or purposes.
Each element of this characterization will now be discussed at a very general level.
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A Social Unit or Group of People
The first aspect of the definition of organization to be considered is the nature of the “social unit”,
“group of people” or “group of individuals”. It may be noted that each of those terms, “social unit”,
or “group of people” or “group of individuals”, suggest some form of collective orientation and
collective behaviour.49 In this sense, the terms reference a social relationship among the members
of the group, much as suggested by Weber with respect, at least, to the organization. Indeed, some
modern social theorists, such as Schuetz, contend that it is the “cultural pattern of group life”,
meaning “all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such
as the folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which…characterize – if not
constitute – any social group at a given moment in its history.”50
Of course, this observation is consistent with Alfred Schuetz’s early advocacy of
phenomenological sociology and his development of a philosophy of social science that supported
Weberian sociological and economic analysis. Accordingly, Schuetz treats the underlying social
relationship as characterizing, and arguably even constituting, the group in much the same way as
Weber treats the underlying social relationship as characterizing, and arguably even constituting,
the organization or association. In this sense, of course, a group could not be seen as in stasis, but,
instead, as dynamic, subject to regular, if not unremitting, change in its membership and other
aspects. As such, reification of the group as a fixed entity would be inappropriate. The boundaries
of the group, as discussed below, may be considered to be constituted in part in relation to those
of other groups; and may be considered to periodically adjust accordingly.
It is not intended to embark here on a discussion of the typologies of social units or social groups
which include households, communities, peer groups, clubs, teams, in-groups and out-groups,
small groups, and larger groups. Instead, for present purposes, it will be assumed that those terms
refer to more than one individual having some type of association among themselves. Some groups
are characterized by voluntary association and others by involuntary association. Examples of the
former include clubs, churches, political parties, and labour unions. Examples of the latter include
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families, nationality or citizenship determined by birth or by presence within a jurisdiction, and
military organizations characterized by conscription.
It will be assumed here that the presence of an individual in a group somehow affects his or her
behaviour or, expressed differently, that the behaviour of an individual, as such, is intermediated
by the group. The behaviour of the other individuals in the group and, perhaps, the behaviour of
the group, as such, may also be intermediated by the behaviour of the subject-individual. This may
be as a result of interaction among individuals other than the subject-individual, and, as well, as a
result of interaction between the other individuals and the subject-individual. It may even be that
mere presence of an individual in a group affects the subject-individual’s own attitudes and
behaviour. These assumptions will be discussed in greater detail below.
Intraorganizational Organizations
The discussion of the firm as an economic actor in Chapters Two and Three averted to the existence
of various groups within the organization, and to the existence of various subgroups within those
groups. Those chapters considered the ways in which the corporation might act as a single
economic actor at the macro-level, the level of the corporation or organization as a whole, but
might act otherwise, both internally and externally, at the level of groups or subgroups within the
corporation as organization. That is to say, those chapters considered the ways in which groups
might act, and subgroups within groups might act, as individual economic actors separately from
the corporation at the macro-organizational level.
This phenomenon can be easily explained, logically and syntactically. As indicated, an
organization is considered to be a social unit or group of people which act collectively and also
satisfy certain other conditions with respect to such collective action, which relate to its structure
and processes, and to its goals and objectives. It is logical and rational to consider that there may
be within such a social unit or group of people intraorganizational social units or groups of people
which act “collectively”; and that such intraorganizational social units or groups of people taking
collective action may themselves satisfy the other conditions to be considered as organizations in
their own right.
These social units or groups of people may take collective action in various respects, such as with
respect to different goals and objectives. Likewise, two or more social units or groups of people
within the organization may pursue the same goals and objectives but may have different
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memberships, which may be somewhat coextensive with, or entirely separate from, each other.
This work maintains that each of these can be regarded as separate “organizations” within the
macro-organization, provided that they satisfy the requisite elements of the definition of the term
“organization”.
Accordingly, there may be within the corporation, at the macro-organizational level, organizations
established with respect to various goals and objectives taking collective action with respect to
their attainment. For ease of reference, these have often been referred to in this work as “groups”
or “subgroups” within the organization; and they have sometimes been denominated as divisions,
departments, functions, and otherwise. Considering whether groups or subgroups within a macroorganization satisfy the elements necessary to constitute an organization may contribute
significantly to understanding the macro-organization itself.
It is frequently the case that research and theoretical literature in various disciplines refer to
“groups” and “subgroups” within an organization without expressly analyzing whether those
groups or subgroups themselves constitute organizations. Indeed, this seems to be almost
invariably, or, perhaps even invariably, the case. Instead, it may often be assumed, no doubt for
valid reasons limiting such discussion, that this is the case, and that such groups and subgroups
have their own goals and objectives.
If, of course, those groups and subgroups are themselves organizations, each of them would also
have organizational structures, procedures, and processes that are considered to be conducive to
attainment of its own organizational goals and objectives. As such, those structures, procedures,
and processes may differ from those of the macro-organization, and, as well, from those of other
intraorganizational groups and subgroups.
In the case of a corporation, these groups may be constituted by action taken at the macroorganizational level; that is, at the “corporate”, headquarters, or head office level. Many social
theorists, including Weber, recognize that an organization need not be created autonomously.
Weber indicates that an organization may be either autonomous, meaning “that the order governing
the organization has been established by its own members on their own authority, regardless of
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how this is taken place in other respects”; or heteronomous, meaning that such order “has been
imposed by an outside agency.”51
The characterization of the modern business corporation in this respect is unclear and depends
upon how the corporation is characterized with respect to its organizational status. Considering the
corporation itself as a formal organization, it is established as an enterprise by action of the
incorporators, but is established as a legal entity heteronomously by the state pursuant to general
corporate legislation but only on application, autonomously, by the incorporators. In that case, the
order governing the corporation as organization may be considered to be established
heteronomously only with respect to certain elements of the organization which are prescribed by
statute, and the remaining elements may be considered to be established autonomously. Of course,
the foregoing assumes that the corporation is identical with its formal organization. As discussed
here, it is also possible to consider the corporation, purely as a legal entity, as engaging with the
formal organization involving individual persons by which and by whom it is enabled to take
action and it is animated and vivified.
However the relationship between the corporation as a legal entity and as an organization is elided,
as has been seen in the previous chapter, commentators on organizations and, in particular, on
corporations, frequently avert to “groups” and “subgroups” within the organization, to their goals
and objectives, and to their membership or composition. Often, the goals and objectives of the
organization, whether a corporation or otherwise, are distinguished from those of groups within it,
and from those of subgroups within such groups.
In this regard, Chapter Three discussed March’s analysis of “the business organization as a sociopolitical conflict system subject to economic constraints”.52 In terms of that analysis, March argued
that it is a postulate of conflict system analysis “that the basic units are not themselves conflict
systems”, and that viewing a single system “as either an elementary unit or a conflict system
depending on the level of aggregation involved” presented analytical problems. Despite this,
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March concluded that “most systems studied in the social sciences are apparently conflict systems
of conflict systems.”53
As noted previously, among March’s conclusions was that economic theory, by which he appeared
to mean classical or neoclassical economic theory, treated “the firm” as the basic unit of a larger
conflict system, whether that was the industry, market, or the economic system as a whole, rather
than as a conflict system itself.54 As maintained in those sections of the present text, as a result,
economic theory tended to disregard preference ordering within the firm itself, considered as a
subsystem, or basic unit, of the larger economic system. Consequently, it became necessary to
resort to other modes of analysis to explain the interaction of an organization with the
intraorganizational organizations or groups contained within it.
In the result, generally speaking, researchers, analysts, and theoreticians of organizations,
including corporations, frequently discuss the goals and objectives of intraorganizational groups
and subgroups without any explicit reference to the status of those groups and subgroups as
organizations and themselves, and often without analyzing the structure, systems and processes
which are constitutive of, and sometimes partially or wholly distinctive (within the macroorganization) to, that group or subgroup as an organization itself. Awareness of these aspects of
intraorganizational groups and subgroups may be expected to influence the veracity and predictive
capacity of organizational and intraorganizational models of behaviour. Consequently, we turn
now to some of these influences.
Social Comparison Theory
Leon Festinger, one of the most frequently cited psychologists of the twentieth century, famous
for his social comparison theory and his concept of “cognitive dissonance”, explains that
knowledge of group opinions or group abilities have an effect on an individual’s perceptions which
were initially formed privately, especially at the time at which such opinions are initially formed
and thus are, at that time or otherwise, inherently unstable.55 According to Festinger, the opinions
of members of a particular group tend to be less divergent than opinions outside the group.56
Similarly, the prevalence of wide divergences in opinion among a particular group may result in a
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change in group composition.57 An individual’s excessive diversion of opinion from that of the
group as a whole may lead to his or her ejection or voluntary removal from the group.58
Festinger argues that the more attractive a group is to a member, the greater will be the pressure to
uniformity, expressed as a tendency to change one’s own position, to attempt to change the
positions of others, and to restrict the range of comparison of opinions.59 He argues that the greater
is the importance of an opinion to the life of the group or to the attainment of the satisfactions that
attract the members to the group, the greater will be the pressure towards uniformity of opinion.60
Festinger concludes that the drive to compare opinions with other group members will be greater
where the subject-matter is more important, more related to behaviour, and especially to social
behaviour, and where the behaviour concerned is more immediate.61 Consequently, where the
attractiveness of the group is not a significant determinant, people tend to move in and out of
groups based on opinion and ability similarity.62 Where the attractiveness of the group is
significant, the pressure to “fit in” may result in an opinion self-adjustment.
Social Identity Theory
The influential social psychologist Henri Tajfel criticizes Festinger’s social comparison theory as
being “almost exclusively concerned with social comparisons made between individuals and with
evaluations of oneself and others made by means of these inter-individual comparisons”, thereby
neglecting an “important contributing aspect of an individual’s self-definition, namely, that he is
a member of numerous social groups and that this membership contributes, positively or
negatively, to the image that he has of himself”.63 This difference of opinion is, perhaps,
understandable in view of Tajfel’s more social orientation. We might note in passing, however,
that social comparison and pressure to conform to the behaviour of others may, in themselves,
represent some indication of group membership.
This contribution of group membership to an individual’s self-definition has become known as
“social identity theory” or “social identification theory”. Like social comparison theory, it is
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important in this work insofar as it contributes to understanding intragroup and intergroup
interaction. The extent of its contribution in this regard merits extensive exposition here.
Tajfel employs four related concepts to explain how this self-definition proceeds: social identity,
social categorization, social comparison, and psychological distinctiveness. Festinger’s social
comparison theory was discussed in the preceding section. However, as Tajfel notes, Festinger
concentrated on inter-individual comparisons which “neglects an important contributing aspect of
an individual’s self-definition, namely that he is a member of numerous social groups and that this
membership contributes, positively or negatively, to the image that he has of himself.”64 Indeed,
Tajfel indicates that group membership is a factor in each of these four aspects of self of definition.
He maintains that the assumed need for differentiation or the establishment of psychological
distinctiveness between groups is, under some conditions, “the major outcome of the sequence
social categorization-social identity-social comparison.”65
The first two of these concepts are the related concepts of social categorization and social identity,
both of which are related to the term “group”, but express the significance of the group to the
individual concerned, which includes perceptual, epistemological, or cognitive matters. Tajfel says
that: “The process of categorization, as it is used by the human individual in order to systematise
a whole and simplify his environment, presents certain theoretical continuities between the role
played by categorizing in perceptual activities and its role in the ordering of one’s social
environment. For our purpose, social categorization can be understood as the ordering of social
environment in terms of social categories, that is, of groupings of persons in a manner which is
meaningful to the subject.”66
Tajfel explains that, for this purpose, “the term “group” denotes a cognitive entity that is
meaningful to the subject at a particular point in time and must be distinguished from the way in
which the term “group” is used in much of the social psychological literature where it denotes an
“objective” (most often face to face) relationship between a number of people. In other words,
social categorization is a process of bringing together social objects or events in groups which are
equivalent with regard to an individual’s actions, intentions, attitudes and systems of beliefs.”67
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Tajfel asserts, in effect, that the group which is meaningful to an individual is not the group of
social psychology, where it denotes an “objective” (most often face-to-face) relationship, but the
group as experienced by the individual concerned. That individual engages with the group and its
members as the group is seen by the individual in relation to the individual’s own actions,
intentions, attitudes, and systems of beliefs.
Tajfel’s second threshold concept, “social identity”, is understood to mean “that part of an
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group
(or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership.”68 Social
identity, then reflects the individual’s self-assignment, notionally or otherwise, to the group and
the emotional significance to that individual of such self-assignment.
Both social identity and social categorization are, for Tajfel, highly important to the individual,
inasmuch as social categorization is “the orientation which creates and defines the individual’s
own place in society.”69 He supports this conclusion with conclusions reached by Peter L. Berger,
namely, that “[e]very society contains a repertoire of identities that is part of the objective
knowledge of its members”;70 and that “[s]ociety not only defines but creates psychological reality.
The individual realises himself in society – that is, he recognizes his identity in socially defined
terms and these definitions become reality as he lives in society”.71
We might express all of these observations by saying that the individual negotiates a notional or
an epistemic space or spaces in society as he or she assesses, selects, and adopts social identities
which he or she considers comport with his or her actions, intentions, attitudes, and systems of
belief, and that such individual does so in relation to his or her perception of groups and their
accord with his or her actions, intentions, attitudes, and systems of belief. The self of the individual
is instantiated, expressed, and developed in his or her life in society.
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Intragroup Aspects of Social Identity
Tajfel unpacks this further, delineating four principal consequences of this “recognition of identity
in socially defined terms”. The first of these is that “[i]t can be assumed that an individual will
tend to remain a member of a group and seek membership of new groups if these groups have
some contribution to make to the positive aspects of his social identity; i.e. to those aspects of it
from which he derives from satisfaction.” Secondly, if it does not make this contribution, “the
individual will tend to leave it unless: a) leaving the group is impossible for some “objective
reasons or, b) it conflicts with important values which are themselves a part of his acceptable social
identity.”72
Thirdly, if “leaving the group presents the difficulties just mentioned, then at least two solutions
are possible: a) to change one’s interpretation of the attributes of the group so that its unwelcome
features (e.g. low status) are either justified or made acceptable through a reinterpretation; b) to
accept the situation for what it is and engage in social action which would lead to desirable changes
in the situation(of course, there may be various combinations of a) and b), such as, for example,
when the negative attributes are justified and social action to remove them is undertaken at the
same time).”
Fourthly, Tajfel says that “[n]o group lives alone – all groups in society live in the midst of other
groups. In other words, the “positive aspects of social identity” in [the first item] above, and the
reinterpretation of attributes and the engagement in social action in [the third item] above, only
acquire meaning in relation to, or in comparison with, other groups.”73 Again, the participation of
an individual in a group is affected by his or her self-perception and perception of the group.
Perception of the group is affected, in turn, by another process of comparison, this time comparing
or relating one group to others, and assessing how his or her perception of each group accords with
the individual’s own actions, intentions, attitudes, and systems of belief.
When Tajfel says that no group lives alone and that all groups in society live in the midst of other
groups, it need not be assumed that the presence of groups in society is, of necessity, ordered and
exclusive. Instead, an individual may be a member of a great many groups, some of whom may
have other members in common, while others may not. Likewise, groups may be situated within
72
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other groups. But, Tajfel says, no one group is coeval and coterminous with the society itself. A
group, in this sense, exists within the overall society.
Of course, it is not necessary that the range of opinion constituting phenomenological sociology
or that constituting a social philosophical analysis of Weberian sociology be accepted in order to
accept the analyses but forward by Schuetz, Tajfel, and Festinger, respectively, above. Instead,
these analyses are offered here as prolegomena to the analysis of the organization itself.
Individual and Intragroup Aspects of Social Identity
In an influential and much-cited review article,74 Blake Ashforth and Fred Mael apply the social
identity theory (SIT) developed by Tajfel and others to groups and organizations. In addition to its
influence and continuing use as a reference, the breadth and depth of its review of the subject
makes it an appropriate primary source for the explication of social identity theory in a coherent
and disciplined manner consistent with the arguments made in the present work. Consequently, it
is cited extensively for this purpose below.
Social Classification and Social Identification
Ashforth and Mael say that social classification, firstly, enables an individual to classify others by
means of prototypical characteristics abstracted from the members of the group or organization;
and, secondly, “enables the individual to locate or define him-or herself in the social environment.”
They explain that, according to SIT, “the self-concept is comprised of a personal identity
encompassing idiosyncratic characteristics (e.g., bodily attributes, abilities, psychological traits,
interests) and a social identity encompassing salient group classifications.”75
In this regard, “Social identification, therefore, is the perception of oneness with or belongingness
to some human aggregate… As such, social identification provides a partial answer to the question,
Who am I?”76 The present work has repeatedly referred to individuals as constantly “negotiating”
their identities; and also refers summarily to this process as variously involving acquiring “new”,
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and discarding “old”, identities. In effect, such short-from descriptions or assertions have been
based on an understanding of social identity theory, and upon recognition that a new identification
by the relevant individual of a group as salient to their own social identity may cause that individual
to reassess the comparative saliences of other groups and, in effect, to reprioritize his or her social
identity accordingly. Likewise, an adjustment to the salience of one group classification or “group
identity” may also cause such readjustment across the board.
Ashforth and Mael hold that social identification is a perceptual cognitive construct that is not
necessarily associated by the individual with any specific behaviours or affective states, or
expenditure of effort, except that such individual is “psychologically intertwined with the fate of
the group”.77 That is, the individual personally experiences the successes and failures of the group.
This need not, they say, entail internalization, or acceptance and incorporation within the self as
guiding principles, of the values and attitudes of the group.78
Instead, this identification with a group has similarities with identification with a person or with a
reciprocal role relationship (such as husband-wife or doctor-patient) inasmuch as one partly
defines oneself in terms of a social referent.79 We might say, in other words, that the subjectindividual considers himself or herself to be one side of a relationship, in this case, with the group,
which is, or is on, the other side of the relationship. This recalls Weber’s description of the
organization as a social relationship.
Ashforth and Mael claim that the subject’s perception of a relevant group for such purposes may
be relatively diffuse, inasmuch as the “individual’s social identity may be derived not only from
the organization, but also from his or her work group, department, union, lunch group, age cohort,
fast-track group, and so on.”80 As often observed in the present work, this suggests that numerous
group affiliations may contribute, simultaneously, to an individual’s social identity and, further,
that their salience to the individual may be subject to periodic recalibration.
Ashforth and Mael explain that, with certain limited exceptions, such as missionary organizations
(for reasons to which we will avert below), the existence of a single or blended organizational
identification, characterizing holographic organizations, is problematic in most complex
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organizations, and that, instead, individuals within subunits may share a common identity or
identities which are subunit-specific, and are not shared across subunits, which is characteristic of
ideographic organizations.81 In this way, an organizationally situated social identity may be
comprised of more or less disparate and loosely coupled separate group-related identities. The
present work has previously maintained that these identities may operate at the level of the
organization and at intraorganizational levels, including divisions, departments, functions, groups,
subgroups, and subgroups of subgroups.
Social Identification and Organizational Commitment
As previously noted, Ashforth and Mael maintain that social identification by an individual with a
particular organization is distinct from commitment to that organization. They assert that
organizational commitment is most commonly considered to involve, firstly, belief and acceptance
of its goals and values; secondly, willingness to exert effort on its behalf; and, thirdly, a desire to
maintain membership. They argue that an individual who believes that an organization is a
convenient vehicle for his or her career or other goal may display organizational identification, but
may not exhibit organizational commitment.82
The present author concludes that organizational commitment has an affective, rather than rational
or exclusively rational, component, which may arise, at least in part, from “sharing” common
purpose and effort. What Ashforth and Mael describe as organizational commitment or even
organizational identification correlates well with certain definitions of the term “organization”. In
particular, Chester Barnard, whose empirical and theoretical work will be discussed in the next
chapter, defines the term “organization” in terms of identification or commitment, as well as
cooperation. He asserts that that “an organization comes into being when (1) there are persons able
to communicate with each other (2) who are willing to contribute action (3) to accomplish a
common purpose”.83
According to SIT, membership in a group is consistent with in-group favouritism, cooperation and
cohesion, and discrimination against an out-group and its members, even where there is no prior
personal acquaintance, similarity or liking, and where there is no interaction within or between
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groups.84 Ashforth and Mael relate this to what Turner considered as a “psychological group”,
which Turner defined as “a collection of people who share the same social identification or define
themselves in terms of the same social category membership.” A member of a psychological group
“does not need to interact with or like other members, or be liked and accepted by them. It is his
or her perception of being, say, a loyal patriot or sports fan that is the basis for incorporation of
that status into his or her social identity. The individual seems to reify or credit the group with a
psychological reality apart from his or her relationships with its members.”85
The suggestion here may be that it is in crediting the group with a psychological reality apart from
the individual’s relationship with the members of the group, perhaps both individually and
collectively, that the individual reifies the group itself. This may be the case with respect to the
organization which is implicated with a particular corporation: an employee, shareholder, or other
individual who incorporates the corporation as organization into his or her social identity may be,
in the first instance, reifying or entifying the organization as the group with which he or she
identifies, and is thereby identifying with the corporation as such.
In the case of groups or organizations sufficiently large that the individual concerned may not be
personally acquainted with all other members of the group or organization, the individual’s
identification with the group or organization, and that individual’s reification of such group or
organization may be based on typification of members, which would apparently involve creation
of an “ideal type” of member.
We might speculate that this abstraction may be less immediate to the individual and, therefore,
less attractive as a bonding or commitment mechanism than immediate personal acquaintance;
with the result that the likelihood of bonding or commitment is likely normally somewhat greater
in “face-to-face” relationships or situations, those involving groups or subgroups, rather than the
organization as a whole, or some higher level groupings within the organization, such as divisions,
departments, and the like. However, this is only an inference from other literature reviewed.
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Ashforth and Mael indicate that the distinctiveness of values and practices in relation to
comparable groups tends to increase the tendency to identify with certain groups. Within the
organization, such distinctiveness is qualified by the clarity and impermeability of group domains
or boundaries.86 Identification is also increased by the prestige of the group, the salience of outgroups (which reinforces awareness of one’s in-group), and other factors traditionally associated
with group formation, such as interpersonal interaction, similarity, liking, proximity, shared goals
or threats, and common history.87
Within the corporation, these factors are likely to increase in salience with successively more
granular groupings: for example, in the case of the group as compared with the organization or the
subgroup compared with the group. Thus, the observations and generalizations to this effect in the
present work finds support from the work of Ashforth and Mael.
Implications of Social Identification
Ashforth and Mael identify three general consequences of SIT that are relevant to organizations:
firstly, individuals tend to choose activities congruent with salient aspects of their identities and to
support institutions embodying those identities; secondly, social identification affects the
outcomes conventionally associated with group formation, including intragroup cohesion,
cooperation, and altruism, and positive evaluations of the group by its members, internalization of
and adherence to group values and norms, and homogeneity of attitudes and behaviour; and,
thirdly, SIT reinforces the factors that antecede such identification, including distinctive values
and practices, group prestige, and salience of, and competition with, out-groups, and other
traditional causes of group formation.88 The present work has referred repeatedly to such
consequences.
As the individual comes to identify with a group, its values and practices become more salient to
that person, and are perceived as more unique and distinctive. Ashforth and Mael conclude that
“perhaps the greatest contribution that SIT makes to the literature on organizational behavior is
the recognition that a psychological group is far more than an extension of interpersonal
relationships: Identification with a collectivity can arise even in the absence of interpersonal
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cohesion, similarity, or interaction and yet have a powerful impact on affect and behavior.” Such
social identification, they say, results “in crediting a collectivity with a psychological reality
beyond its membership” and “enables the individual to conceive of, and feel loyal to, an
organization or corporate culture”, even to such a point that Turner identified social identity as
“the cognitive mechanism which makes group behavior possible.”89
As previously noted, the fact that an individual is able to identify with a collectivity even in the
absence of some interpersonal interaction by the individual with it or its members vests the
collectivity with what Ashforth & Mael call “psychological reality” apart from its membership, or,
as they have said elsewhere, entifies it. They indicate that it is not clear whether this is because the
collectivity is clothed by the individual with ideal characteristics generalized from the experience
of the individual, such as with persons admired by or persons having a formative influence with
respect to, the individual concerned. However, they indicate that the psychological reality of the
collectivity is borne out in experience and research. The present work has relied on the same.
Organizational Socialization
In their extensive review of the research and literature, Ashforth and Mael explain that
organizational newcomers are thought to be “highly concerned with building a situational
definition”, namely, understanding the organization and learning how to act within it, which, in
turn, requires learning “its policies and logistics, the general role expectations and behavioural
norms, the power and status structures and so forth.” However, “organizational newcomers also
are often concerned with building a self-definition”, which includes social identity.90
We may consider the situational definition to relate to general cognition and meaning with respect
to the organization or group, and the self-definition to relate, in significant part, to situating oneself
within the organization or group, but also more broadly, outside the focal organization or group.
In effect, as the newcomer engages in the process of acquiring such situational definition and selfdefinition, that individual, as noted in the present work from time to time, negotiates his or her
social identity: acquiring, developing, reprioritizing, reemphasizing, and discarding certain aspects
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or components of his or her social identity, which have sometimes been referred to in the present
work, for convenience, and notionally, as different or separate “social identities”.
Developing a Social Identity
Ashforth and Mael explain that the literature on organizational socialization indicates that
definitions and self-definitions emerge through symbolic interactions, in which meaning evolves
from verbal and nonverbal interactions of individuals. In part, individuals form self-conceptions
by interpreting the responses of others in situated social interactions. In terms of organizations,
this suggests that the internalization of organizational values and beliefs takes place as individuals
are socialized into the organization and identify with it, which, in turn, effects internalization.91
They find that the shared values and beliefs, mission, structures and processes, organizational
climate and other characteristics reflect, and even constitute, the identity of the organization, the
“shared understanding of the central, distinctive and enduring character or essence of the
organization among its members.” They note that Ashforth himself showed that “the more salient,
stable, and internally consistent the character of an organization (or in organizational terms, the
stronger the culture), the greater this internalization.”92
Ashforth and Mael indicate that socialization has a direct effect on internalization, and that
internalization and identification occur separately from one another. For example, “total and quasitotal institutions such as prisons, military and religious organizations, professional schools, and
organizational plans” apply not only investiture processes with respect to building incoming
identity, but also apply divestiture processes to supplant existing identity with a new
organizationally situated identity.
In connection with the latter, such institutions often “remove symbols of newcomer’s previous
identities; restrict or isolate newcomers from external contacts; disparage newcomer’s status,
knowledge and ability; impose new identification symbols; rigidly prescribe and proscribe
behaviour and punish infractions; and reward assumptions of the new identity.” Evidently, “the
more that the organization’s identity, goals, values and individual role requirements deviate from

91

Ibid at 27.
Ibid. They cite: BE Ashforth, "Climate Formation: Issues and Extensions" (1985) 10 Academy of Management Rev
837.
92

330
the societal mainstream, the greater the need for organizationally situated identification”. 93 These
findings are generally consistent with the experience of knowledgeable generalist observers.
Ashforth and Mael explain that social identity theory has important implications with respect to
reification, “how an individual can identify with, or feel loyal and committed to, an organization
per se. The implicit assumption is that regard for individuals simply generalizes to the group, that
interpersonal relationships somehow are cognitively aggregated to create an individualorganizational relationship.”94
The suggestion appears to be that, like aggregation of demand in economic theory, this represents
some kind of methodologically individualistic fallacy, however, Ashforth and Mael purport to
“reverse this logic and argue that identification with the group can arise quite separately from
interpersonal interaction and cohesion. In perceiving the social category as psychologically real –
as embodying characteristics thought prototypical of its members, – the individual can identify
with the category per se (I am a Marine).”
Yet, as noted above, Ashforth and Mael claim that an individual is able to identify with a
collectivity even in the absence of some interpersonal interaction by the individual with it or its
members. This seems to contraindicate the generalization or aggregation explanation. Also of note
is their observation that social identification thus permits the continuance of loyalty to one’s own
department despite a complete changeover of personnel and, likewise, permits a continued belief
in the integrity of the organization despite wrongdoing by senior management.
Again, these findings seem to present difficulties with respect to the generalization or aggregation
explanation of identification. For our purposes, however, it is important to note that such continued
loyalty to the organization may involve some type of reification or entification which, according
to Ashforth and Mael, is observed to be universally present with respect to all organizations,
including corporations. Observations to this effect been cited throughout the present work.
Management of an organization, they say, has an interest in managing symbolic interactions, not
only at the time of socialization into the new organization but also on a continuing basis. “Although
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the coherence of the group’s or organization’s identity is problematic, we believe that symbolic
management is designed to impart this identity, or at least management’s representation of it”,
which is effected “through the manipulation of symbols such as traditions, myths, metaphors,
rituals, sagas, heroes, and physical setting”.95
Ashforth and Mael “contend that precisely because identification is group-specific” organizations
are able to claim “a positive and distinctive organizational entity [which] attracts the recognition,
support and loyalty of not only organizational members but other key constituents (e. g.,
shareholders, customers, jobseekers)”.96 This has been the subject of frequent comment in the
present work.
Social Identity and Organizational Units
Ashforth and Mael conclude that “the newcomer’s emerging situational definitions and selfdefinitions are apt to be largely subunit specific” since, firstly, there is a greater need for, and ease
of, interaction in the immediate work group which involves greater task interdependencies and
interpersonal proximity; secondly, for those reasons, the immediate work-group, whose members
are likely to have more homogeneous beliefs, is a more ready source of comparison for those
emerging beliefs; thirdly, in view of such interdependence, proximity, and similarity, the
newcomer may also regard the work-group as a psychological group, thereby facilitating social
influence; and, fourthly, “given the importance of the situational definition to job performance and
the centrality of the social identity to the self-concept, it is likely that a normative structure will
emerge to regulate and maintain these conceptions.”97
In other words, all other things being equal, the organizational level which is likely to be the most
relevant to the social identity of individual members is generally that which is the most immediate
to such individual member, namely, the smallest or most intimate grouping which satisfies the
relevant requirements to be called a “group”. Of course, while this identity may be most salient to
the individual generally, that individual may also present other social identities of greater or lesser
salience, either generally or in particular circumstances. As suggested previously, changes in
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circumstances and affect and otherwise may cause the individual to reprioritize the salience of
those social identities.
Role Conflict
Ashforth and Mael contend that an individual’s social identity is likely to consist of “an amalgam
of identities, identities that could impose inconsistent demands upon that person” in terms of the
values, beliefs, norms, and demands inherent in such identities; and that an individual’s social
identity can also conflict with the demands of the individual’s personal identity. In an
organizational context, “conflicts between work-group, departmental, divisional, and
organizational roles are somewhat constrained by the nested character of these roles; that is, each
hierarchical level encompasses the former such that the roles are connected in a means-end
chain”.98 Observations to this effect been made from time to time in the present work, but it can
now be seen that Ashforth and Mael provide express support for such observations, including
treatment of social identity as involving an amalgam of identities.
They find that “in the course of assuming a given identity (e.g., department), the group becomes
more salient and both intragroup differences and intergroup polarities are cognitively minimized,
thus rendering both lower order (e.g., work group) and higher order (e.g., organization)
identifications less likely”. They also note that “given the association between identification and
internalization, a lack of congruence between the goals or expectations of nested groups may
impede joint identification”.99 In effect, entry into a new group, although “nested”, reduces
identification with other groups of which the individual is a member, especially where such groups
may have different goals or expectations.
It might be expected that “nested” groups within rationally ordered organizations would effect
some congruence of higher-order goals and expectations as between higher levels and successively
lower levels; that, at the same time, such higher order goals and expectations may command less
salience with respect to individuals who are members of such nested groups; and that lower-order
goals and expectations may command greater salience with respect to such individuals. Of course,
where groups are not “nested”, in the sense that the sub-group is a component of the relevant group,
and so on, there would not necessarily be an expectation that goals or expectations of one group
98
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may be congruent with that of another group, or that goals and expectations of any particular
subgroup may be congruent with that of another subgroup. It must be emphasized, of course, that
these characteristics may be expected to obtain only in the case of organizations which are
rationally ordered.
Ashforth and Mael posit that, rather than integrating these several identities, the individual treats
them cognitively “by ordering, separating, or buffering the identities.” That is, the individual may
self-define in terms of the most salient social identity or personal attribute; or might defer to the
identity under the greatest external pressure and minimize, deny or rationalize the conflict; or
might “cognitively decouple the identity so that conflicts simply are not perceived”; or, finally,
might “comply sequentially with conflicting identity so that the inconsistencies may not be
resolved for any given action”.100
We have referred to this process in the present work from time to time as the individual
“negotiating” his or her social identity; and as acquiring, developing, reprioritizing, reemphasizing,
and discarding certain aspects or components of his or her social identity, which have sometimes
been referred to in the present work, for convenience, and notionally, as different or separate
“social identities”. Such references, it can now be seen, are consistent with social identity theory.
Ashforth and Mael indicate that this kind of identity segregation permits the individual to benefit
from holding multiple roles “including resource accumulation, justification for failure to meet
certain role expectations, and support against role failure or loss”.101 Accordingly, they consider
that “one’s identity is an amalgam of loosely coupled identities”, rather than a unified, consistent
whole.”102 Again, their analysis of the relevant research and literature thus supports observations
made in this respect throughout the present work.
Intergroup Relations
Ashforth and Mael find that “much intergroup conflict stems from the very fact that groups exist”,
since social identities are maintained primarily by intergroup comparison, in respect of which, in
order to enhance self-esteem, groups seek to establish positive differences between themselves and
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reference groups. Consequently, in organizations “comprised of subunits members of which share
a social identity specific to their subunit”, there is a tendency towards subunit identification such
that “subunits tend to be the primary focus of intergroup conflict”, which tendency is “exacerbated
by competition between subunits for scarce resources and by reward and communication systems
that typically focus on subunit functioning and performance”.103
Ashforth and Mael say that just as “a strong group identity unifies group members, so too should
a strong organizational identity unify organizational members”. However, where organizational
identity is not strong, they say that firstly, the subject group as in-group “may develop negative
stereotypes of the out-group and deindividuate and depersonalize its members”; secondly, may
tend to maintain social distance from, and subordination of, the out-group; thirdly, that this may
become a contagion, which may tend to polarize perceptions of the situation; and fourthly, that
these tendencies may be exacerbated by competition, which may threaten the group and its
identity. In fact, even absent objective sources of conflict, such as scarcity of resources, such
groups may exhibit competition and hostility, which may be even greater than that which may
obtain between individuals.104 Apparently, in the case of groups which are more comparable and
undifferentiated, the in-group bias may be greater than where there are differences.
Ashforth and Mael indicate that such comparisons are affected by the relative status of the groups
concerned in that, firstly, groups often restrict their comparisons to similar, proximal, or salient
out-groups; secondly, like individuals, who can make social comparisons on multiple dimensions,
groups may exhibit in-group favouritism on dimensions regarded as important to them, but may
have positive perceptions of the out-group on dimensions seen as important by the out-group and
not by the in-group; and, thirdly, differing outcomes in allocations of resources or in social
comparisons may not provoke bias where these differences are seen as legitimate or
institutionalized.105
Conclusion – Organizations as Social Units or Groups of People
Accordingly, investigation of the research and theorization of the first element of the definition of
the term “organization”, namely, that it consists of a “social unit”, or a “group of people” or a
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“group of individuals”, has indicated, firstly, the complexity and consequences of that element of
the definition and, consequently, of the definition as a whole. That investigation has also indicated,
secondly, that the organization itself may be analyzed in terms of the “groups” within it: the various
groups and subgroups of which it may be composed.
Such investigation has also demonstrated, thirdly, that groups, and perhaps also individuals,
engage in intergroup action; and, fourthly, that such intergroup action may take place on a number
of levels, including between the organization itself and each group, between each group and each
of its subgroups, between or among some or all of the groups and other groups, and between or
among some or all of the groups and the subgroups of other groups within the organization, and,
perhaps, between the organization and some or all of the subgroups of groups within the
organization. Fifthly, subgroups within groups may engage in intragroup activity and that such
intra-unit activity may also extend to activity within subgroups, whether by lower order subgroups
or by individuals.
It is apparent from this investigation that: 1. The social identity of individuals is related, at least in
part, to the organizations or groups of which they are members or in which they participate. 2.
Individuals may also exhibit commitment to such organizations, the degree of which may be
influenced by various factors. 3. The identification with, and commitment to, organizations by
individuals may vary over time, a process described here as involving a “renegotiation” or
reprioritization of such identities and commitments. 4. The incorporation of a new organization
into an individual’s social identity is often sought to be fostered by socialization mechanisms
undertaken by the organization, which may be described as “organizational socialization”. 5. An
organization or group is seldom completely socially coherent, that is to say, most often various
groups, or subgroups, or groups of groups or subgroups, can be identified within the focal supraorganization.
This investigation also indicates that: 6. Intraorganizational groups may constitute organizations,
that is to say, they may collectively pursue common goals or objectives. 7. The goals pursued by
intraorganizational groups may not be coextensive with those of the focal supra-organization. They
may be the same as or similar to, partially complementary with, or conflict with her be inimical to,
the goals of the focal supra-organization. 8. Thus, the focal supra-organization, in order to attain
its own goals, must exercise some control or influence over the goals of its constituent
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organizations and groups. 9. Failure or inability to exercise such control or influence may present
a challenge to the operations and even existence of the focal supra-organizational group. 10. This
may also create extraorganizational problems, potentially including liability in respect of the
actions of intraorganizational organizations or intraorganizational groups which actions are not
aligned with the goals, and even policies and processes, of the focal organization.
It is apparent from this review that managing an organization is a challenge of significant
dimension. This challenge may be expected to be particularly acute where participants in the
organization have no direct or automatic right to participate directly in such management, such as
is the case with modern business corporations or with various types of political, social, nongovernmental, or other organizations. The authority to select and monitor management, to approve
or disapprove of, or to amend, certain management actions may assume considerable importance
with respect to organizations of diverse objectives. This may be the case without respect to the
entitlement of any such participants to terminate their participation in the organization, financial
or otherwise, and whatever the legal status of the organization.
In the case of the modern business corporation, these organizational considerations impact the
essentialist legal attributes of the corporation as a legal entity, but most especially, of course, the
existence of central management and its separation, as a matter of law, from its equity participants.
The next chapter, Chapter Five, will consider the distinctive characteristics of organizations as
compared with other groups: firstly, with respect to their structure, process, personnel, and
operations generally which are developed rationally with a view to accomplishing its goals and
objectives; and, secondly, with respect to jointly establishing, pursuing, and seeking to attain the
collective goals and objectives of the group.
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PART 3 – HOW, INSTEAD, TO ANALYZE THE CORPORATION: A CORPORATIVE
THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
SECTION A – THE ORGANIZATION – PART B – STRUCTURE, PROCESS, AND
MANAGEMENT
CHAPTER FIVE – THE ORGANIZATION - DEFINING AND OTHER ATTRIBUTES –
STRUCTURE, PROCESS, AND MANAGEMENT
PROGRESSION OF THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE BOOK
The earlier parts of this book, Parts 1 and 2, together with Appendices A and B, consider,
respectively, the legal attributes of the corporation as instantiated in modern corporate legal
statutes in an effort to describe what are generally considered to be the attributes of modern
business corporations, in order to frame the discussion, to identify essential attributes requiring
further investigation, and, in the course of such examinations, to endeavour to discern any
assumptions or generalizations upon which those statutes might be grounded. Part 2 and Appendix
B investigate assumptions or generalizations of classical and neoclassical economic theory
reflected in discourse concerning the firm and the corporation which might be considered to have
some relevance to corporate law and corporate legal statutes in terms of theorization of the
corporation.
This part of the book, Part 3, sets forth an approach to, or perspective on, analyzing, or a theory
of, the corporation which is an alternative to approaches, or perspectives, or theories which are
historically related to classical and neoclassical economic theory. As shown in Part 2 of the book
(concerning the corporation as an economic actor) and in Appendix B (concerning economic
theory more generally), many of its generalizations and assumptions have been succeeded, since
early theorization of the corporation in the common law, by recent refinements,
recharacterizations, modifications, and even wholesale revisions, including behavioural
economics, new institutional economics, agency theory, and joint production theory.
This part begins with an examination of the nature of organizations generally, not limited to, but,
rather, including, organizations which purportedly have principally economic objectives, such as
the modern business corporation. It will draw particular attention to literature reviews and theory
relevant to the corporation and will review some of the principal perspectives in considerable
detail. While this will require extensive references to the literature, it is considered that this
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procedure will thereby provide a theoretical and empirical basis from which a theory of the
corporation as legal entity and as an organization can be derived, supported, and analyzed.
Finally, this part of the book will then consider the implications of such organizational analysis to
the corporation as a legal entity and otherwise. In that context, it will advance the present author’s
“corporative theory” of, or “corporative perspective” on, the modern business corporation.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER
Chapter Three, which was the last chapter in Part 2 of this work, examined the way in which the
corporation functions as an economic actor and otherwise, internally and externally. Among other
things, it showed that the modern business corporation sometimes functions as a single actor, and
sometimes functions otherwise. In that regard, Chapter Three mentioned a number of
considerations relevant to the organization which acts as, and on behalf of, the corporation or,
expressed alternatively, instantiates the corporation in action in the real world.
As observed at the beginning of the immediately preceding Chapter Four, a rough working
definition of the term “organization” is that it is a social unit structured and managed in such a way
as to meet one or more particular needs or to pursue or accomplish one or more collective goals or
purposes; or, alternatively, that it is a group of people working together in an organized way to
meet, pursue, or accomplish one or more collectively shared needs, goals, or purposes. In this
sense, an organization may be said to have a structure, processes, and to be managed in a manner
which is rational vis-à-vis seeking to attain the relevant needs, goals, or purposes.
Chapter Four examined the aspect of the definition of “organization” which concerns itself with a
“social unit” or “group of persons”, and considered the nature and effects of the same. The present
chapter directs attention to the means by which an organization is established and by which it
conducts its business. This concerns the structure or method of its formal organization, as well as
the processes and procedures by means of which it operates, and the features of the personnel who
are engaged in such operations. In order to attain its goals and purposes, the structure, processes
and personnel of the organization must be instantiated in an intendedly rational manner. As
indicated earlier in the chapter, Weber himself emphasized the necessity of rationality in order that
an organization may be said to exist. In that regard, Weber emphasized the importance of
bureaucratic organization, the discussion of which in Chapter Four will be further advanced here.
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Accordingly, Chapters Three and Four and Appendix B review literature from various fields which
summarizes research and theory concerning, and itself theorizes, various aspects of the
organization. Those chapters thus provide support for some of the generalizations and observations
made earlier in this book in circumstances in which it was not possible to do this. They also provide
support for the corporative theory or corporative perspective elucidated further later in this part of
the book. It now remains to consider other aspects of the organization, as such, and then to relate
these to the legal entity known as the corporation and, in particular, the modern business
corporation.
As was noted in the immediately preceding chapter, commentators have observed that
organizations of diverse natures share certain common characteristics. For example, Oliver
Williamson observed that complex organizations, including, but not limited to economic
enterprises, employ a knowledge of the attributes of human nature, a hierarchy, a separation of
strategic and operating decisions, and the application of controls, in fashioning their decision
making and implementation structure and processes1 Again, many of these factors were explicated
famously by Weber, to whose review of which subjects we now turn.
Following that review of the traditional Weberian analysis of formal organization or bureaucracy,
we will turn to a review of other, generally more modern, relevant research, literature, and theory
concerning the characteristics and behaviour of organizations, some of which relates more
specifically to the modern business corporation. In that way, the present chapter will continue the
effort to support some of the generalizations and observations made earlier in the work, but which
were made subject to providing this kind of further support.
STRUCTURE, PROCESS, AND PERSONNEL
Rational-Legal Authority, Administration, and Bureaucracy
Legitimacy and Rational-Legal Authority
Weber began his analysis by considering the grounds upon which authority could legitimately be
claimed. As is well known, Weber considered that there were three grounds, each of which may
be considered to be ideal types, on which authority could be claimed to be legitimate: rational,
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traditional, and charismatic. It will be assumed here that claims of authority relating to most
organizations, including all economically-oriented organizations, such as modern business
corporations, will be based on rational grounds.
Rational claims to legitimacy rest on “a belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and
the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)”, in
which case “obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order [and] extends to the
persons exercising the authority of office under it only by virtue of the formal legality of their
commands and only within the scope of authority of the office.”2 Such legal authority is made
effective when certain other ideas of principles or accepted.
In this regard, Weber argued that legal authority relies on acceptance of a number of mutually
interdependent ideas, which may be summarized as follows: 1. Any legal norms could be
established by agreement or could be imposed on rational grounds or on grounds of expediency,
where obedience by members of the group could be claimed.3 2. Bodies of law consist of a
consistent system of abstract rules intentionally established, administration of which consists in
applying them to particular cases, which administrative process involves “the rational pursuit of
the interests which are specified in the order governing the corporate group within the limits laid
down by legal precepts and following principles which are capable of generalized formulation and
are approved in the order governing the group, or at least not disapproved in it.”4 3. The typical
person in authority occupies an “office” acting pursuant to which, including when issuing
commands to others, the officeholder is “subject to an impersonal order to which his actions are
oriented”. 4. Someone obeying authority does so only in pursuance of his capacity as a member
the corporate group and obeys only “the law”. 5. Obedience is owed by a member of the corporate
group not to any individual person, “but to the impersonal order. Hence, it follows that there is an
obligation to obedience only within the sphere of the rationally delimited authority which, in terms
of the order, has been conferred upon [such person]”.5
It is significant that both Weber’s “law” and its administration involve devising general rules that
are internally consistent, and applying them in a logically coherent manner to particular cases in a
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manner which is non-subjective and impersonal. The order establishing and continuing to govern
the group specifies its goals and objectives, and the rules and principles intended to apply to the
group. Power and authority are considered to inhere in the group but to be exercised in concrete
instances by duly appointed office holders whose authority emanates only from the office of which
they are the incumbents. Such power and authority are established, and submission to them is
accepted by members of the group, in each case, within stipulated boundaries, in connection with
the institution and constitution of the group as an organization, the “order” governing the group.
Clearly, Weber’s characterization of organizational legitimacy is highly regarded and highly
influential. It also accords with more modern usage. Of course, the fact that Weber’s description
of this “rational-legal” paradigm of legitimacy meets with relatively ready acceptance by modern
readers may result, in part, from its extensive influence and adoption, consciously or
unconsciously, by other commentators and theorists. Indeed, in many significant respects, his
description also accords with commonly held criteria concerning the “rule of law”. This
observation is further discussed below.
The State, the Organization, and the Corporation
It is immediately apparent that Weber’s characterization of legal authority posits that legal
authority exists in relation to an “organization”; is instituted by the “order” establishing the
organization; and that his “law”, or “rule”, is instituted by, and pursuant to, that founding order.
Both the adoption and administration of those laws or rules are intended to be rationally coherent
means of pursuing the agreed common interests for which the organization was established. The
“organization” described by Weber satisfies the “common sense” and other definitions of that term
generally in use at the present time as discussed in Chapter Four.
Weber’s characterization of the organization, of course, is intended to apply to the modern state,
as well as many other forms of organization, including the corporation. His explication of formal
organization or bureaucracy may be considered to be oriented, to a significant degree, to the state
itself. However, it is also intended to be applicable to all other species of organizations.
Having regard to the purposes of the present work, it must be emphasized that Weber seeks to
explain not only how the legitimacy of the state originates, but also how the legitimacy of all other
organizations originate: namely, rationally, traditionally, or charismatically. In certain cases, the
present work maintains, states may originate or, we may say, re-originate, as such, rationally; that
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is to say, even if originally founded on traditional or charismatic principles, or based on states or
statal authority which was so founded, they may be re-created or re-instantiated based on the
adoption of new constitutional or other principles.
It is important to note that if it is assumed, for the purpose of argument, that Weber would agree
that such constitutional re-origination or reformation of the state thus originates its legitimacy on
a rational basis (regardless of how legitimated originally), then it can be seen that such a state
would be fundamentally similar, in that regard, to any other type of organization. In other words,
Weber would then argue that any organization whose authority is rationally established, including
the constitutional state, in the circumstances posited, has certain fundamental characteristics.
These fundamental characteristics include the “mutually interdependent ideas” upon which legal
authority relies, as discussed in the previous section, and the “fundamental categories of rational
legal authority”, many of which relate to bureaucratic authority, as discussed in the next section.
Restricting attention to the purpose of the present work, then, provided that the legitimacy and
authority of the modern business corporation is founded on a rational basis, which seems to be a
reasonable assumption and relatively free from doubt, it may be expected to be characterized by
structures, processes, and personnel practices, characteristic of other forms of organization,
including the state. This, of course, goes to the heart of the present work.
The modern business corporation must be considered, as a matter of corporate law and as a matter
of legal theory, not only as an entity accorded certain attributes as a matter of law, or as an entity
“for legal purposes”, which is to say as bearing rights and duties; but also as constituting,
involving, or engaging, an organization whose characteristics are much like those of any other
form of organization, as modified, of course, by its characterization as a matter of law.
Hierarchy, Rules, and Formal Organization
Weber identifies certain “fundamental categories of rational legal authority”, which we summarize
here: 1. Official functions are continuously organized and bound by rules. 2. Spheres of
competence are specified as part of systematic division of labour, which obliges and authorizes the
incumbent to perform certain functions and to employ in that behalf clearly defined means of
compulsion subject to definite conditions.6 3. Offices are organized in a hierarchy, in which each
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lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one. 4. The rules regulating conduct
of office may be technical rules or norms, learning which may require specialized training upon
receipt of which individuals become “officials”. 5. The means of production or administration are
not owned by the officials, but are provided for their use in connection with such office, and are
subject to an obligation to account for such use.7 6. The incumbent has no “right” to his official
position, which does not belong to him. 7. “Administrative acts, decisions and rules are formulated
and recorded in in writing” and “the combination of written documents and a continuous
organization of official functions constitutes the ‘office’ which is the central focus of all types of
modern corporate action.” 8. Legal authority can be exercised in a wide variety of different forms.8
It is apparent that, while Weber may be more directly addressing the type of bureaucracy that exists
within a governmental organization, he clearly intends that his observations have wider
application.
It is highly significant that the exercise of rational legal authority requires that administrative acts,
decisions, and rules be formulated and recorded in writing, and retained subsequently, apparently
for future reference and employment in future cases. Of course, this permits reference to earlier
formulations and interpretations of rules, as well as to administrative acts and decisions, to discern
the principles upon which they were adopted, to apply such principles to present and future cases,
and to further develop the body of rules, and administrative acts and decisions in a coherent and
rational manner, as is the case with the common law practice of adherence to precedent.
It is clear that the “rational-legal” basis on which Weber says that legitimacy of authority may be
founded, as one of the three alternatives, is closely related to his “fundamental categories of
rational legal authority”, since the latter may be seen as giving expression to the ways in which the
continuance of such rational legal authority may be justified on an ongoing basis. Administration,
which, for Weber, involves the exercise of authority and imperative coordination,9 must also be
organized and conducted on similar rational-legal principles. Of course, it would be possible, at
least theoretically, for authority to be legitimately conveyed or conferred on “rational-legal”
grounds, but for the organization to function based upon principles which would be less “rational”
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in terms of its structure, processes, and operations than what Weber contemplates in connection
with his “fundamental categories of rational legal authority”.
However, if, as a thought-experiment, one negates or reverses any of these fundamental categories,
one finds that such a situation might provoke a challenge to the claimed legitimacy of such rationallegal authority. For example, in the absence of a systematic division of labour, the responsibility
and authority of officials would not be clear, and could result in conflicting claims and exercises
of such responsibility and authority. The latter might also result from the absence of hierarchical
organization. In effect, the exercise of legitimate rational-legal authority in a manner which is
neither sufficiently “rational” nor “legal”, that is, as regards its structure, processes and personnel,
might be expected to lead to a challenge to the very legitimacy of such rational-legal authority.
As will be seen in the next section, Weber carries his conception of rational legal authority and his
conception of its legitimacy into the structure and process of the organization established by its
“order”.
Organizational or Bureaucratic Officials
Weber indicates that individual officials must be appointed and must function according to certain
criteria, as follows: 1. They are personally free, and are subject to authority only with respect to
their impersonal official obligations. 2. They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of legal competence, namely, authority. 4. The office
is filled by a free contractual relationship with free selection. 5. Candidates are selected on the
basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or
guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected. 6.
They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money. Only under certain circumstances does the
employing authority, especially in private organizations, have a right to terminate the appointment,
but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in
the hierarchy; but the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent’s social
status may also be taken into account. 7. The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary,
occupation of the incumbent. 8. It constitutes a career. There is a system of “promotion” according
to seniority or to achievement or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgment of superiors. 9.
The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without
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appropriation of his position. He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the
conduct of the office.10
Of course, Weber is discussing the administration of the organization by its officials and, as a
result, focuses on the claims made on them in that respect by the organization. As the first item
emphasizes, the freedom of the officials of the organization is not restricted except in relation to
authority. Although free in other respects, the official is said to be subject to strict and systematic
discipline and control in his or her official capacity. Thus, the engagement of the official in the
organization does not exhaust the activities, and hence, obligations, that may be undertaken by the
official. Weber thus acknowledges that officials of the organization may be subject to claims that
may be made upon them otherwise than by the organization.
One would expect that Weber would be able to make a similar observation with respect to members
of the organization. Their freedom of agency, then, would be considered to be restricted by the
organization only with respect to duties and other claims upon them made by the organization, its
officials, other members, and other of its agencies or components.
Thus, with respect to both officials of the organization and members of the organization,
involvement in the organization is regulated by rational legal authority in the order establishing
the organization. In both cases, involvements of officials or of members which are outside the
organization are expected to be significantly, if not entirely, free of organizational regulation or
intrusion. In other words, the official, or member, of the organization submits to the
intraorganizational authority of the organization, which, however, has no (or, at least, no express)
extraorganizational authority over the official or member. However, as noted in the preceding
chapter, that official or member may exhibit loyalty or commitment to the focal organization,
which may tend to affect his or her external or extraorganizational behaviour, subject to mitigation
by other external influences.
Of course, Weber indicated that this “type” of organization could be applied in business, charitable,
political, and religious organizations and “in any number of other types of private enterprises
serving ideal or material ends”.11 In effect, it is an “ideal type”. Weber’s description of this formal
or bureaucratic organization addresses the issues which have been specified here as the structure,
10
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processes and procedures, and management and personnel aspects of the organization. Thus, he
addresses concerns which may be expected to arise with respect any organization which satisfies
the working definitions or more formal definitions of the term “organization” specified in the
immediately preceding, and at the beginning of the present, chapter. In many respects, Weber’s
descriptions of formal organization and bureaucracy are echoed by later commentators, including
with respect to business enterprises and, in particular, the modern business corporation.
Importantly, Weber clearly includes “business organizations” within the scope of the term
“organizations”. He also expressly indicates that formal organization and bureaucracy can be
applied “in any number of other types of private enterprises serving ideal or material ends”.
Accordingly, for Weber, business organizations not only qualify as a particular species of
organizations, but they are also organizations to which a system of formal organization and
bureaucracy may be applied.
Rationality, Organizations, and Efficiency
As Weber indicated, the fundamental categories of rational legal authority include a systematic
division of labour specifying spheres of competence and authority, and the existence of the
hierarchy in which each lower office is controlled and supervised by a higher office.
Among the bases of selection for office are technical qualifications or technical competence, which
are considered to be indicative of knowledge. Career advancement or promotion is dependent upon
seniority or achievement, or both. In turn, seniority or achievement as criteria for advancement
may also be considered to be indicative of knowledge. Further, requirements to justify decisions
on rational criteria and to maintain records of decisions are considered to increase the rationality
of decision-making by the organization at the time of the instant decision, as well as in the future.
These characteristics relate to what has been described here as the structure, process, and personnel
aspects of the organization.
Claims of Efficiency
In fact, Weber claims: “Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of
administrative organization – that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy – is, from a purely
technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense
formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings.”
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Further, he says that it is “superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of
its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability
of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it.”12
These results follow, according to Weber, because bureaucratic administration is specifically
rational in that control is exercised on the basis of knowledge. Bureaucratic officials acquire, by
means of experience, a special knowledge of facts and documentary material which increases not
only their effectiveness, but also their power.13 In effect, Weber’s definition of bureaucratic
administration virtually ensures that this is the case, at least in ideal terms.
Egon Bittner challenges Weber’s claim that bureaucratic organization is efficient, saying that “pure
bureaucracy obtains when the principle of technical efficiency is given overriding priority above
all other considerations”, which may be expected to be the case only with respect to bureaucracy
as an ideal type, rather than as actually instantiated in reality.14 He asserts that the “efficiency
principle merely selects, identifies, and orders those existing elements of the scene of action that
are perceived as related to it. The relevance of the known qualities of things becomes very apparent
when one considers that it must be at least possible for them to be related in ways that the
idealization stipulates.”15
In effect, Bittner argues that Weber’s theory rests on “a rich and ambiguous body of background
information that normally competent members of society take for granted as commonly known”
and which normally “furnishes the tacit foundation for all that is explicitly known, and provides
the matrix for all deliberate considerations without itself being deliberately considered.” Because
that information is regarded by members of society as “natural” and because such information
“enters into that commonplace and practical orientation to reality which the members of society
regard as ‘natural’ when attending to their daily affairs, Bittner maintains that the explicit terms of
Weber’s theory is “embedded in this common-sense orientation” and cannot be understood without
tacit reference to it.16
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Bittner’s argument, then, is that Weber’s claims for efficiency rest on assumptions which are
considered “natural” or “normal” by members of society generally, and, accordingly, are not
consciously and deliberately investigated. That is not, of course, to say either that they are not
assumptions, or that they do not require investigation. Thus, while seeking to justify bureaucracy
solely on the basis of efficiency, Weber “provides us with no clear-cut guide on how this standard
of judgement is to be used. Indeed, the inventory of features of bureaucracy contains not one single
item that is not arguable relative to its efficiency function.”17
Consequently, says Bittner, “what Weber had in mind when speaking about efficiency was not a
formally independent criterion of judgment but an ideal that is fully attuned to practical interests
as these emerge and are pursued in the context of every-day life. The standard itself and the correct
way to use it are, therefore, a part of the selfsame order of action that they purport to control.”18 It
may be concluded, further, that Bittner’s argument about Weber’s efficiency standard asserts that
efficiency is really an “ideal type” not seen, but only the subject of striving and approximation, in
reality. Indeed, Bittner argues that Weber’s efficiency is not a clear standard to be applied to
judgments but, instead, some undefined ideal; or, perhaps, some rough and ready standard which
is not independently justified but, instead, “satisfices” in all the circumstances.
It will be recalled that Weber claimed not only that bureaucratic organization is the most efficient,
but also that it is “formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over
human beings.” While Bittner’s discussion relates to efficiency only, it is at least arguable that his
criticisms of Weber’s claims for efficiency may also be extended on essentially the same grounds
to Weber’s claims for rationality. Fortunately, it is sufficient for our purposes to recognize that
Weber’s claim of “efficiency” is intended to address the issue whether formal organization or
bureaucratic organization is, in itself, intendedly rational. There is no doubt that Weber considers
this to be the case.
Accordingly, an organization, including a business organization, applying a system of formal or
bureaucratic organization may be considered to be acting rationally, or, at least, intendedly
rationally, with a view to the attainment of its goals and objectives. Adoption of a scheme of formal
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organization or bureaucratic organization, then, may be considered to be consistent with the status
of the adopting social unit or group of persons as an “organization”.
Of course, as discussed in Chapter Four under the subheading “Organization as Social
Relationship”, Weber himself characterized an organization as a particular species of “social
relationship”19, albeit one having attributes commonly included in other formal and informal
definitions of the term “organization”.
Organizational Rationality, and Individual Bounded Rationality
Robert K. Merton, a leading social theorist prominent in the origination of theories of social groups
and social roles, examined the relationship and bureaucratic structure and personality in a paper
extensively cited despite its brevity. He describes bureaucracy as the “ideal type” of formal
organization, and credits Weber with the “classical analysis of bureaucracy”20 Of course, this
judgment is widely accepted. Merton observes that a “formal, rationally organized social structure
involves certain patterns of activity in which, ideally, every series of actions is functionally related
to the purposes of the organization.”21
In Merton’s ideal type, both the structure and the patterns of activity are rationally and functionally
related. He describes the structure of a formal organization, in terms of offices and hierarchy,
competence, authority, and responsibility, in much the same way as does Weber. It is immediately
apparent that the likelihood of such ideal types obtaining in the real world is far from certain. As
noted repeatedly here, organizations, however defined, commonly pursue common purposes in a
manner which is intendedly rationally conducive to those purposes. Of course, that is not to say
that such manners of proceeding are actually and rationally conducive to such purposes.
March and Simon emphasize Weber’s objective of construing formal organization and, in
particular, bureaucratic organization, as a means of avoiding, or at least minimizing, limits on the
rational behaviour of individuals, which they refer to as “bounded rationality”. They suggest that
“Weber wishes to show to what extent bureaucratic organization is a rational solution to the
complexities of modern problems. More specifically, he wishes to show in what ways bureaucratic
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organization overcomes the decision-making or ‘computational’ limits of individuals or alternative
forms of organization (i.e., through specialization, division of labor, etc.).”22
In effect, the argument made by March and Simon is that in seeking, by means of rational structure
and processes, to pursue certain goals or objectives, a formal or bureaucratic organization seeks to
eliminate, or, at least, minimize, non-rational influences on that pursuit. Weber’s description of
bureaucratic organization is certainly consistent with such objectives.
Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality” was developed and applied to organizations in 1947 in
his magisterial work, Administrative Behavior.23 Political scientist Terry Moe provides a succinct
description of Simon’s model, in which he indicates that such concept “recognizes that people are
limited both in the information and knowledge they possess and in the computational skills they
bring to bear in making choices. Thus, they cannot engage in the kind of informed optimization
attributed to economic man, nor can they engage in the kind of decision making under uncertainty
that information economists and game theorists have so subsequently developed. Instead,
boundedly rational individuals “satisfice.” This mode of choice, in turn, leads them to behave in a
routine, myopic, but reasonably adaptive manner.”24
Applying the concept of bounded rationality in an organizational context, Simon’s key insight,
Moe claims, is that “just as individuals will routinize behavior if left to their own devices, so
routines can also be imposed by organizational superiors, who can take steps to shape the
decisional premises (information, beliefs, aspiration levels) of subordinates and provide them with
the programmed responses deemed suitable for efficient pursuit of the organization's objectives.”25
Organizational superiors, then, routinize the behaviour of subordinates in a way in which the
subordinates might do themselves, if they possessed the appropriate perspective and, we would
suggest, the appropriate incentives. The present work has maintained, of course, that the
22
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“organizational perspective”, which is that of the relevant organizational superiors, is able to take
into account not only information concerning the nature and effects of previous responses by the
organization in similar cases, but also information concerning how such responses relate to other
organizational actions and objectives.
For Simon, then: “It is this combination of bounded rationality and managerial efforts to program
subordinate behavior that largely explains organizational structure. Individuals throughout the
organization, precisely because they are boundedly rational, will behave in the routine, patterned
ways characteristic of structured behavior; and (boundedly rational) managers, in seeking to shape
and coordinate individual programs into an organized, efficient structure, impose behavioral
routines via hierarchy, division of labor, communications flows, and training programs.”26
Individual Bounded Rationality, and Rulemaking
Accordingly, as maintained by Weber and by Simon, in a rationally organized pursuit of the
organization’s goals and objectives, officials within the hierarchy are governed by rules, which
Merton describes as “general, abstract, clearly defined rules which preclude the necessity for the
issuance of specific instructions in each specific case”, the generality of which “requires a constant
use of categorization, whereby individual problems and cases are classified on the basis of
designated criteria and are treated accordingly.”27 As has been seen, the development of those rules
in itself requires, or should require, categorization, including, of course, categorizing prior events
and experiences.
A related perspective is that of Frederick Winslow Taylor, the founder of “scientific management”,
often called “Taylorism”. Taylor explained that such scientific management involved “the
deliberate gathering in on the part of those on the management’s side of all of the great mass of
traditional knowledge, which in the past is been in the heads of the workmen, and in the physical
skill and knack of the workmen, which he has acquired through years of experience”, as a first
step, “and then recording it, tabulating it and, in many cases, finally reducing it to laws, rules and
even to mathematical formulae.”28 He considered that scientific management could thereby obtain
26

Ibid.
Supra note 20 at 561 [emphasis in the original].
28
Frederick Winslow Taylor, "Scientific Management" [1947] in DS Pugh, ed, Organization Theory: Selected
27

Readings (New York: Penguin Books, 1977) 124 at 125. Excerpted from Frederick Winslow Taylor, Scientific

352

“the initiative of the workmen – that is, their hard work, their good will, their ingenuity…
practically with absolute regularity, while under even the best of the older type of management
this initiative is only obtained spasmodically and somewhat irregularly.”29
Taylor’s scientific management thus seeks to apply some kind of empirical methodology, by
commencing with observation and investigation before applying techniques of analysis in seeking
to develop a routine, the application of which, according to Simon, seeks to avoid the limitations
of bounded rationality. Taylor was discussing the situation of workmen on the shop floor, but there
was an obvious implication, which was developed elsewhere in his work, that the principles of
“scientific management” could also be applied with respect to other employees and managers. As
well as developing the knowledge or “science” with respect to the required tasks, scientific
management also mandated the scientific selection and progressive development of the workmen.
Taylor’s “scientific management” principles warrant further examination.
Methodology of Rulemaking
In the case of workmen, Taylor spoke of management’s duty “to deliberately study the character,
the nature, and the performance of each workman with a view to finding out his limitations on the
one hand, but even more important, his possibilities for development on the other hand” and then
to provide the latter on an ongoing basis.30 In the result, he said, the actual work would be divided
almost equally between planning and other aspects of the work, to be performed by management,
and the “actual work of the establishment”, to be performed by the workmen.31
While this classical model of management may be considered to involve a “machine” or at least
“mechanistic” model of man, it is clear that Taylor, at least, did consider certain specifically human
aspects of individuals in the workplace. His management provided its input not only in supervising
and developing the individual employee but in assessing his or her capacity and limitations so as
to provide “management” and direction beyond that point. Taylor’s laws or rules were to be
developed against the background of knowledge and experience and so as to apply in most cases,
Management (New York: Harper & Row, 1947) 39. In the poll referenced above in note 22, it was selected as the
single most influential management book of the twentieth century and described as the "most influential management
book ever published".
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arguably with some allowance for individual employee capacity as developed up to the relevant
point in time. In effect, he attributed the subsequent improvement in performance to the application
of a high level of relevant knowledge and experience, which, today, might be called “best
practices”, in rule-relevant situations in the future.
It can be seen that, where rules have been developed to a high standard, the need to apply rational
analysis may, ideally, involve a relatively small number of situations not contemplated by the rules,
the number of which might be anticipated to be greatly reduced as a result of the breadth and depth
of those rules. Further comment on this is made below.
The assumption is that rationally developed rules take into account prior events and experiences,
and that against that experiential background, rules of general application can be devised that may
be applied in many concrete cases. Ideally, such rules are developed, collectively, based on input
from many sources, thereby combining many events and experiences and, further, considering
such events and experiences from the perspectives of various participants in past cases, and in
anticipated possible future cases. In that way, the development of the rules, the imposition of such
rules, and the application of those rules in concrete instances would not be constrained by the
bounded rationality of a single individual in a situation requiring immediate decision making, as
sought by Weber and by Simon.
As Merton suggests, clearly defined rules “preclude the necessity for the issuance of specific
instructions for each specific case”.32 In connection with the use of rules as a corrective for
bounded rationality, Simon says that, “decisions are programmed to the extent that they are
repetitive and routine, to the extent that a definite procedure has been worked out for handling
them so that they don’t have to be treated de novo each time they occur”. In effect, “if a particular
problem occurs often enough a routine procedure will be worked out for solving it.”33 On the other
hand, “decisions are nonprogrammed to the extent that they are novel, unstructured and
consequential”, perhaps “because [the problem] hasn’t arisen before, or because its precise nature
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and structure are elusive and complex, or because it is so important that it deserves a customtailored treatment.”34
Programming is an important concept for Simon. By program, he means “a detailed description or
strategy that governs the sequence of responses of a system to a complex task environment.”
Similarly, a response is nonprogrammed “where the system has no specific procedures to deal with
situations like the one at hand, but must fall back on whatever general capacity it has for intelligent,
adaptive, problem-oriented action”. In that case, in the absence of specific skills and specific
knowledge, “man has some general problem-solving capacities” which can be applied to reason
about “almost any kind of situation, no matter how novel or perplexing” in terms of ends and
means.35 It is submitted, however, that nonprogrammed responses requiring the application of
“general problem-solving capacities” invoke bounded rationality and, accordingly, are nonpreferred, as compared with programmed responses, which seek to avoid the “bounds” or
“boundedness” of rationality.
Bounded Rationality, and Organizational and Personal Meaning
Instead of considering all problems as problems of first impression, in programmed or rule-based
responses, the bounded rationality of the individual is applied to considering into which category
the instant situation falls, which determines the rule that applies, which can then be applied by the
relevant official. This eliminates subsequent case-by-case determination on a “first impression” or
“first-principles” basis for many routine situations which immediately present themselves; and, in
turn, allows more detailed consideration for non-routine circumstances. It also requires fewer
orders or commands to be issued, which is thought to reduce awareness of relative power and
authority as between the command giver and the command receiver, and which may minimize
conflict.
As we have indicated, rule-assignment or rule-categorization operates both retrospectively and
prospectively, not only in an organizational context, but also in individual and personal contexts.
Bittner observes that rules are not only used in “determining the occurrence of certain responses
under suitable conditions, [but] are also invoked to clarify the meaning of actions retrospectively.”
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In this regard, he claims that “it is a readily demonstrable fact that a good deal of the sense we
make of things happening in our presence depends on our ability to assign them to the phenomenal
sphere of influence of some rule. Not only do we do this but we count on it happening.”36
Consequently, it is said that the ability to assign or categorize activity not only simplifies the
exercise of bounded rationality, but also provides signification as to the relevance of the activity
concerned. Thus, Bittner credits rulemaking with assisting in providing individuals with relevant
cognitive frameworks, as well as with relevant frameworks of wider meaning or signification.
Further, Bittner maintains that “the formal organization meets exigencies arising out of the
complexity and large scope of an enterprise”, ordering “affiliations between persons and
performances that are too remote for contingent arrangement, by linking them into coherent maps
or schedules.”37 The formal organization thus provides its participants with a way of “making
sense” of various aspects of the organization in ways not otherwise apparent to organizational
participants. It may even be said that it is a “map of sense-making”.
Applying the argument made in the penultimate preceding paragraph, we may say that the formal
organization also facilitates developing rules which can be applied at the relevant level of
hierarchy, which will dovetail with superordinate rules existing at a superior level of the hierarchy,
in order that a coherent system of rules be available which are rationally conducive to achieving
those superordinate goals and objectives. This comports with Weber’s observations.
Bittner argues that the specifics of the superordinate rules, and their benefits and advantages, may
not be known to the personnel at the subordinate level, who may know only that the rule applied
to, or by, them at that subordinate level meets some overarching standard of organizational
rationality. Because the rules are thought to be rational, the argument goes, they are perceived to
be legitimate, and hence to require deference and observance. In turn, that knowledge at the
subordinate level provides meaning in situations involving considerable complexity and in which
meaning might be otherwise absent.
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Bittner says: “The integration transcends what might result from negotiated agreements between
contiguous elements, and lends to elements that are not within the sphere of one another’s
manipulative influence the character of concerted action. As a consequence of this, however, each
link derives its meaning not so much from the specific rule that determines it, but from the entire
order of which the rule itself is a part.”38 Accordingly, he maintains that both immediate parties
and non-immediate parties who could not themselves negotiate satisfactory agreements are
encouraged to adhere to rules considered to have been rationally adopted and in the best interests
of the organization as a whole.
In effect, for Bittner, at least implicitly, the rules “complete” contracts or arrangements that could
never themselves be finalized by express agreement, for various reasons, including information
asymmetries, lack of information, and lack of proximity. The rules themselves perform this
function because intraorganizational actors assume that such rules are rational and legitimate, and
consequently merit concurrence and obedience. These various assumptions and attitudes
contribute to creating what Barnard and Simon call “zones of acceptance” or “zones of
indifference” in relation to authority. This is discussed further in the next section under the heading
“Formal Organizations and Informal Organizations”.
Indeed, Bittner goes so far as to suggest “the possibility of a principle of discipline that derives
from the formal style of the rational scheme and which works against centrifugal tendencies and
heterogeneity” in which the “resulting coherence will be in evidence as outwardly proper conduct
and appearance.”39 The propriety of conduct, then, will be immediately apparent to organizational
participants. In the result, the formal scheme provides meaning and justification for, and thus a
basis for acceptance of, organizational actions. It thereby contributes to creating commitment to,
and identification with, the organization as a whole.
Accordingly: “When from the perspective of a fragmentary involvement the actual contingent
outcome of one’s work cannot be appraised, or appears senseless, then it can be understood and
judged in terms of its over-all functional significance by invoking the formal scheme”. Bittner
claims, further, that the formal scheme can also be used as a basis for requiring corrections or
enforcing prohibitions and, more generally, for applying to something that happens within the
38
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organization “the criterion of success or failure when real results are not visible, or must be
discredited.”40 Put plainly, a relevant actor at the subordinate level assumes that acting in
accordance with the applicable rules is rational in terms of the organization, and, as such, this
provides meaning to, and the basis for concurrence on the part of, such actor, quite independently
of whether or not such actor can “make sense of” the situation.
The development and application of rules, then, is thought not only to contribute to rational
decision-making, and to overcoming the limitations of bounded rationality, but is also thought to
contribute to individual, group, and organizational, and even personal, sense-making. Such sensemaking not only assists in providing cognitive and rational coherence to individuals, groups and
to the organization as a whole, but also assists in providing a sense of coherence of effort, unity,
and identity, and even commitment, for the organization and those individuals and groups within
it. Bittner considers this paradigm to be operative irrespective of the type of organization
concerned.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
As has been demonstrated previously, an organization is considered to be characterized by a
structure which is adopted in the exercise of rationality as a means of rationally pursuing the shared
goals and objectives for which the group has been, and remains, constituted. Some more detailed
examination of the specifically structural aspect of organizations now follows.
Weber famously claims that the “development of the modern form of the organization of corporate
groups in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of
bureaucratic administration”, and indicates that this is true “of church and state, of armies, political
parties, economic enterprises, organizations to promote all kinds of causes, private associations,
clubs, and many others.” Further, he indicates that its development is “the most critical
phenomenon of the modern Western state.”41
Thus, Weber equates the “modern form” of organization with bureaucratic organization. He asserts
that all modern forms of the organization adopt such bureaucratic organization or administration.
Further, he includes within the scope of the term “organization” many groups which have
significantly disparate objectives, including pursuit of religion, military power, political power,
40
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economic power, social power, and state power. Of course, he considers economic enterprises, the
business firm or corporation, as organizations and, as such, as appropriate for bureaucratic
administration. In terms of both structure and process, such bureaucratic type of organization is
characterized, as we have seen, by specialization and delegation.
March and Simon criticize this approach, saying that “Weber perceives bureaucracy as an adaptive
device for using specialized skills, [but] he is not exceptionally attentive to the character of the
human organism.”42 They maintain, in effect, that Weber examines the adaptations by which
bureaucracy uses specialized skills, as if they can be somehow divorced from their human
possessors. They are not alone in this criticism. In Weber’s bureaucracy, Merton says, the
“structure is one which approaches the complete elimination of personalized relationships and of
nonrational considerations (hostility, anxiety, affectual involvements, etc.).”43
Of course, seeking to minimize the impact of personalized relationships and of nonrational
considerations does not mean that such attempts will be successful. At the same time, failure to
recognize, and to provide against, them may be deleterious to the attainment of organizational
objectives. Other commentators have sought to consider these issues in more detail. An
examination of their perspectives follows.
Fayol and Modern Business Management
Fayol on Structure
A contemporary of Frederick Winslow Taylor, Henri Fayol, was considered as another founder
of modern management principles. However, his approach, often called “Fayolism”, is more
sensitive to the personnel aspects of the organization than are those of Weber and Taylor. His
approach involves all aspects of the organization treated in the present work, namely, structure,
process, and personnel. An examination of his approach will assist in explicating the
interrelationships of those aspects. Fayol developed a number of major principles (fourteen) in this
regard, which will be discussed here in terms of their relevance to what this work considers to be
the structure, process, and personnel, of the organization.
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Even with respect to specialization and division of work, Fayol, like Weber and Simon, recognizes
that division of work reduces the number of objects to which attention and effort must be directed,
and facilitates acquisition by the employee of “an ability, sureness and accuracy which increase
their output”.44 He acknowledges that centralization, like specialization, is inevitable in any
organization. Thus, the “question of centralization or decentralization, is a simple question of
proportion, it is a matter of finding the optimum degree for the particular concern.”45
Moreover, the appropriate degree of centralization or decentralization “may itself vary constantly”
so that it is “a problem to be solved according to circumstances, to the best satisfaction of the
interests involved.”46 As previously noted in this work, no single structure or scheme of
organization is likely to be effective in all cases. As Fayol’s choice of title for his major work
indicates, although many of his remarks are expressed to relate to organizations generally, his
primary concern was industrial business enterprises.
Fayol describes the hierarchy of the organization as a “scalar chain [, which] is the chain of
superiors ranging from the ultimate authority to the lowest ranks.” He says that this “line of
authority is the route followed – via every link in the chain – by all communications which start
from or go to the ultimate authority.”47 He acknowledges, however, that in the great majority of
businesses, where success turns on speedy execution, instead of insisting that a matter go up to the
top of the chain of responsibility, and then down to the relevant position on other side, especially
where a chain of different functions or departments are involved, the managers involved can
authorize their respective subordinates to deal directly with each other and to inform their
respective superiors what they have agreed upon. Fayol indicates that such a process can save time
and inconvenience, improve results, and speed turnaround.48
One aspect of structure relates to maintaining order, both material and social. As to the first, Fayol
indicates that there must be a place appointed for each thing and each thing must be in its appointed
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place. Further, the appropriate place must be chosen in order to facilitate activities as much as
possible, and to avoid loss of material.49 As to the social order, this presupposes good organization
and good selection, such that the place (or office) is suitable for the employee and the employee is
suitable for the place (or office), which requires “precise knowledge of the human requirements
and resources of the concern and a constant balance between these requirements and resources”.50
While the concern of the present section is structure, it will be convenient now to briefly examine
some of Fayol’s related observations with respect to process and personnel. He indicates that
“authority is the right to give orders and the power to exact obedience”, distinguishing between
official authority, which is derived from office, and personal authority, involving intelligence,
experience, moral worth, ability to lead, past services and other matters, and saying that the two
are complementary. Similarly, he indicates that responsibility is a corollary of authority, its natural
consequence, and essential counterpart, and arises wheresoever authority is exercised.51
In regards to exacting obedience and applying sanctions, whether rewards or penalties, Fayol notes
that “it is relatively easy to establish a workman’s responsibility for his acts and a scale of
corresponding sanctions; in the case of a foreman it is somewhat difficult, and proportionately as
one goes up the scalar chain of businesses, as work grows more complex, as the number of workers
involved increases, as the final result is more remote, it is increasingly difficult to isolate the share
of the initial act of authority in the ultimate result and to establish the degree of responsibility of
the manager. The measurement of this responsibility and its equivalent in material terms elude all
calculation.”52
This accords with many of the present author’s statements and generalizations earlier in this work
and provides some authority therefor. The indication, then, is that the higher the level in the
organization at which the decision is taken, the more complex its nature, the more remote its
ultimate result, and the greater the number of persons involved in it, the more unlikely it will be
that responsibility with respect to such decision will be accurately apportioned among the
participants or that such accurate apportionment is even possible. The present work maintains that
these considerations support the initial assignment of collective, rather than individual,
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responsibility in cases of nonfeasance, misfeasance, and other misdeeds, as a matter of law. This
perspective will be further discussed later in Part 3.
Fayol relates authority, in terms of giving orders and exacting obedience against the threat of
sanctions, to discipline. He says that discipline “is in essence obedience, application, energy,
behaviour and outward marks of respect observed in accordance with the standing agreements
between the firm and its employees, whether these agreements have been freely debated or
accepted without prior discussion, whether they be written or implicit, whether they derive from
the wish of the parties to them or from rules and customs, it is these agreements which determine
the formalities of discipline.”53
Fayol’s position is consistent with Chester Barnard’s views on employee acceptance of authority,
which are described in Chapter Four above and in this chapter under the heading “Common
Purpose, Intraorganizational Cooperation, and the Zone of Acceptance”,54 where Simon’s similar
view is also described. It is also consistent, more generally, with Weber’s description of the
institution of organizations, as described earlier in the present chapter under the heading “RationalLegal Authority, Administration, and Bureaucracy”.
Just as the agreements creating obligations of obedience, application, energy, and behaviour are
expected to vary in nature from one organization to another, so, too, is the nature of the discipline
expected. Regardless of the source or form of discipline, however, Fayol concludes that “general
opinion is deeply convinced that discipline is absolutely essential for the smooth running of
business and that without discipline no enterprise could prosper.”55 Where sanctions are required,
the choice of the type and degree of sanction must involve the tact and experience of the manager,
taking into account the individuals and attendant circumstances concerned.56
Fayol on Process
It is, of course, difficult to disentangle issues of organizational structure from issues of process,
and each of those from issues of personnel. However, it is hoped that effecting such a separation
for the purpose of discussion, at least, imposes a greater degree of order on this discussion than
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might be possible otherwise. Issues of authority, responsibility, sanctions, and discipline relate to
each of these areas, but have been discussed here in connection with organizational structure.
Fayol’s fourteen principles of management included three which relate to organizational process
and which are described here as Fayol’s “three unities”: unity of command, unity of direction, and
unity of interest. Unity of command posits that for any action, an employee should receive orders
from only one superior. Otherwise, according to Fayol, “authority is undermined, discipline is in
jeopardy, order disturbed and stability threatened.”57 Unity of direction entails “one head and one
plan for a group of activities having the same objective”, which is considered by Fayol to be
essential to unity of action, coordination and strength and focusing of effort.58
What the present author calls “unity of interest” is actually referred to by Fayol as “subordination
of individual interest to general interest”, the principle “that in a business the interest of one
employee or group of employees should not prevail over that of the concern, that the interest of
the home should come before that of its members and that the interest of the State should have
pride of place over that of one citizen or group of citizens.”59 This diversity of interest as between
the organization and individuals and groups within it has been the subject of frequent notice in the
present work. Concerns arise as to how to ensure dominance of superordinate organizational goals
over subordinate group and individual goals. Fayol recognizes the need to subordinate both the
interests of individuals and the interests of groups of individuals to the interests of the organization.
Fayol attributes subordination of the general interest to individual interest to such causes as
“ignorance, ambition, selfishness, laziness, weakness and all human passions”, and claims that it
can be reconciled and counteracted by means of superiors exercising firmness and providing a
good example, by adopting agreements that are as fair as is possible, and by exercising constant
supervision.60 Fayol does not discuss how group loyalties and interests might affect adherence to
organizational interests, and the one hand, and individual interests, on the other. However,
discussion of these matters in the present work, both to date and to follow, provide alternative
views. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that Fayol acknowledges the existence of
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individual interests and group interests as separate from, and requiring subordination to, the
interests of the organization as a whole.
Another principle to which Fayol says that management should attempt to adhere is stability of
tenure of personnel, since, in addition to the requisite abilities, time is required “to get used to new
work and succeed in doing it well”, especially in the case of managers, who may require a lengthy
and costly period of time in order to “settle in”.61 He admits that some changes in personnel are
inevitable due to age, illness, retirement, death, changes in capacity to perform duties, and
achieving fitness for greater responsibilities.62 Of course, as indicated in this work, attempts to
define the term “organization” often emphasize stability of membership. Fayol’s attention is
directed, as might be expected in a text on industrial management, to considerations of efficiency.
Fayol on Process and Personnel
Fayol refers to initiative as involving the importance of the power, and the freedom, to think out
and execute a plan and ensure its success. He states that such initiative requires tact and integrity,
maintaining respect for authority and for discipline, and sacrificing some personal vanity, but says
that initiative, on the part of the manager and everyone else, can represent a great source of strength
for business, especially in difficult times. He indicates that unity and harmony, and esprit de corps,
are sufficiently valuable that effort should be made to achieve them.63
In this regard, personnel should be compensated, he says, in a way that is as fair as possible both
to such personnel and to the firm, so as to “encourage keenness by rewarding well-directed
effort”.64 This may involve providing bonuses or entering into profit-sharing arrangements at
various levels of the hierarchy.65 Such compensation may also include non-financial benefits and
incentives.66
Another of Fayol’s principles of management is that management should also seek to achieve
equity, which results from treating employees with kindliness and with justice, and which produces
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devotion and loyalty on the part of employees. This may require, variously, over time, forcefulness,
sternness, good sense, experience, and good nature.67
As to his management principles, in general, Fayol claims that: “This code is indispensable. Be it
a case of commerce, industry, politics, religion, war or philanthropy, in every concern there is a
management function to be performed, and for its performance there must be principles, that is to
say acknowledged truths regarded as proven on which to rely. And it is the code which represents
the sum total of these truths at any given moment.”68
In summary, Fayol’s management principles provide useful insight into the interrelationship
among organizational structure, process, and personnel considerations. They represent a
significant advance on Weber’s more general observations. And they purport to relate to all types
of organizations, including business corporations.
Determinants of Structure
The present work has mentioned, from time to time, that the structure of organizations, including
modern business corporations, is far from invariant, and, instead, exhibits considerable variety.
Chester Barnard referred to a “scheme of organization”, which he describes as “the definition of
organizational positions”, the formal system of coordination of work to be done by the organization
with “its purposes broken up in the subsidiary purposes, specializations, tasks, etc.”, as well as
“the kind and quality of services of personnel that can be obtained; the kind and quantity of persons
that must be included in the cooperative system for this purpose; the inducements that are required;
and the places at which and the times when these factors can be combined”.69
In effect, Barnard recognizes the interrelationship among the structure, processes and personnel
which instantiate the organization itself. He also observes that the scheme of organization assumes
that other factors of organization remain fixed for the time being, with the result that “any scheme
of organization at any given time represents necessarily a result of previous successive
approximations through a period of time” and is, accordingly, subject to change, as changes in the
other factors of organization transpire,70 as has been mentioned frequently in the present work.
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Thus, Barnard recognizes that the scheme of organization must adapt to the environment, including
the availability of external resources, as well as internal resources, such as personnel. In addition,
of course, the structure, or scheme of organization, and the organization’s processes and personnel
must be adapted to changes in its strategy, as demonstrated by Chandler.
Indeed, Barnard also seems to admit that a scheme of organization is necessarily an ideal type, as
suggested by Weber. Philip Selznick, a leading and highly influential organizational theorist, who
set forth the principles of his approach in a widely cited paper published in 1948,71 is also
considered to regard organizational schemes or structures as ideal types. Bittner, for example,
claims that each of Weber and Selznick “assumes that the formal structures represent an ideally
possible, but practically unattainable state of affairs. While Weber outlined the contents of the
normative idealization in general terms, Selznick pointed out that the normative idealization, to be
an effective source of restraint, must be constantly adapted to the impact of functional imperatives
of social systems.”72
As indicated here, the organization is also required to adapt to external functional imperatives. As
Bittner observes, an organization is seen as “having some determining power over action that takes
place under the scope of its jurisdiction”; however, this “power to produce an intended result is
uncertain and depends for its effectiveness on complex structural conditions.”73 The present work
maintains, of course, that the organization must adapt to both internal and external influences and
variances.
Specialization and Delegation, and Goals
As noted previously, as expressed by Selznick, “formal organization is the structural expression
of rational action”, which is highly dependent upon delegation, “a precarious venture which
requires the continuous elaboration of formal mechanisms of coordination and control”. He says
that as a result of the institutionalization of relationships, “the formal structure becomes subject to
calculable manipulation, an instrument of rational action.”74 In effect, Selznick maintains that
without institutional relationships, including formal delegation, the formal structure cannot be
employed to take rational action having in view the attainment of the organization’s objectives. As
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will be discussed later, Selznick is doubtful that this objective is achievable, largely due to the
nature of the human beings concerned.
As discussed frequently here, the employment of rational action in the achievement of an
organization’s goals and objectives is essential to it instantiating itself as an organization. Barnard,
as previously noted, assigns the formulation and definition of the purposes and objectives of the
organization to the organization’s executive, noting, however, that such purpose must be “broken
into fragments, specific objectives, not only ordered in time so that detailed purpose and detailed
action follow in the series of progressive cooperation, but also ordered contemporaneously into
the specializations – geographical, social and functional – that each unit organization implies.”75
He indicates that this is so complex that no single executive can effect this result, which, instead,
requires the cooperation of the entire executive organization.
Hence “the critical aspect of this function is the assignment of responsibility – the delegation of
objective authority.”76 One aspect of this assignment of responsibility, he asserts, is the scheme of
positions and the system of communication adopted by the organization, which he says affects the
organization’s potential, while the other is “the actual decisions and conduct that make the scheme
a working system”, which has a rather more immediate effect.77 These observations comport with
those of Weber, Simon, and Merton, as discussed under the preceding heading “Structure, Process,
and Personnel”.
The Organizational Hierarchy
Examining how Barnard explicates the organizational hierarchy provides some useful insights:
“Accordingly, the general executive states that ‘this is the purpose, this the objective, this the
direction, in general terms, in which we wish to move, before next year’. His department heads, of
the heads of his main territorial divisions, say to their departments or suborganizations: ‘This
means for us, these things now, then others next month, then others later, to be better defined after
experience.’ Their subdepartment or division chiefs say: ‘This means for us such and such
operations now at these places, such others at those places, something today here, others tomorrow
there.’ Then district or bureau chiefs in turn become more and more specific, their sub-chiefs still
75
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more as to place group, time, until finally purpose is merely jobs, specific groups, definite men,
definite times, accomplished results.”78
In principle, each organizational level responds to the directives from its immediately superior
level and translates the higher order goals and objectives expressed in such directives into actions
which can be meaningfully effected at the subordinate level. Meanwhile, as Barnard says,
communications pass up and down the hierarchy, chronicling problems and accomplishments, and
redefining and modifying purposes, level after level.
Barnard observes that coordination of these activities is indispensable, saying that such
coordination “requires a pyramiding of the formulation of purpose that becomes more general as
the number of units of basic organization becomes larger, and more and more remote in future
time. Responsibility for abstract, generalizing, prospective, long-run-decision is delegated up the
line, responsibility for definition, action, remains always at the base where the authority for effort
resides.”79 Not only is the level of generality of decision making more abstract and generalized at
higher organizational levels, but decision-making at successively higher levels involves a much
longer term perspective. Accordingly, goals and decision-making at successively higher levels are
more critical, although sometimes less immediate, to the success and continued existence of the
organization as a whole.
It may be said that higher, more abstract goals and objectives are analyzed and particularized for
action at the subordinate level, and the results of the actions are transmitted up the hierarchy. From
this, it can be seen that the goals and objectives prevailing at that subordinate level must be
effectively translated into, and be consistent with, and accepted by, those at subordinate levels.
Similarly, the goals and objectives, and the implementational actions, which prevail and are acted
upon at the subordinate level must be consistent with those of, and accepted by those at, the
superordinate level. As observed previously in this work, lack of congruence of goals and
objectives as between organizational levels may present significant difficulties.
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Communication of, and Commitment to, Organizational Goals
Barnard averts to this problem of goal congruence as between organizational levels when he says
that the “formulation and definition of purpose is then a widely distributed function, only the more
general part of which is executive. In this fact lies the most important inherent difficulty in the
operation of cooperative systems – the necessity for indoctrinating those at the lower levels with
general purposes, the major decisions, so that they remain cohesive and able to make the ultimate
detailed decisions coherent; and the necessity, for those at higher levels, of constantly
understanding the concrete conditions and the specific decisions of the ‘ultimate’ contributors from
which and from whom executives are often insulated.”80
Operating such a system obviously requires a high degree of coordination. Barnard’s
“indoctrination” operates at least bi-directionally. While the organizational goals and objectives
are communicated down to lower organizational levels, a properly functioning executive would
seek, and would expect those levels to “communicate up the line”, the relevant circumstances
impacting decision-making and actions at those levels. This can be regarded as involving
“communicating up the line” not only lower level goals and objectives, but also how such lower
levels effectuate and implement higher level goals and objectives and how effective they are.
The intended result, however, is that “indoctrinating” lower-level operating groups with higher
level goals, such that lower level operating groups can appreciate the relevance of their goals to
those higher goals, should assist in achieving both levels of goals, and in effecting upwards
transmission of information relevant to their intended achievement. Consequently, Barnard can be
understood to be saying that, in the absence of such coordination and indoctrination, lower level
groups cannot fully appreciate the ways in which their own goals contribute to higher level goals,
nor can higher-level groups fully appreciate the factors influencing achievement of lower level
goals. Barnard’s observations thus accord with those of Bittner, as discussed above under the
subheading “Bounded Rationality, and Organizational and Personal Meaning”, to the effect that,
in some cases, at least, confidence in the efficacy of the system must be relied upon instead.
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More generally, Barnard observes that “without that up-and-down-the-line coordination of
purposeful decisions, general decisions and general purposes are mere intellectual processes in an
organization vacuum, insulated from realities by layers of misunderstanding. The function of
formulating grand purpose and providing for their redefinition is one which needs sensitive
systems of communication, experience in interpretation, imagination and delegation of
responsibility.”81 The ability to achieve such coordination is powerfully influenced by the systems
and processes of the organization, as well as the attributes of its participants. These subjects will
be discussed further below.
Intraorganizational Organizations
The present work has mentioned, from time to time, the importance of intraorganizational groups
in, and to, the activities of the organization as a whole. It has also discussed the relationship
between intraorganizational groups and their individual members. The present chapter permits
some examination of the research and theory relating to these matters which, in turn, supports the
arguments made in this behalf throughout the present work.
March and Simon are very clear on the importance of these issues, saying that “many of the central
problems for the analysis of human behavior in large-scale organizations stem from the operation
of subsystems within the total organizational structure”, noting the number of studies that have
focused on “the ways in which the needs of individuals, the primary work group, and the large
organization interact to affect each other.”82
As noted previously, March and Simon interact with, and devote particular attention to, the models
of bureaucracy proffered by Merton, Selznick, and Gouldner. Their summary of Selznick’s
explanation for the diversity of interest between subunits and the organization, as well as among
subunits, in bureaucratic organizations is particularly succinct, and, in this writer’s judgment, even
more apt than Selznick’s own; and, for that reason, will be referenced here.
March and Simon note that Selznick emphasizes the delegation of authority, which is motivated
by demand for control at the top. Delegation increases the amount of training in specialized
competences that is required. Restricting attention to smaller numbers of problems increases
experience in, and improves ability to deal with, such problems. Delegation also decreases the
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difference between organizational goals and achievement, which stimulates more delegation, and
thereby departmentalization, and thence a bifurcation of interests among subunits of the
organizations.83
Importantly, the “maintenance needs of the subunits dictate a commitment to the organizational
goals over and above their contributions to the total organizational program” as a result of which
“the activities originally evaluated in terms of the organization goals are seen to have additional
important ramifications for the subunits”. In turn, “many individual needs depend on the continued
success and even expansion of the subunit.”84 As indicated in the present work, the continued
existence of an organization, which in this case is the subunit, is thought to be among any
organization’s primary goals.
As we have previously observed and will have occasion again to observe variously throughout our
discussion of organizational and intraorganizational goals, respectively, many organizational
theorists, researchers, and practitioners treat intraorganizational groups, often without significant
discussion or analysis, as if such intraorganizational groups themselves constitute organizations,
“mini-organizations”, or intraorganizational organizations. Of course, it may also be that such
characterization is simply not raised for explicit discussion.
In any event, many, if not most, of these commentators do not expressly address whether such a
group or unit itself constitutes an organization which is nested within the macro-level organization.
As a matter of fact, having conducted various research and Internet searches, the present writer
has not found such an explicit examination within the context of the corporation. Accordingly, the
outline of such an analysis appears below.
As maintained by Weber, the definition of the term “organization” does not require that it come
into being either autonomously or endogenously. As can be seen from the discussion under the
present heading, March and Simon, and Selznick, as well as many other commentators referenced
otherwise in this work, consider that a unit or subunit of a “social unit”, or a group or subgroup of
a “group of persons”, (one requirement) may have its own goals and objectives (a second
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requirement), thereby satisfying two definitional requirements in order to be considered as an
organization.
The remaining requirement of the definition of “organization”, of course, is that the relevant social
unit or group of persons adopt structures, processes and procedures in an effort to successfully
attain their respective goals and objectives. Again, it is not necessary, for purposes of the definition
of the term “organization”, that such structures and processes be adopted autonomously or
endogenously. Instead, these structures and processes may be entirely imposed externally.
It is important that the superordinate organization may be expected to proceed rationally in order
to attain its own goals and objectives and, therefore, to prescribe, or to allow the relevant group or
subgroup or unit or subunit, to adopt, structures, processes, personnel, and other practices
considered by the superordinate organization to be conducive to the objectives of the superordinate
organization, and conducive to those objectives prescribed by the superordinate organization for
the relevant subordinate group, subgroup, or unit or subunit.
The existence of intraorganizational organizations has a number of implications for organizational
analysis, including the relationship between the goals of the superordinate organization and those
of the subordinate organization, which will be discussed in the next section.
Goals of Intraorganizational Organizations
Separation of Tasks and Goals
A major assumption underlying the Selznick and the March and Simon arguments here is that the
very specialist training and experience which improves the capacity of the relevant group members
to deal with the problems assigned to the group creates an asymmetry of knowledge and experience
as compared with superordinate and other groups. We would also argue that specialist training,
knowledge, and experience also creates a sense of separateness or awareness of the distinctiveness
of the focal group as compared with other groups, which may also increase the sense of
identification with, and commitment to, the focal group. This is supported by observations of
March and Simon which are noted below.
As observed by Fayol and others, the assignment of specialized tasks to the group also creates a
separation of goals vis-à-vis the superordinate group, which has higher-order goals, some of which
may be intended to be effected, in part, by the subordinate group attaining the goals of the
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subordinate group. Similar divergences of goals are likely to exist among various groups at the
same level, which have different but similar order goals, which are or may be, as a matter of fact,
related in somewhat the same way to the goals of the superordinate group. Thus, it is likely that
the instant subgroup has at least some goals which differ not only from those of the superordinate
group, but also from those of other subgroups.
March and Simon explain that “the activities originally evaluated in terms of the organization goals
are seen to have additional important ramifications for the subunits”, and that the continued success
and even expansion of a subunit “dictate a commitment to the subunit goals over and above their
contributions” to the goals of the macro-organization.85 Consequently, the “bifurcation within the
organization leads to increased conflict among organizational subunits” as a result of which “the
content of decisions made within the organization depends increasingly upon considerations of
internal strategy, particularly if there is little internalization of organizational goals by
participants. As a result there is an increase in the difference between organizational goals and
achievement and this results in an increase in delegation.”86
March and Simon are understood to maintain, then, that the goals of successful subunits must
motivate members separately from goals of the organization; that macro-level goals may not be
the subject of a lower level of awareness, internalization, and commitment by members of
intraorganizational units or groups than lower level goals; and also that the “content of decisions
made within the organization depends increasingly upon considerations of [organizational subunit]
strategy”, which is to say, the strategy of intraorganizational units, groups, or organizations.
Internalization of, and Commitment to, Intraorganizational Goals
As explained in this work, organizational goals, including that of maintaining the organization,
may find expression by individuals within the organization in terms of internalization and in terms
of commitment. March and Simon described how Selznick relates intraorganizational conflict to
internalization, saying: “The struggle for internal control not only affects directly the content of
decisions, but also causes greater elaboration of subunit ideologies. Each subunit seeks success by
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fitting its policy into the official doctrine of the large organization to legitimize its demands. Such
a tactic increases the internalization of subgoals by participants within subunits.”87
In effect, “subunit ideologies” are elaborated, at least, if not also formulated, so as to incorporate
macro-organizational “ideologies”, and thereby to confer legitimacy on subunit ideologies, goals,
and demands. For example, as discussed previously, Bouquet and Birkinshaw demonstrated the
importance to subunit power and influence of subunits constantly reaffirming their commitments
to macro-organizational objectives.88 March and Simon’s suggestion seems to be that elaboration
of organizational goals by subunits for the purpose of thereby acquiring purported legitimacy for
subunit goals also has the effect of promoting intraorganizational conflict and power struggles.
Further, according to the Selznick model, decisions are made within the subunit based on
operational criteria provided by the organization and by the subunit, with considerable importance
being given to subunit goals. In the result, subunit members become habituated in their responses
to situations which, in turn, reinforce the internalization of subunit goals.89
In their further appraisal of the Selznick model, March and Simon observe that internalization of
subgoals is partially dependent on the “operationality” of operational goals, meaning by this the
observation and testing of the achievement of organizational goals. Further, variations in
operationality of organizational goals affect the content of daily decisions, and hence the extent to
which subunit goals are internalized. Accordingly, they say that in the Selznick model “delegation
has both functional and dysfunctional consequences for the achievement of organizational goals.
It contributes both to their realization and to their deflection.”90 In this regard, as discussed
previously, Birkinshaw and Hood demonstrated that the track record of a subunit namely, “the
extent to which it has delivered, over the years, results at or above the expectations of the parent
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company” is the most critical factor affecting subsidiary evolution, which reflects subsidiary power
and influence.91
March and Simon disagree with Selznick, however, when he maintains that all increases and
decreases in goal achievement cause an increase in delegation; arguing, instead, that “by suitable
changes in the extent to which organizational goals are operational or in the internalization of
organizational goals by participants, some of the dysfunctional effects of delegation can be
reduced.”92 Thus, March and Simon claim that both of these mechanisms, operationalization and
internalization, can be used as “dampers” to limit the operation of the dysfunctional mechanisms
of delegation and intraorganizational internalization of, and commitment to, the goals of
intraorganizational units or groups.
March and Simon thus contemplate that the prioritization of organizational and subunit goals can
be influenced by intraorganizational action, including action by management of the organization.
That point has been made at various points in the present work.
Formal Structure and Relationships
Institutionalization of Relationships
As discussed, such institutional analysts as Weber, Barnard, and Fayol have remarked on the
institutionalization of relationships within bureaucratic or formal organizations. They treat such
institutionalization of relationships as part of, or at least endemic in, structure.
Merton characterizes the interaction among parties in the hierarchy as involving “a considerable
degree of formality and clearly defined social distance between the occupants of these positions”
with a “more or less complicated social ritual”. He observes that such formality “serves to
minimize friction by largely restricting (official) contact and modes which are previously defined
by the rules of the organization”, which permits “ready calculability of others’ behaviour and a
stable set of mutual expectations” and also “facilitates the interaction of the occupants of offices
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despite their (possibly hostile) private attitudes toward one another.”93 He maintains, then, that
such formality increases tendencies towards rationality. This is reminiscent of Weber and Barnard.
Selznick is emphatic on this point, saying that the “security of all participants, and of the system
as a whole, generates a persistent pressure for the institutionalization of relationships, which are
thus removed from the uncertainties of individual fealty or sentiment. Moreover, it is necessary
for the relations within the structure to be determined in such a way that individuals will be
interchangeable and the organization will be free of dependence upon personal qualities. In this
way, the formal structure becomes subject to calculable manipulation, an instrument of rational
action.”94 In effect, the formalization of relationships is rationally coherent in terms of
organizational teleology, although it may present substantial practical difficulties, as discussed
next.
Roles and Depersonalization of Relationships
Selznick maintains that: “From the standpoint of organization as a formal system, persons are
viewed functionally, in respect of their roles, as participants in assigned segments of the
cooperative system. But in fact individuals have a propensity to resist depersonalization, to spill
over the boundaries of their segmentary roles, to participate as wholes.”95 In effect, the role identity
of an individual as a participant in the organization does not exhaust either that individual’s social
identity or their personal identity.
Selznick further acknowledges this when he says that “the whole individual raises new problems
for the organization, partly because he brings with him a set of established habits as well, perhaps,
as commitments to special groups outside of the organization.” Put another way, the “whole
individual” may act in ways that are not determined by, and consistent with, that individual’s role.
Consequently, “the needs of individuals do not permit a single-minded attention to the stated goals
of the system within which they have been assigned”, which is the principal hazard inherent in the
act of delegation.96
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For example, in the case of delegation, functions and powers are assigned to roles or official
positions, rather than to individuals as such, “however, delegation necessarily involves concrete
individuals who have interests and goals which do not always coincide with the goals of the formal
system. As a consequence, individual personalities may offer resistance to the demands made upon
them by the official conditions of delegation”.97 In other words, individuals may act in ways that
are not role-determined.
As maintained by Weber, Barnard and Fayol, within the organization, contractual and other
arrangements endeavour to ensure an appropriate relationship between the demands of the system,
as expressed in instructions emanating from superordinate levels, and in the willingness of
individuals, groups, and subgroups within the organization to accept and implement such
instructions. Observing certain formalities as between the giver of instructions and the receiver
facilitates greater recognition that the imperative emanates from the organization through a
particular official or “office” as Weber would say, rather than from an individual person as such.
March and Simon relate this to Gouldner’s approach, which emphasizes the use of general and
impersonal rules regulating work procedures. They indicate that “one consequence of such rules
is to decrease the visibility of power relations within the group” which, in the American culture of
egalitarian norms, increases the legitimacy of the supervisory position and therefore decreases
tension within the group.98
We submit that this decrease in intragroup tension may also contribute to establishing a groupcentric orientation, as indicated by measures of group identity and group commitment. We also
note that unofficial contact within a group or between individuals in different groups, which may
often be informal, typically characterizes relationships which are often personal, even face-to-face,
and which involve factors which may mitigate against interpersonal friction.
Repersonalization of Relationships
An early exponent of modern management theory, Mary Parker Follett, commented on these
matters in an article first presented in 1925, in which she claimed that scientific management tends
to depersonalize orders, since “one might call the essence of scientific management the attempt to

97
98

Ibid at 27.
Supra note 21 at 39 [emphasis in the original].

377

find the law of the situation. With scientific management the managers are as much under orders
as the workers, for both obey the law of the situation.”99 Her comments on depersonalization merit
further examination.
Follett argued that the job of scientific management is not to devise methods to ensure obedience
to orders, but is, instead, “how to devise methods by which we can best discover the order integral
to a particular situation. When that is found, the employee can issue it to the employer, as well as
employer to employee. This often happens easily and naturally.”100 Like Taylor,101 Follett assumes
that the knowledge, experience and “know-how” of the worker makes a valuable, even essential,
contribution to this process, which seeks to ameliorate the effects of bounded rationality.
Her perspective challenges Weber’s view that direct hierarchy is the best form of leadership for
large organizations, while it also exhibits some similarities to Taylor’s earlier explication of
scientific management. Many organization and management theorists would argue that there are
but limited situations in which the exigencies of time and other matters permit a “quest” to discover
the law of the situation; and that, consequently, Follett’s perspective is a form of idealization.
That said, her conceptualization of the “quest” may be a useful thought-guide. Organizational
participants may be seen as being thereby directed to consider the relevant circumstances, and to
make a determination as to the range of responses, group of responses, or individual response,
which is most appropriate to the situation at hand. Follett’s perspective may be particularly relevant
to organizations characterized by highly educated, highly intelligent, and highly motivated
workforces; for example, in technology and other knowledge-based businesses, which often also
adopt modern “flat hierarchy” schemes of organization considered to be appropriate for such
businesses and workforces.
Follett’s concept of obeying the “law of the situation”, of course, invisibilizes, or, at least, attempts
to invisibilize, the imbalance in power as between superior and inferior offices or their incumbents.
In some ways, her approach amounts to a deinstitutionalization of intraorganizational relationships
in which, she says, the “bossing pattern” of “bossing” on the one hand, and of being bossed and
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being in opposition to the bossing, on the other hand, are replaced by uniting “all concerned in a
study of the situation, to discover the law of the situation and obey that.”102
In her scheme, to a large extent, the “role” assigned to the various parties to intraorganizational
relationships (superior, inferior, or other) is de-emphasized to permit a shared role of inquiry,
although, admittedly, one in which there is necessarily some inherent imbalance in the
circumstances of participation. Of course, de-emphasizing roles may permit individuals to
instantiate extraorganizational aspects of their social identity, behaving, perhaps, as more of a
“whole person”, which may de-rationalize the process.
Follett refers to this process as depersonalizing orders and authority, but ultimately finds this
expression inadequate, saying, instead, “I think it really is a matter of repersonalizing. We,
persons, have relations with each other, but we should find them in and through the whole situation.
We cannot have any sound relations with each other as long as we take them out of that setting
which gives them their meaning and value. This divorcing of persons and the situation does a great
deal of harm. I have just said that scientific management depersonalizes; the deeper philosophy of
scientific management shows us personal relations within the whole setting of that thing of which
they are a part.”103
Of course, the setting that gives intraorganizational relations “their meaning and value” relates to
the organization itself, as well as its structure and processes, including the relationships among
intraorganizational groups, and those among individual members of those groups, and those among
individual members of those groups and such groups. It may be, however, that Follett is averting
to “meaning and value” in the sense of how the activity in which the relationship is concerned “fits
into” the overall organizational scheme, so as to give such activity “meaning and value” within the
context.
It will be recalled that Bittner maintained that a formal and rational scheme of organization may
link remote persons and performances into concerted action and that “each link derives its meaning
not so much from the specific rule that determines it, but from the entire order of which the rule
itself is a part”. He suggested that it may be possible to devise “a principle of discipline that derives
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from the formal style of the rational scheme and which works against centrifugal tendencies and
heterogeneity” and will appear coherent.104 Follett may have anticipated Bittner’s analysis in this
respect.
It is clear, then, that the “structuring” of relationships is generally considered by organizational
theorists to represent one aspect of the structure of an organization. This is true of modern business
corporations, as well as other organizations. It now remains to consider the “informal” structure
and relationships within the organization, which is often discussed in terms of the organization’s
“informal structure”.
Informal Structure and Relationships
Prevalence
The present work has averted, from time to time, to an informal organization, and its structure,
processes, and personnel, which may operate either “outside”, or “alongside”, or, in some more or
less integrated fashion, in connection with, the formal organization, structure, processes, and
personnel.
While there may be some tendency to regard the existence of such an informal organization as
counter-organizational or as counter-rational, Chester Barnard, at least, regarded the informal
organization as “essential to formal organizations, particularly with reference to communication…
not only [to] the organization as a whole, or [to] its ultimate subordinate units, but also [to] that
special part which we call the executive organization”, describing “the maintenance of informal
executive organization as an essential means of communication”.105 He found that “in all the good
organizations I observed the most careful attention is paid” to the informal executive organization,
that informal organizations operate in all good organizations, and that “this is usually not apparent
except to those directly concerned.”106
Barnard’s focus, as expected in a book so entitled, is on the functions of the executive in this
respect. However, it is commonly thought that informal organizations exercise a role at nonexecutive levels of the hierarchy as well, and perhaps even throughout the hierarchy at every level.
It is likely that the effects of the informal organization may differ at various levels of the hierarchy,
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having regard to a number of factors. These may include the extent, and perhaps the type, of
discretion conferred on officials at such hierarchical level. However, as discussed below, it is
expected that the informal organization may have some impact throughout the organization.
Roles and Relationships in Formal and Informal Structures
As discussed earlier in the chapter, particularly in the previous section entitled “Formal Structure
and Relationships”, the institutionalization of relationships within bureaucratic or formal
organizations has been central to the work of many institutional analysts, including Weber,
Barnard, Fayol, Merton, Selznick, March and Simon, and Follett. In effect, relationships among
individuals within the formal organization are characterized in terms of the roles assigned to those
individuals within it.
However, as discussed in that section, the role identity assigned to an individual as a participant in
the organization does not exhaust either the social identity or the personal identity of the individual
participant. As Selznick notes, individuals resist depersonalization and may express this by acting
outside such roles and participating as whole individuals, rather than as “depersonalized”
individuals who are wholly role-dependent. Commensurate with Follett’s observations, they may
seek to repersonalize their intraorganizational relationships.
In our opinion, these observations are consistent with, and seem to explicate, the existence and
operation of an informal organization, involving an informal structure and informal relationships.
Individuals resisting deindividuation, intraorganizational definition solely by role assignment, and
depersonalization of relationships may express these aspirations in the informal organization,
informal structure, and informal relationships. Ambitious individuals may seek to expand their
activities beyond their assigned roles, while less ambitious, or even timorous, individuals may seek
to limit their role-assigned activities, perhaps as a result of fear of failure or other considerations.
Furthermore, of course, a particular intraorganizational role is not expected to be entirely unitary
or even singular. That role may involve, instead, a role at the macro-organizational level, say at
the level of the corporation, as well as other roles within various groups and subgroups. As
discussed in Chapter Seven, the individual concerned may adopt various strategies in order to
instantiate those various role-identities in particular circumstances. We submit that such strategies
may include participation in role-identities outside the focal role by informal means, that is to say,
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through the informal organization, informal structure, and informal relationships. We submit that
such participation may involve some accommodation of the individual’s various role-identities.
Invisibility of Informal Organizations and Relationships
Barnard’s observation that the operation of informal organizations within formal organizations is
usually not apparent except to those directly concerned is not unimportant. It suggests, among
other things, that someone who is an outsider with respect to the organization or relevant group or
subgroup cannot, simply by examining the organizational chart with respect to the same, determine
the actual, rather than ideal, assignments of authority and responsibility, and the sources and nature
of power and influence in respect of the formal organization. Instead, such a determination would
seem to require some empirical investigation concerning the instantiation of such matters, both in
general, and in the case at hand.
Among other things, this has the consequence that the situs of actual decision-making, as well as
authority and responsibility, may not always be apparent from the organizational chart. On the one
hand, it may be more widely distributed than as indicated there; but, on the other hand, it may be
more concentrated, instead.
This may become extremely important in connection with the application of sanctions internally,
that is to say, within the organization or relevant group or subgroup, and externally, that is to say,
from outside the organization taking it as the focal unit, or outside the relevant group or subgroup
but within the organization more generally. Just as the existence and operation of the informal
organization and the related issue of informal relations complicate the question concerning who
may properly be considered blameworthy with respect to some misadventure of the relevant focal
unit, so it is a complicated question concerning where and to whom credit may properly be
assigned with respect to some achievement of the relevant focal unit.
It can readily be seen that both aspects of sanctioning, positive and negative, may be affected,
including such matters as bonuses, negative readjustments of bonuses previously determined or
paid, and imposition of legal liability by way of fines and penalties by individuals or groups of
individuals or relevant subsidiary company actors within the corporation and at all organizational
levels.
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Informal Communication
Focusing on “the executive”, of course, Barnard observes that the “functions of informal executive
organization are the communication of intangible facts, opinions, suggestions, suspicions, that
cannot pass through formal channels without raising issues calling for decisions, without
dissipating dignity and objective authority, and without overloading executive positions; also to
minimize excessive cliques resulting from too great divergence of interests and views; to promote
self-discipline of the group; and to make possible the development of important personal
influences in the organization.”107 While Barnard focuses on the transmission of information, he
also indicates that the informal executive organization may also perform other functions. Again, it
may be expected that at least some of these functions, particularly the communication of
information, may be exercised informally to some extent at other levels in the hierarchy.
Barnard explains that informal executive organization can accomplish a number of important
results, one of which is “avoiding formal issues, that is, for avoiding the issuance of numerous
formal orders except on routine matters and except in emergencies”, thereby avoiding
disagreement which might challenge the exercise of authority, or of cooperation. Instead, he says
that many major executives seldom issue explicit orders or judgments on important issues,
preferring, instead to use them as means of expressing agreement with authority.108 Such a
procedure, of course, tends to reduce the visibility of the exercise, and imbalance, of power.
In effect, then, such executives, instead, “informally” communicate their views, judgments, and
decisions, leaving it to affected subordinates to act accordingly. It can be readily seen that such
informal communications may complicate identifying whether, when, and where, and by whom,
the relevant judgments or decisions have been made.
In many cases, informal communication of the views of the superior will elucidate a response by
the subordinate that the superior wants or expects the subordinate to take a certain action, but
without issuing any order or instruction to that effect. Instead, it may be argued that the course of
action appropriate in all the circumstances becomes apparent to the subordinate. It may even be
said, cynically or otherwise, that the subordinate discovers “the law of the situation”. This is
discussed further below.
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Personal Influence
Barnard avers that another merit of informal organization, at least at the executive level, is that it
can enable positive exercises of personal influence. He notes that “many men not only exercise
beneficent influence far beyond that implied by their formal status, but most of them, at the time,
would lose their influence if they had corresponding formal status”. He speculates that this may
be because “many men have personal qualifications of high order that will not operate under the
stress of commensurate official responsibility”, like top golfers who cannot perform in
tournaments.109 This is broadly consistent with Taylor’s insistence that management incorporate
into its rulemaking all of the experience and expertise available within the organization, at all
levels, generally.
Barnard may also be claiming that the influence which some individuals attain with respect to their
peers, in effect, as embodying the “best judgment” of that peer level would be dissipated, and, in
fact, even lost completely, if the individual was promoted even to the next higher level of the
hierarchy. In that case, that individual would no longer embody the “best judgment” of the
individual’s preceding peer level, as they have ceased to be “peers” at that level. This may be
particularly important where and to the extent that collective decision-making, involving
unanimity, general concurrence, or otherwise, is practiced.
In a case in which the judgment of the “next best” individual at that peer level is considered to be
substantially inferior to that of the focal individual, promoting the focal individual might result in
a loss which might be greater than the benefits achieved by means of the promotion. The example
can be further extended by positing that the judgments made at the preceding peer level are of
great importance. Again, in that case, the loss of “leadership” by the relevant individual among
those peers might be extremely detrimental to the organization generally.
It will be recalled that one advantage of formal organization as it pertains to the exercise of
authority and responsibility is that incumbents of offices or positions are assumed to be fungible,
easily replaceable, and devoid of personal characteristics, and, in particular, characteristics that
might tend to personalize authority and responsibility, thereby inhibiting homogeneity. In effect,
Barnard maintains that some of the disbeneficial aspects of formal or bureaucratic organization
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can be mitigated, while the beneficial aspects may largely be maintained, by informal
organizational activity.
Accordingly, Barnard recognizes that influence within the organization is not only a product of
official status, but may also reflect the knowledge, experience, and judgment of the individual
concerned, and the recognition and approbation of the same by others within the organization or
within the relevant intraorganizational group. Clearly, personal influence can also be exercised
with negative effects; however, in at least some cases, such results may be restrained by formal or
informal mechanisms.
Generalizability among Types of Organizations
Importantly, Barnard acknowledges the existence and significance of informal organizations
which are related to formal organizations. This accords with the observations previously made in
the present work. It is also important to note that, while Barnard tends to concentrate his discussion,
and his examples, on business enterprises, particularly those engaged in manufacturing, his
observations are usually more generalized and extend to all organizations.
For example, Chapter VII of his book, which chapter is entitled “The Theory of Formal
Organization”, makes clear that the term “efficiency” as conceived in his book “is not used in the
specialized and limited sense of ordinary industrial practice or any restricted sense applicable to
technological processes”, since Barnard thinks that his usage has little meaning as applied to other
kinds of organizations, such as churches, patriotic societies, scientific societies, and theatrical and
musical organizations. Instead, efficiency, for Barnard, signifies “efficiency relative to the
securing of necessary personal contributions to the cooperative system.”110 This recalls March’s
analysis of organizations, particularly the firm, as a political system as discussed under that
heading in Chapter Six of the present work.
In the case of organizations that are not business enterprises, he says that “material inducements”,
by which he primarily means money, are not particularly efficient. It is not clear, however, how
Barnard ascertains this. It may relate to determining the quantum of personal contributions to the
cooperative system that are necessary in order to induce their being made. If so, the question arises
how to determine, and how to measure, it, and on what scale.
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It seems that only a comparative, rather than absolute, determination, measure or scale would avail.
For example, if funds are advanced to a particular corporation by way of loan, the absolute rate of
interest “demanded for such contribution” in the relevant circumstances would lack relevance,
absent a consideration of those circumstances and a comparison of those against other relevant
circumstances. Accordingly, the application of such a measure of efficiency seems problematic.
Barnard’s use of the term “efficiency”, of course, differs from use of such term in classical and
neoclassical economics, where it is usually applied to the production cost curve and in relation to
diminishing marginal costs. The sense of the term in which Barnard uses it does not arise in that
connection. Among other reasons, as we have indicated previously, this is, in part, because the
“black box” of production, the process of generating products and services, does not arise in the
context of securing contributions from participants which are necessary to effect the organization’s
purpose.
By comparison, Barnard’s use of the term arises only in that context. It can be seen that informal
structures, relationships, and communications are considered by Barnard to contribute to
“efficiency” in industrial enterprises, other business enterprises, and other organizations having
significantly different objectives. The “organization” element of the “business organization” is,
for Barnard, fundamentally common to such organizations. Accordingly, the activities of business
organizations, including the modern business corporation, may be expected to have certain
fundamental commonalities within organizations of diverse goals.
Formal Organizations and Informal Organizations
Functions of Formal Organizations and Informal Organizations
Herbert Simon maintains that the formal organization, which is “a set of abstract, more or less
permanent relations that govern the behavior of each participant”, is created by “procedural
coordination – the specification of the lines of authority, and the spheres of activity and authority
of each organizational member”.111 Formal authority is exercised to establish and enforce the
scheme of formal organization, which then itself prescribes the lines of authority and division of
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work to be followed in carrying the work of the organization. It may also establish the scope of
authority, procedures, and lines of communication.112 We associate the latter two items not only
with structure but also what we denominate here as “process”.
Accordingly, Simon, like Weber, characterizes an organization as a relationship, which he says is
abstract but “more or less permanent” in terms of governing the behaviour of each participant.
Unlike Weber, he expresses this not in terms of expectation, but in terms of authority. His
description makes it clear that the “participants” in the formal organization are individuals and that
they are “members” of the organization. It is assumed that the formal organization has some
common purpose. It is also evident that the social unit or group of persons concerned in the
organization is structured or “organized” with the objective of attaining such purpose.
Like Weber and other social theorists, Simon talks about the organization as a relationship.
However, instead of referring to the “organization” as the relationship, Simon himself
characterizes the “formal organization” as the operative relationship, as if the “formal
organization” was somehow different from the “organization” as such. One might have expected
that the “formal organization” would differ from the “organization” not only by reason of the
formality of the relationships described, but also by reason of the “formal organization” being the
reified or entified version of the “organization”. One might have expected, in that event, that the
“formal organization” would be described as having a “scheme of organization” which could then
be analyzed in terms of divisions, spheres, and lines, of authority.
In the result, of course, the conceptual and definitional problems previously discussed in this
chapter and otherwise in this book continue to assert themselves even in Simon’s work. For
example, Simon talks about the “formal scheme of organization”, not simply the “formal
organization”, as an ideal type. He argues that the “formal scheme of organization will always
differ from the “organization as it actually operates”; firstly, because the formal scheme is unlikely
to be complete, in that it may omit many interpersonal relationships; and, secondly, because “the
interpersonal relations in the organization as it operates may be in actual contradiction to the
specifications”,113 which is to say that the established rules and procedures are not always
followed.
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While this suggests the existence of an “informal organization”, Simon acknowledges this
explicitly, referring to it as the “interpersonal relations in the organization that affect decisions
within it but either are omitted from the formal scheme or are not consistent with that scheme”,
and observing that probably “no formal organization will operate effectively without an
accompanying informal organization.”114 As noted in the preceding paragraph, Simon claims that
this is partly because “the formal structure could not be specified in such detail as to obviate the
need for an informal supplement”. But, while necessary, the informal relations that are permitted
to develop within the formal structure must be limited and contained by the formal organization if
the formal organization is to be effective.115
Simon also maintains that “it is an important function of the formal organization to prevent the
development of organization politics – struggle for influence and authority – to a point that would
be deleterious to the functioning of the organization”. Instead, the formal structure should
encourage the development of the informal structure along constructive lines, including facilitating
cross-fertilization and cooperation.116 The implication, of course, is that the informal structure,
either by providing a situs for organizational politics or by restraining its pursuit within the actual
formal structure, may prevent seriously dysfunctional struggles for influence and authority within
the formal structure.
Common Purpose, Intraorganizational Cooperation, and the Zone of Acceptance
Within

the

formal

organization,

authority

significantly

determines

the

actions

of

intraorganizational participants. Simon says that “the most striking characteristic of the
“subordinate” role is that it establishes an area of acceptance in behavior within which the
subordinate is willing to accept the decisions made for him by his superior” and that “his choice is
then determined, always within the area of acceptance, by his superior, and the relation of superiorsubordinate holds only within this area.”117 Simon acknowledges Barnard’s origination of this
concept, which Barnard calls the “zone of indifference”118, but which Simon calls the “zone of
acceptance”.119
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For Barnard, this acceptance is implicit in his concept of an organization. He says that “an
organization comes into being when (1) there are persons able to communicate with each other (2)
who are willing to contribute action (3) to accomplish a common purpose”. Accordingly, the
“vitality of an organization lies in the willingness of individuals to contribute forces to the
cooperative system”, which willingness requires the belief that the purpose can be carried out and
also requires that individual contributors secure satisfactions, which exceed the sacrifices required,
in the process of carrying out the purpose.120 Presumably, this demonstrates that the organization
is “efficient” in the Barnardian sense discussed in the section on Informal Structure and
Relationships under the heading “Generalizability Among Types of Organizations”.
Accordingly, Barnard asserts that “a purpose does not incite cooperative activity unless it is
accepted by those whose efforts will constitute the organization” such that “there is initially
something like simultaneity in the acceptance of the purpose and willingness to cooperate.”121 In
this context, willingness “means self-abnegation, the surrender of control of personal conduct, the
depersonalization of personal action”, the effect of which is cohesion of effort or sticking together,
and the cause of which is the disposition necessary to “sticking together”. The latter is required to
maintain sustained personal effort as a contribution to cooperation.122
Barnard says that such willingness vis-à-vis the organization may be expressed as loyalty,
solidarity, or esprit de corps, and relates to the intensity of attachment to the “cause”.123 This use
of the term “willingness” is distinctive, even unusual, inasmuch as it involves a substantial degree
of commitment. Barnard maintains, however, that “the willingness of an individual cannot be
constant in degree [but] is necessarily intermittent and fluctuating”, with the consequence that “the
aggregate willingness of potential contributors to any formal cooperative system is unstable.”124
Barnard takes a utilitarian approach to motivation, saying that willingness to cooperate “is the
expression of the net satisfactions or dissatisfactions experienced or anticipated by each individual
in comparison with those experienced or anticipated through alternative opportunities… either
personal and individualistic or those supported by other organizations”. Consequently, willingness
120
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to participate “is the net effect, first, of the inducements to do so in conjunction with the sacrifices
involved, and then in comparison with the practically available net satisfactions afforded by
alternatives.”125 We may conclude that this likely involves Barnard’s concept, and measurement,
of “efficiency”: Efficiency, he seems to argue, consists in, and may be measured by, this scale of
net satisfactions or dissatisfactions in comparison with available alternatives. This accords with
our previous comments.
In the case of the employer and employee relationship, the willingness of each of the parties to
contribute to the formal cooperative system which constitutes their relationship is affected by
Barnard’s “zone of indifference” or Simon’s “zone of acceptance”.
The Range of the Zone of Indifference or Acceptance
For Simon, the factors affecting the zone of indifference include: for the employer, the fact that
without it, the employer gains nothing from the employee; for the employee, the fact that he or she
may genuinely be relatively indifferent, albeit within certain limits; the nature and magnitude of
incentives; status and prestige; relations within the working group; possibility of promotion;
possibility of other material and nonmaterial incentives; desire to maintain the organization;
loyalty to the objectives of the organization; and loyalty to the organization itself.126 Social
attitudes, social and other sanctions, and the avoidance of social disapprobation and
embarrassment may also be factors.127
Simon argues that organizational values are substituted for individual values within the zone of
acceptance, and when the focal individual is behaving impersonally or “organizationally”, but that
personal motives become apparent and hence restrict these organizational values when outside the
zone of acceptance.128
It thus becomes apparent that the “zone of acceptance” or “zone of indifference” actually relates
to the role conferred upon, and accepted by, the incumbent of the office; and, further, that the
consent to enacting that role is exhausted when the limits of the role are reached. Accordingly, it
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is somewhat misleading to say, as does Simon, that “if it is attempted to carry authority beyond”
the subordinate’s “zone of acceptance” then “disobedience will follow.”129 Instead, it is more
accurate to say that the “zone of acceptance or “zone of obedience” has been exhausted, exceeded,
or terminated at the point in question. Indeed, as noted above under the heading
“Institutionalization of Relationships”, it may be more meaningful to conclude that the individual’s
“organizational role” has been exhausted, exceeded, or terminated at that point, at which point the
individual commences to reassert his or her social identity or personal identity without reference
to organizational role or identity.
Cooperative Systems, Authority, and Acceptance
Selznick also makes an important contribution to examining the relationship between the formal
organization and the informal organization. As previously noted, he regards organization as an
open economy and as an adaptive social structure. “Considered as an economy, organization is a
system of relationships which define the availability of scarce resources and which may be
manipulated in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.”130
He maintains that the ability to manipulate those relationships in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness is affected by the structure of the organization, and not only by its processes of
delegation and control. Manipulating the system of coordination “depends on the extent to which
that system is operating within an environment of effective inducement to individual participants
and of the conditions in which the stability of authority is assured.” Like Simon, he credits this
conclusion to Barnard.131
Consequently, says Selznick, “The indivisibility of control and consent makes it necessary to view
formal organizations as cooperative systems, widening the frame of reference of those concerned
with the manipulation of organizational resources.”132 As demonstrated earlier in the present
discussion, Barnard also treated organizations as cooperative systems. That is to say, both experts
hold, in effect, that the efficacy of formal organizations is dependent, at least in part, upon the
establishment, and the continued existence and stability, of a range of cooperation between the
organization and its participants, as well as among those participants, within which range
129
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participants consent to be controlled by the organization and its authorized participants or within
which range they agree to cooperate as members of such a cooperative system. Selznick thus agrees
with Barnard and with Simon on this point.
Each of these authors maintains that a necessary component of such intraorganizational agreement
on the part of members of the organization is that the organization and its authorized participants
will not attempt to exercise control over participants except in specified and mutually agreed
circumstances. As Weber maintains, such rules and procedures are established in the “order”
bringing into being the organization itself, whether autonomously or heteronomously.
As demonstrated in Part 1 of this book, the legal authority of the corporation and its agents is
similarly circumscribed, in this case, by law, which is the “order” by which it is brought into being
as a legal entity. Consequently, it may be said that the authority, and the zone of acceptance, of the
organization vis-à-vis its members is, in the case of the corporation, given effect by the law and
other legally required procedures pursuant to which the corporation is established as a legal entity.
What is particularly characteristic of the corporation, then, is the legal status, as a legal entity,
which accompanies its coming into being pursuant to the “order” which brings into being, which
is the “legal order”. Other organizations which are constituted as “legal entities” by the legal order
which brings them into being as such may also be expected to display similar attributes. The
“difference” in this regard, then, between the corporation and many, if not most, other forms of
organization is that because the order by which it is established is the “legal order”, it may possess
attributes which relate directly to the “legal order”, and which, as a matter of law, and as a matter
of fact, may be conferred only by the legal order.
Intraorganizational Roles and Extraorganizational Roles
For Selznick, formal structures can “never succeed in conquering the non-rational dimensions of
organizational behaviour” which “remain at once indispensable to the continued existence of the
system of coordination and at the same time the source of friction, dilemma, doubt, and ruin.” He
explains that: “This fundamental paradox arises from the fact that rational action systems are
inescapably imbedded in an institutional matrix in two significant senses; (1) the action system –
or the formal structure of delegation and control which is its organizational expression – is itself
only an aspect of a concrete social structure made up of individuals who may interact as wholes,
not simply in terms of their formal roles within the system; and (2) the formal system, and the
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social structure within which it finds concrete existence, are alike subject to the pressure of an
institutional environment to which some over-all adjustment must be made.”133
As discussed in the present work, social identity theory, as expressed by Ashforth and Mael,
considers an individual’s identity to be “an amalgam of loosely coupled identities”, rather than a
unified, consistent whole.134 As discussed in Chapter Four under the subheading “Role Conflict”,
according to those authors, these “identities” relate to the various roles assumed by the individual.
Individuals within the organization enact various aspects of their own social identity, as well as
their own personal identity; and, further, may seek to accommodate differences in these identities,
which, in effect, means differences in the behaviour normally attributable to such identities, in
different ways, and at different times, depending on a number of factors, including perceived
salience at the instant time.135
However, the primary interaction of such individuals within the organization concerned, and that
which is usually of greatest concern to the organization, is intraorganizational interaction, which
is rationally defined by the organization itself as the interaction most immediately relevant to the
organization. Accordingly, the interactions within the organization which are not relevant to the
organization in rational terms may tend to be disregarded. Of course, this does not eliminate
interactions which are non-rationally based.
In Selznick’s analysis, “from the standpoint of individuals as a formal system, persons are viewed
functionally, in respect of their roles, as participants in assigned segments of the cooperative
system. But in fact individuals have a propensity to resist depersonalization, to spill over the
boundaries of their segmentary roles, to participate as wholes” and the “whole individual raises
new problems for the organization partly because of the needs of his own personality, partly
because he brings with him a set of established habits as well, perhaps, as commitments to special
groups outside of the organization.”136 As we have previously noted, Selznick thus expresses, in
terms of the enaction of “roles”, observations previously made by Barnard and by Simon, although
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in terms of position and authority vis-à-vis the organization, but also made by Ashforth and Mael,
more generally, as noted above under the present heading.
Selznick’s observation here is also consistent with modern social identity theory insofar as the
individual is expected by the organization to instantiate in his or her behaviour within, and in
relation to, the organization, and its intraorganizational groups and individual members, only the
intraorganizational role to which he or she is assigned by the organization. Yet, as we have seen,
that intraorganizational role and corresponding identity may not be single and completely
homogeneous.
Put another way, such intraorganizational role and corresponding identity is only one aspect of the
“whole person” of the individual, as Selznick describes it, and does not in any way exhaust all of
the individual’s other identities or roles. Instead, the extraorganizational roles and identities of
such individuals may also continue to be operative even as the individual undertakes functions or
roles within the organization. Selznick does not explicitly reference in this discussion the
heterogeneity of the individual’s intraorganizational roles and identities, but he does recognize the
existence of the individual’s extraorganizational roles and identities.
Selznick says that when individuals exercise non-assigned roles, the formal systems “cannot take
account of the deviations thus introduced, and consequently break down as instruments of control
when relied upon alone.” At least in part, he attributes these deviations to the fact that
“unfortunately for the adequacy of formal systems of coordination, the needs of individuals do not
permit a single-minded attention to the stated goals of the system within which they have been
assigned. The hazard inherent in the act of delegation derives essentially from this fact.” 137 Of
course, it is also possible to attribute such “breakdown in control” to the fact that the consent of
the individual participant to organizational control, which Selznick posits, is necessarily limited to
the organizational role or function assigned, as was noted, in varying language, by Weber,
Chandler Barnard, and Simon. As such, it would appear that it ceases to operate beyond that limit.
While the organization delegates formal functions and powers to roles or official positions,
“delegation necessarily involves concrete individuals who have goals and interests which do not
always coincide with the goals of a formal system. As a consequence, individual personalities may
137
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offer resistance to the demands made upon them by the official conditions of delegation.” 138 This
kind of resistance by individuals may be expressed individually or, if related to more widely held
goals and interests, even collectively.
In both cases, Selznick maintains that individual resistance may be acknowledged and recognized
by action, or may be ignored and sublimated. If diversions of goals and interests from
organizational goals and interests and their expression in individual resistance arise with some
frequency, intraorganizational action, whether by the formal organization or by some informal
organization, may eventuate, in an attempt to suppress such resistance. As we have noted
frequently, these results may also attend delegation to intraorganizational groups.
Informal Organizations and Institutionalized Deviance
In Selznick’s terms, “in large organizations, deviations from the formal system tend to become
institutionalized, such that “unwritten laws” and informal associations are established.
Institutionalization removes such deviations from the realm of personality differences,
transforming them into a persistent structural aspect of formal organizations. These
institutionalized rules and modes of informal cooperation, he says, are normally attempts by
participants in the formal organization to control the group relations which form the environment
of organizational decisions.”139 In effect, such informal associations and informal methods of
organization permit certain limited variances or deviations from the rules of formal organization.
As suggested here, it is likely that only recurring deviations will become institutionalized in this
manner. However, the recurrence of deviations of diverse manner may contribute to the rise of an
informal organization, which may also be able to deal with previously unobserved, or novel,
deviations. Importantly, though, unwritten rules, informal associations, and other aspects of
informal organization are often said to arise largely in an effort to control the relations, not among
individuals, but, instead, among groups within the organization.
Selznick agrees with Barnard, then, that informal organizations, structures, processes, and the like
may have positive, negative, or relatively benign, effects. He also seems to agree with a proposition
previously asserted in this work, namely, that goals and objectives of such informal organizations
may exhibit different degrees of longevity, persistence, and recurrence. He states that the “informal
138
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patterns (such as cliques) arise spontaneously, are based on personal relationships, and are usually
directed to the control of some specific situation. They may be generated anywhere within a
hierarchy, often with deleterious consequences for the formal goals of the organization, but they
may also function to widen the available resources of executive control and thus contribute to
rather than hinder the achievement of the stated objectives of the organization.”140
Selznick also suggests that the informal organization may also tend to introduce and act as a bridge
towards potential modifications of the formal organization, saying: “The deviations tend to force
a shift away from the purely formal system as the effective determinant of behavior to (1) a
condition in which informal patterns buttress the formal, as through the manipulation of sentiment
within the organization in favor of established authority; or (2) a condition wherein the informal
controls effect a consistent modification of formal goals, as in the case of some bureaucratic
patterns. This trend will eventually result in the formalization of erstwhile informal activities, with
the cycle of deviation and transformation beginning again on a new level.”141
Of course, it may be that either of these effects enables some informal testing of possible
innovations without the accoutrements and consequences of formal and official recognition. That
is to say, informal reinforcement of formal patterns may test the extent to which such patterns
continue to be accepted as valid and effective. Informal modification of goals by informal controls
may permit an informal test of the validity, efficacy, and acceptance, of the original goals and, at
the same time, of the extent to which such goals may come or should be, modified. This kind of
informal testing, however, would not necessarily invoke the kinds of authorization, controls, and
precedental concerns which might accompany more formal testing.
Organizational Continuity and Cooptation
The tendency of an organization to seek to maintain its integrity and continuity has been discussed
earlier in this work. Selznick deftly explains how informal organization and a process which he
identifies as “cooptation” may be employed as relevant mechanisms for these purposes, for which
reason some further extensive reference to his work follows.
Selznick expresses the need to maintain the organization in terms of five principal imperatives:
Firstly, the security of the organization as a whole in relation to social forces in its environment.
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Secondly, the stability of the lines of authority and communication. Thirdly, the stability of
informal relations within the organization, including the relationships of individuals and subgroups
with the organization. Fourthly, the continuity of policy and of the sources of its determination,
for each level within the organization, and for the organization as a whole. Fifthly, a homogeneity
of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the organization, in effect, “a unity derived from
a common understanding of what the character of the organization is meant to be.”142
Challenges to the organization’s integrity and continuance may be expected to invoke various
defensive mechanisms, one of which, according to Selznick, is a tendency to construct ideologies
reflecting the need to come to terms with major social forces, and another which is cooptation. It
is easy to appreciate what Selznick means by referring to the tendency to construct ideologies. On
the other hand, he employs the term “cooptation” in a particular sense, by which he means “the
process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an
organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence.”143 He explains that formal
authority may resort to cooptation where “there exists a hiatus between consent and control, so
that the legitimacy of the formal authority is called into question.” Incorporating into the leadership
organization new elements “which in some way reflect the sentiment, or possess the confidence of
the relevant public or mass” may “lend respectability or legitimacy to the organs of control and
thus reestablish the stability of formal authority.”144
We would note that there appears to be some relationship between informal organization and
cooptation, both of which may sometimes operate to bolster legitimate formal authority. Formal
authority may also employ cooptation as a response to organized forces applying or threatening to
apply power against the formal authority, for example, where outside elements independently
command funds or other resources which the organization requires. In this case, cooptation might
involve sharing some power or influence in the determination of policy with the resource
provider.145
Such informal cooptation recognizes the power which the resource provider may be able to
exercise in the organization’s external environment, for example, where the organization requires
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the loyalty and support of the external social community. Selznick indicates that such cooptation
is an adaptive response of the cooperative system to a stable need which produces change which
is consequential for the character and role of the organization in shaping its future fields of choice
and modes of action.146
It is submitted that one response to such countervailing action by parties lacking formal authority
may be for the parties having such formal authority to adopt some form of cooptation. Other
responses and more broadly-based discussions of power and of responses to external and internal
sources and applications of power were examined in our discussions of the organization as a polity,
relying significantly upon the work of James March147 and of Meyer Zald.148
It is notable, too, that this kind of cooptation is but one example of a variety of readjustments
which an organization may be required to make to its strategy, and to its structure, processes, and
related personnel matters, to take account of changes in the external environment, the internal
environment, or other changes in and to its structure, processes, and related personnel matters.
Selznick’s analysis of organizations also supports many of the generalizations and observations
made up to this point in the present work. As will be recalled, Selznick sees organizations “as
cooperative systems, adaptive social structures, made up of interacting individuals, sub-groups,
and informal plus formal relationships”.149 This is consistent with the perspective advanced here.
As previously discussed, in spite of their interrelationship for purposes of analysis, it is convenient
here to discuss the processes of the organization considered separately from its structure and from
its personnel. In this respect, the work of March and Simon, as well as the work of Robert Merton,
considering bureaucratic structure, personality, and its functions and dysfunctions provide a
convenient guide to research and theory and, accordingly, will be usefully referenced below.
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ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS
Reliability of Behaviour
March and Simon assess Weber’s attempt to justify bureaucracy as a rational solution to the
decision-making or computational limits of individuals, but, as seen above, they note that “he is
not exceptionally attentive to the character of the human organism”.150 Of course, Weber
maintained that the bureaucratic structure resulted in a precision, reliability, and efficiency of
administration. March and Simon also say that, while Merton, Selznick, and Gouldner have
suggested that bureaucratic organization has significant dysfunctions, and while Weber himself
goes beyond the model of human individuals as a machine, those critics nonetheless perceive some
continued utility for the “machine” model of human behaviour.151
As to efficiency, Merton notes that for the bureaucracy to operate successfully, “it must attain a
high degree of reliability of behaviour, an unusual degree of conformity with prescribed patterns
of action”, which, in turn, “exerts constant pressure on bureaucratic officials” to be “methodical,
prudent, and disciplined.”152 He says that discipline is fundamental in this regard, and that it “can
be effective only if the ideal patterns are buttressed by strong sentiments which entail devotion to
one’s duties, a keen sense of the limitation of one’s authority and competence, and methodical
performance of routine activities.” In this regard, “the efficacy of social structure depends
ultimately upon infusing group participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiments”, definite
arrangements for which are made in bureaucratic organizations.153 As will be shown below,
Merton draws attention to the dysfunctions which derive from the exercise of control by
rulemaking and otherwise in these manners.
March and Simon describe Merton’s model of organization as embracing the “machine” model of
human behaviour for securing reliability of behaviour within the organization as one in which
“standard operating procedures are instituted, and control consists largely in checking to ensure
that these procedures are, in fact, followed.”154 These standard operating procedures increase
predictability of behaviour, while the verification of their proper application produces some degree
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of accountability for conformity to those standard operating procedures. Both of these results are
thought to contribute to overcoming bounded rationality.
Rigidity of Behaviour
March and Simon explain that this emphasis on reliability of behaviour and the application of
techniques used to install it has three principal consequences. They describe these consequences
as the “reduction in personalized relationships, the increased internalization of rules, and the
decreased search for alternatives [which] combine to make the behavior of members of the
organization highly predictable; i.e., they result in an increase in the rigidity of behavior of
participants.”155
These three principal consequences will be discussed separately below, however March and Simon
maintain that rigidity of behaviour itself has these two major consequences: “First, it substantially
satisfies the original demands for reliability. Thus, it meets an important maintenance need of the
system. Further needs of this sort are met by strengthening in-group identification…Second, it
increases the defensibility of individual action. Simple categories rigorously applied to individual
cases without regard for personal features can only be challenged at a higher level of the
hierarchy.”156
In this sense, then, organizational reliability is achieved in most cases, namely, those in which the
applicability of the rule to the instant case is not challenged. Likewise, a tendency may arise to
perceive individual cases as “fitting into” existing categories for a number of reasons, including,
we would suggest, the desire: firstly, to be perceived to be competent in determining categoryapplication; secondly, to be perceived to possess the competence to deal with most cases coming
before the individual official; and, thirdly, to achieve positive performance assessments from the
organization. This may sometimes result in “stretching” the category to fit the case at hand, which
may sometimes produce unsatisfactory results.
Such behaviour by individual bureaucrats or officials is also seen to have one more consequence.
“Third, the rigidity of behavior increases the amount of difficulty with clients of the organization
and complicates the achievement of client satisfaction – a near-universal organizational goal.
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Difficulty with clients is further increased by an increase in the extent of use of trappings of
authority by subordinates in the organization, a procedures that is encouraged by the in-group’s
defensiveness.”157 It can be seen that these difficulties with clients arise, at least in part, because
of the lack of personal flexibility and because of personal resort to claims that such flexibility is
not permitted by organizational guidelines.
Merton indicates that emphasis on categorization in decision-making and real or perceived
organizational pressures to fit cases presented into existing categories may also decrease efforts to
search for alternatives to prescribed actions.158 For example, it may be the case that some
alternative to the prescribed action may be preferable from a number of perspectives, including
that of the organization, if the particular situation is not considered to fall within some existing
category. In some cases, however, applying some rules from one category and some rules from
another category may lead to superior results. In this regard, Merton notes that the lack of “ready
adaptation under special conditions not clearly envisaged by those who drew up the general rules”
can produce significant inefficiencies.159
Assessments of Behaviour
Depending upon the assessments of their behaviour, ideally effected in the prescribed manner, of
organizational officials by their superiors, officials may be subject to sanctions, or to discipline,
including demotion and termination, or approbation, including increases in pay or responsibilities,
bonuses, and promotions. As discussed above under the heading “Rationality, Organizations, and
Efficiency”, Weber considered the conduct of bureaucratic officials to be subject to discipline and
control which is both strict and systematic,160 making organizational results highly predictable and
reliable.161
As discussed above, Fayol considered discipline to involve “in essence obedience, application,
energy, behaviour and outward marks of respect observed in accordance with the standing
agreements between the firm and its employees,”162 both explicit and implicit, and including
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relevant rules and customs. In his sense, discipline is both positive, exhorting the employee to
superior performance, and negative, penalizing inferior performance. As also mentioned there,
Fayol considered unity of command to be essential to maintaining discipline.163 Fayol also averts
to the “standing agreements” between the firm and its employees, which may be considered to
establish the “zone of acceptance” or “zone of obedience”, as discussed previously.
Of course, Fayol’s references to discipline are relatively conventional, and reflect the principles of
the modern management, and the scientific management, perspectives. It can easily be seen,
however, that Follett’s “law of the situation”,164 which is discussed above, is also relevant to the
positive and negative aspects of discipline. In such regard, assessments of performance and
consequent imposition of positive and negative discipline can be seen as related to the extent to
which the relevant official is able to devise, perhaps to persuade others regarding, and to
implement, her “law of the situation”.
As remarked previously in this chapter, Follett’s law of the situation bears comparison with
Bittner’s suggestion, as interpreted by the present author, that a coherent principle of discipline
“that derives from the formal style of the rational scheme and which works against centrifugal
tendencies and heterogeneity” can be developed as a kind of “higher order” discipline which gives
meaning to all aspects of the organizational process.165
In accordance with Fayol’s principles of management, which are discussed above under the
heading “Fayol on Structure” and under the present heading, agreements, whether formal or
informal, explicit or implicit, and generally accepted rules and norms determine the scope of
activity within which employees may be expected to accede to instructions of their employer.166 It
is apparent that such agreements, rules, norms could stipulate that employee should follow Follett’s
“law of the situation” or Bittner’s supervening or superordinate coherent and rational principle and
scheme of the organization. However, as noted in our discussions of those subjects, we would
submit that, except in environments characterized by a relatively flat hierarchy, as well as highly
motivated, and generally highly educated individual employees, this may present difficulties.
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Among these are difficulties relating to approbation, sanction, and assessment, as well as ensuring
conformity with what we describe as Fayol’s three unities of command, direction, and interest.
Goal Displacement, Goals, and Instrumental Goals
The present work has previously argued that goals which are essentially instrumental in nature
may, in some cases, achieve their own validity, in effect, as actual separate goals which are not
themselves actually perceived as instrumental in nature. This process is often denominated as “goal
displacement”.
Rule Orientation and Goals
Merton argues that goal displacement results from the transference of organizational loyalty to
loyalty to the rules of the organization. The section above headed “Reliability of Behaviour”
averted to Merton’s contention that discipline must be “buttressed by strong sentiments which
entail devotion to one’s duties, a keen sense of the limitation of one’s authority and competence,
and methodical performance of routine activities.”167 He asserts, however, that “this very emphasis
leads to a transference of the sentiments from the aims of the organization onto the particular
details of behavior required by the rules” such that “adherence to the rules, originally conceived
as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself; there occurs the familiar process of
displacement of goals whereby ‘an instrumental value becomes a terminal value’ or, put another
way, means are transformed into ends.168
Merton seeks to explain this transformation as resulting from “transference of sentiments” from
organizational goals to rules instrumental to their achievement. When Merton averts to
“sentiments”, he does so in terms of organizational goals and organizational rules. He is not
distinguishing between “sentiments” which support organizational goals and “sentiments” which
support the goals of other intraorganizational units or groups. This argument, then, attempts to
explain how rule orientation, conceived to be an instrumental value, becomes a separately
recognized value in itself. It does not explain how other instrumental values, that is to say,
instrumental values other than rule orientation, are transformed into independent values, although
it still describes all of these transformations as “displacements of goals”.
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Merton argues that as a result of the goal displacement which he describes, “conformance with
regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes but
becomes an immediate value in the life-organization of the bureaucrat” and “develops into
rigidities and an inability to adjust readily.” In some cases, this may reach the point where “primary
concern with conformity to the rules interferes with the achievement of the purposes of the
organization.”169
This result flows from the transformation of rules, originally conceived of as instrumental, into
non-instrumental or absolute goals or ends-in-themselves, which are “no longer conceived as
relative to a given set of purposes”, but as goals-in-themselves.170 Thus, says Merton, such rules
become, for the official, symbolic, rather than strictly utilitarian, and so have “meanings” from
which the official cannot be divorced.
Role Orientation and Intraorganizational Rules
The present text has previously averted to conflicts of goals as between the organization and a unit
or subunit. If Merton’s argument is accepted, it can now be seen that one way in which this can
arise is where each ultimate goal of the unit or subunit, is purely an instrumental goal of the
organization, and rules conducive to the attainment of the goals of the unit or subunit cease to be
seen by that unit or subunit as purely instrumental in nature.
In that case, not only may the unit or subunit pursue the subordinate goal at the expense of the
organization’s superordinate goal, but the unit or subunit may even apply rules, which are
themselves seen as non-instrumental goals, which are beneficial only to the attainment of the goals
of the unit or subunit, and not to the superordinate goal of the organization. Of course, the purport
of Merton’s argument is that the unit or subunit may also pursue rule conformity as a separate,
non-instrumental, goal, sometimes at the expense of more fundamental goals. The pursuit of the
goals of intraorganizational groups at the expense of the goals of the organization itself may be
seen, in some ways, as, in itself, an example of goal displacement.
The Merton argument could be extended by indicating that “sentiments” which support the goals
of groups or subgroups within the organization, in effect, as instrumental goals, may also be
transformed into observance of the rules of such groups or subgroups as independent or non169
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instrumental goals. The present work discusses in several places, including the present chapter, the
ways in which identification with, and commitment to, groups and subgroups can arise; and also
describes research supporting the relative strength of group and subgroup loyalties as compared
with loyalties to the overall organization.
However, although Merton suggests that the goals of the organization at the top level attract strong
positive sentiments on the part of participants, he does not explain how these goal-oriented positive
sentiments become transferred, or even displaced, from those goals to the organization itself, or
from group goals to the group itself. That is to say, he does not explain how identification with,
and commitment to, the organization itself, or to its groups, or to their subgroups, arises, can be
encouraged, and may be sustained. Investigation of relevant research is beyond our mandate.
Rule Primacy
As discussed above under the heading “Rigidity of Behaviour”, one aspect of goal displacement
is that actions of officials become defensible in terms only of the rules themselves. To be clear,
this means that official actions can be justified and defended on the sole basis that they conform
to the rules. In this regard, March and Simon note that the application of simple categories “to
individual cases without regard for personal features can only be challenged at a higher level of
the hierarchy.”171
The primacy of rules at certain levels of the hierarchy may be such that officials may consider
themselves under some pressure to find a rule which can be said to apply to the situation at hand
and which, in itself, justifies a particular action on the part of the official. That action may be much
easier to justify or defend than applying an amalgam or combination of one or more rules, or
devising a new rule, or seeking to treat the situation as a case of first impression, either by applying
other existing proximate rules, or by applying principles, by means of analogy, which are thought
to underlie the rules.
It is acknowledged, of course, that not all instrumental goals are created processually in connection
with developing and applying rules. Some subordinate or more proximate goals are deliberately
adopted which are considered to be instrumental in the achievement of superordinate or less
proximate, and perhaps even long range or long term, goals.
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As has been seen from this discussion of rulemaking, it is difficult to separate issues of
organizational process from issues relating to organizational personnel. The next section will
attempt, however, to concentrate on the latter.
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSONNEL
Controlling Organizational Behaviour
As discussed above under the heading “Formal Structure and Relationships”, many institutional
analysts, including Weber, Barnard and Fayol, consider the institutionalization of relationships
and the concomitant removal of personal and affective relationships from the organization to be
critical to the structure, process, and effectiveness of bureaucratic or formal organizations.
The bureaucratic or formal structure, says Selznick, assigns persons to positions or roles which are
intended to be occupied by individuals each of whom is more or less interchangeable, in an effort
to ensure that the organization will be dominated by rational, rather than by personal and affective,
considerations.172 This interchangeability also facilitates ready replacement of incumbents. Merton
observes that individuals occupying positions or enacting roles in the organization are expected to
observe a considerable degree of formality and to maintain a clearly defined social distance from
other members of the organization.173
As we have previously suggested, relationships which are formal and impersonal, rather than
affective and personal, emphasize the institutional order surrounding the giving and accepting of
instructions and expectations relating to the same. The ideal here is that human actors instantiate
roles assigned to them by the organization; and that neither authority nor susceptibility to authority
arises from any purely personal element, such as personal power, influence, or prestige.
In that sense, as observed by March and Simon, following Gouldner, general and impersonal rules
also contribute to decreasing the visibility of power relations, and hence to decreasing the level of
interpersonal tension within the group.174 The present author has argued, however, that these
behaviours may also contribute to group-centric orientations among participants for a number of
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reasons, including a perception that power relations exist primarily outside, and do not intrude
into, the group, and a preference in that behalf.
Merton maintains that bureaucratic or formal organization is “a secondary group mechanism
designed to carry on certain activities which cannot be satisfactorily performed on the basis of
primary group criteria”.175 Primary groups, such as families, are considered to be highly
susceptible to affective motivations and satisfactions. This would not be expected to be the case
with respect to secondary groups, which are, by nature, more formal.
As such, Merton indicates that the “normal responses involved in this organized network of social
expectations are supported by affective attitudes of members of the group. Since the group is
oriented toward secondary norms of impersonality, any failure to conform to those norms will
arouse antagonism from those who have identified themselves with the legitimacy of these rules.
Hence, the substitution of personal for impersonal treatment within the structures is met with
widespread disapproval”, which is emotionalized as resentment.176 These results are consistent
with the claimed or, at least, intended subordination, by the group ethos, of non-rational
considerations to boundedly rational considerations.
In the result, the behaviour of intraorganizational individuals is expected to be constrained by their
respective roles. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this is also assumed to be true, to at least
some extent, with respect to intraorganizational organizations, such as groups and subgroups,
themselves.
Organizational Changes in Behaviour and Relationships
Organizational Identity or Organizational Personality
Merton177 and March and Simon178 say that when officials react to other officials as incumbents
of positions with specified rights and duties, rather than as unique individuals, in effect, the
“amount of personal relationships” is reduced.179 As indicated, conflict within the bureaucratic
structure may arise “when personalized relationships are substituted for the structurally required
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impersonal relationships”,180 that is to say, when personal relationships intrude into the
organizationally sanctioned impersonal environment within the organization.
Assuming and enacting these official impersonal roles and required impersonal relationships may
result in a significant change in the recurrent and pervasive response pattern of individuals to
certain stimuli, frequently known as “personality”.181 Merton maintains that such changes in
personality are institutionally demanded; and that the intrusion of personal, or primary group,
attitudes into the institutional or secondary group, in which secondary group, or impersonal,
attitudes are expected, threatens the bureaucratic environment, and could even result in its
disintegration if they were fully supplanted by personalized relations.182
Barnard also treats of the adjustments which must be made to the personality of individuals to
organizational environments. He uses the concept of the “organization personality”, to mean
something like the personality that a member does, or must, employ as part of the organization. In
fact, his concept is even more like the “personality of the organization”. He says: “The most
important single contribution required of the executive, certainly the most universal qualification,
is loyalty, domination by the organization personality. This is the first necessity because the lines
of communication cannot function at all unless the personal contributions of executives will be
present at the required positions, at the times necessary, without default for ordinary personal
reasons.”183
He says that, when expressed as a personal qualification, this is the quality of “responsibility”. As
will be seen shortly, Merton also directs attention to these matters. Barnard maintains that this
contribution of personal loyalty, submission, or responsibility, does not arise solely or primarily
from material inducements or other positive incentives. Instead, it may be seen as involving some
type of sublimation of an individual’s non-organizational “personality” into that individual’s
“newly constructed” or organizationally fashioned “organizational personality”.
Alternatively, as suggested in this work previously, the individual may be “negotiating” the
demands of the various identities, or “personalities” if you will, comprising his or her social
identity with the requirements of the organization. This may be analogized to the “zone of
180
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acceptance” or the “zone of indifference”, in which the individual assumes a disposition in relation
to that individual’s participation in the organization to follow certain proper instructions given in
the required manner by those having the requisite authority.
As in that case, it may be argued that the individual assumes a disposition to behave in certain
organizationally acceptable manners, when enacting that individual’s role in the organization. It
may even be said that he or she accepts modifications to his or her social identity, in effect,
constructing a new “organizational identity”, which must be incorporated somehow into the
individual’s pre-existing social identity and personal identity.
Organizational Identity and Organizational Values
Merton notes that “bureaucratic officials affectively identify themselves with their way of life”
and its attendant attitudes and values, with the result that “through sentiment-formation, emotional
dependence upon bureaucratic symbols and status, and affective involvement in spheres of
competence and authority, there develop prerogatives involving attitudes of moral legitimacy
which are established as values in their own right, and are no longer viewed as a purely technical
means for expediting administration.”184
It is clear that this “moral legitimacy” either goes beyond, or is an extreme form of, goal
displacement. Merton maintains, in effect, that the “ways of going about” administration in the
relevant context are considered by organizational officials to be goals in themselves, and worthy
of assertion and preservation. It is not clear whether such statement averts to “ways of going about”
administration generally, in the particular organization concerned, or within intraorganizational
groups of the particular organization concerned. Nonetheless, it is clear that he is arguing that
process or processual goals may displace ultimate goals as the only end goals of the organization,
becoming end goals themselves.
Merton is also describing, in general, the adoption of ultimate goals and other organizational goals
by organizational participants. In this way, members of the organization often adopt many of its
explicit or implicit values, even if this involves some accommodation of their own personal values.
This is often discussed, as in the preceding chapters of the present work, as involving identification
with, and commitment to, the organization. What Merton describes is a sense of bureaucratic
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“professionalism”, only part of which appears to be related to the focal organization; the other part
seems to relate to the role and function of bureaucrats, officials, or management personnel, as such.
The latter may be seen as representing not only identification with, but also commitment to, such
role or function. This concerns itself with maintaining performance, ethical, and other standards.
Apparently applying a model of government or of a highly bureaucratized business, Merton averts
to the way in which a bureaucrat’s “official life is planned for him in terms of a graded career,
through the organizational devices of promotion by seniority, pensions, incremental salaries, etc.,
all of which are designed to provide incentives for disciplined action and conformity to the official
regulations”.185 Merton cites these as examples of features of the bureaucratic structure which are
conducive to the formation of the bureaucrat’s sentiments promoting rigorous discipline.
As previously noted, Merton claims that these positive sentiments promote further changes in
affect. He indicates that: “The official is tacitly expected to and largely does adapt his thoughts,
feelings, and actions to the prospect of this career. But these very devices which increase the
probability of conformance also lead to an over-concern with strict adherence to regulations which
induces timidity, conservatism, and technicism.”186
Organizational Cognition and Organizational Performance
It can be readily appreciated that certain behaviour is expected from organizational officials, but,
as just noted, Merton argues that officials also adapt their thoughts and feelings, not just their
actions, to organizational expectations. In addition, his argument is that such adaptation may go
beyond what is situationally required by organizational expectations. Thus, excessive attention to
rules may result in underperformance of the organizationally required tasks.
For Merton, these results arise from structural sources, in a process in which: “(1) An effective
bureaucracy demands reliability of response and strict devotion to regulations. (2) Such devotion
to the rules leads to their transformation into absolutes; they are no longer conceived as relative to
a given set of purposes. (3) This interferes with ready adaptation under special conditions not

185

Ibid at 564 [emphasis in the original]. Such "planned official life" apparently obtained at Merton's time of writing
at the start of the nineteen forties and for a number of decades thereafter, but its pervasiveness, both in bureaucracies
generally, and in the extent of its scope even in bureaucracies in which it obtains, has apparently been reduced
considerably since then.
186
Ibid [Emphasis in the original].

410

clearly envisaged by those who drew up the general rules. (4) Thus, the very elements which
conduce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific instances.”187
Gouldner acknowledges, similarly, that rulemaking produces inefficiencies.188 March and Simon
explain that “work rules provide cues for organizational members beyond those intended by the
authority figures in the organization”. They say that “by defining unacceptable behaviour, they
increase knowledge about minimum acceptable behavior. In conjunction with a low level of
internalization of organizational goals, specifying a minimum level of permissible behaviour
increases the disparity between organizational goals and achievement by depressing behaviour to
the minimum level.”189 It may be said, then, that rulemaking produces certain unanticipated
adverse consequences.
On Gouldner’s model, this reduction to minimum acceptable performance is perceived by
superiors as a failure, the usual response to which is to increase the closeness of supervision of the
relevant work group. In turn, this increases the visibility of power relations within the organization
and increases the tension level in the work group.190 In effect, these related effects undercut some
of the benefits sought to be derived from general and impersonal rules and from delegation
generally. March and Simon explain that Gouldner thus “attempts to show how a control technique
designed to maintain the equilibrium of a subsystem disturbs the equilibrium of the larger system,
with a subsequent feedback on the subsystem.191 Gouldner’s argument also appears to envision
subsequent feedback to the larger system in response to the feedback on the subsystem. His model
thus supports the analysis of intraorganizational organizations and their interaction with the large
organization which has been presented in the present work.
The present work has consistently maintained that intragroup relations, for example, at the group
level, can significantly affect intraorganizational relations, whether between the focal group and
the organization at large, or among the focal group and other similarly situated groups. In this case,
adoption of, and adherence to, general and impersonal rules decreases awareness of power
imbalances within the group, but, in the situations posited by Gouldner, may not decrease, may
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create, or may even increase, awareness of power imbalances between the group and groups at
hierarchical levels superior to that of the focal group.
This may stimulate resistance to the exercise of power by sources within the organization which
are outside the immediate focal group. This may, in turn, cause the members of the immediate
focal group to display some disaffection or resentment towards perceived interference by persons
outside the focal group. As indicated in Chapter Four under the heading “A Social Unit or Group
of People”, Ashforth and Mael indicate that perceived group membership is not only consistent
with in-group favouritism, cooperation and cohesion, but is also consistent with discrimination
against perceived out-groups and their members.192
In other words, the positive sentiments of individuals towards the organization, which are
discussed by Merton, may collide with similar positive sentiments of individuals within the
relevant focal group towards the focal group itself. As indicated above, individuals may tend to
exhibit identification and commitment to various focal groups193, but tend to exhibit a higher level
of identification and commitment to the most immediate focal group, rather than to less proximate
groups, or to the organization as a whole,194 although this is not always the case.195
Intraorganizational Organizations and Goal Displacement
As discussed under the heading “Organizational Process - Goal Displacement, Goals, and
Instrumental Goals” and under the immediately preceding heading “Organizational Changes in
Behaviour and Relationships”, the organization, as a secondary group, is “designed to carry on
certain activities which cannot be satisfactorily performed on the basis of primary group criteria”,
according to Merton.196 In lieu of the personalized relationships which obtain in primary groups,
such as families, organizations are dependent upon various mechanisms to inculcate the positive
sentiments required to engender identification and commitment on the part of individual members.
Intraorganizational Identity, and Goals
Yet, as seen from the review of research and theory set forth in the present work, particularly in
Chapter Four under the heading “A Social Unit or Group of People” and in the immediately
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preceding subsection of the present chapter, social groupings more immediate than the
organization at large, such as groups and subgroups, may evoke greater identification and
commitment, as well as action corresponding with the same, on the part of individual members of
the organization.197 As discussed above, these identifications and commitments are considered to
be aligned with organizational roles and to be related to the individual’s social identity. Thus, an
individual’s social identity may reflect that individual’s participation in the organization as a
whole, and in one or more relevant groups, or subgroups, within the organization itself.198
This is sometimes expressed in abbreviated and informal fashion by saying that the individual has
separate social identities in this regard: for example, considering an organization with three levels,
an identity as a member of the organization; as a member of a particular intraorganizational group;
and as a member of a particular subgroup within any relevant intraorganizational group. The
relevant group or subgroup may be determined by reference to functional, geographic,
professional, or other determinants or characteristics.
As discussed, of course, these identities may have different salience to the individual over time
and from time to time; that is, such salience may change or be reprioritized at various points in
time, depending on circumstances perceived by the individual to be then relevant to that particular
individual. Ashforth and Mael posit that, in some cases, the several identities assumed by an
individual may be incapable of integration, in which event the individual may treat them
cognitively “by ordering, separating, or buffering the identities”. This may involve: prioritizing
the most salient social identity or personal attribute; developing a scale or hierarchy of salience
and resolving conflict by deferring to most salient social identity; prioritizing the identity under
the greatest external pressure and minimizing it; denying, or rationalizing conflict; decoupling the
identity or identities giving rise to the conflict, such that the conflict is not perceived; or, finally,
complying sequentially with the conflicting identities, thereby eliminating the appearance of
conflict at any particular time.199
An individual may be subject to varying degrees of influence and to both internal and external
pressures to conform to the attitudes and behaviour of the relevant organization, group, and
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subgroup. Both research and theory, as considered above, and as reviewed by Ashforth and
Mael,200 support the proposition that such influence and pressure is more attenuated in more
immediate groupings.
Reinforcement of Intraorganizational Goals
Further, as noted above under the heading “Goals of Intraorganizational Organizations”, March
and Simon apparently approve Selznick’s conclusion that because decisions are made within the
subunit based on operational criteria provided by the organization and by the subunit, with
considerable importance being given to subunit goals, the internalization of subunit goals is
reinforced by repeated, and eventually habituated, responses to situations which arise within the
subunit.201
In addition, Merton suggests that those who work together “have a sense of a common destiny”
and share the same interests, to the point where “the esprit de corps and informal social
organization which typically develops in such situations often leads the personnel to defend their
entrenched interests rather than to assist their clientele and higher elected officials.”202 He cites as
examples withholding detailed information from an incoming official who does not properly
recognize the status of the information providers, leading to errors for which the incoming official
may be held responsible; and overloading a superior official with information or requests for
approvals, in cases where there is some threat to the integrity of the group.203
It is noteworthy, however, that Merton claims not only that the relevant focal group may prefer its
own interests as against other organizational interests, including superordinate goals, but also that
such focal group may also prefer its own interests as against extraorganizational interests, such as
the interests of customers and of members of the public, and that the immediate preference over
extraorganizational interests may produce conflict with the organization’s clientele or the public.
Such extrinsic conflict may be expected to be detrimental, to a greater or lesser degree, to the
organization’s overall interests.
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Indeed, such extrinsic conflict may also be detrimental to the interests of the relevant focal group
vis-à-vis those external parties with whom it is interacting. This detrimental effect may arise even
independently of the intraorganizational detriment to the focal group. That is to say, the
intraorganizational detriment of such conflict may not be the only cost of such behaviour to the
focal group.
Defending intragroup interests may also encompass defending intragroup goals and objectives and,
in particular, intragroup goals and objectives which are exclusive to, or are not widely shared
outside, or which are more significant within, the instant group. We may consider such intragroup
goals and objectives, when comparatively differentiated from extragroup goals and objectives, as
more or less “group-centric”. The significance of non-group-centric goals and objectives may be
subordinated, at least within the group, to that of group-centric goals and objectives. This may lead
to some distortion of the relevance of the non-group-centric goals and objectives.
For example, a particular non-group-centric goal, say, achieving a certain level of profitability for
the organization as a whole, may be perceived by group members to be less significant to the group
and to such members than a particular group-centric goal, for example, the group achieving a
certain level of profitability, or the group preserving its current personnel.
As has been shown, emphasizing performance at successively lower organizational levels as a
determinant of individual performance bonuses may be considered to be perfectly rational, at least
from an organizational perspective. However, because it focuses attention, apparently for quite
appropriate reasons, on the level at which an individual’s own performance can have the greatest
overall impact, it may tend to encourage that individual to privilege group performance, as a goal,
over organizational performance.204
CONCLUSION
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the present chapter continues to examine the essential
attributes of the organization, defined, in effect, as a social unit or group of people working
together in such a way as to meet one or more collectively shared needs or to accomplish one or
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more collectively shared goals or purposes. The present chapter considers the ways in which the
organization goes about seeking to achieve these objectives: in effect, the way in which it is
“organized” to do this; or the structure, processes, and personnel and management adopted by the
social unit or group of persons with the objective of so doing.
This chapter considered Weber’s concept of the legitimacy of rational-legal authority as a basis
for the formation of organizations, statal and otherwise; the “order” pursuant to which
organizations are established; and the consequences of that authority and order for the formal
structure, processes, and personnel aspects of the organization.
Among other things, the chapter considered the relationship among various concepts, including:
the organization as a relationship, as posited by Weber; the nature of the relationships within the
organization, as delineated by Weber; the relationship between organizational participants and the
organization; the relationship between the “scheme of organization” and the organization; the
relationship between the organization as a reified and entified group, and the organization as social
group or social relationship; and the putative rationality of the structure, processes and personnel
practices of the formal organization in terms of rationally seeking attainment of the organization’s
objectives; and other indicia of “efficiency”. The discussion demonstrated that these concepts and
the relationships among them obtain in corporations, just as in other organizations.
This chapter also examined formal organization as a corrective mechanism to deal with the
negative consequences of the “bounded rationality” of individuals and, perhaps, of groups of
individuals, which would obtain otherwise. This included some consideration of the means, and
advantages and disadvantages of: delegation and specialization of tasks; the adoption of a
hierarchical form of organization; formalization of the relationships of individuals when acting
within the organization; intraorganizational acceptance of authority; the establishment of
intraorganizational groups; rulemaking; and organizational cognition and sense-making.
The chapter continues this book’s review of major historical perspectives of organizational
theorists and practitioners concerning business and other organizations, including those of: Weber;
Taylor and Fayol with respect to “scientific management”; Chester Barnard and Mary Parker
Follett with respect to “modern management theory”; Philip Selznick with respect to neoclassical
organizational theory (which combines formal and informal aspects); Herbert Simon, and James
March and Herbert Simon with respect to what might be called “behavioural organization theory”;
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Egon Bittner, taking a cognitive or phenomenological approach, with respect to the experience of
individuals of organizationally derived meaning; Robert Merton, with respect to social groups and
social roles; and others.
While certain analysts, notably Barnard, Taylor, Fayol, and Follett, concentrate attention on
business enterprises, their observations were seen to be generalizable to other types of
organizations; and the other analysts generalize their observations as such. Consequently, the
present chapter demonstrated how various perspectives on organizations applied equally to
corporations, as organizations.
The review in this chapter was partially enabled by empirical research and analysis concerning the
modern business corporation presented in Part 2 of the book (Chapters Two and Three), concerning
the corporation in action, and, concerning the corporation more generally, in Appendix B. That
examination facilitates the examination of the corporation as an organization, in the previous
chapter as a social unit or group of persons, and in the present chapter as characterized by
structural, processual, and personnel and management elements.
The examination in Chapters Two and Three and, in greater detail, in Appendix B, when combined
with the analysis of individuals, groups of individuals, and organizations which appeared in
Chapter Four, also facilitates consideration in the present chapter of the relationships among
individuals, intraorganizational groups, and organizations. In consequence, the necessary
background was provided for the present chapter to discuss the relevant issues, both with respect
to organizations generally, and with respect to corporations, in particular.
The present chapter, accordingly, discussed the importance of the organization and of its groups
and subgroups to individual members of the organization, in terms of effects on the social identities
of such individuals and their identification with the organization and with intraorganizational
groups and subgroups, and the relevance to those individuals of the goals of the organization and
of the goals of intraorganizational groups and subgroups. The chapter also discussed the
“moderating effect” of informal structure, process, and relationships on formal structure, process,
and relationships, both within the organization itself and within intraorganizational groups and
subgroups.
Importantly, the present chapter has established that organizations engage with, respond to, and
seek to provide partial fulfilment of, affective needs of the individuals, groups, and subgroups
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within the organization. The chapter demonstrates that an intraorganizational individual
“negotiates” his or her social identity and personal identity as that individual acquires identification
with, and commitment to, the organization, and its intraorganizational groups and subgroups. In
the course of such negotiation, the individual, whether implicitly or explicitly, assesses the costs
and benefits of involvement in the organization, as compared with other alternatives, in terms of
securing satisfaction of the individual’ s needs, goals and objectives.
In the result, this chapter has established that the corporation, as an organization, has the same
essential attributes, in general, as those of other organizations. It is admitted, of course, that the
corporation is a business enterprise, that is, an organization a principal objective of which is to
secure some economic gain. As noted in the immediately preceding paragraph, this entails that
individuals contemplating initiating, continuing, or terminating, association with a corporation will
undertake, explicitly or implicitly, something in the nature of a cost-benefit analysis, on a
comparative basis.
In the case of a corporation, such cost-benefit analysis may involve consideration of different costs
and benefits depending upon the nature of the relationship of the corporation, ranging from purely
financial (as in the case of lenders) to highly affective as well as economic (as in the case of
directors, officers, and employees). The cost and benefit factors may be considered to be arrayed
in a complex multi-dimensional spectrum, each factor in which may be considered to involve a
continuum. Since some species of relationships with the corporation may be expected to have
significant affective components, affective costs and benefits will factor in such cost-benefit
analysis.
The immediately following chapter will consider the final essential element of the definition of an
organization: namely, the collective or shared needs, or goals or objectives for the satisfaction or
attainment of which it has been brought into being. Like other organizations, the modern business
corporation presents itself as having certain shared goals and objectives In particular, the next
chapter will present argument that economic gain alone, or profit maximization, as maintained by
classical and neoclassical economic theory, is not the single overarching goal or objective of the
modern business corporation or, indeed, of many, or all, of its constituents.
That chapter will demonstrate that many of the incidents of the organization are largely
independent of those collective or shared needs, or goals or objectives; with the result that the
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corporation, as an organization, does not differ intrinsically from other organizations, except at the
margin, namely, in certain respects with respect to which the need, goal or objective of the focal
organization, paradigmatically sustaining itself economically, is particularly important.
Importantly, by the conclusion of the next following chapter, the propriety of analyzing the
corporation as an organization will have been established. What will then remain is to demonstrate
how this organizational analysis impacts the essential attributes of the corporation as a matter of
law, which will be the task of the final chapters of the present work.

419

SECTION A – THE ORGANIZATION – PART C – ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND
OBJECTIVES
CHAPTER SIX – THE ORGANIZATION - DEFINING AND OTHER ATTRIBUTES –
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF PART 3 AND OF THIS CHAPTER
The final chapter of Part 2 of this book, Chapter Three, presented alternatives to classical and
neoclassical economic assumptions concerning the firm acting as a single economic actor. In
particular, that chapter reviewed various barriers to unified action. It also examined the firm as a
political system and, in particular, as a socio-political conflict system in which internal and
external conflicts required to be resolved; contrasted the theory and research on those subjects with
the approach to joint preference ordering taken by classical and neoclassical economics; and
examined theory and research concerning organizations, particularly firms, as polities, and
concerning firms as coalitions, contrasting all of this with the classical and neoclassical economic
theory of the firm. Finally, it examined theory and research concerning significant legal and
organizational variants of the firm in terms of their development historically, and their
configurations at the present time.
The present section of Part 3 of the book, Section A, continues consideration of the nature of the
organization. As such, it provides support, both in theoretical and in empirical terms, for many of
the generalizations and assumptions about corporations and other organizations which the present
author, in this book, and other authors have employed in making observations about corporations,
and about organizations more generally.
The preceding two parts of Section A dealt with the organization as a social unit or a group of
people, in Part A, and, in Part B, with the structure, processes, personnel, and other ways in which
that social unit or group of people works together, or is “organized”, to meet, pursue, or accomplish
one or more collectively shared needs, goals or purposes. Accordingly, the discussion there of
“working together” or “organizing” a social unit or group of individuals to meet collective needs
or to attain shared goals and objectives necessarily involved some discussion of those collectively
shared needs, goals or purposes, at least in respect of the ends towards which such organization
aims.
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The present section focuses on the existence and typology of organizational goals and objectives.
However, in view of the extensive prior discussion of organizational goals and objectives in the
context referenced in the preceding paragraph, much of the present section will avert to matters
more substantively discussed previously, in Chapter Three in Part 2, and in Chapters Four and Five
in Part 3, of the book.
In particular, the present chapter will draw upon the examination of the corporation as an economic
actor in Chapters Two; and the discussion of the defining attributes of organizations in the earlier
chapters of this Part 3, beginning in Chapter Four, which considered the organization as a social
unit or group of people, and continuing in Chapter Five, which considered the organization as
involving structure, process, and management.
Upon conclusion of the present chapter, the essential attributes of the organization, the possession
of those attributes by the corporation, and its qualification as an organization will have been
established. It will then be in order to examine the dual aspect of the corporation as a legal entity
and as an organization.
EXISTENCE AND TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Existential Goals and Objectives
As noted in Chapter Three, Charles Perrow, a leading organization theorist, identified four tasks
which every organization must accomplish: firstly, securing adequate capital and other inputs for
inception, operations, and expansion; secondly, securing legitimation, acceptance as carrying on a
legitimate activity; thirdly, marshaling the necessary skills; and fourthly, coordinating its activities
internally, and its relations with other organizations, clients, and consumers, externally.1 Of course,
failure in any of these tasks may entail that the organization will not be established initially or that
it will fail over the course of time. Accordingly, these tasks may be considered to be “existential”
goals, goals related to establishing and maintaining the organization’s existence.
Unless, of course, the purpose, goal or objective of the organization has some finitude, the
continued existence of the organization is generally one of its purposes, goals or objectives,2
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inasmuch as it was for those purposes, goals or objectives that it was brought into being. Of course,
if the purpose, goal or objective is finite, then it need not, and may not be expected, to continue to
exist beyond the satisfaction of that need or the accomplishment of that purpose, goal or objective.
As discussed in Chapter Three, Zald maintains that these collective ends and the beliefs about how
to attain them form part of the constitution, or constitutive agreement, or “social contract”, of the
organization.3 Zald’s constitution is more than the oral statement of goals and procedures, which
“may have little to do with the organization’s actual constitution”. Attempts to change that
constitution may be expected to create conflict and disaffection within the organization, and may
threaten the organization’s stability, and even its existence, unless such change produces clear
benefits to important participants.4 Zald’s focus on the organization’s constitution or constituting
agreement as instantiated in action, which might be called the “operative constitution”, bears some
conceptual affinity with Perrow’s concept of “operative goals”, which is discussed in the next
section. Both take pains to distinguish the actual or “operative” phenomenon from the “ideal type”,
or theoretical or ostensible nature, of the observed phenomenon.
As has been seen, these observations apply to corporations, as well as other forms of organizations.
Discussion of matters particularly, or peculiarly, relevant to corporations appear below under the
heading “Goals of Corporations”.
Official or Explicit Goals and Operative or Implicit Goals
This subject has been discussed in Chapter Three under a similar heading, making extensive use
of an important, much-cited, and succinct theory and research review by Charles Perrow, The
Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations.5 Use of that review will be continued in this section.
This source is particularly apt for our purposes, as Perrow “was perhaps the person most
responsible for transferring knowledge of organizational sociology into the fields of organization
theory and organization studies starting with [that article].”6 His seminal observations in that
article are still accorded great respect in such fields, and, consequently, will be a useful guide here.
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The focus in Chapter Three was on the organization as a collectivity, embracing a plurality of
individuals and, arguably, a plurality of groups and subgroups, sometimes acting in the economy
as a single economic actor, and sometimes as separate economic actors. Here, the focus is more
specifically on the difference between official or explicit goals, on the one hand, and unofficial,
implicit, or operative goals, on the other hand, and on the impact of the same on the organization.
Official Goals – Organizational and Intraorganizational
In that regard, Perrow says that the official goals are “the general purposes of the organization” as
set forth in authoritative pronouncements made on behalf of the organization, such as its charter,
or annual reports, or public statements by key executives.7 Official goals are, by their nature,
expressly declared as such. Such official goals are usually purposely vague and general, and do
not indicate either “the host of decisions that must be made among alternative ways of achieving
official goals”, “the priority of multiple goals”, or “the many unofficial goals pursued by groups
within the organization.”8 Perrow refers to all of these as “operative goals”.
As we have suggested above, components and subcomponents of the organization may also have
expressly declared official goals. In this case, they are generally assigned to the component or
subcomponent by superior authority with the objective of facilitating the achievement of official
higher-level organizational goals. As has been seen, the success of the component or
subcomponent within the organization is generally perceived as determined, at least in part, by its
success in pursuing and achieving assigned official goals. It may also be expected that the
component or subcomponent of the organization will also have operative goals, as described by
Perrow.
As discussed in the present chapter, both at the level of the organization and at the level of the
organizational component or subcomponent, the declared or assigned goals often need to be ranked
as to their priority, as Perrow suggests. However, the ranking or the means of assigning such
ranking may or may not be clearly and explicitly determined. This will be discussed further below.
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Operative Goals
As indicated earlier, Perrow claims that operative goals include official goals insofar as they are
actually pursued; and, secondly, the means of prioritizing among the official goals actually
pursued. Identifying the operative goals of the organization is, in effect, an empirical task which
requires consideration of not only the official goals of the organization, but also of its actual
operating policies and, in particular, of the ends to which they are actually conducive.
Perrow asserts that operative goals either “designate the ends sought through the actual operating
policies of the organization; they tell us what the organization actually is trying to do, regardless
of what the official goals say are the aims”; or they “provide the specific content of official goals”,
thereby reflecting choices made among competing values.9 Zald apparently draws attention to
something similar to Perrow’s “operative goals” when he says that the “constitution of any
organization” includes not only agreements about goals, but also agreements or beliefs about how
to attain them, the means or modes of proceeding.10
As discussed in Chapters Three and Four and earlier in this chapter, operative goals may include,
may reflect, and may also, to some degree, determine, the processes by which the organization
goes about pursuing its goals. Those processes may themselves be, or may become, goals, often in
the nature of instrumental goals, although Perrow concedes that these means or processes of
achieving official goals may, in some cases, also become end goals in themselves.11
The extent to which procedural or processual goals not initially considered to be non-instrumental
achieve non-instrumental or end goal status is likely to be highly contextually dependent. It is well
to recall, however, March’s observations concerning organizations as involving conflict resolving
mechanisms and mechanisms for determining the ordering of joint preferences. In some cases, it
is a superordinate process, rather than a superordinate goal, which has this effect.
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Profit as Superordinate Goal – Official or Operative Goal
As explicated in Chapter Three, March specifically considered “the business organization as a
socio-political conflict system subject to economic constraints”.12 As our discussion there
indicated, March describes a conflict system as a system which lacks a preference ordering and in
which preferences conflict; a resolution to which conflict is sought either by means of adherence
to a superordinate goal, such as “profit”, as in the case of theories of business firms, he says; or by
means of adherence to a superordinate process of conflict resolution not involving an explicit
comparison of utilities, as in the case of theories of political coalitions.
As discussed in Chapter Three, March claims that the “implicit assumption that the firm represents
a conflict system susceptible to useful description in terms of a superordinate goal (whether profit
maximization or some other) is shared by most economists” and that “most economic theories
build upon it (although not all necessarily depend upon it).”13
March found, however, that the assumption that profit is the superordinate goal of a business firm
“is almost certainly wrong as a micro-description of a business firm”, in that it failed to meet
technical requirements of stability, and meaningfulness, as well as the empirical requirement of
validity.14 Consequently, he maintains that profit is not the single overarching objective of a
business enterprise, whatever the legal form of that business enterprise.
Alternatives to Profit as Superordinate Goal
If, as March claims, the superordinate goal of profit generation must be rejected as the sole
determinant of conflict resolution in business firms, then theories of joint preference ordering and
conflict resolution, such as that posited by March, would suggest that conflict must be resolved by
means of a superordinate process not involving an explicit comparison of utilities.
Of course, there are several other possibilities, including, at least, the following: firstly, that there
can be more than one superordinate goal, each of which may be applicable in different
circumstances, or the conflict between each of which may be resolved by some other mechanism,
such as an assignment of priorities, perhaps including application of a superordinate process rule;
12
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secondly, that resort may be had to a superordinate process of conflict resolution; and, thirdly, that
in some cases, some combination of superordinate goals and superordinate processes may be
employed. Finally, conflict resolution may reflect some combination of the foregoing, as well as,
perhaps, other mechanisms and relevant factors.
By way of example, a particular business enterprise may adopt a goal of attaining a level of
profitability, however measured, within a certain range, which may be affected by achievement of
other goals. More specific targets within that range may depend upon the pursuit, and the
attainment, of other goals; for example, achieving a level of retained earnings within a certain
range, generating a level of returns to shareholders within a certain range, achieving a level of
profitability per employee within a certain range or achieving other financial goals.
The target range for profitability and other financial goals may, in turn, be affected by the pursuit
and attainment of other non-financial goals, including, for example, customer satisfaction,
employee satisfaction, supplier satisfaction, community reputation, providing stability of
employment, providing opportunities for education and advancement for management and
employees, providing stability of the supply chain, ensuring the continued viability of employee
compensation, retirement, and benefit plans, supplying certain community benefits, bearing a
“fair” level of tax incidence, etc. Again, it might be expected that each of these goals would be
established within a stipulated continuum or range, and that such continuum or range could be
adjusted in relation to other objectives of the corporation.
While beyond the scope of the present discussion, a cogent argument exists that some significant,
successful, and reputable corporations may be applying some of these considerations in their dayto-day judgments, implicitly or explicitly, and in their derivation and application of operative
goals. In other words, the kind of conflict resolution and joint preference ordering posited by
March may actually be operative in many decisions by corporations having intraorganizational
and extraorganizational application and effects.
In fact, such conflict resolution would be consistent with the roles of the corporation and its
participants, both within and without the corporation. The corporation is not only a means whereby
shareholders can passively generate profits, but provides a vehicle for the satisfaction of many
other financial and nonfinancial objectives of the various parties, as indicated in the example
discussed here. The extent to which this is the case is demonstrated in situations in which the
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existence of the corporation is terminated, such as Enron Corporation, WorldCom Inc., or Arthur
Andersen LLP, or is significantly restructured and reorganized.
Reconciling Official Goals and Operative Goals
Applying March’s conflict resolution argument to Perrow’s typology of goals, it can be suggested
that operative goals may be much more frequent determinants of decisions made at various levels
in the organization than official or express goals. These operative goals are “shaped by the
particular problems or tasks an organization must emphasize”15, which may vary, in at least some
cases, from time to time. Given the importance of operative goals, it is important to ascertain how,
and by whom, and even when, such operative goals are adopted; and by what problems, tasks, or
other circumstances they are shaped.
In this regard, Perrow claims that the “operative goals will be shaped by the dominant group,
reflecting the imperatives of the particular task area that is most critical, their own background
characteristics (distinctive perspectives based upon their training, career lines, and areas of
competence) and the unofficial uses to which they put the organization for their own ends.”16 While
the first of these items, the criticality of the task area, relates to the objectives of the organization
as a whole, the remaining two items, which are discussed under the next heading, relate to the
interests of the dominant group.
Changes in Operative Goals
Assuming the accuracy of Perrow’s claim concerning how operative goals are shaped, it might be
expected that changes in the dominant group might affect the operative goals of the organization
and, similarly, that changes in the operative goals of the organization might effect changes in which
particular group or group of groups (previously existing, or newly established for the purpose)
assumes dominance within the organization. Salancik and Pfeffer support this observation, on both
theoretical and empirical grounds, saying, in effect, that “power shifts with changes in
organizational environments”; and that the “dominant coalition” within, and leaders of, the
organization “will tend to be that group that is most appropriate for the organization’s
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environment”.17 The latter observation seems to be problematic, however, insofar as it is
conclusory and lacking in immediate verification.
The final item which Perrow enumerates as affecting operative goals, “the unofficial uses to which
they put the organization for their own ends”, assumes that the dominant group causes the
organization to pursue ends which are of benefit to the dominant group, as such; which ends may
be equally or incidentally beneficial to, neutral in respect of, or disbeneficial to, the interests of the
organization as a whole. This is consistent with the ability of the dominant coalition to influence,
prioritize, and “frame” the organization’s operative goals.
Perrow’s argument would entail that a shift in the dominant group might effect a shift in the
“unofficial uses to which [the (new) dominant group puts] the organization for [its] own ends.” It
might be expected, logically, that shifts in such “unofficial uses” may, to at least some extent,
“accompany” shifts in the dominant coalition, perhaps subject to some lead time or lag time, as
the case may be. Consequently, the operative goals of the organization may be in flux frequently,
if not normally, or, perhaps, even constantly. As discussed below, intraorganizational
organizations, however denominated, whether as divisions, departments, groups or subgroups,
may themselves have their own dominant coalitions, and their own official goals and operative
goals. Consequently, “shifts” in their dominant coalitions and operative goals may also be expected
to take place over time.
Accordingly, shifts in the dominant coalition and operative goals of the organization as a whole
and those of any particular intraorganizational group may not be congruent. This may cause a
misalignment of goals as between the organization and the focal group at any particular point in
time. The frequency and duration of these shifts will be expected to affect the temporal
congruency, and the alignment or misalignment, of organizational goals vis-à-vis the goals of the
intraorganizational focal group.
The same analysis might be expected to apply to any particular intraorganizational focal group visà-vis any other intraorganizational group. That is to say, shifts in the dominant coalition, and
operative goals, of the organization and of its various intraorganizational groups may all eventuate
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from time to time and may result in conflict among those coalitions at different levels and among
the operative goals pursued at such levels.
March concludes, to similar effect, that the “goals and commitments of business firms shift slowly
over time in response to shifts in the coalition represented in the firm.”18 As will be discussed
further below, shifts in the organizational environment, as well as the perception of such shifts by
its dominant coalition and leadership, shifts in the coalition and leadership, and consequent shifts
in goals and commitments, both operative and otherwise, may be expected to be gradual in most
cases but may, occasionally, be more abrupt.
Accordingly, empirically determining the state of each of the same may present substantial
difficulties, and may have significant consequences. For example, attributing authority and
responsibility, both generally and with respect to particular matters, and for a variety of purposes,
including legal liability, may be difficult; and, as such, may entail detailed examination of relevant
intraorganizational factors.
Further discussion of these matters specifically in relation to the corporation appears below under
the heading “Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals”, most particularly under the
subheadings “Intraorganizational Goals, Power, and Loyalty”, and “Goals of Corporations”.
Teleological Goals and Instrumental Goals
A useful typology of organizational goals would, among other things, distinguish between ultimate
goals, and, on the other hand, goals which are purely instrumental in connection with the process
of seeking to achieve goals which are not themselves purely instrumental, including, but perhaps
not limited to, ultimate goals. The “purely instrumental” goals might be denominated as
“instrumental goals”, while the goals that are non-instrumental (that is to say, not purely
instrumental) might be denominated as “teleological goals”, “ultimate goals”, or “end goals”.
These teleological goals, then, are goals which are “goals in themselves”, are generally accepted
as such, and do not require independent validation or verification within the organization. They
are “real goals”, “ultimate goals”, or “end goals”.
Perrow’s distinction between “official” and “operative” goals is different, of course. Among other
things, his term “operative goals” is used to indicate the goals that are actually, not presumptively,
18

Supra note 12 at 675.

429

or theoretically, or “ideally” (as an “ideal” type of goal), pursued by the organization. They may
or may not be entirely non-instrumental. While he apparently means to exclude “end goals” or
ultimate goals, it is possible, logically, at least, that operative goals may actually include end goals
or ultimate goals. Indeed, constituents and supporters of such organizations would be expected to
maintain, with some justification, that “something is wrong” if the goals actually pursued by the
organization do not include at least some of its stated goals. Perrow may, however, be drawing
attention to the difficulties which may attend determining whether or not end goals or ultimate
goals are actually “operative” in all the circumstances.
Perrow cites the example of a hospital whose official goal “may be to promote the health of the
community through curing the ill, and sometimes through preventing illness, teaching, and
conducting research.” It can be persuasively argued that the first item, promoting the health of the
community, is an end goal or non-instrumental goal, while the others are instrumental in nature.
Another example he gives is a business corporation which states “that its goal is to make a profit
or adequate return on investment, or provide a customer service, or provide goods.”19 Profit or
return may be considered to be the ultimate goal or end goal, while providing customer service or
goods may be seen as instrumental to that end.
Both of these examples demonstrate, at least if goals are considered not to be essentially
problematic, that management of the organization can be seen “as using rational and logical means
to pursue clear and discrete ends set forth in official statements of goals.”20 A more granular
examination of organizational goals should facilitate closer consideration of the merits of various
strategies and tactics and a more accurate assessment of management performance. Perrow’s
concept of “operative goals” would seem to contribute to facilitating such granular examination
and assessment.
In this regard, Perrow observes that “if making a profit or serving customers is to be taken as a
sufficient statement of goals, then all means to this end might appear to be based on rational
decisions because the analyst is not alerted to the countless policy decisions involved.” 21 These
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decisions include identifying, evaluating, and successfully pursuing goals which vary in proximity,
but which are purely instrumental vis-à-vis the ultimate goal.
Pursuit of these instrumental goals, as has been seen, may involve assignment of goals at various
levels of the hierarchy of the organization to organizational components, such as groups and
subgroups, however determined. Further, without an accurate assessment of goals which are
apparently being pursued by the organization, their categorization as end goals, or instrumental
goals, or, perhaps, as both end goals and instrumental goals, respectively, may not be possible.
Superordinate Goals and Subordinate Goals
As discussed above under the subheading “Reconciling Official Goals and Operative Goals”,
March maintains that preference ordering in conflict systems can proceed either by applying
superordinate goals in order to assign priorities to various subordinate goals, and ranking
procedural or instrumental goals accordingly; or by applying a superordinate process, such as
effecting determinations by means of a political coalition, which may or may not itself be stable
over time. It is, of course, arguable that the superordinate process or, perhaps, more accurately
syntactically, the maintenance of the superordinate process, is itself a species of, or even
manifestation of a, superordinate goal.
As we have stated elsewhere, the ordering of goals may differ as between different levels of the
organization, in part because of their granularity, and in part because of their instrumentality. In
the hospital example which Perrow cites, for example, a superordinate goal for the organization as
a whole may be promoting the health of the community; for the inpatient department, curing
illness; for the outpatient department, preventing illness; and so on; yet curing illness and
preventing illness may both be subordinate objectives of the hospital as a whole.
Again, we might posit that preventing illness might be a subordinate objective of the inpatient
department and that a more subordinate objective might be teaching, or conducting research on
illness prevention. Thus, the respective priorities accorded to various objectives may vary as
among the organization as a whole, groups within the organization, and subgroups within the
organization.
As just demonstrated, even a rough typology or taxonomy of goals and objectives assists in
“unpacking” the nature and effects of the same, which task we will now proceed to advance further.
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ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND INTRAORGANIZATIONAL GOALS
The Modern Business Corporation in Action
Strategy, Structure, and the Great Transformation
Chapter Five of the present book examined assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics
concerning the “firm” as a single economic actor, and challenged those assumptions on analytical
and logical grounds, referencing economic and other perspectives. It also compared those classical
and neoclassical assumptions to the “firm” or the corporation as found, by empirical research, to
be instantiated in the “real world” or, in other words, to be the “firm in action”.
For such purpose, that chapter extensively reviewed the history of the development of the modern
business corporation, primarily as chronicled and explained by the eminent business historian,
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., most particularly in his works Strategy and Structure,22 and The Visible
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business.23 Chandler is generally considered to
have had a transformational effect on business history and, as such, to be the founder of modern
business history. He is also considered to have made significant contributions to organizational
theory and to business strategy.
Chandler’s Strategy and Structure described the means by which modern business corporations,
pursuing their goals, came to be organized, in terms of their structure, processes, and personnel,
while also relating those matters to the strategy they pursued, and to the pattern and trajectory of
their development. In particular, it described the hierarchical structure as involving head offices
(which we might also describe as “headquarters” or “corporate” offices), divisions, departments,
and field offices; the functions or work undertaken by managers at each level; the nature and
division of decision-making as between strategic and tactical matters, as well as operating matters,
undertaken at each level; and the nature and flows of information required in such decision-making
and operations.24
The Visible Hand described the “great transformation” of the economy and of business enterprise
as new technologies and markets permitted the production and distribution of goods on a much
22
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greater scale than ever before; and, according to Chandler, in which, as a result, the “visible hand
of management” replaced Adam Smith’s “invisible hand of market forces”, as modern business
enterprises took over certain “market” functions, including coordinating production and
distribution, and allocating funds and personnel for future production and distribution.25
The New Function of Management and the Manager
Chandler indicates that this change originated a new economic function, namely, administrative
coordination and allocation, as well as “a new subspecies of economic man – the salaried manager
– to carry out this function.”26 This new economic function and the new economic man engaged
in that function responded to the complexity involved in the “great transformation”. That
complexity involved great modifications of the strategy, structure and processes, and management
and personnel practices, as well as size, of these new mega-organizations. It also forced changes
in their goals and objectives.
Chandler explains how the “great transformation” resulted in administration of the organization
and its managerial hierarchy becoming a source of permanence, power and continued growth;
separating an increasingly professionalized management from ownership of the enterprise; and
establishing decision-making practices which favoured long-term stability and growth, rather than
the maximization of current profits.27 It was this separation of professional management from
ownership, according to Chandler, which, in turn, ultimately separated their respective interests.
His attempt to explain the development of a lack of congruence as between the interests of
management and the interests of owners may be considered to be somewhat more nuanced than
that of a pure “agency” explanation.
Operational Complexity and Organizational Complexity, and This Work
Chandler chronicles how the size and scope of the enterprise and the attendant complexities of
managing the enterprise increased, necessitating the increasing professionalization of
management, and the development of new management structures involving large numbers of
business units pursuing various growth strategies, in an effort to secure the stability, growth, and
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continued existence of the enterprise as a whole.28 The present author argues that these factors may
tend to inhibit the scope and immediacy of the corporation’s ability to respond in the short-term to
changes in the external environment, thereby increasing the importance of long-term planning and
strategy, and, accordingly, tending to promote the prioritization of longer-term, over shorter-term,
objectives. It can be seen that this argument and Chandler’s are well aligned.
Carrying on different businesses through separate business units also facilitated corporate pursuit
of some degree of diversification, as the portfolio businesses might be expected to have somewhat
different characteristics, embedding different types and degrees of risk and reward. Diversification
might thereby be expected to reduce the incurrence and amplitude of risk and reward effects, both
anticipated and unanticipated, on overall organizational performance over time.
As explained in Chapter Five, Chandler’s description and explication of what is described here as
the “modern business corporation in action” provides an empirical foundation for the discussion
of the modern business corporation, in various contexts, in the present book. As such, it provides
a description and an analysis of the modern business corporation from an organizational
perspective. When combined with our consideration of research and theory concerning
organizations generally, it also facilitates a comparison of organizational aspects of the modern
business corporation with other types of organizations. Finally, when combined with our
consideration of the essential characteristics of the modern business corporation as a matter of law,
we can begin to see how this combinatorial approach may be persuasive theoretically, and
possessed of significant explanatory, and possibly predictive, power empirically.
As will be recalled, Chapter Three examined various literature reviews, research, and theory
relating to the structure, processes, and personnel aspects of modern business corporations,
including considerations relevant to the importance and functions of business units; and the
relationship of business units to other business units, and to the corporate and other levels of the
organizational hierarchy. The materials reviewed in Chapter Three included materials relating to
the goals and objectives of the corporation as a whole, those of its groups, and those of its
subgroups.
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The purpose of the present section is to consider the goals and objectives of corporations and, most
especially, the question whether such goals and objectives satisfy the formal and informal
definitional requirements for organizations generally. We consider that question to have been
largely settled, in the affirmative, of course, in the course of discussion earlier in this work,
especially in Chapters Two and Three. Consequently, the present section will briefly reference
those discussions and will indicate how they demonstrate that corporations may be said to have
goals and objectives, thereby satisfying that definitional requirement in order to be considered as
“organizations”.
Goals of the Corporation In Action
As discussed in various places in this work, goals, whether teleological goals or end goals, on the
one hand, or purely instrumental goals, on the other, or goals which might fall between those two
if arrayed on some notional continuum, may be considered, on the one hand, to be goals of, and
attributed to, the organization as a whole, which are shared among many or all its participants,
which we may denominate as “organizational goals”; and, on the other hand, to be goals of, and
attributed to, components of the organization, which are shared only among participants in the
relevant organizational component. We may denominate these as “intraorganizational goals” or,
variously, as “group goals”, “subgroup goals”, “divisional goals”, “departmental goals”, and the
like, as appropriate.
As noted in Chapter Three under the heading “M-Form Corporations”, Fligstein established that
the multidivisional form, or “M-form”, or “MDF” corporation, sometimes also called a
multidivisional corporation (”MDC”), had become, by the last decades of the twentieth century,
the “preferred organizational form for the large firms that dominate the American economy”.29
Consequently, the relationship between the corporation as a whole, as represented by its
headquarters or head office, and individual business units (“BUs”), sometimes called “strategic
business units” (“SBUs”), within the corporation, has been the focus of some attention in relevant
literature, both practical and theoretical.
Much of this literature is canvassed in Chapter Three. However, it becomes useful to refer to some
of this research and theory in the present discussion, which focuses on the needs sought to be met,
29
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or the goals sought to be attained, by organizations, including corporations, as an essential element
of the claim that corporations may be considered to be organizations.
Goals of the Corporation as Organization
As noted at the beginning of this chapter and in Chapter Three, Charles Perrow, the prominent
organizational theorist, established that corporations, like other complex organizations, have
certain official goals, unofficial goals, and operative goals, the analysis of which presents
difficulties arising from organizational complexity.
Some of the difficulties arising from organizational and intraorganizational goal conflicts were
reviewed in Chapter Five under the headings “Intraorganizational Organizations” and “Goals of
Intraorganizational Organizations”, referring there to observations by Selznick and by March and
Simon, and “Intraorganizational Organizations and Goal Displacement”, referring there to
observations by Selznick and by Merton.
One of the studies discussed in Chapter Three under the heading “Power and SBUs” was Bouquet
and Birkinshaw’s study of the relationship between multinational enterprises (“MNEs”), also
called multinational corporations (“MNCs”), and their national or “in-country” subsidiary
operations, without regard to their particular legal form, in their capacity as BUs or SBUs. MNEs
almost invariably are constituted with multiple divisions, however structured legally, and thus can
be regarded for many organizational purposes as functionally similar to M-form or MDF
corporations or MDCs, but with the additional attribute that they conduct foreign operations.
Consequently, for many organizational purposes, they can be regarded as M-form corporations
with foreign operations.
While acknowledging that an MNE operates as an “economically integrated economic institution
that encourages members to continuously justify their existence within an emerging global
hierarchy”, Bouquet and Birkinshaw maintain that the MNE is also, at the same time, “a socially
constructed community of subsidiary members that can only advance their cause with corporate
headquarters if they are believed to adhere to a common set of strategic goals, norms, and
values.”30
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This kind of requirement for existential justification would seem to apply equally, and based on
the same reasoning, to MDCs which operate within a single national boundary (and, accordingly,
are considered to be “uninational”). It is also noteworthy that Bouquet and Birkinshaw
anthropomorphize the separate business units as “members” of “a socially constructed
community”, that being the economic enterprise considered as a whole, regardless of the legal
entity status of its “members”. Certainly, their study confirms the prevalence of “political”
activities as discussed by March and others.
As discussed in Chapter Three, using data for 283 subsidiaries of MNEs, Bouquet and Birkinshaw
investigated how BUs weight, and change the weighting of, goals; change goals and their
weighting; pursue relationships; and seek and exercise attention, power and influence, and
resource allocations from the ultimate parent. In order to be perceived as a “reliable, credible, and
trustworthy actor” (a description which may be considered as additional evidence of
anthropomorphization), it was found that one of the tasks which the national subsidiary or BU had
to undertake was to continually “reaffirm its commitments to the parent’s objectives”.31
In the absence of that research finding, it might have been thought that the commitments of
business units, whether operating domestically or in foreign countries, to overall parent company
goals would be assumed as a matter of course. That such continuous reaffirmation of
organizational goals is, as a matter of fact, required from groups and subgroups within the
organization is, in itself, an indication of the extent to which group and subgroup goals may be
considered, at least at, or by, the head office or headquarters level, to be more dispositive of the
actions of the group or subgroup, as the case may be, than goals of the organization itself.
As a minimum, such finding certainly attests to a perception of the importance, and perhaps
independence or partial independence, of group goals and subgroup goals at those levels,
respectively.
Organizational Control of Intraorganizational Groups by Corporations
As referenced in Chapter Three under the heading “Headquarters Functions, Strategy, and
Structure”, Chandler finds that MDCs adopt three principal frameworks or styles by which the
ultimate parent corporation, that is to say, the organization at the macro-level, exercises control
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over divisions, departments and other organizational components of the corporation acting as
groups and subgroups within the corporate organization. Following Goold and Campbell,32
Chandler identified these as the Strategic Planning, Strategic Control, and the Financial Control
models, which are claimed to result from different patterns of growth, patterns of investment, and
sets of organizational capabilities reflecting, in part, the industries in which such corporations
operate.33
As explained in the earlier discussion in this work, the principal variable among these three models
is the extent of headquarters control over the strategy, financial budgets, goals and targets, and
financial performance of a division or business unit. Strategic planning companies are subject to
the least stringent, and financial control companies to the most stringent, controls.
The relative importance of organizational goals as compared with business unit goals varies
accordingly. It is likely that this is also the case with respect to subunits within the business unit.
For example, the goals pursued by particular subunit or subgroup may range from direct goals that
are assigned to it by higher authority; goals of the business unit or group, which are assigned to all
subunits or subgroups within it; and goals of the organization itself, which are assigned to all
business units and groups within the organization.
As shown in the section entitled “Relationships Among SBUs” in Chapter Three, often the most
immediate and hence most powerful incentives to performance are those determined at the lowest
relevant level, which is often the one whose performance a given individual has more power to
affect.
As reported there, Martin and Eisenhardt found that business unit general managers were more
motivated by formal incentives that rewarded BU performance, which were considered to be
“high-powered”, than by incentives that rewarded performance at the corporate level, which were
considered to be “low-powered” incentives.34 That result may be considered to reflect rational
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design and efficacy of an incentive structure which is more heavily weighted to achieving goals
with respect to which the business unit general manager has more control or capacity to influence.
Intraorganizational Goals, Power, and Loyalty
Intraorganizational Goals
Intraorganizational goals have been discussed extensively in this work already, especially in
Chapter Five in relation to “Organizational Structure”, “Organizational Personnel”, and, of course,
in the present chapter above in relation to “Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals”.
Particular emphasis has been placed on the relationship between organizational goals and the goals
of intraorganizational components, such as functions, divisions, departments, and other groups and
subgroups within the organization. Here, the focus is on the relationship between group goals,
group power, and group-focused loyalties.
Power and Organizations
Each Part of the present work has involved some discussion of power, whether social, political, or
economic. A brief discussion of some aspects of the subject, in the broadest possible terms, as
relevant to organizations and corporations, is now in order. It will be possible only to avert to a
few relevant matters with great brevity in order to situate this work’s discussion of organizations
and, in particular, the corporation, with respect to this subject. For this purpose, reference will be
made to Robert Bierstedt’s influential article, An Analysis of Social Power,35 which canvasses the
subject, research, and relevant literature in some detail.
In that article, Robert Bierstedt explained that social power encompasses political, economic,
financial, industrial, and military power, that “society itself is shot through with power relations”,
and that power “is a universal phenomenon in human societies and in all social relationships”,
perhaps excepting the primary or family group.36 Considering “force” as the application of
sanctions, “power itself is the predisposition or prior capacity which makes the application of force
possible… the ability to employ force, not its actual employment, the ability to apply sanctions,
not their application.”37 Within an organization, this application of sanctions is generally subject
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to previous assent, at least with respect to something approaching a particular “zone of acceptance”
or “scope of agreement”.
Bierstedt argues that “the locus of power is in groups and it expresses itself in inter-group
relations”; that it “appears in the statuses which people occupy in formal organization”; and that it
is “a function of the organization of associations, of the arrangement and juxtaposition of groups,
and of the structure of society itself.38
Concerning formal organizations, Bierstedt maintains: “It is in the formal organization of
associations that social power is transformed into authority. When social action and interaction
proceed wholly in conformity to the norms of the formal organization, power is dissolved without
residue into authority. The right to use force is then attached to certain statuses within the
association, and this right is what we ordinarily mean by authority. It is thus authority in virtue of
which persons in an association exercise command or control over other persons in the same
association… Power in these cases is attached to statuses, not to persons, and is wholly
institutionalized as authority. In rigidly organized groups this authority is clearly specified and
formally articulated by the norms (rules, statutes, laws) of the association.”39
As noted in the present work, such organizational theorists and commentators as Weber, Barnard,
Chandler, Fayol, Selznick, Merton, and Zald, among others, adopt similar perspectives. In formal
organizations, authority, the ability to exercise command or control over certain other persons, and
to impose sanctions for failure to adhere to the same, arises from the institutionalization of power
as attaching to organizational status, or office, rather than to personal attributes. At this level of
theorization, the distribution and possible diffusion of such authority is often not considered.
Power, Organizational Stability, and Change
According to Bierstedt, power “is required to inaugurate an association in the first place, to
guarantee its continuance, and to enforce its norms. Power supports the fundamental order of
society and the social organization within it, wherever there is order. Power stands behind every
association and sustains its structure. Without power there is no organization and without power
there is no order.”40 This is not, of course, to suggest that an organization arising as a result of
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voluntary commitment on the part of its participants is without power or the ability to enforce
sanctions in respect of its members.
As discussed early in Chapter Four, Weber distinguishes between organizations established by the
members on their own authority, which he considered to be established autonomously, from
organizations imposed by an outside agency, which he considered to be established
heteronomously.41 For Weber, all organizations are “ordered” relationships, and are characterized
by certain expectations. In the case of organizations established autonomously, he says that its
“enacted order may be established in one of two ways: by voluntary agreement, or by being
imposed and acquiesced in.”42 Thus, the analyses of Weber and Bierstedt agree in this regard.
Bierstedt explains that while social organization “makes possible the orderly social intercourse of
people do not know each other… [t]he members do become acquainted with each other and begin
to interact not only “extrinsically” and “categorically,” in terms of the statuses they occupy, but
also “intrinsically” and “personally,” in terms of the roles they play and the personalities they
exhibit.”43 In effect, as Selznick notes, and as discussed previously here, “individuals have a
propensity to resist depersonalization, to spill over the boundaries of their segmentary roles, to
participate as wholes.”44 That is to say, they cannot be confined to their purely institutional roles
and, as a result, interact with each other in their plenary human capacity, including in respect of
their extraorganizational roles, as human wholes or as a whole human beings.
As discussed in the present work, the extent to which individuals consistently maintain and
instantiate their organizational roles, and do so exclusively, is in itself problematic and is subject
to variation over time. This may have intraorganizational effects.
Even in non-hierarchical organizations, subgroups may “arise and begin to exert subtle pressures
upon the organization itself, upon the norms which may be breached in the observance thereof,
and upon the authority which however firmly institutionalized is yet subject to change”45 In formal
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hierarchical organizations, subgroups constituted by the organizational hierarchy may also take
such actions in such a way as to threaten the stability of the organization.
Informal relationships and the “informal organization” may facilitate these developments, not only
positively, but also negatively. Chester Barnard emphasizes the positive influences which informal
relationships and the informal organization can exert at the executive level.46 Bierstedt explains
that “no formal organization can remain wholly formal under the exigencies of time and
circumstance. Power is seldom completely institutionalized as authority, and then no more than
momentarily.”47 In short, the formality of the formal organization, including role assignments,
inevitably is mitigated by informal relationships and the “informal organization” in which power
is not institutionalized as authority, as is the case in the formal organization, but remains as
uninstitutionalized power.
As seen here, pressures on, and challenges to, the stability of the organization arise both internally
and externally. In many cases, developments in the external environment of the organization
require adjustments to how it functions, including adjustments to its structure, processes and
procedures, and personnel. Bierstedt explains that “the intrusion of the time dimension and the
exigencies of circumstance require continual re-adjustments of the structure of every association
not excepting the most inelastically organized, and it is power which sustains it through these
transitions” and “supplies the stability which it maintains throughout its history”.48
Consequently, it can be seen that certain structural readjustments to institutionalized power, which,
according to Bierstedt, is institutionalized as formal authority, cannot themselves be implemented
by action taken by organizational leaders solely under the formal authority which is vested in them
by the formal organization. Implementation of at least some of those structural adjustments may
go beyond the authority vested in the repository of formal authority. Such formal authority may
require to be supplemented either by other lawful means of conveying formal authority, or by
informal organization and informal authority providing support for the formal authority acting
beyond the bounds of its actual formal authority.
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Bierstedt’s argument, then, maintains that structural readjustments of formal authority, or
institutionalized power, require support from the uninstitutionalized power which resides in
informal relationships and in the informal organization.
Internal and External Threats to Organizational Stability
By way of example, we refer to the earlier discussion in the present chapter under the heading
“Organizational Control of Intraorganizational Groups by Corporations”. There, we referenced the
text in Chapter Three under the heading “Headquarters Functions, Strategy, and Structure”, which
related to Chandler’s conclusion that MDCs adopt three principal frameworks or styles by which
the ultimate parent corporation, that is to say, the organization at the macro-level, exercises control
over divisions, departments and other organizational components of the corporation acting as
groups and subgroups within the corporate organization.
Chandler identified these as the “Strategic Planning”, “Strategic Control”, and the “Financial
Control” models, which are claimed to result from different patterns of growth, patterns of
investment, and sets of organizational capabilities reflecting, in part, the industries in which such
corporations operate.49 We suggest that, in addition, these models also reflect differences in the
strategy of the parent company and in the goals assigned by it to the relevant business units.
Among other things, this suggests that, as the corporation changes its strategy to take account of
changes in its environment, it may seek to change its structure, as Chandler proposed more than
fifty years ago, which may, in turn, make it appropriate to change the means by which it exercises
control over its business units. For example, strategic planning companies, which regard their
divisions and business units as portfolio investments, review divisional and business unit proposals
in terms of the parent company’s portfolio mix and related matters. Such a company might sell off
its investments in particular businesses, which, in turn, might make it possible and even efficacious
for the parent company to exercise a higher level of control over certain remaining divisions and
business units. Similarly, effecting many acquisitions in unrelated business areas might lead to a
reduction in such control.
Often, changes in the external environment provoke similar reactions from different companies
with similar strategic and control orientations, such as conglomerates. DiMaggio and Powell
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described this as a type of “institutional isomorphism”.50 Chandler remarks on the experience of
U. S. conglomerates, which engaged in “expansive growth through unrelated acquisitions in the
1960s and into the 1970s, then drastic pullbacks in the 1980s.”51
Both increases and decreases in control may result in changes in headquarters functions and
staffing. Chandler provides many examples of these strategy-control realignments, both in Strategy
and Structure52 and in his later article, “The Functions of the HQ Unit in the Multibusiness Firm”.53
We submit that headquarters staffing and processes may also have an effect on the degree of
control which it may exercise, which might lead to an increase or decrease in the quantum of
control, or to some change in the means by which control is exercised. For example, in connection
with Chandler’s references to responding to changes in the corporation environment by effecting
changes in its strategy a few paragraphs ago, we indicated that the resultant changes in strategy
might make it appropriate to change the methods by which control is exercised at the
organizational or headquarters level over strategic business units.
Among other things, it might be suggested that the means of exercise of control by headquarters
might also differ from one business unit to another, depending on the position or importance of
that business unit in the corporation’s overall strategy, and depending on the strategy pursued by
the relevant business unit, among other things. An example of another influencing factor is the
interrelationship between the operations and strategies of the focal business unit with some other
business units or business units.
An extraorganizational party, whether a strategic or financial investor seeking to acquire the
corporation and to subsequently implement changes in its strategy, structure and operations, for
example, by divesting certain divisions, combining certain divisions, or integrating certain
divisions with divisions of the acquiror would not have, ex hypothesi, as complete and
understanding of these interactions as would be expected to be the case at the highest levels of the
corporation itself. Consequently, proposals of this nature, such as are often made by hedge funds,
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and by private equity and specialist investors, may be extremely difficult, not only for target
shareholders, but also for the proponents, to evaluate with any real precision.
Theories of Intraorganizational Power
Coping with Uncertainty – A Strategic Contingencies’ Theory
Prominent among theories of intraorganizational power is one which considers intraorganizational
power to arise, at least in part, from the capacity of the relevant business unit to take account of
changes in the external environment by providing for contingencies, in effect, in such a way as to
“buffer” the exposure of the organization and of other business units.
A prominent and influential theory in this behalf was elaborated in 1971 in a much-cited paper by
David Hickson and Bob Hinings and their collaborators, “A Strategic Contingencies’ Theory of
Intraorganizational Power.”54 The theory presented in that article is based upon research reported
in their 1968 study, “Dimensions of Organization Structure.”55 Their theory was further advanced
in their 1974 article, “Structural Conditions of Intraorganizational Power.”56
A similar theoretical approach was developed by Jerry Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer in a 1974
research study entitled “The Bases and Uses of Power in Organizational Decision-Making: The
Case of a University”57 and in a 1977 analytical article entitled “Who Gets Power – And How
They Hold on to It – A Strategic-Contingency Model of Power.”58
Hickson and Hinings et al. (1971) adopt59 Lawrence and Lorsch’s definition of an organization as
“a system of interrelated behaviors of people who are performing a task that has been differentiated
into several distinct subsystems.”60 This is generally similar to the working definitions and formal
definitions considered earlier in the text of Chapter Four. Averting to previous studies of power in
work organizations whose focus was generally on the individual, Hickson and Hinings et al. follow
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Perrow in focusing on the power of functional groups, even considering that “power” as a term
“takes on different meanings when the unit, or power-holder, is a formal group in an open system
with multiple goals, and the system is assumed to reflect a political-domination model of
organization, rather than only a cooperative model”, as Perrow maintains.61
Accordingly, instead of focusing on the vertical superior-subordinate relationship, “when
organizations are conceived as interdepartmental systems, the division of labor becomes the
ultimate source of intraorganizational power, and power is explained by variables that are elements
of each subunit’s task, its functioning, and its links with the activities of other subunits.”62 Those
tasks and links, then, are variables affecting differentials in power as among subunits.
Hickson and Hinings et al. maintain that a major task of organizations is coping with the
uncertainty which confronts them. Organizations may create certain subsystems specifically to
deal with uncertainty; and they may also eliminate uncertainty, in whole or in part, by reference to
other subsystems. Dividing and allocating to subsystems the task of coping with uncertainty
creates a reciprocal interdependency, imbalance in which gives rise to power relations: “The
essence of an organization is limitation of the autonomy of all its members or parts, since all are
subject to power from the others; for units, unlike individuals, are not free to make a decision to
participate, as March and Simon (1958) put it, nor to decide whether or not to come together in
political relationships. They must. They exist to do so… The groups use differential power to
function within the system rather than to destroy it.”63
As mentioned previously, some care must be taken to recognize anthropomorphizations of
organizations and intraorganizational units. As Hickson and Hinings say here, unlike individuals
participating in organizations, intraorganizational units are likely to have only very limited
freedom to decide “whether to stay or whether to go” from the organization, that is to say, whether
to exercise “voice or exit”. There are some cases, such as where management effects a management
buyout (“MBO”), either as a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) or otherwise, in which management of the
intraorganizational unit may have some ability in this regard, but this must be considered to be
relatively exceptional, at least in so far as it affects day-to-day decision-making. Staying or
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remaining within an organization in the case of an individual, would normally be considered to be
relatively less constrained than a similar decision for a business unit of a business unit of a
corporation, and, accordingly, to be less remote from everyday decision-making.
Considering dependency as the reverse of power, Hickson et al. find that intraorganizational
dependency can be associated, firstly, with “the degree to which a subunit copes with uncertainty
for other subunits”; secondly, “the extent to which a subunit’s coping activities are substitutable;
and, thirdly, the focal unit’s centrality, meaning “the varying degree above [a minimum of task
interconnection among subunits] with which the activities of a subunit are linked with those of
other subunits.”64
They define “uncertainty” as “a lack of information about future events, which results in the
unpredictability of alternatives and outcomes “; and “coping” as having the means to deal with
uncertainties in such a way as to generate adequate task performance. 65 This finding is not at all
surprising. It might be expected that a subunit a high proportion of whose function consists of
coping with uncertainty for a large number of subunits and whose performance of that function is
highly nonsubstitutable, perhaps even approaching uniqueness, would have considerable power.
But it is not only the task of coping with uncertainty which is divided and allocated within the
system: more basic functional differentiations and allocations are effected; some subunits may
have a high degree of uncertainty, while others may have almost none. Hickson et al. say that “if
organizations allocate to their various units task areas that vary in uncertainty, then those subunits
that cope most effectively with the most uncertainty should have most power within the
organization, since coping by a subunit reduces the impact of uncertainty on other activities in the
organization, a shock absorber function”. They indicate that, by coping, “the subunit provides
pseudo certainty for the other subunits by controlling what are otherwise contingencies for other
activities. This coping confers power through the dependencies created.”66
We would argue, however, that, logically, more successful performance of tasks of higher
uncertainty would be expected to increase the power of the focal subunit as compared with another
subunit only where the tasks or subunits are of similar orders of magnitude, and of similar orders

64

Supra note 54 at 218.
Ibid at 219.
66
Ibid at 219-220.
65

447

of criticality to the organization as a whole, and, of course, where the substitutability such tasks is
comparable as between subunits; in other words, ceteris paribus. Otherwise, variances in power
among subunits might be expected.
It is apparent that coping capacity is a capacity of both subunits and of the organization as a whole.
At the organizational level, “organizations do not necessarily aim to avoid uncertainty nor to
reduce its absolute level, as Cyert and March (1963) appear to have assumed, but to cope with it.
If a subunit can cope, the level of uncertainty encountered can be increased by moving into fresh
sectors of the environment, attempting fresh outputs, or utilizing fresh technologies.”67 Coping by
one subunit, then, may permit the assumption of higher levels of uncertainty by other subunits
within the organization, and hence by the organization as a whole. This makes sense logically, and
also accords with diversification theory.
This is not, of course, to suggest that coping capacity is the only determinant of intraorganizational
power; however, it seems to be an important one. Hinings and Hickson et al. indicate that,
according to strategic-contingencies theory, “different subunits will travel different routes to
power at different times, as the circumstances in and around organizations change”, inasmuch as
“changing fields of operation (markets), changing technologies, changing outputs, will all affect
power”, which is continuously shifting.68 As shown previously, Barnard advances a somewhat
similar argument.
Resource Dependence – Strategic-Contingency Theory
Salancik and Pfeffer aim to elaborate upon strategic-contingency theory, “a view that sees power
as something that accrues to organizational subunits (individuals, departments) that cope with
critical organizational problems”. Subunits and others use power “to enhance their own survival
through control of scarce critical resources, through the placement of allies in key positions, and
through the definition of organizational problems and policies”, in the course of which processes,
organizations can become “both more aligned and more misaligned with their environments.”69
They say that “to the extent that power is determined by the critical uncertainties and problems
facing the organization and, in turn, influences decisions in the organization, the organization is

67

Ibid.
Supra note 54 at 42.
69
Supra note 17 at 4.
68

448

aligned with the reality it faces”. Such alignment facilitates the organization’s adaptation to its
environment, whereas a misalignment creates significant problems, by reason of maladaptation.70
Hickson and Hinings and their collaborators focus attention on coping with uncertainty. In their
model of strategic-contingency theory, Salancik and Pfeffer focus, instead, more directly on their
own version of resource dependence theory, asserting that that “to understand power in an
organization one must begin by looking outside it – into the environment – for those groups that
mediate the organization’s outcomes but are not themselves within its control.”71
These groups include groups which provide critical resources and, we would maintain, groups to
which the focal organization may be able to provide critical resources. They argue that “the
environment sets most of the structure influencing organizational outcomes and problems” with
the result that “management would do well to devote more attention to determining the critical
contingencies of their environments”,72 in effect, maintaining awareness of those environments,
and changes in those environments, and implementing appropriate, timely measures accordingly.
Their theorization treats uncertainty as only one species of environmental influence and relates it,
in part at least, to resource dependence.
However, in this regard, the environment in which organizations operate “includes both the
internal environment, the shifting situational contexts in which particular decisions get made, and
the external environment that it can hope to influence but is unlikely to control.” This
environmental context determines the problems to be dealt with, the criticality of those respective
problems, and the availability of needed resources.73
Salancik and Pfeffer maintain that subunits that contribute to the critical resources of the
organization will gain influence within the organization, and will use that influence to “bend the
organization’s activities to the contingencies that determine its resources”. As they say, this entails
that, contrary to the assumption of many organizational analysts and managers, units or subunits
of the organization on the same tier in the organizational pyramid may not enjoy equal power and
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status.74 In fact, it is possible, logically, that a subunit which is centrally located and controls
critical resources that are widely required may possess more power than a unit at a higher level.
Organizational power, as discussed below, may result in organizational change, but it may also
result, to some degree, in stasis, as result of which “the organization will never be completely in
phase with its environment or its needs.”75 We consider that this lack of phasing may also result,
quite simply, from the fact that responses to changes generally require acknowledgement of their
recurrence, analysis of the reasons and effects, and analyzing and adopting some one or more of
various alternative courses of action, each element of which reactive process take some time. One
might expect that the reactive capacity of the focal organization would be a significant determinant
of the extent to which its intended realignment “lagged” developments in the environment or was
more “in phase” with such developments.
These observations support the arguments made in the present text that the success of the
organization requires that it be able to develop an adequate understanding of its environment, both
external and internal; the contingencies existing in such environment, both external and internal,
the means of mitigating the same; the resources which it requires to succeed, both external and
internal, and the criticality of each of the same; and the most effective means by which to access,
and then to employ, such resources.
Scarcity, and Criticality, of Resources, and Uncertainty
Salancik and Pfeffer maintain that three conditions affect the use of power in organizations:
scarcity, criticality, and uncertainty. “The first suggests that subunits will try to exert influence
when the resources of the organization are scarce. If there is an abundance of resources, then a
particular department or a particular individual has little need to attempt influence. With little
effort, he can get all he wants anyway.”76 We would suggest that extraorganizational or external
scarcity of resources may often be a key determinant of intraorganizational or internal scarcity of
resources, but what is more particularly relevant to intraorganizational power is the latter.
The second condition, criticality, “suggests that a subunit will attempt to influence decisions to
obtain resources that are critical to its own survival and activities”; however, what is critical, they
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say, depends on “people’s beliefs about what is critical [which] may or may not be based on
experience and knowledge and may or may not be agreed upon by all.” 77An accurate assessment
of criticality can avoid wasted effort.
Salancik and Pfeffer suggest that increasing scarcity of a resource tends to decrease the use of
objective criteria in its allocation, and to increase the tendency to use power, and to increase the
quantum of power which is employed, in an effort to obtain it. “Every subunit will vie for resources
according to its needs and demands, but not all will be able to completely satisfy their demands. If
a subunit is to obtain resources, it must overcome the pressures of other subunits for the same
contested resource.”78 However, “power is exercised only when there is discretion in the allocation
of resources.”79
As to the third condition which affects the use of power, uncertainty: “When individuals do not
agree about what the organization should do or how to do it, power and other social processes will
affect decisions. The reason for this is simply that, if there are no clear-cut criteria available for
resolving conflicts of interest, then the only means for resolution is some form of social process,
including power, status, social ties, or some arbitrary process like flipping a coin or drawing
straws.”80 As a result, contestants with more power are more likely to succeed. This recalls our
discussion of March’s analysis of a business organization as a political coalition.
Resources, Influence, Leadership, and Survival
Salancik and Pfeffer draw the conclusion that “those units most likely to survive in times of strife
are those that are more critical to the organization” which “gives them power to influence resource
allocations that enhance their own survival.”81 This is not at all surprising. We would expect that
the power to allocate resources is important not only to the sustenance, growth, and survival, but
also to the decline, atrophy, and even extinction, of a focal subunit.
They say: “The strategic-contingencies model implies that subunits that contribute to the critical
resources of the organization will gain influence in the organization. Their influence presumably
is then used to bend the organization’s activities to the contingencies that determine its
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resources.”82 Among other things, these observations suggest that the subunits that contribute
greater amounts to the organization’s critical resources and thereby acquire greater influence or
power may not be denominated as such on the organizational charts, may not necessarily be
situated at the top of the organizational hierarchy, and may not have leaders whose titles
necessarily indicate their importance within the organization.
Instead, what might be called “organizational criticality power” or “criticality power”, a power
which arises from contribution of critical resources to the organization, may not be readily
apparent, and may, instead, require some knowledgeable investigation to discern. Of course, not
all intraorganizational power is criticality power. Instead, other dimensions or aspects of power
are at work within the organization.
While such alignment between criticality and criticality power might be desirable, it is not clear,
as a matter of logic, that such a realignment always eventuates. Salancik and Pfeffer’s observation,
though, is bolstered by their argument that “The power to define what is critical in an organization
is no small power… If an organization defines certain activities as critical when in fact they are
not critical, given the flow of resources coming into the organization, it is not likely to survive, at
least in its present form.”83
Thus, misunderstanding the criticality of activities may be expected to lead to engagements in
activities which are less productive than other activities might be, to omit or to reduce engagement
in activities which may be more highly productive than others, and to misallocate resources
accordingly. This may impact organizational growth, maintenance, and even survival. Thus, the
use of power to acquire criticality power in circumstances in which such criticality power is
unwarranted may be disbeneficial, not only to the organization, but also to the relevant subunit.
Power and Leadership, Alignment, and Realignment
Moreover, “power not only influences the survival of key groups in an organization, it also
influences the selection of individuals to key leadership positions and by such a process further
aligns the organization with its environmental context.”84 The exercise of power in leadership
selection may also tend to reflect the criticality, and hence power, of certain key groups, and
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changes in each of these factors: “The critical contingencies facing the organization may change.
When they do, it is reasonable to expect that the power of individuals and subgroups will change
in turn.”85 The present work has made arguments to this effect previously.
Salancik and Pfeffer go on to suggest: “One implication of the idea that power shifts with changes
in organizational environments is that the dominant coalition will tend to be that group that is most
appropriate for the organization’s environment, as also will the leaders of an organization.”86 They
chronicle the dominance of engineers in American industrial firms up until the 1950s, as they were
able to deal with production problems; followed by that of marketing executives in the 1950s, as
production became routinized and mechanized, and as the principal problem became selling all the
goods so produced; followed by financial executives in the 1960s, as the need to maintain the
stability of markets and production led to greater need for funds to finance acquisitions of
competitors, and to undertake costly research and development of new and improved products.87
Perrow finds, likewise, that the leadership of hospitals varied over the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, especially as medical technology advanced and major decisions were
increasingly based on technical competence.88 It is clear, however, that the dominance of the “most
appropriate” group is contingent, rather than inevitable. What Salancik and Pfeffer appear to be
able to maintain, instead, is that the organization and its leaders, and the subunits and their leaders,
as the case may be, may suffer as a result of non-performance by reason of such misalignment,
which, in turn, may be expected to invoke remedial action to force realignment.
As the present work has indicated previously, changes in power, and, more particularly, in the
leadership of the organization and changes in the dominant coalition are not likely to be
contemporaneous with changes in the critical contingencies facing the organization. Instead, it
may be expected that leadership and dominant coalition changes are likely to lag critical
contingency changes to some degree, although it may be the case that some forward-looking
organizations might make anticipatory leadership and coalition changes in the expectation of
critical contingency developments.
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In any event, in all probability, changes in power may precede leadership and coalition changes,
whether anticipatory or otherwise. Indeed, changes in power may themselves be anticipatory. That
is, the anticipation of changes in the ambient environment, whether internal or external, and the
resultant changes in critical contingencies facing the organization may result in power shifts within
the organization even before those environmental or critical contingency changes eventuate.
While it might be expected that the identity of the leadership of the organization would be
immediately apparent to outside observers, this may not be the case, particularly if the leadership
of the formal organization and that of the informal organization are not congruent. Similarly, the
members of the “dominant coalition” may not be obvious, or even easily determined.
Instead, determining the parameters of the organizational leadership, or that of the relevant group,
or subgroup, as the case may be, or the members of the dominant coalition of the organization,
group, or subgroup, may require detailed and appropriate investigation. The lack of synchronicity
of changes in environment, critical contingencies, leadership, and coalitions (particularly in their
relative salience or dominance) complicates such investigation further.
In this regard, examination of organizational decisions alone, for example, to determine the sources
and use of power in that regard, will not necessarily reflect the distribution of power within the
organization. “Using power for influence requires a certain expenditure of effort, time, and
resources. Prudent and judicious persons are not likely to use their power needlessly or wastefully.
And it is likely that power will be used to influence organizational decisions primarily under
circumstances that both require and favor its use.”89 Furthermore, there may be many
organizational decisions with respect to which the bearers of power are more or less indifferent
and, in consequence, with respect to which the exercise of power may be unnecessary at all, or to
any significant degree.
Nonetheless, the maintenance by subunits of their existing power is, according to Salancik and
Pfeffer, facilitated by: firstly, the ability to name their functions as critical to the organization when
they may not be; secondly, the tendency to categorize problems in familiar ways and to accord
weight to the perceptions of those with prior credibility or existing power; and thirdly, the ability
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to institutionalize power by establishing structures and policies that favour their influence and
become accepted as more or less permanent.90
It must be noted again, however, that maintenance of existing subunit power on such bases may
be antithetical to organizational performance, which may be revealed by appropriate attention by
organizational management to environmental conditions, and which may precipitate a realignment
of subunit power, often including the acquisition of substantial subunit power and even dominance
by a new subunit whose function is more aligned with the bases on which the former dominant
subunit claimed, but did not actually successfully meet, those conditions of power.
For example, naming the function of the focal unit as critical when it is not may result in that
function receiving excessive attention and in more critical functions receiving inadequate
attention, thereby decreasing organizational performance. Characterization of “new” problems in
familiar ways and assigning dealing with them to subunits whose power and credibility is based
on factors that are not relevant to the “new” problems may be detrimental to organizational
performance.
This may also be the case if structure and policies favour subunits with existing power, but whose
functions and capacity do not extend sufficiently to dealing meaningfully with the “new”
problems. In each of these cases, accurate assessment of the factors contributing to the “resulting”
shortfall in organizational performance may lead to a readjustment of subunit power.
Information and Sanctions as Sources of Intraorganizational Power
Salancik and Pfeffer also identify two other important sources of institutionalized power. One of
these is the ability to structure and control information systems, since “those who have information
are in a better position to interpret the problems of an organization, regardless of how realistically
they may, in fact, do so.” The other is the ability to distribute rewards and resources, which may
be used to pacify competing interest groups.91
Information
An example of the use of the power to structure information systems provided by Salancik and
Pfeffer is “setting up committees to investigate particular organizational issues and having them
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report only to particular individuals or groups”. This facilitates “awareness of problems by
members of those groups while limiting the awareness of problems by the members of other
groups.”92 Such an imbalance in information with respect to the identification, analysis, and scope
of, determination of factors relevant to, and potential solutions with respect to, such issues is
considered to create or to exacerbate an imbalance in power.
An interesting example of the ways in which intraorganizational power in general and
intraorganizational power derived from control over intraorganizational information can operate
is provided by a study of the crisis at General Motors Corporation (“GM”) relating to defects in its
engine ignition switches and the related cover-up of the same. These events were investigated by
special counsel to GM’s board of directors, Anton R. Valukas, the chairman of Chicago law firm
Jenner & Block, who had also acted as Examiner in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings.
The study, “Ethical Culture and Legal Liability: The GM Switch Crisis and Lessons in
Governance”, by Marianne Jennings and Lawrence J. Trautman, provides some interesting
information in this regard, citing the report by Mr. Valukas (the “Valukas Report”) extensively.93
The authors find that “organizational dysfunction may have caused or may have been the result of
organizational communication failures and insufficient knowledge at the levels of the organization
where change could have been implemented”, referring, in particular, to observations in the
Valukas Report that, in addition to individual mistakes and organizational dysfunction, including
the fact that some GM systems were “inaccessible to some and impenetrable to many.”94 Relevant
information often resided in isolated subunits which had minimal intraorganizational incentive to
collaborate proactively with other subunits.95
In addition to information silos, however, some of the problems of GM apparently arose from
integration failures, namely, failures to understand how seemingly disparate pieces of information
fit together, as well as from incentive failures, namely, failures to provide adequate rewards or
reinforcement, and, to the contrary, even punishing employees, for surfacing potential problems.96
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As noted previously in the present work, employees at lower levels make determinations as to the
information to be transmitted to superiors. These determinations may have significant effects, as
“organizational members rely on accurate and timely information not only to make effective
decisions but to effectively coordinate and implement those decisions”.97
In particular, Jennings and Trautman note that: “Both those with practical experience (including
CEOs and consultants) and academics agree on this proposition: Negative information struggles
to find its way to the top of a large organization.”98 A study by Detert and Trevino indicates that
employees often express concern about the treatment of information they provide, albeit often
indirectly, to leaders even two to five levels above them, who often have the power to handle
strategic contingencies and resolve key uncertainties within particular work environments.99
Further, as Jennings and Trautman observe: “Those at the top of the organization often fail to
recognize the messages they send by indirect communication”, which “can result from
emphasis”100, for example, on schedules, results, and performance, rather than, for example, on
safety or reputational issues. Often, the dispersal of such indirect communication throughout the
organization cannot be controlled by the formal organization or otherwise. Such indirect
communication may often arise from informal relationships and from the informal organization
more generally, which may be even more difficult to control than those of a more formal nature.
Sanctions
As noted in the immediately preceding subsection, the ability to distribute rewards, to provide
incentives, and to dispense punishments also significantly affect intraorganizational power. The
GM example and its discussion by Jennings and Trautman is instructive in this regard. Evidently,
at the time when the ignition switch issues were evolving, there was a “culture of cost-cutting”,
which impacted all aspects of its business and its culture, particularly as it was necessitated by a
massive restructuring of GM’s North American operations which had been underway for several
years.101This affected the ignition switch problems because those responsible for a vehicle were
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also responsible for its costs, including any changes required, and the effects of this cost-cutting
also extended to suppliers, with orders being sourced from those with the lowest price bids, rather
than the bids providing the highest quality.102
Accordingly, those responsible for the “cost” of GM vehicles acquired great intraorganizational
power due to the centrality and criticality of that function. We would submit that the internal legal
function apparently also acquired considerable internal power, again, as a result of the centrality
and criticality of the legal function, both during and after the restructuring. The centrality and the
criticality of the legal function were further enhanced as internal and external legal investigations
and proceedings were undertaken with respect to the “ignition switch” problem.
It was said that employees of GM never wanted to be “the bearers of bad news”. 103 Employees
apparently feared “pushback” and retaliation for raising safety issues. This extended to reporting
safety problems, apparently over a very long period, leading to the conclusion that since as long
ago as 1958, GM had “allowed cost pressures to prevent fixes and avoid public disclosure” 104 of
safety issues, leading to failures of accountability.105 Presumably, such internal retaliation could
extend to denials of salutary performance reviews, bonuses, raises, promotions, and other financial
and nonfinancial benefits. In general, of course, as we have noted previously, such sanctions, both
positive and negative, tend to be concentrated in their effectiveness at lower organizational levels,
where they provide more powerful incentives.
Accordingly, it would be reasonable to expect that organization-level incentives, such as
participation in the profit or bonus incentive plans at the GM corporate level, which might be more
immediately impacted by reputational and other considerations, would be less significant, both
immediately and quantitatively, to unit and subunit employees. In this way, internal sanctions
could very well have independently reinforced the efforts of units engaged in cost-cutting and legal
functions to minimize problems arising from, or relating to, cost-cutting, as well as safety, issues.
The Valukas Report found that these failures of accountability involved “not only a culture of
silence, but also a culture of concealment” in which employees “did not take notes at all at critical
safety meetings because they believed GM lawyers did not want such notes taken”, despite the fact
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that no evidence could be found reflecting any such instruction.106 This attests to the power of the
legal function in relation to the dominant “culture of cost-cutting”. It also attests to the power of
informal communications and relationships, and of the informal structure generally, with respect
to intraorganizational behaviour.
It was also found that the very nature of group decision-making at GM also promoted a lack of
accountability, including with respect to the ignition switch problems, which were considered by
“an astonishing number of committees” at those meetings, at which some of these issues were
flagged, solutions were proposed, and then were referred to another committee or ad hoc group.
At that point, the proposed solution often died, but without any single person “owning” the
decision, and without clarity as to the membership of, and issues considered by, the relevant
committees, which usually did not maintain minutes. Responsibility was regularly deflected onto
others, and often meetings ended with agreement to a plan of action which none of the parties in
attendance actually intended to pursue.107
Accordingly, the GM “ignition switch debacle” chronicled by Jennings and Trautman aptly
illustrates the control of information and the control of sanctions as tools in pursuing and exercising
intraorganizational power.
Exercise of Intraorganizational Power
In their 1974 study of the distribution of power within a university, Salancik and Pfeffer
acknowledge their reliance on the perspectives of Herbert Simon,108 of Cyert and March,109 and of
March alone,110 treating the organization as a coalition. They assert that this coalitional view rejects
the notion that organizations function as do individuals, resolving conflicts by means of the use of
economic incentives to arrive at a preference ordering shared by all organizational participants.
Instead it “emphasizes the differences in objectives and preferences of subunits and participants
and seeks to describe the process by which conflicting preferences and beliefs are resolved”.111
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This recalls our discussion of March’s analysis of joint preference ordering by means of
superordinate goals, such as in highly rational organizations, on the one hand, and superordinate
procedures, such as in political coalitions, on the other hand. It also recalls our objections made in
earlier chapters and in Appendix B with respect to the assumption of methodological individualism
in the social sciences, in theory and in practice.
In this connection, Zald, following Selznick, explains how the “organizational analysis” approach
studies the organization as a whole and focuses on “the allocation of power to different groups and
the manner in which subgroup loyalties and power affect the operation of organizations.” He also
indicates that, while central to this approach, an analysis of the polity of organizations, namely,
“the patterned distribution and utilization of authority and influence” is often only implicitly
treated in research and theoretical discussions.112 His analysis, as well as that of Hickson and
Hinings and their colleagues, significantly influenced Salancik and Pfeffer.
Distribution of Intraorganizational Power – Formal and Informal
As referenced in the immediately preceding paragraph, in the forty years since Zald made this
observation, there have been many studies of the distribution of power, influence, and loyalty
within organizations and, in particular, within corporations. A number of these studies are
referenced in Chapters Three and Four.
By way of example, Bouquet and Birkinshaw study how power and influence may be variously
distributed among groups and subgroups within the corporation.113 As discussed previously, in
another study Birkinshaw and Hood demonstrated how one single country business unit within a
MNE could exercise its power and influence in order to expand its scope of operations.114 At a
more general level, Amit and Schoemaker showed that some business units determined by country
of operation within an MNE may enjoy greater independence and be able to exercise greater power
than others. Factors relevant in this respect were found to include BU track record and informal
ties between BU and corporate level managers.115
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As referenced in Chapter Six under the heading “Relationships Among SBUs”, Wenpin Tsai’s
2002 study of 24 BUs, in a variety of businesses, within a single large MDC, examined situations
in which individual business units not only competed with each other for resources, but in certain
cases actually competed with each other for business externally. Contrary to expectations, he found
that intrafirm coordination and knowledge sharing was not significantly affected by internal
competition for resources, but, again, contrary to expectations, was actually enhanced by external
competition for business. This was only the case, however, in decentralized environments.116
The latter finding may suggest that high-powered incentives at the business unit level to succeed
against external competitors, and even internal competitors, in externally-oriented competition,
when combined with lower-powered organization-wide incentives, may facilitate BU general
managers cooperating across business units, in order for both business units to succeed against
external competition. The study also found that informal relationships and social interaction among
business unit general managers promoted trust and increased cooperation.117
This finding can be taken as an indication of the importance of informal networks and of the
“informal organization” within the formal organization, including the capacity to exercise power
or influence within the organization. Those subjects are canvassed, in particular, in the section on
Organizational Structure, especially in the sections on “Intraorganizational Organizations”,
“Informal Structure and Relationships”, and “Formal Organizations and Informal Organizations”.
Intraorganizational Politics
A particular unit within the organization may pursue activities designed to advance its own
particular interests within the organization as a whole, such as expanding its operations, as
discussed in the immediately preceding paragraphs. Such activities are frequently characterized,
usually critically, as undertaking “political” activity or “playing politics”, as if to minimize their
legitimacy, and as involving “games”, or “political games”. These subjects are considered by
Henry Mintzberg, the eminent social theorist, and management and strategy expert, in an important
article, “The Organization as Political Arena”, published in 1985.118
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Mintzberg describes politics as one of the systems of influence in an organization, the others being:
the system of authority, which defines “formal power”, the power allocated on an explicit and
legally sanctioned basis; the system of ideology, which “although implicit, typically represents
norms and beliefs that are widely accepted in the organization”; and the system of expertise, which
“represents power that is usually certified on an official basis and typically sanctioned by formal
authority”.119 The system of politics, he says, “may be described as reflecting power that is
technically illegitimate (or, perhaps more accurately, ‘alegitimate’) in its means (and sometimes
in its ends as well” such that “behavior termed political is neither formally authorized, widely
accepted, nor officially certified”.120
Political behaviour, according to Mintzberg, “is typically divisive and conflictive, often pitting
individuals or groups against formal authority, accepted ideology, and/or certified expertise, or
else against each other” and arising when the other systems of influence are absent or weak.
However, he indicates that the political system “can also be evoked” by those other systems, “as
when departmentalization, created through formal authority, encourages group processes that
benefit parochial interests at the expense of the needs of the organization at large.” 121 It may be
assumed, then, that the other systems, namely, those of ideology and expertise, may also evoke the
political system in their service, in certain situations.
In some organizations at some times, he says, “politics may be the dominant system of influence,
and conflict strong”, either because politics and conflict “weakened the other systems of
influence”, or arose by reason of their weakness.122 He describes an organization “which is
captured in a whole, or in significant part, by politics and conflict” as involving a “Political Arena”
of which he identifies and describes four basic types and the interrelationships among them.
However interesting, they cannot be examined here.
Mintzberg finds that political activity in organizations is often described in terms of games. He
identified thirteen types of political games described in the literature, “although no comprehensive
description of the organization as a system of various political games could be found”. Each of
these games has some relationship with the other systems of influence.123 He finds that some of
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these games can coexist with, and often could not exist without, strong legitimate systems of
influence; other highly divisive games “arise in the presence of legitimate power but are
antagonistic to it, designed to destroy or at least weaken it”; and others “arise when legitimate
power is weak, and substitute for it”.124
It is important, however, to recognize the existence of political behaviour among
intraorganizational organizations or units, behaviour which is analogized to that within the polity,
the external political environment, or the environment of the state.
Intraorganizational Loyalty
Relation to “Organization Personality”
The section of Chapter Five entitled “Organizational Changes in Behaviour and Relationships”
discussed Barnard’s perspective on loyalty as the most important single contribution required of
the executive. In particular, he expressed the view that loyalty involved domination by the
“organization personality”, which he defined to mean something like the personality that a member
does, or must, employ as part of the organization.125 We explicated this concept as meaning that
an individual’s non-organizational “personality” is sublimated into his or her “organizational
personality” in respect of the individual’s role within the organization.
As argued previously in this work, the individual may assume multiple intraorganizational roles
and identities which often require to be “managed” or, as this book has often said, “negotiated” in
some fashion. In Barnard’s terms, this could be expressed by saying that the individual had a
separate organization personality in respect of the organization as a whole and in respect of each
component of the organization of which that individual is a member. Alternatively, it might be
posited that Barnard’s “organization personality” synthesizes those separate aspects of
organizational identification.
While the former assumption clearly contemplates that the individual is required to “negotiate” or
“manage” those identities, the latter assumption may simply ignore or assume this. However,
neither construction explicitly acknowledges that intraorganizational groups may satisfy all of the
requirements to be considered as “intraorganizational organizations”, as does the present work.
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However, it is clear that discussions of loyalty engage notions of identification, at least, and
perhaps of commitment.
Barnard himself claims that loyalty and similar expressions, such as “solidarity”, and “esprit de
corps” relate to intensity of commitment, which is “vaguely recognized as an essential condition
of organization”. According to him, loyalty “is required is not necessarily related either to position,
rank, fame, remuneration, or ability.”126 It can be readily seen that loyalty and other expressions
relating to commitment may characterize intraorganizational groups as well as the macroorganization itself. In this regard, then, the organizational character of intraorganizational groups
may be said to be assumed by Barnard himself. In effect, Barnard may assume that
intraorganizational groups or components themselves constitute organizations and may be
analyzed accordingly.
Relation to Organizational Identification
Herbert Simon claims that one component of organizational loyalty on the part of participants is
the perception that the organization’s objective is important and has value not only independently,
but also for the participant concerned.127 He says: “The individual who is loyal to the objectives of
the organization will resist modification of those objectives, and may even refuse to continue his
participation if they are changed too radically.”128 Another component of organizational loyalty
relates to the participant’s interest in the continuance of the organization or in the organization
itself: “The individual who is loyal to the organization will support opportunistic changes in its
objectives that are calculated to promote its survival and growth.”129
For present purposes, it is important to note that these components of organizational loyalty may
also characterize loyalty to the intraorganizational components of the organization itself: its
internal organizations, divisions, departments, functions, units, subunits, groups, subgroups, and
so on. It may be assumed, following Simon, that the loyalty of individuals to the objective of the
focal group may be distinguished from their loyalty to the focal group itself.
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As observed previously in this work, it is important to distinguish between the individual’s
identification with the organization or relevant focal group, on the one hand, and his or her
commitment to it, on the other hand. Simon’s use of the term “loyalty” seems to more closely
approximate the former, as does his title for Chapter X in which these remarks appear, which is
“Loyalties and Organizational Identification”.
Simon’s comment that “the identification of the individual may be either with the organization
objective or with the conservation of the organization”130 makes this quite clear, since the sense of
this quotation is identical in its effect with his comments on loyalty quoted in the first paragraph
of the present section. On the other hand, because Simon does not contrast such identification with
“commitment”, it is possible to be only almost, but not quite, definitive on the issue. As will be
seen below, the extent of identification with conservation of the organization as an objective may
vary among organizational participants and, in particular, may be higher among the professional
managerial group whose members are typically interested not only in material benefits and values,
but also in non-material benefits and values, such as prestige and power.131
Simon’s explication of the concept of identification is that “a person identifies himself with a group
when, in making a decision, he evaluates the several alternatives of choice in terms of their
consequences for the specified group.”132 Of course, as previously noted, Simon relates
identification to acceptance of intraorganizational authority and roles. Within the area of
acceptance, the individual will behave “organizationally” or impersonally, substituting the
organizational value scale for the individual’s personal value scale as the criterion of “correctness”
in his or her decisions. But, “when the organizational demands fall outside this area, personal
motives restrict themselves, and the organization, to that extent, ceases to exist.”133
Simon acknowledges that “it might be hoped, then that it would be feasible to broaden, to some
degree, the area of identification which governs the administrator’s decisions”, in effect, by taking
steps “to transfer allegiance from the smaller to the larger organizational units, and from the
narrower to the broader objectives”. Simon seems to assume, then, that loyalty or allegiance is
more immediately felt at lower component levels of the organization, but that steps can be taken
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to change this. He also notes that “to the extent that this is achieved, the precise location of
decision-making functions is of less importance”.134 In other words, to the extent that componentlevel loyalty and identification does not exceed that exhibited at the organizational level, decisions
may be expected to be less reflective of, or less biased in respect of, the interests of the component.
Changes in the Dominant Coalition or Top Management Team
The expectation is that at the highest organizational level, as Chandler advocated, the senior
officers would adopt an “impartial over-all view” which would be “unencumbered by any
particular division loyalty or bias”.135 It will be recalled, however, that Salancik and Pfeffer, as
referenced above in the subsection entitled “Power and Leadership, Alignment, and Realignment”
chronicle the dominance of executives from certain functional groups, such as engineering,
marketing, and finance in various periods during the twentieth century.136 As also noted there,
Perrow likewise found that certain functional groups dominated the leadership of hospitals during
different periods of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.137
In this regard, Perrow indicates that domination by functional or “skill” groups may occur in two
ways. The first of these eventuates where a department “because of the technology and stage of
growth, effectively exercise a veto on the executive’s decisions and substantially shape decisions
in other departments.” This recalls the GM example discussed previously. The other, he says,
contradicting Chandler, or, at least, Chandler’s aspirations, arises where “lines of promotion may
be such that top executives are drawn from one powerful department, and retain their identification
with the parochial goals of that department.”138 In addition, there is evidence that certain other
types of loyalties, some related to function, such as professional and task loyalties, still continue
to obtain.
Simon maintains that “the organization objective itself changes in response to the influence of
those for whom the accomplishment of that objective secures personal values.”139 This is
particularly the case with the dominant coalition. As already noted, the group which consists of
the most senior officers of the corporation, the “top management team” or “TMT”, enjoy
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significant non-material benefits in terms of prestige and power which continue to accrue as a
result of the organization continuing its existence.140 Accordingly, it may be expected that these
continuance, maintenance, or “conservation” values, that is to say, the objectives of continuing,
maintaining, or conserving the corporation, will be among the values sought by that group.
Of course, as noted previously, it cannot be assumed that changes in the dominant coalition will
be effected at all at once. This may be the case whether the dominant coalition is considered to be
the TMT, the board of directors, or both. Certainly, changes in the TMT are likely to be effected
more gradually, even though, over time, there may be a change in orientation of the TMT itself.
For example, it would be unlikely that changes in the functional training and experience from, say,
engineers, to marketing executives, would take place en bloc. Instead, it would be more likely that
such a change would involve the gradual introduction of additional members with the soon-to-be
dominant functional background.
This may also take place as a result of what Selznick describes, and we outlined in Chapter Five
under the heading “Organizational Continuity and Co-optation”, as “cooptation”. As noted there,
this means “the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining
structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence”141 It may be
that, in some cases, the increasing power of a particular function or of persons having a common
functional background may precipitate a gradual turnover of functional dominance.
The Dominant Coalition as Intraorganizational Group
The Top Management Team as a Group of Individuals
As noted previously, Cyert and March consider that the “dominant coalition” of individuals
responsible for setting firm direction is the top management team (“TMT”) of the corporation,142
which also, according to Mintzberg, identifies environmental opportunities and problems,
interprets relevant information, considers organizational capabilities and strengths, and formulates
and implements strategic change.143 The position of the board of directors (”BOD”) vis-à-vis the
dominant coalition, the CEO, and the TMT generally is considered at the end of this section.
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The foundation has now been laid for the assertion that the dominant coalition or top management
team may be examined as a social unit or group of persons and, moreover, can be evaluated as to
whether it constitutes an intraorganizational organization, that is to say, an organization within the
larger umbrella organization. To some extent, we have accepted and articulated the first
proposition up to this point. As we indicated with respect to intraorganizational organizations
generally, the determination of whether the TMT constitutes an organization in itself requires
consideration of whether it is “organized”, that is to say, set up with a structure, processes, and
composed of personnel conducive to the attainment of some common goal or objective and also
“operated” in this way. The question whether the TMT constitutes an organization seems to present
some difficulties that do not arise specifically with respect to a division or function within the
umbrella organization. One of these potential difficulties is discussed next.
Top Management Team Goals and Objectives
As to the existence of some common goal or objective, it may be assumed, with some justification,
that the TMT, like the board of directors itself, shares the official or explicit, and probably even
all or most of the operative or implicit goals or objectives of the corporation, in large part because
the TMT and BOD participate in crafting those goals and objectives. It is of course possible,
perhaps even likely, that, firstly, the TMT as a group may have other more proximate goals and
objectives; secondly, this may be true for BOD; and, thirdly, some members of the TMT or BOD,
as the case may be, may have other, more personal, goals and objectives. Each of these sets of
goals and objectives may be supported by internal sanctions operating at the TMT, BOD, or
organizational levels.
For example, the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) may have goals and objectives that relate to the
finances of the organization as a whole and, perhaps, with respect to organizational components
as well. The CFO may also have functional, professional, and educational characteristics and
loyalties. The CFO’s performance evaluations, compensation, and bonuses, and future prospects
may depend in part upon organizational performance, but is also likely to depend in part upon the
CFOs performance in respect of the finance function. The weighting of these factors may have a
significant impact on the attention paid to such factors by the CFO. Other TMT members are likely
to be in somewhat similar positions, mutatis mutandis, having both organizational level, as well as
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functional, goals and objectives that weigh variously on their performance assessments,
compensation, bonuses, and future prospects, among other things.
The negotiation or assimilation of an individual’s identity as a member of the TMT, for example,
will have certain characteristics in common with negotiation of membership in groups at other
organizational levels. Similarly, each member of the TMT may be expected to exhibit certain role
behaviour consistent with such position, function, and professional and other attributes. Reference
is made to the discussion of these matters in Chapter Five, particularly under the headings
“Organizational Process” and “Organizational Personnel”.
It is, of course, necessary to recognize that the term “top management team” or “TMT” may not
be formally defined within any particular organization. In any particular corporation, it may be
considered to include the chief executive officer, as well as the heads of various functions (“Csuite” executives) or divisions, but it may also be considered on the one hand, to exclude some of
the incumbents of those positions and, on the other hand, to include others. In may simply be
considered to be the incumbents of the positions at the hierarchical level immediately below the
CEO, or it may be considered to be those reporting directly to the CEO.
In this regard, the informal structure and relationships within the formal organization must also be
considered. It may be that the TMT in a particular corporation includes positions or individuals
who would not be considered as members in other corporations. Simon may be taken to recognize
this in his specification of the “controlling group” as “the group that has the power to set the terms
of membership for all the participants” in the organization. While the “legal” power to do this
inheres in the board of directors, the “de facto” power may inhere in the TMT. Simon certainly
recognizes that “if the group that holds a legal control fails to exercise this power, then of course,
it will devolve on individuals further down the administrative hierarchy.”144 To be sure, the
respective positions of the BOD and the TMT were not the focus of Simon’s attention in this
regard. Indeed, at Simon’s time of writing, the TMT, not the BOD, was considered to be the
dominant coalition or controlling group.
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Top Management Teams and Collective Action
Questions arise concerning how the top management team, as a group, takes decisions and
implements actions. In this regard, Anneloes Raes and her colleagues developed a process model
of interaction between the TMT and middle managers (”MMs”), considering the TMT as “the
inner circle of executives who collectively formulate, articulate, and execute the strategic and
tactical moves of the organization.”145 Accordingly: “In describing TMT role behavior, we have
assumed that the TMT exists and operates as a social entity and that TMT members are, at least to
some extent, consistent in their behaviour toward MMs.” As a result, they considered it appropriate
to focus on the TMT, rather than on individual members, as interfacing with MMs.146
Thus arises “the issue of the teamness of TMTs”, which is debated among scholars.147 It is said:
“On the one hand, it seems that many organizations currently do have teams at the top whose
members function on the basis of shared goals and responsibilities. On the other hand, even when
formal and legal structures for being a team are in place, there may still be differences in the extent
to which TMTs are cohesive, interdependent, and behaviourally integrated.”148
While it is clear that a BOD has collective legal responsibility and that its individual members also
have individual legal responsibility, only the latter is the case with respect to the TMT: TMT
members have no collective, but only individual, legal responsibility. As a result, the extent to
which the TMT may be expected to function collectively, as a matter of fact, presents different
issues. While members might consider that they share common goals, it is not as clear that they
consider that they have, or share, any collective responsibility for actions of the TMT as a whole,
apart, perhaps, from some moral feeling of collective responsibility which may, however be very
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genuine and serious. However, some part of the sanctions possibly applicable to members of the
TMT, both individually and collectively, such as bonuses, may be based on assessments of their
collective performance. This may encourage awareness of collective responsibility.
Raes et al. indicate that managing the TMT-MM interface is likely to be more important in larger
organizations with more diversified functions because asymmetries of information, and interest,
and constraints against TMT-MM contact are likely to be greater in such organizations.149 “In
large, multibusiness organizations, MMs are often general managers of separate business units
who are particularly likely to have information that is different from that of the TMT” and to have
interests which pertain primarily to their own business unit.150
These subjects have been discussed in Chapter Five and earlier in the present chapter, especially
under the heading “Information and Sanctions as Sources of Intraorganizational Goals, Power, and
Loyalty”. As noted there, subordinates very frequently have the opportunity to determine the
information which is transmitted to their superiors as part of the reporting or decision-making
processes. While the information available to the subordinates may be quite granular, various
degrees of selectivity may be involved in “packaging” the information which is to go to superiors.
As also discussed there, most particularly under the heading “Theories of Intraorganizational
Power”, Raes and her co-authors note that the influence of a particular business unit may depend
on its network centrality and resources, on its geographic location and confidence, and on its
attempts to exercise upward influence151 These findings comport with the findings of Hickson and
Hinings et al.,152 Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, and Turner,153 and Hinings and Hickson et al.; 154 and
with those of Salanzcik and Pfeffer.155
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Raes et al. also note that the TMT and MMs have to process unstructured streams of complex
information, make sense of them, and find solutions under conditions of unclear cause-and-effect
relationships.”156 They say that the tasks of MMs in this regard are complicated by their dual roles
as links between the TMT and lower organizational levels, entailing that in their actions with the
TMT, they are both the “accomplice of the TMT” and the “representative” of their BU. Raes et al.
conclude that “this dual role leads to a potential conflict of interest, both inside the MMs and
between the TMT and MMs.”157
It is also important to note that the TMT and MMs “have fewer opportunities to interact than do
those in other leader-follower relationships, making their episodes of interaction important
“windows of opportunity” for achieving alignment in their activities.”158 Among other things, this
limits the opportunities for trust to be generated between or among the parties, such that longer
tenure might be beneficial. Various TMT members having different perspectives may interact with
the same middle manager over time, making assessments of the confidence and trustworthiness of
such middle manager more difficult, inasmuch as these activities may require organized
communication among the relevant TMT members.
Finally, Raes and her colleagues say that while “scholars are debating the teamness of TMTs in
terms of their internal functioning, we know of no research that does address the question of how
TMT members coordinate and execute their collective leadership actions toward followers.”159 In
effect, then, research was lacking only a few years ago, at their time of writing, concerning the
interaction between the TMT and middle management, or between the TMT and some focal group
of middle management, in terms of intergroup interaction, at least. The review in the present work
suggests that this is not atypical of interaction among intraorganizational groups more generally.
Board of Directors, Top Management Team, and the Dominant Coalition
As discussed in Chapter One and in Chapter A1 of Appendix A, modern corporate law statutes
assign to the board of directors the responsibility for managing or supervising the management of
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the business and affairs of the corporation.160 Accordingly, it is clear that the board of directors
possesses the legal authority to determine how the business and affairs of the corporation will be
managed.
However, the board is also empowered to designate offices, appoint officers, specify their duties,
and delegate to them powers to manage or to supervise the management of the business and the
business and affairs of the corporation, subject to certain statutory limitations.161 As discussed
there, officers may have certain powers and responsibilities pursuant to the relevant statute and
corporate charter documents, the relevant common law, and relevant contracts and agreements.162
It is commonly acknowledged that a corporation of any significant size is normally managed from
day to day by its officers and employees, rather than by its board of directors. The related question
is who exercises de facto or actual authority over how the corporation will be managed from one
day to another: the board, on the one hand, or the CEO and the TMT, on the other. The logical
possibility exists, of course, that such day today responsibility and authority could be shared in
some fashion; however, this possibility does not figure significantly in the relevant literature. The
prevailing view concerning the composition of the dominant coalition or controlling group vis-àvis the board, the CEO, and the TMT more generally has varied over time.
Berle and Means on the Dominant Coalition
As is well known, Berle and Means analyzed the impact of the separation of ownership and control
of the corporation in terms of the separation of equity ownership by shareholders and the exercise
of control by management of the corporation, resulting in a divergence in their interests.163 For
them, the term “management” included both the board and what would now call the top
management team or TMT: “managers consist of a board of directors and the senior officers of the
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Corporation”.164 Mark Mizruchi argues that “because their key point about the separation of
ownership from control is that managers become a self-perpetuating oligarchy”, this indicates that
Berle and Means regard the board, rather than the officers, as in control of the firm. 165 He also
notes that at their time of writing boards of directors were largely composed of the CEO and other
senior officers of the firm.
Berle’s 1954 book, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, frequently elides the board and its
management, treating them collectively as “management”. He points out that change of
management by shareholder votes is “extremely rare, and increasingly difficult and expensive to
the point of impossibility”. When combined with the business judgment rule, he says that this
“leaves management with substantially absolute power” except for the power of their own
consciences.166 Yet later in Chapter V, “Corporate Capitalism and “The City of God”,” he refers
only to the consciences of the directors as distinct from the officers of the corporation,167 as holding
out hope that corporations will make contributions to the improvement of society and the selfrealization of individuals.168
Berle’s 1958 article ““Control” in Corporate Law”169 focuses on “control” in the sense of the
power or a legal authority to elect a majority of the board of directors, who have the legal authority
to manage, and thus concentrates attention on legal, rather than de facto or actual, authority. This
accords with his earlier view that “all powers granted to the corporation or to the management of
the corporation…are necessarily… exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders
as their interest appears”.170
Stephen Bainbridge argues, as does the present work, that it is the board of directors which has
primacy over the power and right to exercise decision-making, rather than the shareholders as in a
shareholder primacy model, or the managers, as maintained by managerialism.171

164

Ibid at 96.
Mark Mizruchi, "Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and Power of Large U.S. Corporations" (2004) 33:5
Theory and Society 579 at 591.
166
Adolf A Berle, Jr, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution, (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1954) at
180.
167
Ibid at 184-186.
168
Ibid.
169
Adolf A Berle, Jr, "‘Control’ in Corporate Law" (1958) 58:8 Colum L Rev 1212.
170
Adolf A Berle, Jr, "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust" (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 1049 at 1049.
171
Stephen M. Bainbridge, "Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance" (2002) 97 Nw U L
Rev 547 at 605.
165

474

The Dominant Coalition in Historical Perspective
Chandler’s historical analysis indicates that before 1850, industrial enterprises were very small
and usually family affairs, such that the “two or three men responsible for the destiny of a single
enterprise handled all its basic activities – economic and administrative, operational and
entrepreneurial” with the result that “business administration as a distinct activity did not yet
exist.”172 While “a very few of the very largest American economic enterprises to develop
embryonic administrative structures”,173 it was the operation of the great railways across America
that gave rise to a full-time administrative structure in American business.
Chandler chronicled the ascendancy of management control as a result of the increasing
complexity of business operations and the need for specialized and highly developed skills and
their management, concentrating on four of the largest industrial corporations.174 For example, the
increased diversification of the business of the DuPont Company after the First World War greatly
increased its administrative needs, including the application of broad goals and policies, resource
allocations, and performance appraisals.175
The board of directors of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in 1912 consisted largely of
full-time executives, mostly generalists, and a very few heads of specific functional activities.176
By 1919, the board of directors consisted of executives responsible for particular functional
activities, such as marketing production, manufacturing, finance, treasury, and control.177 As
specialists, they “had little time for, information about, or interest in the administration of the
company as a whole”, with the exception of the individuals who acted, separately, as Chairman of
the Board and as President, and, thus, the directors could not “fully appreciate the needs and
problems of their colleagues on the Board.”178 Although the directors managed various functions,
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in general, the asymmetry of information between the board and the management of individual
departments, subsidiaries, divisions and functions, was even then quite apparent.179
With the adoption of a multidivisional structure and the creation of the head office of general
executives and staff specialists in 1927, the general officers on the board were relieved of operating
responsibilities. By 1933, its board consisted of “full-time executives who devoted their time
wholly to over-all coordination, appraisal, and policy planning.”180 Similar developments took
place at the remaining companies closely studied by Chandler: at Sears, Roebuck and Company in
that same year,181 at The du Pont Company in September 1921,182 and at General Motors in
December 1920.183
Adopting a multidivisional structure “clearly removed the executives responsible for the destiny
of the entire enterprise from the more routine operational activities and so gave them the time,
information and even psychological commitment for long-term planning and appraisal”, in effect,
attending to the policy function, while giving the general managers of the multifunction divisions
“the responsibility and the necessary authority for the operational administration”, the operations
or administration function.184
Chandler concluded that in the large corporation, the task of allocating resources and determining
the basic goals and policies had long ago been abdicated by shareholders, who had “neither the
time, information nor (as long as the enterprise is paying dividends) the interest to make basic
policy decisions”185 The members of the Board of Directors, unless “they were also full-time,
career executives of the concern… had only a little more knowledge and understanding of the
workings of their company than the stockholders”, “had neither the time nor sources of information
independent of the full-time executives” to study its workings, and “were occupied with their own
business activities”.186 In this sense, “the members of board unless they were full-time executives
of the concern, were as much captives of the professional entrepreneurs as were the stockholders.”
Thus, the task of management was left to professional managers.
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Both the board and shareholders “had only a negative or veto power on the government of their
enterprise and on the allocation of its resources” since they lack both the information and “the
awareness of the company situation to propose realistic alternative courses of action.”187 However,
according to Chandler, both the board and the shareholders came alive “whenever company’s
dividend stopped and receivership loomed.”
On the other hand, those professional entrepreneurs, the “general executives”, once freed from
non-entrepreneurial responsibilities, can spend their full-time on the entrepreneurial tasks of
planning and appraisal, relying on head office staff for independent verification of divisional
information and for alternative policy proposals and recommendations; and their actions are
subject only to negative control by their “legal superiors”, the board of directors. 188 Thus, it was
the professional managers at head office, the “general executives”, who were the “key decisionmakers” and had the “actual or real, rather than merely to legal, power to allocate resources
available to them and… in fact, determine the basic goals and policies for their enterprise.”189
Chandler’s historical perspective enables a number of observations to be advanced. Firstly, the
roles of the shareholders, directors, and top management team vis-à-vis actual performance of the
management function has changed substantially over time. Secondly, a significant influence in this
regard was the increase in scale and scope of operations conducted by the focal corporation. The
small group of individuals, family or otherwise, who originated its operations became insufficient
to manage those operations. Thirdly, specialty skills were required. This, in turn, increased the
importance of coordination as a critical function, also involving specialized skills.
As we have seen, these developments created various intraorganizational groups or
intraorganizational organizations, surfacing the issue of possible identification with, and possible
commitment, by participants to the organization, and its groups and subgroups. Fourthly, such
scale and scope attenuated the need for, and volume of, strategic and policy determinations
required. Fifthly, ideally, these should be made by headquarters personnel without operating
attachments to groups or subgroups within the organization other than to the headquarters group
itself. This is important not only to ensure concentration on the relevant strategic matters, as
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Chandler says, but also to reduce identification with and commitment to operational groups and
subgroups, as distinct from identification with and commitment to the organization itself.
The Board of Directors as a Group of Individuals
The first sections under the present heading, “The Dominant Coalition as Intraorganizational
Group”, considered whether the top management team could be examined as a social unit or group
of persons, and evaluated as to whether it constituted an organization itself within the large
organization, which might be described as an intraorganizational organization. Similar questions
arise with respect to the board of directors. Thus, much of the discussion under those headings
concerning the TMT is also relevant to the BOD. There are, however, some salient differences.
Firstly, with respect to a large corporation, it can normally be assumed that members of the TMT
are full-time officers and employees of the corporation. Currently, other than the CEO, most, if
not all, members of the BOD are not so engaged. Secondly, as officers and employees, TMT
members acquire certain rights and obligations, under statutory corporate law, agency law and
other common law, and relevant contracts. Other than the CEO, their intraorganizational duties
and responsibilities do not span the entire organization, but are more limited. This is not the case
with respect to directors. Moreover, the BOD exercises responsibility directly on behalf of the
corporation, while the CEO and other TMT members exercise only delegated authority, as agents.
Thirdly, while TMT members may be expected to have certain intraorganizational identities and
commitments at the group or subgroup level, in addition to their organizational identities and
commitments, directors are expected to have only the latter. They must, nonetheless, “negotiate”
their identity as a director of the focal corporation vis-à-vis the board as a group, and vis-à-vis their
other social identities.190 Fourthly, in general, the board interacts only as a group with the CEO
and other TMT members. Actions by the chair of the board or its committees or other actions by
individual directors or committees of directors which are authorized by the board itself are
exceptions to this general rule. Fifthly, because most directors are not engaged in that capacity on
a full-time basis, their own individual opportunities for interaction within the board, on the one
hand, and with the CEO and TMT members, on the other hand, are quite limited. As noted above
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under the heading “Top Management Teams and Collective Action”,191 this presents difficulties
in terms of taking decisions and actions, creating role behaviour, and developing trust and
confidence, within the group, in this case, the BOD, and with the TMT.
Board of Directors Goals and Objectives
As discussed under the heading “The Dominant Coalition as Intraorganizational Group” with
respect to the TMT, the Board’s goals and objectives may be expected to relate almost exclusively
to goals and objectives of the corporation itself, to a much higher degree than would be the case
with respect to the TMT. Of course, the board may set certain goals and objectives for itself, as a
group within the organization or as an intraorganizational group. The TMT may do likewise.
However, as discussed under that same heading, unlike the TMT, the BOD has a collective legal
responsibility, in addition to individual responsibility.
Board of Directors and Collective Action
As discussed in relation to the TMT, and as discussed under the heading “The Board of Directors
as a Group of Individuals”, the board makes decisions and takes action as a group. The factors
referenced in the discussion indicate some of the distinctive aspects of decision-making by a board
of directors, acting as a group, as compared with other groups.
Organizational Goals and Corporate Operations
Historical Development of Operations
As discussed extensively in Chapter Two, Chandler described the evolution of the corporation in
the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as technology and modern
management techniques evolved, enabling corporations to pursue various strategies, and enabling
and, some extent, requiring them to adapt their organizational schemes accordingly, including
effecting changes in the structures, processes, and management and personnel practices, of such
corporations. Chandler, Fligstein, and others described the evolution of corporations operating
exclusively or primarily in the United States into multinational enterprises conducting operations
around the world.
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MDCs and MNEs
As discussed in Chapter Three under the heading “Headquarters Functions, Strategy, and
Structure”, Chandler examined the relationship among the strategy, structure, and headquarters
and business unit functions in the case of various multidivisional corporations.192 Chandler stressed
the importance of the monitoring function as being intimately related to strategic planning and
resource allocation, a classic, if not the defining or ultimate, entrepreneurial function.193
As also seen in Chapter Three, this time under the heading “Multinational Enterprise
Organizational Structure”, Theodore Herbert discussed various generic strategies, largely based
on resource flows, that would lead to internationalization and other structural design criteria that
have been found to impact the strategy and structure adopted with respect to multinational
operations and to affect their evolution and development.194
The relationships between headquarters and business units on the one hand, and among business
units, on the other hand, are referenced in Chapter Three under the headings “The HeadquartersStrategic Business Unit Relationship” and “Relationships Among SBUs”, respectively. Research
by Bouquet and Birkinshaw195 and by Birkinshaw and Hood196 reviewed under those headings
explored various models of the structure and process considerations in the relationships between
the headquarters and business units of MNEs. In particular, the relationships between meta-level
organizational goals, on the one hand, and goals of MDCs and MNEs are discussed earlier in the
present chapter under the headings “Goals of the Corporation as Organization” and
“Organizational Control of Intraorganizational Groups by Corporations”. Hence, only a few
supplementary remarks concerning change are offered here.
With respect to both MNEs and MNCs, of course, the evolution of the ultimate parent
corporation’s strategy, at both the organizational and business unit levels, and the development of
the related structure, processes, and management and personnel practices often lead to significant
change and even to significant periods of change within the organization at various levels. For
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example, the structure of authority, and the relationships between formal and informal structure
and formal and informal authority frequently evolve197, as does the relationship with the host
countries of the relevant foreign subsidiaries or other operations.198
For example, as noted earlier in the present chapter under the heading “Internal and External
Threats to Organizational Stability”, as the corporation adapts its strategy to environmental
changes, it may seek to change its structure, as posited by Chandler.199 Such change in structure
may make it appropriate to change the means by which the corporation exercises control over its
business units generally or in particular cases.
As noted earlier in this chapter under the heading “Power, Organizational Stability, and Change”,
according to the present author’s interpretation of Bierstedt, the formality of the organization and
its formal authority, and their development, are mitigated by informal relationships and the
informal organization. This is particularly important at times when structural readjustments
become necessary or are otherwise being made to the formal structure and formal authority: in
such cases, formal authority or institutionalized power require support from the uninstitutionalized
power which resides in the informal relationships and the informal organization relating to the
same.200
It may, perhaps, go without saying that during significant periods of change authority relationships
may come under some pressure and the relationship between formal and informal authority and
between the operations of the formal and the informal organization may also change. These
circumstances may exacerbate the normally considerable difficulties of assigning business or legal
responsibility to particular groups or to particular individuals.
Inceptions and Terminations of Operations
As discussed in Chapter Three under the heading “Organizations as Polities”, as corporations seek
to enter into new areas of operation or to withdraw from existing areas of operation, various groups
or subgroups within the organization may be differentially affected. These different effects may
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include differences in the affect of individual members of the organization, group, or subgroup,
such as identification with, and commitment, or loyalty, to, affected groups or subgroups.
Entries into or exits from the corporation’s areas of operation may also differentially affect various
levels within the hierarchy of the corporation, group, or subgroup, as the case may be. As
previously seen, Simon suggests that prestige and power may be considered to have a greater value
and hence to be more important as independent goals or objectives as one ascends the
organizational hierarchy.201
For example, an acquisition may enhance the prestige or power of an officer of the corporation to
a greater degree if the officer is a member of the top management team, as compared with officers
at lower levels of the hierarchy. Similarly, the disposition by the corporation of the unit or subunit
to which an individual belongs may be regarded by that individual as positive, at least in personal
terms, if the individual secures continued employment of the corporation at a higher level in the
hierarchy, or at a higher level of compensation, or if the function in which the individual is to be
engaged is or becomes more central to, or a “core function of, the corporation as a whole.
Of course, commencement of new, or termination of existing, areas of operations may be
consequential upon other changes in goals and objectives. As Meyer Zald observes, changes in
goals tend to produce conflict and disaffection, and, if such changes in goals are significant, may
threaten the existence and viability of the organization.202 Such effects may be particularly
attenuated in cases of inceptions and terminations of operations.
Changes in Coalitions and in the Environment
As noted in Chapter Three under the headings “Competing Preferences Within the Firm, and
Formation of Coalitions” and “Continuing the Coalition”, one may treat the formation of a business
firm or corporation as involving a political coalition responsive to the demands of its constituents.
In that event, it is clear, according to March, that the demands of organizational constituents are
not constant but, instead, shift “in response to experience (both actual and vicarious), and the
attention which may be brought to bear upon such demands, namely, “the extent to which they are
seen as relevant to action – shifts in response to the perception of problems”.203
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Consequently, as the coalition represented in the firm changes, the goals and commitments of the
corporation also shift, even if slowly, over time.204 Of course, the corporation must also continue
to monitor and respond to conditions in its environment, both internal and external. These changes
in conditions might result in changes in strategy, structure, and process, becoming appropriate.205
Changes in Goals and in Monitoring
As discussed in Chapter Three, Chandler shows that the upper levels of the hierarchy of the
corporation, including at headquarters and divisional levels, vary the nature and extent of their
involvement in planning, monitoring, and control, depending on the nature of the goals and
objectives pursued by the corporation at the relevant time.206 Accordingly, changes in goals and
objectives would be expected to result in changes in these functions.
Changes in goals and objectives may often be considered to be salutary, at least to the extent that
such changes aim to maintain and continue the existence of the organization. They may be
considered, variously, as evidence of its continuing “relevance” to its environment; as evidencing
a capacity to attain a certain range of goals and objectives; as evidence of the organization’s
effectiveness in terms of its ability to attain certain goals and objectives to date; as a means of finetuning existing goals and objectives; as a means of adding new and more relevant goals and
objectives and eliminating older and less salient goals and objectives; and as claiming new goals
and objectives for the organization which may be instrumental to, or congruent with, existing goals
and objectives of groups, subgroups, and individuals within the organization.
Goals of Corporations
Profit Maximization as Superordinate Goal
As shown in Chapter Three, commentators have established that the claim that all corporations
have only a single goal, that of making a profit, is highly problematic at the very least, and, more
likely, highly inaccurate. James March’s attack on this assumption from a theoretical perspective,
which is summarized in a number of the initial subheadings in that chapter under the heading
“Organizations as Political Systems”, is well considered and highly persuasive.
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Even more persuasive, however, is his report that the studies of behaviour of firms is not consistent
with the single superordinate goal of profit maximization.207 He asserts that studies of polities have
likewise been unable to derive a single superordinate goal, such as the “public interest”, which is
simultaneously meaningful, stable, and valid.208 Accordingly, studies of conflict resolution in both
firms and in polities became focused on theorizing conflict resolution by means of a superordinate
process, rather than by means of a superordinate goal.209
That is not to say, course, that corporations do not have end goals. Instead, the author’s assertion
is that they likely have a number of ultimate goals, the prioritization of which at any particular
time is dependent upon the exercise of power and influence within the corporation; and they may
also have a multiplicity of instrumental goals ranked by similar means.
It has likewise been established, elsewhere and in the present work, that each component (unit or
subunit) of the corporation has a number of goals and objectives, some of which may align to
varying degrees, and others of which may not align at all, with those of the corporation as a whole.
While some of these may be assigned by superior elements and levels of the hierarchy of the
corporation, others may not be so assigned. It has also been established that some of the goals of
a particular component may align, and others may not align, with the goals of other components,
whether in related or unrelated areas of the corporation, at similar or different levels within the
corporate hierarchy, or otherwise.
It has also been demonstrated that each component of the corporation may compete with some one
or more components of the corporation for resources and otherwise; that the power and influence
of each component may vary from one to another; and that each component may engage in
activities aimed at increasing its power and influence vis-à-vis the headquarters of the corporation
and vis-à-vis other components.
It is now in order to discuss the taxonomy of goals of the corporation and its components.
Typology of Goals in Corporations
The review in the early sections of this chapter of Charles Perrow’s important work on
organizational goals discussed his important distinctions among official goals, and unofficial
207
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goals, and operative goals. “Where operative goals provide the specific content of official goals
they reflect choices among competing values.” They may also reflect the ends sought through the
actual operating policies or “what the organization actually is trying to do, regardless of what the
official goals say are the aims.”210
These may be distinguished from instrumental goals in aid of official goals, which would be
expected to consider the ways in which the organization actually goes about achieving its official
goals. As is often the case, stated purpose and reality may differ: the goals actually pursued may
not be the official goals claimed by the corporation or other organization.
Perrow says that: “A business corporation, for example, may state that its goal is to make a profit
or adequate return on investment, or provide a customer service, or produce goods.”211 As
demonstrated previously, its actual goals may be expected to be somewhat more complex and
diverse: “If profit-making is an overriding goal of an organization, many operative decisions must
still be made which will shape its character.”212 While the official goals can be determined from
official documents and sources, the operative goals pursued by the corporation can be determined
only by empirical investigation. Some consequences of these observations are discussed next.
Managerial Capitalism and Goals
Perrow, refers to the frequent assertion “that the importance of profits, per se, has declined with
the increased power of professional management, especially in large organizations” on the grounds
that “since management does not have a personal stake in profits, they consider them less important
than stability, growth, solvency, and liquidity.”213 Perrow cites a study conducted by James Dent
which surveyed executives of one hundred and forty-five business firms of varying sizes
concerning the aims of top management of their organizations, finding that making a profit was
reported most often, and that employee welfare and “good products or public service” tied for
second place.214 This suggests that generating, but not necessarily maximizing, profit is important.
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Perrow repeats Robert A. Gordon’s assertion “that the common pattern of evolution is for active
leadership by owners in the early years of the firm, then it is passed on to new generations of the
families concerned, and gradually responsibility for decision-making passes to professional
executives who frequently have been trained by the original leaders. Goals likewise shift from
rapid development and a concern with profits to more conservative policies emphasizing
coordination, stability and security of employment.”215
As noted in Chapter Two and in the present chapter, Chandler chronicles similar developments in
Great Britain and in the United States, but relates changes in responsibility for decision-making to
the impact of technology on the scale of operations of corporations, leading, among other things,
to the advent of the professional manager and to “managerial capitalism”.216 He concludes, with
Dent and Gordon, that the “decision-making of such career managers was observed to favour longterm stability and growth, rather than maximizing current profits.”217
As indicated previously, Herbert Simon averts to the “conservation” values of an organization,
which are those derived from the size and growth of the organization which are relevant, in
personal terms, to the professional managerial group who exercise actual control or, in effect, act
as the dominant coalition.218 As already mentioned, these may be expected to include prestige,
reputation, extraorganizational power and influence, compensation, and many other attributes of,
or related to, the organization.
Simon explains that the group “which exercises the power of determining the basic value criteria”
of the organization “will attempt to secure through the organization its own personal values –
whether these be identified with the organization objective, with the conservation objectives, with
profits or what not.” But, according to him, that group is not able to exercise “an unlimited option
to direct the organization in any path it desires, for the power will continue to exist only so long
as the controlling group is able to offer sufficient incentives to retain the contributions of the other
participants to the organization.”219
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Thus, he indicates that “in business organizations, the control groups can ordinarily be expected
to be oriented primarily toward profits and conservation.”220 Clearly, the profit generation
objective must be balanced against the organization objective and conservation objectives. In
effect, this means that profits need not be maximized but, instead, should be optimized. That is to
say, the profit objective should be expressed in terms of satisficing, rather than in terms of absolute
quanta, and in terms of balancing it as against other organization and conservation objectives.
Such control group orientations indicate that the control group should employ all of the
corporation’s resources, including financial and personnel resources, “in such a manner as to attain
a maximum of inducement to employees, and a maximum of attainment of organization objectives
with these resources.”221 Simon considers this to be a criterion of efficiency. We would note,
however, that such inducements must be provided to all providers of resources, not just to
employees.
Simon explains that, despite the apparently opportunistic pursuit of efficiency, “most commercial
organizations…do tend usually to maintain fairly stable objectives”. He expresses this stability of
objectives in terms of the business actually pursued by the corporation. According to him, such
stability arises because: firstly, “sunk costs” incurred by the organization “make immediate and
rapid adjustment unprofitable even from the standpoint of conservation”; secondly, the
organization normally acquires know-how in a particular field, which he describes as an intangible
sunk cost or, more properly, a “sunk asset”; and, thirdly, it also requires goodwill “which is also a
sunk asset that may not be readily transferable to another area of activity.”222
Simon says that “stated differently, a change in organization objectives ordinarily entails decreased
efficiency and use of resources (sunk costs and know-how) and a loss of incentives otherwise
available to maintain a favorable balance (goodwill).”223 Consequently, changes in organization
objectives may be expected to be effective, in most cases, gradually, partly in order to continue to
benefit from accrued sunk costs and know-how, least until such time as the benefits of the new
area of activity may be realized, in whole or in part. This kind of organizational objective
“arbitrage” may be expected to be especially characteristic of industries or markets characterized
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by administered competition and whose participants have enormous organizational scope, for
example, in the petroleum industry, in which the market capitalization of ExxonMobil Corporation
over the past 20 years has consistently placed it in the top ten publicly traded corporations.
The present work has frequently observed that the assumption that the dominant or superordinate
goal of all corporations is maximizing current profits must be considered to be counterfactual and
erroneous. As a result, such assumption should not be operationalized in examinations of the goals
and objectives pursued by boards of directors, top management teams, senior and other executives,
middle managers, and others, vis-à-vis the assignment of responsibility as a matter of law or
otherwise. This will be discussed further in the next following chapter.
It goes without saying that shifts in goals, such as those chronicled by Perrow, Gordon, and
Chandler, may or may not be articulated as changes to formal goals but may be reflected, instead,
in operative goals only. Consequently, as advised by Perrow, determining operative goals and
shifts in formal, as well as operative, goals will require an empirical investigation, involving what
goals are currently pursued by a corporation as a matter of fact and are, accordingly, its real “goals
in action”.
Changes in Power and Goals
Perrow describes how skill groups can come to dominate boards of directors and other
management levels, saying that, firstly, because of technology and stage of growth, a particular
department may “effectively exercise a veto on the executive’s decisions and subsequently shape
decisions in other departments”; while, secondly, top executives may be recruited from one
powerful department and “retain their identification with the parochial goals of that
department.”224
He says that where one task area dominates a firm, there may be no shifts in power, with the result
that operative goals will remain fairly stable. However, where basic tasks shift, either because of
growth or changing technology, operative goals may change, with concomitant shifts in power.
Despite such changes, however, “the formal authority structure may not vary during this sequence,
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but recruitment into managerial positions and the actual power of management, trustees or skill
groups would shift with each new problem focus. Multiple leadership is also possible”.225
As discussed earlier in this chapter under the heading “Theories of Intraorganizational Power”,
strategic contingencies theories, as articulated by Hickson and Hinings and their collaborators,226
or by Salancik and Pfeffer,227 attribute the intraorganizational power of components of the
corporation in large part to the ability of such component to contribute to the reduction of
uncertainty, and the garnering of resources critical to, the corporation as a whole.
As demonstrated in the discussion there, this may also result in changes in the relative power of
components of the corporation as a whole, both vis-à-vis the corporation itself, and vis-à-vis other
components of the corporation. Determining where intraorganizational power resides and whether
there is any change in the locus of such power is a matter for empirical investigation. The existence
of informal relationships and of the informal organization, and the extent of their power and
influence, as described in Chapter Five, notably under the heading “Formal Organizations and
Informal Organizations”, is such that the relevance of the formal “organizational chart” to such
matters must be considered to be problematic.
Pursuit of Multiple Goals in Corporations
The present discussion of the goals of the corporation has found grounding in the empirical and
theoretical work of Chandler, March, and Perrow. Among other things, it has been found that while
one of the goals of the typical corporation is normally to generate profit, neither generating profit
nor maximizing profit is the single superordinate goal of the corporation; and that, instead, in most
cases, a corporation has a number of ultimate goals or end goals, as well as certain operative goals
and instrumental goals. It is also been shown that goals operate not only at the organizational level,
that of the parent corporation, but also at intraorganizational levels, in functions, divisions, groups,
subgroups, and other components of the corporation.
James March maintains that his theory of the business firm as a political coalition “has both face
validity and a certain amount of empirical support”, especially as it “seems more consistent than
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other available theories with [certain] widely observed attributes of business decision making.”228
The attributes to which he appeals in this regard are as follows: “1. Organization goals seem to be
a series of more or less independent constraints. 2. Business firms seem to tolerate a rather large
amount of apparent inconsistency in goals and decisions, both over time and from one part of the
organization to another. 3. Goals and decisions tend to be paired and decentralized with loose cross
connections. 4. The extent to which decisions within the firm involve extensive conflict and
"marginal" decisions varies with the munificence of the environment. 5. The goals and
commitments of business firms shift slowly over time in response to shifts in the coalition
represented in the firm.”229
A proper response to March’s points is as follows: 1. We agree that both theory and empirical
research support a multiplicity of goals, rather than a superordinate goal of profit-making. 2. Our
review of theoretical and research literature suggests that goals of the organization at one time may
not persist to another; may not be pursued in all cases, or in, or by, all components of the
organization; and, in some cases, may be differentially applied, minimally applied, or ignored.
Thus, March’s second point seems to be well supported. 3. Components of the corporation,
including divisions, departments, groups, and subgroups will rationally pursue componentrelevant goals set by the organization in anticipation of, and thereby intended to facilitate the
attainment of, organization-relevant goals. 4. The availability of resources, whether scarce or
munificent, affects the choice of goals, both at the corporate or organizational level and at the
component level, and, in both cases, although normally to a greater extent with respect to scarce
resources, may promote intraorganizational conflict. 5. Goals of corporations and their respective
components may be expected to shift in response to changes in their internal and external
environments, which may include the constellation of power within the corporation, or within the
focal component.
March maintains that models of firm decision-making “have not gone beyond the static
implications of the fact that firms are political coalitions. Essentially they assert that certain
phenomena occur in the firm because of its character as a coalition. They do not attempt to reflect
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shifts in coalitions per se.” Instead, he argues that describing shifts in coalitions, leading to a more
general theory of coalition development, “has hardly been touched except conceptually”.230
Of course, the present work does not seek to develop a theory of decision-making in terms of
coalitions but, instead, has sought to establish that such a “political” approach can contribute much
to understanding the theory and operations of corporations. In that sense, it is but one aspect of
conceptualizing the corporation as involving an organization, and not only as a rights-and-dutybearing entity in law. We consider that up to this point we have established the capacity of such a
conceptualization to the legal understanding of the corporation. This work now proceeds to
consider this dual conception.
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SECTION B – THE CORPORATION AS LEGAL ENTITY AND AS ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER SEVEN – A CORPORATIVE THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER AND THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS
Part 1 of this book examined what are normally considered to be the essential legal attributes of
the corporation as instantiated in modern corporate statutes, how they engage with the common
law and, in particular, agency law, and how those attributes are interrelated as a matter of law and
otherwise. Part 2, together with Appendix A, investigates assumptions or generalizations of
classical and neoclassical economic theory, and of other academic disciplines and fields, which
are reflected in discourse concerning the firm and the corporation, in part, least, in an effort to
determine whether, and if so, to what extent such assumptions or generalizations are instantiated
in the declarative law applicable to the modern business corporation.
The present part, Part 3, investigates the modern business corporation as a species of organization,
that is, from the perspective of organizational theory and practice. That investigation, as conducted
in Chapters Four to Six inclusive, also brought to bear theory and research from a number of
academic disciplines and fields, including not only economics, but also, principally, social
psychology, sociology, political science, social theory, and various management and business
disciplines and fields.
The present chapter investigates how the essential characteristics of the modern business
corporation as a matter of law, as described and considered in Part 1, may be impacted by the
essential characteristics of the modern business corporation as an organization, as described and
considered in Parts 2 and 3 and Appendices A and B. Accordingly, the present investigation will
involve considering how the attributes of the corporation, as an organization, relate to each of its
essential legal attributes, as a corporation as a matter of law.
WHAT NEW METHOD OF ANALYIS? AND WHY?
In analyzing the corporation, including analyzing the corporation from a legal perspective, it is
common to characterize the corporation, very often implicitly, from an organizational perspective,
that is to say, treating the corporation as an organization, like other organizations, but without
expressly acknowledging this.
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It is as if concentrating attention on those legal aspects of the corporation which are distinctively
“legal” invisiblizes, or, at least, occludes, other aspects of the corporation. In this case, such other
aspects include the ways in which the corporation acts, as a legal actor, an economic actor, a social
actor, a political actor, and, generally, in any capacity whatever with respect to human individuals
or entities other than the focal corporation itself.
Legal writers, including law professors, legal practitioners, and theorists, when engaging with the
corporation, assume, almost always without explicit acknowledgement, that the corporation or, at
least, the “more-than-one-individual corporation”, possesses organizational attributes and, in fact,
either is, or engages with, something that can be characterized as an organization.
Volumes, too numerous to count, have been written concerning the corporation as an economic
actor, that is, acting in “the economy”; as a social actor, that is, acting in a “society”; and as a
political actor, that is, acting in the “polity” or in relation to the “state”. These have included works
of theory, including works concentrating on economic theory, social theory, political theory, and,
of course, legal theory.
Those works concentrating on legal theory have frequently involved extensive consideration of
economic theory, social theory, political theory, and other subject-matters. It is not the purpose of
the present work to demean or diminish the importance of analyzing the corporation from the
perspective of economics or the economy, society, or the polity or state. On the contrary, it is
acknowledged that these perspectives are extremely useful and important to the theory and practice
of corporate law, including its statutory and other regulation.
It is, instead, the contention of the present work that all too few works of legal theory have
concentrated on aspects of the corporation from a legal perspective, and most notably, with respect
to its essential legal attributes, which are consequences of, or may be affected by, or related to, its
organizational status; and, consequently, all too few such works have considered, extensively or
otherwise, the organizational research and theory applicable to the same. The focus of the present
work is to investigate whether, and if so, how, and to what extent, consideration of the corporation
from an organizational perspective, including theory and research, may inform legal theory and
practice in relation to the corporation.
The earlier chapters in the present Part 3 of this work, together with the earlier Parts of this work,
have explicated certain aspects of organizational analysis, including research and theory, most
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especially those which may be considered as more immediately applicable to the corporation, and
have frequently identified their implications with respect to the corporation. The remaining
chapters in Part 3 investigate the questions: What difference does this make? How does our
investigation of the corporation as organization and of organizational theory and practice inform,
affect, modify, or even transform, our understanding of the corporation as a matter of law, both in
theory and practice?
In keeping with the descriptive methodology of the present work, the present chapter will proceed
by considering: firstly, the extent to which the essential legal elements of the corporation, as
discussed in Part 1 of this work and as they are instantiated in declarative law (as further described
in this paragraph), are or may be affected by the essential organizational attributes of the
corporation; secondly, the extent to which corporate discourse and corporate essentialist legal
discourse engages with or may be affected by essential organizational attributes and otherwise by
organizational theory and practice; thirdly, how such organizational analysis may be brought to
bear on the legal analysis of the corporation, in theory and practice; and, fourthly, a few summary
examples of how this approach may be instantiated. These issues will be discussed under headings
related to each of the essential legal elements of the corporation. The instantiation of each of these
legal essentialist characteristics in declarative law will, for the sake of simplicity, mainly focus on
the Canadian business corporation statutes discussed in Part 1 and Appendix A of this work. While
there are some differences between incentives and the American statutes discussed there,
discussion of those differences would entail diversions from present objectives which are too great
to countenance.
In conclusion, the findings of this work will be summarized as the “corporative theory of the
corporation” or, expressed alternatively, the “corporative perspective on the corporation”. In this
regard, it is intended that this corporative theory or corporative perspective be applicable not only
with respect to legal theory and practice relating to the corporation, but also to organizational
theory and practice more broadly, including in such disciplines as economics, sociology, political
science, social theory, organizational theory, and in such business disciplines as organizational
behaviour, general management, strategy, information management, and finance.
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WHY NOW?
In the course of investigating assumptions and generalizations commonly made about the firm and,
more particularly, the corporation, as an economic actor, Part 2 and Appendix B compared the
assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics in that behalf with research-based evidence
and theory with respect to the “corporation in action”, in effect, as an organizational actor, by
which is meant an organization which acts, as such, “in the real world”.
In that connection, Part 2 reviewed the exposition by the pre-eminent business historian, Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr., of the development of the modern business corporation in the United States during
the latter part of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century. As part of the book’s descriptive
or descriptivist methodology, this review revealed the “corporation in action” or the corporation
in the “real world” during that period and, when combined with other materials surveyed, up to
the present time.
Chandler emphasized, firstly, the massive impact of technological developments, such as advances
in communications and transportation, on the design, production, sales, and distribution of
products during that period; secondly, the impact of all of the foregoing developments on industries
and markets; and, thirdly, on the corporations involved in such concerns. In respect of the latter,
Chandler described the characteristics, evolution, and development of “managerial capitalism”,
which was enabled and facilitated, and arguably even necessitated, by the technological
developments which eventuated and the attendant consequences. The impact which Chandler
ascribed to managerial capitalism, it will be recalled, was extremely significant, not only for the
corporations concerned, but also for the relevant industries and markets, and for the economy,
society, and polity, more generally.1
Chandler demonstrated the importance of the telegraph and extensive railway systems to mass
production and distribution, which, in turn, had extremely important economic, social, and political
consequences. These included reducing imbalances of standards of living as between rural and
urban areas, promoting consumption, arguably leading to the “consumer society” of the latter half
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of the twentieth century, increasing awareness of distant states, regions and cities, and facilitating
greater economic, social and political unification, and nationalism.2
Chandler implicitly compared this to the “great transformation” described by Polanyi as involving
the “dual movement” embracing the increasing dominance of the market as economic, societal,
and political institution, and the “commoditization” of non-commodities; combined with the
development of social protection mechanisms, legislatively and otherwise, to ameliorate the most
pernicious effects of such marketization and commoditization.3
The developments which were related to Chandler’s “great transformation” or, even if not so
related, eventuated in the period under review, included the development of the automobile and
the American national highway system, the development of the assembly line system or “Fordism”
and improvements in it, including by way of “time and motion study” and other elements of
scientific management or “Taylorism”, and the development of business machines, including,
eventually, the computer.4 Nevertheless, the nature and scale of the technological or
technologically enabled developments which have eventuated since Chandler wrote about this in
1977 have been both massive and massively impactful. These more recent technological or
technologically enabled developments are, to some extent, described in previous chapters of the
present work, and others are sufficiently familiar to readers not to require their exposition here.
The pace of such developments may be expected to continue and even to accelerate in subsequent
periods of like duration.
If Chandler is right, then the massive scope and scale of the developments in the economy, society,
the polity, including developments in industries, markets, and in the methods by which economic,
social, and political actors organized themselves to respond to these developments, as corporations
and other organizations, which transpired over the past one hundred and fifty years may be
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expected to be exceeded, perhaps even greatly exceeded, by developments over the next one
hundred and fifty years.
Just as “managerial capitalism” evolved as an organizational adaptation by the economy, society,
and the polity generally, but, more particularly, by corporations, to technological or
technologically enabled developments in that century and a half, organizational adaptations,
perhaps even more considerable in scale and scope, may be expected to eventuate in the future. If
that is the case, it becomes extremely important for corporate and organizational law to carefully
consider the nature of the corporation and other business organizations, as a matter of law, both in
theory and in practice.
In fact, it may be that evolution of the corporation, at least as a matter of legal theory, has not yet
fully “caught up to” the development of managerial capitalism. While the practice of corporate
law is arguably somewhat more advanced in that regard than corporate legal theory, for example,
with respect to corporate and organizational criminal liability, much remains to be done.
It may be contended that, in many ways, the advancement of corporate legal theory, which, by
now, has proceeded beyond classical and neoclassical economic analysis of the firm, is still
inhibited by the singularity of its attention to economic analysis alone, without consideration of,
or benefit from, other academic disciplines, including business strategy, general management,
organizational behaviour, organizational theory, psychology, sociology, and political science.
As corporations struggle to embrace, or otherwise adopted, the technological and technologically
enabled developments and related organizational developments, such as by means of virtual
organizations or organizations which are “hollowed out” as compared with the corporations of past
eras, and to respond to other changes in their ambient physical and other environments, many of
which raise concerns about the sustainability of corporate activities, concerns about the physical
environment (such as global warming), and social responsibilities of corporations and other
business entities, questions arise anew concerning the corporation, in particular, what it is, and
what purpose or purposes does it or should it serve.
Corporative analysis can be helpful in this regard: firstly, proceeding by descriptivist analysis to
determine what it is that is identified as a corporation and what functions it carries out; and
secondly, by focusing on its legal essentialist characteristics and investigating their relationships
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with changing (and some unchanging) internal and external phenomena which engage with these
contemporary issues.
LEGAL ESSENTIALIST ATTRIBUTES AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
In Chapter One, under the heading “The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism in Law”, the essential
attributes of the corporation in law were identified as: 1. separate legal entity (“SLE”) status; 2. limited liability
or asset partitioning; 3. transferable equity interests and capital lock-in; 4. central management independent of
“owners” of the equity interests or equity capital; and 5. indefinite duration. Each of these attributes is
described under separate eponymous headings in that section of Chapter One.
While alternative formulations of these attributes are in common use, most of these direct attention to similar
features.5 For example, Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman refer to the “five core structural characteristics of
the business corporation” as being “(1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) transferable shares, (4)
centralized management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership by contributors of capital.” They
indicate that “in virtually all economically important jurisdictions, there is a basic statute that provides for the
formation of firms with all of these characteristics, which they describe as “having strongly complementary
qualities”.6
The present part of this chapter will discuss each of these attributes, principally with respect to the contribution
which is, or might be, made by organizational analysis with respect to each attribute and how such
contribution may inform legal theory and practice. Of course, these attributes are interrelated. Accordingly,
discussion of one attribute often necessarily requires some reference to one or more other attributes, which
entails that discussion of a particular attribute may sometimes appear under headings related to one attribute
and sometimes under headings related to one or more of the correlated attributes. Appropriate cross-

Jason Neyers lists “limited liability, effective legal personality, perpetual existence, free transferability of shares,
and separation of ownership and control”, which he describes as "an amalgam of the traditional attributes listed in
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Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at c. 5.; R.C. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1986) at s.1.1 (2); H.A.J. Ford &
R.P. Austin, Principles of Corporations Law (Sydney: Butterworths, 1995) 86-7; L.E. Ribstein, 'Limited Liability and
Theories of the Corporation' 50 Mar. L. Rev. 80 at 89." Thus, his list, which is very similar to the one used in the
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references, the detailed headings and subheadings in the chapter, and the Table of Contents are employed in
an effort to make sense of such correlations. In some cases, detailed discussion of the correlation appears in
relation to the first attribute discussed, while in other cases, such detailed discussion is deferred and appears
in relation to the subsequent correlated attribute discussed. Often, determination of the order of this discussion
depends upon its salience to other topics referenced in the focal discussions.
FACT PATTERN FOR DISCUSSION – GREAT MOTORING CORPORATION
For the purpose of discussing how the essential attributes of the corporation as a matter of law may
be affected by essential attributes of the organization of the corporation, it will be convenient to
use the following example or fact pattern as a basis for discussion:
1. The business enterprise which is the focus of our discussion and which is intended to, and
actually does, bear no resemblance to any real corporation has, as its ultimate parent
corporation, a public corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange known as Great
Motoring Corporation (“GMC” or the “Corporation”) which has several million
shareholders resident in various jurisdictions all over the world. It is incorporated in one of
the jurisdictions whose declarative corporate law was surveyed in Part 1 of this book. This
is also the case with respect to each of its subsidiaries all of whom are wholly-owned in the
sense that 100% of their equity shares are owned by GMC or other of its subsidiaries or
both. The headquarters of GMC coordinates the activities of its divisions and departments
which operate across its relevant operations, however such operations are legally
organized. This is the first level of the organization’s hierarchy.
2. GMC manufactures vehicles and has four divisions, each of which bears the brand name
of vehicles manufactured and sold by the division: Challenger, Champion, and Ultimate
for automobiles and Great Motor Trucks, or “GMT”, for trucks. This is the second
hierarchical level. Challenger and Champion operate as divisions of GMC, without being
separately incorporated, while Ultimate and GMT are separately incorporated.
3. Each division has five departments: Design; Manufacturing; Marketing, Sales and
Distribution (usually called “Sales”); Finance and Treasury (usually called “Finance”.
4. Accounting, Control and Operations (usually called “Operations”). This is the third
hierarchical level.
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5. Each department is subdivided into units or groups which involve separate functions within
the division, for example, the separate Accounting group, the Control group, and the
Operations group within the Operations division. This is the fourth hierarchical level.
6. Each unit or group is, in turn, subdivided into subunits or subgroups which involve separate
subfunctions within each unit or subunit. For example, the Accounting group has a number
of subunits or subgroups which include Accounting Principles, Depreciation and
Amortization, and Consolidation. This is the fifth level of the organizational hierarchy.
7. Thus, the “organizational chart” for GMC has five hierarchical levels on the vertical axis
and four levels on the horizontal axis, basically, then, filling twenty spaces on the chart.
8. The Corporation as a whole, and each division, department, unit or group, and subunit or
subgroup, has numerous subsidiaries, joint ventures, partnerships, and other legal forms by
which it carries on business.
9. Likewise, the corporation as a whole, and each division, department, unit or group, and
subunit or subgroup operates in a variety of jurisdictions.
With that, the review of the essential legal attributes of the modern business corporation thus commences.
ATTRIBUTE ONE – SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY
A statement that a corporation is a legal entity is easily intelligible. As previously mentioned,7 among other
things, a legal entity can acquire, hold, dispose of, and otherwise deal with property on its own behalf, that is
to say, that it can exercise rights of ownership vis-à-vis property. It can also enter into contracts thereby
acquiring rights and becoming subject to liability, in both cases, on its own behalf, in that regard. Further, it
can sue and be sued and otherwise be a party to various types of legal proceedings, also on its own behalf.
A statement that an entity, such as a corporation, is a separate legal entity may be considered as a statement
that its status as a legal entity is appurtenant to the entity entirely on its own behalf, and not as dependent upon,
or derivative from, the status of some other legal entity. In the case of a corporation, which has shareholders,
as well as management, separate legal entity status indicates that the corporation’s legal entity status is not
dependent upon, nor derivative from, the status of its shareholders or of its management. This is the sense in

7

See Chapter One in the section entitled "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism in Law" and therein under the
heading "Essential Attributes of the Corporation in Law" and the subheading "Separate Legal Entity".
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which such statement will be understood and explicated in the present section. Considerations of limited
liability and of asset partitioning will be discussed mainly in the eponymous section below.
Declarative Law
A Rights-and-Duty-Bearing Entity
As described in Chapter One,8 a corporation may be considered to be a separate legal entity
(“SLE”), that is to say, a rights-and-duty-bearing entity, a party or entity which may possess legal
rights and which may be subject to legal duties.9 These are normally considered to include the
capacities to own property, to enter into contracts, and to maintain and to defend legal actions.10
Its property is free of any claims of creditors of the shareholders of the corporation; and those
shareholders, as such, and their assets may not be called on in respect of obligations of the
corporation.
This work has maintained that the meaning of the term “legal person” is substantially identical to
that of “rights-and-duty-bearing party or entity”.11 Our examination of four important North
American business law statutes examined this issue, finding two styles of statutory conveyance of
authority. The first style, such as that adopted in the CBCA and OBCA, conveys legal authority
equivalent to that enjoyed by a natural person, but may also enumerate other specific authorities
which are included in the more general authority. The second style, which is adopted in the DGCA
and, in part, in the MBCA, simply enumerates the specific authorities enjoyed by corporations
subject to the statute.
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Relationship to Natural Persons
CBCA and OBCA corporations have the rights, powers, and privileges of a natural person.12 This
is intended to mean that such a corporation has the legal capacity to engage in any activities which
may be undertaken by a natural person. Naturally, a corporation cannot engage in any activities
which require actual corporeal existence; but this is a factual, rather than a legal, consequence. As
discussed previously,13 a corporation, according to Lord Haldane, has neither mind nor body,14
and, according to Blackstone, is not liable to corporal penalties, imprisonment, apprehension,
arrest, or excommunication.15
The legal capacity of a natural person and, by extension, of a corporation includes owning property,
entering into contracts, and initiating, maintaining, and defending legal proceedings of various
kinds. As previously noted, this does not entail that the corporation is a “natural person” in view
of the law, or that the corporation has “legal personality” (except in the sense stipulated) or that
the corporation is possessed of “legal personhood” (except in the sense stipulated), or is, except
for such purposes, otherwise to be considered a “person” as a matter of law.16
Similarly, having powers equivalent to those of a natural person does not entail, of course, that the
word “person”, where used in law, whether in statutes or otherwise, always and everywhere
includes a corporation, or that where the word “person” is so used, it can be replaced in relevant
particular circumstances by the word “corporation”. Instead, it signifies that the corporation is
recognized, as a matter of law, as an actor within the realm of “legal action”, the realm to which
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law addresses itself. As previously noted, the purposes of this work neither require nor permit a
more complete discussion of these “legal personality” issues.
Consideration of the statutes examined here confirm this. As noted, while “the nature of the
business or purposes to be conducted or promoted” by DGCL corporations must be set forth in its
certificate of incorporation, it is not necessary to go beyond the statement that such business or
purposes are “to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized”
under the DGCL. Such a statement thereby includes within the purposes of the corporation all such
lawful acts and activities, unless otherwise expressly limited.17
An MBCA corporation may engage “in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set
forth in the articles of incorporation”. It also “has the same powers as an individual to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs”.18
Rights, Powers, and Privileges Expressly Stated
As noted in Chapter One, each of the statutes examined also enumerate specific powers expressly,
but not exhaustively, possessed by the corporations under its jurisdiction. These powers include
the right to own property, to contract in its own name, and to initiate, maintain and defend legal
proceedings in its own name. One difference among the statutes reviewed concerns the effect of
incorporation: under the DGCL the incorporators signing the certificate of incorporation and their
successors and assigns “shall, from the date of such filing, be and constitute a body corporate”.19
In effect, the DGCL expressly states that those who take the initiative in establishing the
corporation in the prescribed way themselves, with their successors and assigns, constitute the
corporation. Ignoring any theories of legal personality which might be presented by or associated
with such a statement, this kind of statement recognizes that the actors initiating the formation of
the corporation likewise constitute and continue to animate it.
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Even if those incorporators are themselves bodies corporate (as is possible under the DGCL), at
some point there is an individual human actor who acts for it and on its behalf. However, the
express characterization to this effect in the DGCL, which assists in enunciating the relationship
of corporation and organization, does not limit its applicability in other situations. Such
relationship will be explored further below.
The Corporation, the Legal Entity, the Organization, and the Participants
Organization, Legal Status, and Organizational Action
As noted earlier, that the corporation is a particular kind of organization has been widely conceded
by commentators from various fields.20 For example, the acclaimed institutional economist
Geoffrey Hodgson notes that economists use the terms “firm”, “corporation”, and “company” as
virtual synonyms.21 He indicates that a firm is a “special type of organization that is legally
recognizable and devoted to production”. In particular, it is defined as “an integrated and durable
organization involving two or more people, acting openly or tacitly as a ‘legal person’, capable
of owning assets, set up for the purpose of producing goods or services, with the capacity to sell
or hire these goods or services to customers.”22
Such an entity is integrated in that “it is regarded as a ‘legal person’ owning its products and
entering into contracts” and durable “in that it constitutes more than a transient contract or
agreement between its core members and it incorporates structures and routines of some expected
longevity.” Hodgson’s firm is a distinct legal entity or legal person which “may carry legal
entitlements and liabilities in its own right”, which “manages the resources in its possession,
essentially by administrative control rather than by internal contract” as “an organized enclave,
apart from markets and exchange”, although the latter dominate its external relations.23
Hodgson averts to the derivation of the term “firm” from the Latin adjective firmus, meaning
strong, powerful, durable and lasting” and the use it acquired as a noun to mean “(legally binding)
‘signature’”; and he describes the firm as “an organizational and legally circumscribed entity”.24
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“Firms”, he says, may take the form of partnerships, cooperatives, companies, or corporations,
although these “different types of firms all have important differences of structure, rationale and
possible behaviour.”25
Organizational theorists Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal also approached firms as
organizations, saying that an organization “is fundamentally a social structure", and that even when
actions of and within organizations are “motivated by a variety of economic and other objectives,
they emerge through processes of social interactions that are shaped by the social structure”.26
Hodgson maintains that “the law does not ignore the organizational character of the firm”, and that
“even in legal terms, the firm is a structured set of relations between persons”, including
relationships within the firm that are governed by legislation, such as the employment
relationship.27 It has been argued in the present work that the “structured set of relations between
persons” which Hodgson acknowledges obtains in connection with the corporation “even in legal
terms” is recognized by corporate law, both as a matter of declarative or statutory law, and as a
matter of common law.
In particular, Chapter A1, which is entitled “Corporate Essentialism and Corporate Organization
in Law”, notes that statutory corporate law vis-à-vis the relationships between the corporation, on
the one hand, and the board of directors, the officers, and other employees, on the other hand,
principally deals, firstly, with the relationships between the corporation, the board and individual
directors; and, secondly, with the relationships between the corporation and officers; in effect, with
the highest levels in the hierarchy of the organization. Most other matters concerning the
relationship between the corporation and employees and between the employees inter se are dealt
with by the common law or by specific statutes concerning employment relationships.
It is noteworthy, however, that Hodgson acknowledges that firms, including corporations, are
organizations. It will be recalled that Chapter Three of the present work discussed James March’s
approach to the firm as a political coalition, recognizing that the modern business firm as a “large
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complex organization” for “making and implementing decisions within a market economy”,28 and
considering “the business organization as a socio-political conflict system subject to economic
constraints”.29 As discussed there, March argues that the economic theory of the firm “suppresses
as outside its domain” process by which the firm, as “an organization composed of a rather
complex mixture of people with considerable heterogeneity of goals generates a single preference
ordering.”30 Likewise, March, writing in 1962, asserts that while economists “for many years”
have considered firms are organizations rather than entrepreneurs, “only in the last few years have
such strictures had any impact on the theory of the firm.”31
Of course, the present work has taken the position that the organizational character of the
corporation is important, both as a matter of theory and practice. As a separate legal entity, of
course, legal authors have recognized that the corporation is separate from its members,32 both
individually and collectively. As Murray Pickering has commented, “essentially, therefore, the
company is simply a means [provided by law] by which the property and associated rights of
numerous individuals may be amalgamated and reconstituted for their more efficient and effective
utilisation.”33 This “reconstitution” involves an exchange of property by the holder with the
corporation in exchange for certain rights vis-à-vis the corporation. As a legal entity, it is separate
and independent from its members (property contributors) in every respect.34
Pickering explains that the first principal effect of formation of a company is that “its shareholders,
and their transferees, become members of an association and are granted rights as such” and that
“pre-eminent among these” are, normally, “powers of control in the widest sense of an entitlement
to participate, by voting, in the management of the company through the appointment and removal
of its directors, the distribution of profits and other decisions of the company in general meeting,
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and also by the power to enforce the company’s regulations.”35 These shareholder rights are
discussed extensively in the present work in Chapter A2 entitled “Corporate Essentialism and
Equity Owners”. The second principal effect which Pickering describes is that “the members
relinquish all proprietary and other interests in the monetary or other consideration which they
have given for their shares and which becomes wholly vested in the company”.36 The corporation
is then able to deal with such property as its own.
After the corporation comes into existence, then, there is “an association of members, which may
themselves be corporate bodies; and… an entity possessing independently of its membership the
legal capacity to exercise proprietary, contractual and other powers.”37 In effect, this “association
of members” is limited to, or exhausted by, the exercise of individual and collective rights of
participation in the corporation as shareholders. Generally, a particular shareholder may also
participate in the organization in some other capacity, for example, as a director, officer, employee,
creditor, supplier, or customer. However, there is no doubt that the shareholders participate with
others in the organization which constitutes the corporation and which is a separate legal entity
from the shareholders and other organizational participants.
While the language of the modern North American corporate statutes does not emphasize this as
much as British and other similar statutes, which expressly use language relating to “association”,
there is no doubt that the result is the same: the corporation is both a separate legal entity and an
organization. Of course, under the British statute, the Companies Act 200638, a company is
incorporated by the issuance of a certificate of incorporation pursuant to the filing of articles of
association, together with its memorandum of association, which identifies its subscribers and is
its main constitutional document but is treated as part of its articles.
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The Organization and Organizational Participants
As indicated in the immediately preceding section, Geoffrey Hodgson treats the firm as an
organization which is devoted to production and has certain legal characteristics. He defines it as
“an integrated and durable organization involving two or more people, acting openly or tacitly as
a ‘legal person’, capable of owning assets, set for the purpose of producing goods or services,
with the capacity to sell or hire these goods or services to customers.”39 He expressly recognizes
the firm and, in particular, the corporation, as organizations. As explained previously, Hodgson’s
definition accords with the formal and informal definitions of the term “organization” discussed
in Chapter Four.40
As such, the organization involves a social unit or a group of people 41 who collaborate or work
together, which involves certain structures, processes, and personnel attributes,42 in pursuit of
shared ends, goals, or objectives.43 The participants in the organization, its “organizational
participants”, may be said to be the persons who are members of the focal social unit or the focal
group of people. As Weber indicates, the organization is a social relationship44 which involves
certain expectations of social action, as well as mutual responsibility to act towards each other in
accordance with the agreement regarding mutual behaviour and representation of the
organization,45 such that action taken by authorized members of the group may be imputed to all
other members of the group.46
The preceding paragraph merely averts to, but does not describe, the organizationally essentialist
characteristics of an organization, those characteristics which organizational theorists consider as
essential to an organization, which, it has been established in this work, includes a corporation. It
is important, however, for present purposes, to emphasize that those individuals or entities who
are identified as “organizational participants” are members of a social unit or group of people who
collaborate or work together, involving certain structures and processes and personnel considered
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appropriate, in order to achieve certain ends or goals or objectives. These attributes constitute its
organizationally essentialist characteristics.
Accordingly, in order to be considered as organizational participants, unsurprisingly, such persons
must participate in the social relationship thereby obtaining. That is to say, the primary determinant
of organizational participation, as that term is used here, is participation in the activities of the
organization in some capacity. Chapter Four demonstrated, somewhat unsurprisingly, that an
individual person may be a member of more than one social unit or group of persons. These social
units or groups of persons may, but also may not, have any relationship between or among them,
whether in terms of membership or various other relevant matters.
For example, one or more of them may be “nested” within another or within others, their
memberships may overlap to some extent, or their memberships may be entirely discrete and
separate from one another. The existence of any relationship among such social units or groups
of persons, or among their respective members, is likely to be affected by the nature of such unit
or group. If more than one of the social units or groups of persons to which an individual belongs
meets the formal requirements to be considered an organization, it is clear that an individual may
belong to or participate in more than one organization.47
As explained in Chapter Four, membership in a number of such groups, units, or organizations
requires that the focal individual determine the extent of their interest in, or commitment to, each
of the same.48 As demonstrated in that chapter, this requires determination of the extent to which
the focal individual adopts an intragroup or intraorganizational identity, and, correspondingly, the
extent to which that individual will preserve some extraorganizational identity, whether or not
affected by participation in other groups, units, or organizations, or otherwise.49
Consequently, a focal individual’s social identity may relate partly to participation in a particular
group, unit, or organization, and partly may be quite independent of such participation. 50 A focal
individual may be said to be “within” or “inside” the group with respect to that participation and
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“outside” the group otherwise. Such individual may be said to be “inside” the group insofar as and
to the extent that such relationship obtains and has salience in the particular circumstances, and
“outside” the group insofar as and to the extent that it does not (which may or may not entail that
some other relationship is more salient). This characterization of “inside” and “outside” may be
considered to relate to the proximity, and to the salience, of the particular relationship to the
corporation or to the individual, as the case may be. The relationship may occupy a place
somewhere on a continuum between relationships which are “as intimate as possible” and those
which are “as distant as possible”.
Geoffrey Hodgson expresses this in terms of the “boundaries of the firm”, a subject which is
discussed further below. He says that “the boundary of the firm is made up of points in time at
which the ‘legal person’ of the firm concludes legal (written or unwritten) contracts with
individuals or other legal persons” such that upon hiring a person “cross[es] the boundary [from
the outside] to the inside of the firm”. However, an employee “is only ‘inside’ the firm during the
periods, and under the circumstances specified in the employment contract.”51 When Hodgson
observes that such contract by an employee with the legal person of the firm (or corporation)
crosses the legal boundary of the firm (corporation) and places the employee “inside the firm”, it
is the “firm as organization” that the employee has joined, although it may be said as a kind of
shorthand description that the employee is now “inside the corporation (as legal entity)” in that
certain aspects of the employer-employee relationship are internalized within the corporation and
its hard outer legal shell.
This language recalls the description of the employment relationship and acceptance of authority
by Barnard (referring to the “zone of indifference” of the employee with respect to instructions
from superiors) and by Herbert Simon (referring to the “zone of acceptance”).52 With respect to
the employment relationship, certainly, it can be described as one of authority: authority by the
employer over the employee and acceptance of such authority by the employee, which is conveyed
by, and within, the terms of the employment contract. Such authority, according to Fayol, involves
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the right to give orders and the power to exact obedience.53 As Robé says, it allows the employer
to make decisions about the activities of the employee during the time of employment.54
Importantly, because the employment contract is expressed in general terms, the power or authority
conveyed by the employment contract is broadly understood between employer and the employee;
as a result of which the employer may, as a practical matter, assume authority within the “zone of
acceptance” or “zone of indifference”.55 However, there are limits to such authority and to the
legitimacy of the instructions which may be issued pursuant to the same.
Organizational Participants, Stakeholders, and Corporate Social Responsibility
Considering that the corporation has objectives which may be described, at least in part, as
economic in nature, it might be expected that participants in the corporation qua organization might
also have objectives which might be described, at least in part, as themselves economic in nature.
However, for the purposes of the analysis conducted in the present work, which involves
considering organizational aspects of the corporation, our primary focus is on participation in the
relevant organization, rather than participation in the economic aspects of the corporation.
Among other things, this entails that the organizational participants referred to in this work cannot,
without further consideration, be identified with “stakeholders” as that term is employed in
relevant literature.56 This is certainly the case to the extent that the term “stakeholder” is considered
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to connote some economic interest which is affected by the operations of the focal corporation.
More importantly, however, even when the term “stakeholder” is used to reference a party whose
interest, whether economic or otherwise, might in some way be affected by the operations of the
focal corporation, this does not in any way indicate that such party in interest is internal to the
organization.57 As indicated in the discussion under the preceding heading, while organizational
participants may have economic interests that relate to the organization, such economic interests
do not exhaust the interests of organizational participants, who are, first and foremost, participants
in the social relationships which are constitutive of the organization.
Although the scope of the present work does not permit consideration of stakeholder theory of the
corporation to any significant extent, it is important to note that the terms “organizational
participant” and “stakeholder” are not synonymous and, indeed, reflect different perspectives on
the corporation. For example, where a party “outside the corporation” interacts with the
corporation as a legal entity on a single liquidated transaction on a purely external basis, such a
party can be described as an organizational participant only in a somewhat superficial respect.
In addition, stakeholder theory of the corporation is often considered to have significant normative
implications and to recognize the corporation as having moral obligations to such stakeholders.
The concepts of organizational participation and of organizational participants employed in the
present work are used without assigning to them any normative significance. Similarly, such
concepts do not directly address issues of corporate social responsibility, which subject is not
directly considered by the present work. It is simply not possible to address issues of stakeholder
theory and corporate social responsibility in any meaningful fashion in a work of this nature.
The Borders of the Corporation and the Borders of the Organization
It is clear that the determination of whether a person is or is not a participant in the corporation is
an empirical one involving certain indicia of organizational participation, as noted above.
However, certain categories of persons identified by their relationship with the corporation, as a
matter of law and otherwise, may be considered presumptively to be organizational participants.
These include directors, officers, managers, and employees. The question of how organizational
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participation affects persons with such relationships is discussed further below, in relation to those
and other categories.
There are at least two problems having great significance with respect to the issue of organizational
participation which concern the issue of the “borders” of the corporation. The first, which is
already been discussed in this work, concerns aspects of the organization which traverse the strict
legal boundaries of the focal corporation. The organization of the business enterprise as a whole
may involve a vast array of corporations and other forms of business entities (which are, generally
speaking, excluded from our discussions) arranged in a vast hierarchy of corporations (each of
which, for purposes of simplicity, is generally assumed here to be wholly owned). Reference is
made to the example provided under the heading “Fact Pattern for Discussion”. Issues relating to
the structure of business enterprise are considered extensively in Chapters Two,58 Three,59 Five,60
and Six.61
Geoffrey Hodgson distinguishes between “modern conglomerates made up of legally separate
units” and “multinational conglomerates” which are “multinational enterprises [which] exist as
separate legal bodies in different countries, all owned by the headquarters corporation.”62
Accordingly, as his discussion of the subject makes clear, he treats the operations of an MNE in a
particular country as the “local” or “national” operation of the MNE as a whole, regardless of the
legal form employed. In fact, in so doing, he even assumes that the local operation will normally
involve several separate legal entities.
Addressing the issue of legal form more broadly, Hodgson acknowledges that “the formal legal
status of any organization tells us no more than a small part of the whole story” and that legal
formalities have the effect of “masking a different reality.”63 Thus, “a conglomerate of different
firms may in practice act like a single firm, because control of the conglomerate is concentrated in
a single group”. However, different structures may have different legal and economic
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consequences. He gives the example of dissolution of a conglomerate which, he says, involves
different processes than the disintegration of a single firm or economic entity into separate legal
units.64
By way of another example, executive authority with respect to a particular function in a subsidiary
of the fourth level of the corporate hierarchy may reside in an executive on the corporation which
is at the second level of the corporate hierarchy. Such person might be providing instructions to
individuals engaged in a corporation which a subsidiary of a subsidiary of the corporation in which
the instructing executive is situate. Thus, the instructing individual might not be an official of the
focal corporation at all.
The second issue with respect to the borders of the corporation concerns whether the organization
extends beyond the “borders” of the corporations, taken as a whole, through and by means of which
the business enterprise operates as a collectivity of legal entities. As discussed with respect to the
preceding issue, whether an individual or group is a participant in a particular organization is
determined by the nature of the relationship between the focal individual or group, on the one
hand, and the relevant organization, on the other.
As noted previously, the nature of such relationship is not determined solely by economic relations,
economic dependency, or other economic factors; nor is it determined solely by legal relationships.
Of course, this makes it important to assess the extent to which legal relationships and
organizational relationships affect each other. This may go beyond determining the extent to which
legal essentialist attributes and organizational essentialist attributes affect each other.
As noted previously, a relevant discrimination concerns whether the organizational relationship is
exclusively, primarily, or significantly, “internal” to the organization as compared with the ways
in which the organization customarily deals with “external” or extraorganizational parties. As
suggested in discussion elsewhere in this work, it is expected that this determination would be
made empirically, based on the relevant facts and circumstances, both generally and, more
particularly, on a case-by-case basis. General categories of possible participants are discussed
further below.
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The Corporation, Organizational Participants, and Intraorganizational Relations
The amalgamation and reconstitution of property and associated rights by the contributors in connection with
the formation of the corporation, as described by Pickering in the section above entitled “Organization, Legal
Status, and Organizational Action”, separates the corporation, as a separate legal entity, from its participants,
including the “entrepreneur” of economic orthodoxy. As expressed in a recent article by Simon Deakin, David
Gindis, Geoffrey Hodgson, Kainan Huang , and Katharina Pistor,65 “legal incorporation means that the state
recognizes the firm as a singular legal person with rights and duties” which is “itself an owning agent; that is
to say, ownership of the assets of the firm are vested in the legal person the corporation”.66
It thus has the capacity to own property. It also “hires the workers, buys machines and raw materials and sells
the output”, thereby entering into contracts of various natures; and “is sued if it sells defective products and
sues if it suffered damages from breach of contract and the like”,67 a capacity to initiate, maintain, and defend
legal proceedings to which we previously averted. Deakin et al indicate that “the ‘economic’ activities of the
firm become possible because the firm has a legal status, and has powers enshrined in law”, including asset
ownership, contractual capacity, and capacity to maintain legal actions.68 Consequently, the “corporation hires
the workers, buys machines and raw materials and sells the output. The corporation is sued if it sells defective
products and sues if it suffered damages from breach of contract and the like.”69
Of course, the capacity to own property, enter into contracts, and be involved in legal proceedings, in each
case, in its own name, are distinguishing attributes of a legal, or rights-and-duty-bearing, entity. As JeanPhilippe Robé says, “the corporation is recognized by the legal system as being a juridical person
having rights and liabilities”.70 Deakin et al maintain that the “glue binding the corporation
together is the power of corporate law, the adoption of its principles by the shareholders, and the
agreement between them” and it is the “establishment of the singular legal person under which the
entrepreneurs (shareholders) operate” which constitutes the corporation and not, as Coase argues,
the entrepreneurial administration of a production process.71
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Deakin et al maintain that the corporate form is economically effective because of what Hansmann,
Kraakman, and Squire refer to as its “entity shielding” function, protecting corporate assets from the personal
creditors of the shareholders and the shareholders from creditors of the corporation;72 and its function of
protecting corporate assets by “locking-in capital”;73 because of the extensive powers of directors and officers
to manage the corporation which “could easily give rise to abuse were it not for the broadly defined fiduciary
duties the law imposes upon them”;74 and because of the ability of the corporation to outlast its original
individual members and, as we note here, their successors.75 These enablers of economic effectiveness were
identified previously in this work as the legal essentialist attributes of the corporation.76 This work maintains
that these legal essentialist attributes are key components of “the glue binding the firm together”.
Thus, Deakin et al observe that the “glue that holds the firm together consists of the legal provisions that bind
the parties into one entity, and in turn draw on appropriate legislation.” Indeed, “in the case of the corporation,
the glue can outlast the lifetimes of the individual members involved. Their individuals and assets may change
many times over.” This is a consequence of duration of the corporation’s existence. However, they maintain
that the corporation as a legal entity is “distinct from its human constituents. A coalition of owners may create
a firm. And firms typically own non-human assets. But the firm is not the same thing as a coalition [of owners]
or a collection of assets.”77
As the present work has indicated, organizational objectives, including continuity, may not infrequently
require making significant changes to the corporation’s strategy and structure and these may, in turn, require
a readjustment of the rights of corporate participants. As indicated in Part 1 of the present work, such
readjustment is provided for in the declarative corporate law applicable to the corporation. It enables the
property and associated rights of contributors which are “amalgamated and recombined” in Pickering’s
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terminology in exchange for the acquisition of rights vis-à-vis the corporation by those contributors and their
successors in interest to be varied. Consequently, say Deakin et al, “legal personality has clear advantages in
regard to uncertainties and complexities surrounding any long-standing contract, and the required flexibilities
that are needed to face an unpredictable future. Rather than contracting for everything in advance,
entrepreneurs rely on evolved commercial law and the choices of legal template on offer.”78
Robé argues that it is not only the creation of the separate juridical entity which reduces uncertainties and
complexities and provides flexibilities, but it is also the specification of “the procedures which will be
followed to operate the venture”, either in the articles, bylaws, or shareholders’ agreement, in corporate law,
or in general contract law.”79 Those procedures involve the assignment of decision-making, such that “after
contribution of the assets to the corporation, decisions about their use will not be made by contracting parties
negotiating to revise their contract with some parties having residual control rights over the real assets while
others have none” but, instead, such decisions “will be made by the officers or directors or shareholders, in
accordance with the company’s articles of corporation and the applicable corporate law, which provide for
procedural rules governing how decisions will be made through time in connection with the venture.”80
As demonstrated in Part 1 of this work, as a result of its endowment with what has been described here as its
essentialist legal attributes, the corporation can subsist for an indefinite length of time as a legal entity separate
from its participants, who are accorded certain rights in respect of their participation. As further demonstrated
in Parts 2 and 3 of this work, as an organization, groups, and subgroups, and even individuals within the
corporation may come into conflict with respect to intraorganizational goals and objectives which are not
identical either with those of other groups, subgroups, and individuals, or with the organization as a whole.
Ghoshal and Bartlett argue that much recent organizational analysis considers “conflict among disparate
subunit goals …as pervasive”.81 The formal legal procedures of corporate law and of other applicable law
provide methods for resolving such conflicts, and thereby, considered together, constitute a superordinate
procedure of joint preference ordering, or for resolving conflicts within the organization, considering it as a
socio-political conflict system.
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Robé concludes that “it is precisely because we do not live in a comprehensive contracting world that there
is room for creating corporations, as separate legal persons, to own businesses and as a consequence deal with
future issues as they arise in accordance with the by-laws and corporate law.” He draws the further conclusion
that: “The incompleteness of contracts indeed leads to an understanding of ownership: to an understanding
of ownership by separate juridical persons. The so-called “legal fiction” of the corporation, far from being
negligible in economic analysis, is actually central to it.”82
If joint preference ordering is not achieved, this may result in dissatisfaction on the part of various participants.
For example, dissatisfied shareholders, who are unable to seek a return of capital by reason of capital lock-in,
may seek to exercise a right of voice or exit. Certain rights of voice are specifically provided as a matter of
law, in the statutes and otherwise. Shareholders subject to transformational changes proposed by management
may take actions, individually and collectively, to oppose these initiatives, by means of shareholder proposals,
proxy solicitations, changes in board membership by exercising the voting rights of shareholders, or by
seeking to initiate alternative transformational changes, whether by way of merger proposal, takeover bid, or
otherwise.
Thus, the law (both declarative law – statutes – and common law) regulates certain aspects of the organization
which animates and vivifies the corporation. It is not, of course, only the formal legal procedures applicable
to a particular corporation which permit it to resolve intraorganizational conflicts; instead, informal procedures
also contribute. Informal influences contributing to conflict resolution may be provided by the informal
structure or “informal organization” and by informal processes, procedures, and other intraorganizationally
embedded understandings, and values, and “rules of the game”.
As discussed, particularly in Chapter Three, joint preference ordering takes place within the corporation itself
at various hierarchical (both vertical and horizontal) levels with respect to conflicts within the focal unit level,
among the focal unit and other organizational units and subunits, and between the focal unit and the highest
level of the organization. In some cases, such conflict resolution or joint preference ordering may result from
the application of standardized rules and procedures. This is consistent with concept of bounded rationality,
rulemaking and bureaucratic procedure generally in which it is sought to minimize the exceptional cases that
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may require individual consideration and determination in order to preserve resources to that end, rather than
dissipating such resources with respect to more ordinary or non-exceptional situations.
Categories of Organizational Participants
As discussed above, the assignment to the board of directors of plenary decisionmaking authority with respect
to most matters requiring decisions to be made by the corporation facilitates central day-to-day
decisionmaking which, in turn, is normally final except in exceptional circumstances. This permits the
readjustment and reallocation of the rights of corporate participants vis-à-vis the corporation, and each other,
over time and from time to time.
For the purposes of the present work, it is clear that a threshold question is whether a particular person or
group is a member of, part of, or a participant in, the focal organization and, more particularly, what is the
nature of such relationship. From an organizational perspective, as has been seen, this involves determining
the expectations of the parties to such relationship. From a legal perspective, a threshold question is what legal
rights are enjoyed by the person or group who participates in the organization as a result of declarative and
common law, charter documents, relevant agreements, and other relevant determinants.
Shareholders
As discussed in the preceding section, shareholders contribute property, property rights, and other things to
the corporation in exchange for receiving certain rights evidenced by way of shares in the corporation. As
Deakin et al note, the corporation is not “a res or thing which the shareholders can be said to own”;83
instead, they own shares in the corporation rather than owning the corporation itself;84 and,
accordingly, even in a single shareholder corporation, the corporation is distinct in this respect.85
The ownership of shares entitles the holder to certain rights vis-à-vis the corporation as determined
by its charter documents, declarative corporate law, and other applicable common and other law.
As previously discussed, certain of these rights, while attached to a share of the corporation and
exercised on that basis, such as the right to vote, affect its decisionmaking processes when
exercised collectively, that is, in common with other such shareholders.
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Pickering emphasizes that “the company is more than an entity capable of the ownership of
property. It is also an association of persons, all of whom individually possess their standing at
law.”86 As the persons so associated are themselves capable of legal action it became necessary to
determine whether or not the corporation would be affected by acts of members.
As discussed in Chapter One, it was determined in the case of Foss v. Harbottle87 that “the
company’s members have no capacity to act in else, or in the company’s name, on its behalf or for
its benefit.”88 Consequently, the liability of the corporation and of its shareholders can be separated
at common law. As determined in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.,89 such separation of liability
persists even of the corporation has but a single shareholder. This separation is effected by means
of the essentialist legal attributes of limited liability and asset partitioning, discussed further below.
As noted in Chapter One, the separation of legal liability facilitates the transfer of shares to
successors in interest. Neither the vendor nor the purchasers are, in general, affected after the
completion of the transaction by the creditworthiness either of the other party or of the corporation
itself. Ordinarily, unless the corporation is a private company or its shares are subject to a
shareholders’ agreement or other applicable legal restrictions, this permits the relatively free
alienation of the shares. As previously discussed, this opportunity to “exit” from such share
ownership facilitates joint preference ordering within the corporation as a legal entity and as an
organization.90
Equally well, the separation of the corporation from acts of its members or shareholders entails
determining who may act on behalf of the corporation. This is discussed in the following section.
However, in terms of taking legal action on behalf of the corporation, as Pickering notes, “the
company and the company alone must act, and be acted against, to enter into and enforce its rights
and obligations.”91 This entails, procedurally, that “the proper plaintiff in respect of a wrong
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alleged to be done to a company or association prima facie the company or association… itself.”92
Pickering notes that “the rule applies to actions by and against the company and vis-à-vis both
outsiders and its own shareholders.”93 Thus, the separation of the corporation and shareholders is
given effect procedurally, as well as substantively, as a matter of law.
In certain cases, a holder of a sufficient number of shares of a public company sufficient, when
combined with control of the proxy apparatus or otherwise, to elect a majority of the board of
directors (commonly referred to as a “controlling shareholder” may purport to issue instructions
or directions to the board of directors, the CEO, or other officers. The exposition here indicates
that such instructions or directions are not legally effective.94 Even a shareholder of all the shares
of the corporation and even shareholders who together whole all the shares of the corporation are
not empowered to take such action. The board of directors is not, and the directors individually or
not, agents of the shareholders.95
Instead, the suggestions of controlling shareholders may be regarded, as a matter of law, as
suggestions the persuasive effect of which, however, may be supported by an implicit or explicit
threat of removal of voting support (or even removal from office) if disregarded, if not in the
immediate case, then over a longer term. Often, particularly in the case of founding entrepreneurs,
these interventions by controlling shareholders may be made with reasonable regularity. In that
event, depending on the nature and degree of interaction, the controlling shareholder may be
considered to be a participant in the organization. In any event, although not legally binding, such
interventions must be recognized and given appropriate weight in the organizational analysis of
the corporation.
The duties of the board of directors and individual directors are, of course, owed to the corporation
and not, under Canadian law, to the shareholders generally or to any shareholders in particular.
Accordingly, the directors must consider such interventions in the light of all relevant
circumstances.96 In some cases, those circumstances may include the prospect of disruption of the
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business and affairs of the corporation if the controlling shareholder seeks to remove the board.
Needless to say, the merits of the suggestions offered should be given appropriate consideration.
Directors
This work argues, notably in Chapters One and A1 through A3 inclusive, as well as in Chapters
Two through Six inclusive, that the board of directors of the corporation is the primary, primordial,
or first-level, actor for and on behalf of the corporation. In consequence, it has also maintained
that the board of directors is not, and that an individual director is not, in any sense, an agent of
the corporation.97 Instead, as we argue in Chapters One, A1, and A2, the authority of the
corporation as principal with respect to all matters, including appointment of agents, is shared to
some extent, albeit unequally, as between the board of directors (collectively) and the shareholders
(collectively). For practical purposes, however, it is the board of directors which has ultimate
management authority, including appointing agents.
As detailed in Chapter A1,98 day-to-day responsibility for managing the business and affairs of the
corporation is assigned, without exception, to the board of directors, but subject to the rights of
shareholders, as detailed in Chapter A2, to elect the directors,99 to receive information with respect
to the business and affairs of the corporation,100 and to exercise supervisory authority with respect
to exceptional circumstances or transactions.101 The board is the body empowered to make
decisions on behalf of the corporation and, in effect, is its highest decision making authority for
most purposes.
Directors are themselves rights-and-duty-bearing parties, in which regard they are separate from
the corporation itself. In the ordinary case, members of the board are not liable for obligations
incurred by, nor are they entitled to benefits belonging to, the corporation. This is commensurate
with the corporation’s status as a separate legal entity and, in this case, as separate from its board
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of directors, both collectively and individually. Of course, as noted in Chapters A1,102 and A3,103
directors may incur liability for breaches of their “broadly defined fiduciary duties” imposed on
them by law to the corporation, which include duties of care, good faith, and compliance. This is
generally conceded to be appropriate in view of their “extensive powers to manage the
corporation”.104
The authority of the directors to manage the corporation is direct and is a consequence of corporate
law, as discussed in those chapters. They are not agents of the corporation or of its shareholders
and, accordingly, they have no duties as “agents” towards the corporation or anyone else, including
the shareholders. Further, not being agents, they are not subject to direct control or supervision by
anyone who is their principal, as is normally the case with respect to agents.105 However, as
discussed in Chapters A1 and A3, the directors are bound to comply with legal formalities,
including the relevant corporate statute and regulations, and the corporation’s charter documents,
relevant to the corporation’s status as a legal entity.
Chapters Five and Six discussed various matters relating to the corporation as an organization. In
particular, they considered matters relating to the relationship between the corporation at its
highest organizational level and groups and subgroups within it, both individually and collectively,
and relationships among those various groups and subgroups, as well as the positions of individuals
within the organization and those various groups and subgroups. Those considerations raised
further issues concerning the goals and objectives of the organization and its intraorganizational
groups and subgroups and the effect of such goals and objectives on organizational, group,
subgroup, and individual performance and attainment.
In turn, other subjects of discussion included matters relating to the informal structure and
relationships of and within the organization, and the relationship between informal structure and
relationships, on the one hand, and the formal structure and relationships, on the other hand.
Chapters Five and Six raised the question of the extent to which the board of directors operates as
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an intraorganizational group and, even, as an intraorganizational organization. It is argued that
such matters are, or may be, significant with respect to the role, duties, and operations of the board
of directors.
Among other things, the board of directors of the ultimate parent corporation (“parent board”)
must concern itself, on behalf of such corporation, with the election of boards of directors of
subsidiary corporations (“subsidiary boards”). The directors on those subsidiary boards are, of
course, required to comply with their statutory, law, and other legal duties, which will have to be
reconciled with instructions or directions from the parent board, unless, of course, the ultimate
parent corporation is party to a unanimous shareholder agreement under which it assumes the
duties and obligations of the directors of the subsidiary.106
As a practical matter, however, such conflicts of duty are not particularly acute as long as the
subsidiary is wholly-owned by the parent corporation. Although the focal director would owe
separate duties to each corporation, the fact that the equity ownership and voting power is held
only by the ultimate parent corporation would normally limit the freedom of action of the
subsidiary board, which may be subject to replacement at any time, by written resolution or
otherwise, at the instance of the sole shareholder. Thus, in many cases, the subsidiary boards do
not act independently. Often, instructions and directions are transmitted directly from officers of
the ultimate parent corporation (or some intermediary corporation) to officers of the focal
subsidiary.
In many cases, that is, instructions or directions from the ultimate parent corporation to direct or
indirect subsidiaries may be transmitted not from the parent board to the subsidiary board, but
from an officer of the parent corporation to an officer of the focal subsidiary, or by an officer of a
corporation subordinate to the parent corporation which is a direct or indirect parent of the focal
subsidiary to an officer of such focal subsidiary. That is to say, the strict legal proprieties
concerning the separate legal entity status of each corporation within the corporate group
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controlled by the parent corporation may not be observed. Indeed, such observance may not be
organizationally effective in certain circumstances.
The effect of this state of affairs on the legal liability of the parent board and its directors, of the
board and directors of the relevant subordinate corporations, and of the board of directors of the
focal corporation are beyond the present scope of discussion. However, even the formal
organizational structure and the formal processes and procedures may not accord entirely with the
legal requirements attendant upon each corporation’s status as a separate legal entity. Moreover,
the informal organization and informal processes and procedures may be even less respectful of
those legal requirements.
As noted in Chapter Five, even within a single (and even if unitary) corporation, compliance with
the requirements of its organizational hierarchy are often short-circuited in order to improve
performance. For example, rather than transmitting requests for information on the corporation up
the hierarchical chain of a particular department or division to the level which it interfaces with
another department or division, subordinate employees may be authorized, either explicitly or
implicitly, to communicate directly with their counterparts in the other focal department or
division.107
A frequent observation in this work, according with its overall objective, is that improving
understanding of how corporations operating in the “real world” on the part of those concerned
with law as it relates to corporations may be expected to improve legal compliance and legal
efficacy while minimizing undue interference with factors conducive to corporate success.
Officers
Although responsibility for the management of the business and affairs of the corporation is
assigned by modern corporate statutes to the board of directors, such statutes also normally
empower the board, subject to the provisions of the corporation’s articles and bylaws, to appoint
officers.108 In some cases, as detailed in Chapter A1, the right to appoint officers other than the
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Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) may be delegated to the
CEO, the CFO (with respect to officers reporting to the CFO), or other officers. Whatever the
formal mechanics of appointment, the officers to whom subordinate officers report are generally
considered to bear some (or, in some cases, complete) responsibility for the engagement,
continuance, and termination of such subordinate officers.
In addition to the corporate statute, articles, bylaws, and relevant resolutions, the authority and
responsibilities of officers may also be determined by a relevant contract, generally an employment
contract of the officer is a full-time employee, by the provisions of other declarative law, and,
importantly, by agency and other relevant common law. As discussed in Chapter A1,109 actual
authority may be conveyed to such an officer thereby. In addition, “a person held out by a
corporation as a director, officer, or agent” may be clothed with apparent or extensible authority,
namely, authority “to exercise the powers and perform the duties that are customary in the business
of the corporation or usual” for such an officer, unless such authority is expressly vitiated by actual
knowledge on the part of the person “dealing with the corporation” or “who acquired rights from
the corporation”. Provisions to this effect are implemented by most modern corporate statutes,
failing which, as noted in Chapter A2, they are imposed by agency law.110
Chapter A1 also discusses the duties imposed on officers by statute, by contract, and by common
law.111 Consideration of the essential organizational attributes of the corporation as organization
as presented elsewhere in Parts 2 and 3 of this work complexify these matters considerably. Firstly,
a question arises whether the references to persons “dealing with the corporation” or “acquir[ing]
rights from the corporation” are limited to persons who are not themselves directors, officers, or
agents of the corporation (which expression would include all management and many, if not all,
other employees).112
This question addresses a situation in which a person whose superior “holds out” that person,
perhaps expressly or perhaps implicitly, by acquiescence or otherwise) as having certain authority.
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It asked whether such person can be treated by a person within the corporation or within the
enterprise and organization of which the corporation is a part and who does not have knowledge
otherwise, explicitly or by virtue of the person’s position with or relationship to the corporation
(and, similarly, is such position or relationship limited to the focal corporation only?), as having
such authority by reason of the applicable statute and common law.
The answer to this question has implications not only within the focal corporation but also within
other corporations which are within the enterprise and organization controlled by the ultimate
parent. It is clear from the description provided in this book that instructions or directions which
are expected to be heeded frequently pass between persons who are officers in different
corporations within the same overall enterprise. A related question concerns the effect of such
instructions or directions on the liability on the person issuing, and on the person receiving, them,
including the impact of the same as a matter of declarative and other corporate law, contract law
(particularly concerning the relevant employment contracts), and agency and other common law
more generally.
Secondly, as is apparent from the foregoing discussion, a question arises concerning the extent to
which a person outside the corporation and the overall enterprise ( that is, a “real outsider”), or a
person outside the corporation but within the umbrella of the overall corporate enterprise (and
hence, arguably, a third party to the focal corporation) may be said to be “dealing with” or to
“acquire rights” from the focal corporation, in circumstances in which the person purporting to
deal with the third party or to convey rights to that third party is not expressly “held out” by the
focal corporation as having such authority. For example, the holding out may be effected by a
person lacking actual authority to represent the focal corporation, such as a director, officer,
employee, or other agent of a parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of the focal corporation.
These questions acquire significance in relation to consumer transactions, such as what bankrelated entity or entities have various types of responsibilities when a consumer goes into a bank
branch and contributes funds to some government-sponsored plan (perhaps a registered retirement
savings plan or RRSP in Canada, or an individual retirement account or IRA in the United States)
which purports to be sold and administered by a bank-related entity other than the bank itself.
However, these questions also acquire significance in relation to business-to-business transactions,
for example, where parent corporation logos and names appear on business cards and other
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stationery but orders are issued by or to, or formal contracts are executed by, a subsidiary of that
ultimate parent corporation.
The point of the present discussion is not to resolve the specific questions posed or to result in the
context of the examples provided, some of which may already have been addressed by declarative
law or by common law in certain jurisdictions. Instead, it is to illustrate the types of issues which
arise, as legal matters, where greater familiarity with organizational matters is acquired. Such
issues are not limited to matters of corporate law alone. Of course, those types of issues go beyond
the primary concern addressed here, which, as stated, is the interrelationship among legal
essentialist characteristics of the corporation and organizational essentialist characteristics of the
corporation.
Managers and Other Employees
As described in Chapter A3, the CEO and any other officers appointed by or on behalf of the board
of directors constitute the “first” or “top” level, or superior, agents of the corporation,113 below
which are various levels of inferior agents of the corporation.114 All agents of the corporation may
incur liability on its behalf and are entitled to indemnification with respect to the same.115
Moreover, agents of the corporation may also incur liability to the corporation on account of any
breach of duty to the corporation as principal.116
As discussed previously in this chapter, and in Chapter A3, all employees of the corporation,
whether or not they are agents of the corporation, because they are in a relationship of employment
with the corporation, may be considered to be participants in the corporation as organization.
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Lenders
Whether parties who provide debt financing to the corporation are participants in the corporation
as organization depends upon the particular circumstances. It will be recalled that organizational
participants are engaged in a relationship not only with the corporation, but also with other
organizational participants.
Debt financiers who are not trade creditors are generally parties to the agreements with the
corporation which deal with the conditions for the availment, drawdown, and maintenance of
funding, including both positive and negative covenants, and including events of default
whereupon repayment is accelerated or becomes due. Certain legal essentialist characteristics,
which may also be the subject of loan covenants or conditions are important in this regard. Capital
lock-in prevents reduction of the capital available to the business, while limited liability protects
the shareholders’ assets from claims of the corporation’s creditors, and asset partitioning protects
the assets of the corporation from claims of creditors of the shareholders.
Debt providers whose arrangements of the corporation are restricted to simply lending funds,
without further involvement in the corporation as organization, may not be considered to be
organizational participants. Their relationship may be said to be external to the corporation as
organization. However, where a lender appoints, is entitled to appoint a certain number of
directors, or certain officers (perhaps the Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, or Comptroller, a
Monitor, and even a Receiver or Receiver-Manager), as a condition of the loan or upon the
occurrence of certain other conditions, that lender, by means of its duly appointed agent, may be
considered to be an organizational participant.
In that event, consideration must be given to how such organizational participation affects, or may
affect, the legal relationship between the lender, corporation, and other relevant parties, including,
but not limited to, matters relating to the legal essentialist characteristics of the corporation. For
example, as in cases of instructions passing between officers of corporations that directly or
indirectly control the focal corporation and officers of the focal corporation, questions (which,
however worthy, cannot detain us here) may arise concerning the duties of the lender-appointed
directors or officers to the focal corporation.
Other questions, which may have legal implications, may arise concerning the knowledge which
may accrue to such lender as a result of this organizational participation, including, in particular,
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the duties of such lender-appointed director or officer to the focal corporation with respect to the
same, and the uses to which such knowledge may be put on behalf the lender and otherwise.
Similar questions may arise where, for example, the lender has regular, perhaps monthly or even
more frequent, meetings with the CFO and other senior financial officers, and perhaps with the
Audit Committee of the board of directors. Where lenders can be said to assume a role as a
participant in the organization, organizational analysis informs us that the communications
between lenders and other intraorganizational participants may assume a character which is quite
different from situations in which the lender is treated as a purely extraorganizational or external
party. For example, there may be some expectation by corporate officers of some degree of
cooptation of the lender’s representative.
Whatever legal answers may be given to such questions in the absence of such organizational
analysis, it is clear that the organizational analysis may be meaningful to both these questions and
their answers and may affect the result reached based on this new understanding of the facts and
circumstances relevant as a matter of law. Consequently, corporative theory or the corporative
perspective may have, or may come to have, significantly legal consequences.
Distributors and Customers
As discussed, whether a distributor of the corporation’s product or services is a participant in the
organization will depend on the nature of their participation in the corporation not just on an
economic basis, but in the ongoing enterprise. Robé, who considers the firm as an economic entity,
finds that whether a distributor which is a party to a long-term contract requiring the distributor to
distribute the focal corporation’s goods or services only and exclusively can be regarded as an
economic member of the firm will depend upon the degree of integration of the distributor’s
activities with those of the focal corporation, including the extent to which the distributor is
required to make or has made investments which are specific to the focal corporation.117
As shown in the present book, social theorists from Weber’s time to the present have articulated
the relationship between organizations, authority, and power.118 One of the indicia of whether a
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particular party participates in the focal organization is whether the focal party is subject to
authority and power of, and within, the organization. Of course, other indicia include whether the
focal party displays identification with, and even commitment to, the organization, and whether
the focal party is identified as a participant by other parties who claim, or are seen by others, to be
themselves participants. The behaviour of the focal party may be affected by these factors to
various degrees, which may sometimes approach, approximate, or even exceeding, the
requirements of legal contracts and other applicable law.
Adopting a corporative theory of the corporation, and thereby applying both legal and institutional
analysis to it and to its activities facilitates considering how institutional factors may influence the
behaviour and activities of the corporation, whether positively, negatively or benignly, as a legal
entity subject to law; and, similarly, how knowledge of such institutional factors can be enlisted in
aid of the law and legal compliance.
Suppliers and Others
In the case of all parties contracting with the focal corporation, Hodgson argues that whether that
party is a member of the firm (as an economic entity) depends on the focal corporation’s “effective
power over them and on its ability to abuse it because of their lack of autonomy”. He maintains
that the firm as an economic entity has no “neat boundaries” but, instead, “just grey margins
surrounding the firm” which depend, instead, on the issue at stake. Further, those boundaries “are
linked to the fact that the firm is an organization exercising power (authority) and within which
power is being exercised” and whose “limits could be said to exist where the effects of the power
fade away.”119 Accordingly, he would employ these criteria in determining whether suppliers are
members of his (economic) firm. For Robé, as well, the question whether suppliers bound by longterm contracts are part of the (economic) firm depends on the extent of control which the focal
corporation exercises over them. This control, he says, reflects supplier-specific investments made
by the focal corporation.120
In addition, Hodgson notes that mutual understanding and trust may characterize long-term
“relational” contracting, including supply agreements, and the development of long-term
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relationships, especially when such relationships involve shared knowledge and mutual,
interactive learning.121 As explained previously, although the present book considers participation
as relating to the organization through and by means of which the corporation operates and carries
on business, the criteria employed by Hodgson and by Robé are relevant to determining what
parties are to be considered as participants in the organization.
The Separate Legal Entity, the Organization, and the Individual Human Actor
Acting on Behalf of the Corporation
It is clear that the incorporators who become and constitute the relevant body corporate as a
separate legal entity must either be individual human actors, or, if the incorporators are other than
individual human actors, must be taking action through the instrumentality of individual human
actors; and that such human actors, on their own behalf or on behalf of other bodies corporate or
entities, actually personate, animate, and vivify the corporation, both at incorporation and
subsequently.
It might be considered that those same human actors could be regarded as an organization, in the
sense of a social group or unit of persons acting in concert in order to attain some common need
or to achieve some common goal or objective. As a minimum, the incorporators or the individual
human beings through whom they act are taking action, collectively or in concert, in order to
establish the corporation, which is the common goal or objective. Accordingly, as established
earlier in this work, those individuals acting to establish a corporation may be said to constitute an
organization; and the individuals who thereafter carry on the “business” of such corporation may
be said to act in that capacity as members of such organization.
Clearly, it is not possible to explicate all of the consequences of this duality; however, a number
of the principal consequences have been chosen for examination here, including: firstly, the means
by which the legal entity takes action through individual human beings, which engages issues
relating to authority and its limitations; secondly, the related issue of the means by which
individual human actions taken on behalf of the legal entity may be distinguished from individual
human actions taken otherwise, including actions taken on one’s own behalf and actions taken on
behalf of others; thirdly, the means by which actions taken on behalf of the legal entity may be
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structured, whether simply or unitarily, through various divisions or groups within the single legal
entity, or whether through various subsidiary corporations, each of which is a separate legal entity;
fourthly, the considerations which are often applicable in respect of the foregoing determination;
and, fifthly, how the application of those considerations at various points in time may implicate
and result in adaptational changes in structure by the legal entity and, correspondingly, the
implications of such changes in structure over time. As many of these issues have already been
canvassed in the present chapter, those issues can be dealt with summarily here.
Authority and Limitations on Authority
As discussed above in relation to “Officers” and “Managers and Other Employees”,122 the scope
of the duty and actual authority of an officer, manager, or other employee may be determined by
the bylaws or board resolutions, employment agreements, employee and other policy manuals, and
otherwise. Frequently, the title of the officer or employee is some indication of duty and authority.
However, it is possible that an officer or employee may receive instructions or directions that
enlarge the express duty and authority previously relevant. As discussed, the officer or employee
may explicitly or implicitly accept such variation, at least if it is within that person’s zone of
acceptance or zone of indifference.
In certain cases, an officer or employee may seek to expand such duty and authority, whether as a
result of exercising initiative or otherwise. If that expansion is within what might be called the
employer’s “zone of acceptance” or “zone of indifference” with respect to such matters, the
employer may, explicitly or implicitly, permit such extension of duty and authority. Ghoshal and
Bartlett explain that “organizational effectiveness depends on the willingness and ability of visual
to take personal initiatives, and on the structure, processes and norms organizations need to
facilitate such initiatives”.123
However, whenever an employee exceeds his or her actual authority, this may come into conflict
with formal authority, either because someone else has actual authority in the instant case or
because the employee expansion of authority conflicts with rules regarding authority. Similarly,
such employee action may conflict with the informal organization, rules, procedures which are
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operative. Thus, according to Ghoshal and Bartlett, “individuals are also subject to certain failures
and limitations, so the same structure, processes and norms [which facilitate personal initiatives]
must also protect the organization from those pathologies of individual behaviors and actions.”124
In some cases, the employer may tolerate such employee action as a sort of “test” of whether actual
authority should be expanded.125
As previously discussed, where an employer permits an employee to exceed his or her actual
authority, such employee would acquire ostensible authority, which would normally permit third
parties outside the corporation to rely on actions of that employee, both at common law and by
statute.126
At common law, the scope of authority of agents to interact with outsiders was originally related
to the function performed. For example, employees within the sales function sold products and
services to outsiders; employees within the operations or financial function collected receivables
from outsiders; employees within the purchasing function purchased from outsiders the necessary
products and services to be used as inputs; and employees of the operations or financial function
attended on the payment of accounts payable to outsiders. Consequently, the scope of the
delegation and specialization, by means of function, in turn, determined the scope of authority of
individual persons to act as agents of the corporation. The inclusion of any individual person in a
particular department or function, and the title bestowed on such person, was intended to convey
to outsiders the nature and extent of the authority of such person to act with respect to relevant
outsiders.
The ascension of M-form corporations or MDCs, and multinational enterprises or MNEs, as
chronicled in Chapter Three127 complicated these issues. The span of activity of particular
functions, divisions, departments, or corporations within the overall organization could be
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extremely difficult for outsiders to determine. This might affect not only the actual authority, but
also the ostensible authority, of officers or managers within those groups. Such perceptions by
outsiders may relate to legal matters, including some relating to the legal essentialist characteristics
of the corporation, such as separate legal entity status and asset partitioning. Legal boundaries may
not always be clear: outside parties may not know the legal nature of the group with whom they
are interacting. Accordingly, they may not know whether they are engaging with the legal capacity
of the ultimate parent corporation, a subsidiary, an affiliate, or otherwise. Yet it is clear that such
legal boundaries make a difference both to the external parties and to the enterprise itself.
Depending on the degree of integration within the organization, the names by which
intraorganizational groups are identified to outsiders may or may not reflect their legal status; but
they may not even adequately reflect their function. Consequently, the titles of officers and
managers within those intraorganizational groups may not be an adequate indicator of their actual
authority. For example, when Enron Corporation filed a bankruptcy petition with the bankruptcy
court in the Southern District of New York on December 2, 2001, it also filed on behalf of 13 of
its critical subsidiaries. However, the time, it had more than 3,500 subsidiaries in the United States
and abroad, many, if not all, of which were expected to commence bankruptcy proceedings.128
That all of these were clearly identified to trade creditors and others as entities that were legally
separate from Enron may be considered to be extremely doubtful.
A related concern is whether shareholders of, and lenders to, Enron or any of the subsidiary or
affiliated corporations were aware of the legal status of the subsidiaries and other entities and the
legal effects of such status. For example, Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann report that
“Enron took advantage of US accounting rules, which enable companies to set up corporate
vehicles, so-called special purpose entities or SPEs, to manage assets off balance sheet” by
transferring an asset to an SPE in exchange for issuing debt to the vendor company. Such debt,
together with equity investment from an outside investor would enable the vendor company to
earn a higher rate of return as a result of the SPE investment.129
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Then, “in the course of the nineteen nineties, Enron set up several thousand companies which,
thanks to the rules of US GAAP on SPEs and so-called “equity accounting”, did not count as its
subsidiaries and whose accounts therefor did not need to be consolidated with its own and enabled
it to “replace potential liabilities (risky or heavy investments with the potential to be a drain on the
oh company)” with assets in the form of debt obligations owed by the SPE to Enron and earnings
from such repayments of debt.130 This did not infringe any accounting principles or rules of
corporate law until, in the absence of real outside investors, Enron started creating “sham” outside
investors and outside investments. The eventual restatement of Enron’s earnings statement and
balance sheet which became necessary on discovery of the shams reduced Enron’s net worth by
several billion dollars and contribute to its eventual bankruptcy.131
These transactions also involve borrowings from third parties were not aware of the nonindependent nature of the SPEs and who dealt with persons who were not independent of Enron
but, instead, were Enron employees who reported to the CFO of Enron.132 It might be conjectured
that the persons dealing with those third-party lenders likely represented themselves as employees
are agents of the relevant SPEs, rather than as Enron employees. In this sense, the complexity of
the Enron ownership structure may have obfuscated the nature and identity of the party, and its
representative, securing the loan.
Acting on One’s Own Behalf and Acting on Behalf of Another
As noted above,133 the activities of typical organizational participants, particularly employees, are
not exhausted by intraorganizational action. Instead, organizational participants commonly engage
in extraorganizational activities, which may or may not involve participation in other
organizations. Accordingly, Hodgson describes employees as "crossing the boundaries of the
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firm", and as being "inside" the firm "during the periods, and under the circumstances specified in
the employment contract."134
In the case of officers, managers, and employees, the employment contract and attendant
declarative and common law is an appropriate point of commencement for an inquiry into when
the employee is acting on behalf of the corporation. As discussed in Chapter A3,135 an officer,
manager or other employee who pursues other activities, at least during normal working hours,
may be considered to be in breach of the focal employment agreement which may result in liability
to the corporation. This is also true of actions in excess of the individual’s actual authority.
However, acts done by the individual on behalf of the corporation which are within the individual’s
actual authority do not incur any personal liability. It is the scope of the individual’s responsibility
within the corporation which is a primary determinant of when acts of the individual is acting on
behalf of the corporation and thus binds the corporation, and also when the individual is acting on
his or her own behalf, or on behalf of another (which may be a group, corporation or other
organization, or otherwise).
Such a person may, however, undertake activities on behalf of the corporation during other periods
and away from the corporation’s offices. Such person may also be undertaking activities on the
person’s own behalf simultaneously or intermittently during those periods, which activities may
not be subject to the employment arrangements. Further, that person may take actions on behalf of
other groups or organizations. As is well known, some acts undertaken by officers, managers, or
other employees outside of their exercise of authority may be considered to breach the express and
implied terms of the employment arrangements and, as such, to provide grounds for the employer
taking action against the employee by way of sanctions, sometimes including termination of
employment.136
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Effects of Separate Legal Entity Status on Organizational Structure
As discussed earlier in this chapter, especially under the heading “The Corporation, the Legal
Entity, the Organization, and the Participants”, in many cases, the organization and the corporation
will correspond and yet their boundaries will not be coterminous. As indicated, the relevant
business activity, which we have denominated as “the enterprise” may involve a business entity or
business entities characterized by various legal forms, including, perhaps, corporations, limited
liability corporations (LLCs), limited partnerships, partnerships, business trusts and others.
MDCs and MNEs
Chapter Three distinguishes between a unitary or U-Form corporation and a multidivisional
corporation (“MDC”) or M-Form corporation.137 Alfred Chandler and Oliver Williamson identify
a unitary or U-Form corporation as operating in a single product line or in multiple but related
product lines, and as vertically integrated with central or ministration through various functional
departments. Fligstein describes the multidivisional form as decentralized, being organized into
product divisions and each of which contains a unitary structure with separate functional
departments. Such a division is not normally a separate corporation but, instead, operates as a
matter of law, as the focal corporation directly.
As described in Chapters Two and Three, Chandler chronicles the historical development of Mform corporations or MDCs largely by reference to the expansion of, and advances in,
technology.138 Chapter Three details the different relationships which can obtain between the focal
corporation’s headquarters, on the one hand, and its strategic business units (“SBUs”) or business
units (“BUs”), on the other.139 The exposition in these two chapters relates to the organization by
which the ultimate parent corporation operates its business or enterprise; from which it may be
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concluded that the “big picture issues” relating to such organization are largely independent of the
legal form of those business units. Exceptions to this state of affairs are discussed below.
In this regard, Chapters Four, Five, and Six compared the organizational essentialist attributes of
an organization with the features of corporations as organized and operated “in the real world”.
These concerned the presence of the following elements: firstly, a social unit or group of persons
(Chapter Four); secondly, the structure, processes, and management and organizational personnel
by means of which it functions or operates (Chapter Five); and the goals and objectives shared,
and pursued, by members of the organization (Chapter Six). These “organizationally essentialist”
attributes could be ascribed to the ultimate parent corporation of a corporate group or enterprise
and to such corporate group or enterprise without, for the most part, referencing the legal structure
of the groups or business units encompassed within it.
Concerning the organization of the business or enterprise, reference is made to the heading “Fact
Pattern for Discussion” in this chapter. There, an example was provided involving a public listed
corporation known as “Great Motoring Corporation” (“GMC” or the “Corporation”), having four
divisions, two of which, Ultimate and GMT, each have a separate subsidiary of GMC at the top of
their divisional “organization chart”, and two of which, Challenger and Champion, do not have
direct subsidiaries of GMC at the apex of their divisional hierarchy. GMC can be described as a
multidivisional corporation, or M-Form corporation, or MDC, as described in Chapters Two,140
and Three.141
Chapter Two discusses Chandler’s chronology of the development of MDCs, denominated by him
as multidivisional enterprises (“MDE’s”), which he related to advances in transportation and
communications, as well as increases in the concentration of population, in wealth and in demand,
among other things. This permitted advances in what he called “administrative coordination”,
saying that the modern business enterprise appeared when the volume of economic activities made
administrative coordination more efficient and more profitable than market coordination.142 This
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permitted the development and continued growth of multiunit business enterprises. Chandler
criticized economists for their failure to analyze the function of administrative coordination such
that their theory of the firm remained essentially a theory of production.143
Much of the discussion in Chapter Three concerning M-form corporations relates to the
relationships between the headquarters and the strategic business unit and to the relationships
among SBUs. Much of such discussion also relates to the organizational structure of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) and to MDCs more generally. In particular, the relationship between
headquarters functions and organizational strategy and structure is discussed, including
examination of financial control, strategic control, and strategic planning models of interaction
between headquarters and business units.144
In effect, the description of MDCs and MNEs (and, for that matter, unitary corporations) by
specialists and other commentators is generally agnostic on the subject of legal form: that is to
say, the discussion of the overall organizational structure and processes generally does not treat
the legal form of a particular business units, or even divisions, as being of cardinal importance. As
noted previously, and reported in Chapter Three,145 an extensive review by Birkinshaw and Hood
of literature and theory development in connection with the evolution of multinational
subsidiaries146 even defines the term "subsidiary" in non-legal terms, considered it as a “valueadding entity in its country” regardless of the legal structure of that economic subsidiary, that is,
whether as one or more separate legal entities or divisions or branches or branch of the MNC.147
An earlier review of research and theoretical work concerning MNCs by Theodore Herbert
examined the principal strategies leading to internationalization and the relevant structural design
criteria relating to such strategies and structures of operations, but generally without specifically
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referencing the legal structure attendant upon such international operations.148 For example, it
reviews the potential establishment of an international division and considers the possibility that
it can be structured according to geography, product lines, function or some combination of these
criteria and considers them most likely to be headed by a Vice President reporting directly to the
CEO.149 It also considers a structure in which foreign and domestic markets are treated identically
by means of fully integrated regional operations, the officers heading which would report directly
to the CEO.150 It also considers the use of a matrix structure,151 as discussed in Chapter Six.152
Thus, these reviews of research and theory concerning MNEs are generally ambivalent concerning
the legal structure of the foreign operation.
In many cases, administrative or organizational considerations operate across the organization
irrespective of legal boundaries; and the division and allocation of authority and responsibility
within the organization is often based on organizational, rather than legal, parameters. However,
legal considerations may become more dominant in certain fact situations, such as where a
particular division is experiencing organization decline: it may be advisable to structure that
possibly failing division as a separate corporation, in order to immunize other divisions from the
adverse consequences of its possible failure. Where the focal corporation is actively and regularly
engaged in acquisitions or divestitures, whether in a particular division or otherwise, it may be
advantageous to employ separate corporate entities, at the divisional level or otherwise.
Deconglomeration
Davis, Diekmann & Tinsley’s 1994 review of the deinstitutionalization of conglomerates during
the nineteen eighties relates this development to the external environment and other
considerations.153 It indicates that the model of growth through acquisition centred on
diversification into other industries arose partly as a result of the regulation of horizontal and
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vertical integration by statute starting in 1950 and that this gave rise to the “firm-as-portfolio”
model described by Michael Porter as being dominant in the late 1980s.154
Those authors indicate that doubt concerning the merit of bringing weakly related businesses
together under a single management and the rise of a takeover market in the nineteen eighties
provided motive and mechanism to deinstitutionalize these conglomerates,155 by means of “bust
up” takeovers “where raiders bought conglomerates and financed the deal from the postacquisition sale of their separated parts” by means of divestitures, and by divestiture of unrelated
businesses to focus on “core businesses” when not threatened by hostile takeovers.156
The conglomerate form and the “firm-as-portfolio” model of the corporation, they argue,
deinstitutionalized “the very idea of the corporation as a bounded social entity analogous to a
sovereign body”, effectively as a separate legal entity.157 Whereas the growth of a corporation
could be seen as somehow natural or organic like a body, “conglomerates strained the body
analogy, because they offered no credible basis for a myth of identity” in the sense that the parts
were not contiguous and “did not belong together by any “natural” link.”158
Thus, the authors argue, although the rise of conglomerates may have resulted from growth
strategies, the very existence of conglomerates themselves “inherently undermined the notion of
the firm as a bounded actor, capable of growth, and distinct from its environment; and poor
financial performance of invited challenges in the form bust-up takeovers moreover, once bust up
to possible, the sovereignty of any organization boundary was rendered problematic” and,
accordingly, “any aspect of what an organization did was a potential candidate for externalization
if it failed to meet a market test” as adjudged by actors inside and outside of the organization.159
Chapter Six demonstrated that organizations, including corporations, experience internal and
external threats to their organizational stability and that the ability to secure scarce and critical
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resources needed by the organization, to “cope” with uncertainty to which the organization is
subject, to obtain and distribute critical information, and to allocate resources and sanctions are
important determinants of intraorganizational power, including the capacity to influence
organizational goals.160
As argued there, these critical abilities and their significance are not likely to be immediately
apparent from a glance at the corporation’s organizational chart. Depending upon the historical
background to the corporation’s current configuration, its duration, and many other factors, even
“loosely coupled” enterprises may become significantly integrated in ways not obvious to
outsiders. Consequently, external proposals assessing certain corporate operations as performing
inadequately, may not reflect the totality of the contribution of such operations to the organization
as a whole. Similarly, proposals for their divestiture may not take into account all of the
concomitant costs and disbenefits. That is not, of course, to argue that such proposals are
intrinsically unmeritorious and unworthy of implementation; but, instead, suggests that a
painstaking organizational investigation and assessment should attend such proposals.
Multilayered Subsidiary Forms (MLSFs)
As just discussed, developments, both internal and external, to a particular corporation at the level
of the ultimate parent corporation may result in changes to its internal legal structure. Some of
these developments may be shared more widely among companies in certain industries or pursuing
certain strategies, while others may be shared among public companies generally. An important
2002 study by Boies and Prechel examined changes in the structure of the largest US industrial
corporations in the late 20th century, from MDCs to multilayered subsidiary forms (MLSFs),
during a period of economic uncertainty. They attributed this change to capital dependence,
arguing that “capital accumulation opportunities and constraints are historically contingent, and
corporate transformation occurs in response to those historical and social forces” and that the MLS
of increases financial flexibility 161

160

See the discussion in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals", especially under
the heading "Intraorganizational Goals, Power, and Loyalty" and therein under the subheading "Information and
Sanctions as Sources of Intraorganizational Power".
161
John Boies and Harland Prechel, "Capital Dependence, Business Political Behavior, and Change to the
Multilayered Subsidiary Form" (2002) 49:3 Social Problems 301 at 321.

543
They defined a MLSF as a hierarchy of two or more levels of subsidiary with a parent company
acting as a management company, at the top.162 This took place in connection with a reconfiguring
of product lines, such that after reconfiguring a large division into subsidiaries, top management
would acquire other corporations to gain greater market concentration and control in a particular
product line, while divesting from other product lines by spinning off subsidiary corporations. This
resulted in the elimination of non-core businesses and the reduction of diversification.163
The study reports that during the nineteen eighties, the size of the largest corporations and the
concentration of asset ownership in them increased substantially but that subsidiaries became
increasingly widespread by the early nineteen nineties. The largest 100 industrial corporations had
703 subsidiaries in 1981, but 2,724 subsidiaries in 1987, with another 1796 subsidiaries added in
the next six years, by 1993. The mean number of divisions in the largest 100 industrial corporations
dropped from 8.8 in 1981 to 4.3 in 1993, while the mean number of subsidiary corporations
increased from 21 to 48.164 Ten of the largest had more than 100 domestic subsidiaries, one of
which had 156 and another of which had more than 200.165 There were no fourth level or fifth level
domestic subsidiaries in 1981, but 34% of that group had fourth level and 15% had fifth level
domestic subsidiaries in 1993. A number of corporations had fifth, sixth, and even seventh level
subsidiaries by 1996.166
As compared with a MDC structure, Boies and Prechel say that a MLSF structure: may create an
improved incentive structure for employees, because of separate financial reporting, such as by
use of “tracking stock” which acts as a proxy for how well the subsidiary would perform if it was
an independent company; may improve the operation of internal capital markets (capital availment
by the parent); may reduce the cost of acquiring and maintaining investment in the focal entity;
may permit public ownership of the minority interest, which may increase visibility although at
the expense of the compliance and financial costs of maintaining public company; may facilitate
increasing the capital base by public equity offerings which may be dilutive unless the parent
invests proportionately (which, however, may be done at a later time when it has funds available
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or when the stock price is cheaper); and may facilitate any necessary restructuring and employee
layoffs.167 It also increases financial flexibility; allows changes from debt to equity financing; may
expedite forming joint ventures or other business combinations with third parties; insulates the
parent and other subsidiaries from liability for the focal corporation; and may result in a higher
price/earnings multiple or higher stock value.168
Boies and Prechel purport to follow Chandler and Williamson in maintaining that “conglomerates
are a category within a corporate form; business units within conglomerates can be organized as
divisions or subsidiaries”.169 However, they maintain that “change in the dominant business unit
(e.g., department, division, subsidiary)” can be seen as “the criterion to signify corporate form
change”.170 They say that: “Just as the shift from departments to divisions changed the basis of top
management control, the change from divisions to subsidiaries changed the way in which top
management controls their business units”, which becomes expressed in terms of property relations
since, unlike divisions which “are part of the same corporation see central office, subsidiaries are
legally separate corporations that are wholly or partly owned by the parent company.”171
Their principal argument in this regard is that where the subsidiary corporations are public
corporations, top management of the parent company can employ stock values, profits and other
related information concerning the subsidiaries to monitor their performance. Of course, not all
conglomerates involve hierarchies of public corporations, but those that do are affected by the
separate legal status of the subsidiaries. As well as requiring relevant information to be provided
to outside shareholders, of course, other matters involving duties and responsibilities to
shareholders become relevant not only at the parent corporation level, but at the level of the
subsidiary public company. In those events, the scope of the legal consequences of separate legal
entity status result more from public company status than from SLE status.
Extraorganizational Action and the Corporation
It has become apparent that shifts in organizational structure, whether from the U-form to the Mform, or from the M-form to the MLSF reflect adjustments in corporate strategy. Those
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adjustments in corporate strategy may also be reflected in changes in organizational processes and
in changes in organizational personnel. As suggested here, the sudden “curtaining off” or
internalizing of certain functions within a particular subsidiary, as compared with previous
operation of those functions across the organization as a whole, may be undertaken in response to
its perceived decline and possible restructuring or divestiture, and in order to preserve the benefits
of asset partitioning. This is an example of the kind of organizational change which engages legal
essentialist attributes to which legal experts and others must be attentive.
In view of the way in which many MDCs, MNEs, and even MLSFs integrate certain operations
and functions across the whole enterprise, observers must consider whether or not changes in such
practices are motivated by legal matters, including paying attention to and relying upon legal
essentialist attributes of the corporation. Such changes may also require the attention to the
question how organizational participants are differentially affected by such changes; and, in effect,
how such changes affect the expectations of organizational participants with respect to the
corporate relationship, whether at the level of the ultimate parent and organization as a whole or
at the level of the focal corporation concerned.
For example, in the GMC fact pattern, the incorporation of a new corporation to carry on the
activities previously carried on by the Champion Division may suggest that its performance is
otherwise than its name might indicate; namely, that it is experiencing some organizational decline
such that it would benefit the parent corporation and other divisions if it was subject to asset
partitioning. Alternatively, it may suggest that its performance has been sufficiently positive that
its divestiture and the resulting reemployment of funds arising from such divestiture might be
appropriate and might actually be under consideration. These observations lead to consideration
of limited liability and asset partitioning.
Legal Structure, Organizational Structure, and Value of a Diversified Enterprise
As reviewed in Chapter Two, Chandler chronicled the relationship between strategy and structure
in the context of the challenges of diversification and against the background of the historical
development of major industrial corporations.172 A 1998 review of research and theoretical
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literature by Bethel and Liebeskind173 argues that, while a firm’s organizational structure has been
shown to be related to diversification and performance,174 “to date the legal organization of firms
has been largely neglected by organization scholars.”175 Of course, the present work has
maintained that the corporation is characterized by both legal and organizational aspects or
characteristics and that these interact with one another, particular importance being assigned to the
interaction of legal essentialist characteristics and organizationally essentialist characteristics.
Bethel and Liebeskind devote attention to the diversified firm, in particular, and find that the
“existing literature on the relationship between strategy and structure tends to ignore the legal
dimension of the organization of diversified firms”.176 The authors argue that “the value of a
diversified firm is related to its legal organization”.177 In particular, they examine what they call
“corporate groups”, in which “a ‘parent corporation’ owns or partially owns a series of subsidiary
corporations and/or partnerships”, which subsidiary firm’s operate domestically.178
They claim that the prevalence of corporate groups is sought to be explained by the desire to limit
product and other tort liability, to reduce taxes, and to allow large shareholders to increase their
voting control relative to a simple, that is to say unitary, corporation. They purport to show that
“under some circumstances the value of a diversified firm will be higher if it is organized in the
corporate group than if it is organized as a simple corporation” because costs that might otherwise
be borne by some current stakeholders of the simple corporation (but not by others who may
benefit, instead) as a result of diversification and which may result in the corporation incurring
“protection costs” (such as lawsuits, proxy battles, imposing protective covenants and charter
documents, debt instruments or labour agreements) can be reduced or eliminated within the
corporate group structure.179
Their discussion is framed in terms of “stakeholder” analysis, distinguishing primarily between
parties having fixed claims against the corporation, such as holders of debt instruments or
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creditors, as against those having residual claims, such as holders of equity or common
shareholders. Our analysis focuses, instead, on organizational participants. However, their focus
on fixed and residual claimants against the corporation can be accommodated within our
corporative perspective. Their investigation yields a number of conclusions about the relationship
between legal and organizational characteristics.
Firstly, the performance, and hence value, of a diversified firm is related to its legal organization,
and not only to its internal organization. That is to say, the value of the diversified firm is affected
not only by its organizational characteristics, but by its legal characteristics.180 As explained in our
corporative theory, particular legal and organizational characteristics, including those which we
describe as “essentialist”, affect or “map onto” each other in various ways. For example, Bethel
and Liebeskind say that the economies of scope (reduction of average cost per unit produced) are
lower in a corporate group because of separate accounting and more independent management.
Secondly, “the value of any specific diversification event should depend, inter alia, on the legal
organization with which it takes place”.181 This would apply to acquisitions and divestitures. They
posit that differences in stock market valuations of such trigger events may be affected by the legal
form obtaining pre-event and post-event, inasmuch as stock market values would be discounted if
the legal organization considered by the market to be preferred is not adopted at the relevant time.
For example, completely selling off, as a subsidiary, a business operation which has high potential
tort liability is more advantageous than selling it off as a division by way of asset sale.
Thirdly, “the “relatedness” of a given diversification strategy may be a choice variable for
managers, because it is more difficult and costly to exploit economies of scope in corporate
groups.”182 In other words, there may be barriers to achieving such savings, which may be in the
form of high associated protection costs.
Fourthly, “corporate restructurings, especially spinoffs and divestitures, may result from changes
in the cost of diversification or changes in the distribution of its costs and benefits between fixed
and residual claimants.”183 They argue that this is because “the optimal legal organization of a firm
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depends on economies of scope, cash flow variance, and the priority claims, changes in any of can
be expected to change the optimal legal organization of a firm and even, its overall scope.”184 For
example, they suggest that firm should spin off or divest lines of business affected by “strict
liability” product regimes. They also argue that, for this reason, firms are less vertically integrated
in industries where product liability exposure is high.
Fifthly, they argue that residual claimants (common shareholders) “are more likely to undertake
variance-increasing diversification than fixed claimants, and to maximize economies of scope by
organizing the firm as a simple corporation”, which explains why block share purchases were
followed by corporate restructurings of American large corporations during the nineteen eighties.
In effect, “the legal organization of a diversified firm can be expected to be related to that firm’s
ownership structure, and to be responsive to changes in ownership structure”.185
Finally, they say that “changes in the cost of protective activities and/or in claimants’ ability to
impose protection costs on other claimants” should result in “changes in legal organization and
changes in firm scope”.186 This and other such claims will be evaluated, further, in the next chapter
with respect to the second essentialist legal attribute, namely, limited liability and asset
partitioning.
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PART 3
CHAPTER EIGHT – A CORPORATIVE THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE – PART B
ATTRIBUTE TWO – LIMITED LIBILITY AND ASSET PARTITIONING
Declarative Law
Limited Liability
As described in Chapter One, shareholders of modern business corporations do not enjoy any rights
nor are they subject to any liabilities, as such shareholders, vis-à-vis the corporation and its
property, contracts, actions or inactions.1 Shareholders of the corporation are not, as such, liable
in respect of acts of the corporation alone nor are the assets of such shareholders subject to claims
of creditors of the corporation.
The CBCA and OBCA specifically enumerate liabilities, acts, or defaults which constitute
extremely limited exceptions to the rule. The DGCA and MBCA permit the constating documents
of a corporation to impose personal liability on shareholders for specified acts or debts (DGCA)
or for debts only (MBCA). Both of these statutes expressly indicate that a shareholder may become
personally liable by reason of such shareholder’s own acts or conduct. Conventionally referred to
as “limited liability”, when relating it to the shielding of the personal assets of the shareholders
from claims of creditors of the corporation, Hansmann and Kraakman refer to this as “defensive
asset partitioning”2, while Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire refer to it as “owner shielding”.3 4
Entity Shielding
The obverse of such limited liability involves protecting the corporation against claims by creditors
of its shareholders and against seizure of the corporation’s assets to satisfy claims by creditors of
shareholders. Hansmann and Kraakman refer to this as “affirmative asset partitioning”, 5 while
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Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire refer to this as “entity shielding”.6 The corporation is protected
against claims by creditors of the shareholders of the corporation and against seizure of its assets
to satisfy such claims.
As indicated in our discussion in Chapter One, exposing the corporation’s assets only to liabilities
of the corporation and, the same time, proscribing access to assets of the corporation’s shareholders
to satisfy liabilities of the corporation, is both consistent with, and important to, establishing the
status of the corporation as a separate legal entity.
Separate Legal Entity Status and Asset Partitioning
The preceding chapter, in the section entitled “Attribute One – Separate Legal Entity”, discusses
the corporation as a separate legal entity or SLE, which is described as a “rights-and-duty-bearing
entity”, and describes the implications of such status as a matter of declarative law and otherwise.
It also demonstrates how the corporation, as a separate legal entity, is enabled to take action by
means of individual human actors acting collectively in order to achieve common goals and
objectives. This type of collective action denominates the corporation as, or as involving, an
organization. Accordingly, that section indicated how the organizational analysis of the
corporation explicated in previous chapters may be expected to affect the first legal essentialist
attribute of the corporation, namely, separate legal entity status, and how such effects might have
other legal and organizational implications, with respect to organizational characteristics,
organizational participants, and otherwise.
The present chapter and section proceed similarly with respect to what has been identified as the
corporation’s second legal essentialist attribute, namely, asset partitioning, both with respect to the
assets of the corporation and with respect to the assets of those involved in the corporation as
shareholders and otherwise. The concept of a separate legal entity as a rights-and-duty bearing
entity is consistent with its ownership of its property in the sense of it having certain legal rights
with respect to the same, and non-ownership of other property, including the property of its
shareholders and others, in the sense of not having legal rights with respect to the property of such
others.

6
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Thus, the concepts, firstly, that the corporation’s property could be affected by ownership rights
held by someone who has rights vis-à-vis the corporation but not against such property (i.e., a
shareholder); and, secondly, that the property of someone having such rights, as a shareholder or
otherwise, vis-à-vis the corporation could be affected by their ownership of its shares; appear to
be consistent, or, at least, do not appear to be inconsistent with such asset partitioning.
Consequently, the present chapter averts to a number of issues which also relate to separate legal
entity status, and hence could have been discussed in the preceding chapter, but have been left for
discussion here so as not to unduly burden the text of the previous chapter.
However, as is well known, while the law in Great Britain, Canada, and United States had long
acknowledged not only the concept of the corporation as a separate legal entity, but also recognized
the concept of asset partitioning, in both cases, with respect to certain categories of corporations,
at least, asset partitioning in the form of limited liability did not characterize corporations
generally, as distinct from particular corporations or particular types of corporations,7 until the
19th century, England in 1855,8 in Canada in 1850,9 and in United States around 1825 according
to Phillip Blumberg.10 Some of the consequences of this chronology are discussed below.
Asset Partitioning and Policy Considerations
Capital Requirements, Characteristics of Investors, and Capital Markets
Henry Manne indicated that the development of large corporations in the 19th century began
essentially in the eighteen thirties with the first wide public promotions of railroads as an
investment, in order to address the need to raise capital from a relatively large number of
investors.11 In England, it was thought by some that schemes requiring large investment, such as
roads, ships and commerce, by availing themselves of limited liability, would enable members of
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the aristocracy, the trading class, and the working class, to participate in such investments and to
associate with one another in that respect.12
Manne argued that when large corporations raise capital, limited liability “allows individuals to
use small fractions of their savings for various purposes, without risking a disastrous loss if any
corporation in which they have invested becomes insolvent.”13 It also permits investors to invest
different amounts of funds without becoming liable equally, proportionately or otherwise, for debts
in excess of the corporation’s capital, which is considered to unfairly disadvantage investors,
wealthy or not, whose small investment of capital might put their entire wealth at risk.
At the same time, it facilitates investment by those wealthy investors who possess large amounts
of capital, perhaps greatly disproportionate to the assets of other investors. Instead of being liable
to the fullest extent of their wealth, by limiting their potential loss to the amounts contributed as
capital, investors absorb losses in proportion to their investments. Otherwise, with a rule of equal
liability for debts, Manne says that “small investments and corporations would tend to come only
from the individuals who were nearly insolvent already. Wealthy individuals would never make
small investments in a corporation.”14
As previously noted,15 a rule of limited liability eliminates the necessity for someone considering
an investment in a corporation to make inquiries concerning the wealth of existing investors; and
also facilitates the need for a corporate or vendor to make inquiries concerning the wealth or
creditworthiness of prospective new investors, including those who require shares of existing
investors. This facilitates the transferability of shares, as discussed in Chapter One.16
Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull maintain that imperfect capital markets may impose a cost on
prospective investors ascertaining the identity and wealth levels of investors, with the result that
wealthy shareholders may refuse to purchase even a small number of shares and, in extreme
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conditions, securities markets will not exist.17 In the absence of limited liability, since the
maximum potential loss of a wealthy investor is independent of the number of shares but, instead,
depends on the wealth of the other shareholders, a wealthy investor may determine to become a
shareholder only by acquiring a sufficient number of shares that, firstly, it is worth closely
monitoring the operations of the corporation; or, secondly, the investee company agrees to
restrictions on the investment, operating, and financing decisions of management; or both. This
would make it likely that ownership of equity shares would be concentrated in the hands of the
few wealthy shareholders, which would make it unlikely that an active market in the corporation’s
shares would develop.18
Accordingly, asset partitioning, together with the separation of management rights from equity
ownership, facilitates what might be called the “financialization” of corporate shares: that is to
say, the treatment of shares of corporations, particular public corporations, as an investment, and
the accompanying commodification of such shares as investment instruments or investment
securities. Easterbrook and Fischel maintain that with unlimited liability, “shares would not be
homogeneous commodities, so there would no longer have one market price.”19 Instead, with
limited liability, “the identity and wealth of other investors is irrelevant. Shares are fungible; they
trade at one price in liquid markets”.20
In the absence of a rule of limited liability, Halpern et al. argue that it would be appropriate to
adopt a pro rata liability rule whereby each equity investor is liable for the amount invested plus a
proportion of the excess claims arising from default. This would have the effect of prorating
liability for unsatisfied liabilities to the amount invested. Accordingly, these authors maintain that
such pro rata rule would increase the risk of investment, and hence the expected rates of return
required in order to motivate such investment. This would require monitoring the activities of the
company but not the wealth composition of its shareholders.21 Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull
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conclude that “in the case of large, widely held companies, a limited liability regime, as a general
rule, is the most efficient regime.”22
The effects of organizational analysis concerning the implications of limited liability and asset
partitioning with respect to investors, investment characteristics of corporate shares, and capital
markets are discussed below in relation to the effect of the foregoing on shareholders as
organizational participants and otherwise.
Separation of Management from Equity Ownership
As indicated in the preceding section, asset partitioning assists in facilitating the separation of
management of the corporation from its equity ownership. Manne emphasizes the importance of
raising capital from a relatively large number of investors to the development of large corporations
in the United States during the 19th century. Consequently, he maintains that the concept of the
corporation “as a capital-raising device” and the concept of centralized management are directly
related.23
He argues that “if the principal economic function of the corporate form was to amass the funds
of investors, qua investors, we should not anticipate their demanding or wanting a direct role in
the management of the company” or even in selecting particular managers, which he did not
consider, at least in theory, to be a function of capital investors. Instead, he maintained that
“management is a discrete economic service or function”, from acting as, or even selecting,
individual managers.24 Easterbrook and Fischel agree that “the publicly held corporation facilitates
the division of labor” whereby “the distinct functions of managerial skills and the provision of
capital (and the bearing of risk) may be separated and assigned to different people.25
Manne considers the task of selecting such managers to be part of the entrepreneurial function, by
which he means “not only conceiving an idea, but also engaging in those steps necessary to bring
the idea to successful fruition”, which includes acting as promoters “in forming a corporation and
marketing its shares”.26 Similarly, Chandler, of course, considered the separation of ownership of
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shares of the corporation from its management to be a function of the increased complexity of
what he called “the administrative function” in and after the second half of the nineteenth century,27
which effectively created a need for specialized management, and thereby created what Chandler
called “managerial capitalism”.28
Limited liability facilitates both the centralization of management separately from equity
ownership, and the lock-in and transferability of equity capital. As noted above, the absence of
limited liability would require continuous monitoring of corporate operations, by both
shareholders and prospective shareholders. Even then, because they are not guaranteed any direct
participation in management, investors are not going to be able to forecast, on a reliable and
consistent basis, when liability might be incurred. In particular, Manne notes that “the possibility
of liability arising at an unforeseen time and in an unpredictable amount would probably be too
great a risk for large numbers of small investors to shoulder” with the result that “limited liability
is probably an essential aspect of a large corporate system with widespread public participation.”29
The combination of separate legal entity status, and limited liability and asset partitioning, on the
one hand, and the separation of management from equity ownership, on the other hand, have an
interrelationship which is not always recognized. The directors, officers, and other managers who
act as human individuals for and on behalf of the corporation as an inanimate legal entity are not
ordinarily liable to third parties for their actions in that regard nor are their assets subject to the
claims of the corporation’s creditors. Jean-Philippe Robé suggests that asset partitioning, not only
with respect to the assets of equity owners who are shareholders in the case of a corporation, but
also with respect to the assets of those charged with management of the corporation “is a truly
essential aspect in the development of corporate law; some claim more important than limited
liability”.30
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Investment in Shares, Diversification, Lock-In, and Transferability
As noted above, the combination of limited liability, capital lock-in and transferability, and
centralization of management separately from equity ownership permits the equity shares of public
corporations to be the subject of investment by investors with a variety of investment objectives.
This will be discussed further below.
As Henry Manne says, it also permits investment by many individuals in many enterprises
“without risking a disastrous loss if any corporation in which they have invested becomes
insolvent.”31 In effect, this directs attention to the diversification of investment permitted by these
interrelated factors. Some commentators have credited Manne with originating this observation.32
Consequently, say Easterbrook and Fischel, “many investors will have diversified holdings. Only
a small portion of their wealth will be invested in any one firm.” They credit limited liability, when
combined with separation of investment from management, with making “diversification and
passivity a more rational strategy”, and one which “potentially reduces the cost of operating the
corporation”, in effect, by reducing its cost of capital, as the perceived risk of investment is
reflected in the price investors are willing to pay for shares.33 They note that such diversification
permits investors to bear additional risk beyond that which they would otherwise consider
acceptable.34 Consequently, corporations can enter into high-risk ventures “(such as the
development of new products) without exposing the investors to ruin” because the investors “can
hedge against the failure of one project by holding stock in other firms.” Hence, limited liability
increases the availability of funds that would otherwise subject investors to incremental risk.35
This is considered to benefit the ambient economy and society.
As discussed previously, because the investor’s capital is generally “locked-in”, transferability is
important. Manne argues that an individual may decide at a particular time that “his needs are best
served by a high-risk investment” but would not want to make this decision “on a near-permanent
basis”. It is apparent that an individual’s investment needs and interests may be expected to change
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with a number of factors, including, Manne says, age, family circumstances, wealth and size and
quality of investment portfolio, and even death, introducing “a new owner with different needs
and circumstances.”36
In addition, three factors extraneous to the individual are normally relevant to transfer decisions:
firstly, alternative opportunities for utilization of funds; secondly, changes in circumstances within
the corporation such that “the investment no longer serves its initial function;” and, thirdly, the
investor may want “to disassociate himself from a particular corporation if for any reason he
becomes dissatisfied with its management.” 37 Limited liability and separation of ownership from
management mitigate the disadvantages of capital lock-in by facilitating transfer of an equity
investment.
Asset Partitioning, MDFs, and MLSFs
History
Phillip Blumberg explains that in the United States, while limited liability was generally firmly
established in most states by 1825, “corporations generally were not permitted to own shares of
other corporations until late in the nineteenth century”,38 a development whose importance was
noted by Chandler.39 At that time, a number of states adopted statutory provisions permitting the
general incorporation of a single parent or holding company to hold the majority of the stock of
locally chartered subsidiaries.40 English law allowed a corporation to purchase shares of another
company if permitted by its memorandum of association.41 Consequently, “limited liability in
Anglo-American law was established firmly in a time when corporations generally lacked the
power to acquire and own shares of another corporation. Such power came much later.”42
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Limited Liability of Parent and Holding Corporations
This change in the law permitting corporate ownership of shares of another corporation, according
to Blumberg, “opened the way to a profound change in corporate structure. Corporations began to
organize other corporations to conduct parts of their business and to acquire other corporations as
an alternative method of expansion.” He indicates that “with this development, a corporation no
longer represented the entire enterprise. The enterprise became increasingly fragmented among
parent and subsidiary corporations.”43 Because “the parent (as the shareholder) and the subsidiary
collectively made up the enterprise… the parent’s shareholders already benefitted from limited
liability, and insulation of the parent created a second layer of protection.”44
Blumberg argues that when corporations were given the power to acquire and own shares of other
corporations, “the extension of limited liability from protection of ultimate investors to protection
of parent corporations followed almost automatically, without any apparent consideration of the
soundness or the desirability of the extension of the principle to create successive layers of
protection against liability within the corporate group.” Further, any increase in the efficiency of
the economic system which might arise from limited liability is “largely irrelevant when the special
case of intragroup liability is considered.”45
The argument, then, is that “both as an academic and a political matter, the application of limited
liability to corporate groups has never undergone the scrutiny and debate that such a fundamental
extension of the doctrine deserves” and that restriction of limited liability with respect to
intracorporate liability may be appropriate in some situations.46 We will discuss this in connection
with the effect of limited liability on organizational participants, particularly employees, in the
next section, to which we turn our attention shortly.
Choosing MDFs and MLSFs as Legal Business Forms
In much the same way as individuals, by means of incorporation, can participate in ventures having
a higher degree of risk then they would undertake on a personal basis (that is to say, without limited
liability), corporations may establish direct or indirect subsidiaries to undertake ventures having a
higher degree of risk, as Easterbrook and Fischel note above. For example, Barney, Edwards, and
43
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Ringleb conducted an empirical investigation of the strategies which corporations use with respect
to their legal liability to employees exposed to hazardous materials while on the job.47
They found, firstly, that firms facing the threat of legal liability as a result of employee on-the-job
exposure to hazardous materials were less vertically integrated than other firms; and secondly, that
the level of threat of such liability was associated with a higher percentage of small firms in an
industry.48 This suggests that such corporations are willing to shift these burdens of production
onto their forces of production, namely, the employees actually performing the work.
The willingness of corporations to mitigate risk by using direct and indirect subsidiaries so as to
obtain the protection of limited liability is considered to be affected by external environmental
conditions, including the nature of the business (as the example concerns non-the-job risk
indicates) and financial and other conditions prevailing generally at the relevant time. For example,
a 1986 study shows that the business forms that are adopted for international transactions is related
to perceived political risk.49
The earlier discussion of MDCs, MDFs and MNEs is relevant in this regard.50 Among other things,
that discussion describes the rise of conglomerates, partly in an effort to mitigate regulatory risks,
and later their demise and deconglomeration in connection with leveraged buyouts effected by
“corporate raiders”, who were financing their acquisitions in part from the proceeds of postacquisition sale of components of the conglomerate.51 In both situations, other environmental
conditions also appear to have been relevant.
The discussion of MLSFs presents a 2002 study by Boies and Prechel which examined changes in
the structure of the largest US corporations the late 20th century from MDCs to MLSFs during a

Jay B Barney, Frances L Edwards and Al H Ringleb, “Organizational Responses to Legal Liability: Employee
Exposure to Hazardous Materials, Vertical Integration, and Small Firm Production” (1992) 35:2 Academy of
Management J 328 at 328.
48
Ibid at 346.
49
Frederick J Phillips-Patrick, “Political Risk and Organizational Form” (1992) 34:2 JL & Econ 675 at 687.
50
See, particularly, discussion in Chapter Seven under the heading “The Separate Legal Entity, the Organization, and
the Individual Human Actor”, especially under the subheading “Effective Separate Legal Entity Status on
Organizational Structure”; discussion in Chapter Three under the heading "Forms of Corporations – Legal and
Organizational Variants"; discussion in Chapter Two in the section entitled "History of the Development of the
Modern Business Corporation"; and discussion in Chapter Six in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and
Intraorganizational Goals" and especially, under the heading "Organizational Goals and Corporate Operations" and
therein under the subheading "MDCs and MNEs".
51
Gerald F Davis, Kristina A Diekmann, and Catherine H Tinsley, "The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm
in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form" (1994) 59:4 American Sociological Rev 547.
47

560

period of economic uncertainty prevailing from 1981 to 1996.52 As indicated there, the increase in
the use of direct and indirect subsidiary corporations by the largest 100 industrial corporations was
dramatic, both in terms of the numbers of such subsidiaries (ten of the largest had more than 100
domestic subsidiaries) and the number of levels of such subsidiaries (a number of which had seven
levels of subsidiaries).53 As established earlier in this work, these changes may not be attributable
entirely to risk-related considerations. Other considerations may be operative. For example,
potential dispositions of non-core businesses may also have been relevant in some situations.
A 2018 study by Belenzon, Lee and Patacconi, using data from 16 countries in Europe, the
Americas and Asia, examined the propensity of courts in a particular country to impose liability
on all members of a corporate group with respect to obligations of any single member, which they
considered to be a measure of enterprise liability. They found that in countries with weaker
enterprise liability (or stronger limited liability of individual corporations within the group),
corporate groups tended to partition their assets and operations more finely into legally
independent subsidiaries; to grant more autonomy to their subsidiary managers; and to grow faster.
They found that these effects were stronger in industries in which the downside risk was greater.54
These authors argue that “stronger limited liability protections for headquarters increase the
benefits of asset partitioning and decreases the agency costs of delegation by externalizing risk.”
In turn, this decreases the risk associated with investment, lessens the degree of control exercised
by headquarters, and thereby permits corporate groups to invest more and grow faster.55
In the result, then, the decision by a parent corporation to carry on a particular business through a
separate legal entity, such as a corporation, or otherwise will be affected by a number of factors,
many of which relate to downside risk.
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Implications of Organizational Analysis for Limited Liability and Asset Partitioning
The preceding section, in the subsection entitled “The Corporation, the Legal Entity, The
Organization, and the Participants – Categories of Organizational Participants”, discussed the
relationship of various parties to the corporation and whether such relationship might implicate
those parties as participants in the organization. That section considered the implications of
organizational essentialist characteristics for separate legal entity status, which is a legal
essentialist characteristic, and vice versa; and the implications of each of the same for
organizational participants. This section will engage similarly with limited liability and asset
partitioning, another legal essentialist characteristic. Again, the focus of the discussion will be on
particular categories of organizational participants.
Shareholders
Separation of Shareholders and the Corporation as Rights-and-Duty-Bearing Parties
As discussed in reference to this topic under the heading “Separate Legal Entity Status and Asset
Partitioning”, these two corporate essentialist characteristics have the effect of firmly separating
shareholders, even those who take the initiative (as entrepreneurs, according to Manne) 56 in
forming the corporation or “promoting” it as a public corporation by a public offering of its
securities, from the corporation, by establishing a relationship of rights and duties between them.
Those respective rights and duties include capital lock-in and share transferability, as well as rights
and duties relating to central management intrinsically separate from equity ownership. This is
particularly true with respect to public corporations. The assets of shareholders are isolated from
the corporation’s operations by limited liability or negative asset partitioning, while the
corporation’s assets are isolated from claims against the shareholders by means of affirmative asset
partitioning, the net result of which is to ensure the complete separation of the assets and liabilities
of shareholders from those of the corporation, thereby giving effect to the corporation’s
“autonomous existence” as a separate legal entity.57
Further, in respect of the cash or other property contributed by shareholders as the cost of acquiring
their shares, like the rest of the business of the corporation, those assets are in the care of the board
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of directors, which has a duty of loyalty, a duty of care, and a duty of compliance.58 These duties
are not only significant to shareholders contributing capital or to their subsequent transferees, but
are also significant to creditors and others.59
While directors, officers, and employees may own equity shares of the corporation, it is not the
ownership of shares which entitles the person to participate in management of the corporation but,
instead, the status as a director, as an officer, or as an employee. The legal relationship between
shareholders and the corporation is described in Part 1, especially in Chapters One and Three, and
in the present chapter and section. It is clear that shareholders enjoy certain rights and that the
corporation owes them certain duties with respect to the selection of directors, expressing opinions
(a right of “voice”), receiving certain information, approving or disapproving of certain
fundamental or exceptional transactions, and transfer or liquidation of their investment (a right of
“exit”).
Organizational Expectations
One question which is relevant to any relationship is the extent to which each party maintains
expectations concerning the behaviour of the other.60 In the case of a large public corporation, its
expectations concerning shareholder behaviour are usually concentrated at some level of
aggregation; that is to say, while the board of directors and management of the corporation may
have expectations concerning the behaviour of a particular shareholder, in most cases (that is to
say, unless the shareholder has a large share position or is especially vocal) those expectations
relate to the corporation’s shareholders in the aggregate or to particular groups of shareholders. In
many cases, those expectations may be that the particular shareholder or the shareholders generally
will vote to elect the directors proposed and to support the matters put forward for consideration
by shareholders. However, in at least some situations, the case may be otherwise.61 This is also
true with respect to the expectations of shareholders.
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The expectations of the corporation with respect to individual shareholders, groups of
shareholders, and its shareholders as a whole, and vice versa, may vary in accordance with the
degree of interaction between the parties. For example, where the board or management of a
corporation and a certain group of shareholders enjoy a high level of interaction, the expectations
of each party may be more fulsome than otherwise. In effect, the higher level of participation of
the shareholder in the corporation as an organization may implicate that particular shareholder
group as a participant in such organization, and may do so to a degree much greater than would be
the case with a lower level of interaction.
This organizational participation may give rise to greater predictability concerning the exercise by
the shareholder group of legal rights, including those relating to the legal essentialist characteristics
of the corporation. For example, regular interaction with a large shareholder or a shareholder group
may create expectations by the corporation concerning under what circumstances such shareholder
or group might terminate its organizational relationship with the corporation by exercising its legal
essentialist right of transfer. This may become important in the case of proxy battles or contested
takeover bids.62
Investment and Diversification
The present chapter has already established that the combination of legal essentialist characteristics
of the corporation: as a separate legal entity with both affirmative and defensive asset partitioning;
with capital lock-in and transferability; and with centralized management; facilitates the use of
shares of a corporation as an investment. As discussed, shareholders may be able to diversify risk
by diversifying their investments, such as by holding shares in different corporations. The
shareholders of a corporation may also have different investment objectives as among themselves.
This may result in certain shareholders having affinities with other shareholders with similar
investment objectives, having previously established affinities with other shareholders, or having
affinities with other shareholders whose operations and investments may be subject to similar
regulation. In all of these cases, such shareholders, as organizational participants, may act as a
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group. As such, they may act individually, vis-à-vis the corporation, differently than they might
have acted otherwise.
For purposes of both organizational and legal analysis, as well as corporative analysis,
shareholders as organizational participants cannot be considered to be entirely fungible. These
observations may also obtain with respect to the investment horizon or expected duration of
investment by a shareholder.63 For example, a group of shareholders, each of whose members as
the objective of achieving significant capital appreciation over the long-term, say, five years, may
have, and may express, different interests in the corporation as compared with a group the members
of which have an objective of achieving a very high rate of return over a very short period of time,
say, three months.
A heightened degree of interaction between the corporation, on the one hand, and shareholders, on
the other, whether individually, in groups, or as a whole, may be expected to result in an increased
knowledge by both parties of the objectives sought, and the attendant means of achieving them.
As demonstrated in earlier chapters,64 alignment between the strategy pursued by the corporation
and the structure, processes, and human management resources by which such strategy is sought
to be implemented within its organization may be expected to have a significant effect on the
corporation’s achievement of that strategy and performance, as measured by various financial and
other indicators.
In the result, the corporation’s mode of organization may be the single most important ingredient
in its success. At the same time, as previously demonstrated, the specifics of such organization
may not be readily amenable to determination by shareholders and other organizational
participants other than directors, TMT members, and perhaps by other officers, managers, and
employees the performance of whose functions give rise to some more detailed awareness of its
organizational structure, processes and personnel, the relation of the same to relevant strategic
issues, and the respective advantages of the same. As noted below, considerations related to the
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separate legal entity status of business units and other components of the enterprise may amplify
the difficulty of making such assessments.
Organization and Intracorporate Boundaries
As discussed in previous chapters,65 a single parent or holding corporation may have many levels
of hierarchical and legal organization. A multidivisional corporation, such as Great Motoring
Corporation in our example, may employ subordinate holding corporations to organize certain
divisions, but may operate directly, that is to say, without subordinate holding corporations in the
case of other divisions. It may have a number of levels in its organizational hierarchy and may
employ various levels of subordinate holding and operating corporations or other legal entities at
various organizational levels.
Depending on applicable accounting rules, the financial statements of some or all of these
corporations and other legal entities may be consolidated with those of the parent corporation, in
effect, presented in such a way as to reflect the real ownership of the parent corporation of the
enterprise as a whole.66 Among the significant considerations this raises, only three are considered
here: firstly, issues relating to investment and diversification; secondly, issues relating to risk; and,
thirdly, issues concerning the value of the corporation and organization concerned.
Unboundedness and Financial Analysis
Normally, the financial information required to be made available to shareholders, regulators and
others67 is insufficiently granular, even when segmented,68 to permit a detailed analysis of the
operations, investment and other cross, and relative contributions to revenue and profits
attributable to the businesses carried out by separate organizational and legal components of the
corporation or shown on the parent corporation’s organizational chart.
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Generally speaking, segmented presentations are required under International Financial Reporting
Standards (“IFRS”)69 in relation to each “operating segment” of a corporation, which term is
defined to mean a component of an entity that engages in revenue earning business activities;
whose operating results are regularly reviewed by the chief operating decision maker; and for
which discrete financial information is available; but only if the operating segment is a “reportable
segment”. A reportable segment, broadly speaking, is one the reported revenue, reported profit or
loss, or reported assets of which are more than 10% of the total from all operating segments70
A post-implementation review of the relevant standard, International Financial Reporting Standard
8 (“IFRS 8”), finds that auditors, accounting firms, standard-setters, regulators, and investors
agreed that audited segmented information was useful, although investors sometimes thought that
“segments are supported in such a way as to obscure the entity’s true management structure (often
as a result of concerns about commercial sensitivity) or to mask loss-making activities within
individual segments.”71 While these comments support the importance of management structure
as an element of business success, they also suggest some of the problems which understanding
such structure prevents to investors and other organizational participants.
In the result, while the corporation may achieve certain benefits by way of diversification,
shareholders are likely to be unable to appreciate the nature and extent of such diversification
within the corporation itself, and hence are likely to be unable to assess how this intracorporate
diversification affects the desired level of diversification of the individual shareholder’s own
investment portfolio. Simply put, intracorporate diversification may complicate shareholder
portfolio diversification. This may result in the shareholder not attaining the level of portfolio
diversification sought, which may, in turn, be reflected in some underpricing of the focal
corporation shares.
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Unboundedness and Financial Risk
The second issue arises from the same factual background and relates to misspecification of risk.
In the context just discussed, the extent of the risk to which certain business operations: firstly, are
subject; and, secondly, are able to mitigate with respect to other business operations within the
focal corporation; may be extremely difficult or even impossible to determine. For example, as
discussed in the previous chapter,72 Enron’s use of special purpose entities and other legal entities
which were not required to be consolidated with the financial statements of the parent corporation
enabled it to avoid disclosure of relevant financial information. When Enron commenced using
such entities illegally, without conforming to relevant accounting requirements, its overstatement
of earnings and understatement of liabilities reduced its net worth by several billion dollars and
contributed to its eventual bankruptcy.73
Jill Fisch chronicles how JP Morgan spun off its Chief Investment Office (“CIO”) as a separate
unit of the bank to invest the bank’s excess deposits using, among other things, the acquisition,
holding, and trading of synthetic credit derivatives in its Synthetic Credit Portfolio (“SCP”).74
However, while the CIO portfolio generated massive profits initially, it generated losses, instead,
in later years. The unit increased the size of trades and began to manipulate the method of, and
credit derivatives in, the portfolio and failed to report these.75
Management and the board ignored the risks associated with CIO derivatives trading, especially
when the unit was generating large profits, and breaches of CIO risk limits and internal advisory
policies were repeatedly reported to Morgan management but were routinely ignored. Subsequent
congressional investigation revealed “a bank culture in which risk limit breaches were routinely
disregarded, risk metrics were frequently criticized or downplayed, and risk evaluation models
were targeted by bank personnel seeking to produce artificially lower capital requirements.”76
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In the result, consulting a publicly available description of JP Morgan’s risk management practices,
even if relatively fulsome, would not have assisted shareholders, actual or prospective, other
securities market participants, or regulators in assessing the real risk assumed by the bank, because
those practices were not followed.
Organizational Contribution to Corporate Value and Share Price
Finally, as suggested previously, the difficulty of assessing the contribution of the organization to
the market price and value of the parent corporation is considerable.
Chandler indicates that the firm is both a legal entity and an administrative entity involving teams
of managers who coordinate and monitor its different activities, noting that “once established, a
firm becomes a pool of physical facilities, learned skills and liquid capital.”77 The organizational
or administrative aspect of the corporation is essential. As Margaret Blair says: “finance capital
and physical capital do not operate themselves. They must be coordinated, managed, maintained,
and operated daily by people, who must then develop systems, routines, and reputational and
information networks to carry out their tasks”, which tasks must often be worked out over a long
period of time.78
In the past, these organizational capabilities”, says Chandler, acted as a barrier to new market
entrants, accounted for the “long-term persistence of profits by the same players over decades”,
and, together with such retained earnings, “became the basis for their continued growth.”79
Continued industry and global leadership is a function of “how the enterprises evolve their
organizational capabilities and how their long-term competitive strength and weakness reflect
these learned capabilities as well as those of their competitors from abroad and related
industries.”80
These organizational capabilities “permit the enterprise to be more than the sum of its parts” and
“give it a life of its own above and beyond the individuals involved. The individuals come and go,
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the organization remains.”81 In effect, Chandler maintains that the organization persists despite
wholesale change in its membership, an attribute which, as established here, characterizes
organizations generally, and not just business corporations.82 Philip Selznick notes that relations
within, and the structure of, the organization are such that individuals are interchangeable and the
organization free of dependence upon personal qualities.83 Such organization may endure
indefinitely and, in the case of the corporation, it may endure indefinitely as a separate legal entity.
The structure, processes, and personnel of the human organization which acts in the “real world”
in the place and stead of the inanimate corporation as legal entity is often difficult for even
“insiders” to comprehend. Its description is not exhausted by a single organization chart. As
mentioned here frequently, informal structures and processes which may be described as an
informal organization are frequently, even almost invariably, operative. Again, these do not lend
themselves to summary description in corporate disclosure documents and, consequently, to their
easy assimilation by shareholders and investors.
Yet the intrinsic and market values of the corporation and its shares are normally highly dependent
upon these factors. Disclosure of the investee corporation’s strategy or business model, by itself,
does not adequately explain the relevant relationships. As demonstrated in the present work, the
corporation’s strategy and business model must be aligned with its organization. The methodology
of such alignment is likely to elude investigation even by knowledgeable and resourceful investors.
Organizational Learning
As discussed previously, the value of knowledge and experience to any kind of large organization
has been acknowledged by organization theorists and practitioners including Chandler, Weber,
Barnard, Fayol, Taylor, March and Simon, and others.84 It is well-established that specialization
of responsibility and consequent knowledge accrual overcome some of the limits of the bounded
rationality of individuals.
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For example, acquisition of knowledge concerning changes in the organization’s internal or
external environment requires a strategic response which depends in part on the organization’s
ability to act cohesively, which, say Marsick and Watkins, “requires alignment of vision of about
what to do, shared meaning about intentions, and the capacity to work together across many
different kinds of boundaries. This collaborative capacity leads to collective action.”85
Marsick and Watkins assert that a learning organization “is one that has embedded the capacity to
adapt or to respond quickly and in novel ways while working to remove barriers to learning” by
making changes in the systems that affect learning, namely, strategy, structure, slack, and
technology,86 as well as “systems thinking, here defined as making systemic connections and
creating embedded systems to capture and share knowledge”, which is, they say, the “glue that
makes the other disciplines work”.87 They cite a number of studies which “provide growing
evidence of a relationship between performance and the dimensions of the learning
organization.”88
However, as noted in connection with many of the matters previously discussed here,
organizational aspects of the corporation are not expected to be easily susceptible to investigation.
The interrelationship between such organizational aspects and related legal issues, such as separate
legal entity status, limited liability, and asset partitioning may be even more difficult to investigate.
Communities of Practice
Another example of a valuable but usually non-apparent organizational element is what Wenger
and Snyder call “communities of practice”, which are “groups of people informally bound together
by shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise” within a corporation, such as engineers
engaged in deepwater drilling, consultants specializing in strategic marketing, or front-line
managers overseeing check processing at a commercial bank.89 The authors maintain that these
can “drive strategy, general new lines of business, solve problems, promote the spread of best
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practices, develop people’s professional skills, and help companies recruit and retain talent”, and
thereby improve organizational performance.90
Such communities of practice are informal (establishing themselves, their agendas, and their
leadership on their own) and self-selected (by ability and interest) such that members “tend to
know when and if they should join”, whether “you have something to give and …are likely to take
away something”, and whether prospective members may be appropriate for the group.91 They
may be recognized by, but are generally independent from, the formal management structure, for
example, at American Management Systems and the World Bank.92 How such communities of
practice might be affected by the nature of the relationship between organizational and legal
matters such as SLE status and asset partitioning would not likely be clear to investors and
prospective investors, and other organizational participants.
Enterprise Integration
Another example of organizational elements which are not immediately apparent but which may
contribute significantly to corporate value and share price, which is provided by Brandenburger
and Stuart, is the relationship, outside the boundaries of the corporate legal entity, between the
corporation and the customers it serves and the suppliers upon which it relies.93 For example, a
corporation may find ways to meet the needs of buyers better than other firms,94 it might reduce a
supplier’s costs of doing business with it,95 it might reduce a customer’s willingness to purchase
from other corporations by reducing the cost of purchasing from it (perhaps by entering into a
long-term supply agreement which saves switching costs as compared with other potential
suppliers),96 or it might increase the opportunity costs to its suppliers of providing products or
services to other corporations.97 Such practices have been shown to add value to the corporation
and the market price of its shares.
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As is well known, in such cases, the focal corporation and its suppliers are each making firmspecific investments or, as Blair would say in terms of team production, in team-specific
investments in the relationship between them, because once such investments “have been sunk
into the enterprise, [their value] is tied to the overall success of the enterprise.”98 As in the case of
other organizational matters, it might be expected that shareholders would find it difficult to
evaluate their effects on the focal corporation as a result of the legal structure of entities below the
focal corporation the hierarchy of organization and the hierarchy of legal ownership.
Organizational Advantages and Organizational Change
As the foregoing examples indicate, the organizational advantages of a particular corporation may
be unknown, or misperceived, or undervalued, both by shareholders and by outsiders, such as
activist investors seeking board or management changes, sales of component parts of the
corporation, or seeking to acquire control of the focal corporation. Shareholders should be
attentive, however, to well-informed investors who have expended the time and effort to develop
an “organizational map” of the corporation as a whole, and who have investment objectives similar
to the shareholder concerned.
Such organizational map may be helpful in identifying how the corporation may respond to
changes in its external or internal environment and the risks and opportunities that they present.
As maintained previously, a sale of a particular business, whether it is a separate corporation or
simply a division, may have implications which extend far beyond financial considerations,
including containment of risk or provision of “sleeping opportunities” as yet unpursued. An
accurate assessment of a corporation’s organizational advantages or disadvantages at the level of
the parent corporation may be complicated by the below-parent-level legal structure of the
enterprise. Such below-parent-level legal structure of the enterprise may not be completely
apparent from public disclosure documents. Nevertheless, such legal structure may be important
to shareholders and other organizational participants, notably employees.
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Board of Directors
Role and Function
As discussed at various places in the present work,99 the board of directors is the primary,
primordial or first-level actor for and on behalf of the corporation. It has the responsibility and
authority for managing or supervising the management of the business and affairs of the
corporation, including appointing officers to exercise delegated authority with respect to the same.
This work has maintained that, lacking corporeal capacity, the corporation as a separate legal entity
can only act in the real world through human actors. As a rights-and-duty bearing entity, certain
human actors must be assigned responsibility and authority to act for and on behalf of the
corporation, and this role is assigned to the board of directors.
Margaret Blair is among the commentators100 who note that centralization of such authority in a
relatively small group is especially important in larger organizations with many investors and
participants.101 An additional benefit, she says, is that “assigning decision-making to a board
restricts the control that various individual participants, such as the president, or a major financial
investor, might otherwise have”, which “thereby helps assure all participants” that management
will not be able to use corporate assets for their own personal benefit” and that “financial
participants will not be able to easily pull assets out of the firm once other participants have made
investments” which are, to some degree or other, firm specific.”102
Blair argues that such allocation of decision-making entails that “individual team members
relinquish some of the ability they might otherwise have had to hold up other members”, which
“makes their commitments to engage with the others in a cooperative way more credible.”103 Robé
indicates that even majority shareholders who are the principal officers of the corporation and hold
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a majority position of the board may be restrained by the remaining directors, the directors’ duties
of fidelity and care, and applicable corporate law.104
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s explication of their version of team production theory describes the board
of directors as a “mediating hierarch”, which possesses authority to mediate the claims of participants in
the corporation as separate legal entity, at least those which cannot be resolved at lower levels, which can
“limit shirking and deter rent-seeking behavior among team members. In other words, team members
submit to a hierarchy not for the hierarch’s benefit but for their own”,105 at least if that hierarch is informed,
faithful, and disinterested.106 They say that participants who do not like the decision of the board or
subordinate authority concerning the division of duties and rewards can either stay in and abide by those
decisions, or leave, in which case they lose the value of their firm-specific investments and do not share in
the residual value generated by the enterprise.107

In effect, “a public corporation is a team of people who enter into a complex agreement to work
together for their mutual gain”, with the participants “including shareholders, employees, and
perhaps other stakeholders such as creditors or the local community” agreeing to subject
themselves to the mediating hierarchy, thereby yielding “control over outputs and key inputs (time,
intellectual skills, or financial capital) to the hierarchy” in exchange, not for specified items, terms
or outcomes, but for “participation in a process of internal goal setting and dispute resolution”.
Blair and Stout refer to this as a “pactum subjectionis”,108 invoking the “pact of subjection” of
political theory109, a pact “in which individuals so associated alienate their political agency to a
ruler, within certain stated provisions and limits”110 as described by Schmidt.111
As Chapter A3 of this work demonstrates, the employment relationship is just such a pact of
subjection: the employee agrees to be subject to the instructions of the employer (which may be a
corporation) subject to agreed terms and conditions which are accepted by the employer as the
104
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basis upon which the employer agrees to employ and compensate the employee. The reciprocity
of the fundamental nature of that relationship is palpable. Capital providers to public corporations
who cede their property to the corporation in exchange for shares of the corporation recognize that
the shares represent a package of reciprocal rights as between the corporation and shareholder.
These reciprocal rights are described in Chapters A1 and A2, and the impact of organizational
analysis upon such relationship and rights is discussed next, and also later in this chapter under the
heading “Centralized Management Independent of Equity Ownership”.
Board as Mediating Hierarch
Leaving aside (for discussion in the next section concerning central management) the way in which
the board of directors functions as a social unit or group of individuals, our review of the
organizational aspect of corporations has identified at least two significant ways in which that
review is relevant to directors. As the primary actor having the ultimate authority and responsibility
for the corporation, in order to discharge its functions and its legal duties, the board receives
information from, and transmits instructions or directions to, subordinate levels of hierarchy.
The discussion in Chapters Four, Five, and Six explicated the informal structures, processes, and
relationships, as well as goals, which often characterize various levels of hierarchy within the
corporate organization in addition to the formal structure, processes, relationships, and goals. The
Nobel laureates Holmstrom and Tirole identify the organizational problem of “coordinating the
actions of a differentially informed set of experts”, which “takes time and effort even when parties
share organizational goals” but “more typically, individuals have differing objectives and
informational expertise [which] may permit them to pursue their own objectives to the detriment
of the organization as a whole.”112 Discussion elsewhere in this work averts to these issues, which
go to the very core of organizational operations, and are present at each level of its hierarchy. As
they say, “the organization must succeed in capturing the returns from informational expertise by
alleviating the exchange hazards that inevitably accompany asymmetric information.”113
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Transmission of Information and Instructions
In order to satisfy the board’s positive mandate of advancing the business of the corporation,
involving identifying suitable opportunities, as well as its defensive mandate of mitigating risks
attendant to the business and the opportunities presented, the board must endeavour to ensure the
accuracy and completeness of the information which it receives from others within the corporation
and otherwise. As was explained in those earlier chapters, the board must also endeavour to ensure
that its instructions and directions are suitably transmitted to, and implemented by, organizational
participants at inferior hierarchical levels and, on some occasions, by suppliers, distributors, and
customers. Efforts to ensure compliance with these communication issues may involve employing
sampling, multiple sourcing, and crosschecking of information and receipt of instructions, and
other techniques.
Employees are obligated to communicate to the employer all facts to the employer ought to know,
in effect, to reveal all relevant information,114 a duty which when combined with “the fact that an
employee is less likely to profit successfully from nondisclosure should reduce his incentive to
distort or conceal information from his employer”, according to Masten.115 Masten argues that it
may also decrease the employee’s incentive to accumulate information in the first place, increasing
the need for employee oversight.116
With respect, this seems to oversimplify the information disclosure problem. In fact, problems
may arise in particular fact situations. For example, in many cases it will be difficult to establish
that information not communicated by the employee was both possessed by the employee and
considered by the employee to be something that the employer should know. It is also likely to be
exacerbated by competing loyalties, as noted below. Further, a problem may arise concerning who
represents the employer. For example, it may be argued that, in certain circumstances, it may not
be sufficient to communicate information only to one’s immediate superior, depending upon its
salience and other relevant matters.
To the extent, however, that communication only to one’s immediate superior discharges this
obligation, the superior, who is vested with a like obligation, becomes the decisionmaker as to
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whether or not the information is communicated to persons at higher levels of the hierarchy. Of
course, at each successive level the recipient of the communication, by reason of additional
responsibilities or otherwise, may have information not available to the communicating inferior
party, which may affect the superior party’s decision as to further communication. Such additional
information may enter into the determination of whether or not to communicate the focal
information further.
Content of Information and Instructions
An additional issue for consideration by the superior party is the specific content of the information
required to be communicated. Abbreviation, summarization, changes in format, and selection
criteria (such as a more detailed or a more general level of data presentation) may significantly
affect the interpretation of the focal information by the recipient. Even knowledge of the
background, experience and interests of the recipient may factor into how the focal information is
communicated. Communication of directions or instructions to subordinates may be subject to
similar considerations.
As noted in previous chapters,117 however, communication of information (up), or of instructions
(down), may be further complicated by the individual employee’s identification with, and
commitment to, the focal group and their perception of the objectives of the focal group, of higher
level components of the organization, and of the organization as a whole. These affective
considerations may impact whether and how further information or instructions are transmitted.
As is well known, the purport of information or instructions can be significantly affected by its
format, the accompanying information or instructions, identification with respect to urgency or
priority, and other circumstances. Of course, all of the foregoing may affect the information
received, and instructions or directions issued, by the board of directors.
Divisions, departments, or other functional groups or business units may or may not constitute
separate legal entities which are subject to limited liability and asset partitioning. As previously
indicated, it may be advantageous in some circumstances for the parent corporation or a lower tier
organizational entity to be able to assert SLE status and claim the benefit of limited liability and
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asset partitioning, in which case barriers to transmission of information and instructions which
were not previous present may be implemented.
In any event, to the extent that SLE status, limited liability, and asset partitioning may possibly be
asserted at some future point in time, their consequences can only be taken into account by the
board if and to the extent these matters are known to the board vis-à-vis each corporation or other
entity at each hierarchical level. It is clear that the relevant information would have to be supplied
to the board by the CEO or other TMT members and that such information would be subject to the
problems of information asymmetries previously noted.
Officers
Status and Duties
As established elsewhere in this book,118 unlike directors,119 officers are agents of the corporation,
subject to the direction of the board of directors, in the case of the CEO, or superior officers, in the
case of other officers, and are subject to certain statutory duties120 and other duties by virtue of
their employment relationships with the corporation.121 They are not, in any sense, agents of the
shareholders who not own the corporation or its assets.122
Organizational Capabilities
As noted earlier, Chandler attributed the continuing growth and profitability of the leading
corporations which he surveyed largely to what he called “organizational capabilities”.

123

He

claimed that that these learned capabilities “resulted from solving problems of scaling up the
processes of production, from acquiring knowledge of customers' needs and altering product and
process to service such needs, coming to know the availabilities of supplies and the reliability of
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suppliers, and in becoming knowledgeable in the ways of recruiting and training workers and
managers.”124 This learned knowledge was “evident in the firms’ product-and process-specific
human skills”, the most critical of which were those of the senior executives, “the top managers
who recruited and motivated the middle and lower-level managers, defined and allocated their
responsibilities, monitored and coordinated their performance, and who, in addition, planned and
allocated resources for these enterprises as a whole.”125
Firm-Specific Investments by Officers
Of course, the human skills and experience acquired by the corporation reflects skills and
experience acquired by individual human participants within the organization, particularly,
according to Chandler, its senior executives and top managers. This process results in such
individuals acquiring knowledge which is “firm-specific”, either having unique or simply greater
value to the focal corporation as compared with the external labour market generally, and which
constitutes a “firm-specific” investment by the officer concerned in the relationship with the focal
corporation.
Gilson exemplifies this by referring to the skills demanded of employees in a manufacturing
system which is a firm-specific investment which, once made, is “essentially sunk”. This gives the
corporation “an incentive to renege on the return promised to employees for their firminvestment”,126 requiring control of such incentive by means of appropriate corporate governance
mechanisms. Increased age, length of service, and hierarchical position may be expected to affect
the transferability of the employee’s knowledge to alternative corporate employers. The
availability of alternative comparable employment may be expected to diminish at successively
higher levels of the organizational hierarchy. This suggests that the CEO, followed by TMT
members, followed by other officers, may have reduced comparable relocation opportunities as
compared with those of other managers and employees.
Career Development
Officers, particularly those who are considered to have “high potential” for successively higher
positions may be groomed for these by appropriate human-resources initiatives. For example, in
124

Supra note 77 at 84.
Ibid.
126
Ronald J Gilson, "Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions Matter?" (1996) 74:2
Wash U LQ 327 at 335.
125

580

order to break down the educational, professional, and functional loyalties which often affect
organizational commitment,127 high potential officers may be transferred to other divisions or
departments, to different countries, or to head office. This may reduce the knowledge and
experience which might otherwise have been acquired in a particular product market or industry
segment characterized by comparable competitors who might have been sources of potential job
opportunities with more specialized (i.e. less diversified) knowledge and experience.
Devising such career paths is intended to produce CEOs, TMT members, and other officers who
will enable the focal corporation to achieve greater success in the future. This kind of career
development is also considered to contribute to such officers’ ability to satisfy their duty of care.128
However, it also increases their specific human investment in the focal corporation. As noted
previously, the contribution of such practices to organizational effectiveness may not be readily
discernible by insiders.129
Organizational analysis suggests that the employment of CEOs, TMT members, and other officers,
like that of other managers and employees, may be affected by SLE status, limited liability and
asset partitioning. For example, as they ascend the organizational hierarchy, officers may move
from one business which is a division of the ultimate parent corporation to another which is a
subsidiary, whether direct or indirect. These changes may affect the officer’s entitlement to
pension and other entitlements, and to payments on termination of employment.
Especially later in the overall employment relationship between the officer and the enterprise,
these entitlements may become of such importance to the officer that they are reflected, perhaps
at the request of the officer (at least if emboldened to do so), in revisions to the relevant contract
of employment. Otherwise, such entitlements may be unconsolidated at the level of the enterprise
as a whole, which may be detrimental to the officer concerned. This may particularly be the case
127
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if the legal entity by whom the officer is employed at a particular time becomes bankrupt or
insolvent, and the SLE-asset partitioning legal attributes are asserted against such officer.
Information Asymmetry, Monitoring, and Default
Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull assert that employees “may obtain an intimate knowledge of the
financial position of the company and can use this information and setting the terms and conditions
of employment”,130 depending upon their level and function. However, such information is likely
to be quite asymmetrical as between the parent corporation or focal corporation, on the one hand,
and the officer or employee, on the other. As noted here, the financial position of the parent
corporation, when consolidated with its subsidiaries and other affiliates and related entities (for
which consolidation is required or permissible) is separate from the financial position of a
particular subsidiary or other entity by whom the officer (or employee) may be employed at the
particular time. Accordingly, it may not be possible for the officer to monitor the financial
condition of the relevant entity.
For example, in the example provided earlier,131 Great Motoring Corporation may determine that
its direct subsidiary, Ultimate, is experiencing continuing losses at a level which threatens the
operations of the parent corporation, and its divisions, Challenger and Champion, and its
subsidiary, Greater Motor Trucks, such that it determines that Ultimate is presently insolvent and
should be shuttered. In the absence of contractual and statutory provisions the contrary, it might
be possible in the circumstances for Great Motoring Corporation to avoid any liability to the
officers, managers, and other employees of Ultimate. This sometimes eventuates, in part, due to
moral hazard, whereby the corporation obtains benefits by assuming increased risk but the
downside burden is transferred to other parties, which Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull note,132
includes employees.
Except for very highly placed officers, such as the CEO and some or all of the TMT members, and
perhaps certain other officers having relevant functional responsibilities, such information may
not be available widely and, in any event, may not be available to some or all of the officers of
Ultimate. As a result, such persons would be unable to take appropriate steps to protect themselves.
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Moreover, as a result of the distribution of organizational identification, commitment and loyalties
at different organizational levels and functions, others within the organization may be able to assist
some officers of Ultimate in avoiding disastrous results.
Lack of Diversification
Importantly, unlike financial investors, whether shareholders or lenders, employees are unable to
diversify their firm-specific investments in the focal corporation both as employees and as
creditors, say Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull.133 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that, unlike
shareholders or other creditors who can minimize risk by diversification, “human capital… is
notoriously difficult to diversify” and “managers who have firm-specific investments in human
capital cannot diversify the risk of business failure.”134 Instead, because “investors want managers’
fortunes tied to the fate of the firm’s other control”, they “induce managers to bear extra costs of
these firms fail” and “offer disproportionate rewards for success.”135 For example, base salaries
may be relatively low, but potential bonuses may equal or exceed base salaries, in some cases
amounting to several times the base salary. This limits the downside for the corporate employer,
while incenting performance.
Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull note that “diversification of risk must also consider the
alternative market opportunities available to the employee of the company goes bankrupt”, which
opportunities and hence which costs of default may be greater for some employees (such as
accountants and technicians) than for others.136 Of course, the extent to which the investment of
the officer or employee in employment with the focal corporation is firm-specific affects the
availability of such alternative market opportunities.
Consolidation of Liabilities to Officers
The question arises whether a parent corporation or other focal corporation should be able to
benefit from SLE status, limited liability, and asset partitioning with respect to officers, managers,
and employees of the overall corporate enterprise in all circumstances. The organizational analysis
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conducted in the present work indicates that in many cases the internal organization by which the
ultimate parent corporation takes action may operate across legal boundaries.
In our example, the officers of Great Motoring Corporation with responsibility for financial
matters may give directions or instructions directly to their counterparts at Ultimate, at
subsidiaries, direct and indirect, and at other affiliates, of Ultimate on a regular basis, in effect,
ignoring the corporate legal proprieties as a matter of course. Let it be assumed that in the months
immediately preceding the bankruptcy or insolvency of Ultimate, this changes and all instructions
concerning financial matters are transmitted by the board of Great Motoring Corporation to the
board of Ultimate. It is acknowledged, of course, that the board of Great Motoring Corporation is
not entitled, in its embodiment as a shareholder of Ultimate, to give instructions to the board of
Ultimate. However, this change in procedure might signal to the board and informed officers of
Ultimate that significant financial dangers were in view.
Accordingly, Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull argue for an exception to limited liability in the
case of employees, on the grounds that “amongst corporate creditors, employees, as a class,
probably face the most severe informational disabilities, have the least ability to diversify risk of
business failure, and may have the strongest equity argument (in terms of relative capacity to
absorb losses).”137 They acknowledge that “some employees will possess both superior
information on corporate finances and high job mobility (e.g., corporate executives and
professional employees”.138 However, they claim that all officers, managers and other employees
should be potentially eligible for such treatment. This will be discussed further below.
The corporative analysis of the organization’s essentialist attributes and the corporation’s legal
essentialist attributes demonstrates that, analyses such as those of Gilson, Easterbrook and Fischel
and Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull, which are clearly highly sophisticated according to certain
legal and economic perspectives, are lacking by way of comparison to corporative analysis.
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Managers and Other Employees
Status and Duties
As established elsewhere in this book,139 non-officer managers and other employees having
supervisory responsibilities and some freedom of action with respect to their assigned tasks are
agents of the corporation, subject to the direction of the board of directors, the CEO, or appropriate
officers. They possess certain rights and are subject to certain duties by virtue of their employment
relationships with the corporation, under declaratory law, common law, including agency law, and
otherwise.140
These “legal” relationships between the employee and the corporation must be considered in
relation to, and in relation to our knowledge of, the formal and informal relationships not only
between the employee and the corporation but among those two and various other participants in
any corporation as legal entity and as organization. While it is not possible to specifically
enumerate all of these intersections of corporate and organizational participation, the identification
of a few of them should provide some indication of the scope of application of the corporative
perspective.
Organizational and Intraorganizational Commitment
As noted elsewhere with respect to officers,141 the performance of duties by other employees,
managerial or otherwise, may be affected by the nature and levels of identification with, and
loyalty and commitment to, the organization and various intraorganizational groups. As a result,
employees may consider that they have “duties” not only to the corporation but to the specific
intraorganizational groups with which they are affiliated, which may include informal, as well as
formal, groups.142
It is intended by the focal corporation that such intraorganizational groups pursue goals and
objectives which are both congruent with those of the focal corporation and congruent with the
intraorganizational goals and objectives assigned to such groups by the focal corporation.143 In
139
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fact, some goals and objectives of the focal group may be wholly or partially and congruent with
those of the organization as a whole or those of groups that superior hierarchical levels 144. It can
readily be seen that this may produce a conflict of identification, loyalty and commitment for the
focal employee.
Officers and managers who are superiors to the focal employee may take these matters into account
from an operational, as well as a legal, perspective. In cases in which such superiors anticipate that
an employee may have conflicts in this regard, they may wish to take prophylactic measures to
avoid non-compliance with instructions and directions. For example, the superior may issue
instructions and directions which are highly specific and extremely clear in an effort to avoid
claims by the focal employee that noncompliance resulted from the ambiguity of the relevant
instructions or directions.
Employee Participation and Intraorganizational Relationships
The Employment Contract, Subordination, and the Duty of Fairness
As established in Chapters Five and Six, Weber, Simon, and others characterize an organization
as a relationship in which the behaviour of each participant is governed primarily by expectations
in the case of Weber and by authority in the case of Simon, who focuses more closely on
corporations.145 The relationship is one of inferior and superior. Within certain parameters, which
Barnard calls the “zone of indifference” and Simon calls the “zone of acceptance”, the subordinate
is willing to accept decisions made by the superior.146
Robé explains that the employment contract “allows the employer to be the decision-maker in
connection with the employee’s activity during his employment” by giving authority “to the
employer (and, in fact, to the member of the firm’s management team, as agents of the employer)
to direct the employee because the employee accepted entering into a legal relationship of this
kind” by which the employee agreed “within certain limits, to do her job as directed by his
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employer in the sphere in which he excepts to be subordinated”.147 Masten notes that an employer
also has “the right to expect loyalty, respect, and faithfulness from his employees”, as well as
decent and proper deportment so as not to injure the employer’s business.148
The duties of the employer and employee, respectively, are discussed elsewhere in this book.149
The employee’s duties are enumerated much more extensively than are those of the employer.150
One of the employer’s affirmative duties is to deal with the employee fairly and in good faith,
including a duty to provide the employee with information about risks of physical harm or
pecuniary loss that the employer knows, has reason to know, or should know are present in the
employee’s work, but which are unknown to the agent.
Intraorganizational Transfers of Employment and Appropriateness
Questions arises concerning how this duty applies to intraorganizational transfers of employees
even assuming that the transfer is effected so as to preserve all of the employee status and rights,
including length of service and other matters affecting pension rights. For example, when a solvent
and high performing subsidiary transfers an employee, at the direction of its parent or other affiliate
corporation which normally gives direction to the focal corporation, does the focal corporation, as
immediate employer, have a duty to advise the employee to this effect? Similarly, does the
directing corporation have such a duty? Or does the corporation accepting the transferred employee
have such a duty? Or, as a normative matter, or as a legal matter, should one or more such
corporations have such duty?
Intraorganizational transfers may be considered within the overall organization to be normal and
even a tacit part of the bargain between the employer and employee and as an expected aspect of
the role of employee within the umbrella organization. Not only does the employer possess
authority over the employee within the context of the employment relationship but management
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also has the “ability to shape the definition of the situation”, thereby “tacitly channeling activity
toward some possibilities and away from others”, according to Freeland.151
For example, it is often asserted that a person felt compelled to accept a promotion to a new
position in a different city, where not otherwise required by the relevant terms of employment, to
avoid suffering the negative consequences of ending one’s ability to secure promotions. This is
particularly the case in certain kinds of businesses, such as retail banking. “The rules of
appropriateness associated with roles and identities are the primary tools that the firm uses to
motivate actors to transcend their own self-interest and their own individual preferences”, in effect,
to use the employee’s “desire to manifest appropriate role behavior” in order to supplant or
diminish individual self-interest. These rules of appropriateness are “rules of the game – shared
common knowledge concerning how the firm functions and is supposed to function.”152
Freeland indicates that determining what behaviour is appropriate “is neither given nor simply
imported from the outside world. Rather, it is given substance within the firm by the organizational
definition of the situation, which emphasizes some rules of appropriate behaviour (or aspects of
such rules) and deemphasizes others.” Moreover, the “standards of appropriate behaviour, in turn,
are determined largely by top managers through the power of close control conferred by the
law.”153 In effect, close control allows management “to shape not only what actors in the
organization see and think”, in terms of rational decision-making, “but also what they value and
feel”, in terms of normative decision making.154
Of course, as a matter of law, intraorganizational transfers of employment may often result in the
substitution of one employer for another, that is, in the creation of a new employment relationship
between the employer and the employee, as a matter of law. However important this may be to the
employee in the event of the subsequent insolvency of the new employer, it may not be considered
particularly important to the employee at the time. This perceived unimportance and consequent
inattention is not likely to be the sole result of the employee’s self-perceived lack of bargaining
power, requiring a legal remedy such as group or enterprise liability to employees generally in
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cases of bankruptcy or insolvency, as maintained by Halperin, Trebilcock and Turnbull, Blumberg,
and others.155
An employee’s reaction to the proposed transfer may also be affected by the prevailing standard
of “appropriateness” of employee behaviour generally in respect to such matters and the employer
control which is exerted with respect to the same. This may warrant investigation of the question
whether such a transfer is in the best interests of the employee, whether the employer should be
advising the employee of all material information relating to the employee’s decision whether or
not to accept the transfer, and whether failure to do so might not violate the employer’s duty to
treat the employee fairly and in good faith.156
Unlike a purely economic analysis, corporative analysis permits us to approach this problem from
a much broader perspective. The reason that this kind of situation might call for a remedy at law
is not simply because of an inequality of bargaining positions, but because, in addition to that,
expectations of the parties vis-à-vis the organization or the enterprise as a whole makes
consideration of a remedy appropriate.
Firm-Specific Investments by Employees
As noted above, Chandler directed attention to the importance of organizational capabilities,
identifying those the top managers as particularly critical to the corporation’s success.157 He noted
that these organizational capabilities embodied “knowledge and skills… developed by learning
from trial and error, feedback, and evaluation”. Thus, “the skills of individuals depended on the
organizational setting which they were developed and used”, which “skills and knowledge were
company-specific and industry-specific” and were “difficult to transfer from one industry to
another, or even from one company to another, precisely because they had been learned within a
very specific organizational context”.158 As noted above, Gilson considers that these investments
by employees are essentially “sunk costs” and the employer has an incentive to renege on return
from employs an action for such investment.159
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The learned knowledge of top executives includes various human and organizational skills relating
to “managing” middle and lower level managers and planning and allocating resources for the
focal corporation’s organizational components.160 The learned knowledge of the middle or lower
level managers “managed” by the top executives may be expected to become increasingly
company-specific and industry-specific at successively lower levels of the hierarchy.
Consequently, managers at such levels would be expected to be increasingly dependent upon the
fortunes of the focal corporation at successively lower levels of the hierarchy. This may be the
case even more with respect to non-managerial employees whose skills and experience may not
reflect their duration of employment to the same degree, suggesting that a greater variety of
alternative potential opportunities may be available to them.
Needless to say, the extent of the “sunkenness” of firm-specific investment by managers and
employees (including officers) at different levels is an empirical matter which cannot easily be
determined. The extent to which risk of insolvency is transferred to managers and employees
(including officers) at different levels is also an empirical matter which cannot easily be
determined. However, these considerations are obviously relevant to discussions concerning the
assumption and transfer of risk of insolvency and related issues of expectations and fairness. They
will be further discussed below under the heading “Central Management Independent of Equity
Ownership”.
Consolidation of Liabilities to Employees
As previously discussed,161 the way in which corporate activities are conducted from an
organizational perspective may not be completely respectful to, and may even sometimes
disregard, to some extent, the legal essentialist characteristics of SLE status, limited liability, and
asset partitioning. That is to say, a parent corporation or a holding corporation or other entity
subordinate to such parent corporation may administer particular business operations in the same
way, whether or not conducted by a corporation, which has SLE status, or by the superior
corporation directly, in effect, as a division or department.162
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The question arises whether the ultimate parent corporation, in addition to the focal corporation,
should bear responsibility for obligations of the focal corporation to employees, particularly in the
event of insolvency or other restructuring, voluntary or otherwise. A related question is whether
all of the intervening corporations in the ownership chain between the ultimate parent corporation
and the focal corporation should share in such liability.
These questions bear on the issue of how any protection of employees should be fashioned,
whether by the courts or by the legislature. Many of those who argue that employees as a class
“may have the strongest equity argument equity argument (in terms of relative capacity to absorb
losses)” for an exception from limited liability, also seem to suggest that a legislative solution may
be more appropriate.163 It certainly would provide greater clarity as to its purpose, certainty as to
its application (including definitions of “control” and provision for exceptions), and historical
perspective concerning the bases of employee protection generally.
The analysis conducted here indicates that drafting such legislation would be complicated and
would likely involve a number of rebuttable presumptions concerning “control” and other related
matters. Further, such organizational analysis illustrates the importance of such legislation
recognizing organizational aspects of control and influence over legal components of the overall
business group, and not just legal conceptions of control. Any such legislation should recognize
what the law considers as “de facto” control and not just “de jure” control. To the extent that
limiting limited liability arises as a result of judicial, not legislative, action, similar considerations
apply. Among the many advantages of legislative action is the increase in advance knowledge of
the effects of such changes.
Lenders
Lenders or external financiers who provide funds to the corporation largely independent of any of
other relationship must be distinguished from those who provide credit in connection with the
provision of goods and services, such as suppliers and employees. The term will be used here in
the first-mentioned sense.
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Organizational and Intraorganizational Commitment
As indicated in Chapter Seven, lenders who are otherwise independent of the corporation and
simply lend funds without involvement in the corporation as organization may not be considered
as organizational participants.164 As previously noted, a lender which is entitled to representation
on the board or among the top management team or other corporate officers,165 may be considered
to be an organizational participant. This may also be the case where the lender is related to other
organizational or legal participants, such as the majority or major shareholder. In such cases, the
legal relationship between the lender and the corporation as a legal entity, on the one hand, and
the organizational relationships between the lender as organizational participant and the
organization by which the corporation takes action, on the other hand, may affect each other.
A lender which is an organizational participant may be more affected by organizational essentialist
attributes than other lenders. For example, its nominee directors may be subject to
intraorganizational considerations with respect to the function of the board of directors; or its
nominee as Chief Financial Officer may be subject to intraorganizational considerations with
respect to the function of the top management team. These may include identification with and
commitment to the corporation and, as well, to the board or to the TMT, the case may be; and to
the issues of goal congruence and incongruence as between the corporation as a whole and the
group in which the lender’s nominee participates.
Transferring Risk to Lenders and Other Creditors
An argument which is often made is that limited liability transfers the risks of business failure
from shareholders to creditors without compensation. Landers argues, in effect, that the concern
of the ultimate parent corporation (holding 100% of the shares of its subsidiaries) in MDCs and
MLSFs is with overall profitability and not with the profitability of individual BUs or protection
to creditors, which may lead to intermingling and transfers of assets in non-market price
transactions, complicating a lender’s task in obtaining and monitoring information and operations.
He argues that this may justify subordination of debts owed to the parent company by its bankrupt
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subsidiary, allowing creditors of that subsidiary to hold the parent company level, and allowing
consolidation of affiliated corporations in bankruptcy to permit creditors of any such affiliate
corporation to share equally in the pool of assets.166
Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull167 contrast this with Posner’s arguments, in effect, arguing that
the lender should be in a position to accurately assess the risk involved in making the loan, to
reflect that risk in the interest rate, and, in most (but not all) cases, should be able to impose
conditions restricting the corporation’s freedom of action in sufficient detail to maintain the
original risk assessment.168 These conditions may include restrictions on declaring dividends,
making investment decisions and issuing new debt, and may also require the corporation to provide
specified financial information regularly, sometimes monthly.169 Belenzon, Lee & Patacconi note
that “sophisticated contractual creditors such as banks and other financial institutions can charge
higher interest rates compensate for the risks associated with weaker enterprise liability” and
prevent their absorption of risk sought to be externalized by the focal corporation.170
David Millon concludes that efficiency rationales for limited liability are unpersuasive and
proposes, instead, that the purpose of limited liability is to act as a subsidy to encourage business
investment at the expense of corporate creditors. He suggests that while tort creditors, victims of
corporate torts, are forced to bear any losses that exceed corporate assets, contract creditors can
usually insist on compensation ex ante for such quantum of losses.171
In cases in which there is no minority interest in any of the direct and indirect subsidiaries of the
ultimate parent corporation, there are, by definition, no outside shareholders to monitor compliance
with corporate boundaries. However, as noted already, employees and others, such as trade
creditors, may be affected by any unboundedness as among the separate legal entities within the
overall corporate group. As noted with respect to employees, parties other than lenders typically
have less bargaining power to agree on operating restrictions and monitoring mechanisms.
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Consolidation of Liabilities to Lenders and Other Creditors
Lenders may become aware that the ultimate parent corporation “manages across legal
boundaries”, that is to say, treats business units in the same manner, whether they are divisions or
departments of the ultimate parent corporation or separate legal entities, such as direct or indirect
subsidiary corporations. Such lenders may negotiate for guarantees of loans to the focal
corporation from other corporations within the group. These may be limited to corporations or
other legal entities within the same or related lines of business, or may not be so limited. Lenders
may impose restrictions on those related corporations and may monitor their compliance, as well
as that of the focal corporation. Alternatively, the lender may make the funds available to the group
of related corporations specifying that they are secured by assets of such group and may monitor
compliance by such group. Unlike tort creditors, contract creditors such as lenders have some
ability to investigate the affairs of the borrower corporation, to attempt to negotiate appropriate
protections, and to monitor compliance with the same, and the operations and performance of the
borrower corporation in other regards.
Proposals to consolidate the liabilities of corporations below the ultimate parent corporation tier
of the corporate group structure and organizational chart will be discussed below.
Piercing the Corporate Veil
It is common to assert that the strictness of legal liability is often sought to be ameliorated by
“piercing the corporate veil” to allow plaintiffs in tort and contract access not only to the assets of
the focal corporation defendant but also to the assets of its shareholder, its immediate parent
corporation. Although a comprehensive review of the subject is beyond the present purposes, some
aspects of veil piercing relate to our organizational analysis and corporative perspective and so
will be reviewed briefly.
Strasser and Blumberg argue that the traditional “veil piercing” rules are both uncertain and
emphasize corporate formalities.172 Langlois indicates that the corporate veil is often used if the
subsidiary as acted as “agent” for the parent firm such that “the two are essentially inseparable
from a managerial point of view”; the parent firm has perpetuated a concealment or
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misrepresentation which gave rise to estoppel; or if the parent firm has fraudulently conveyed the
assets of the subsidiary firm to avoid meeting the legal obligations of the subsidiary.173
Robert Thompson’s important 1991 empirical study of “piercing the corporate veil” American
cases surveyed 1583 such cases,174 finding that the law respects limited liability “unless
compelling reasons are shown to vary from it” thereby providing a degree of certainty and planning
“while it shifts risks to those who did not explicitly contemplate those risks.”175 He found that
these compelling reasons often involve the activities of insiders.
In particular, he found that “Mere ownership of stock (or overlap of ownership in corporate groups)
is not sufficient, nor is overlap of shareholders and directors (or common directors within a
corporate group). More pejorative conduct is required. Undercapitalization, if found by the court,
usually leads to loss of limited liability. Failure to follow corporate formalities also leads to
piercing, but more powerful factors are demonstrations of lack of substantive separation of the
corporation and its shareholders, and intertwining in the activities of the corporation and its
shareholders.”176
Lack of substantive separation and intertwining of activities as between the focal corporation and
its parent corporation speak to the organizational aspects by means of which the business of the
focal corporation and its parent corporation is conducted. Thompson finds that statutory provisions
relating to product liability employ “the more common bargain reasons for piercing –
misrepresentation, undercapitalization, and absence of corporate formalities” less frequently than
in bargain cases; and statutory provisions of other natures, such as securities laws, tax laws or
labour laws, adopt “control” provisions which are affected by the specific purpose of the statute.177
Other useful reviews of veil piercing cite many of the same factors as relevant. Jason Neyers’
lawful and comprehensive article from 2000 reviews cases in Canada and the United Kingdom.178
Blumberg’s 2005 paper179 and Meiners, Mofsky and Tollison’s 1979 paper argue that the
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importance of limited liability is overemphasized, both with respect to contract and tort claims.180
Meiners et al. note that factors important in insulating the parent corporation from liability for
subsidiaries include adequate capitalization to meet normally foreseeable obligations, not
intermingling business records, accounts, property, transactions and employees; observing certain
corporate formalities such as board meetings; and not representing to and possibly misleading the
public concerning the extent to which the related enterprises are unified.
They characterize these factors as indicating whether or not “the corporate privilege has been used
in good faith for legitimate business purposes”. Where a parent corporation sufficiently dominates
another corporation, they may be treated as if they were one corporation as a matter of law, in
which case the parent corporation will not be insulated from the liabilities of the subsidiary.181
In view of the uncertainty and excessive attention to legal formality which Strasser and Blumberg,
among others, identify, there have been frequent proposals for comprehensive judicial or
legislative attention to veil piercing and other mechanisms to ameliorate possibly adverse
consequences from strict application of statutory limited liability and asset partitioning rules.
These are discussed under the heading “Proposals for Limiting Limited Liability and Asset
Partitioning” at the end of this chapter.
Distributors and Customers
Organizational Participation and Intraorganizational Commitment
In considering the path to market of the focal corporation, it is apparent that some corporations
may appoint “distributors” on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, who may also be denominated
as “dealers” in order to offer the products and services of the focal corporation to customers or
end-users. Whether or not such distributors or dealers participate in the focal corporation’s
organization may depend on a number of factors, including the presence or absence of exclusivity,
the duration of the relationship, the term of the relationship, whether aspects of the legal
relationship are embodied in extensive distributorship or dealership agreements, the nature of the
obligations, events of default, and remedies on default, any asymmetries in bargaining power, the
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implicit or explicit control exercised by the focal corporation over the distributor or dealer, and,
finally, the degree of dependence of the distributor on the focal corporation.
Luigi Zingales states that the “defining characteristic of a firm is that it substitutes authority for
the price mechanism in determining how decisions are made” and identifies the boundaries of the
firm with the limit of the firm’s authority over decision-making.194 Robé suggests that the “limits
could be said to exist where the effects of the power fade away”. He indicates that the firm has no
“neat boundaries” or “bright line” distinguishing “inside” and” outside” in all circumstances but
instead, “just grey margins surrounding the firm within which different answers may be given to
the question, depending on the issue at stake.”195
Robé argues that in circumstances in which firms are able to “operate via legal instruments
allowing them to issue orders and exercise authority” at one end of the spectrum, this indicates
that the parties receiving such orders are part of the firm, and not merely equals bargaining with
respect to “horizontal” market transactions, as at the other end of the spectrum. Many cases, of
course, would be in between these opposites. He would apply this test to suppliers of inputs and
distributors of outputs.196
Control and Information Asymmetry
Franchise agreements, for many of the reasons noted above, have, in particular, been found to
subject franchisees to significant control by franchisors. To that end, franchise legislation been
adopted in many jurisdictions, often imposing prospectus standards of disclosure of information
to potential franchisees and prospectus-like remedies for non-disclosure.197 In the United States,
the Federal Trade Commission promulgated a rule198 and published proposed interpretive
guides,199 which became effective October 21, 1979 and were the subject of an extensive review
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article shortly after that time.200 That article suggests methods which may be employed to
distributorship agreements in an attempt to avoid the application of the statute, saying that “in
general, the seller should expressly reserve control only over those items which it considers
essential to the operation of the subject distributorship. The seller should remain mindful of the
general policy of the rule to require disclosure if the subject arrangement renders the distributor
dependent upon the seller for the daily operation of its business.”201
It is apparent from the organizational analysis conducted here that distributors and dealers which
do not receive the benefit of franchisee disclosure under applicable legislation may be relatively
unaware of the intraorganizational structure of the focal corporation with which they are
contracting and with which they may be establishing a long-term and close relationship. For
example, the production and sales of the product or service concerned may be housed in separate
legal entities with various tiers of subsidiaries involved, including. This is common in the oil and
gas business (separating “upstream” or production operations from “downstream” or product
distribution operations, very often separating regional and country operations with separate
subsidiaries or groups of subsidiaries for each function) and in certain other types of businesses.
Robé comments that adopting such a “corporate structure” or configuration of separate legal
entities may not result in any change in how the corporate group (which he denominates as the
“firm” in an economic sense and the present text denominates as the “organization”, the “corporate
group” or the “enterprise”) operates under normal conditions since “it is still the same people are
making the key decisions and giving the orders, irrespective in the main of the formal corporate
governance of the subsidiaries”.202 He argues that, even though local CEOs may have some status
within the firm and some say over the firm’s local organization, “they are part of the governance
structure of the firm as an organization, not autonomous skippers of the local subsidiaries and, for
all practical purposes, are subordinates within the hierarchy set in place at the mother company’s
headquarters level.”203 This means that the consequences of the actions of the organization legally
attach to individual subsidiaries, rather than to the corporate group as a whole.

David L Black, “New Federal Trade Commission Franchise Disclosure Rule: Application to Distributorship
Arrangements” (1980) 35:2 Bus Law 409.
201
Ibid at 425.
202
Supra note 30 at 49.
203
Ibid at 49-50 [emphasis in the original].
200

598

Distributors and dealers may be incented to sell the products and services of the focal corporation
without investigation of the relevant legal framework for a number of reasons, including fear of
such arrangements not being established or being disrupted at a later point in time. Thus, it may
be difficult, as a practical matter and taking into consideration relevant power and influence
considerations, for the distributor or dealer to monitor arrangements “in the background” of the
focal corporation, such as whether it is solvent and whether its parent corporation is solvent. As
an example, they might not be aware of the institution of separate upstream and downstream
operations posited in this discussion.
Yet such matters may be important to the dealer or distributor who may be the subject of warranty
or product liability claims by its purchasers at some later date. Equally well, the closer the
relationship between the focal corporation and the focal distributor or dealer, the more difficult it
may be for the latter to raise these “legal” issues. In this sense, the extent to which the distributor
or dealer act as a participant in the focal organization may inhibit its attempt to investigate,
monitor, and access its “legal” or “contract” rights. The range of situations which may be
envisioned is considerable and, unfortunately, cannot be further explored here. However, some
further comments on relevant policy changes appear in the last section of this chapter.
Suppliers and Others
In principle, the issues of the relationship between the focal corporation and its suppliers are similar
to its relationship with its distributors, dealers, and customers. However, the consequences of the
interposition of separate legal entities may be much more immediately relevant. For instance,
separating the production and distribution operations of the focal corporation into separate tiers of
subsidiaries may result in drastic changes in the creditworthiness of the corporate entity to which
a supplier ships product and thereby becomes a trade creditor. As noted previously, similar results
may attend acquisitions and dispositions of subsidiaries or groups of subsidiaries within the overall
corporate group.
Proposals for Limiting Limited Liability and Asset Partitioning
As previously noted, there are a number of proposals to limit limited liability and asset partitioning,
whether traditionally or legislatively. Time and space limitations allow only a brief review of these.
David Millon asserts that “veil piercing is the most heavily litigated issue corporate law, yet legal
doctrine in this area is notoriously incoherent”, requiring an examination of underlying policy. He
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maintains that limited liability, as a matter of policy, should not “protect illegitimate behaviour”,
by which he means opportunistic behaviour by shareholders towards third parties, in effect, by
using “limited liability as a device deliberately or recklessly to extract value from third parties
without their consent and without compensation.”204 He argues that limited liability should protect
controlling shareholders who have managed the business in a financially responsible manner from
losses that could not reasonably have been anticipated or prevented and which precipitate
insolvency.
The only shareholders who should be liable for focal corporation debts, says Millon, are those who
actually exercise their control over the corporation to cause it to act in a financially irresponsible
manner and to shift costs of insolvency to its creditors in an unreasonable manner. He maintains
that shareholders who do not act in this way should not lose the protection of limited liability.205
Millon’s proposals relate primarily to judicial veil-piercing, which may be somewhat more
problematic than statutory veil-piercing, which might, however, be based on similar principles.
For example, he would presume that majority shareholders exercise control over corporations, on
the assumption that “a substantial investment creates an incentive to exercise control over business
decisions”, but he admits that the majority shareholder might sometimes be unable to, or might
choose not to, exercise such power and might play no role in the selection of management. He also
considers the possibility that “the majority shareholder, even though not actively involved in
management or the selection of management, may know or have reason to know that those who
are in control or running the business in a financially irresponsible manner”, which might justify
veil piercing in some circumstances.206 He notes that minority shareholders acting in concert
should also be subject to veil-piercing for these reasons.207
With respect to contracts, Millon focuses on two points in time. At the time the corporation
assumes an obligation, for example, to a lender, the court should determine, firstly, “whether the
shareholders believed in good faith that the corporation would be able to discharge this obligation
in a timely manner”; and, secondly, whether this belief was reasonable under the circumstances.208
At this first point in time, “reasonable shareholder expectations about future revenues, expenses
204
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and cash flows” are relevant to such determination. Then, between the incurrence of the debt and
its maturity, managers should act responsibly towards creditors by not engaging in conduct “that
significantly increases the risk of default that each creditor has agreed to assume”, primarily by
maintaining sufficient liquid working capital.209
With respect to tort claims, Millon would discontinue limited liability for shareholders “who
caused their corporations to engage in activities that are likely to harm others but decide as a matter
of policy to make no provision for compensation, knowing that the corporation will be unable to
satisfy a claim brought by an injured party and intending to hide behind the limited liability shield”
and for shareholders who fail to pay any attention at all to the need to provide compensation for
injured third parties.210
Stephen Bainbridge distinguishes between veil piercing, which he says should be limited to natural
persons liable for debts and obligations of the corporation of which they are shareholders, from
enterprise liability, which he says should be invoked when someone is attempting to hold an entire
corporate group liable, whether one is dealing immediately with affiliated corporations or with a
parent and subsidiary.211 He concedes that there are many legitimate reasons for enterprises to split
assets among multiple corporate entities, including regulatory requirements applicable to the focal
corporation as a result of the nature of its business, with the result that “sorting out legitimate use
of multiple entities from those serving solely as a vehicle for judgment proofing is a nontrivial
task.”212 In some cases, where an operating entity is run by different managers than the owning
entity, the managers of the operating entity have an incentive, in protecting their firm-specific
investment in human capital, to insure against liabilities that threaten their employer’s solvency.213
Strasser and Blumberg, leading theorists of enterprise liability, start from a different perspective,
considering the whole corporate group as “in reality one business enterprise, operating under the
unitary control of the parent and possessing a high degree of economic integration” such that its
functions (including administration, finance, employee selection, and management, and use of the
corporate persona) are carried on interdependently.214 They argue that in such cases the
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justifications for limited liability for individual investor shareholder do not apply to the parent
company shareholder. Indeed, whether to function interdependently or to allow substantial
business units “substantial independence of initiative or action”, in the case of the controlling
parent company shareholder, “is a strategic management decision made by those in charge of the
whole enterprise and one that can of course be changed as senior management of the parent
chooses” and regardless of the “legal form or internal designation of that business unit, whether it
is a separate corporate subsidiary, an operating division or some other internally defined unit.”215
Strasser and Blumberg argue that the “transaction cost justifications for limited liability are not
applicable to a parent company shareholder” since it frequently owns 100% of subsidiary and so
need not monitor the assets of its fellow shareholders to determine its contingent liability, since it
provides management itself, so that there is no need to monitor third-party management, this matter
and reducing costs of diversifying portfolio investments is not relevant. They maintain that
diversifying businesses carried on within the corporate group is a different kind of decision that it
is with respect to investors seeking to diversify investments to reduce the risk of any single
investment. Instead, they assert that the internal management decision of the ultimate parent
corporation to diversify the businesses which it carries on has operating costs and benefits quite
different from those attached to investment diversification; for example, whether and how closely
to integrate the operations of such businesses and a variety of other factors which relate to the
operations of the businesses and not simply to spreading financial risk.216
Accordingly, Strasser and Blumberg argue that the legal rights and responsibilities of parent
corporations as shareholders should reflect the distinctive economic roles which they play, as
compared with the roles of parties who are only investor shareholders. They contend that legal
decision making by courts, legislatures or administrative agencies, should start with the
fundamental reality that “the legally separate subsidiaries are in fact part of a larger economic
enterprise controlled by a parent company”, rather than focusing only on legal form and possibly
ignoring economic substance and other relevant regulatory considerations.217
The present book has maintained that a corporation, which is unable to act otherwise, is animated
or vivified only by individual human actors who, together, constitute an organization at least some
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of whose objectives are economic in nature. Accordingly, the questions to which the present book
devotes attention are somewhat different from the more limited questions that are posed by Strasser
and Blumberg. They contend that control and economic integration, administrative and financial
integration, employee selection, and management are important determinants of whether a group
of corporations is one enterprise; and that another important indicator is whether “the enterprise
chooses to present itself as one business, using a consistent corporate persona.”218
As a result of the starting point of the present book, we have proceeded by examining the legal
essentialist characteristics of the corporation as a legal entity and the organizational essentialist
characteristics of the corporation as an operating organization in order to endeavour to assess the
impact of these various characteristics upon and interrelationship with the other such
characteristics. Accordingly, while the inquiry conducted by the present book has some similarities
with the “enterprise quest” proposed by Strasser and Blumberg, the present inquiry “goes behind”
their indicators of collective enterprise to the ultimate essentialist attributes of each of the
corporation as a legal entity and the organization as its human actor or instantiator. Nonetheless,
the Strasser and Blumberg analysis has some similarities with the corporative approach of the
present book.
A Corporative Approach to Limited Liability and Asset Partitioning
The focus of this chapter is on how analysis and, in particular, organizationally essentialist
characteristics, affect certain legally essentialist characteristics, in this case, limited liability and
asset partitioning. The book has demonstrated that the corporation, as organization, may operate
across internal legal boundaries, to a large extent, without taking them into account except where
it is not possible to do otherwise, as a matter of law.
For example, implying the “Fact Pattern for Discussion” from Chapter Ten, the CEO of GMC at
the parent corporation level may give instructions or directions to the executive responsible for
each division, without taking into account whether the division is a separate legal entity. The CEO
of GMC would not normally request, or request that GMC’s board of directors pass a resolution
(which, coming from a shareholder, would not be binding in any event) requesting, that the board
of Ultimate, one of its divisions the top company in the hierarchy of which is separately
218
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incorporated, to authorize Ultimate to take a certain action or to instruct Ultimate’s CEO directly
to take such action. Instead, GMC’s CEO would more likely provide instructions directly to the
CEO of Ultimate, just as would be done with the CEO of the Challenger division, which is a
division of GMC, but is not a separately incorporated subsidiary.
In effect, boards of directors, officers, managers and other employees frequently “ignore” the
separate legal entity status of corporations within the parent corporation’s overall organizational
hierarchy, particularly with respect to matters whose primary immediate effect is within the
organization itself. That is to say, the strict “legal boundaries”, such as separate legal entity status,
of intraorganizational organizations, which may not be at the forefront of organizational
operations,

are

very

often

subordinated

to

organizational

requirements,

at

least

intraorganizationally and immediately. As noted in this chapter, these legal boundaries may
assume greater intraorganizational significance, in terms of managing the organization as a whole,
“at the margins” or in exceptional (or, at least, non-ordinary) circumstances, in circumstances in
which it may be legally advantageous for the organization as a whole to be able to assert its
compliance with, and entitlement to benefit from, legal boundaries, for example, where a particular
corporate entity is failing and the organization may seek to take advantage of its SLE status by
insulating claims to the focal corporation, in this case Ultimate, only. This would not be possible
with Challenger, which is a division only, and not a separately incorporated subsidiary.
Limited liability and asset partitioning may be disadvantageous to organizational participants, as
legal counterparties, such as employees. In many cases, employees, especially if they are not
represented by a union, may not know the current legal status of the intracorporate organization
which is their direct employer, or of another intracorporate organization with which they may deal.
Such legal status may have changed since the inception of their employment. Their original
employer may have ceased to exist or may have ceased to have assets to support employee claims
against it. Employees may think that still they are employees of GMC or Ultimate or a direct
subsidiary of Ultimate but may find that they have become, instead, employees of a corporation,
limited partnership, or special purpose vehicle at the fourth-tier of the hierarchy. The effect of
insolvency of the immediate employer on its employees may differ, at least in some jurisdictions,
according to its legal status.
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Likewise, the chief marketing officer (“CMO”) of one of Ultimate’s direct subsidiaries (third tier
of the hierarchy) may sell or transfer goods or services to another intraorganizational organization
in the belief that it is a separate legal entity whose income and assets are adequate for such purpose,
only to discover that its income and assets have been encumbered for some purpose, that its
business is failing, and that GMC and Ultimate will ultimately allow the CMO’s corporation to
become bankrupt. The focal CMO may thus be taking actions disadvantageous to his or her
position as an employee and which, if they were known to be so disadvantageous, might have been
avoided. Further, the CMO’s action may impair the position of suppliers and customers of the
focal corporation, the latter of which would likely be particularly important to the CMO.
Lack of knowledge of the legal status of intraorganizational organizations and the lack of
knowledge of whether and how such legal status may be asserted by relevant levels of the
organization may be detrimental to various organizational participants, including employees,
suppliers, and customers. An argument that employees, suppliers, and customers are able to protect
themselves contractually may not completely recognize “the realities of the market”. Furthermore,
while these organizational participants may, in some cases, get notice of changes in legal status
which may affect them in these respects, this may not always be the case.
In the result, organizational analysis may suggest that it may be appropriate to consider affording
some legal protections to certain categories of organizational participants in various circumstances,
whether by statute or otherwise. What is important from the present, corporative, perspective is
that decision making of this nature considered, firstly, the “facts on the ground” or facts “in the
real world”, from an organizational perspective, and, secondly, how those facts may affect the
impact on such “facts” of applicable law. In short, actual “real world” behaviour, rather than
stylized perceptions of human and organizational behaviour, must be considered in framing
applicable legal standards. Among other things, this signifies that appeals to the expectations of
organizational participants should be based on actual relationships, rather than invocations of
stylized or abstract perceptions of “legal rights and duties”.
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CHAPTER NINE – A CORPORATIVE THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE –PART C
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter continues to investigate how the legal essentialist characteristics of the modern
business corporation, as described in Part 1 and Appendix A of this book, may be impacted by the
essential characteristics of the modern business corporation as an organization, as described and
considered in Parts 2 and 3, and vice versa.
In this regard, Chapter Seven considered the first legal essentialist attribute, that of constituting a
separate legal entity, while Chapter Eight considered the second, limited liability and asset
partitioning. Those two legal essentialist attributes are closely interrelated with the remaining ones:
thirdly, capital lock-in with transferable equity interests; fourthly, centralized management
independent of equity owners; and, fifthly, its indefinite duration of existence. In consequence,
many of the comments which might be made in that regard in relation to these three remaining
attributes have already been anticipated in the previous discussion of the first two attributes. This
is particularly true with respect to the interrelationship among the five legal essentialist attributes.
Accordingly, this chapter will endeavour to raise some observations particular to the third and
fourth attributes which were not specifically referenced in those earlier discussions.
ATTRIBUTE THREE – CAPITAL LOCK-IN WITH TRANSFERABLE EQUITY
INTERESTS
Declarative Law
Capital Lock-In
As discussed in Part 1 and Chapter A1 of this work, unless shares are redeemable at the option of
the holder (“retractable”), the capital contribution which they represent (by way of consideration
for the original issuance of the shares) cannot be withdrawn at the option of the holder as a matter
of right.1 Shares that are made redeemable by the corporation’s articles may be purchased or
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redeemed from the holder at prices not exceeding the redemption price stated, or calculated
according to a formula contained, in the articles, and subject to a solvency test.2
Transferability of Equity Interests
As Chapters One and A1 indicate, absent permitted restrictions in the charter documents of the
corporation, the shares of a modern business corporation, unless it is a “private” or “close”
corporation, are generally freely transferable, as a matter of corporate law.3 Some statutes contain
extensive provisions concerning transfers of shares, including provisions relating to the issuance,
purchase and sale, and registration of shares.4
Voluntary and Involuntary Transfer of Equity Interests to the Corporation
As discussed in Chapter A2, shareholders who dissent in the prescribed manner from special
resolutions approving certain fundamental transactions are entitled to be paid by the corporation
the value of their shares as determined in the prescribed manner.5 On the other hand, shareholders
who fail to accept a public takeover bid for all the shares of a certain class of shares may be
required, in certain circumstances as described in Chapter A2, to transfer their shares to the
successful bidder.6 As likewise discussed in that chapter, under the oppression remedy, the
purchase or exchange of securities, inter alia, may be ordered by a court.7

solvency tests: s 38 CBCA and ss 24 (9) and 34 OBCA. See also Chapter A1 in the section entitled "Management
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unanimous shareholder agreement. As noted there, the focus of the present work is public" corporations and,
accordingly, that subject is not discussed here. Likewise, as noted there, the statutory permissibility of provisions
relating to qualifications for special or advantageous treatment under tax or regulatory statutes is not discussed here.
See also, in particular, the discussion in Chapter A2 in the section entitled "Shareholder Rights Beyond Voting",
especially under the heading "Right to Sell or Transfer Shares".
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5
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6
See, in particular, the discussion in the section entitled "Legal and Management-Related Rights of Shareholders";
and in the section entitled "Shareholder Rights Beyond Voting", especially under the headings "Right to Sell or
Transfer Shares", and "Compulsory and Compelled Acquisitions".
7
See, in particular, the discussion in the section entitled "Legal and Management-Related Rights of Shareholders";
and in the section entitled "Shareholder Rights Beyond Voting", especially under the heading "Remedies of
Shareholders and Others" and therein under the subheading "Oppression Remedy".

607

Organizational Analysis, Capital Lock-In, and Transferable Equity Interests
The questions examined here concern what effect the organizational analysis conducted earlier in
this book and in more detail in Appendix A of this book has on the legal essentialist attributes of
capital lock-in and transferability of equity interests, and vice versa. Many of the points that arise
for discussion in this connection have already been mentioned in other contexts in Chapters Seven
and Eight. Accordingly, this chapter will frequently avert to those discussions, sometimes focusing
more directly on capital lock-in and transferability of equity interests than on the legal essentialist
attributes which were the focus of discussion in those earlier chapters.
As in the previous chapters, the discussion will relate to the various categories of organizational
participants. It is acknowledged, however, that while the legal essentialist attributes of capital lockin and transferability of equity interests are most immediately relevant to shareholders, they do
have significant impacts upon other organizational participants. Among organizational
participants, the board of directors has the most immediate impact upon capital lock-in and
transferability of equity interests. Finally, because of the close interrelationship between capital
lock-in and transferability, the subjects will largely be discussed in tandem, as if they were
concomitant legal attributes.
Shareholders
Capital Lock-In
As discussed in Chapter Seven, in exchange for their contribution of money, property, property
rights or other things to the corporation, the original shareholders of the corporation receive certain
rights evidenced by way of shares in the corporation, as determined by the corporation’s charter
documents and applicable law.8 As described in the present chapter under the heading “Declarative
Law”, generally speaking, these rights do not include the right to require repayment of amounts
contributed to the equity capital of the corporation by the original shareholders or their successors
in interest.
The board of directors, as the ultimate decision-maker with respect to the corporation, is
empowered to determine whether to return any capital to shareholders by way of dividend or
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See the section entitled "The Corporation, the Legal Entity, the Organization, and the Participants", particularly
under the heading "Categories of Organizational Participants" and under the subheading "Shareholders".

608

repurchase of shares from the shareholders individually or collectively, as permitted by law, and
whether to distribute any earnings to shareholders by way of dividends.9 As indicated in Chapter
Eleven,10 in respect of their management or supervision of the management of the business and
affairs of the corporation, including the determinations with respect to the corporation’s capital
just mentioned, the directors are subject to certain duties which, to some extent, ameliorate capital
lock-in by attempting to ensure that capital is employed in order to advance the business of the
corporation, subject to some standard of reasonableness.11
As discussed in Chapter Seven,12 the effects of capital lock-in (“LIC”) on shareholders is also
ameliorated by the power of the shareholders to elect directors,13 to remove directors,14 to make
proposals with respect to the business and affairs of the corporation,15 to requisition meetings of
shareholders for the purpose of discussing certain permitted issues,16 and to conduct proxy contests
with respect to the election of directors.17 Shareholders also have the power to approve or
disapprove contracts in which directors are interested,18 matters submitted to them by the
directors,19 and certain fundamental transactions.20 They also have the rights to receive certain
information intended to facilitate the exercise of such rights.21
The locking-in of capital affects decision-making by the board and by management with respect
to the corporation as a separate legal entity. As Margaret Blair indicates, these factors “made it
possible to build lasting institutions”, empowering the board to make investments “in long-lived
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and specialized physical assets, in information and control systems, in specialized knowledge and
routines, and in reputation and relationships, all of which could be sustained even as individual
participants in the enterprise came and went.”22
Moreover, LIC permits the full amount of a corporation’s capital to be invested in the business and
reduces uncertainty as to the amount of capital available at any particular time. Otherwise,
restrictions might have been required concerning the amount or percentage of capital which could
be withdrawn within a particular time period or more generally, in order that the corporation could
maintain a reserve sufficient to effect such return of capital. The practical (and perhaps a charter
or other legal) requirement of maintaining such a reserve would reduce the corporate return on
investment, possibly increasing the return required by shareholders, make it more expensive to
carry on the business.
Blair notes that charters and statutes in the United States in the nineteenth century typically
prevented capital withdrawals unless the corporation was formally dissolved;23 allowed directors
to pay dividends only out of “clear profits and income”, but not capital;24 and, later on, emphasized
that the directors were not required to pay out all of the profits as dividends, but only as much as
they deemed prudent;25 and that shareholders have no legal right to dividends except as and when
declared by the directors.26
Consequently, once a shareholder determines to become a shareholder, whether by original
subscription or as a subsequent transferee of a share, that shareholder becomes a participant in the
organization, even if it is only in the capacity of exercising, actually or potentially, the right to
determine or to influence the determination of those who lead the organization, the board of
directors; to approve or disapprove related party transactions; or to approve or disapprove of
fundamental agreements and transactions. Together with the transferability of equity capital, the
foregoing rights are discussed in Chapter A2 in relation to what Albert Hirschman called exit,
voice, and loyalty.27 Transferability, or exit, is discussed under the next heading. Capital lock-in
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also has important effects on non-shareholder participants, which are discussed under the
appropriate sections below.
Transferability
Transferability, the ability for a shareholder to exit an investment in the corporation by transferring
the “share” embodying the rights and liabilities of that shareholder, is the concomitant of capital
lock-in. As discussed in Chapter Eight, because the share represents capital which is locked in to
the corporation, the principal means of “freeing up” such capital is to transfer the share.28
Transferability also facilitates the treatment of shares as a means of investment.
As noted in Chapter Eight, limited liability and asset partitioning, despite capital lock-in, permit
individuals to purchase shares of various corporations without the necessity of monitoring such
investments in an effort to avoid catastrophic risk of loss; and, together with the separation of
management rights from equity ownership, permits treatment of shares of corporations as
instruments for the investment of funds separately from any investment of labour and effort;
together with transferability, permit the commodification of corporate shares as tradable
instruments the value which depend on prospective and actual rates of return; and permit
diversification of such investments.29
As explained in Chapter Eight, shareholders may have different investment objectives, investment
horizons, and investment strategies, which may be affected by the legal structure of the corporation
in whose shares they invest, including the extent to which the investee corporation operates its
businesses by means of a unitary form, by means of a multidivisional form (using divisions, with
or without subordinate separate subsidiaries), or by means of a multilevel subsidiary form
(structuring subordinate operations as separately incorporated subsidiaries).30 As discussed in
Chapter Two, Chandler demonstrated that organizational form and legal form may be
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independent,31 however, the organizational attributes of a business enterprise are extremely
important in understanding its operations and prospects for success.32
As discussed elsewhere, the objectives of shareholders may change as a result of factors pertaining,
as well as those extraneous, to the individual’s personal circumstances. These changes in
objectives may make it appropriate in some cases to vary a particular investment in shares and to
acquire an investment, in shares or otherwise, more suitable to the shareholder’s revised objectives.
The ability to transfer shares makes possible the termination of the original investment and the
reinvestment of the proceeds. Thus, as Henry Manne notes, the original investment decision need
not be near-permanent.33
As explicated in Chapter Eight, the legal structure of the corporate group or enterprise below the
ultimate holding corporation at the top of the ownership and organizational hierarchy may
significantly impede rigourous financial and risk analysis, which may, in turn, adversely affect
accurate market assessment of the “intrinsic value” of the shares of the ultimate corporation.34 A
significant barrier to rigourous financial and risk analysis is the frequent inadequacy of disclosure
of the organizational advantages of the corporate group, including its organizational structure,
processes, and personnel and personnel and management practices. These include the means of
integration of the organizational components, however structured legally, into the functioning
enterprise or corporate group.
Overall, the disclosure of its organizational advantages, including strategic alignment and
functional and tactical implementation of strategy is unlikely to be reflected in public disclosure
documents affecting market evaluation and pricing. As noted previously, the full impact of its
organizational advantages, as well as of any organizational disadvantages, may not even be fully
known to the board of directors and senior management.35 In fact, organizational considerations
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may be those which are most important to the value of the overall business.36 As noted in Chapter
Two, Oliver Williamson credits Alfred Chandler with having established for the first time that
organization form had important business performance consequences, such a revolutionary and
important observation that “the mistaken notion that economic efficiency was substantially
independent of internal organization was no longer tenable after [Strategy and Structure]
appeared.”37
Unless the shareholder concerned is the controlling shareholder, or a member of a control group
of shareholders, or is otherwise engaged, alone or with other shareholders, in dialogue with the
board of directors or management of the corporation, it is unlikely that the role of the shareholder
as a participant in the organization would overcome these difficulties.
Directors
Role of the Board of Directors
As often stated in this work, the board of directors, collectively, is the primary actor and decision
maker for and on behalf of the corporation as a legal entity and the human organization which
empowers its subordinate action and decision making. As Chandler says, it is administrative
coordination which made possible the integration of specialized operations into a single enterprise
and the development of managerial capitalism.38 Of course, this involved the development of the
legal and organizational variants described in Chapter Three.39 Importantly, also, organizational
complexity exacerbated the necessity of prioritizing the claims of organizational participants and
others. Among other things, this has led to consideration of organizations, including corporations,
as political systems and, in particular, as a socio-political conflict system involving a system of
joint preference ordering, which operates at various hierarchical levels, as explained in Chapter
Three.40
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At the pinnacle of the organizational hierarchy, the board of directors makes the ultimate
determinations as to how the preferences of individual organizational participants will be jointly
ordered and implemented. This necessarily involves the joint preference ordering of preferences
themselves reached as a result of joint preference ordering within various organizational
components and at different organizational levels, as explained in Chapter Nine, and often
irrespective of the boundaries of legal entities. As explained in Chapter Three, the allocation and
division of authority and responsibility may not be bounded by legal structures or requirements
but, instead, may be bounded by organizational considerations,41 some of which are explicated in
Chapter Five.
Locking-In Capital and Duties of Directors
In making such determinations, the board of directors of the ultimate parent corporation, both as a
matter of law and as a matter of organization, must be concerned with the best interests of the
corporation as a whole,42 and not with those of individual components. However, determining what
is in the best interests of the corporation as a whole must take into account the several contributions
of organizational components, including the absorption of risk across the enterprise, as well as at
lower hierarchical levels.43
These considerations are important with respect to the lock-in of capital contributions, as well as
with respect to the non-shareholders who make firm-specific investments in the corporation. Both
categories of investors are reliant upon directors to suitably perform their duties. For example, as
described in Chapter Eight, assumption of inappropriate levels of risk, which were not generally
discerned even by sophisticated investors, at a single organizational component led to the
bankruptcy of Enron (and, incidentally, of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen) and, separately,
the near-insolvency of JP Morgan.44 Apocryphal situations such as these may have important
effects on the rates of return on equity demanded by prospective investors.
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Particularly in situations in which information which is or may become critical to locked-in equity
investment and which may not be available, publicly or otherwise, except to the board of directors,
the CEO and top management team and other senior officers, shareholders are highly reliant upon
the directors to fully discharge their duties in making decisions. Admittedly, the legal and
organizational complexities of a large corporation may make it difficult even for directors to secure
the detailed information and analysis which may be necessary in this regard. The present work
directs attention to many of the topics worthy of investigation by directors from an organizational
perspective and the ways in which they relate to legal characteristics of the corporation and vice
versa, which is to say, topics which are important in connection with the focal corporation from a
corporative perspective.
Margaret Blair argues that board decision-making “helps assure all participants that financial
investors will not be able to easily pull assets out of the firm once other participants have made
investments that are committed to the enterprise, and that active managers will not be allowed to
use the assets of the firm for their own personal benefit”, and that it deprives other participants of
“some of the ability they might otherwise have had to hold up other members” which “makes their
commitments to engage with the others in a cooperative way more credible.”45 Accordingly, the
board “can help to mediate among competing interests in a corporation.”46 Capital lock-in is
reinforced by the duties of the directors with respect to their decisions to repay capital and by the
necessity to consider the interests of other organizational participants in that regard.
Transferability and the Role and Duties of Directors
In a public corporation, the transferability of equity shares as a legal attribute of the corporation
may be affected, as a practical matter, by the board of directors in a number of ways, including:
entering into a merger agreement or an agreement to recommend acceptance of a takeover bid to
shareholders; repurchasing shares by private agreement or the public markets with the intention of
improving share price; “splitting” equity shares into a greater number of shares with the intention
of improving overall equity market capitalization; and engaging in outreach and persuasion
activities with respect to equity shareholders, especially those having practical or legal control of
the corporation, individually or collectively.
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Explaining matters such as how the corporation’s strategy is being implemented, has been
amended, the effects of any such amendments on corporate performance, any shortfalls from
targets and any proposals for recoupment may have greater effect on shareholder confidence in the
board and management team. As discussed in Chapter A2, the board of directors can thereby
endeavour to encourage shareholder voice and to develop shareholder loyalty, in the hope of
moderating shareholder impetus towards exit.47 These matters will be discussed further in
connection with Attribute Four – Central Management Independent of Equity Ownership.
Officers
The roles, responsibilities, and duties of officers in relation to the corporation’s status as a separate
legal entity and in relation to the organizational analysis conducted in this work are discussed in
Chapter Seven, which, in turn, further references discussion in Chapter A1.48 Similar discussions
in relation to limited liability and asset partitioning appear in Chapter Eight.49
Capital Lock-In
Capital lock-in provides assurance to officers and others who make firm-specific investments in
the corporation that those firm-specific investments will be protected, Margaret Blair comments,
which helps to induce “individuals with sufficient talents and experience to run a business
operation” that they should “give up their own entrepreneurial aspirations in order to work in a
business in which they would not be independent and might not share directly in the potential
business profits.”50
Combined with SLE status, limited liability, and asset partitioning, LIC helps to assure the CEO,
TMT, and other officers that the corporation possesses the financial resources, and possesses or
can acquire the other resources requisite in order to advance its business, sustain its existence,
acquire and maintain a positive reputation, and achieve growth, all of which are normally sought
by such officers.51 As established by Chandler and others, career management tends to favour long47
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term stability and growth, rather than maximizing current profits.52 Chapter Six demonstrated how
components of the organization, whether or not considered as intraorganizational organizations,
may pursue intraorganizational goals, and that such intraorganizational goals may be affected by
changes in the corporation’s internal or organizational environment, as well as by changes in its
external environment.
Transferability
Combined with SLE status, limited liability, and asset partitioning, transferability helps to assure
the CEO, TMT and, and other officers that the corporation will not be subject to unreasonable
demands from shareholders, whose capital is locked in the corporation, since shareholders are able
to monetize their investment by transferring their shares to others.
Thus, transferability may be considered to mitigate or ameliorate opportunities for excessive
conflict between shareholders, on the one hand, and other organizational participants, on the other
hand. Henry Manne argues for the importance of transferability by observing that “in most
instances, a functioning stock market will be of more interest to a potential corporate investor than
will the limitation of his liability in the event that the corporation is not successful”; and that market
liquidity facilitates transfer by a shareholder as a result of changes in investment needs, and in the
event of shareholder dissatisfaction with management of the corporation.53
Managers and Other Employees
The roles, responsibilities, and duties of managers and other employees in relation to the
corporation’s status as a separate legal entity and in relation to the organizational analysis
conducted in this work are discussed in Chapter Seven which, in turn, further references discussion
in Chapter A1.54 Similar discussions in relation to limited liability and asset partitioning appear in
Chapter Seven.55
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Although managers normally operate at hierarchical levels which are inferior to those of officers,
as a result of their firm-specific investment in the corporation as a legal entity and as an
organization, they likewise benefit from capital lock-in and the transferability of equity interests.
This is also largely true of non-managerial employees. As previously indicated, managerial and
other employees may be affected by identification with, and loyalty and commitment to
intraorganizational groups, as well as to the organization as a whole.
These affective phenomena may be expected to influence the employee concerned to make firmspecific investments in the corporation, even to the extent that the quantum of such investment is
it unlikely to approximate any return to the employee from such investment. In that sense, such
firm-specific investment may be considered to be non-rational, at least in the sense of economic
rationality. However, as demonstrated in the present work, organizational participants may be
expected to derive non-economic benefits from their association with the corporation, and these
may make such participation worthwhile.
As previously discussed, managerial and other employees may be shifted among various divisions
and subsidiaries of the ultimate parent corporation. They may not have the flexibility to accept the
review such transfers and may be unable to investigate the financial and other circumstances of
their “new” and “direct” employer within the corporate group.56 Consequently, while capital lockin might protect their corporate-specific or corporate group-specific investments, this may not
necessarily be the case in any particular circumstances.
In addition, of course, the ability of the ultimate parent corporation or other subordinate level legal
entities, including corporations, to transfer the shares of the particular corporation by which an
employee is directly engaged may make capital lock-in and transferability of equity interest a twoedged sword: advantageous on the one hand but disadvantageous on the other.
Lenders
Both the locking in of capital and transferability are advantageous to lenders: the former to prevent
dissemination of assets providing security for the lenders; and the latter to permit transfer of shares
to parties who may be more capable of creating value for the business or more willing to devote
resources to doing this.
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Distributors and Customers
Blair argues that separate legal entity status assures sales agents and customers that an ongoing
relationship with the corporation, such as continued provision of warranty service, may be
continued and will be backed by the assets sets of the whole business, regardless of changes in
personnel.57
Suppliers and Others
Just as on the output side, Blair argues that suppliers of inputs can rely on the separate legal entity
status of the corporation to continue its relationship with suppliers over time. For example, when
a corporation manufactured products requiring iron or steel seeks to enter into a long-term supply
agreement with the owner of an iron and steel mill, the latter “can be reassured that the assets of
the whole business are backing the commitments made under the contract”58 and regardless of
changes in personnel.
ATTRIBUTE FOUR – CENTRAL MANAGEMENT INDEPENDENT OF EQUITY
OWNERSHIP
Declarative Law
Chapter A1 discusses the statutory role of the board of directors under modern corporate statutes,
which is to manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the corporation;
the related duties of directors; the power of the board of directors to appoint officers,59 which
officers are subject to certain statutory duties;60 and the extensive nature of such general
management powers.61 As Chapter A2 explains, normally the directors are selected by the
shareholders.62 Although participation in the selection of directors is normally a right of holders
of equity shares, no shareholder of a public company has a right, as such, to be a director.
Accordingly, a shareholder is not generally entitled by reason of equity ownership to participate
in management of a public corporation. In this sense, the right to manage or exercise management
of such a corporation is “independent” of equity ownership. As discussed previously, this does not
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entail that directors or officers may not participate in such equity ownership; but, instead, that
equity ownership is not a necessity of, nor does it entitle anyone to participation, in the corporation
as a director or as an officer.
Effects of Legal Separation on Organizational Participation
As discussed, the separation of centralized management from equity ownership (“management
ownership separation”) is an essentialist legal attribute of the corporation. Our corporative analysis
leads to the question of how such separation, as a matter of law, affects the organization and its
participants, more particularly in terms of its organizational essentialist attributes. The related
question, of course is how the organization and its participants, particularly in terms of
organizational essentialist attributes, affect management ownership separation and its
consequences. These two questions are, of course, interrelated and, accordingly, discussing each
distinctively from the other presents substantial difficulties. However, this will be attempted to at
least some extent.
No Prioritization of Management-Equity Ownership Relationship
Unlike a partnership or other business forms, a corporation, as a separate legal entity, is a distinct
rights-and-duty-bearing entity which is, among other things, legally separate and distinct from its
equity contributors, equity owners, or, in the case of the corporation, its shareholders. The
incorporators of the corporation name the first directors, who then issue shares, which enables the
newly incorporated corporation to take any action requiring shareholder approval.63 It is not
necessary that the incorporators become directors or shareholders of the corporation, which comes
into being upon issuance of a certificate of incorporation.
Management ownership separation, accordingly, does not develop subsequent to, but is coeval
with incorporation. Consequently, as part of their overall management powers, the board of
directors is free to develop organizational structures and processes which are independent of the
owners of equity capital in terms of normal course activities, but subject to certain shareholder
powers as previously described. Similarly, shareholders may, but are not required to, take part in
managing the corporation’s business, either as directors or as officers or other employees. Instead,
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the equity contributors cede control over the corporation’s assets and activities to a board that is
legally independent of shareholders64 and has broad powers.65
Independence of Organization from Equity Ownership of Legal Entity
Management ownership separation facilitates the development of organizational structures and
processes which are independent of relationships between shareholders as contributors and owners
of equity, and the one hand, and the corporation, on the other. For example, as discussed
previously, large enterprises which are constituted as corporate groups can be managed from an
organizational perspective in many, if not all, aspects without regard to the existence of separate
legal entities within the corporate group.66
In the result, changes in ownership at the ultimate parent corporation level need not necessarily
affect the organization and its operations below that level. At the same time, changes in ownership
below the ultimate parent corporation level may take some corporations out of the group or may
add corporations to the group, which changes may affect the organization of the overall enterprise.
This work has largely set aside discussions of possible problems with minority interests in
corporations below the ultimate parent corporation level: that is to say, corporations which are
subsidiaries, but not wholly-owned subsidiaries, of the ultimate parent corporation. In those cases,
as previously noted, the duties of directors, and the residual powers of, and remedies available to,
shareholders provide some mitigating influence and protection to minority shareholders.
Commoditization of Equity Interests
As discussed in Chapter Eight, the legal essentialist attributes of SLE status combined with limited
liability and asset partitioning entail that parties having legal and other relations with the
corporation, such as shareholders, directors, and officers and other employees are protected with
respect to such dealings with the corporation, provided that such dealings are regular and lawful.67
Among other things, persons who are prepared to act as directors or officers (or other managers or
employees) are not generally exposed to liability except with respect to the value of any shares
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that they might hold in the corporation irrespective of such office.68 Because the other assets of
shareholders were not exposed to loss on this account, individuals could invest in small amounts
of money without placing their entire wealth at risk, as argued by Henry Manne, Halpern,
Trebilcock, and Turnbull, and others.69 As previously noted, limited liability makes the wealth of
past or future shareholders irrelevant to acquisitions or dispositions of shares by other
shareholders, which enhances transferability, and contributes to the creation of a viable market for
such shares.70
As previously argued, the absence of any requirement to participate in management, together with
limited liability and transferability, facilitates the “financialization” of corporate shares: not only
in treating their purchase as an investment but also in their commodification as investment
instruments or investment securities.71 However, as noted in Chapters Seven72 and Eight,73
management ownership separation, together with separate legal entity status, facilitates
intraorganizational management across, and often largely ignoring, SLE boundaries. Such
intraorganizational organizational unboundedness greatly complicates analysis of a particular
ultimate parent corporation and enterprise from financial performance, financial risk, and
intraorganizational diversification perspectives.74
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Certainty as to Authority – Identity and Capacity
As discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, in order to take action, the corporation, as a separate legal
entity, must act by and through individual human actors.75 As noted there, among the issues which
arise in that connection are issues concerning authority, as to both the identity of the person or
persons having authority, and the limitations of such authority.76 In the case of a general
partnership, subject to the partnership agreement, each general partner has a right to take part in
any aspect of the partnership business. In the result, specialization or delegation of authority by
the partnership to individual partners can only result from the partnership agreement or other
internal arrangements among the partners, which arrangements are normally unknown to
outsiders.77
In the case of the corporation, however, only the board of directors is the primary actor for and on
behalf of the corporation, and it has the authority to make effectively all decisions required to be
made in the normal course of business.78 It appoints immediate subordinate agents to act on behalf
of the corporation, who appoint lower level subordinate agents, and so on, creating a hierarchy of
agents arranged in superior-inferior relationships the result of which is to regularize the
corporation’s dealings and ensure that they are binding upon the corporation.
This would not necessarily be the case in the event that any shareholder, or any shareholder having
a certain percentage of the outstanding shares of the corporation, was entitled to act on its behalf,
in the same way in which general partners are entitled to act on behalf of the partnership concerning
any aspect of its business. Authority and responsibility are delegated and specialized within the
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corporation; however, the doctrines of ostensible and apparent authority protect parties dealing in
good faith with the corporation.79
Stability of the Board of Directors
As previously noted, management ownership separation facilitates the transferability of equity
interests: “management”, both at the board of directors level and at the officer level, need not
change automatically as a result of the transfer of any equity shares. This makes the continuity of
such management, and hence the business strategy and business plan pursued by such
management, likely to survive for a longer period than might otherwise be the case.
For example, if a shareholder was to be entitled to a board seat for every ten per cent shareholding,
then a sale of shares by a shareholder so as to fall below the threshold would have the effect of
displacing such shareholder’s nominee from the board. In certain cases, such as sales by other
shareholders having nominees on the board of directors which took them below that threshold
level, their nominees might be required to resign or otherwise be replaced, which might result in
the board being unable to conduct meetings due to a lack of quorum.
Similarly, an acquisition of shares which took a shareholder from slightly above ten per cent to
slightly above twenty per cent would entitle the shareholder to an additional “board seat”. In the
event that the charter documents provided for a fixed number of directors all of whom are in place
or a maximum number of directors which equaled the number of directors then on the board, this
might require a resignation in order to create room for the new twenty per cent shareholder to
nominate an additional director.80
It can be seen that private share transactions which might be advantageous to particular
shareholders might be complicated by such linkage between share ownership and rights to
participate in management. Furthermore, as previously noted,81 automatic changes in board
79
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membership as a result of changes in ownership status would present significant difficulties,
including difficulties of continuity of strategy and policy.
Management Stability and Organizational Stability
As established in our discussion of resource dependence, strategic contingencies’ theory, and
strategic-contingency theory in Chapter Six, the corporation and other organizations must identify
critical resources upon which it depends for its continuance and must respond to changes relevant
to such dependence, whether in the external or internal environment.82 Such adaptive responses
must, to the greatest extent possible, be consistent with ongoing corporate strategy, structure, and
processes in order to minimize costly disruptions.83 This is facilitated by management ownership
separation, as a result of which board membership does not change automatically upon certain
changes in equity ownership, and by the consequent stabilization of operational management at
the CEO, TMT, and officer levels.
Relative stability of board membership contributes to director tenure for a period which is, ideally,
sufficient to develop the requisite expertise and trust and confidence among board members,84 but
not so long as to inhibit, by reason of friendship, free discussion among the directors.85 A high
level of trust and confidence is particularly valuable with respect to major or “bet the farm”
decisions.86 This is also important with respect to committee assignments, which typically involve
82
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a high level of delegation to a relatively small number of directors, thus requiring a high level of
confidence in them on the part of the other directors.87 Often such committee assignments involve
responses to crisis situations and other circumstances requiring immediate responses by the board
of directors, such as approaches with respect to “friendly” takeover bids (or tender offers, in the
American parlance) or mergers.88 While such committee assignments avail the opportunity to get
to know other committee members more closely, external time and other pressures mitigate against
this to some extent, and also create a certain intensity which may be inimical to developing such
awareness.89
Perhaps for the first time explicitly in academic literature, this book has suggested that the board
of directors can be analyzed as, and may actually constitute, an intraorganizational organization.
This applies the corporative perspective, combining a legal analysis of the corporation as a legal
entity and an organizational analysis of the corporation as an organization. It is argued that the
board of directors, alone or together with the TMT, constitutes an intraorganizational organization:
an organization within an organization involving, as such organization, a social unit or group of
people collaborating on an intendedly rational basis to seek to accomplish a common goal or
objective or, perhaps, more than one such common goals or objectives.
Top Management Team Stability and Organizational Stability
The perspective that the Top Management Team, alone or together with the board of directors,
constitutes the “dominant coalition” of individuals responsible for setting firm direction, as
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maintained by Cyert and March and by Mintzberg,90 is discussed in Chapter Six.91 Chandler
asserted that management control eventually replaced board of directors control, although, to be
sure, even when board of directors control prevailed its members were largely full-time
executives.92 Berle and Means, of course, maintained that the separation of equity ownership from
“management” referred to both the board of directors and the TMT, although, because directors
were the relevant time mostly senior officers, Mizruchi interpreted this to mean that the board was
in control.93
TMT Collaboration and Stability
As previously noted, that chapter also considers whether the TMT, alone or together with the board
of directors, constitutes an intraorganizational organization, by reason of possessing the attributes
discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph. Although a thoroughgoing analysis of that
characterization goes beyond the scope of the present work, Chapter Six considers each of the
attributes of the organization in connection with the board of directors and in connection with the
TMT.94
A prominent issue in that regard is the “teamness” of the TMT. While not addressing the question
raised here whether the TMT can be considered and evaluated as an intraorganizational
organization, a study referenced in Chapter Six by Annaloes Raes et al.95 considers the ways in
which the TMT takes collective action vis-à-vis the middle managers who are subordinate to the
TMT and how identification with, and loyalty and commitment to intraorganizational components
(which may actually be intraorganizational organizations, as may be indicated by the criteria
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referenced in the present work) affects such interactions, which they claim may be fewer in number
than in other superior-inferior relationships.
As noted in the first paragraph of this chapter under the heading “Management Stability and
Organizational Stability”, the board of directors, CEO and TMT are expected to scan the internal
and external environments, and identify, and react appropriately to, such changes. An intended
result of specialization and delegation is to ensure that members of the TMT perform this task with
respect to their areas of authority and responsibility, in effect, separately, but collaboratively.
Consequently, as some minimum period of tenure of the TMT as a group may be expected to
promote greater trust in areas in which not only separate performance of individual TMT members
is operative, but also in which collaborative performance is operative, the board, the CEO, and the
other non-focal members of the TMT may express greater trust and confidence in the focal TMT
member both in terms of individual tasks, including scanning and action, and collaborative tasks,
including collaborative scanning and action. Rapid changes in board membership, such as might
be effected as a result of automatic changes in shareholding might be expected to increase CEO
and TMT changeover, thereby affecting trust and confidence at these various levels.
Cyert and March, and Mintzberg, identify the dominant coalition with the TMT.96 In some cases,
the dominance of certain functional groups changes over time in response to environmental and
other changes as noted by Chandler, Salancik and Pfeffer, and Perrow.97 In the normal course,
absent some critical event such as a proxy battle or takeover bid, such changes may be expected
to be more gradual rather than dramatic single events.98 Again, automatic changes in board
membership as a result of the absence of management ownership separation might have a negative
effect in this regard.
A related consideration, as noted in Chapter Six, is that individual members of the TMT have no
collective, but only individual, legal responsibilities to the corporation.99 Accordingly, the extent

96

See the discussion in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals" under the heading
"The Dominant Coalition as Intraorganizational Group".
97
See the discussion in Chapter Six in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals" under
the heading "Intraorganizational Goals, Power, and Loyalty", particularly under the subheading "Changes in the
Dominant Coalition or Top Management Team".
98
Ibid.
99
See the discussion in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals" under the heading
"The Dominant Coalition is Intraorganizational Group" and therein under the subheading "Top Management Teams
and Collective Action".

628

of collaboration among TMT members is a factor, as a matter of law, principally (if exclusively)
by considerations of individual legal duty. Failure to “collaborate effectively” with other TMT
members may be a factor in performance assessment of the focal individual, but cannot necessarily
be assumed to be a separate head of legal duty. In any event, any legal duty of effective
collaboration would likely assume reciprocity, limitations on which might affect the duty of the
focal officer. The complexities which attend such effective collaboration are discussed throughout
the present work. At the same time, however, sanctions, both positive and negative, are often based
partly on individual performance and partly on a collective performance.100 Thus, collaboration
can be congruent with the personal goals of TMT members.
As noted in Chapters Five101 and Six,102 because the requisite transmission of information and
instructions involves a significant element of subjectivity, such transmission may be impaired by
frequent changes in board, TMT, and lower level officer personnel. Raes and her co-authors have
concluded that such transmission between the TMT and officers reporting to individual TMT
members is further complicated by the dual role of such officers as TMT subordinates and as
representatives of their focal business unit.103 They say that the limited extent of interaction
between TMT members and their direct reports limits the opportunities for generating trust.104 As
previously noted, this may be expected to be the case with board-TMT member interaction as well.
TMT and Goal Stability
As established in Chapter Three, the corporation may be considered as a conflict system for
internal and external conflicts, for resolving these by ordering joint preferences,105 and for
implementing and effecting the same.106 As demonstrated in Chapter Six, the organization as a
whole may have separate official or explicit goals, as well as operative or implicit goals.107 In the
100
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case of the corporation, unless otherwise determined by the charter documents (which would be
rare in the case of modern business corporations unless established for some highly particular
purpose), such goals are generally promulgated by the board of directors. However, each
intraorganizational component may establish its own goals.108
Ideally, of course, the goals of the organization as a whole and of its individual components should
be completely aligned; however, the extent of such alignment is affected by the power and
influence of any particular individual component.109 Changes in such power and influence may
result from changes in the board, the TMT, other officers, and component-level management. Such
changes, in turn, may produce a realignment of organizational and intraorganizational goals. It is
apparent that the automaticity of board changes as a result of equity ownership changes would
exacerbate the need for, and the difficulties of effecting, such realignment on a timely basis.
Adaptational Costs of TMT Instability
Accordingly, management ownership separation may be expected to reduce the frequency of such
changes and thereby improve the extent of alignment as between organizational and
intraorganizational goals. This, in turn, may be expected to reduce the expenditure of time,
financial, and other resources in trying to adapt to frequent goal changes, at least some of which
may be relatively, even highly, unproductive. For example, variations of slightly different
hierarchies of goals at the level of the ultimate parent corporation may be expected, in many, if not
all, cases, to require component level hierarchical variations. Returning, say, to the original
hierarchy at the level of the ultimate parent at some later time might result, in significant ways, in
the expenditures of resources at many, or even all, of the various organizational levels.
Further lack of synchronicity of the organization with its internal and external environments as a
result of TMT changes may require further readjustment, sometimes by means of experimentation,
which can be extremely costly.110 The cost of readjustments includes the time necessary to absorb
changes. Investment of time and financial and other investments in retooling the organization may,

108

See, in particular, the discussion in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals".
See the discussion in Chapter Six in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals",
especially under the headings "Intraorganizational Goals, Power, and Loyalty", "Organizational Goals and Corporate
Operations", and "Goals of Corporations".
110
See the discussion in Chapter Two in the section entitled "History of the Development of the Modern Business
Corporation" and in Chapter Six, particularly in the sections entitled "Existence and Typology of Organizational Goals
and Objectives" and "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals".
109

630

in at least some cases, be expected to diminish profitability, return on equity, and share price,
which may result in the corporation become more vulnerable to takeovers driven by price rather
than as a means of disciplining non-performing management. As established by Hirschman and
other chroniclers of organizational failure, quite apart from takeover exposure, the results may be
expressed in a “cascade to the bottom”.111
Effecting changes in the organizational structure, processes, and personnel requires the exercise of
power, which, as noted by Bierstedt and Weber, is required to guarantee the continuance of the
organization, but which is not unlimited.112 Intraorganizational components of the organization
may employ power and influence in an effort to preserve or secure intraorganizational advantage
in such circumstances. As Barnard and Bierstedt indicate, the exercise of formal organizational
authority may be mitigated by informal relationships and authority.113 The expenditure of authority
as a resource frequently is, or should be, a considered decision, and, accordingly, must be weighed
in the light of alternative such expenditures. Unnecessary or inappropriate exercises of authority
may mitigate its employment in other circumstances.
Management as a Separate Organizational Component and Constituency
Divorcing management from equity ownership permits the development of the organization of the
corporation independently, to a greater or lesser extent, and thereby increases the
professionalization of management, both at the board level, and at the level of the TMT,
subordinate officers and other managers. As Chandler indicated, management or administration,
as he calls it, is perceived to be a separate function within the corporation.114 The adoption of
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specialization and delegation in pursuit of rationality and efficiency was observed by Weber in
connection with formal organizations generally,115 including the corporation.116
In turn, management or administration becomes professionalized,117 and its practitioners adopt an
attitude of professionalization as part of their own self-image.118 Lipartito and Morii emphasize
that Berle and Means focused not on the separation of management and control leading to a
principal-agent conflict, as maintained by some later writers, but, instead, on the separation of
ownership and control, namely, management exercising control over a corporation “owned” by
others: the managerial corporation.119
As discussed previously, management ownership separation contributes to professional
management seeking satisfaction which is not entirely monetary, as noted by William Baumol and
by Robin Marris, providing perquisites, say Lipartito and Morii, such as salary, staff, and
discretionary investments,120 as well as prestige, power, and job satisfaction.121 Instead,
professional management may focus on sustaining satisfactory profits and performance over a
relatively long term horizon, and on growth, as noted by Buchanan (“growth not profits”),122 rather
than maximizing profits in the short-term.123 Instead, professional managers might be even “more
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focused on profit and performance than the classic owner-manager, with his or her diverse menu
of subjective motivations” and a greater motivation, by virtue of fiduciary duty, to suppress their
own self-interest.124
Members of management, considering management as full-time employees of the corporation
(“Management”), which thereby excludes members of the board of directors in their capacity as
directors but includes the CEO, TMT and other officers, are agents of the corporation and are
subject to employment relationships,125 the consequences of which have been discussed
previously.126 Relationships and behaviour in such a professionalized environment become
formalized and standardized in certain respects, as delineated by Weber;127 however, informal
relationships and organizational structures continue to be operative.128
As explicated extensively in Chapter Four of this book, directors and members of Management
adapt their social identities to incorporate their roles and functions within the organization.129
Some commentators even consider this to involve their adoption of a “corporate personality”.130
These factors, including more specific characteristics of the situation and other personal
characteristics, affect the actual behaviour of directors and members of Management.131
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Administrative Coordination and Professionalization
In addition to collaboration, delegation and specialization of intraorganizational functions require
coordination, both at similar, and at different, hierarchical levels. As described in Chapter Two,
Chandler separates activities which he identifies as administrative (rather than functional) into
coordination, appraisal, and planning.132 As demonstrated there, these administrative, as well as
functional, activities take place at various levels of management, which are differentiated by task,
authority, and means of control.133
Cheffins, following Chandler, Berle and Means, and others, comments on the “basic business logic
assumed to underpin the divorce between ownership and control”, namely, that as business
enterprises became more complex and physically decentralized their continued success “was
contingent upon developing robust managerial capabilities buttressed by the hiring of careeroriented, professionally trained executives”, the talent pool for which was greatly expanded by
eliminating stock ownership as a necessary qualification for top executive posts.134
As explained in Chapter Eight, and as noted by Holmstrom and Tirole, the organizational problem
of coordinating actions, which is time-consuming and laborious even when organizational
participants share common organizational goals is further complicated when this is not the case
and where they have different information and different informational expertise.135 For example,
Bartlett and Ghoshal explain that the corporation’s objectives and standards must be
communicated from the highest levels (the Board, CEO, and TMT) down to the front-line
managers, while business needs and opportunities must be communicated in the reverse direction,
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from front-line managers to corporate level managers.136 According to the eminent managerial
theorist, Joseph Bower, the level of detail required to make informed decisions is too great for it
to be evaluated by top management.137
Accordingly, like Chandler, Bower considered the key role of middle management to be the
selection, screening and interpretation of information.138 Chandler considered the role of staff at
department, division, and corporate levels to be acting as a check on information provided
upwards, but Bower considered their role as more political, in effect, in terms of assessing the
upward flow of requests, proposals, estimates and other information against, at least in part, the
past evaluations of the managers providing it.139 This required middle management to focus not
only on content of projects proposed, “but also on the process by which they were developed and
the credibility and commitment of those proposing them.”140 Ideally, the communication by top
management of its corporate objectives and priorities to middle management should facilitate the
middle management process of selecting, screening, and interpreting information for upward
transmission.141
In addition, delegation and specialization, which contributes to the creation of such information
asymmetry, also contributes to the creation of intraorganizational groups, intraorganizational
goals, and intraorganizational identification, loyalty and commitment, as delineated in Chapters
Five142 and Six.143 These of course, further exacerbate problems of coordination.
The development and modification of organizational relations, as explicated by Weber,144 has been
shown by Chandler to be influenced by historical factors, to demonstrate significant path
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dependence, and to create a relationship between strategy and structure,145 and, ultimately, to result
in what Chandler denominates as the “managerial corporation”, as discussed previously.146 As
noted here, this organizational development is facilitated by the legal essentialist characteristic of
what has been denominated here as management ownership separation.
As will be further discussed below, because the equity owners are neither those who supervise
Management (or operating management), which is the role of the board of directors, or who
undertake management of the corporation, namely, Management (or operating management), even
if this may not be the case otherwise (which is not assumed here), the interests of the equity
contributors of the corporation (shareholders) are, in consequence, not necessarily the only
interests considered by the board or by other management, whether in seeking to resolve joint
preference conflicts or otherwise.
Management ownership separation, by reducing or eliminating the correspondence between
management and equity ownership, significantly enlarges the opportunity for management to
consider the whole range of organizational participants in making decisions. The lack of
dependence of the management prerogative on ownership of equity shares entails that management
may own a significant block of shares on the one hand, or, on the other, may own none.
Management Ownership Separation and Organizational Participants
As already discussed in this work, the legal essentialist attribute of management ownership
separation has various implications not only for the organization in terms of structure, processes,
and personnel but also for organizational participants. It may be convenient, however, to recall
some of these briefly, at this point.
Shareholders
As shown in Chapter Seven, the corporation’s legal status as a separate legal entity in respect of
which equity contributors acquire rights against the corporation evidenced by means of shares
separates equity contribution from the legal entity, and the legal entity from the legal holders of
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rights with respect to the corporation itself, unlike the case of a partnership, and requires
establishment of a primordial human actor or actors to take action for and on its behalf: namely,
the board of directors.147 The choice of the board of directors as the corporation’s primary human
actor, rather than, say, a shareholder holding a majority or plurality of the shares, in itself effects
the separation of equity ownership from management.
As demonstrated in Chapter Eight, limited liability and asset partitioning permit commodification
of corporate shares and their treatment as investments, although management of the organization
across intracorporate legal boundaries, which is often the practice, complicates investment and risk
analysis. Organizational advantages are very often not required to be disclosed, often partly as a
result of the interaction of intracorporate legal boundaries and disclosure requirements, and may
be thought to be proprietary and confidential information to be protected from securities markets,
as well as from competitors. Thus, proposals for divestitures or restructurings may ignore existing
organizational practices and advantages which are not of such a nature as to be immediately
apparent to outsiders.148
Capital lock-in and transferability permits management to be treated as a career, since the absence
of the ability to withdraw capital contributes to the stability of ongoing operations, while the ability
to transfer shares provides a safety valve in respect of changes in personal circumstances, outlook
for the corporation, and shareholder satisfaction with management, as noted earlier in the present
chapter.149
As noted in the present chapter, also, the indefinite duration of corporate existence, when combined
with the normal objective of management of an organization to ensure its continuance, facilitates
the adoption of a long-term perspective on its operations, as well as short-term and medium-term
perspectives. In turn, this permits the board and other management to consider the interests of
organizational participants over such various time horizons, which necessarily includes parties
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who may participate in the organization and engage in legal relations with the corporation in the
future.
Directors
It is apparent, from the foregoing and otherwise, that management ownership separation has
significant effects on the board of directors and on its members who are not automatically required
as a matter of corporate law to be shareholders,150 but have complete authority in respect of its
day-to-day management, as discussed in Chapters Seven151 and Eight152 and in the earlier chapters
referenced therein.153 As the primary human actor on behalf of the corporation, the board of
directors, when acting in accordance with its duties, has no legal liability either to the corporation
or as a result of such membership, as a result of its SLE status, limited liability and asset
partitioning. Accordingly, the board is free to consider how to best advance the interests of the
corporation.
The Board as Intraorganizational Organization or Component
As previously noted in this chapter, the board of directors does not automatically change as a result
of changes in shareholdings and, in consequence, can develop over time as a social group or as an
intraorganizational organization, as explicated in Chapters Four,154 Five,155 and Six.156
Chapter Six maintained that individuals may develop loyalty not only to the organization but also
to intraorganizational components within the organization, which may be considered in
appropriate cases, to constitute intraorganizational organizations, organizations in their own right
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which subsist within the umbrella organization.157 As explicated there,158 the board is a group of
individuals who collaborate towards the achievement of a common goal and, accordingly, may be
denominated as an intraorganizational organization. In the case of the board of directors, whether
or not this is the case, individual directors may acquire and exhibit identification with, and
commitment to, and loyalty towards, the board of directors as an intraorganizational component.159
Commitment, at least partly because of its relationship to effort and thence to task effectiveness,160
has been shown to have a strong influence on group performance,161 apparently including that of
boards of directors.162
Organizational Knowledge as a Firm-Specific Investment
As previously established, individual directors, assuming that they are not “inside” directors who
have such investments otherwise, also make firm-specific investments in the corporation on whose
board of directors they serve in connection with that service.163 These include becoming
acquainted and developing relationships of trust with the other directors (which has been shown
to increase commitment),164 learning about the corporation and the industry or industries in which
it operates, and learning about the organizational aspects of the corporation, including its
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organizational structures, processes, and personnel, all of which may affect the individual
director’s knowledge and decision-making capacity.165
Effectiveness in such tasks166 may be expected to be reflected in enhancements in the director’s
personal reputation as a director167 among other members of the board, who may transmit such
information to individuals who are directors of other corporations,168 thereby enhancing the
director’s reputation externally,169 which may, in turn, secure additional board appointments.170
Similarly, outside directors, may be disciplined for poor performance.171 However, directors are
also considered to constitute decision-making experts, a description which suggests the
transferability of the related skills and experience. Although the skills and experience may be
transferable, to the benefit of the director and the corporation to whose board corporation he or she
is appointed, specific knowledge and information about the focal corporation may not be.
As Chapter A1 demonstrates,172 specific knowledge concerning the organization by which the
corporation’s business is conducted is essential to the discharge of the board’s management
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function and duties. This is particularly the case, in certain statutes, which expressly assign to the
board responsibility not only for management or supervision of the corporation’s business but also
for its “affairs”, which is defined to mean “the relationships among the corporation, its affiliates,
and the shareholders, directors and officers of such bodies corporate but does not include the
business carried on by such bodies corporate”.173 The responsibility for “affairs” has received scant
attention in legal literature, concerning such duties or otherwise.174
The logical construction of this express assignment of responsibility, together with the definition
of the term “affairs”, is that the responsibility of the board of directors in such cases (leaving aside,
for further discussion, whether it obtains without any express assignment), includes responsibility
for managing or supervising legal relationships in which affiliates of the focal corporation, and the
shareholders, directors and officers of the focal corporation act as legal counterparties of the
corporation or act as intraorganizational participants. This is potentially important in connection
with the oppression remedy, discussed in Chapter A2.175 For example, in an appropriate case, the
oppression remedy might be applied with respect to the corporate essentialist attribute of limited
liability and asset partitioning in such a way as to impose liability on other corporations other than
the focal corporation which are owned by the same ultimate parent corporation (that is, within the
same corporate group, enterprise, or group of companies comprising a particular enterprise) with
respect to obligations of the focal corporation.
Suppliers, employees, and customers in a legal relationship (and hence being legal counterparties)
with, and hence organizational participants in, a corporate group) might be able to assert rights
against other corporations in the corporate group other than the focal corporation with which they
have a legal relationship. Employees of long standing who are “transferred” to another corporation
within the group might employ the oppression remedy to claim benefits, such as pensions, based
on their employment by corporations within the overall corporate group, rather than just with the
particular focal corporation. Suppliers with long-term contracts might endeavour to assert rights
against other corporations within the group after the bankruptcy or insolvency of the focal
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corporation who was their legal counterparty. In effect, the liabilities of corporations within the
same group could be consolidated, as a matter of law, just as they would be for accounting
purposes. As argued in Chapter A2, by means of the oppression remedy, the legal rights of such
parties as legal counterparties of the corporation could be aligned with the expectations of such
parties as organizational participants, which otherwise might have been frustrated.
It must be noted that most, if not all, of the organizational information and background required to
manage or supervise the management of such relationships, as well as the business of the
corporation, is firm-specific and thus is not transferable to a directorial role with another
corporation. Instead, it is a “sunk cost” to be employed while a director of the focal corporation,
which then becomes a “stranded asset” subsequently. Of course, to the extent that it results in
enhancements in the focal director’s reputation as a director, it may also improve the director’s
status and value in the “market for directors” and result in additional board appointments.
Officers, Managers, and Other Employees
Chapter A3 explicates the roles of officers, managers, and other employees (collectively,
“Managers”) as agents of the corporation appointed by the human actor authorized to act on behalf
of the corporation and, in that capacity, to appoint agents, and to authorize such agents to appoint
sub-agents, with various capacities and responsibilities and at various levels.176 Chapter A1
examines issues relating to the appointment and duties of Managers.177
Chapter Seven discussed the interrelationship of the corporation as a separate legal entity and the
organization which enables it to act and, in particular, discussed the roles of Managers as
organizational participants and as persons having legal relations with the corporation as a legal
entity.178 It noted that the scope of authority of individuals when acting externally, or vis-à-vis
outsiders to the corporation, may be affected by ostensible or apparent authority, which, however,
is complicated by Managers who act across intraorganizational legal boundaries or who exercise
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informal authority or responsibility which is recognized within the organization but not necessarily
recognized without the organization.
Chapter Eight examined the interrelationship between limited liability and asset partitioning, as
essentialist legal attributes of the corporation and the organization, including the legal and
organizational positions of Managers.179 Although Managers ordinarily have no external liability
to outsiders for breach of duty, as a result of limited liability and asset partitioning, as well as rights
of indemnification, they may incur liability to the corporation in certain circumstances.
Importantly, however, they may not be able to protect themselves adequately in respect of
intraorganizational boundaries, including those which limit the liability of components of the
organization which are legally constituted as corporations or other separate legal entities and are
characterized by limited liability and asset partitioning. Consequently, an argument arises in favour
of consolidation of liabilities to Managers across the entire organization and enterprise.
The previous sections of the present chapter considered the legal essentialist attribute of capital
lock-in with transferable equity interests in respect of the same issues and organizational
participants.180 A pre-eminent consideration is the extent to which Managers make investments in
the enterprise which are not transferable outside the corporate group.181 The considerations
specified under this heading of the chapter are also relevant to management ownership separation.
Lenders
As is the case with respect to the other categories of organizational participants discussed
previously under the present heading, the interrelationship between the legal essentialist attributes
discussed previously and organizational essentialist and other attributes also obtain with respect to
management ownership separation and are discussed in this and the two immediately preceding
chapters of this work: Chapter Seven with respect to separate legal entity status;182 Chapter Eight
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with respect to limited liability and asset partitioning;183 and the earlier part of the present chapter
with respect to capital lock-in and transferability.184
Of course, importantly, management ownership separation presents a challenging binary for
lenders, the discussion of which here excludes trade creditors. On the one hand, it facilitates
evaluating the creditworthiness of the focal corporation independently of organizational
advantages and management continuity, which often entails focusing excessively on asset values,
rather than the capacity of the enterprise to generate sustainable earnings and growth. On the other
hand, focus on asset values concentrates on realizable values of assets as recognized by third
parties who may seek to acquire such assets in the event of realization by lenders in a distress
situation. Again, this approach often undervalues organizational advantages and management
continuity and as such, may be overly conservative.
In point of fact, lenders are normally highly dependent upon the capabilities of the CEO, and the
TMT, and other Management. Lenders are also subject to legal boundaries within the overall
enterprise a corporate group, in consequence of which they may seek guarantees or other forms of
cross-collateralization or covenants prescribing certain intraorganizational practices, such as
transfer pricing below market prices, such as to limit or proscribe it by positive or negative
covenants, whether general or specific. As explicated here, management of the organization or
enterprise across legal boundaries may operate both formally and informally, and the means by
which this is effected may be difficult for outsiders to discern; as a result of which outsiders may
not be aware of the extent to which it is operative and of the effects which it has from a corporative
perspective, including both legal and organizational effects. It is submitted that a partial response
to such complications may be afforded by developing increasing sophistication in these legal and
organizational; that is to say, corporative, aspects.
Such a credit underwriting process is likely to involve significant costs, some of which the lenders
may seek to pass on the borrowers by way of interest rates or credit investigation or underwriting
fees, and some of which, likely to be a smaller portion, they may, instead, absorb themselves. This
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credit investigation or underwriting process may require skills and experience which bankers
focused on asset-based lending may not necessarily possess. Thus, it may be necessary to acquire
new, or to train existing, bankers in respect of these skills. Importantly, however, such credit
assessment processes focus on relationships between strategy and structure and other matters
thought to be highly determinative of business success. The corporative perspective both permits
and encourages focus on these elements of business activities.
Distributors and Customers, Suppliers, and Others
As discussed in Chapter Seven,185 depending on the degree of control which the focal corporation
has over its distributors and its suppliers and the nature of its relationship with customers and
others, such parties may be considered to be organizational participants, as well as parties having
legal relations with the corporation as a legal entity. As in the case of lenders, a closer relationship
with the corporation, as an organizational participant, that is to say, a higher degree of integration
between the two parties, may affect the legal rights of such parties, who may be considered to
possess certain knowledge of its internal organization which may, in some cases, prevent their
insistence, or in other cases, the corporation’s insistence, upon strict legal rights.
Chapter Eight indicates that distributors, customers, suppliers, and others may identify with,
exhibit commitment to, and exhibit loyalty towards, the focal corporation or enterprise in a manner
and to an extent commensurate with their participation in the organization.186 Such attitudes may,
as explained in Chapter A2 (with respect to shareholders), reduce the tendency of such parties to
exit from the relevant relationship in the event of negative developments and increase their
tendency to exercise their right of voice in such circumstances: protesting changes to, rather than
leaving, the relationship.187
As explained earlier in this chapter, capital lock-in and transferability contribute to a higher
comfort level on the part of participants,188 in this case distributors, customers, suppliers, and
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others, in their dealings with the corporation, particularly in the case of long-term arrangements.
As explained above, greater continuity of the board of directors, the CEO, TMT and other officers
and managers as a result of management ownership separation also contributes in this regard.
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CHAPTER TEN – A CORPORATIVE THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE –PART D
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter completes our investigation of the relationship and interaction between and among
the legal essentialist characteristics of the modern business corporation as a legal entity, as
described in Part 1 and, in more detail, in Appendix A, of this book, and its organizational
essentialist characteristics, as an organization, as described in Parts 2 and 3 of the book.
This chapter considers the fifth legal essentialist attribute namely, its indefinite duration and
theoretically possible perpetual existence. As in the case of the preceding two chapters, the three
chapters need to be considered together. Many of the relevant matters that are discussed in portions
of the text in relation to one legal essentialist attribute also bear on other legal essentialist attributes.
In the result, each of the chapters supplements and amplifies discussion of those legal essentialist
attributes and the organizational essentialist attributes in one place or the other. The next chapter
endeavours to summarize the argument of the book, to delineate some of the current challenges to
contemporary capitalism and to the modern business corporation, and to indicate how corporative
theory can facilitate responses to those challenges.
ATTRIBUTE FIVE – INDEFINITE DURATION OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE
LEGAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
Declarative Law
Chapter One1 explains that, rather than expressly providing that a corporation has perpetual
existence, modern corporate law statutes are often silent on the subject, but provide for termination
of the corporation’s existence in certain stipulated manners, voluntarily or involuntarily.2 Some
statutes permit the articles to limit the duration of the corporation, which, apparently, is rarely
effected.3 For example, Delaware permits the articles to contain a provision limiting the duration
1

See the discussion in the section entitled "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism in Law" under the heading
"Essential Attributes of the Corporation in Law" and therein under the subheading "Indefinite Duration".
2
See e.g. the Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA], s 207ff; and the Ontario Business
Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16 [OBCA], s 191ff.
3
See e.g. the Delaware General Corporation Law, also known as the "Delaware Code", 8 Del Code, c 1, § 101 [DGCL],
§ 102(b)(5). The Model Business Corporations Act, American Bar Association, Model Business Corporation Act
Annotated, 4th ed, (Chicago: American Bar Association, 2008) [MBCA]. § 2.02 (a) of the MBCA does not require to
be contained in the articles any provision setting the duration of the corporation's existence, which is considered,
accordingly, to be perpetual. § 2.02 (b) (2) (iii), which permits the articles to set forth provisions not inconsistent with
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of the corporation’s existence provides that “otherwise the corporation shall have perpetual
existence”.4 The Model Business Corporations Act is similar.5
Consequently, in the case of a public corporation, it can be assumed that it has indefinite and
possibly perpetual existence (“IE”). Attention now turns to examining the interaction of IE with
respect to the corporation’s other legal essentialist attributes. Generally speaking, it may be said
that IE amplifies the importance of the others.
Relation to Other Legal Essentialist Attributes
It is, of course, the SLE attribute which enables the corporation to have a lifespan beyond those of
its legal counterparties (who are individuals) and its organizational participants (who are
individuals). As explicated in Chapter Seven, as a legal entity, the corporation lacks the capacity
to take action except through individual human actors: firstly, the board of directors; and, secondly,
those to whom the board of directors delegates authority to act on behalf of the corporation.6 The
IE attribute makes it apparent that there may be a succession of such boards of directors, individual
directors, and board delegates over the corporation’s lifespan.
Likewise, there may be a succession of legal counterparties and organizational participants,
including shareholders, officers, managers and employees, suppliers and customers, as well as the
board of directors and individual directors in relation to the corporation as such. As discussed in
Chapter Four, while the identity of the participants in the organization may change over time, this
does not affect the continuance of the organization as such, which is a separate social entity. 7 The
tendency towards organizational preservation as an objective of any organization may be
complicated by reason of the IE of the corporation as a SLE, thus entailing many successions in
organizational membership or participation.8 In fact, IE may highlight the importance, as well as
law, inter alia, "defining, limiting, and regulating the powers of the corporation", allows a shorter duration to be
inserted in the articles, according to the Official Comment.
4
DGCL, § 102(b)(5).
5
Supra note 158. § 3.02 of the MBCA specifically states that, unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise,
every corporation has perpetual duration.
6
See the discussion in the sections entitled "The Corporation, the Legal Entity, the Organization, and the Participants"
and "The Separate Legal Entity, the Organization, and the Individual Human Actor"; and discussion in Appendix A,
particularly in Chapter A3 in the section entitled "The Corporation as Principal".
7
See the discussion in Chapter Four in the section entitled “Working Definitions and Formal Definitions.”
8
See the discussions in Chapter Six in the section entitled "Existence and Typology of Organizational Goals and
Objectives", particularly under the headings "Existential Goals and Objectives", and "Official or Explicit Goals and
Operative or Implicit Goals"; and in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals",
especially under the headings "Organizational Goals and Corporate Operations" and " Goals of Corporations".
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the difficulties, of acculturating and integrating new members into the group, of them acquiring a
new social identity, and of the symbols and rituals attached to the same.9
As will be further discussed below, the corporation and those who are its legal counterparties and
organizational participants, both at the focal time and other salient times, will have interests across
a temporal spectrum ranging from immediate or short term interests to long term interests, and
some of those will have interests across, or at various points of, that temporal spectrum. The sheer
numbers of legal counterparties and organizational participants over a long period of time, never
mind a theoretically indefinite one, could be mind-numbing.
Except in the case of legal counterparties and organizational participants which are also
corporations or otherwise possess IE, the interests of longest duration will be those of the focal
corporation itself. Accordingly, as noted below, in fulfilling their duties to act “honestly and in
good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation”, and to “exercise the care, diligence
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances”,10 the
board of directors must consider what the best interest of the corporation might be across the broad
time spectrum of the corporation’s likely and possible existence or duration.
The IE attribute highlights the importance of the rights of shareholders with respect to selecting
management, approving director interested contracts and fundamental or other actions or
transactions, and exercising voice by way of shareholder proposals and requisitions for meetings,11
as well as exercising a right of exit by way of transfer of shares without which a shareholder could
never dispose of such investment.12
It goes without saying that, at least in the case of ownership of shares by individuals, partnerships,
or other entities not possessing the attribute of IE, the importance of management ownership
separation is further attenuated by IE. Because of IE, the consequences of management actions
may extend for long period into the future. Excessively “long-tailed” (long-duration) liabilities

9

Supra note 6. See also the discussion in Chapter Four in the section entitled "Groups of People or Social Units".
Supra note 6. See also the discussion in Chapter A1 in the section entitled "Management Role of the Board of
Directors".
11
Supra note 6. See also the discussion in Chapter A2 in the section entitled "Legal and Management-Related Rights
of Shareholders".
12
Supra note 6. See also the discussions in Chapter A2 in the section entitled "Shareholder Rights Beyond Voting";
in Chapter Eight in the sections entitled "Asset Partitioning and Policy Considerations" and "Implications of
Organizational Analysis for Limited Liability and Asset Partitioning"; and in the present chapter in the sections entitled
"Capital Lock-In with Transferable Equity Interests" and "Central Management Independent of Equity Ownership".
10
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may arise which may not “fall in” or become concretized for a long time, for example, a breach of
environmental or other laws in the present the damage from which eventuates at a point in time
well into the future but while the corporation itself still subsists. IE thus heightens concerns about
responsibility, authority, and control mechanisms to ensure that members of management do not
create excessively long-tailed liabilities which may affect the corporation and its legal
counterparties and organizational participants, including the society and polity concerned.
Problems of Intertemporal Choice
Considered purely as a matter of logic, the problems of intertemporal choice, considered simply
as choices made at one point in time which affect choices to be made at a point in the future, must
increase to a considerable degree when the length of time over which such choices must be made
is indefinite and may theoretically approach perpetuity. The construction of means-ends
relationships and the expectation of satisfaction from the attainment of specified goals and
objectives must be considered to be extremely problematic over extremely long time-frames.13
The difficulties of procuring collaboration and cooperation in an intendedly rational manner
among organizational participants14 over an indefinite time frame and, at least theoretically,
possibly in perpetuity, in order to accomplish common goals and objectives,15 which may
themselves change over time, can seem formidable. These issues are presented dramatically in the
contemporary debate concerning “short-termism” and “long-termism” to which we now turn.

13

In this regard, see the discussions in Chapter Three in the sections entitled "Barriers to Unified Action" and
"Organizations as Political Systems"; in Chapter Five in the section entitled "Structure, Process, and Personnel" and
therein under the headings "Rationality, Organizations, and Efficiency" and "Individual Bounded Rationality, and
Rulemaking"; and in Chapter Six, especially in the section entitled "Existence and Typology of Organizational Goals
and Objectives". Some of the subjects referenced in those chapters are the subjects of more detailed discussions in
Appendix B, particularly in Chapter B4 in the sections entitled "Atomistic Utilitarianism", and "Atomism and
Methodological Individualism"; and in Chapter B5 in the sections entitled "Individual Determination of Utility" and
"Independent Rational Informed Actors".
14
See the discussion in Chapter Five, particularly in the section entitled "Structure, Process, and Personnel".
15
See the discussion in Chapter Six, particularly in the sections entitled "Existence and Typology of Organizational
Goals and Objectives" and "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals".
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SHORT-TERMISM, LONG-TERMISM, AND INDEFINITE EXISTENCE
The Problem Stated
Purpose and Scope of This Discussion
As generally conceived, short-termism is considered to be the tendency to over-emphasize shortterm objectives at the expense of long-term objectives. This will be considered in greater detail
below. However, even this introductory statement presents a number of issues, including, what are
the objectives of the corporation, in general and in the instant case; the respective salience of those
objectives; how those objectives may be classified, on the one hand, as short-term, and on the other
hand, as long-term; how their attainment might be measured; how the pursuit, achievement, and
measurement of those objectives are inter-related; and how the structure and processes of the
corporation relate to the foregoing. Other primary questions relate to the right amount of emphasis
to be placed on short-term and on long-term objectives, whether the answer to this question is
affected by the salience of those objectives, how the presence of under-emphasis and overemphasis can be determined, and whether such determinations are affected by the identity of the
person or entity making such determination.
This section will present evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, concerning the existence and
perceived existence of short-termism and of its adverse and non-adverse effects. It presents a brief
and summary explanation of how economic, personnel, and organizational elements influence
intertemporal decision-making. It advances some explanations from relevant literature concerning
the relationship between market influences more remote or external to the corporation and
organizational influences more proximate or internal to the corporation.
It also presents the conclusions of some commentators concerning how disclosure obligations may
affect the behaviour of the corporation and its internal organization, as well as how the corporation
and its internal organization may, on the one hand, moderate and reduce or, on the other hand,
attenuate and increase, the effects of external influences, including market and regulatory
influences, on organizational reaction to such influences.
The corporative perspective enables us to envision the effects that such pressure to maximize shortterm results at the expense of long-term benefit may have on the structure, processes, and personnel
of the corporate organization, as well as the effects that the structure, processes and personnel of
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the corporate organization may, in turn, have on pursuit of such short-term results. These will be
developed in the discussion below.
In considering the personnel aspect of the organization, we will examine, separately, the particular
perspectives of, and pertaining to, various organizational participants, including the board of
directors, the CEO, CFO, and other members of the top management team (TMT) and other levels
of management, operational functions, divisions, and SBUs, and other personnel. As this work
considers shareholders and other suppliers of capital as having a dual aspect, as external claimants
with respect to its legal entity exterior, and as internal to its organization in some respects and in
at least some situations, we will also identify possible impacts of short-termism as an external
influence on such capital providers as mixed participants or quasi-participants in its internal
organization.
A Historical Perspective
While often thought to be a phenomenon of the present millennium, or even more recent times,
the debate was actively pursued in the nineteen eighties, at least. An influential author who has
focused attention on the debate is Kevin Laverty.16 He identifies Drucker, Hayes and Abernathy,
and Jacobs as proponents of the existence and inefficacy of short-termism, short-sightedness with
respect to investments especially in advanced technologies with long-term payoffs; and, on the
other hand, Jensen and Williamson as sceptics, arguing that efficient markets optimize the tradeoff between short-term results in long-term investment over the long-term,17 an argument which,
we maintain, appears to rely on a strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. Laverty notes that
underinvestment by firms in resources and capabilities necessary to acquire or maintain

16

Laverty's doctoral dissertation (supervised by leading strategy thinker Richard P. Rumelt) at the University of
California (Los Angeles) was in this subject area, entitled Time Preferences, Time Horizons, and Strategic Choice:
Towards an Understanding of Organizational Myopia.
17
Kevin J Laverty, "Managerial Myopia or Systematic Short-Termism? The Importance of Managerial Systems in
Valuing the Long-Term" (2004) 42:8 Management Decision 949 at 949. He cites: P Drucker, "A Crisis of Capitalism"
(1986) Wall Street Journal at 31; RH Hayes and WJ Abernathy, "Managing Our Way to Economic Decline" (1980)
58:4 Harvard Business Review 67; MT Jacobs, Short-term America: The Causes and Cures of our Business Myopia
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991); MC Jensen, "The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and
Evidence" (1986) 4 Midland Corporate Finance Journal 6; and OE Williamson, "Perspectives on the Modern
Corporation" (1984) 24 Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 64.
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competitive advantage may have important negative consequences for individual firms, and for
the countries in which they operate.18
More recently, short-termism has been the focus of considerable discussion. In 2013, McKinsey
& Company (“McKinsey”) and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (“CPPIB”) established
Focusing Capital on the Long Term (“FCLTGlobal”) whose objective is “to encourage a longerterm focus in business and investment decision-making” by “developing practical tools and
approaches to support longer-term behaviors across the investment value chain.”19 The
prominence of these leading organizations as sponsors of this initiative and their aggressive
furtherance of the same have attracted considerable attention to it.
In a 2013 article in the Harvard Business Review, Dominic Barton, the global managing director
of McKinsey, and Mark Wiseman, the Chief Executive Officer of CPPIB, note that: “Since the
2008 financial crisis and the onset of the Great Recession, a growing chorus of voices has urged
the United States and other economies to move away from their focus on “quarterly capitalism”
and toward a true long-term mind-set.” Despite this, they say, “the shadow of short-termism has
continued to advance—and the situation may actually be getting worse. As a result, companies are
less able to invest and build value for the long term, undermining broad economic growth and
lowering returns on investment for savers.”20
Barton and Wiseman claim that the main source of the problem “is the continuing pressure on
public companies from financial markets to maximize short-term results”. They argue that a
“crucial breakthrough would occur if the major players in the market, particularly the big asset
owners, joined the fight — something we believe is in the best interests of their constituents”.21
To counter pressures from financial markets to maximize short-term results, Barton and Wiseman
call on large investors to take actions which are in the best interests of their own constituents,

18

Supra note 17, citing Jacobs, supra, and Michael E Porter, "Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital
Investment System" (1992) 70:5 Harvard Business Review 65.
19
See the Focusing Capital on the Long Term web site at https://www.fcltglobal.org/.
20
Dominic Barton and Mark Wiseman, "Focusing Capital on the Long Term" (2014) 92:1/2 Harvard Business Review
44 at 45-46. Finance and investment literature, in the main (but arguably not to the point of establishing a firm
convention in this regard), refers to "short-termism", rather than "short termism"; and similarly, to "long-termism",
rather than "long termism". Except in quotations, we will generally use the hyphenated versions of the terms: namely,
"short-termism" and "long-termism".
21
Ibid at 46.
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whether pensioners in the case of retirement plans, shareholders in the case of corporations, or
otherwise.
Intertemporal Decision Making, Short-Termism, Temporal Traps, and Myopia
The indefinite existence of the corporation requires consideration of intertemporal decision
making, which, in turn, requires explanation of a number of salient concepts. Favouring actions in
the short-term that have detrimental consequences in the long-term is generally considered to be
genuine “short-termism”; as distinct from problems in making judgments as a result of which
preferences respecting short-term consequences are dominant over those respecting long-term
consequences,22 a phenomenon which is identified by Marginson and McAulay as “myopia”,
meaning, in effect, the difficulty of assessing long-term consequences, irrespective of whether this
difficulty results in judgments which are, or are not, suboptimal in their effects.
Laverty identifies a phenomenon known as a “temporal trap”, a decision in which the choice that
is best for the long term is different from the choice which is best for the short term. He notes that
“while it might appear at first that temporal traps are inherent in all strategic decisions,” research
indicates that “the degree to which this tradeoff is present for an individual manager making a
single decision varies.”23 In effect, a temporal trap requires that a decision be made between shortterm and long-term preferences. Of course, positing the existence of a “trap” assumes that both
short-term and long-term preferences cannot be accommodated or, at least, cannot be
accommodated equally. Thus, while an intertemporal trade-off may be required in a given
situation, its nature and extent may depend, at least in part, upon the affect and other characteristics
of the decision-maker concerned, including economic, personal and organizational influences.
Laverty asserts that the existence of trade-offs between short-term and long-term concerns is
positively associated with undervaluing the long-term. In his 2004 study of UK companies, a
majority of which were in industries requiring long-term investments, he suggested that some firms
may be “better than others in limiting the degree to which temporal traps are inherent in their
culture, routines, and processes.” For example, where progress toward long term goals is more the
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David Marginson and Laurie McAulay, "Exploring the Debate on Short-Termism: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis" (2008) 29:3 Strategic Management J 273 at 274. This article has attracted a great deal of attention and has
been widely cited, although less widely than Laverty's 1996 article. The two articles review a wide swathe of the
literature and theorization concerning the debate and, for that reason, are referenced extensively here.
23
Supra note 17 at 951, citing J Platt, "Social Traps" (1973) 28 American Psychologist 64.
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prerogative of individual managers, temporal traps are greatly reduced, as compared with
situations in which progress towards long-term goals is reported but managers are judged on shortterm performance.24 In effect, short termism, as an attitude, may be an effect not only of “external”
pressures from shareholders, the market, and the investment community generally, but also of
“internal” perceptions and pressures, such as positive and negative sanctions relating to short term
performance, from individuals and groups of individuals within the corporation.
Moreover, within a particular organization, certain structures, routines, and processes can reduce
(or, we would argue, increase) the quantum and salience of temporal traps. In this respect, it is
important to note Laverty’s finding that seeking long-term goals, while only measuring,
evaluating, and presumably compensating primarily short-term performance, tends to focus the
managers on temporal traps. On the other hand, a decreasing emphasis on quarterly performance
as a measure of managerial achievement, quality, and compensation tends to reduce the effect of
temporal traps. Of course, this is but one example of the ways in which organizational structure
and processes can be affected by, and, in turn, can affect, external influences.
Indeed, in a 2000 study of perceptions of short-termism by American and Swedish managers,
Segelod cast doubt on what appeared to be while the main difference between them, namely, “the
Swedes’ claim that stock market reaction is of little relevance to the balance between the shortand the long-term.”25 He proposed an alternative explanation: whether the managers had an
external or an internal locus of control. He referred to a study of Canadian managers which found
that those with an internal locus of control followed a more innovative, risky and forward-oriented
strategy than those more influenced by external demands;26 and a study of American managers of
public port and ancillary facilities, which found that insiders did not really care about what others
thought about the organization, unless the outsiders were considered as a threat to its identity.27
Locus of control is but one example of how factors personal to the decision-maker, including those
relating to his or her affect, as well as economic and organizational factors, may influence decision-
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Supra note 17 at 957.
Esbjorn Segelod, "A Comparison of Managers' Perceptions of Short-Termism in Sweden and the U.S." (2000) 63
International J Production Economics 243 at 252.
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Ibid, citing D Miller, M Kets de Vries, and JM Toulouse, "Top Executive Locus of Control and Its Relationship to
Strategy-Making, Structure and Environment" (1982) 25:2 Academy Management J 337.
27
Supra note 25 at 252, citing JE Dutton and JM Dukerich, "Keeping an Eye on the Mirror: The Role of Image and
Identity in Organizational Adaptation" (1991) 34:3 Academy Management J 517.
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making, including that of an intertemporal nature. Whether or not affected by locus of control,
Swedish managers indicated that anticipated market growth and political risk, both largely external
and having primarily economic aspects, were more important influences in their decision-making
than quarterly performance.
Segelod’s comments about management perceptions are useful. Individuals and groups within the
organization may characterize and respond to “pressure”, as persuasive, controlling, or otherwise,
to different degrees and in different ways. As noted, this may depend, in part, on the extent to
which they have an external or an internal “locus of control”. It may also depend on other personal,
as well as economic and organizational, influences. As Laverty noted above with respect to
temporal traps, a corporation’s culture, routines and processes may have a significant effect. So
may its organizational structure. We will return to this point further, below.
External and Internal Influences on Intertemporal Decision Making
In effect, much of the argument and debate on short-termism has concerned whether capital
markets are myopic28, and whether “chief executives of listed companies are pressured into trading
long-term performance for short term performance in order to meet stock market expectations, and
especially in order to secure fluid and impatient capital”.29 Marginson and McAulay acknowledge
Michael Porter’s argument that the transient nature of capital markets in the United States provides
some explanation of managerial short-termism.30 However, as noted by Laverty, by Marginson
and McAulay, and by Porter, “there is surprisingly little research that answers the questions raised
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Supra note 25.
Ibid.
30
Supra note 22, citing Porter, supra note 3. Porter compared the capital markets of the United States, Germany, and
Japan. The most recent of these highly influential empirical studies, by Marginson and McAulay, supra note 22, was
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by these arguments.”31 In a 1993 study of UK corporations, David Miles commented to like
effect.32 We will refer to more of this research below.
The argument concerning “patient” and “impatient” capital engages discussion of cultural and
structural influences in an economy and polity, which has been the subject of consideration, in the
“varieties of capitalism” literature33, which was influential at that time.34 We submit that the
“patience/impatience” continuum of capital commitment reflects, and is reflected in, the nature of
the relationship between providers of equity (and, to some extent, debt) capital and the corporation
concerned. To the extent that capital providers participate in the internal organization of the
corporation, they may be said to be among the constituents of that organization, as evidencing
some commitment to it, and are implicated in its intertemporal tradeoffs. At the same time, of
course, such capital providers engage in an external or legal relationship with the corporation as
claimants upon its assets and resources, whether current, medium-term or long-term (as in the case
31

Supra note 22 at 252.
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of debt capital) or residual (as in the case of common equity capital). Thus, the behaviour of
shareholders may exhibit, from time to time, their legal counterparty status or their organizational
participant status, or both. It is probably more accurate to consider their behaviour along continua
involving two axes, one as legal counterparty and one as organizational participant.
The Calculus of Intertemporal Decision Making
Decisions are, of course, situate in time, and are made with respect to information available at that
time, sometimes with some awareness or knowledge as to, and as to the nature of, information that
may be available in future. In some cases, decisions are postponed pending receipt of further
information; such postponement may reduce the alternatives available. Intertemporal choice also
raises the issue of how choices made at one point in time influence the options or choices available
at later points in time. Laverty comments that the “concept of intertemporal choice, a characteristic
of decisions "in which the timing of costs and benefits are spread out over time" is basic to the
debate over economic short-termism”. He traces it “back at least as far as the writings of the
philosophers John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and Jeremy Bentham—for each of whom the
observed tendency of individuals to undervalue future outcomes was a unique situation that
justified societal restraint of individual action”35, apparently as non-rational.
Intertemporal decisions implicate several issues, including, importantly, the anticipated timing of
costs and benefits, the risk or certainty that such costs and benefits will eventuate, and the
information available with respect to the same. As previously indicated, intertemporal decisionmaking involves economic, personal, and organizational influences. From an economic
perspective, the “normative economic approach to intertemporal choice” is discounted utility
(DU): “Outcomes in the future are discounted: A cash flow in the present is preferred to one of
equivalent amount that occurs in the future. All else being equal, the greater the discount rate, or
the longer the time horizon to the receipt of the cash flow, the lower the net present value (NPV).”36
The application of the discount rate to the future cash flow or expenditure constitutes a discounted
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cash flow (DCF) analysis, and the resulting NPV is compared with alternative investment choices
in decision making.
Of course, the selection of an appropriate discount rate is critical to the proper determination of
net present value. That selection involves, directly or indirectly, a myriad of assumptions about
the future concerning the economy and the focal corporation, many of which may present
intertemporal decision making considerations when considered separately and collectively.
Empirical Research on Short-Termism
Laverty finds that the “largest body of empirical evidence [concerning economic short-termism]
investigates the stock market myopia explanation, whereas lines of research testing other claims
are not so well-developed.”37 Laverty’s important 1996 review of the economic short-termism
debate incorporates a meta-review of empirical research and a meta-analysis of observations,
conclusions and theorizations respecting the same. As such, it remains the most widely cited article
on this general subject-matter, although Marginson and McAulay’s 2008 article has also been very
well received.38 Consequently, and for reasons of brevity, the discussion here focuses quite closely
on these two sources.
In a 1993 study of the UK stock market, Miles tested the existence of short-termism by
investigating whether the discount rates implicit in market valuations applied to cash flows which
accrue in the longer term were too high, both absolutely and relative to rates applied to cash flows
in the near term.39 He found evidence that short-termism prevailed throughout much of the 1980s.40
In particular, actual discount rates employed in the market were approximately 180% of
independently determined rates: discount rates applied by the market to cash flows which accrued
six months in the future were more appropriate to flows accruing in eleven months, while cash
flows expected in five years were discounted as if they did not accrue for nine years.
Miles’ finding was that “projects with only a six month time horizon need, on average, to be 5%
more profitable than is optimal if companies which undertake them are not to suffer a decline in
stock market value; projects with five years to maturity, however, need to be around 40% more
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profitable than is optimal. On even the loosest definition of what constitutes clear sight this counts
as serious myopia.” Likewise, he concluded: “Allowing for short-termism only to 'kick in' after
five years suggests an even greater degree of excess discounting of long-term cash flows. The
results reported… imply that cash flows accruing more than five years in the future are discounted
at twice the rate of shorter term flows.”41 Miles found it doubtful that these results reflect a
plausible degree of risk aversion and a rational assessment of the underlying risk of projects,
presenting a challenge to believers in efficient markets.42
Thus, Miles provides what appears to be persuasive evidence of capital market short-termism in
economic terms, at least as measured by discounted cash flows. Market valuations of equities, at
least in the UK during the period studied, did not reflect rational predictions of future cash flows
appropriately adjusted for risk.43 Miles also shows that conventional economic models do not
satisfactorily explain why short-termism exists, or why it is or is not rational in economic terms.
Short-Termism and Long-Termism – On the Merits
Intertemporal Decision Making and Indefinite Existence
Considering the external and legal aspects of the corporation, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that long-termism is a rational perspective in corporate decision-making. The corporation has a
lifespan which is theoretically unlimited and, therefore, the time, if any, at which it might cease to
exist cannot readily be determined.
While it is possible to provide when the corporation is established for its corporate existence to be
terminated, as, for example, by means of a winding-up, at a particular point in the future, anecdotal
evidence suggests that this is a very rare occurrence with respect to corporations.44 However, some
other investment vehicles, such as limited partnerships, general partnerships, joint ventures and
other entities, do have termination or periodic reinvestment provisions. Thus, there is some definite
point in the future at which capital and accrued income and other gains will be returned to investors
or at which they may elect to reinvest such funds. In such a case, management of the investment
41

Ibid at 1393-4.
Ibid at 1394.
43
Ibid at 1395.
44
See the discussion in Chapter One in the section entitled "The Corporation and Corporate Essentialism in Law"
under the heading "Essential Attributes of the Corporation in Law" and the subheading "Indefinite Duration". See
also the discussion earlier in this chapter in the section entitled "Legal and Organizational Context" under the heading
"Declarative Law".
42

660
vehicle would be expected to “manage towards” that date, among other things, by targeting a
terminal value that, together with distributions of earnings throughout the investment period,
would yield a satisfactory return and, in turn, motivate reinvestment in that vehicle or in another
vehicle managed by the same or related management group.
In the case of an operating business, however, the organizers are unlikely to be able to determine
a point in the future at which such determination may be advantageous to all concerned.
Terminating the existence of the corporation at some point in time may be significantly
disadvantageous, or at other times significantly advantageous, to shareholders, or to some of them,
or to other corporate constituents. Termination at some points in time may disproportionately
reward the contributions of some corporate constituents as against others. For example, with
respect to a newly established business which requires significant front-ended investment before
generating any or any significant returns, winding-up the corporation at a point in time at which
the investment has been recouped but either no earnings or no significant earnings have been
generated might satisfy lenders and providers of equity capital by way of preferred shares, but
would not likely satisfy common shareholders. As with other types of organizations, the
continuance of the corporation itself may be a significant goal of the corporation.45 This might
have implications in terms of other subordinate goals, both short-term and long-term.
Balancing Short-Term and Long-Term Horizons
Suitably emphasizing long-term and short-term time frames entails avoiding over-emphasis on
either long-term or on short-term horizons. The optimal balance as between short-term and longterm time frames may differ from one corporation to another. Malcolm Salter observes that “many
businesses need to manage both short-term and long-term horizons”, which can be tricky.46 On the
one hand, when “managers are running a business or investing in markets with little “edge”—that
is, with little differentiation in products or services—short-term time horizons and opportunistic
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investing are often the way to go. In such a world of commodity products and services, a strategy
of making a series of sequential short-term investments and commitments can be economically
justifiable.” On the other hand, where a business or investment has some sustainable advantage
and short-term risks can be hedged and opportunity costs minimized, a long-term time horizon
makes the most sense.47
Appropriate attention to short-term horizons is required in order to sustain the existence of the
corporation beyond the short-term and into the medium-term, and then into the long-term. As
Segelod’s survey showed, there must be a balance between long term projects and cash-generating
projects. This may require developing a “portfolio” of projects, lines of business, or businesses
within the corporation or within a corporate group; in effect, a species of diversification of
investments internal to the corporation or relevant corporate group, unit or sub-unit. The existence
of a conflict between seeking short-term or long-term profit may be somewhat illusory since, if
short-term profit is low, the loss of impetus erodes the future return of long-term investments to
some extent. Thus, attention must be paid both short-term and long-term cash flow and profits.48
Insolvency has very immediate and short-term consequences.
Without generating “sufficient cash-flow to be able to develop your long-term projects and make
them profitable…you cannot utilize the profitable business opportunities which your long-term
investments create.”49 Segelod’s study also demonstrated that top management “must constantly
communicate the long-term vision and kindle the employees' enthusiasm for its realization” so that
the whole organization shares the vision with the result that all pull their weight and avoid internal
dissension. “Then, you have to follow this vision up in the short-term to see that you are on the
right track.”50 As Segelod’s findings show, the realization of a long-term vision and its progressive
implementation over the short-term require support not only from the external capital markets but
also from internal or more proximate organizational actors, such as employees.
As previously indicated, shareholders, as providers of equity capital by way of common shares,
may be considered to participate in the corporation in both its external and internal aspects, as
having legal rights enforceable against the corporation and as a participant in its internal
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organization, according to some continuum having regard to their respective activities.51 As
previously noted, holders of common shares who are “invested” in the corporation for the longterm and who engage in dialogue with its board of directors and management may be considered
as more “internal” or “proximate” to the corporation and its organization than short-term
shareholders, who may be considered as relatively more “external” to the corporation and its
organization.52
Ensuring an appropriate balance and thereby contributing to the continuity of a useful organization
is both economically rational and beneficial to society and the polity. Society and the polity benefit
by the creation of surplus value over the term of the existence and operation of the corporation, as
well as from the social and political benefits provided by such corporations.
It is important to note that this balancing of short-term and long-term perspectives does not
necessarily entail making decisions which have optimal effects at every point in time or, indeed,
at any particular point in time. Laverty averts to Schumpeter’s statement that “A system—any
system, economic, or other—that at every given point in time fully utilizes its possibilities to the
best advantage may yet in the long-run be inferior to a system that does so at no given point in
time, because the latter's failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of long-run
performance.”53 Among other things, long-term optimization, in at least some cases, may militate
against short-term optimization.
Delay and Risk of Cash Flow, Budgeting, and Non-Cash Flow Considerations
Of course, using discounted utility (DU) as the normative economic approach to intertemporal
choice accounts only for time delay with respect to the receipt of cash flows. It does not take
account of any risk with respect to the fact of receipt of the cash flows. As Laverty explains, the
normative model for decision-making under uncertainty is expected utility (EU), which does take
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risk into account, with the result that a riskless cash flow is preferred to a risky cash flow with an
identical expected value.54 He follows Prelec and Loewenstein in saying that "time and uncertainty
are typically correlated with one another in the real world" and that "anything that is delayed is
almost by definition uncertain."55 In other words, any non-immediate receipt of funds is subject to
a risk discount, as well as a time delay discount.
In addition, as might be expected, an economic model properly employing risk-adjusted
discounted cash flows would nonetheless ignore any consequences of decision-making that do not
have consequences immediately referable to cash flows. Consequently, such a model would not
be expected to reflect intangible and hard to quantify payoffs from investment.56 However, the
application of funds for such investments could affect cash flow and free cash flow calculations.
Segelod reports on findings that the decentralized type of budgeting undertaken by US firms
promotes investment in assets easy to measure and classify, and excludes investments in systems
and capabilities important for the efficient coordination and use of those assets, which therefore
fall through the cracks of such capital budget systems.57 Arguably, both the increase in such
investments as a result of expenditure of financial and other resources, and the reduction in such
investments as a result of their use, amortization or depreciation, might properly be reflected in
capital budgets; however, this is apparently not the case.
Yet it may be precisely those investments in organizational systems and capabilities, or as we
would say, in the organization’s structure, process and personnel, that may have the most
significant effect on the performance, and even survival, of the corporation. In effect, though,
however possible it may be to model returns involving intangible and hard to quantify payoffs
from investments, such items are not commonly included in budgets of American companies. If
those investments are not appropriately recognized (and valued) internally by those who are
charged with such budgetary functions, we must conclude that their recognition by others is even
more problematic.
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It may be that the level of aggregation discourages this, in effect, because the type of discrimination
required in order to generate, include, and appreciate such factors in performance models and
budgets may be present at lower levels of the organization, such as a function, division, or business
unit, on a less aggregated basis, but not at a higher or corporate level, especially those at which
performance and performance-related compensation is more closely assessed. In order to avoid
performance-based penalties in consequence of shortfalls from goals that are considered to be
“hard”, rather than “stretch”, goals, estimates and targets that may be more granular, fine, nuanced,
and at lower levels of the organization (and may be used at lower levels as estimates or targets at
such levels) may not be reflected in the fixed goals agreed with higher or corporate levels of the
organization. In addition, of course, performance may be measured before the long-term adverse
consequences of making short-term decisions becomes apparent.
In such a model, seeking to report increasing profits in the short-term may sacrifice the long-term
economic health of the corporation.58 This may be exacerbated by the skewing of management
incentives in that respect, and, in particular, aligning CEO compensation with stock prices which
reflect speculative deviation from fundamental stock pricing models, which may, in turn,
encourage CEOs to pursue a short-term speculative projects even at the expense of long-term
fundamental value.59
Budgeting and Reporting for the Value of the Organization
In summary, economic models of budgeting and performance may differ significantly at different
levels of the organization, but, at all levels, may undervalue the structure, processes, and personnel
aspects of the corporation’s organization. As we will discuss below, the recognition of intangible
assets, such as goodwill, may be a relatively simple process when it relates to payment of a
premium for acquisition of a business whose operations are subsequently consolidated, for
accounting purposes, with that of the acquiring corporation; in which case the premium is treated
for accounting purposes as “goodwill”. However, recognition of the value of other intangible assets
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developed within the existing business of the company whose financial statements are presented
may be more complex, more subjective, and thus more subject to challenge and doubt.60
Accordingly, current accounting rules do not generally permit recognition of internally generated
intangible assets on a company’s balance sheet,61 generally because they are not “separable”
(capable of being sold, assigned, transferred, licensed, etc.) and hence are not identifiable.62 This
test attempts to respond to a number of issues, including the difficulty of valuing the same; the
difficulty of establishing the period over which such intangible assets will be used, and hence the
period over which they are required to be amortized; and the dangers of valuing, and then revaluing
the same in any subsequent accounting period, giving rise to the possibility of the use of such
valuations of internally generated intangible assets for earnings management or other types of
“gaming” financial disclosure.
This creates a curious anomaly: acquired intangibles can, but internally developed intangibles
cannot, be reflected on the corporate balance sheet for accounting purposes. Acquired intangibles
have arguably been valued to some extent by the market, as reflected in the acquisition price. This
is somewhat problematic in itself; yet the internally developed intangibles, which may be much
more critical to the corporation’s performance and future existence, are not reflected on the balance
sheet for accounting purposes, although, ideally, at least, they are taken into account by the market
in determining its enterprise value.
This does not, in fine, present a compelling argument as to why mature complex corporations
should not undertake this endeavour, at least as a supplement to formal required financial
disclosure, and should not be supported in this effort by sophisticated investment analysts,
shareholders, and other capital market participants. This support would, of course, involve
engagement with the reporting corporation in discussing factors relevant to determining the value
60
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of such intangibles. Such engagement may, in turn, promote more granular examination by the
reporting corporation itself, which would then be discussed with these capital market participants,
to various levels of iteration.
This is particularly important at a point in time at which intangibles represent such a high portion
of assets reflected on the balance sheets of major corporations, as discussed below.63 This may
facilitate generation of more meaningful balance sheets (and other financial statements) that can
be used to supplement required accounting disclosures. The potential problems, including potential
litigation, connected with disclosure of such non-standard reporting cannot be ignored, but may be
less serious than might be apparent upon initial consideration, as argued below.
Short-Termism, Earnings Reporting, and Earnings Guidance
Internal Financial Modeling
Not only may a corporation employing such economic and financial modelling methods for its
internal decision-making at the corporate level tend to overweight short-term performance, but in
assessing the performance of its divisions, subsidiaries, or other business units, it may do the same.
We have suggested other reasons, including asymmetric information and incentives, for this above.
Laverty indicates that because the multidivisional structure creates “brutal pressures on
management to perform in the present” as measured by quarterly and annual reports, this may
impair motivation for divisional managers to engage in long-term investment, which may be
critical to the firm’s long run well-being.64 However, according to Segelod, studies show that
divisional managers tend to believe that corporate level managers emphasize short-term
performance measures more than they actually do, and that, instead, such measures are
supplemented by other types of communication.65
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This may produce a feedback loop in which divisional managers, in such belief, accentuate shortterm performance measures more than expected, or intended, by their superiors. As noted, better
communication of expectations of those at higher levels of the hierarchy, and alignment of
incentives accordingly, may contribute to a more realistic perception and alignment of those
expectations. This finding has both legal and organizational implications.
Frequency of External Disclosure
In a 2014 paper, Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan demonstrate that frequency of
disclosure affects firms’ project selection strategies. Specifically, the authors purport to show that
the price pressure created by high reporting frequency induces managers to adopt a short-term
perspective (which they describe as “managerial myopia”) in choosing the firm’s investments (i.e.
projects, research, new lines of business, etc.); while, on the positive side, the market discipline
thus imposed imposes a reactive discipline with respect to decision-making that decreases the
probability of undertaking negative net present value projects.66
Presumably, however, some of those projects may have long-term benefits, which such capital
market discipline might restrain the firm from capturing. Gigler et al show that, while frequent
financial reporting has an effect on managerial myopia: “Capital market impatience alone,
however extreme, cannot alone produce the kind of price pressure that induces managerial myopia.
Sustaining managerial myopia requires a combination of impatience in the capital market,
information imperfections, and frequent financial reporting.”67
Indeed, they claim to demonstrate that “if the market and manager have same information,
managerial short-termism cannot be caused by price pressure, no matter how impatient the firm’s
current shareholders are.”68 Of course, information asymmetry as between corporate level
management and “the street” is endemic; and accordingly, assuming otherwise is unrealistic.
“Realistically, managers make choices based on large amounts of detailed information, collected
at considerable expense, that is either unavailable to outsiders or difficult to interpret by outsiders”,
information which is “usually soft, sensitive, and unverifiable” and which “cannot be and is not
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disclosed in mandatory financial statements that are disseminated to the world at large, nor can it
be disclosed on a voluntary basis.”69
Not only is the quantum of information available to management greater than that available to “the
Street”, but such information is also more detailed and disaggregated, as well as more nuanced and
generally qualitatively superior, in part, as just noted, because it reflects information not easily
identified, or disclosed, by management. For example, it may reflect appraisals of the ability of
the corporation to react to prospective events or developments, anticipated or otherwise. These,
and other appraisals may depend, in part, upon greater knowledge of the organization’s structure
and processes, and of the qualities and propensities of its personnel, a type of know-how highly
relevant and particular to the organization concerned.
Consequently, it may be said that the capital markets rely on “hard” information that is relatively
easily available and digestible. Analysts and others who engage in significant effort and perhaps
expense to develop detailed information, which includes “soft, sensitive, and unverifiable”
information concerning the firm and its environment, may find themselves less pushed to rely
solely on “hard” information disclosed by the corporation, and more capable of producing a more
nuanced perspective on its historical and likely future performance, results and prospects. This
may be expected to produce significant rewards for the analysts and intermediary organizations
concerned and for their clients and customers. It may be argued that the eventual diffusion of such
more nuanced perspective into the market may improve the accuracy of short-term and long-term
equity (and even debt) pricing by the capital markets.
In the absence of effective generation and diffusion of this kind of more nuanced information
concerning corporate performance and prospects, quarterly financial and other reports do provide
some informational content. However, this information asymmetry between internal and external
actors may significantly affect corporate behaviour. A 2005 survey of more than 400 chief
financial officers found that almost 80% of respondents would decrease long-term discretionary
spending, such as for research and development, advertising, maintenance and hiring, or even give
up positive net present value projects, in order to meet short-term earnings targets, to avoid
punishment by the capital markets. The authors thus reveal “unambiguous managerial intent to
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burn economic value to meet financial reporting goals.”70 Of course, information concerning the
alternative uses of funds to attain real economic value, rather than short-term profits, would have
been available to the reporting corporations, but not usually to “the Street”.
Further, to the extent that management chooses to disclose to the market information which is
“soft, sensitive and unverifiable”, it not only risks the “street” making inferences from such
information that are different from its own inferences (for example, because it may have other
relevant information not disclosed or which cannot possibly be disclosed, but that affects the
interpretation of the information disclosed), but also the prospect of potentially incurring liability
based upon such disclosures. This possibility may eventuate, for example, if market actors
experience adverse results from their reliance on such information.
Even if such liability is successfully avoided, the prospect of its incurrence may be expected to
dampen the management’s ardour to share its information with “the street”. The effect of a “safe
harbour” for such disclosure is discussed in more detail below. As further discussed below,
corporate and securities law disclosure requirements, as well as formal accounting conventions,
are highly relevant in this regard.
Earnings Guidance and Frequency
Many public companies attempt to supplement their “hard” disclosures in financial statements,
management discussion and analysis of operations (“MD &A) and similar formal documents with
information thought to be useful to the shareholders, other investors, and to the capital markets
generally. Some of these disclosures may be required pursuant to securities law and stock exchange
requirements. In addition, many corporations provide earnings guidance, guidance as to the
financial results expected in a subsequent quarter or financial year.
Often, such earnings guidance is provided in quarterly earnings calls, which are conference calls
held by the issuer with shareholders, other investors, analysts who follow or “cover” it, and other
interested parties. Commonly, the CEO and CFO of the corporation concerned present the financial
results of the quarter (and year, in the case of the last quarter) and outlook for the next quarter or
year, as the case may be. Often, at the outset of the earnings call, the moderator or counsel for the
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corporation will read a statement providing suitable cautionary language, in effect, indicating that
the “forward-looking” statements made in the earnings call and associated materials are not
guarantees or accurate indications of future activities and performance. A sample appears in the
footnote below.71
Adoption of Earnings Guidance
As Malcolm Salter indicates, the practice of providing quarterly “earnings guidance” became more
common in the United States after Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, which effectively protected executives and their companies from legal liability stemming
from statements made in connection with suitable cautionary language about projected
performance over the next quarter. This change in American federal law provides a useful
illustration of the interrelationship between changes in statutory and other law, on the one hand,
and changes in the interaction among the corporation and its legal and organizational participants.
In this case, the expected benefits of this “earnings guidance” were expected to include improved
earnings multiples and share prices and reduced volatility. Salter maintains that these benefits did
not ensue, citing a 2006 McKinsey study “which found no evidence that frequent earnings
guidance affects valuation multiples, or reduces the volatility of share prices. Frequent guiders did

By way of example, a recent quarterly information report available to the writer for certain instruments (“Notes”)
issued by a special purpose vehicle or special purpose entity engaged only in holding other securities contained several
paragraphs under the heading “Important Legal Disclosures”, two of which were as follows:
Certain statements in this presentation may constitute “forward-looking” statements that involve known and
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or liquidity expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements typically
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with these forward-looking statements. Any forward-looking statements are made as of the date of being
included in this presentation.
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not receive superior valuations in the marketplace—regardless of the year, industry, or size of the
company.”72
Instead, “the only significant effect that McKinsey observed was an increase in trading volumes
when companies begin issuing earnings guidance”, which could simply reflect trading by hypertraders (such as day traders) and hedge fund managers with little interest in companies’ long-term
prospects. According to Salter, in addition to the expenditure of management time, McKinsey
concluded that the entire process “can be a powerful incentive for management to focus excessive
attention on the short term; to sacrifice longer-term, value-creating investments in favor of shortterm results; and, in some cases, to manage earnings inappropriately from quarter to quarter to
create the illusion of stability.”73
While it might have been hoped that this kind of “safe harbour” would produce, as between the
corporation and its organizational participants and other more external parties, the kind of nuanced
discussion of results and outlook that ideally would feature in internal corporate discussions, this
does not appear to have been the result. Instead, it appears that the information provided in earnings
guidance from a corporate or other issuer was taken into account by analysts following the issuer
in formulating quarterly and annual targets for earnings, price/earnings multiples, and share prices,
and in generating “consensus” targets, which are aggregates based on the targets of analysts
derived individually. This is thought to contribute to the short-term orientation of the markets.
Further, this kind of “earnings guidance” is thought to be associated with earnings management.
Salter refers to a massive study of quarterly conference calls74 in which the researchers “found a
predictable relationship between calls where participants used language indicating short time
horizons and efforts to manage earnings. The researchers also found that the short-termism of
investors seemed to beget short-term behavior by executives—and that short-term-oriented
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companies tended to attract short-term investors.”75 This suggests of course, that providing
additional long-term-oriented information, by way of guidance or otherwise, may attract long-term
investors. In any event, what researchers describe as a formulaic or standardized approach to
providing earnings guidance that may be safer from a legal standpoint, although less informative,
than more fulsome guidance. In such an environment, variances from standardized practice may
even be assumed to have an information content that was not intended.
Elimination of Earnings Guidance
However, the elimination of earnings guidance also has consequences. Chen, Matsumoto, and
Rajgopal studied firms that stopped providing earnings guidance between October 2000 and
January 2006 (“stoppers”), differentiating between those that publicly announced this
(“announcers”) and those that did not (“quiet stoppers”). They found that firms that stopped
guidance had poor performance in the preceding twelve months and regularly missed analysts’
expectations, were uncertain about immediate future prospects, and had experienced decreased
analyst coverage. They also found that such firms also had a high percentage of long-term
institutional investors, suggesting that such firms were attempting to focus on the long-term rather
than on the short-term.76
They reasoned that firms with a higher percentage of long-term institutional investors likely face
less pressure to disclose good news immediately, since such news would be revealed in the
ordinary course in connection with earnings announcements and long-term investors do not, by
definition, trade frequently.77 While both announcers and quiet stoppers experienced declines in
share price, these differences were more pronounced with respect to announcers but dissipated in
the six months following the announcement.78 They found that despite calls by prominent
investors, practitioner groups, and academics for firms to renounce earnings guidance, relatively
few firms had done so, and only when the decision was beneficial to them. 79
They found that stopper firms as a group did not experience a significant increase in overall return
volatility or a decrease in analyst following, but did experience a greater increase in dispersion
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among analyst forecasts and a decrease in the accuracy of analyst forecasts. They argue that while
both return volatility and forecast dispersion are measures of uncertainty, the absence of earnings
guidance likely has a more direct effect on forecast dispersion than on stock return volatility.80
They suggest that the increase in forecast error occurs because analysts are not able to
independently generate similar levels of information and forecast earnings in the absence of
guidance.
We would suggest, in addition, that the increase in forecast error and in forecast dispersion may
indicate a difference in efforts and abilities among analysts, who may be more oriented towards
the needs of retail investors than of institutional investors, many of whom rely less on outside
analysts. Further, we would suggest that since management of a company providing earnings
guidance is considered to be more knowledgeable about its prospects than outsiders, outsiders may
place greater reliance on management guidance than on the forecasts of independent analysts. Of
course, management also has the capacity to direct efforts to attainment of its earnings guidance,
whether by generally dispersed efforts to achieve targets or by specific earnings management
activities. In addition, it is apparent that prospective changes in declarative or common law may
have anticipated consequences in terms of legal and intraorganizational relationships; and that
even voluntary changes made by corporations in required or permitted compliance practices, such
as disclosure, may also have such effects. Accordingly, advance consideration of proposed legal
changes from a corporative perspective is advisable.
Earnings Guidance and Short-Termism
The Investment Professional Perspective
The CFA Institute is the largest association of investment professionals in the world.81 It has more
than 135,000 members in 170 countries and territories, the largest numbers of whom are engaged
as portfolio managers, investment analysts, executives, consultants, risk managers and corporate
financial analysts. The top 10 employers of CFA charter holders include JP Morgan Chase, PwC,
HSBC, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, UBS, Ernst & Young, RBC, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley,
and Wells Fargo. Its Centre for Financial Market Integrity and the Business Roundtable Institute
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for Corporate Ethics initiated the “Symposium Series on Short-Termism” which, among other
things, resulted in the publication of a report on the insights of its panel of symposia participants
and other research entitled “Breaking the Short-Term Cycle” (the “CFA Report”) .82
Predictably, it stated that “Short-termism refers to the excessive focus of some corporate leaders,
investors, and analysts on short-term, quarterly earnings and a lack of attention to the strategy,
fundamentals, and conventional approaches to long-term value creation.” It noted that “excessive
short-term focus combined with insufficient regard for long-term strategy can tip the balance in
value-destructive ways for market participants, undermine the market’s credibility, and discourage
long-term value creation and investment”, indicating that such “short-term strategies are often
based on accounting-driven metrics that are not fully reflective of the complexities of corporate
management and investment.”83
The panel’s conclusions are not, of course, unique, but their expression by such an organization as
the CFA Institute, whose members are deeply involved in the investment industry and include
some of the world’s most respected financial analysts, is noteworthy. Its report drew attention to
the emphasis placed on quarterly earnings and on earnings guidance, often thought to provide a
channel of communication with investors and to intensify management’s focus on achieving
financial targets.
Negative Effects of Earnings Guidance
It concluded that its recommendations provided a better roadmap to achieving these objectives. It
found: “Although there may be certain benefits to providing earnings guidance, the costs and
negative consequences of the current focused, quarterly earnings guidance practices are
significant, including (1) unproductive and wasted efforts by corporations in preparing such
guidance, (2) neglect of long-term business growth in order to meet short-term expectations,
(3) a “quarterly results” financial culture characterized by disproportionate reactions among
internal and external groups to the downside and upside of earnings surprises, and (4)
macro-incentives for companies to avoid earnings guidance pressure altogether by moving
to the private markets.” Additionally, it found that “earnings guidance contributes to an
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illusion of complete business predictability, a faulty premise for both companies and their
investors.” 84
In addition, then, to a preference for short-term results over-term growth, it was thought
that quarterly earnings guidance contributed to an illusion of “complete business
predictability”, one of the results of which was that variations from earnings guidance were
seen as “surprises” which incurred disproportionate reactions inside and outside the
company, the awareness of which sometimes give rise to earnings management activities.
That predictability premise is, of course, quite inconsistent with the risk willingly assumed
by companies and their investors. The complexity, volatility and unpredictability of the
business environment external to the corporation gives rise to business opportunities which
may be accurately perceived and acted upon by some business actors, whose market value
will be expected to increase, but not by others, to opposite effect. The ability of such
organizations to perceive and respond to these changes and opportunities are likely to be
affected not only by economic or industry factors but also by their company-specific
attributes, including the structure, processes and personnel characteristics of its
organization.
Of course, the panoply of factors affecting the business of a particular company or industry
strain the limits of rational consideration. Those factors and how they might impact the
instant company and industries in which it operates must not only be selected, but must also
be weighted for salience individually, as well as in comparison with other relevant factors.
They also must be constantly reassessed in light of changing conditions. Some environments
are highly dynamic. Even in an environment that is not highly dynamic, changes in the
environment can sometimes be almost entirely unpredictable and massive in effect. Apart
from “black swans”85, the effects of disruptive technologies may fit this description.86 Even
these simple remarks indicate the complexity of deriving and achieving such predictions.
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Both endeavours are highly sensitive to organizational factors specific to the corporation
concerned.
The Earnings Guidance Life Cycle
It may be that the accentuated attention paid to earnings guidance contributed to its decreased
prevalence. The CFA Report cited research indicating that the number of companies providing
quarterly guidance decreased from 75 percent in 2003 to 52 percent in 2006; that the number of
companies providing annual guidance increased from 38 percent to 82 percent in the same period;
and that 43 percent of companies provided guidance only annually.87 Of the companies that did
not provide earnings guidance, more than 60% provided qualitative statements about market
conditions and trend information that might impact its business, between 40% and 60% provided
industry-specific information and qualitative statements about high-level performance measures,
and slightly less than 40% provided quantitative information concerning business measures and/or
assumptions and estimates/forecasts of selected factors that might drive earnings.88 Companies
eliminating quarterly earnings guidance clearly attempted to provide more high-level and longterm information of a qualitative nature. That type of information might allow observers to derive
a more accurate perception of the industry (or industries) in which it operates, the company’s
position therein, and management’s assessment of the interaction of those two elements, and how
it plans to proceed to generate longer-term positive results.
In one survey of CFA Institute members, 76 percent of respondents supported companies moving
away from quarterly earnings guidance. Of those supporters, 96 percent further agreed that
companies should provide additional information on the fundamental, long-term drivers of the
business.89 The research just mentioned suggests that many companies, whether or not providing
such guidance, provide some kind of outlook on factors that might affect long-term performance.
Some of these may relate to the industries in which the company operates, while others might
relate to the extent to which the company is involved in those industries as compared with others,
and still other factors may relate to attributes more particular to the company itself, including its
strategy. These more individuated attributes may also include the structure, processes, and
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personnel of the company, and adaptations required to those organizational attributes in order to
successfully adapt to its environment and achieve its goals. Of course, as noted previously,
variations and results from earnings guidance have both external and internal effects. Arguably
both of these, and certainly the internal effects, are best known to the company itself.
Accordingly, the CFA panel developed an “earnings guidance lifecycle” to improve guidance on
the basis of company-specific and industry characteristics. The major determinants of this lifecycle
are industry categorization, whether the company is established or has a longer product cycle, on
the one hand; or is more dynamic and has a shorter product cycle on the other; and the size of the
company, whether its market capitalization is towards the lower end of the spectrum (“smallercap”) or the higher end of the spectrum (“larger-cap”).
The panel suggests that “an early-stage, small-capitalization company with a shorter-term
product/service cycle”, which is likely to be covered by few analysts, and may need to raise capital
frequently “may not have the strategic option of providing less than quarterly guidance.” Later,
growth and diversification of products, services, and markets, may enable it to tolerate potential
fluctuations in volatility and investor sentiment that may occur with less frequent earnings
guidance. “Still later in the corporate life cycle, the company may have matured to the point of
focusing on managing the business for the long term and have little need to provide earnings
guidance to outside sources.” 90
Voluntary Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, and Organizational Participation
Of course, a key objective of communicating with investors is to satisfy their expectations as to
timeliness and content. The CFA Report suggested that companies adopting an “earnings guidance
lifecycle” perspective should, at the time of its adoption, indicate its implications for disclosure at
later points in time, by stating what effect the attainment of certain standards will have on the
frequency, reduction, or elimination, of eliminating earnings guidance.91
A company applying such lifecycle perspective to earnings guidance could determine, in the light
of what it considers to be the primary value-drivers of its business, the factors, time-horizons, and
metrics most relevant to its strategy and future performance. For example, it could highlight ways
in which aspects of its structure, process, and personnel are suited to its business and may be
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adapted in future. This might allow analysts and others to develop an appreciation of these
attributes and, concomitantly, how they may be positively and negatively affected by future
developments, including, proposals for restructurings, spinoffs, and other changes.
Treating the shareholders not only as legal counterparties but also as organizational participants, a
corporation would take shareholder expectations into account and would actually discuss them
with shareholders. Thus, the corporation would have an opportunity to explain and discuss these
proposals with its shareholders and analysts covering the company in order to reach some common
understanding as to the nature of earnings guidance and other disclosure to be provided by the
company in the future. This market influence may be expected to ensure that the company does
not provide earnings guidance that is biased so as to only show positive results. In turn,
shareholders and analysts might negotiate to obtain the information they consider most relevant to
their appraisal of the company’s strategy and performance.
By fostering greater understanding of the company’s performance and prospects over a longer
term, the company is better enabled to attract shareholders whose objectives are more consonant
with its own objectives over the longer term. Of course, just as research cited above92 indicates
that companies that pay more attention to short term results attract investors with short-term
objectives, it might be expected that research not yet conducted should demonstrate that companies
whose managements are more focused on the long-term will attract investors with the same focus,
that is to say, real investors attuned to fundamental value creation rather than traders acting in
accordance with market indicators.
As discussed above, risk is endemic to investment, and trading, in equities. A party investing in an
equity security is taking a position in the company that such investor expects to generate positive
results in terms of value accretion, as measured to at least some extent by market price. Eliminating
myopia in relation to the subject investment insofar as possible is said to permit a more accurate
perception of value over short, medium, and long terms. To the extent that this improves the
assessment of value over the long-term, this is expected to impact the market price in the short
term. Thus, improved understanding of a company’s long-term prospects should be expected to
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result in less sensitivity to short-term market influences, and thus to less volatility in its own share
price.
Reducing the information asymmetry as between the board of directors and management, on the
one hand, and investors, analysts and other market participants, on the other, should contribute to
such understanding by the public markets. After all, investors are not only being asked to invest in
the present value of future cash flows, but in the underlying organization forecast to generate them.
Confidence in the board and management, in the past, at the instant time and at various times in
the future, and the ability of its members to effectively anticipate and accommodate changing
factors in the external and internal environment is, or should be, a principal factor in making an
investment. Reducing information asymmetry permits investors, analysts and other market
participants to better understand and judge the performance of the board and management and the
organization as a whole. It also permits them to assess the alignment of the organization’s structure,
processes and personnel with the other such organizational elements, and their congruence with
its goals and objectives, both independent and instrumental.
The shareholder, whether taking a share position for the short-term, medium-term, or long-term,
is, in effect, investing in the organization as an organization, and not simply in a financial
instrument issued by the corporate legal entity that represents certain rights and liabilities for the
holder. It is the organization that will determine the “real life” ability of the corporate legal entity
to meet the legal claims and investment expectations of its shareholders.
Accordingly, we continue to maintain that the legal and organizational aspects of the corporation
cannot veridically be modelled separately from each other. Legal aspects, influences, and changes
must be assessed in relation to the corporation’s more organizational aspects, influences and
changes; while organizational aspects, influences, and changes must be assessed in relation to the
corporation’s legal aspects, influences, and changes. For example, as we have seen, legal
requirements concerning disclosure of short-term results or quarterly guidance may impact
organizational performance.
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Short-Termism, Goal Incongruence, and Value Corruption
Short-Termism and Organizational Corruption
Malcolm Salter argued that the collapsed time horizons of short termism undermine ethical
standards and promote institutional corruption,93 defined as “institutionally supported behavior
that—while not necessarily unlawful—undermines a company’s legitimate processes and core
values, weakening its capacity to achieve espoused goals and eroding public trust in the
institution.”94
The purport of his argument is that short termism may conflict with its long-term objectives and
core values, some of which are processual, or instrumental, in nature. In fact, short termism may
not only conflict with legitimate processual aspects of the organization and its values, but may also
conflict with structural and personnel aspects of the same. Salter maintains that institutionally
supported behaviour that weakens a company’s ability to adhere to pursue and achieve its goals in
accordance with its values, such as by impairing its structure, its process and its personnel and
their ability to pursue those primary goals and values is, ipso facto, goal-incongruent and valueincongruent, and is, accordingly, inconsistent with, disrespectful of, and destructive of, its
principal and predominant goals and values. Salter’s argument that this amounts to institutional
corruption, regardless of moral or legal considerations, must be understood in this context.
As we have argued elsewhere, group, business unit, or subunit behaviour may also be impacted
by, and may themselves impact, the organization’s goals and values. In this context, short termism
as practiced in one business unit, for example, may conflict not only with its particularized longterm objectives and values but may also conflict with short-term objectives and values at those
higher levels of the organization and, as well, with long-term objectives and values at those higher
levels. Salter does not explore these aspects of the problem, however, he finds that the “shorter the
time period for measuring individual and organizational performance, the larger the rewards and
penalties directly tied to these short-term measures, and the weaker the accountability for longterm adverse consequences, the greater the incentive for institutions and their executives to secure
short-term rewards by gaming society’s rules, tolerating institutional conflicts of interest, violating
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common decency or other standards of fair conduct, and resorting to cronyism as a way of
maximizing self-interest.”95
In effect, he argues that short termism incents behaviour that is inimical to the interests of the
organization, and the society and polity in which it is situated. The present work has established
that individual behaviour is affected by identification with, socialization by, and other effects of
membership in, various levels of the organization, including the organization as a whole, and its
various groups, and subunits. As we have seen, the level of the organization with which an
individual has the closest association tends to exert the greatest influence on individual behaviour.
Often, this is the business unit. However, influences of other levels of the organization may be
brought to bear with such force and threat of possible penalties that they may assume a greater
influence than the more immediate focal group.
In this sense, what Salter refers to as institutional corruption, and which we might denominate as
organizational corruption, may not be involved at all. Instead, higher levels of the organization
may be endeavouring to promote goal congruence and value congruence at those higher levels, but
the focal group, whether a division or group, a business unit, or a smaller unit of a business unit,
such as a sub-unit, may be endeavouring to promote, instead, goals and values which are seen as
inimical (or, at least, less preferred or less central) at higher levels of the organization, but which
are central to the focal group concerned.
In effect, what might be perceived as organizational corruption may, instead, be intraorganizational group corruption, the corruption of some particular division, group, business unit
or subunit, which is effectively contained within that focal group, may not extend beyond it, and
thus may not represent as high order a threat to the organization as it would if it was more
pervasive. The behavioural hypothesis that Salter advances and the examples that he provides must
be understood to be subject to these qualifications.96

95

Ibid at 6-7.
Ibid at 7. Salter cites, as examples, the corporate governance scandals in the first decade of the 21st century,
including "accounting shenanigans at WorldCom, HealthSouth, Adelphia Communications, Global Crossing,
Dynergy, Cendant, Qwest, Rite Aid, Computer Associates, Sunbeam, Hollinger International, Xerox, AIG, Fannie
Mae, and Freddie Mac, and the dramatic collapse of Enron—a category-defining case of institutional corruption." He
also mentions the savings and loan (S & L) crisis and other financial crises of the 1980s and the 2008 financial crisis,
noting that "such corrupt behavior persisted after Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, in response to the
accounting scandals of the 2000s."
96

682
Short-Termism and Intraorganizational Incentives
For present purposes, it is not necessary to examine each of Salter’s conclusions. The pursuit of
results that are closer to the focal point in time and, consequently, are perceived as involving less
risk; that is, overvaluing short-term benefits and undervaluing long-term benefits, has been shown
to be quite common. This might obtain at the higher levels of the organization and, as well, at
lower levels of the organization, and might influence participants in the organization, including
officers, managers and employees, and, of course, shareholders.
When the compensation of an individual is determined by the performance of the organization as
determined at various levels within the organization, individuals may be expected to be motivated
to make efforts to maximize that performance. This is particularly important inasmuch as the
influences of the more immediate focal group may be more significant than influences from less
proximate levels of the organization.97 For example, members of the finance group at Enron may
have responded more to intra-group influences than to influences outside the finance group.
Unfortunately, Salter does not engage in this kind of intra-organizational analysis. He does,
however, note that his claim about the ill effects of the collapsed time horizons is “consistent with
research showing how compensation for executives—especially bonus contracts—influences
accounting choices, efforts to manage corporate earnings, and strategies designed to boost stock
prices artificially”; with “claims of legal commentators that compensation based on short-term
employment contracts, stock-based compensation, and maximization of stock price is a key driver
of short-termism and its ill-effects”; with claims of organizational economists “that executives
with significant personal stakes in some economic outcome may jeopardize the long-run interests
of owners, such as the market value and integrity of the institution”; and with ongoing research by
social scientists on the psychological effects of money on short-term human behaviour.98
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Short termism can, no doubt, lead to some incentives that are goal- and value-incongruent.
Accelerating short-term results can lead to successive iterative demands for more and better
results. Recognizing earnings in an earlier, rather than a later, financial period may improve earlier
period financial results, but may make it more difficult to hit targets for the later financial period.
Even in terms of compensation, acceleration of compensation based on short-term performance,
for example in the case just posited, may leave the compensated executive in some cases worse
off, in comparative terms, than otherwise.
Of course, the higher value and lower risk attached to payments closer in time to the time in
question seems to make the tradeoff worthwhile as a matter of discounted utility. It is often argued
that the executive compensated is implicitly wagering on the length of his employment period in
relation to the time of payoff, such that later payoffs are not only perceived to be more valuable
and less risky in general terms, but also in terms of likelihood of still being employed at such time.
In this regard, Salter concludes that proposals “for reorienting an organization to focus on its longrun health [by] restructuring financial incentives to reflect this commitment” generally involve:
employing longer time periods for measuring corporate and managerial performance and paying
incentive-based awards; including qualitative criteria when evaluating individual and institutional
performance; deferring a portion of annual incentive awards, so it can be clawed back given
malfeasance or a significant reversal of corporate results; and basing the vesting of stock grants
and options on longer-term metrics—such as several years of earnings in excess of the company’s
(risk-adjusted) cost of capital—and extending the required holding period of exercised stock
options.99
Salter reported that by the end of 2009 some 64 percent of the country's 100 largest companies had
begun to use “clawbacks”, requiring executives to return part of their pay under certain conditions,
such as malfeasance – up from only 17.6 percent in 2006.100 One might expect that the threat of
clawbacks due to significant reversals of corporate results, such as by reason of financial
restatements or longer-run impacts of earlier adverse decisions, might be a more effective deterrent
to excessive short-termism than clawbacks due to malfeasance. There is no doubt, however, that
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both are likely to be conducive to the long-term interests, goals, and to the basic values of many
prudently run corporations that expect to survive well into the future. Of course, devising
compensation programmes that do not require clawbacks is still preferable.
Interaction of Short-Termism with the Organization
Transmission Within the Organization
Marginson and McAulay comment on a difficulty, posited by Laverty, with the argument that
capital market pressures foster short-termism: namely, how senior executives demonstrate to
owners and investors that the firm’s assets are being managed to maximize value.101 In this task,
the senior executives are confronted by at least two examples of information asymmetry: one as
between senior executives and investors, and another as between senior executives and other levels
of managers within the firm.
In regard to the latter, Marginson and McAulay argue that “the extent to which senior executives
are able to demonstrate good short-term performance at firm level depends in part on the
performance of those in lower-status positions, who must also be prepared to trade long-term
performance for short term results.” This operates by means of hierarchical contagion, which
“begins with senior management short-termism, driven by belief in market myopia, and proceeds
by transmitting this imperative down through the management levels below the most senior.” 102
The mechanism by which short-termism is transmitted into, and within, the organization is an
important item for consideration. Mark Roe finds that the information transmission mechanism in
the current era for transmitting short-termism from stock markets into the boardroom and thence
into the corporation more broadly is, firstly, “shareholder activism and executive compensation,
with boards more willing to fire CEOs if short-term financial results are poor because directors
fear for their own jobs or reputations” and, secondly, senior management, whose compensation is
significantly based on stock market returns, who attempt to achieve the target stock market returns
in order to maximize such variable compensation.103 Roe concludes that transmission of stock
market short-termism inside the corporation causes “boards and senior managers to forgo long-
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term value maximization for short-term results, often managing and sometimes manipulating
earnings, all toward the end of pleasing the stock market.”104
Here, we may recall Segelod’s discussion of the results of his survey of short-termism in Sweden,
the United States, and the United Kingdom. In effect, boards of directors and managers of
corporations are subject to the influence of short-termism from the capital markets only where
such boards and managements assign importance to such influences. His study showed that
Swedish managers assign relatively less importance to these influences than do managers in the
United States and in the United Kingdom. While some of this may be culturally dependent, some
part of this difference may be attributable to relative differences in the sensitivity of the relevant
capital markets and to differing economic, individual and organizational factors.
Roe ignores the latter and considers only pressure from capital markets as relevant influences on
the board and senior management. Consequently, he concludes that proponents of managerialism
may try to find ways to reduce these market pressures. He dissents from arguments that longer
terms for directors and greater board and managerial autonomy from the market would foster
sensible long-term corporate behaviour, citing evidence that persistent references to short-term
horizons by management in communications with investors and a short-term investor base with
higher turnover than average were covariant.105 In effect, corporations and their investors over
time may come to share performance horizons. This result is quite consistent with the corporative
perspective, which, among other things, involves development of certain shared expectations as
between the corporation and shareholders. Of course, the fact that communications were so
characterized does not mean that they necessarily reflect the values of such management.
While Roe does not attempt to analyze the transmission of the short-term orientation from higher
to lower levels of management, Marginson and McAulay do. They argue that information
asymmetry between high and lower levels of management may persist in both directions
simultaneously. In effect, even if more senior management attempts to encourage downwards
transmission of short-term orientation, the information required by more senior management in its
decision-making is, to a great extent, generated by those at lower levels of management.106 This
suggests that information supporting short-termism may not be generated or may be withheld from
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upper transmission if and to the extent that lower levels of management are not in agreement with
the short-term orientation of senior management. Indeed, the downward transmission theory was
not supported by the results of their study.
Environmental Uncertainty and Short-Termism
Before addressing individual and organizational dimensions of corporate decision-making more
generally, some further mention must be made about the position of lower levels of management
subjected to short-term pressures from above. Marginson and McAulay explain that the
information deficiency apparent in intertemporal decision-making has been extensively researched
at the level of the individual through the concept of role ambiguity, the difference between the
information a person needs to fulfil a role and the information available.107 Their reading of the
research is that environmental turbulence (in very general terms, volatility or relatively
unpredictable discontinuities in an environment)108, which is one form of perceived environmental
uncertainty, is a source of role ambiguity; and, further, that role ambiguity, role conflict, and
perceived environmental uncertainty are distinct constructs that nevertheless positively covary
with each other. Thus, role ambiguity, role conflict, and role overload are each associated with
short-termism.109
Marginson and McAulay posit that in an environment fraught with uncertainty, an individual may
find gratification in pursuing outcomes which are more certain.110 This may cause the decisionmaker to displace a long-term orientation, which might be beneficial in circumstances of high
turbulence and volatility, in favour of a short-term orientation with results that are more certain.
In this sense, short termism may be seen as a coping behaviour (and, therefore, having some utility,
to the decision-maker and others) in circumstances which are dynamic and potentially
threatening.111
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Of course, while turbulence and stability are often considered in strategy literature as aspects of
the external environment, they may also be characteristics of functions, divisions or business units
considered in relation to parts of the organization external to the subject function, division or
business unit. We suggest that role ambiguity, role conflict, and perceived environmental
uncertainty may also be characteristics of internal units, in which event short-termism may be a
coping mechanism for those internal units, as well as for the members of such internal units. If this
research is correct, we submit that greater availability of relevant information, greater
simplification or prioritization of social identities or roles, and greater awareness of environmental
changes and their salience may help to foster attitudes more consistent with long-term orientations.
Short-Termism at the Business Unit Level
In their study, Marginson and McAulay investigate organizational dimensions of short termism,
and, in particular, whether short termism at the intrafirm level may result from social influence, a
tendency for the views and opinions of individuals to be shaped by information and attitudes of
significant social referents, such as colleagues, coworkers, or influential outsiders. They examine
whether conformity as to a short-termist orientation might occur at the level of both the work group
and the business unit or function.112 Such work groups may exist at the level of the chief executive
and top management team, as well as at lower levels.
These workgroups and business units may be highly salient to the individual’s construction of his
or her social identity as discussed earlier in this work, especially in Chapter Four.113 As has been
done in this work, Marginson and McAulay refer to the importance of the functional area or
strategic business unit in establishing and reinforcing some conformity of views and opinions
concerning what is desirable and appropriate by means of a range of socialization processes,
“including recruitment, selection, indoctrination, training, mentoring, career ladders, and both
professional and functional affiliations”.114 The salience of the procedures, views, and goals
associated with those experiences is reinforced by positive feedback and rewards from peers and
superiors for adherence to generally accepted norms and standards. Thus, the “individual is thus
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likely to develop, over time, a mode of behavior that is consistent with the particular procedures,
attitudes, goals, and standards of a profession, function, or SBU.”115
While the relationship is not well established, they hypothesize that “the manager’s short-termism
is related to the situationally derived socialization processes occurring at the level of the function
or the business unit”. However, they acknowledge that this relationship may vary as a result of
exposure to different attitudes, goals, standards, or norms. “In effect, short-termism may be
socially legitimized as an accepted form of institutional behavior.”116
In effect, the results of their study supported Laverty’s suggestions that short termism was affected
by both individual and organization level factors.117 Importantly, they find that the socialization
processes of the strategic business unit or SBU are such that its members attach a high degree of
salience to its processes, views and goals.
They suggest that collective myopia may be an attribute of a strategic business unit (SBU) and
offer two examples: one in which managers are able to make joint sense of their immediate context
but are not able to assess the broader consequences of their actions; and another in which the group
may be able to make sense of the present or immediate future but are unable to monitor emerging
patterns of events, with the result that current actions lead inadvertently to detrimental outcomes
in the longer-term future.118 In addition, collective myopia may be said to result from perceptions
of individuals or SBUs which, when aggregated, fail to provide a clear indication of action likely
to be successful; in effect, where a lack of panoptic perspective occludes a veridical perception.
It may be that the degree of socialization of members of the SBU is sufficiently high that with
respect to certain matters they are at a high level of agreement. However, the interaction of the
focal business unit with another business unit not in agreement with the focal business unit on the
same matters may, if heeded, produce some reflexive re-examination of the subject, either as
between the two business units or within the focal business unit. It can readily be seen that the
singleness of vision which may, in some cases, characterize one business unit, with respect to a
given subject, say short-termism or collective myopia, may be counteracted to some extent, at
least, by processes of aggregation of perspectives before proceeding to, or by decision-making and
115

Ibid.
Ibid at 277 [citations omitted].
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid at 287.
116

689
decision-making processes at, a higher level of the organization. As noted, this interaction (among
others) may promote a reconsideration of the subject within the focal business unit.
Similarly, employing some kind of “devil’s advocate” function or process may challenge the focal
business unit in the perception commonly held by its members. A challenge may also come from
the immediately higher level within the hierarchy. However, certain processual rules or practices
may reduce the likelihood of challenges arising at successively higher levels: it may be assumed
by the decision-maker concerned that the second or third level below had knowledge not available
to the focal decision-maker, such that tampering with conclusions reached at that level should be
resisted.
Defending Intraorganizational Goals Against Short-Termism
Just before proceeding to examine the implications of short termism for constituents of the
corporation, and before considering it explicitly from a corporative perspective, it is appropriate
to recall that the corporation, as an organization, has a number of goals and objectives, economic
and other, the salience of which differs as among them. While it is intended that the structure and
processes of the corporation be congruent with the attainment of such goals and objectives, or, at
least, the more salient goals and objectives, this cannot be assured. However, it may be expected
that the corporation, as an organization, may seek to accomplish its most salient goals and
objectives, and to adopt and to vary or modify aspects of its structure and processes which are not
congruent with its hyper-salient goals and objectives. As Malcolm Salter observes, excessive
short-term orientation may interfere with such hyper-salient goals and objectives and the structure
and processes adopted to realize them, weakening its capacity to achieve declared goals, and
perhaps involving gaming applicable legal regulations and persistently violating accepted norms
of fairness.119
A question that arises is how the structure and processes of the corporation (or any other
organization) is employed, of their own motion or otherwise, or can be employed, to preserve its
structure, processes, and core values, goals and objectives. Related questions that arise concern,
firstly, the effectiveness of such autonomous or otherwise directed mechanisms; and secondly, the
means, if any, by which their effectiveness may be promoted by external regulation and
119
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governance, acting on such mechanisms or independently of them. Without knowing how these
mechanisms operate within the organization, however, external regulation and governance may be
ineffective, less effective than it otherwise might be, or even counter-effective, in the sense of
promoting or effecting unsought or undesirable results. In a sense, these consequences of external
regulation and governance may be unanticipated if, and to the extent that, they are not or cannot
be anticipated, by reason of lack of investigation or other lack of knowledge and awareness.
In this way, the short-termism debate, like the discussion of other regulatory issues in previous
chapters, focuses attention on the ways in which the organization which is internal to the
corporation is affected by external factors, such as external regulation and governance of the
corporation as a legal entity. This engages the corporative perspective.
The following sections will proceed, firstly, to discuss ways in which short-termism is perceived
to affect the constituents of the organization, internally and externally, as an organization and as
the legal entity; secondly, proposals for reform; and, thirdly, to evaluate those proposals in the
light of the considerations presented in this section and in the chapters discussing regulatory
matters generally, and in the light of the corporative perspective more generally.
Interaction of Short-Termism with Organizational Participants
Shareholders
The relationship between short-termism and shareholders, both as legal counterparties of, and as
an organizational participants in, the corporation has been canvassed in this chapter to date. That
relationship is often considered to be evoked merely by referring to “short-termism” and its
corollary “long-termism”.120
The Board of Directors
This section advances the previous discussion of short termism and the board of directors by
considering the effect of short-termism pressures on the affect and behaviour of directors, as
reported by directors, and by Barton and Wiseman.121 As noted above, directors reported that they
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themselves were the greatest source of pressure to overemphasize short-term financial results and
underemphasize long-term value creation.122
As discussed previously, directors, like other members of the organization, may experience role
ambiguity. In addition to a lack of information with which to perform his or her responsibilities,
an individual may also experience a lack of confidence stemming not only from informational
disadvantages, but also from environmental turbulence and dynamism. In effect, short-termism
pressures on directors may not be counteracted by them for a number of reasons, including lack of
information, experience, and perhaps interest, in medium-term or long-term goals and strategies.
Barton and Wiseman reported on whether directors surveyed considered that their boards fully
comprehended company strategy strategies (34%); were completely aware of how their firms
created value (22%); and had a strong understanding of the dynamics of their firms’ industries
(16%).123 In effect, by expressing role ambiguity, directors may be signalling a reluctance to tackle
strategic issues.
As many authors have lamented, it is often thought that boards of directors devote insufficient time
and attention to long-term strategy (which may exacerbate role ambiguity), and, all too frequently,
concentrate, instead, on regulatory or “check the box” compliance matters. To avoid this, some
boards circulate regulatory filings and commentaries on them in advance of the board meeting at
which they are to be considered, present a short summary at the meeting, invite questions and
comments from directors, and then pass the appropriate board resolutions summarily. In many
cases, these “check the box” compliance matters may not require much in the way of “heavy
lifting” by the board in the sense of keen and serious thought and discussion. This may suit some
directors, particularly since, according to Barton and Wiseman, director recruitment seldom
prioritizes independent thinking or appropriate business expertise.124
While discussions of board of director recruitment and of business strategy in general are beyond
our present remit, these issues may affect the reluctance of corporations to change strategies;125
their continued adherence, instead, to strategies which are failing or otherwise require modification
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instead of pursuing a credible new strategy that will take years to bear fruit;126 and their tendency
to adopt strategies that are not original, unique, or particularly well suited to them, but which are
common to other participants in the industry.127 For example, Barton and Wiseman report negative
effects from maintaining constant levels of capital allocation over long periods of time as among
various business units, but positive effects from strategically adapting and redeploying capital.128
The duties of directors to act in the best interest of the corporation, whether arising by statute or at
common law, must be understood in relation to the corporation’s legal essentialist characteristics,
including the time horizon of the corporation’s existence, which, as we have noted, is indefinite
and potentially unlimited. Consequently, boards which overemphasize short-term considerations
at the expense of long-term considerations may not be acting in accordance with their duties. While
this may present challenges, as mentioned above, it is nonetheless required, for, as Barton and
Wiseman conclude: “Nothing suggests that the role of a loyal and prudent director is to pressure
management to maximize short-term shareholder value to the exclusion of any other interest. To
the contrary, the logical implication is that he or she should help the company thrive for years into
the future.”129
As noted above, and as discussed by Laverty and by Marginson and McAulay, boards function as
working groups and, as such, are affected by the socialization and other processes of such groups.
Consequently, recruitment criteria for directors which include reputations for independent
thinking, which Barton and Wiseman find are rare, may improve opportunities for re-examination
of various matters, including long-term strategy. Positive contagion can be initiated among the
group itself, particularly by new recruits, or by outside influencers, such as key shareholders.
Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers, and Top Management Teams
The effects of short-termism on chief executive officers (“CEOs”), chief financial officers
(“CFOs”), and other members of the top management team (“TMT”) are not likely to be uniform.
Among other things, CEOs and CFOs may each have separate and distinct statutory and regulatory
duties and responsibilities which are unique to that position alone, and are not shared by other
members of the TMT. Of course, each member of the top management team will normally have
126

Ibid at 100-101.
See the discussion of Interbrew, ibid at 103.
128
Ibid at 102.
129
Ibid at 100-101.
127

693
duties and responsibilities that are unique to the position held, as noted previously.130 At the same
time, all members of the management team, including the CEO and CFO, may have other duties
and responsibilities in common, such as the reporting of criminal and other violations by members
of the organization. Various TMT members, course, we also have duties the performance of which
are highly dependent upon the performance of salient duties by other TMT members, resulting in
significant situations of interdependence.
Laverty, quoting Peter Drucker, claims that American managements feel constantly pushed by
money managers’ quests for higher quarterly earnings and fear of takeover bids “toward decisions
they know to be costly, if not suicidal, mistakes.” Laverty claims that undervaluing the future “is
a symptomatic description of U.S. firms that have failed to make critical investments and thereby
have lost technological leadership and the ability to sustain competitive advantage or even
competitive parity.”131
Whether or not the method of transmission of investor short-termism is from investors from the
board and thence to the CEO or directly from investors to the CEO, as previously discussed, that
pressure was felt by CEOs 20 years ago, according to Peter Drucker. Thomas Palley describes two
paths of research on managerial short-termism: one relating it to financial market imperfections,
and another relating it to CEO and manager careers.132 While the former has been discussed to
least some extent above, some remarks about the latter may be in order.
One argument is that managers undertake short-term projects with a rapid return in order to build
up their reputations and the perceptions of their “talent” by superiors. Palley’s model assumes, on
the one hand, managerial mobility, and on the other hand, managerial rewards, each of which are
tied to current profitability of their existing firm. This may lead them to choose projects with higher
returns earlier in the project’s life even if they have intrinsically lower net present values, simply
because this locks in immediate rewards rather than “rewards that the manager may not be around
to enjoy.”133
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Palley suggests that risk averse managers adopt a short-term orientation. Firstly, they form
portfolios of projects to spread their own reward risk; and secondly, as their probability of quitting
declines, they invest more in long-term-projects with a higher net present value.134 In turn,
managerial turnover affects the degree of short termism: “economies characterized by a high level
of managerial turnover will tend to exhibit a greater degree of short-termism.” Other factors which
may moderate this interaction include cultural and social attitudes toward corporate loyalty and
job mobility, actions of managers intended to increase the probability of receiving an outside job
offer, and firms providing incentives designed to get managers to adopt a long term perspective.
Palley suggest that the role of managerial action in influencing the probability of “quits” can be
illustrated by assuming that, like shareholders, ‘poaching’ firms only observe, and make offers
based on, managers’ current performance, and make offers on the basis of this performance.
Managers, knowing this, have a further incentive to engage in short-termism in the hope of
inducing improved outside job offers at compensation levels which reflect current performance.135
In effect, as investor and board short-termism or other factors increase CEO turnover, the CEO’s
own short-termism may be expected to increase. Similarly, as short-term pressures from the CEO
accelerate departures of top management team members and other members of management, the
short-term orientations of the TMT and other management levels may be expected to increase.
Presumably, these effects have been experienced in North American and European economies in
recent years. For example, Salter references research indicating that the average CEO turnover is
now approximately 16.8% per annum with the result that the average term of the CEO is now less
than 6 years.136
As well, economies in which short-term pressures are reduced, such as those in which capital is
more “patient”, may be expected to have lower levels of management turnover and, consequently,
lower levels of management short-termist orientation. This accords with the comments of other
researchers noted above in relation to Germany, Japan, and Sweden. While equity in American
firms is generally “fluid capital” which moves rapidly based on perceptions of opportunities for
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near term appreciation,137 capital in Japan and Germany is evidently not as impatient, as the debt
and equity providers have more long-term relationships with the corporations and their executives.
Laverty indicates that this greater “bottom-line” orientation increases pressure for short-term
results. Equity shares have become commodities, and this “commoditization of share ownership”
results in fewer shareholders being willing to hold shares for a longer period or being concerned
about the details of the corporation and its business.138
Thus, it can be seen that the more external environment of the corporation, including the polity
and political economy, affect aspects of its (more obviously internal) organization, personnel, and
processes, and concomitant behaviour. In our discussion below of quarterly earnings reports and
guidance, made necessary by regulatory and capital market requirements, we will suggest that
these requirements incur costs, not only directly, but also indirectly. These may include costs
imposed by adjustments to behaviour within the organization necessitated by these external
requirements.
Management and Employees Generally
Much of the commentary in the preceding section, concerning directors, can be considered as
applicable to various levels of management and, in some cases, to non-management employees.
Due to space and time constraints, we will not elaborate on these further at the present time, but
will pass on to the more general analysis of relationships between short-termism and the
organization.
Lenders, Suppliers, Customers, and Communities
The positions of lenders, suppliers, and other trade creditors, as legal counterparties and as
organizational participants may be affected by short-termism. The effect may depend, at least in
part, upon the duration and the committed or expected term of the relationship between the
counterparty/organizational participant and the corporation itself. This may also be true of
customers, communities and polities. For example, a supplier or customer which has had a brief
and non-proximate relationship with the corporation may take comfort in the corporation pursuing
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a largely short-term orientation. On the other hand, suppliers or customers with long-term
relationships and long-term contracts with the corporation are likely to consider an excessively
short-term orientation as a cause for concern.
Relationships Between the Organization and Short-Termism
As we have seen, many analysts consider short-termism to be primarily, if not exclusively, an
external influence brought to bear on the corporation from without. As we have argued, many
influences within the external (or less proximate) environment of the corporation may affect it as
an external legal entity and as animated by the organization within the corporation. As we have
argued, as is the case with other organizations, corporations involve groups of individuals which
seek to accomplish predominant and less dominant goals and objectives by adopting structures and
processes and involving personnel, as groups, units, subunits, and individually. The approach taken
in this work, which we have denominated as “corporative”, takes into account the dualistic nature
of the corporation as an external legal entity and as an internal organization within the legal entity
itself.
A Multidisciplinary Model
In this regard, the problem of short termism presents itself as apt for consideration from the
corporative perspective. Indeed, while not taken from or explicitly applying the corporative
perspective, Laverty expressly applies economic, organizational, and individual influences on
decision-making to the short termism debate. Consequently, his research represents a useful
starting point for demonstrating this multidisciplinary perspective on corporate behaviour. Laverty
models decision-making at top levels of the corporation as resulting from “economic (E).
organizational (O), and individual (I) influences, which affect decisions (D) both directly and
through interaction. These decisions affect the firm's economic performance (P). The combination
of the subject firm's decisions and the decisions of other firms determines what I describe as
collective outcomes (C). The firm's performance and collective outcomes also constitute economic
influences, completing a feedback loop.” 139
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Economic Influences on Decision Making
In Laverty’s model, the “economic dimension includes the "ground rules" for economic
performance, incorporating elements such as consumer preferences, the time horizons inherent in
particular investments, the cost of capital, changing technologies, competitors' decisions, and the
relationship between the firm's actions and its stock price. The organizational dimension includes
processes and structures for making decisions. The individual dimension includes cognition and
judgment in managerial choice.” 140
The outcome of these decisions, the economic performance of the corporation, may be measured
by output, market share, profit, stock price and market value, and may involve both short term and
long-term considerations. The collective outcomes which he mentions apparently refer to the
totality of the decisions of individual firms as embodied in their respective performances.
According to his model, economic influences include feedback effects from performance of the
focal corporation and relevant industry. “For example, poor firm performance may hamper the
firm's ability to make large investments.” Industry outcomes, “such as decreased level of labor
training or the absence of essential suppliers” may influence decisions “by increasing or reducing
the attractiveness of particular investments.”141
Individual Influences on Decision Making
At his time of writing, in 1996, Laverty claimed that evidence concerning bounded rationality and
biases and nonrational heuristics used by individuals in decision-making had not yet been
incorporated into debates over economic short-termism and, in particular, how observed
intertemporal choice in individuals deviates systematically from the normative prescriptions of
discounted utility (DU).
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However, he follows Herbert Simon’s conclusion that behaviour is

intendedly, but only limitedly, rational,143 and Bazerman’s observation that individuals employ
heuristics, which are “standard rules and implicitly direct our judgment [and] serve as a mechanism
for coping with the complex environment surrounding our decisions”.144
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Laverty argues that biases, which may include heuristics, involve systematic deviations from
rational decision-making. These may include biases that overvalue short-term outcomes at the
expense of future outcomes.145 In support of the latter, he cites studies by Thaler, finding discount
rates as high as 277% as between present and specified future dates of payment, and as high as
89% with respect to trade-offs between immediate purchase price and long-run operating costs.146
Other biases which he mentions include preference reversal, where individuals plan to be more
farsighted in future behaviour than they are in present behaviour,147 and hyperbolic discounting,
where the discount rate increases as the payoff date approaches, so that the smaller, nearer choice
becomes more attractive compared to the larger, more distant choice.148In addition to discounting
because of time delay, Laverty notes that discounting because of uncertainty or risk, namely, in
determining expected utility (EU) is also relevant to intertemporal decision-making. For example,
any non-immediate payment engages not only delaying the receipt of payment but also the implicit
risk that the payment will not occur.
Other research, such as that of Tversky and Kahneman, confirms the existence of loss aversion, in
which losses loom larger than corresponding gains,149 and by Shelley that short-term losses loom
larger than short-term gains whereas temporal discounting results in a relative diminishing of the
importance of loss aversion regarding long-term prospects.150 Laverty posits that managers avoid
short-term risk “but they are more tolerant of risk over the longer run because they believe they
will have time to gather information and reduce the likelihood or size of a negative outcome.”
However, when long-run investments “require short-term sacrifices, the negative short-term
outcomes loom disproportionately large.”151
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Organizational Influences on Decision Making
Laverty examines research on group and organizational processes, which he says he had not at that
time been applied to short-termism, that render an organization “unable or unwilling to pursue
strategies that reflect an optimal valuation of the future”.152 He maintains that organizational inertia
preserves an organization’s core features, such as its stated goals, forms of authority, core
technology, and strategy, against changes that might more rapidly respond to changes in the
organization’s external environment. Such inertia helps to maintain its organizational identity.153
However, by limiting the rate of change in the range of future possibilities open to the organization,
such that it cannot change as quickly as changes in its external environment, inertia increases its
likelihood of failure.
As we maintain in this work, in order to succeed over the long-term, a corporation must survive in
the short-term and in the medium-term. Laverty admits that a course of action reflecting optimal
intertemporal choice, especially over a long run, is sometimes inconsistent with survival. “Few
firms are in a position to sustain losses over a prolonged period, even if there is a positive NPV
for these losses and their associated payoffs.” Choices permitting short run survival may
sometimes risk or even assure long-term failure.154
Group and organizational processes relevant in this regard include the “Asch phenomenon” where
a mistake in judgment is expressed and defended by colleagues of the person opining;
“groupthink”, which Laverty describes as the tendency of groups to reject and even punish ideas
that diverge too far from orthodoxy; escalation of commitment, the tendency of decision-makers
to persist in and to increase investment in failing courses of action; the latter reflecting both group
pressures to rationalize past decisions that later appear mistaken; and an individual psychological
tendency to self- justification, which expresses itself in an unwillingness to admit past mistakes.155
Laverty also averts to the organizational theory, not then part of the economic short-termism
debate, concerning findings that temporal orientation is in part socially constructed; which
suggests that norms from social structures may affect the degree to which managers focus on the
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short-term and on the long-term.156 The social structures and affiliations in which they participate,
inside and outside their firms, affect how they construe what is desirable and what is possible.157
What DiMaggio describes as “preconscious understandings the organizational actors share” often
determine the choice of strategies.158 As shown by Meyer and Zucker, elements other than
economic performance constitute selection pressures that affect the survival of organizations.159
For example, Laverty suggests that discounted cash flow analysis may be justified more by general
acceptance conveying legitimacy than by economic efficiency; and that particular types of
investment are legitimized through forces beyond the boundaries of any single firm, including
professional standards and norms across groups and organizations.
It appears, then that decision makers within an organization are affected by norms and social
influences experienced by the decision-maker manager through affiliations external to the
organization, as well as within the organization. This would suggest that external orientations to
short term results have an effect on the decision-maker which may be counteracted to some extent
by a long-term orientation within the organization or, on the other hand, exacerbated by a shortterm orientation within the organization. Likewise, the adoption by a decision-maker of a longterm orientation involves influences both without and within the organization. For example, the
optimal prospects for increasing the long-term orientation of management decision-making would
appear to involve both external and internal pressures in that direction.
Intraorganizational Information and Agenda Transmission
We have also averted to how the process of information selection within organizations affects
decision-making. Laverty averts to salient studies, including one demonstrating that “decisions are
made at successive levels (from bottom to top) of the firm; structure is important because it affects
the set of choices presented to the decision maker.” Another shows that “structure determines the
sequence in which conflicts are resolved, and agendas evolve as conflicts flow upward to top
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management. Thus, choices are made based upon the alternatives presented, not from the full range
of options that were considered at lower levels.”160
As we have argued in this work, neither the full range of options nor the full range of information
relevant to those options considered is presented at successively higher levels of management. This
suggests that the extent to which decision-making is short-term or long-term in orientation is
largely determined at lower organizational levels. Other aspects of the structure, process, and
personnel of the organization are relevant to such determination. For example, as a result of
bottom-up capital budgeting and investment review processes, lower level managers screen out
projects, as a result of which top managers consider only projects that have made it through one
or more levels of screening. Laverty indicates that “Because the time horizon of an individual's
responsibility is inversely proportional to his or her level in the organization, it may well be that
certain long-term considerations will not "bubble to the top" in many organizations.” 161
Correspondingly, if long-term considerations are determined at higher levels of the organization
then, to be relevant to the organization, this determination will have to be reflected, in turn, in
downwardly directed pressures effected by means of structural, processual, and personnel
influences. If external norms are directed towards long-term considerations, this may be expected
to affect all levels of management to some degree. The presence of internal norms directed towards
long-term considerations may vary at different levels of the organization and the effectiveness of
such internal norms at any focal level may be affected by their perceived salience and intensity at
that level. This will, in turn, be affected by group, as well as individual, perceptions. As the most
immediate determined of social identity, group perceptions are likely to be most relevant to any
individual decision-maker.
Laverty says that studies of decision biases support the idea that group dynamics will tend to
mitigate at least obvious mistakes intertemporal choice problems, and that the heuristics and biases
of individual decision-makers which may tend to cause economic short-termism may not do so if
they are counteracted by organizational and economic decision influences.162 He concludes that
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while understanding group and organizational influences on intertemporal choice problems
extremely complex undertaking, it is important to the debate on short-termism.
Generally, information about the long-term is less available than information about the short-term,
producing pressure to produce in the present. Moreover, due to preference reversal, long-term
prospects, which are not undervalued in isolations, are overwhelmed by very short-term concerns.
While “communicating a long-run vision is a fundamental challenge for top managers”, the
criticality of such challenge is directly proportional to the sacrifices required in the short term in
order to achieve long-run goals. When long-run prospects require some sacrifice of with shortterm performance, top managers must attempt to improve the quality and availability of
information by sharing the long-run vision in order to “to provide—in advance—a context for
short-term results”.163For example, the need to invest in and nurture complex capabilities in
environments of accelerating change taxes existing analytical tools, such as specifying future cash
flows associated with capabilities, which are less easily measured than investments in
equipment.164
Laverty argues that discounted utility may not be an appropriate framework for valuing uncertain
long-term prospects; instead, an options framework may be more appropriate. He argues that the
options framework posited by Myers recognizes that the payoff to investment is not simply the
direct cash flow from the investment but also includes a new set of opportunities that would not
have been possible without the original investment. 165 A larger project can be broken into smaller
parts, each of which can be evaluated in terms of both cash flow and the options it creates. Delay
also gives the decision-maker more time to gather information to reduce the uncertainty.166 Thus,
while Eisenhardt observed that most strategic different decisions “can be postponed indefinitely”,
breaking down a strategic decision into smaller parts would allow information gathered since the
last partial decision to be applied to the next decision, and so on. In a technological field, being
competitive at in the future may involve a series of discrete investments over time in new
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generations of technologies, applying cumulative and path-dependent learning at each level of
decision-making.167
Indeed, we would argue that such decision segmentation also presents a feedback loop in which
the prior decision which was not as advantageous as another alternative available at the time the
prior decision was made can, if necessary, be reversed and some other alternative, either one
available at that time or which has become available in the interim, might be assessed as
preferential and pursued accordingly. One of the concomitants of such decision segmentation is
that the decision-maker is able to take into account not only the advantages of various courses of
action but the cost of dropping a course of action at a future decision point and adopting, instead,
an alternate course of action.
As Laverty argues, economic considerations and economic assumptions prove inadequate on their
own as explanations of intertemporal decision-making, since “our world is, in fact, teeming with
short-term/long-run trade-offs” to such an extent “that intertemporal choice is basic (if often
implicit) in managerial work.” 168
Laverty’s model of management decision-making in terms of economic, personal and
organizational influences and his discussion of how they operate has been shown to be consistent
with the corporate perspective of this work. External influences from the broader society and
polity, as well as from the investment community, may affect decision-makers. Influences internal
to the organization, including its structure, processes, and personnel, may affect the groups, units
and subunits in which decision-makers are situated. All of these influences will affect
intertemporal choices, including the balance between short-term and long-term costs and benefits.
Importantly, intertemporal decision-making requires consideration and balancing of: firstly, the
legal interests of the corporation and its counterparties as they may be instantiated over time; and
secondly, the organizational expectations of the corporation and its organizational participants and
they may be instantiated over time; in each case, across a temporal horizon which is indefinite and
may be perpetual. The effect of some decisions on the one hand, may be to forestall, and, on the
other hand, to forgo or limit, reaching certain decisions in the future; which may have the result
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that present decisions affecting legal rights and duties and organizational expectations may
constrain legal and organizational relationships for some definite or indefinite time period in the
future.
As indicated, intertemporal decisions may be approached differently by the corporation than by its
legal counterparties or organizational participants, in part, because of significant information
asymmetries obtaining between the corporation and such parties. Corporative analysis can assist
in identifying such asymmetries, their consequences in legal and organizational terms, and how
they might best be addressed, by reduction or otherwise. To this subject, our attention now turns.
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CONCLUSION:
THE CORPORATIVE CORPORATION OF THE FUTURE
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER
Previous Chapters of This Book
This work has identified as the “corporative theory” of, or the “corporative perspective” on, the
corporation: a conception of the corporation as involving both a legal entity, that is to say, a rightsand-duty-bearing entity engaged with various legal counterparties (the external or “outwardfacing” attitude of the corporation), and as an organization involving human beings as actors on
behalf of the corporation and as organizational participants (the internal or “inward-facing”
attitude of the corporation).
Part 3 of the book, in Chapters Seven through Ten inclusive, investigated: firstly, the
“organizational essentialist characteristics” of organizations generally and of the corporation, in
particular; secondly, the extent to which the legal essentialist characteristics of the corporation and
its organizational essentialist characteristics were interrelated; and thirdly, the relationships, on the
one hand, between the corporation as a legal entity and its various legal counterparties; and, on the
other hand, between the corporation as an organization and its various organizational participants.
Chapter Ten considered the fifth and last “legal essentialist characteristic” of the corporation,
namely its possible perpetual existence, which entails its possible survival beyond that of any
human counterparty or organizational participant. This raises issues relating not only with respect
to intertemporal decision making, but also with respect to intergenerational decision making and
intergenerational duty: namely, the extent to which a focal corporation should take into account
not only existing, but also possible future, legal counterparties and organizational participants,
including communities and polities.
This Chapter
The first section of this chapter, by way of conclusion, summarizes the argument of the book as a
whole; and the final section, identifies, firstly, a number of concerns related to the space and place
of the corporation in the economy, society and the polity, both at national and transnational levels;
and secondly, a number of initiatives which are complementary to the corporate theory of, or
perspective on, the corporation; both in order to situate corporative theory in an appropriate place
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and space relative to pending and possible future developments in corporate law and corporate
legal theory, some further discussion of which concludes the book.
THE CORPORATIVE RESPONSE TO CORPORATE THEORY
This work is considered to be distinctive as a work of corporate legal theory in at least three
respects: firstly, the theory that it advances; secondly, the methodology pursued; and, thirdly, the
breadth and scope of its research and conclusions; as explicated below.
CORPORATIVITY – THEORY AND PERSPECTIVE
Legal Entity and Organization
A fundamental, effectively existential, problem of corporate law and legal theory is explaining
how a non-corporeal entity which bears rights and duties, and is, therefore, a legal entity can take
action in the “real world”, which is a world of corporeal individuals and entities.1 Taking action
requires that one or more individuals animate, personate, or “vivify” the corporation: it requires
(ultimately or proximately) at least one human person to enliven it or bring it to life “in reality”.2
A related fundamental problem which arises concerns the nature of the legal and other relationships
between the corporation, as a legal entity, on the one hand, and the animating individual person or
persons, on the other hand.3 In the event that the corporation involves more than one animating
individual person, those individual persons, the book argues, may, and in fact do, constitute an
“organization”, a term which is generally considered to mean, firstly, a social unit or group of
persons; who, secondly, collaborate or take collective action; thirdly, with respect to achieving
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common results or goals and objectives.4 These three attributes of the organization referred to in
this book as “organizational essentialist attributes”.
Collaborating or taking collective action (“organizing”) toward such goals typically requires the
engagement of structures, processes, and personnel (each an element of the “organization”)
considered, in an intendedly rational manner, to be conducive to attaining such goals.5 These
structural, processual, and personnel attributes impact the organization, and thereby the
corporation, and the attributes which are legally essential to it as a corporation (“legal essentialist
attributes”).6 The book contends that such impacts must be investigated, understood, and taken
into account by legislators and regulators, legal academics and practitioners, jurists, those charged
with enforcement of legislation and regulations, and other participants in legal discourse of, or
relating to, the corporation.
The Corporation as Organization
It is generally agreed that organizations may have economic objectives, including engaging in
business activities in pursuit of economic goals. Thus, the modern business corporation may
constitute an organization if it exhibits all of the organizational essentialist characteristics. That it
does so is established in Part 3 of the book.7
Exposition of research and theory in the book demonstrate that the goals of the modern business
corporation are not exhausted by the pursuit of profit.8 In fact, as noted below, maximizing profit
may not even be its predominant or preeminent goal.9 It also has various other goals and objectives
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(such as its continuance), some of which are end goals and others instrumental goals.10 The book
shows that various groups, subgroups, and individuals within the corporation may pursue, to
various degrees, their own goals, which may or may not accord with goals of the overall
organization.11 The pursuit of such goals may involve direct external engagement with third parties
outside the boundaries of the corporation as a legal entity.12
Research and theory referenced in the book illustrate how groups, subgroups, and individuals
within the corporate legal entity may engage in competitive processes to acquire power and
influence vis-à-vis the organization as a whole; often based, at least in part, upon the focal group’s
capacity to satisfy resource requirements and to address contingencies affecting the organization
as a whole.13 Such intraorganizational power and influence may affect the focal group's pursuit of
goals, including determining which goals of the organization and its groups, subgroups, and
individual participants are pursued, to what degree, and how they are prioritized inter se, by the
focal group within the focal group and otherwise.14
Such a panoply of goals and objectives tends to produce conflict within the organization and,
similarly, within its groups and subgroups. The resolution of such conflicts is often considered to
be effected by means of a superordinate goal or superordinate process. 15 The book demonstrates
that, although profit maximization has been disproven as a superordinate goal, the generation of
“sufficient” profit to continue its activities, which may be considered to be an “optimal” level of
profit, is often considered to be, if not a superordinate goal, then, at least, a highly significant one.16
This is contrary to classical and neoclassical, but not other, economic theory.17
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The Corporative Theory of, or Perspective on, the Corporation
This work advances a theory of, approach to, or perspective on, the corporation which holds that
the corporation must be analyzed both as a legal entity and as an organization.18 The attributes of
the corporation which are considered to be essential to its role and status as a legal entity taking
action in that capacity concomitantly engage with attributes of the corporation as an organization
by which it is instantiated, and takes action, in the real world.19
Some of the legal essentialist characteristics of the corporation may be said to be outward-facing
inasmuch as they concern its legal actions which are relatively more extracorporate or external
(described in the book as relating to its “hard outer shell”), while others are more inward-facing
inasmuch as they concern its legal actions which are relatively more intracorporate or internal
actions (relating to its “soft inner core”).20 The panoply of these characteristics must be understood
as a whole with respect to the theorization of the corporation if any theory of corporate law is to
have meaningful consequences in terms of explanatory, predictive, and effective capacity and
utility vis-à-vis corporate law and attendant academic, practice, legislative, and judicial
considerations.21
Many of the assumptions and generalizations which have commonly arisen, been employed, and
have had significant influence, in respect of corporate law and legal theory,22 particularly those
emanating from classical and neoclassical economics, have failed to recognize this “dual nature”
of the corporation. The book delineates some of the attendant consequences of such failure, both
concerning the place of the corporation in the economy, society, the polity and the state as spheres
of action23 and concerning its mode of action in the economy and otherwise.24

18

See the discussions in Chapter Six, particularly in the sections entitled "Existence and Typology of Organizational
Goals and Objectives" and "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals"; and in Chapter Ten.
19
Ibid.
20
See the discussion in Chapter One in the section entitled "The Corporation in Law and in Discourse" and "The
Corporation and Corporate Essentialism in Law".
21
Ibid.
22
See the discussion in Chapter One in the section entitled "Assumptions About the Corporation".
23
See the discussion in Appendix A.
24
See the discussion in Appendix A, in Chapters A1 and A2.

710
THE METHODOLOGY OF THIS BOOK
The methodology of this work is highly original, if not actually unique, at least in terms of
corporate legal theory. Rather than proceeding purely by abstract reasoning or deductive reasoning
(although often without empirical support, other than anecdotes, or appeals to “common sense”)
to advance a theory of the corporation, the work employs a methodology which is more akin to
inductive or empirical reasoning. The author denominates this as a “descriptive” or “descriptivist”
approach.25
WHAT IS? CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY
Framing the Corporation
This methodology involves inquiring, firstly, what legal theorists, practitioners, jurists, and other
knowledgeable commentators consider the corporation to be, as a matter of law; which may be
phrased as asking what is that which is identified as a corporation by, and within, that particular
knowledgeable community.26
While alternative formulations are possible, for purposes of discussion, this approach identifies
the corporation as having the following essential attributes: 1. It is a separate legal entity or rightsand-duty-bearing entity. 2. It is characterized by asset partitioning and limited liability. 3.
Contributors to its equity capital possess certain rights vis-à-vis the corporation, which normally
exclude a right to demand a return of capital, but normally include a right of the contributor or its
successors in interest to transfer those rights, and, at least in the case of a public corporation, to do
so relatively freely. 4. It possesses “management ownership separation”: the rights to participate
directly in its central management are independent of equity ownership (although equity owners
do have certain other rights with respect to such central management, relating to its authorization,
advice, and accountability). 5. Its duration of existence is normally indefinite. The book identifies
these as its “legal essentialist attributes”.27
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Instantiating the Corporation in Law
Part 1 and Appendix A of the work proceed by examining whether, how, and to what extent, these
legal essentialist attributes of the corporation are instantiated by modern corporate law in the
modern business corporation.28 This involves examining four significant statutes concerning
modern business corporations: the Canada Business Corporations Act 29 and the Ontario Business
Corporations Act,30 which are the most significant such statutes in Canada; the Delaware General
Corporation Law,31 which governs a significant majority of public corporations operating in the
United States; and the Model Business Corporations Act of the American Law Institute,32 which
is the model for the current or proposed corporate statutes of many of the other states.
This examination also considers some aspects of relevant common law which are relevant to such
statutory corporate law insofar as that common law expands, extends, amplifies, or completes the
same. The legal essentialist attributes identified by the expert corporate law community are found
to be instantiated in the actual corporate law surveyed in the book.
This examination of statutory and common law relating to the corporation also investigates the
interrelationship among the several legal essentialist attributes of the corporation, and considers
how such interrelationships are relevant to, and are expressed in, these leading corporation statutes.
This investigation necessarily engages issues concerning how the corporation, as an incorporeal
legal entity, takes action, both internally and externally. These issues, which relate to the
corporation’s organizational attributes, are examined further in Part 3 of the book.
WHY THIS? ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE CORPORATION
The Corporation as Instantiated in Discourse
Part 2 of the book, supplemented by Appendix A, investigates issues concerning why these “legal
essentialist” attributes of the corporation have been thus identified, and why they have been
instantiated as such in modern corporate law. This inquiry engages a second data set, discussed in
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more detail in Appendix B; namely, discourse concerning the corporation, and in particular,
assumptions and generalizations concerning the corporation and the economy, and its relationship
to society, polity, and the state.
The economic objectives of the corporation necessarily prioritize, in such examination, but are not
limited to, assumptions and generalizations of an economic nature, most notably those of classical
and neoclassical economics. Such assumptions and generalizations underlie the role of the
corporation, as a separate legal entity, in taking action, by and through human individuals, in the
real world which is the place and space of human individuals. Important as it is to appreciate the
role of such assumptions and generalizations in legal and other discourse concerning the firm and,
in particular, the modern business corporation, so, too, is the means by which they take action
simultaneously in the “real” and in the “legal” worlds which is the particular focus, and
contribution, of corporative theory. Accordingly, the examination of the assumptions and
generalizations upon which corporate legal action is predicated is contained in Appendix A of the
book, not to in any way minimize its importance, but so as not to unduly burden the main task of
the book which, as noted, concerns the corporation as legal and organizational actor.
Macro-Level Assumptions
In this regard, Appendix B of the book identifies and examines a number of macro-level
assumptions and generalizations with respect to: firstly, the interrelationship among the economy,
society, polity, and state, including: 1. the separation of economic, social and political functions
(considering selected archaeological, historical, and other evidence and theory from ancient and
classical times to the present);33 2. the situation of the economy in the “private” sphere of action
(considering, primarily, the economy of classical Greece and Rome);34 3. the actual and analytical
separation of the “private” and “public” spheres (considering analysis by Habermas, Arendt, and
certain liberal thinkers);35 4. the distinctive mode of analysis of the economy (considering
atomistic conceptions of man in economics and other disciplines);36 and 5. the distinctiveness and
33
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independence of the economy from its ambient society and the polity (considering, as an
alternative, the embeddedness analysis of Polanyi and Granovetter);37 secondly, the firm in
classical and neoclassical economics (as discussed in the immediately following paragraph); and,
thirdly, the corporation as an economic actor (as discussed thereafter).
Micro-Level Assumptions
A discussion of the purpose and methodology of economic theory in Appendix B of the book is
followed by examination, further explication, and criticism (from economic, sociological,
organizational, institutional, political, political economy, philosophical, and legal, perspectives),
of some assumptions and generalizations of classical and neoclassical economics, including: 1.
atomistic utilitarianism;38 2. atomism, and methodological individualism;39 3. individual
determination of utility;40 4. similarity of desires and utility;41 5. the mismatch of desire and
availability;42 6. the complete independence, rationality, and information, of individual market
actors;43 7. the prevalence of utilitarian, independent, market transactions;44 and 8. the equilibrium
of market prices.45
Evaluation of Assumptions and Generalizations
Appendix B of the book establishes that these assumptions and generalizations, as expressed in
classical and neoclassical economics, have been demonstrated, by economic and other theorization
and research, to be: 1. not only highly contestable, but, generally, at variance with alternative (and
usually subsequent) theorization and research; 2. incomplete, inadequate, and even erroneous; and
3. lacking in explanatory and predictive capacity and utility. Accordingly, such assumptions and
37
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generalizations cannot reasonably be relied upon in framing a theory of the corporation, or in
framing policy, legislating, regulating, adjudicating, or otherwise deliberating or acting, with
respect to the corporation as instantiated in the modern world. Thus, a new model is required.
The Corporation as Economic Actor
The focus of corporative theory concerns how an entity constituted, and recognized, by law as
bearing rights and duties in its own separate and distinct capacity can take action in the “real world”
by and through the instrumentality of individual human beings. With respect to the corporation as
an economic actor, the book maintains that classical and neoclassical economics employs a model
of the firm centered on an entrepreneur; which is completely devoid of organizational attributes,
anthropomorphizes the firm, and, accordingly, “invisibilizes” the firm as a social construct. This
prevents robust, or even meaningful, examination of classical and neoclassical hypotheses, and
their explanatory and predictive capacities.46
Consequently, quite apart from the problematic generalizations and assumptions of classical and
neoclassical economics (as noted above), its model of the firm also cannot be reasonably relied
upon in framing a theory of the corporation or in framing policy, legislating, regulating,
adjudicating, or otherwise deliberating or acting with respect to the corporation as instantiated, and
as acting, in the modern “real” world. This has been demonstrated by theorization and research in
economics and other disciplines, justifying search for a new model.47 The corporative theory of,
or perspective on, the corporation is such a model.
Research of the Corporation in Modern History and Today
In accordance with its descriptive or descriptivist approach, Part 2 of the book goes beyond
investigation of theoretical discourse concerning the firm to investigate discourse of a more
empirical nature: namely, that relating to the history of business corporations in America,48
primarily in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.49 It presents data relating to the development
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of the business corporation in that environment, primarily as chronicled by the eminent business
historian, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.50
Part 2 attempts to answer the question what the modern business corporation has been, in recent
history, and is, today, in terms of its features as experienced “in the real world”, particularly with
respect to its structure, processes, and personnel, that is to say, its organizational, features. It
compares those features, as so explicated, with the legal essentialist attributes of the corporation
discussed in Part 1, and explicated in greater detail in Appendix A, of the book. This includes
considering organizational barriers to unified action, including the diffusion of rationality,
information and decision-making within the organization; and its adhesion to complex and
multiple goals, both official and unofficial;51 and implications of these barriers with respect to
resolving conflicts implied by the same, including considering: the corporation as a conflict system
for internal and external conflicts, joint preference ordering in economic theory, and political
aspects of intraorganizational operations, including the formation of coalitions.52 Part 2 also
investigates the development of the multidivisional form (“MDF”), and the multinational
enterprise (“MNE”), and their effects on legal and organizational features of the underlying
business enterprise.53
HOW, INSTEAD, TO ANALYZE THE CORPORATION: A CORPORATIVE THEORY
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
The Organization and the Corporation
Finally, Part 3 of the book analyzes the organization, employing a methodology similar to that
adopted with respect to the corporation in Part 1 and Appendix A. It investigates the definition and
essential characteristics of the organization employed by reputable and knowledgeable, even
authoritative, commentators, including organizational theorists and practitioners;54 considers each
of the characteristics identified by them as essential to the organization;55 and investigates whether
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these essentialist characteristics of the organization (“organizational essentialist attributes”) are
also instantiated in the modern business corporation, both in law and in fact.56
It then proceeds to investigate how the organizational essentialist attributes and other attributes
instantiated in the corporation as organization affect each of the legal essentialist attributes of the
corporation as instantiated in the modern business corporation;57 namely, SLE status;58 limited
liability and asset partitioning;59 capital lock-in with transferable equity interests;60 management
ownership separation;61 and indefinite duration of corporate existence.62
Essential Attributes of the Organization
These organizational essentialist attributes include: 1. being, or involving, a social unit or group
of people; 2. which takes collaborative or collective action; 3. in a manner rationally intended to
achieve some common result, goal or objective.63
Theorization and Research of the Organization and the Corporation Compared
The data set here includes theorization, empirical, and other observations: firstly, of organizations,
by sociologists, social psychologists, and social theorists, such as Max Weber, Philip Selznick,
Egon Bittner, Meyer Zald, Henri Tajfel and John Turner, Leon Festinger, Blake Ashforth and Fred
Mael, and Robert Merton;64 and, secondly, of corporations, by management theorists and
practitioners, ranging from Henri Fayol, Frederick Winslow Taylor, Mary Parker Follett, and
Chester Barnard, to Herbert Simon, James March, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and others.65
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Goals
The data set considered here also encompasses extensive theoretical and empirical information
concerning goals: firstly, of different natures, including official, unofficial, operative,
instrumental, ultimate or end, superordinate, and subordinate, goals; and, secondly, obtaining at
the macro-organizational level and at various intraorganizational (group and subgroup) levels.66
Intraorganizational Organizations and Operations
Theoretical and empirical information concerning intraorganizational power and influence, as well
as identification, loyalty, and commitment, and the sources of each of the same, is also reviewed,
in order to facilitate comprehension of attendant organizational complexities.67 The effect of the
exercise of such power and influence on organizational decision making and action are shown to
be extremely significant, including: the ability to control information and sanctions (both positive
and negative), to mitigate uncertainty, to provide scarce and critical resources, to define what is
critical to the organization, and to provide leadership, in each case, as expressed in real and
meaningful leadership action.68 Such essential information cannot be reliably deduced from a
corporation’s organizational chart, by reason of these matters and by reason of the existence of
informal structures, relationships, and even informal organizations, within the focal organization.69
The book proposes that significant intraorganizational groups and subgroups should be examined
as to whether they constitute intraorganizational organizations, that is, as possessing organizational
essentialist attributes; and essays some consideration of this question in the book, with respect to
both the board of directors and other organizational components. Such examination and such
proposal for examination are thought to be highly original, if not unique. Further research and
development of this proposal, both empirically and theoretically, would be required in order to
unequivocally substantiate the existence of the organizational organizations. However, conceptual
disaggregation of organizations into components consisting of intraorganizational organizations
would allow much greater scope for organizational and corporative analysis, as its unit of
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theorization and investigation would be in much greater supply and may be more amenable to
more discriminating theorization and research.70
The Dominant Coalition – Board of Directors and Top Management Team
Theory and research discussed in the book indicates that the composition of the board of directors,
and the top management team, constituting, either individually or collectively, the “dominant
coalition” identified by organizational theorists and experts, may, and should, vary with strategic
and other influences and developments, both inside and outside the organization.71 The structure,
processes, and personnel (including composition) of that group are shown to be extremely
important.72
The book examines whether the board of directors can be meaningfully analyzed as an
intraorganizational organization and the possible implications of such analysis. As with respect to
other intraorganizational groups, such structured analytic examination is thought to be highly
original, if not unique. Such examination, which is outlined but not completed in detail in the book,
is held to be valuable with respect to the governance of the corporation as a macro-organization.73
The question has particular importance with respect to the board of directors, which is the primary
actor of, for, and on behalf of, the corporation. Its investigation may identify divergences between
the goals of the corporation as organization and those of the board of directors as a constituent
group. This may enable consideration of questions such as: whether the board as an
intraorganizational organization employs or purports to employ the same superordinate goal or
process as the corporation as organization; whether it prioritizes official, operative, actual,
instrumental, or ultimate, goals in the same way; how any differences can be managed, contained,
or otherwise optimized; and what degree of convergence is required to be achieved. The
importance of these issues, which also arise with respect to other intraorganizational groups, is
particularly attenuated at the board level.
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Conclusion – Essentialist Attributes of the Corporation and the Organization Compared
The book demonstrates that the interrelationship among legal essentialist elements of the modern
business corporation provide opportunities for its long-term continuance as a legal entity,
provided, of course, that such continuance is facilitated by the history, currency, and future
prospects, of its business operations.74 It demonstrates, too, that organizational essentialist
elements of the human organization which animate and vivify the corporation are adaptable, as a
matter of rational intentional action or otherwise, to developments in its ambient environment,
both externally and internally, so as to facilitate the long-term continuance of the organization, as
such organization, and of the corporation as a legal entity.75
1. THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK
The Corporation and the Economy, Society, Polity, and the State
This work seeks to situate the corporation within a notional place or space bounded in various
ways by the “larger” places and spaces of the economy, the society, the “private” and “public”
spheres, the polity, the state, and supranational entities.76 It demonstrates the notional fluidity,
malleability, and even partial fungibility of those “larger” places and spaces as among themselves,
and thereby seeks to legitimize the analysis of the place and space of the corporation as “mapping
onto” those other places and spaces variously, in whole or in part, and in different respects.77
The business enterprise and, in particular, the modern business corporation, is shown to be situated
in relation to ambient external and internal environments which are themselves characterized by
certain economic, social, private and public, political, statal, transnational, and supranational
aspects. Those aspects, it is demonstrated, affect the corporation, both as a legal entity (in its
outward-facing, external, or “hard shell” aspect or in its external environment), and as an
organization (in its inward-facing, internal, or “inner core” aspect or in its internal environment).
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The “Black Box” of the Corporation
Assumptions and generalizations of classical and neoclassical economics which underlie treatment
of the firm as a “black box” (within which inputs are somehow converted into outputs) and which
are not amenable to inquiry within that paradigm are contested, and ultimately rejected, in the book
by consideration of other paradigms of economics (including institutional and evolutionary
economics), and of other disciplines.78 These alternative paradigms facilitate “opening”, and
inquiring into, that “black box”, which is demonstrated to be the “black box” of the organization.79
The revealed contents of that “black box”, or, at least, those contents which relate generally to its
organizational aspects (as explicated by leading organizational theorists and practitioners), are
“mapped onto” that part of its contents which are, more specifically, “legal”, inasmuch as they
relate to the firm as a legal entity and, more specifically, to the modern business corporation as a
legal entity possessing certain legal essentialist characteristics.80
In the course of this inquiry, early organizational theory, such as that of Max Weber, is also
challenged, and found to require modification, by organizational theorists and practitioners and by
theorists and practitioners in cognate and other disciplines.81 Analyzing the modern business
corporation as an organization reveals the unsoundness of certain assumptions and generalizations
(many adopted from classical and neoclassical economics) which prevail with respect to its
attributes as a rights-and-duty-bearing entity.
The Corporative Corporation
SLE Status, Limited Liability, and Asset Partitioning
The book illustrates how business units of a particular corporation, whether divisions or
subsidiaries, may act separately from each other, and may even compete with each other, in its
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external environment, including with respect to markets for sales and for supplies;82 and also in its
internal environment, competing (among other things) for resources, revenue opportunities, and
recognition; and that such actions are ordinarily not much affected by status as SLE or otherwise.83
On the other hand, SLE status may become significant with respect to business units which are
declining or failing. They may be “walled off” into SLEs if not already constituted as such; and
may be “walled off” from intensive involvement or interference by higher organizational levels
once it is determined that such decline or failure cannot be averted; in which event other business
units may be sought to be insulated from the liability of the focal business unit.84 However, if such
higher order involvement antedates such determination, attempts at insulation are less likely be
effective.85
Management Ownership Separation and Intraorganizational Decision Making
Accordingly, for many reasons, some of which are discussed in the book, determining the identity
of makers of decisions and the information available to them at the relevant time, such as for the
purpose of assigning responsibility or “blame”, likely presents much more substantial difficulties
than might otherwise be thought.86 Decision makers, information, and other relevant determinants
may not be situate entirely within the bounds of the focal SLE.87 Hence, attributing decisions or
failures to make decisions to particular individuals and groups, whether for managerial, legal or
regulatory purposes, presents difficulties.
Members of business units of the focal corporation are shown to be affected by business unit level
identity, commitment, goals, incentives, and disincentives, which are proven to be more powerful
82
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at lower organizational levels, but such persons are also affected by their higher level equivalents.88
The effects of informal relationships and even an “informal organization” within the formal
organization are also shown to be highly significant. Such relationships and such informal
organization may extend far beyond the focal SLE itself, and may include a myriad of SLEs at
various organizational levels within the business enterprise owned or controlled by the ultimate
parent corporation.89 Thus, the application of organizational analysis to the modern business
corporation not only problematizes much prevailing “legal treatment” of the corporation in
discourse and in action, but also presents opportunities for its improvement and increased efficacy.
Management Ownership Separation, Equity Lock-in, and Transferability
The lock-in of equity capital, its generally free transferability, and the day-to-day independence of
management from equity ownership, combined with broad management powers, including powers
over return of capital and distribution of earnings, permits corporations to enter into long-term
undertakings with considerable freedom from debt and equity holders, markets, and otherwise.90
The assignment of broad management powers to the board of directors insulates the board, on a
day-to-day basis, from shareholder interference.91 Shareholders are accorded powers to elect
directors, to receive information concerning the corporation, and to express their “voice” at
meetings of shareholders and otherwise.92 However, their rights in respect of corporate operations
arise principally in exceptional circumstances, such as the right to approve extraordinary corporate
transactions.93 Because shareholders are not entitled, as such, to participate in day-to-day
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management of the corporation, their “exit” from equity ownership can normally be effected
simply by transfer of their shares, without any adverse effect on its management.94
The book argues that information currently available publicly, both from the corporation and from
capital market participants, concerning the focal public corporation cannot normally enable parties
outside that corporation (and, arguably, even within it) to fully understand the “value drivers” of
its businesses, either individually or collectively.95 These value drivers include considerations
relating to its strategy, structure, processes and personnel; namely, relating to its organization.96
Consequently, a considerable information asymmetry exists, especially with respect to
organizational matters, as between shareholders and management of the corporation.97 This
information asymmetry affects the exercise of certain significant shareholder rights beyond voting
in the exceptional circumstances in which they may be available.98 The exceptional nature of
shareholder rights beyond electing directors may also reflect asymmetries of interest as among
various corporate participants, including duration of participation,99 as discussed under the next
heading.
Information asymmetries can be reduced by formal and informal communication between the
board and TMT with shareholders and prospective shareholders, the “Street” (or the investment
community generally), and others.100 The opportunity to directly exercise such “voice” may be
expected, firstly, to reduce the exercise of “exit”, at least if it results from dissatisfaction with
management, rather than from other portfolio adjustments; and, secondly, to improve the quality
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of shareholder evaluation of exceptional actions or transactions proposed by management, which
may increase support for the same and may decrease support for proposals from shareholders and
others with disparate interests.101
Importantly, however, a primary determinant of the value of the corporation, and hence the market
value of its shares, relates to its ability to: adopt sound objectives; a strategy aligned with their
accomplishment; a structure, and process, personnel, and other attributes conducive to the
attainment of the same; and to execute such strategy effectively. 102 These are all attributes of the
organization as such.103 They influence attainment of its goals and objectives,104 which normally
include generating adequate profitability to maintain its existence,105 and, in that connection,
satisfying, or one might even say satisficing, the interests of participants sufficient to that end.106
As the following discussion will indicate, both attainment (on the “upside”) and the avoidance of
non-attainment (on the “downside”) of its goals are very much affected by such organizational
considerations.107
The Indefinite Term of Corporate Existence
The book demonstrates that organizational continuance is considered to be an existential objective
of every organization, including a modern business corporation.108 As the corporation generally
has no limits on the duration of its existence, the corporation, acting by and through its primary
actor, its board of directors, could conceivably persist indefinitely, outlasting its immediate
participants, although not their successors.109 Accordingly, the corporation may adopt views of its
101
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interests which extend far beyond those of present participants, perhaps taking into account the
internal and external environments expected to obtain in twenty, fifty, or even one hundred years,
from the focal time.110
Consequently, these board determinations may take into account the interests not only of present,
but also of future: holders of debt and equity; employees; pensioners; suppliers; customers;
creditors; places in which it operates; other participants in the ambient economy, society, polity,
state, and beyond.111 The continued success of such corporations, in varying businesses and of
varying sizes, is important to the present and future prosperity of the relevant economy, society
polity, and state, and vice versa.112 This is indicated by the consequences, arguably catastrophic,
of the failures of massive business corporations, such as Enron Corporation, Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., and the steps taken to avert the near-failures of other corporations, such as General
Motors Corporation, Chrysler Corporation, and The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. The difficulties
of size and reduced tractability which characterize large corporations, the time horizon of their
existence unless otherwise truncated, and the depth and dispersal of consequences of their demise
or substantial retrenchment of operations should promote caution by the board and others.
Corporate failures such as those mentioned impose costs not only on immediate participants, but
also on participants whose involvement is less proximate, not only in relationship, but also in
temporal, terms.113 Of course, the cost-benefit analysis of possible corporate courses of action
should take into account not only the positive prospects of success, but also the negative costs of
failure and adoption of a new course of action.114 Treating costs borne by non-immediate
participants as externalities may ignore their importance to the ambient economic, social, political,
Organization, and the Participants" and "The Separate Legal Entity, the Organization, and the Individual Human
Actor".
110
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statal, and other environments.115 Across-the-board corporate failures are detrimental to the
creation of surplus value and the associated well-being of participants in these various
environments.116
Accordingly, it can be seen that corporative theory facilitates integrating the theory of the
corporation more closely with, firstly, prevailing notions of corporate social responsibility; and,
secondly, with the corporation’s ambient economic, social, political, statal, transnational and
supranational environment.
The Distinctiveness of the Corporative Corporation
In this and other chapters of the book, reference has been made, from time to time, to stakeholder
theory,117 and to team production theory,118, principally in support of corporative theory. Those
theories have been distinguished from corporative theory insofar as those theories are principally
concerned with the economic interests of those parties whom corporative theory identifies as being
simultaneously legal counterparties and organizational participants. It is not the intention here to
discuss those theories except for the purpose of differentiating them from corporative theory in
that particular.
The Stakeholder Corporation Distinguished
As reported by Freeman and Reed,119 prominent (and early) exponents and developers of
stakeholder theory,120 the word “stakeholder” was “coined in an internal memorandum at the
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Stanford Research Institute in 1963”121, to refer to “those groups without the support all of which
the organization would cease to exist”, a list of which originally included “shareholders, owners,
customers, suppliers, lenders, and society.”122
Freeman and Reed propose that the term is used in a “wide sense”, meaning any identifiable group
or individual who can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by
the achievement of an organization’s objectives”, including, in the wide sense of the term “public
interest groups, protesters, government agencies trade associations, competitors, unions,
employees, customer segments, shareowners and others”.123 Their “narrow sense” of the term is
“any identifiable group or individual on which the organization is dependent for its continued
survival”, including “employees, customer segments, certain suppliers, key government agencies,
shareowners, certain financial institutions, as well as others”.124
Whichever sense of the term is applied, stakeholders generally exercise power or influence in
relation to the corporation which is primarily and directly economic, although some, such as
governments and consumer groups,125 have power or influence which Freeman and Reed describe
as “political”, but which has economic manifestations, Of course, both senses of the term, but most
particularly the narrow sense, engages the “resource dependence” perspective of strategy as
discussed earlier in this book.126 Except for the focus on purely economic interests, stakeholder
analysis, perspective, or theory has certain commonalities with its corporative counterparts.
However, even stakeholder formulations which acknowledge that, in the course of balancing
stakeholder claims, firms may adopt social objectives, as well as economic objectives, generally
are seen to consider social objectives solely as a “secondary modifying and constraining influence”
on its economic objectives, which are considered primary.127
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In the early 1970s Harvard Business School undertook a project examining how the corporation
can “respond proactively to the increased pressure for positive social change”, linking analysis of
social issues with corporate strategy and organization, which it called “the corporate social
responsiveness model.”128 In 1977, The Wharton School began a “stakeholder project” to enable
executives “to formulate and implement corporate strategy in turbulent environments.”129 Both
initiatives focused on potential or actual impact on the corporation. Indeed, Freeman and Reed
maintain that it is “arguable whether responsiveness to nonmarket stakeholders is in the long-term
interest of the corporation”; instead, appealing to the corporation’s enlightened self-interest as a
reason for taking stakeholder concerns into account, rather than appealing to “utilitarian notions
of greatest social good or altruism or social responsibility.”130 The economic focus is clear.
Although they do not, of course, analyze the corporation as simultaneously implicating a legal
entity and an organization, as does corporative theory, many leading commentators on stakeholder
theory definitely approach the corporation from an organizational perspective. Indeed, Freeman
and Reed acknowledge that their analysis applies to all types of organizations, such that
“throughout our analysis one may substitute “organization” for “corporation,” since other
organizational forms have stakeholders as well.”131 Rowley argues that organizations must address
a set of stakeholder expectations, requiring identification of the identity and types of influence
exerted by such stakeholders; and that a stakeholder theory of the firm must also generate an
understanding of how firms respond to these influences.132 In addition to resource dependence
constraints, organizations are subject to institutional, including governmental, constraints, and to
network effects, including those relating to the density and centrality of its relationships.133
Of course, corporative theory considers both legal relationships involving legal expectations as
between the corporation and its various counterparties, and organizational relationships involving
expectations among the organization and its various organizational participants. Rowley argues
that explaining how organizations respond to their stakeholders requires “an analysis of the
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complex array of multiple and interdependent relationships existing in stakeholder
environments”,134 which is consistent with corporative theory. Most, if not all of the parties
identified by stakeholder theory as “stakeholders” or by corporative theory as simultaneously
“legal counterparties” and as “organizational participants” make some contribution to value
creation, either by positive action or by not taking negative action.135
To somewhat similar effect, this book has maintained that the “legal” and the “organizational”
relationships in which the corporation finds itself, that is to say, its “environment” or the “place
and space” which it occupies must be assessed on a multivariate basis, taking into account all such
relationships, particularly those essential to its legal and to its organizational status.136
Also consistent with corporative theory is the observation of Freeman and Reed that the role of the
board of directors in “stakeholder management”, analogous in corporative theory to
counterparty/organizational participant management, not only involve situations of “typical ‘us
against them’ confrontation” but also to cases “where it is much harder to see ‘us’ and ‘them’.”137
In corporative theory, questions may arise about “which us is us” and “which them is them”, given
that each individual party other than the corporation is separate and distinct from it, both legally
and organizationally.
The Team Production Corporation Distinguished
In their seminal paper on the subject, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout treat team production as a
purely economic phenomenon “where a productive activity requires the combined investment and
coordinated effort of two or more individuals or groups”.138 As an early serious attempt by
economists to explore the issue, they reference139 another seminal paper by Herman Alchian and
Harold Demsetz, in which team production was defined, in effect, as production in which several
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types of resources are used, the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating
resource, and not all resources used in such production belong to one person.140
Blair and Stout also reference141 a 1982 paper by Bengt Holmstrom which concluded that it was
impossible for a monitor seeking to write an employment contract with an agent to design a
contract that prevented shirking the agent’s duties while still allocating all of the joint output from
team production to members of the team.142 They argue that horizontal interactions among team
members, not just the principal-agent relationship, contribute significantly to, and are perhaps the
most important source of, the economic gains to be derived from team production. 143 Following
Rajan and Zingales,144 Blair and Stout argue that parties, each of whom make an irrevocable
commitment of resources to a joint enterprise at least some of which is specific and nontransferable, may cede control over those resources and all outputs to a third party who does not
make any firm-specific investment, but mediates disputes among team members about the
allocation of duties and rewards as a kind of mediating hierarch.145 In the case of the public
corporation, all rights to the resources and outputs are owned by the corporation, but control is
exercised by the board of directors, which makes decisions on its behalf.
Participants in the public corporation, “including shareholders, employees, and perhaps other
participants such as creditors or the local community – enter into a “pactum subjectionis” under
which they yield control over inputs and key outputs (time, intellectual skills, financial capital) to
the hierarchy”, and thus agree not to specific terms or outcomes “but to participate in the process
of internal goal setting and dispute resolution”, “that is especially useful in situations where team
production requires several different team members to make various kinds of enterprise-specific
investments and projects that are complex, ongoing and unpredictable.”146 This accords with the
arguments made in Chapter Eleven of the present book which construed the firm as a sociopolitical conflict system in which joint preference ordering was achieved by means of a
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superordinate process, namely, board decision-making, rather than by means of a superordinate
goal.147
As discussed under the immediately preceding heading “Stakeholder Theory”, both that theory
and team production theory differ from corporative theory in that the interests addressed by those
theories are primarily, if not exclusively, economic in their nature. Corporative theory, which
engages with the organization as an organization, recognizes other goals and objectives, interests,
and values.
Implications of Corporative Theory
As shown in the book, research and theorization concerning the organization and, in particular, the
business organization, in many disciplines and fields has generated significant knowledge
concerning organizational behaviour and effectiveness, which organizational analysis is available
to assist not only those involved in its management, but also those analyzing issues concerning the
corporation as a legal entity. Such corporative analysis has implications for corporations, their
boards, CEOs and top management teams; for regulators, legislators, and courts seeking to
promote, restrain, or adjudicate certain corporate behaviours; and for legal academics and
practitioners seeking to make sense of modern business corporations, their operations, and their
behaviour.
If corporations are expected to generate surplus value which benefits the society, the polity, and
the state, then academics, practitioners, legislators, jurists, and regulators of corporate law and
governance must recognize the corporative nature of the modern business corporation, as
implicating both an incorporeal separate legal entity and the organization which animates and
vivifies it as an actor in the real world. The legal essentialist attributes of the corporation and how
they are affected by the essentialist attributes of organizations require knowledgeable and prudent
investigation and analysis. This constitutes a distinctly “legal” endeavour. It is highly appropriate
that investigation of these issues and of their significance as a matter of law not be ignored by
those who are best placed to appreciate their legal import and attendant consequences.
This work maintains, therefore, that the corporative theory of, or approach to, the modern business
corporation which it sets forth explicates the dual nature of the modern business corporation as
147
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both a legal entity and an organization and thus contributes to understanding it. Moreover, the
corporative theory or perspective also provides valuable and useful hypotheses in such analysis;
and can also be used to delineate the contours of the “toolkit” required for its further investigation.
It is hoped that the corporative theory or corporative perspective outlined in this book will
stimulate further investigation, research, and theorization along these lines. The author looks
forward to participating in those endeavours.
Future work planned by the author in this regard includes corporative analysis of such subjects as:
the history of the business corporation from ancient Greece and Rome to the present; the “short
termism and long termism” debate; shareholder activism; the structure, composition, processes,
and behaviour of, and “best practices” for, boards of directors; corporate social responsibility;
corporate and personal liability for criminal and administrative offenses and other actions; and the
future of the modern business corporation. For such future discourse, the present work articulates
a foundation.
WHY NOW? CHALLENGES TO CAPITALISM AND TO THE CORPORATION, AND
THE RESPONSE OF CORPORATIVE THEORY
This book has been organized into three sections. The first of these asks: What is? What is the law
concerning corporations and corporate governance today? The second section asks: Why this?
Why is the law the way it is? What assumptions and generalizations underlie it? The third section
asks: How can the corporation be analyzed? And how should it best be analyzed? It proposes the
corporative theory of, or perspective on, corporate law and corporate governance for this purpose.
The book’s answers to these first three questions have been summarized in the first part of this
conclusory chapter.
Yet, as this book concludes, it is appropriate to ask another related question: Why now? What
makes corporative analysis timely and useful? What conversations does it join and how can it
meaningfully contribute to them? This final section of the concluding chapter identifies, by way
of example, a number of contemporary developments and issues that implicate the corporation,
and indicates how corporative analysis can contribute to discussion and resolution of the same.
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CHALLENGES TO CAPITALISM AND THE CORPORATION
Contemporary Challenges to Capitalism
Challenges to capitalism are contemporaneous, critical, and continuing. In 2011, Michael Porter
and Mark Kramer noted that “The capitalist system is under siege. In recent years business
increasingly has been viewed as a major cause of social, environmental, and economic problems.
Companies are widely perceived to be prospering at the expense of the broader community.”148
Challenges to Society and the Polity
At the same time, global issues of climate change and the environment and transnational flows of
goods and services, people, and resources now present challenges, many of which exist quite
independently of the behaviour of corporations, addressing some of which are beyond, not only
their capacity, but also the capacity of nation states. Planned and possible solutions to these
problems involving nongovernmental organizations and international organizations have been
threatened by difficulties in securing the necessary agreements of the underlying nation states, in
part because of challenges to their economic well-being, particularly in the aftermath of the
Financial Crisis of 2008, and in part because of problems in sustaining the democratic welfare state
and the “administered market” of 20th and post-20th-century (“contemporary”) capitalism.
These developments have implications at the levels of society and at the level of the polity.
Increasingly, the prevalence of short-termism has been noted, not only in the financial community
with respect to financial investments and the economy more generally,149 but also in the ambient
society and polity. In Great Britain, The Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations
(“Oxford Martin Commission”), considered what it described as “the increasing short-termism of
modern politics” accompanied by “our collective inability to break the gridlock which undermines
attempts to address the biggest challenges that will shape our future.”150 These risks, challenges
and opportunities present themselves simultaneously in, and responses must engage, economic,
social, and political aspects of those phenomena.
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Part 2 and Appendix B of the present work establish that certain generalizations and assumptions
of classical and neoclassical economics can no longer be regarded as accurate or useful, such as:
the separation of economic, social, political functions; the situation of the economy and the
“private” sphere, the actual and analytical separation of the “private” and “public” spheres; the
distinctive mode of analysis of the economy; and the distinctiveness and independence of the
economy from the society and the polity.151 Instead, it was established that the economy is
“embedded in” the society and the polity. Indeed, it could even be argued that the economy, the
society and the polity are “embedded in” each of the others.152
As a result, human activity cannot be disaggregated into elements which are exclusively
“economic”, or “social”, or “political”. Rather, many human activities can be regarded as
simultaneously instantiating economic, social, and political behaviour, goals, and objectives.
Human behaviour is not solely utilitarian in its objective or operation, nor is “utility” determined
by atomistic individuals acting independently, wholly rationally, and with complete
information.153 This is equally true with respect to behaviour which may be characterized as
significantly “economic”, “social”, or “political” in its orientation. Consequently, finding solutions
to problems caused by human activity, as well as responding to challenges and opportunities
presented by such activity, call for holistic approaches.
In this regard, the Oxford Martin Report observed that: “As the world slowly emerges from the
devastating Financial Crisis, it is time to reflect on the lessons of this turbulent period and think
afresh about how to prevent future crises.”154 It concluded that “humanity is at a crossroads. This
could be our best century ever, or our worst. The outcome will depend on our ability to understand
and harness the extraordinary opportunities as well as manage the unprecedented uncertainties and
risks.”155 This observation relates to the fourth question asked by the present book: Why now?
Why must we seek a new paradigm that simultaneously explains and operationalizes the
corporation in the economy, society, and polity? The Oxford Martin Report answers this, in effect,
by saying: Because we must. We cannot delay.
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Challenges to, and the Blaming of, the Corporation
Retrenchment of the operations of, and confidence in, corporations doing business at transnational,
national, regional, and local levels and corresponding changes in the economy, society and polity
are considered to have resulted in part from the Financial Crisis and its aftermath, 156 in part from
the transformation of the generation of supply of products and services involving technological
change (which appears, according to Belenzon et al. to be intensifying over time)157 employing
computers and the Internet (a kind of subsequent post-industrial revolution, or Second or Third
Great Transformation),158 and in part from challenges to the spirit and ethos of late 20th century
capitalism, which seemed to give rise to a new post-modern or contemporary capitalism.159 Julian
Birkinshaw compares the impact on work and society of the technological transition from the
“industrial era” of the recent past to the “digital era” of the present as “equally profound” as the
earlier transition from the preindustrial to the industrial era.160
In the new millennium, cries arose for a new order which would be determined to restrain what
was seen as the worst excesses of a system which appeared to have resulted in “gaming” the system
during the Financial Crisis, iterative periods of massive corporate failures, widespread
unemployment and underemployment, creation of excessive wealth in a relatively few hands
(partly as a result of the development and introduction of transformational technologies), and
income and wealth disparities which not only followed a period of relative prosperity shared by a
broad middle class, but which actually exceeded those disparities seen during much of, and
arguably even beyond, the preceding century.
Very recently, The British Academy published a document in November 2018 setting forth a
framework entitled “Reforming Business for the 21st Century: A Framework for the Future of the
Corporation” (the “Framework”).161 This reported on the first phase of its project entitled “The
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Future of the Corporation”, which it describes as “one of the most ambitious programs of research
and undertaken to date on the current state and future prospects of business.”162 The fact that it is
the British Academy which is sponsoring the project is highly significant. It is the United
Kingdom’s national body for the humanities and social sciences and, accordingly, engages with
academics in diverse subject-areas.
The British Academy has recognized that business is not alone in being confronted by various
economic, environmental, political and social challenges, and scientific and technological
opportunities, the implications of which challenges and opportunities require to be researched. 163
The British Academy observes that such research “is vital now because of people’s concerns about
rising inequality, increasing globalization, declining trust and the impact that new technologies
will have on employment” and because the solutions proposed separately by governments and by
business differ, and “have been found wanting”, making appropriate “a debate about the way in
which business will be conceived, managed and regulated over the coming decades.”164
The British Academy has concluded that “the proposition that the purpose of business is to increase
its profit, with the rules of the game preventing excesses, is not sufficient for the 21st century.”165
The “profit as sole purpose” proposition, of course, has been challenged in the present work.166
The Framework claims that the perspective developed in the first stage of its research program,
undertaken by 31 academics from the humanities and social sciences with guidance from 25
business leaders, “lays the foundation for a radical reformulation of the concept of the firm,”167
and “sets out a new framework for business in the 21st century”, as part of a program “which aims
to contribute to redefining business in the 21st century and building trust between business and
society.”168 It is apparent from anecdotal observation that many members of society and the polity
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in countries having highly developed economies agree with the need for such reformulation. The
extent to which this foundation is, or can be, so laid remains open.
Corporations, seen as the paradigmatic vehicle of the pursuit of capitalism, have been widely
attacked as monomaniacal entities or anthropomorphized “creatures” or “artificial persons”
devoted solely to the pursuit of “their own” maximum profit and wealth, irrespective, and to the
exclusion, of other goals and interests, societal, national or otherwise.169 As noted previously, this
view persists, at least partly involving the anthropomorphization of the corporation, which is
facilitated by its (mis)description as a “legal person”, instead of simply referring to it as a legal
entity or “rights-and-duty-bearing entity”, as argued in Chapter One of this book. Instead, the
present work has established that corporations also constitute organizations: namely, social units
or groups of persons collaboratively carrying out certain activities with a view to accomplishing
certain common goals and objectives; the individual human actors participating in which also
engage in various extraorganizational activities in pursuit of other goals and objectives.170
As individual human beings, organizational participants bring with them to the organization all of
their individual human attributes, including needs for affiliation, society and community, some of
which needs are pursued within the organization, and others without it.171 As noted earlier in this
chapter, the organization of human individuals which enables the corporation as a legal entity to
take action in the real world has certain economic objectives (which are by no means realistically
epitomized as “maximizing profit at all costs”);172 but, in respect of its organizational essentialist
characteristics, is similar to, or even identical with, other organizations having different objectives,
such as universities, labour unions, fraternal benefit societies, religious organizations, charitable,
philanthropic and eleemosynary institutions.173
Concerns about excessive “financialization”, the commodification of corporate shares, separate
and apart from the underlying rights and obligations which they represent vis-à-vis the corporation
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itself, and the related generation of profits and income unrelated to corporate and social
productivity, among other things,174 have been identified as quintessential examples of “gaming”
the system and rewarding unproductive or even counterproductive behaviour. Such concerns have
been accompanied by a considerable debate over long-termism and short-termism, both as related
to buying and selling shares, and as such trading affects corporate operations.175
In turn, that debate among managers, owners, and corporations and other business entities issuing
and creating financial assets, has led to consideration of issues relating to the nature and purpose
of the corporation, the interests of the corporation and its legal counterparties and organizational
participants, and the concomitant interests of the society and polity, in each case over very lengthy
periods of time.176
New Paradigm Corporations
As the transnational economy and individual national economies transformed from producing and
generating products and services to now developing and promoting “disintermediation”
mechanisms relating to such products and services and new “digital” products and services,177 the
scope and scale of business organizations has likewise changed: 178 principally, from massive
multinational enterprises involving considerable financial capital and “hard assets” (often
involving world production mandates) which previously dominated business activity (to the extent
that about 80% of the capital of US corporations was represented by tangibles),179 very often to
enterprises and even “virtual” enterprises (some small or medium-size and others extremely large)
involving little financial capital and little property, plant and equipment (types of “manufactured
capital”) and other tangible capital, but whose reason for being and whose competitive advantage,
if any, significantly involves intellectual or ideational productivity and different kinds of capital
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development and deployment than has been the case previously. These corporations are sometimes
referred to here as “new paradigm corporations” or “NPCs”.
On the other hand, many digital technology firms are extremely large. Julian Birkinshaw indicates
that “the emergence of tech giants has highlighted the superiority of platform-based business
models” that bring users and providers of services together more efficiently, described here as a
species of disintermediation, compared to hierarchical or traditional linear business models, at least
“in markets for digital goods”.180 These include products or services that are “primarily digital”,
such as music, movies, books, games, and news, and physical products that are “digitally enabled”,
such as cars, telephones, and homes.181
In effect, the massive size of some corporations today has been influenced by the fact that: digital
products “are susceptible to network effects, whereby the value experienced by when user
increases as the number of other users increase”; they often have “greater switching costs for
users”; they are “non-rivalrous” in the sense that “many people can use the same product or service
at the same time” (indicating, at least to this author, a very high limitation on output); they are
often “co-created” with users; and there is no point at which economies of scale diminish, thereby
effectively limiting the size of firms.182
Technology, including artificial intelligence, has become increasingly sophisticated to the point
that “digital technology is gradually replacing large number of jobs that were traditionally being
done by humans.”183 Platform businesses, digital firms, and other NPCs threaten patterns and
structures of traditional employment and present a challenge to redeploying human economic
effort into alternate channels of activity.
Birkinshaw finds that “the trend towards computer-based automation… is likely to result in widescale unemployment”, incented by competitive pressures.184 Revenue per employee at digital firms
such as Uber, Apple and Google is approximately twenty times higher than at traditional firms
such as Starbucks or McDonald’s.185 Accordingly, digital firms are much less sensitive in terms
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of revenue and perhaps other financial metrics than are traditional firms to cutbacks or other
declines in their workforce. In the result, they may be more willing to undertake such measures.
Birkinshaw explains, further, that platform businesses, which involve a “platform” or “a
technological interface that mediates transactions between two or more sides” differ from
traditional businesses in that they, firstly, “offer increasing returns to scale” and are often “winner
takes all” businesses; and, secondly, “often operate in a very low-cost way, with few assets”.186
He segments “digital firms” into “pure digital firms”, such as Facebook and Uber; platformenabled firms, such as Amazon and Apple; traditional firms selling digital products, such as The
Financial Times and Experian; and digital service providers, such as Oracle and TCS, “who build
the infrastructure and services that enable digital firms to function”.187
New Paradigm Corporations and Traditional Corporations Compared
Belenzon et al. opine that “corporations today find themselves threatened by disruptive
technological changes that jeopardize the very existence of some companies, while forcing others
to adopt new technologies and business practices to join the revolution rather than be buried by
it.” Yet “technology giants - some of them are newcomers - seem to grow stronger every year,
threatening many industries.”188
As a result, “traditional firms are also going out of business more often than they used to. Studies
have shown that a firm’s “lifespan” on the S&P 500 has dropped from 35 years to about 15 years
over the last 30 years. And the number of high-profile bankruptcies, especially in the retail and
technology sectors, is on the rise.”189 Birkinshaw argues that “while this process of creative
destruction is ultimately good for society, the short-term costs when large firms downsize or even
go out of business are huge.”190 The effect of such new and disruptive technologies,191 of course,
is not only felt by corporations and their employers but, more broadly, by the economy, society,
and the polity in terms of increasing structural and other unemployment, as lately experienced.
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Some observers conclude that digital firms and NPCs generally are changing their thinking about
goals and objectives. Birkinshaw claims that they are frequently experimenting with alternatives
to “linear alignment”, or “defining an intended outcome, say five years into the future, and then
[defining] the specific plans and targets for all the various parts of the firm over the coming years,
to ensure that outcome is achieved.”192 However, “the state of flux in the marketplace makes it
very hard to commit to explicit long-term targets” and reduces the scope of action of
intraorganizational participants, with the result that “many digital firms are using more fluid
objective-setting procedures, and relying on broad expressions of purpose to generate coherent
activity from their employees”, a principle referred to as “obliquity”, which is “the notion that
goals are often best achieved when pursued indirectly.”193 This conclusion is highly suspect. As
argued in this book, external environments which are highly volatile require more frequent and
more significant adaptations to the strategy of industry participants, which can be highly effective
when employing extensive information and adapting strategic and tactical plans accordingly.194
Technological innovation has also dramatically reduced information asymmetries. It permits
information to be aggregated and disaggregated more readily and to be made available more
readily at different levels of the organization. This may result in certain information that previously
might have been “winnowed out” by personnel at lower levels to reach and to receive consideration
at higher levels. Extant information can also be verified at such levels. Similarly, information
previously maintained only at higher levels of the organization may, in some cases, be available
for access at lower levels. This may subject decisions made at higher levels to challenge at parallel
or lower hierarchical levels of the organization. It also facilitates collective decision making.195
New Capital, Value-Drivers, and Reporting
It is increasingly acknowledged that these new paradigm corporations are much more dependent
than traditional corporations upon intangibles, including what The International Integrated
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Reporting Council (“IIRC”)196 identifies in its Framework (the “Framework”) as intangible capital:
individual human participants (identified by accounting and economics as “human capital”),
certain intellectual property, trademarks, and the like (“intellectual capital”), “organizational
capital” (structure, processes, and “know-how”); “social and relationship capital” (involving
institutions, stakeholders, communities, and networks, and shared norms, values and behaviour),
and natural capital, including “common goods” such as air, light, and other natural resources.197
The identification and denomination of such intangibles as “capital” does not, of course, create
any “new” capital, but merely recognizes that resources that are not tangible may be employed by
a corporation for its benefit. Often, these species of intangible capital are developed or “earned”
by the corporation, are central to its “value proposition”, and may even be pre-eminent “valuedrivers” of its business.198
One result is that traditional financial reporting has come to be considered less meaningful with
respect to NPCs and other modern business corporations than with respect to corporations pursuing
more traditional business models. As noted above, intangible capital now represents 80% of the
capital of US corporations, an exact reversal from the paradigm which obtained for most of the
20th century.199 Even in 1975, according to Birkinshaw, 17% of the market value of the S&P 500
represented intangibles, but by 2015, 84% of their value was intangibles, although the statistics
likely understate the change “because the S&P 500 includes many traditional industrial firms as
well as digital firms.” As an extreme example, Birkinshaw reports that less than 1% of Spotify’s
market value in 2018 was represented by tangible assets.200
These types of intangible capital principally involve various aspects of the organization of the
business of the corporation. There is increasing recognition that such assets, which account for the
level of innovation, productivity, planning and strategy, and foresight of such corporations will, in
the future, account for much of their competitiveness, success, and durability, including NPCs.
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CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES TO CHALLENGES
Integrated Reporting
Accounting proposals originally developed in the closing years of the 20th century to take account
of the sustainability of reporting corporations,201 by taking into account their performance on
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) dimensions,202 have been further developed into
“integrated reporting” proposals, which take account of the intangible capital of the reporting
corporation, and the means by which it is employed by the corporation, together with other
elements employed in generating value, in order to present “a holistic picture of the combination,
interrelatedness and dependencies between the factors that affect the organization’s ability to
create value over time”, in the short, medium, and long terms, including how the organization
balances short, medium and long-term interests.203 The International Integrated Reporting Council
(IIRC) emphasizes that determining “how best to disclose its unique value creation story in a
meaningful and transparent way” is the responsibility of the board of directors.204
These accounting and reporting proposals have also been affected by other proposals concerning
the relationship between corporations, on the one hand, and society and the polity, on the other,
and by proposals relating to the pro-social behaviour of corporations. Proposals of this nature have
related, among other things, to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, business ethics
concerns, and other stakeholder management, sustainability and corporate citizenship initiatives.
Positive Social Change
One such proposal is the “Positive Social Change” (PSC) approach, which focuses on
“transformational processes to advance societal well-being”.205 PSC considers corporations and
other organizations as positive change mechanisms, which may be engaged, along with other
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private incentives, to implement a PSC strategy which takes into account the legitimate claims of
what its adherents describe as “internal stakeholders” (such as employees, directors, shareholders)
and “external stakeholders” (identified as including customers, suppliers, lenders, governments,
unions, and the local and general public).206
Stephan et al., the proponents of PSC, criticize research which “mainly focuses inward on
organizational activities and rarely explores how these activities may have external effects
stimulating societal well-being beyond organizational boundaries.”207 Accordingly, Stephan et al.
undertake a research review examining research of organizational activities with both inward and
external focus. This approach makes common cause with corporative analysis. Of course,
corporative theory, unlike stakeholder theory, does not focus primarily on economic interests, and,
instead, considers the groups identified by PSC strategy as internal and external stakeholders to
be, simultaneously, legal counterparties of the corporation and participants in its organization.
Shared Value, Corporate Strategy, and Corporative Theory
Another example, proposing a conceptual reorientation of the relationship between a corporation
and society, is Michael Porter’s “Creating Shared Values” (CSV) approach, which stresses the
mutual interdependency between the competitiveness of the corporation and the well-being of the
society in which it is embedded. Porter, arguably today’s pre-eminent strategy thinker, and his
collaborator, Mark Kramer, have approached issues relating to the social purpose of corporations
and to corporate social responsibility from the lens (es) of strategy and competition. Their 2006
article, “Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social
Responsibility”,208 has been widely cited and extremely influential, as was their 2011 article,
“Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism – and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and
Growth”.209 References to the latter will facilitate discussion of possibly holistic relationships
among strategy as approached by corporations, by society, and by the polity.
Porter & Kramer define “shared value” as “policies and operating practices that enhance the
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions
206
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in the communities in which it operates”, creating which shared value “focuses on identifying and
expanding the connections between societal and economic progress” in which “value” is “defined
as benefits relative to costs”.210 Although contested,211 as might be expected with any theory, the
Porter provenance ensures that the concept of shared value will continue to be taken seriously in
the business academia and in strategy consulting for some time.212
Although neither of these articles were consulted in the course of the development of corporative
theory, as presented in this book, certain aspects of their approach have significant commonalities
with corporative theory. Importantly, these authors respond articulately to challenges to capitalism
and to the corporation, but do so within the framework of business academic orthodoxy,
particularly in the area of strategy, in which area Porter is highly revered. Corporative theory
likewise is informed by, and aligned with, accepted business academic frameworks. It is
considered that this improves the likelihood that corporative theory, like shared value theory, will
be credible to businesses and business academics alike. Of course, corporative theory also aligns
itself with practical and theoretical legal approaches, orthodox and otherwise. Thus, the
relationship between shared value theory and corporative theory merits significant attention here.
Economic Value and Shared Value
The 2011 article identifies the need for a more sophisticated form of capitalism, one “imbued with
a social purpose,” arising “not out of charity but out of a deeper understanding of competition and
economic value creation”,213 which “recognizes new and better ways to develop products, serve
markets, and build productive enterprises”, and which the authors consider as the “next evolution
in the capitalist model”.214
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Porter and Kramer argue that creating economic value by creating societal value completely
accords with self-interest, involving “a broader conception of Adam Smith’s invisible hand” in
which society’s overall interests are posited to be served by all companies individually pursuing
shared value connected to their particular businesses, thereby serving society’s overall interests.
In turn, creation (and, perhaps more importantly, pursuit) of shared value would legitimize
corporations and facilitate governments in pursuing policies that would foster and support
business. Thus, “survival of the fittest would still prevail, but market competition would benefit
society in ways we have lost.”215 Shared value is good for business, according to them, as well as
good for society.
Strategy and Shared Value
Porter and Kramer connect these observations to strategic theory insofar as it maintains that
business success arises out of creating “a distinctive proposition that meets the needs of the chosen
set of customers”, and that competitive advantage arises from how a firm “configures the value
chain, or the set of activities involved in creating, producing, selling, delivering, and supporting
its products or services.”216 Consequently, they maintain that a company can create economic value
by creating societal value: firstly, by reconceiving products and markets; secondly, by redefining
productivity in the value chain; and, thirdly, by building supportive industry clusters at the
company’s locations. Finally, “improving value in one area gives rise to opportunities [to create
shared value] in the others.”217 The first subject is canvassed under this heading, and the second
and the third under the heading “The Value Chain, Suppliers, Employees and Locations” below.
As to reconceiving products and markets, they say that products should be configured in
accordance with the needs of society more broadly, not just with respect to the needs of consumers
of particular products or services. The present book suggests that such an approach involves an
assessment of “need” or “demand” characterized dynamically and intertemporally; that is to say,
in terms of how such “need” or “demand” may present itself in various time frames;218 hence,
developing products and services which anticipate future need or demand is more efficient and
effective for corporations and for society at large. Among other things, it eliminates the
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consumption of input factors used in producing goods and services which may later be replicated
in “new and improved” versions whose previous iterations are then discarded. In effect, this book
invites both corporations and their legal counterparties/organizational participants to more fully
consider their needs and demands in a larger temporal framework, thereby accommodating a
greater proportion of a corporation’s organizational participants.
Porter and Kramer assert that “in advanced economies, demand for products and services that meet
societal needs is rapidly growing.” In effect, “societal needs, not just conventional economic needs,
define markets.”219 This aligns with the statements made by this author in the preceding paragraph.
Consumers of a particular product or service, however widely or narrowly defined, even apart from
intertemporal considerations, are multifaceted: whether individuals, corporations, or other entities,
their activities are not exhausted by consumption of that one particular product or service. Instead,
they have other needs and objectives.
Consumption is also affected by non-consumer driven factors which may implicate both
consumers and other organizational participants. Porter and Kramer argue that businesses are often
far more effective than governments or nonprofits in “marketing that motivates customers to
embrace products and services to create societal benefits”.220 They suggest, then, that consumers
of products and services, at least implicitly, want producing corporations to pursue shared value,
such that meeting the demand to pursue shared value (even, we would argue, if not yet articulated)
is conducive to success.
If they are correct about what customers expect, their claimed demand for shared value may,
depending on the interests of other participants, support the corporation taking action as Porter and
Kramer suggest. Particularly important for present purposes, they posit a much more nuanced
theory of strategy and customer demand which is consistent with organizational participants
generally having a broad range of interests (including societal interests), only some of which are
economic, which customers, as well as other organizational participants, take into account, and
also expect corporations to take into account.
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The Economic Model
Porter and Kramer maintain that “business and society have been pitted against each other for too
long”, partly because “economists have legitimized the idea that to provide societal benefits,
companies must temper their economic success”, since social improvements constrain the
corporation by raising costs and reducing profits.221 Similarly, the interests of business and society
are viewed as opposed when society imposes taxes, regulations and penalties which force firms to
“internalize” externalities, or bear social costs which the firm does not otherwise have to bear,
such as pollution.222 Such opposition, they say, has characterized the thinking of both corporations
and governments, each of which “has assumed that the other is an obstacle to pursuing its goals
and acted accordingly”. Firms “have largely excluded social and environmental considerations
from their economic thinking”, in effect, considering “the broader context in which they do
business as a given” and resisting “regulatory standards is invariably contrary to their interests”,
thus leaving the matter of solving social problems entirely to governments and NGOs.223
These arguments have considerable anecdotal and other support. This book has argued that the
“corporative corporation”, the corporation of corporative theory, acting through its first-instance
animators, the board of directors, must take into account not only the rights and obligations of
legal counterparties of the corporation, but also the expectations of such parties as organizational
participants in the corporation, as well as the expectations of the corporation in respect of such
organizational participants. Social and environmental considerations, and a corporation’s capacity
to affect them, are also critical aspects of the ambient environment of any corporation, requiring
consideration in recognizing and effecting appropriate adjustments to its strategy and structure.
The Economic Model and Corporative Theory
This book has characterized the classical and neoclassical economic theory of the firm as a theory
of production (and, as Porter and Kramer agree, not a very useful one) in which the firm is a “black
box” taking input factors and somehow generating output. It is argued that this “invisibilizes” the
action by which the firm/corporation combines input factors to generate output, action which
involves the structure, process, people and goals of the corporation as organization.
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The present book has likewise argued that “business” or “the economy” is inseparable from the
relevant society and polity: the corporation is not divorced from, but instead is immersed for
“embedded” in, the society and polity; and society and the polity interpolate themselves into the
corporation.224 Legal counterparties of, and organizational participants in, the corporation are not
one-dimensional actors who act only in relation to their involvement with the corporation.225
Instead, they are multidimensional actors who take part in a broad range of economic, social, and
political activities. When they engage with the corporation in some particular, it cannot be assumed
that such engagement constitutes the whole range of their possible action or engagement, or that
such engagement with the corporation exhausts all of their expectations of the corporation.226
It is also been demonstrated in this book that “the corporation” is not a gargantuan monolith which
acts, everywhere and always, as a single actor in relation to all actors other than itself. Instead, the
book has shown that components of the organization may take action vis-à-vis the organization as
a whole, vis-à-vis other organizational components, or vis-à-vis external parties in interest.227 The
corporative approach permits deconstruction of the faceless, monolithic economic “thing” which
is sometimes said to be a legal “person” but devoid of “personal” attributes, and, as such, is
characterized by many as unattractive and as the “ugly” corporation.
Strategy and Corporative Theory
This book has demonstrated that the means by which a corporation seeks to generate surplus value,
which is to say generates outputs the value of which is greater than the inputs (which may be
considered as surplus value or “profit”) involves ongoing collection and assessment of information
about the external environment by the corporation, consideration of such information in relation
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to the corporation’s strategy and structure (as well as processes and personnel), and modification
of that strategy and structure as necessary or appropriate from time to time.228
For example, the availability of certain resources to the corporation may change: they may become
more or less expensive, more or less plentiful or scarce, and more or less amenable to substitution.
Theory and research indicate that a board of directors can be extremely useful in this regard, by
identifying environmental developments (of which they become aware through their external
activities) which may require a suitable response by the corporation;229 for example, the diffusion
of corporate governance developments230 Thus, Porter and Kramer are going back to “basic
principles” of strategy and competition when they require that attention be directed to all relevant
aspects of the external environment. Considering external developments and extrapolating them
and their effects over the long term increases awareness of their importance to the corporation over
various time frames and is required by, and consistent with, corporative theory.
Corporate and Community Benefit
Porter and Kramer relate corporate competitiveness and community well-being: “A business needs
a successful community, not only to create demand for its products but also to provide critical
public assets and a supportive environment”,231 while, on the other hand, “a community needs
successful businesses to provide jobs and wealth creation opportunities for its citizens.” Thus, they
say that “public policies that undermine the productivity and competitiveness of businesses are
self-defeating”.232 We would interpret or extend their meaning of “community” here to include the
ambient society and polity and, arguably, regional and global communities.
In effect, a corporation whose strategy is inimical to or significantly adversely affects the relevant
community is imposing a constraint on its own health and well-being over time frames of various
228

See the discussion in Chapter Two in the section entitled "History of the Development of the Modern Business
Corporation"; and in Chapter Nine.
229
See the discussion in Chapter Six in the section entitled "Organizational Goals and Intraorganizational Goals",
particularly under the headings "Theories of Organizational Power" and "Organizational Goals and Corporate
Operations".
230
One example is the spread of "poison pills" and "golden parachutes" which may have signaled their growing
acceptability to investors: see Gerald F Davis and Heinrich R Greve, "Corporate Elite Networks and Governance
Changes in the 1980s" (1997) 103:1 American J Sociology 1. It is been shown that CEOs also seek advice and new
perspectives on strategic issues from members of their external advice networks: see Michael L McDonald, Poonam
Khanna, and James D Westphal, "Getting Them to Think Outside the Circle: Corporate Governance, CEOs' External
Advice Networks, and Firm Performance" (2008) 51:3 Academy Management J 453.
231
Supra note 210 at 66.
232
Ibid.

751
duration. Similarly, a community which becomes unsuccessful and dysfunctional is not likely to
be able to supply the resources the corporation requires over various time frames. In this regard, it
is well-known that economic assistance by developed countries to less developed countries which
increases their GNP can, at certain levels, increase their demand for consumer products, which
expands markets for businesses in sponsoring and other countries.233
Porter and Kramer argue that management thinking over the previous two decades focused on
increasing sales, and that, facing growing competition and pressures from shareholders for shortterm performance, “managers resorted to waves of restructuring, personnel reductions, and
relocation to lower-cost regions, while leaving balance sheets to return capital to investors”, which
often resulted in “commoditization, price competition, little true innovation, slow organic growth,
and no clear competitive advantage.”234 They call for “a deeper understanding of productivity and
a growing awareness of the fallacy of short-term cost reductions (which often actually lower
productivity or make it unsustainable).”235
At the same time, “the communities in which companies operate perceive little benefit even as
profits rise” but, instead, “perceive that profits come at their expense” in terms of “high
unemployment, local business distress, and severe pressures on community services.”236 In effect,
the focal corporation is failing to meet the expectations of the relevant community, apparently to
detrimental effect, just as corporative theory would indicate. Both corporative analysis and
common sense suggest that such community, even if without redress against the focal corporation,
would have to absorb costs resulting from corporate actions that increase taxes and service costs.
Porter and Kramer indicate that the significance of connections with the communities in which
companies operated reduced as companies became less vertically integrated, and relied more on
outside vendors, outsourcing and offshoring, while operating in so many locations that they “no
longer recognize a home – but see themselves as “global” companies.”237 However, the corporation
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suffers real costs attributable to the relocation and dislocation of operations. Repeating like
behaviour in another community may be expected to have similar results, such as cost reiteration.
Porter and Kramer argue that “a company’s value chain inevitably affects – and is affected by,
numerous societal issues, such as natural resource and water use, health and safety, and equal
treatment in the workplace”, and that many “so-called externalities actually inflict internal costs
on the firm, even in the absence of regulation or resource taxes” eliminating which benefits both
the society and the corporation, creating “shared value”.238 In so doing, corporative theory would
maintain that the corporation and individuals comprising the society and the society itself, as its
legal counterparties and organizational participants, seek fulfilment of their respective
expectations.
These observations call attention to the “black box” of the firm in economic theory, which this
book has described as a theory of production, and has criticized its overly simplistic approach even
to production, as well as its failure to look within the “black box” at the structure, processes,
personnel and other elements of the firm or corporation comprising its organization. Such an
understanding has been found to be incomplete, particularly as compared with corporative theory.
Excessive focus on financial or accounting “cost” and “profit” fails to take into account the
dimensions of those terms which are not purely financial, alternative measures of productivity and
success, and the profit motive in terms of “sufficing” profit or seeking an optimal level of profit
which will, ideally contribute to the likelihood of success and prosperity over the short, medium,
and long terms. In so doing, such approaches misspecify not only the “value-drivers”, but also the
goals and objectives, of business and of economic activity generally, as demonstrated in this book.
The Value Chain, Suppliers, Employees, and Locations
According to Porter and Kramer, transforming the value chain involves adjusting energy use and
logistics, resources (such as water, raw materials and packaging), procurement, distribution,
employee productivity, and location. As to procurement and employee productivity, they argue
that improving the well-being of suppliers and employees can create shared value which will
benefit the focal corporation. In effect, commoditizing and exerting maximum pressure on
suppliers to decrease prices, as well as outsourcing of suppliers in lower-wage locations, can be
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counterproductive. In fact, “marginalized suppliers cannot remain productive or sustain, much less
improve, their quality”, whereas by “increasing access to inputs, sharing technology, providing
financing, companies can improve supplier quality and productivity [which they say may often be
better than lower prices] while ensuring access to growing volume”. Stronger suppliers may have
less environmental impact, making them more efficient.239 These observations are consistent with
corporative analysis, which considers not only the legal rights of counterparties but also the
expectations of organizational participants, in both cases over various time frames.
Porter and Kramer maintain that previous practices of holding down wage levels, reducing
benefits, and offshoring may be disadvantageous, pointing to the “positive effects that a living
wage, safety, wellness, training, and opportunities for advancement for employees have on
productivity”.240 They also argue that it is no longer true that the cheaper the location, the better.
Previous thinking to this effect was founded on the low cost of logistics, the rapid flow of
information, the global nature of markets, and low energy costs. There is also “greater recognition
of the productivity cost of highly dispersed production systems and the hidden costs of distant
procurement”. They argue that high transportation costs and the ability to restock in small
quantities may make it advantageous to move some activities closer to home and to have fewer
major production locations.241
It can be seen that these arguments, at bottom, criticize the “black box” model of the firm as a
model of production, which fails to take into account other aspects of the firm’s operations,
including, importantly, marketing its products and services, as well as obtaining inputs. It may be
expected that pressure on suppliers is not unique to the industry in which a particular corporation
operates and that price reductions by that corporation’s suppliers will impact the costs of its
suppliers, including their own suppliers and employees, resulting in reductions in business profits
and individuals’ incomes, and thereby demand for products and services, more broadly.
Government and Civil Society
Porter and Kramer maintain that society does not care what types of organizations create shared
value; instead, “what matters is that benefits are delivered by those organizations – or combinations

239

Ibid at 70.
Ibid at 71.
241
Ibid.
240

754
of organizations – that are best positioned to achieve the most impact for the least cost” such that
traditional divisions between the responsibilities of business and those of government or civil
society should give way to efficiency considerations.242
This argument works both ways. One consequence is that business should not necessarily oppose
government activity which can more efficiently provides products and services that were
previously supplied by business corporations. Importantly, society and the polity, as legal
counterparties and organizational participants, must recognize the contributions of corporations
which create such shared value and ensure that the benefits of shared value are allocated
appropriately.
Regulation
Porter and Kramer acknowledge that regulation is necessary for well-functioning markets, but
stipulate that the design and implementation of regulation determines whether regulation benefits
society by encouraging companies to pursue shared value or disbenefits society by working against
shared value, perhaps even to the extent of making trade-offs between economic and social goals
inevitable. They argue that regulations that enhance shared value “set goals and stimulate
innovation” and “highlight a societal objective and create a level playing field to encourage
companies to invest in shared value rather than maximize short-term profit.”243
They argue that such regulations: 1. set clear and measurable social goals; 2. set performance
standards, not the methods of achieving them; 3. establish phase-in periods for meeting standards
“which reflect the investment or new-product cycle in the industry” and give “time to develop and
introduce new products and processes in a way consistent with the economics of their business”;
4. implement systems for measuring and reporting performance to regulators who can construct
reasonable benchmarking data to motivate continuous improvement; and 5. require efficient and
timely reporting of results to the regulator, who can audit them as required.244 Of course, such
regulatory objectives are more common and easier to enunciate than to implement. However, their
suggestions as to the nature of phase-in standards takes a realistic approach not always adopted.
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They argue that “business and government will become more aligned on regulation in many areas”
as shared value principles become more widely accepted and companies come to understand that
well-constructed regulation can foster economic value creation to the benefit of both the regulated
companies and the society. They also admit that “regulation will be needed to limit the pursuit of
exploitation, unfair, or deceptive practices in which companies benefit at the expense of
society”.245 It might be thought that companies attuned to shared value creation would realize that
those proscribed practices benefit them, as legitimate businesses, as well as society more generally.
Corporative theory acknowledges the need to design and implement regulation that recognizes the
“corporative” nature of the modern business corporation, including how that affects its interaction
with legal counterparties and organizational participants, including regulators. Regulation which
is appropriate from the perspective of corporative theory must be attentive to the various legal, as
well as organizational, relationships with such parties, and how those relationships are interrelated.
This requires that those who design and implement regulation have, and be motivated and incented,
to exercise appropriate knowledge of such matters, as to which this book is a beginning.
Conclusion
Porter and Kramer conclude that “not all profit is equal” and that “profits involving a social
purpose represent a higher form of capitalism – one that will enable society to advance more
rapidly while allowing companies to grow even more”, resulting in “a positive cycle of company
and community prosperity, which leads to profits that endure”.246 Further, shared value “will also
reconnect company success and community success in ways that had been lost in an age of narrow
management approaches, short-term thinking, and deepening divides among society’s
institutions.”247
As noted here, the concept of shared value has the considerable merit of relating societal needs
and demands to corporate strategy and the need to align the conceptualization of products and
markets, production, and other factors, such as location, with societal expectations and the
expectation of organizational participants generally. As strategists, Porter and Kramer’s focus on
strategy is more acute than the present work, whose focus is on the corporation itself. However,
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shared value theory and corporative theory share a number of commonalities, as described above.
Importantly, their focus on corporate strategy illuminates a number of the salient aspects of
corporative theory. Responding to contemporary articulation of the demands of society and the
polity on capitalism and on the corporation require approaches that integrate the corporation, the
economy, the society, and the polity. As discussed in the next section, this challenge has been
taken up by a number of initiatives emanating from business, government, and the academy.
Initiatives to Recognize and Report “Value Drivers” of Contemporary Corporations
Many modern corporate law statutes, sometimes by means of incorporation of applicable securities
law, such as the CBCA, require annual disclosure of considerable detail about the corporation and
its business, with the objective of describing the corporation’s “value creation story” (as the IRRC
expresses such objective), including factors which are considered to be involved in its achieving
or failing to achieve its goals and objectives, such as risk factors; competitive considerations,
market conditions, product lifecycle considerations, and other market-related factors; research and
development and other input factors; outlook for the business, and the like.248
It is often said that concerns about possible legal exposure and the confidential and proprietary
nature of the corporation’s strategy inhibit full and fair disclosure of these matters pursuant to legal
requirements.249 At the same time, however, concerns about the sustainability of business models
and national economies and other considerations relating to the ambient environment of the
corporation, both physical and social, have motivated initiatives to improve disclosure of these
matters, as well as matters more immediately and directly related to the present business carried
on by the corporation.250 This book would argue that “demand pull” for such disclosure, coming
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from legal counterparties and organizational participants whose legitimate expectations the
corporation may see as justifying such disclosure may be more effective, ultimately, in promoting
such disclosure than “regulatory fiat”.
Considerations relating to the possible adverse effects of corporate decisions and social and
economic developments, such as led to the Financial Crisis of 2008 and earlier crises and collapses
of large corporations (such as Enron and WorldCom), on the society and polity in which
environment the corporation is situated have led to concerns about the place of the corporation in
the ambient society and polity. These concerns have been expressed in calls to develop new
theoretical and practical approaches to the role of corporations and economic activity in the society
and polity, a kind of “reimbedding” them in their natural environment, as envisioned in this book.
Business groups, self-regulatory organizations, regulators, legislators, and various departments of
government have taken the initiative to examine various aspects of these issues. A few of the most
significant of these are briefly referenced below.
A4S Accounting for Sustainability
In Britain, in 2004, the Prince of Wales’ charitable foundation established an initiative entitled
“A4S Accounting for Sustainability”, which aims to “inspire action by finance leaders to drive a
fundamental shift towards resilient business models and a sustainable economy, including
transforming financial decision-making “to enable an integrated approach, reflective of the
opportunities and risks posed by environmental and social issues”.251
In turn, again led by the Prince of Wales, the A4S Accounting Bodies Network, established in
2008, brought together accounting bodies from across the globe in more than 181 countries,
representing two thirds of accountants worldwide. Its key objective is to use “its combined
knowledge to support members and students to account for sustainability, providing the
competencies and frameworks required to build a sustainable economy within which individuals
and organizations can thrive”.252
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The Kay Review
More broadly, over the past five to ten years there have been calls to develop new theoretical and
practical approaches to the role of corporations and economic activity in the society and polity, a
kind of “reimbedding” them in their natural environment. Responses to these calls have included
initiatives taken by a previous British government, led by David Cameron, with the objective of
improving the competitiveness of British business. Those steps included commissioning “The Kay
Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making” (the “Kay Review”) whose final
report was submitted in July 2012 (the “Kay Report”);253 planning for the implementation of that
report as reflected in a document issued by the Department for Business Innovation & Skills
entitled “Ensuring Equity Markets Support Long-Term Growth – The Government Response to
the Kay Review, November 2012;254 and that department’s report on implementation of the Kay
Review entitled “Building A Culture of Long-Term Equity Investment – Implementation of the
Kay Review: Progress Report October 2014” (the “Implementation Report”).255
The Kay Review involved extensive consultation with businesses and business associations
(including financial intermediaries, asset managers, and pension funds and other “ultimate”
investors), nongovernmental organizations and other interested parties, government and regulatory
agencies and bodies, academic, and other parties. As legal counterparties and organizational
participants, the perspectives of such parties are highly relevant to such analysis, from a
corporative perspective.
The Implementation Report relates a number of initiatives taken by the government of the day and
others pursuant to the recommendations of the Kay Review. The Financial Reporting Council
(FRC) published an updated Stewardship Code256 which emphasized engagement in long-term

253

John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making Final Report July 2012
(London: The National Archives, 2012). Available at: www.bis.gov.uk/kayreview.
254
UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Ensuring Equity Markets Support Long-Term Growth – The
Government Response to the Kay Review, November 2012 (London: The National Archives, 2012). Available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253457/bis-12-1188-equity-marketssupport-growth-response-to-kay-review.pdf.
255
UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Building a Culture of Long-Term Equity Investment –
Implementation of the Kay Review: Progress Report October 2014 (London: The National Archives, 2014).
Available at: https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/06/bis-141157-implementation-of-the-kay-review-progress-report.pdf. .
256
Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code September 2012 (London: The Financial Reporting
Council Limited, 2012). Available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b6033d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf.

759
company strategy as recommended by the Kay Review.257 In response to the Kay Review’s
recommendations on improving reporting and dialogue in the investment chain so as to meet longterm investment objectives, in October and November 2013 the government acted258 to reform the
corporate narrative reporting framework to make annual reports less burdensome, more relevant,
and more focused on company strategy,259 and removed mandatory quarterly reporting
requirements.260 The FRC later issued new guidance on narrative reporting.261
The government also commissioned independent research of metrics and models used by longterm investors to assess company and investment performance. These were published with the
Implementation Report.262 The government also responded to the Law Commission review of the
fiduciary duties of investment intermediaries and concerning related government departments, as
recommended by the Kay Review.263 It also introduced a number of reforms concerning
remuneration of directors, including a requirement for a binding vote of shareholders on such
remuneration.264 The FRC amended its Corporate Governance Code accordingly. 265 The
Implementation Report reviewed a number of other actions taken by the government and many
others proposed to be taken thereafter.
Many of these proposals were casualties of the change in government which took place in June
2016, following the United Kingdom referendum on the European Union (“Brexit”). This is
unfortunate not only for the United Kingdom but for the observers of the “living laboratory”
thereby constituted.
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The Oxford Martin School – “Now for the Long Term”
There were also many other non-government initiatives in this regard. In October 2013, the Oxford
Martin School at the University of Oxford published The Report of the Oxford Martin Commission
for Future Generations entitled “Now for the Long Term”,266 which, firstly, provided a synopsis
of global megatrends and the key challenges on which action was considered essential within five
broad categories: society, resources, health, geopolitics, and governance; secondly, identified five
“shaping factors that impact the ability to get things done”: institutions, time, political engagement
and public trust, complexity, and culture; and, thirdly, offered “practical, overarching
recommendations to overcome the gridlock of modern politics and shift mindsets towards the longterm” arranged around five principles: creative coalition; innovative, open and reinvigorated
institutions, revaluing the future, investing in younger generations, and establishing a platform of
understanding.267
The Oxford Martin Commission’s “revaluing the future” principle involves taking steps to focus
business on the long-term, including implementing recommendations made by the Group of 30 on
Long-term Finance,268 which involve developing long-term accounting frameworks, long-term
financial institutions and working with various parties, such as the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development,269 to develop a sustainability assessment for listed companies,
concentrating on “long-term value creation and absolute performance, taking into account
portfolio turn, remuneration incentives, length of investments, shareholder voting rights,
organizational talent and tenure, time dedicated to long-term strategy deliberations, and innovative
capacity”, which would also reinforce the proposals of the Kay Report.270
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
About the same time, in North America, investigations of mandatory sustainability reporting and
the development of key sustainability performance indicators were undertaken. A report entitled
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“From Transparency to Performance: Industry-Based Sustainability Reporting on Key Issues”271
was released in October 2010 by the Initiative for Responsible Investment at the Hauser Centre
for Non-Profit Organizations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. In turn, that report
influenced the development of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, publicly launched
in October 2012, whose mission is to develop and disseminate standardized sustainability
disclosure standards to enable evaluation of financial information sustainability information,
including risks and opportunities, to provide a complete view of corporate performance, and to
improve performance on the sustainability issues most likely to impact long-term value creation.272
International Integrated Reporting Council
In 2010, the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”),273 which had been established to develop
reporting and assurance standards for social and environmental reporting, and the A4S Accounting
for Sustainability Project jointly formed the International Integrated Reporting Committee, later
renamed the International Integrated Reporting Council (“IIRC”), to develop integrated reporting
at a global level.274 IIRC indicates that “the primary purpose of an integrated report is to explain
the providers of financial capital how an organization creates value over time” which, it says,
“benefits all stakeholders interested in an organization’s ability to create value over time, including
employees, customers, suppliers, business partners, local communities, legislators, regulators and
policy-makers.” Integrated thinking “is the active consideration by an organization of the
relationships between its various operating and functional units and the capitals that the
organization uses or affects” and “leads to integrated decision-making and actions that consider
the creation of value of the short, medium and long term.”275
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Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism and Focusing Capital on the Long Term
The Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism (“CIC”),276 established in 2008, “engages leaders across
business, government and civil society in the movement to make capitalism more equitable,
sustainable, and inclusive”. It involves asset managers, asset owners and public companies and
includes some of the largest public pension funds and private fund managers. Its membership
includes the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and McKinsey & Company, whose CEOs had
previously (in 2013) taken the initiative to establish Focusing Capital on the Long Term, which
resulted in the foundation of FCLTGlobal277 in July 2016 with BlackRock, The Dow Chemical
Company and Tata Sons. CIC members and influencers also include founders and members of
Focusing Capital on the Long Term and FCLTGlobal, and others involved in The British Academy
project described below.
The Embankment Project for Inclusive Capitalism
CIC and accounting firm EY established the Embankment Project for Inclusive Capitalism278 in
March 2017. It acknowledges that the introduction of new technologies, the rise of major new
economic markets, and the disruption of entire industries have created significant business
opportunities but also “more challenges, coming from more places, than ever before”, the
heightened scrutiny of business decisions, and a short-term orientation to ensure immediate
business survival even at the expense of future success. The Embankment Project seeks to develop
metrics by which to measure value generation over the long-term, thereby driving “broad-based
prosperity by creating value for shareholders, customers, employees and, and society alike”.279
The British Academy – The Future of the Corporation Project
The British Academy recently embarked on a project concerning “The Future of the
Corporation”280 and published a document in November 2018 setting forth a framework entitled
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“Reforming Business for the 21st Century: A Framework for the Future of the Corporation”. 281
This project is highly significant since the British Academy is the United Kingdom’s national body
for the humanities and social sciences and the project involves many subject-matters.
It proposes “a reconceptualization of the corporation around purpose” involving three principal
elements: corporate purpose, “the reason why corporation exists, what it seeks to do and what is
aspires to become”, of which profit is only a product; commitment to trustworthiness, involving
commitment “to the various parties that are involved in the delivery of those purposes and viceversa”, and which create “reciprocal benefits for the firm, its stakeholders and society”, based on
relations of trust; and a culture enabling trustworthiness, relying on “clearly articulated values that
are adopted consistently in the culture of the corporation”. The document proposes that it be
actioned by means of five “levers”: ownership, corporate governance, regulation, taxation, and
investment.282
World Economic Forum – The New Paradigm
The World Economic Forum undertook an initiative somewhat similar to the British Academy’s
project. At its request, Martin Lipton and certain of his partners at the law firm Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz prepared and, in September 2016, issued “The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an
Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve
Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth”.283
Marty Lipton recently described it (when introducing an updated version) by saying: “In essence,
The New Paradigm conceives of corporate governance as a voluntary collaboration among
corporations, shareholders, and other stakeholders to achieve sustainable long-term value and
resist short-termism. It provides a roadmap for boards to demonstrate that they are providing
thoughtful, engaged oversight and that management is diligently pursuing credible, long-term
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business strategies.”284 He admits that it “does not solve all the problems that corporations will
continue to face, including challenges stemming from technological disruption, globalization,
social media, and political instability, but it does take a significant step toward enabling
corporations to better realize their potential to be drivers of broad-based socioeconomic prosperity
today and in the future.”285
Relation of These Initiatives to Corporative Theory
These initiatives are only a few examples of those recently or currently in progress, but indicate
some of the scope and scale of such initiatives generally.286 Corporations and organizations of
corporations, governments, academic organizations, think tanks, and other organizations are
focusing attention on what the roles of business and of business corporations should be in the
future. The present book has demonstrated important aspects of those roles as observed in North
America for about the past two centuries, as well as at the present time.
Corporative analysis engages with, and has the capacity to improve the effects of, all the initiatives
surveyed. It is timely, makes a significant contribution to discussion and understanding of the
corporation, and has the capacity to be highly useful in this respect. By and large, these initiatives
are broadly consistent with, or, perhaps more aptly, are generally “not inconsistent with”,
corporative theory. However, they generally lack an overall integrative mechanism, such as a
unifying legal or organizational theory, which “makes sense” of such proposals in a larger legal
and organizational context appurtenant to the corporation. This is discussed further in the next
section.
The Limited Responses of Existing Corporate Legal Theory
Existing corporate legal theory, including stakeholder theory and team production theory, focuses
exclusively, or almost exclusively, upon the economic interests of the parties engaged in
generating products and services by means of a firm, which are available in a public market for
purchase and subsequent consumption. The book establishes that such existing corporate legal
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theory relies upon classical and neoclassical economic generalizations and assumptions that are no
longer accepted or considered tenable, including among most economists, and in any event, that
do not generate satisfactory explanations, predictions, and guides to action. Perhaps even more
importantly, extant corporate legal theory lacks a “toolkit” by means of which such particular legal
theory can be readily applied to problems which present themselves, such as long-termism versus
short-termism, sustainability, corporate social responsibility, and the fair apportionment of the
shared value created by corporations with others.
Instead, extant corporate legal theory fails to focus on what is distinctively “legal” about the issues
presented for consideration and, accordingly, ignores the distinctive contribution which legal
commentators can make to discussions which also involve members of other disciplines and
professions. The distinctive contribution of legal issues and approaches, and hence of legal
commentators, to such problems, once ceded, cannot be easily regained. Accordingly,
contemporary debates and discussions are dominated by contributions from other disciplines and
professions and in which their expertise dominates, with legal input often reduced to the mechanics
of implementing policy solutions devised by others, often without meaningful legal contributions.
Further, extant corporate legal theories are largely applied ex post facto: that is to say, only after
the issue has been framed without reference to legal parameters. Such framing effects tend to
“leave behind” the distinctiveness of legal analysis with respect to the corporation. The “logic”
and methodology underlying extant corporate legal theory, if they exist separately from non-legal
corporate theory, often becomes melded with the logic and methodology of other non-legal
theoretical approaches. The result is often a “de-legalized” examination of the problem.
The Unlimited Responses of Corporative Theory
Advantages of Combining Theory and Methodology
The corporative theory of, or the corporative perspective on, the corporation involves a distinctive
methodological approach. Generally speaking, it involves consideration of available information
in order to arrive at some specification of the issue to be considered. Then, it investigates the
problem with a characteristic theoretical and methodological approach.
The methodology of corporative theory with respect to any individual legal issue involves
examining the five “legal essentialist characteristics” of the corporation: separate legal entity
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status, limited liability and asset partitioning, management ownership separation, transferability,
and indefinite duration; and the three “organizational essentialist characteristics” of an
organization as: firstly, a social unit or group of people; secondly, who collaborate or cooperate;
thirdly, towards the attainment of a common goal or objective. Corporative methodology
investigates which legal essentialist attributes and organizational essentialist attributes are
primarily engaged, and how they are engaged, by the issue under consideration.
Corporative analysis examines the respective interests of the corporation and its legal
counterparties, as a legal entity, and, on the other hand, of the corporation and its organizational
participants, as an organization; and considers the interrelationship of those interests with each
other in relation to the matter under discussion. It seeks to comprehend legal and organizational
relationships in a context which engages not only one, but both, sets of relationships. Of course,
many organizational theorists, including Weber, consider relationships to obtain where certain
behaviour can be predicted and expected by one party of the other, and hence is “appropriate” or
“justified”. This attitude is not uncommonly expressed by legal theorists.
Corporative analysis recognizes that the interests of counterparties in legal relationships with
corporation as a legal entity and the interests of organizational participants in relationships with
the corporation as an organization are not exhausted by economic interests. The book demonstrates
that the social identity of directors, CEOs and CFOs, other TMT members, officers, managers, and
other employees is involved in their participation in the organization. Less immediately, often this
is also true of individuals involved as, or with, the corporation’s suppliers, distributors and
customers, particularly those who have exclusive or long-term relationships with the corporation.
Consequently, when organizations like Enron or Arthur Andersen fail, the damage suffered by
employees, for example, is not limited to economic injury, but also includes injury to selfperceptions (being seen as “the best and brightest”, “the smartest guys in the room”, or “the best
accountants”), and to work, social, and other relationships (often involving those emanating from
activities such as sports teams, charitable efforts, speaking or reading clubs, and the like). Losing
one’s job means losing all of that, and all at once.
Intraorganizational transfers from one division or subsidiary to another or from one region or
country to another may increase the dependence of individuals on the corporation as a source of
extracurricular activity and meaning. At the same time, the relationships of individuals as legal
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counterparties of the corporation as a legal entity, and as organizational participants in the
corporation as an organization, may transcend barriers of limited liability and asset partitioning,
such that the individuals concerned may identify with Enron as the ultimate parent corporation
without necessarily acknowledging any constraints of that nature, resulting from their engagement
with a second, third, or fourth tier subsidiary or other non-immediate relationship with Enron itself.
The book shows that organizational roles do not strictly define the involvement of organizational
participants, who also have extraorganizational goals, values, commitments, and interests.
Corporations do, however, engage in socialization processes to inculcate organizational goals and
values and to create organizational identification and organizational commitment, which tend to
promote loyalty and the exercise of “voice” in respect of intraorganizational disagreement, rather
than the exercise of “exit” or its functional equivalent in the circumstances.
Individuals may exhibit organizational identification, organizational commitment, and loyalty to
the particular business units or functions in which they are engaged. Some of these
intraorganizational groups or components, including the board of directors and including the TMT,
may be considered to constitute intraorganizational organizations themselves. They may pursue
goals and objectives which only partially correspond with those of the organization as a whole.
Sanctions, whether positive (incentives) or negative (penalties or disincentives), including those
directed to observing legal requirements, must operate at the appropriate organizational level and
in the appropriate manner. Framers of legal requirements, incentives, and penalties must take such
matters into consideration.
In conjunction with legal rights and obligations, intraorganizational relationships may sometimes,
given due consideration and appropriate methodological application, be “levered” to influence
societally optimal behavioural, including performance (or increased performance) of desired
behaviour and non-performance (or reduced performance) of societally disapproved behaviour.
The ability to construct such leverage mechanisms depends, necessarily, upon proper corporative
analysis of the legal and organizational relationships engaged, most especially in relation to legal
essentialist and organizational essentialist attributes.
Quantifying Corporative Relationships
It is clear that recognizing the legal essentialist characteristics and the organizational essentialist
characteristics most directly engaged by a particular issue and analyzing the issue with respect to
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those characteristics in the manner discussed previously is key to corporative analysis. That
enables a determination of the propinquity or centrality and the salience of both the relevant
corporation-counterparty legal analysis and the corporation-participant organizational analysis.
The discussion under the present heading illustrates but one example of how such centrality and
salience may be conceptualized for the purpose of being operationalized; and how these concepts
may be used to implement change by way of legal and organizational relationships in such
relationships or otherwise.
Let us envision the propinquity or centrality, and the salience, of the corporation-counterparty legal
relationship (“L relationship” or “LR”) and the corporation-organizational participant
organizational relationship (“O relationship” or “OR”), which might be described, collectively, as
the centrality and salience of the corporative relationship (“CR”) between them, as being
represented by a series of concentric circles with the corporative relationships having greater
propinquity and salience depicted as closer to the centre of the concentric circles. It is
acknowledged, of course, that LR and OR can be mapped separately by means of such concentric
circles, and that a methodology for converting separate LR and OR mappings into a combined CR
mapping, if it is possible, has not yet been developed. Instead, each of these mappings is suggested
as a means of simplifying and concretizing the underlying intellectual constructs.
We might identify the circle at the centre as the corporation itself. Without seeking accuracy but
for the purpose of demonstration only, we might consider the relationship between the corporation
and its CEO and CFO to be represented by placement in the first band or within the first concentric
circle surrounding the centre, which we might refer to as a “CR 1 level relationship”, with the
others denominated accordingly. For purposes of demonstration only, members of the TMT might
be considered to be in the second circle (“CR 2”), other officers might be in the third, with senior
managers, middle managers, and lower-level managers in the fourth, fifth, and sixth circles, and
other employees in the seventh circle.
Major suppliers, distributors, and customers in long-term contractual relationships with the
corporation might be placed within the third or fourth circle, while other suppliers might be placed
in the fifth, sixth, and seventh circles, again, for purposes of illustration only. Important lenders,
whether term or revolving, by reason of the term of the legal relationship or the duration of the
organizational relationship, or both, might be placed in third circle or tier. Depending upon the
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circumstances, controlling shareholders might be a level CR 1 or CR 2 level relationship, major
but not controlling shareholders at a level CR 2 or CR 3, influential institutional shareholders might
be at a level CR 4 or CR 5, while significant retail shareholders might be at a level CR 7 or CR 8,
and non-significant retail shareholders might be at a level CR 9 or CR 10.
Assuming that it does not enjoy any preferential tax or other treatment, municipalities and
communities in which the focal corporation has important plants or offices might be in the eighth
circle; the province or state might be in the ninth circle; and the corresponding nation-state might
be in the tenth circle. We will assume that the relevant society or polity may be placed within the
same circle as the government with respect to which it is engaged. Assuming that the corporation
does not supply consumer-branded products or services and that its business is not particularly
dependent upon or sensitive to environmental considerations, “the environment” might be at a
level CR 11 or CR 12, while environmental activists who may be in a position to influence various
levels of shareholders and employees might be at a level CR 6 to CR 8. Of course, all these
assignments of corporative relationships are not intended to be realistic other than as illustrations.
Applying Corporative Theory to Effect Change
Effecting change consequent upon corporative analysis would involve taking into account all the
foregoing considerations. After determining how the relevant legal and organizational essentialist
characteristics engage with the issue at hand, a counterparty/organizational participant wants to
encourage some change with respect to the corporation’s behaviour would consider how to employ
the foregoing centrality and salience analysis to that purpose.
This would include approaching other counterparty/organizational participants having legal or
organizational interests (or both) which are similar to that of the change proponent with a view to
making common cause. Such approaches may be particularly advantageous where the other
counterparty/organizational participant may be perceived to have a CR rating higher than that of
the initiating proponent. As noted below, the proponents of the Equator Principles may be seen as
having implicitly employed something like this kind of corporative approach. It involves, literally,
“taking the relationship to a new level”, that is to say, increasing its centrality and salience, by
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cooperation with other counterparties/organizational participants or otherwise. This may have
characterized, at least in part, the promulgation of the Equator Principles.287
Considered in a manner which vastly oversimplifies the process involved there for the purpose of
providing a dramatic illustration of the type of influence and change process envisioned by
corporative analysis, it may be argued that by ultimately influencing major financial institution
lenders: firstly, to adopt the Equator Principles and to enshrine them in principles and practices
with respect to approval of loan agreements with borrowers; secondly, to report them on the
Equator Principles Association website; and, thirdly, with respect to the same to designate
countries that are considered to have “robust environmental and social governance, legislation
systems and institutional capacity designed to protect their people and the natural environment” in
connection therewith; the proponents of the Equator Principles raised the level of combined legal
and organizational relationship (previously characterized as the corporative relationship or “CR”)
from level CR 11 or CR 12 to level CR 3, based on the assumptions described here.
Thus, getting the attention of, and commitment from, those major lenders enabled the proponents
of the Equator Principles to get the attention of, and commitment from, relevant borrowers, in this
case through the instrumentality of the loan arrangements themselves. In this sense, the proponents
relied on “demand pull” and “participant pull”, the desire of the financial institutions concerned to
derive the reputational advantages and hence market advantages desired by some of their legal
counterparties and organizational participants, including customers.288 Of course, the actual
process leading to the promulgation of the Equator Principles was considerably more complex than
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Equator Principles Association, The Equator Principles III June 2013, online at: https://equator-principles.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/equator_principles_III.pdf. See also Cynthia A Williams and John M Conley, "Global Banks
as Global Sustainability Regulators: The Equator Principles" (2011) 33:4 Law & Pol’y 542; and Olaf Weber and
Emmanuel Acheta, “The Equator Principles: Do They Make Banks More Sustainable?” (February 2016) The United
Nations Environment Programme, Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System, Working Paper 16/05,
online at:
http://unepinquiry.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/The_Equator_Principles_Do_They_Make_Banks_More_Sustainable.pdf.
288

A useful review and analysis of non-state market-driven governance systems, both transnational and domestic, is
Benjamin Cashore, "Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven
Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority" (2002) 15:4 Governance: An International Journal of Policy,
Administration, and Institutions 503. Concerning market-driven governance, see also: Peer Zumbansen, "Happy
Spells? Constructing and Deconstructing a Private Law Perspective on Subsidiarity" (2015) King’s College London
Dickson Poon School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series: Paper No. 2015-31.
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the vastly oversimplified version set forth here as an exaggerated or dramatized illustration of how
corporative theory and corporative relationships may be applied.
Nevertheless, that simplified example demonstrates how increasing the centrality and salience of
legal and organizational relationships contributes to increasing the power and influence of legal
counterparties and organizational participants vis-à-vis the focal corporation itself. It also
illustrates how corporative analysis can facilitate the employment of corporative relationships to
affect corporate behaviour in both its inward-facing and outward facing aspects; and sometimes in
ways which are preferable to, and more powerful than, exterior regulation by more “outside”
parties such as governments and their attendant regulatory authorities.289
Put simply, this involves the employment and application of intraorganizational participation by
various organizational participants, including governmental entities in some cases, in the
organization itself, instead of, or as supplementary to, external legal regulation of the corporation
by government as a legal counterparty external to the corporation as a legal entity. These matters
are expected to be examined more fully in future work.
An Invitation
In the result, corporative theory provides both a theory and a methodology. Its validity and efficacy
may be assessed in relation to its explanatory power, predictive capacity, and capacity of
meaningful instantiation in action in “the real world”. It is submitted that its contributions in that
regard validate the theory, and that it does so in ways not characteristic of other extant theories of
the corporation. Further applications to other critical issues and assessments of the theory await.
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Concerning the merits of self-governance as opposed to external governance, see: Peer Zumbansen, "Rethinking
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CHAPTER A1:
CORPORATE ESSENTIALISM
AND
CORPORATE ORGANIZATION IN LAW
As is explored in more detail in Chapter Four, the term “organization” is generally understood to
mean, in effect, a group of persons acting collectively to satisfy some commonly agreed need (or
needs) or to pursue one or more commonly agreed goals or objectives. As such, an organization
has some structure, pursues its objectives in accordance with certain processes, and involves
individual actors or groups of actors, who may be referred to as its “personnel”. Modern business
corporations also are, contain, or involve, organizations, which have certain economic or
“business” goals and objectives, as demonstrated by the previous review of certain leading
corporate statutes.
PART A – PARADIGMATIC ATTRIBUTES OF THE CORPORATION
A corporation is endowed by law, statutory or otherwise, with certain characteristic legal attributes
which have been described here, roughly, as follows: 1. The corporation is a separate legal entity
(“SLE”), which is to say that it is recognized in law as a rights-and-duty-bearing entity, further
particulars of which are set forth in the relevant corporate legislation. 2. The corporation is
characterized by asset partitioning and limited liability. 3. Interests in its equity or capital are
“locked-in”, but are transferable. 4. Its management is centralized and independent of the “owners”
of its capital or equity. 5. Unless otherwise determined, it has indefinite duration.
As a legal entity, it might be expected that the characteristic legal attributes of the corporation
might impact the relevant organizational characteristics and vice versa. That is to say, those
characteristic legal attributes might affect its choices, and the attributes, of its legal structure,
processes, and personnel. At the same time, those characteristic legal attributes of the corporation
as a matter of law might affect not only its organization as a matter of law, but also its characteristic
organizational attributes, both formal and informal.
This chapter, which deals with the organization of the corporation in law, will examine the
statutory assignment of rights, responsibilities and liabilities among corporate participants,
principally as between the shareholders and the board of directors. As discussed above, the
principle that shareholders, as capital contributors and participants, are not entitled, as such, to
participate in management of the entity (as opposed to partnerships, for example), is instantiated
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statutorily by assigning responsibility for management of the corporation to the board of directors,
although, in exceptional cases, this paradigm may be varied in concrete instances by prescribed
action reserving certain “management” type rights to the shareholders.
This paradigm, of course, raises questions concerning the extent to which shareholders may or
should have vestigial rights with respect to management or oversight of management, which might
include, but may not be limited to, rights to elect and remove directors. The circumstances in which
this management-by-board paradigm may be varied are generally limited to ones in which the
shareholders are unanimous on such variation and where the corporation concerned is not a
publicly listed or traded entity.
As suggested in this section, the corporate attributes of capital lock-in and transfer rights, which
are also related to the separation of “management” and “ownership”, which we may refer to as the
“management ownership separation” attribute, give rise to concerns about situations in which
rights of management or other shareholders or possibly others may be exercised in an abusive
manner such as to merit claims to relief by the shareholder (s) affected, and, as well, about
situations in which such abuses might affect transferability of the shares held by the shareholders
affected. These matters are discussed under the headings “Management Responsibility for
Running the Business” in the present chapter, and “Legal and Management-Related Rights of
Shareholders” and “Shareholder Rights Beyond Voting” in Chapter Three.
Further, the attribute of the corporation that it constitutes a single entity in law raises for
consideration the subjects of extra-corporate action, the ways in which the corporation acts “in the
world” with respect to entities external to itself, and intra-corporate action, the ways in which the
corporation acts in relation to its participants, that is to say, with respect to entities internal to the
corporation, as participants in its internal organization. These matters are discussed in Chapter
Four under the heading “Organizational Liability for Acts of Corporate Actors”.
In effect, this discussion of the statutory paradigm of the organization of the corporation in law
engages not only the internal and external structure of the corporation, but also the processes,
internal and external, by which it is permitted to take lawful action, and the personnel through
whom it may take such action. Thus, it explicates aspects of both the essential legal attributes of
the corporation as a separate legal entity as a matter of law, and its essential and other
organizational attributes as exemplifying and instantiating a species of organization. Accordingly,
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this section will discuss the means by which the essential legal attributes are instantiated in modern
corporate law statutes. This will afford some comparative analysis of the means by which these
attributes are instituted statutorily.
PART B – MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Statutory Role
As noted above, under most modern corporate statutes, the role of the board is to manage or
supervise the management of the business and affairs of the corporation. For example, this is the
case in the CBCA and the OBCA, which provide, in effect, that subject to any unanimous
shareholder agreement, the board of directors shall manage or supervise the management of the
business and affairs of the corporation.1
The Delaware General Corporation Law provides that “[t]he business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.”2 While the author is not aware of the frequency with which powers of management
or direction are assigned otherwise than to a board of directors, one would expect that it would be
relatively low. However, there may be some cases in which board powers and duties are limited
and assigned to others, for example, in the case of shareholder agreements to which all
shareholders are parties.
The language of the Model Business Corporation Act, whose provisions have been adopted as the
basis of state corporation laws in a majority of American states, is slightly different. It states that:
(a) Except as provided in section 7.32, each corporation must have a board of directors.
(b) All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business
and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors,
1

Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 102 [CBCA]; Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c
B.16, s 115 [OBCA]. These provisions codify previously existing law concerning the powers of the board of directors.
The leading case of Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch 34 (Eng CA), confirmed
that the authority of the board of directors to manage the corporation was not subject to any overriding authority of
the shareholders in general meeting. In particular, the directors ignored the results of a vote of shareholders to sell the
assets of the subject corporation on terms previously agreed with a particular purchaser, considering such sale not to
be in the best interest of the corporation. The court held that under the memorandum and articles of the corporation,
the directors had the full powers of the corporation, except where an extraordinary resolution of the shareholders was
required, and could act independently of, and even contrary to, the opinion of a majority of the shareholders.
2
General Corporation Law, 8 Del Code, c 1, § 141(a) [DGCL].
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subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement
authorized under section 7.32.3
Section 7.32 deals with shareholder agreements among all the shareholders of a corporation and is
somewhat similar to a unanimous shareholder agreement under the OBCA and CBCA.
Shareholder agreements authorized under that section may restrict the authority of the board of
directors. As noted above, such an agreement terminates when a corporation becomes a public
corporation as defined in section 1.40 (18 A), which term means “a corporation that has shares
listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more
members of a national securities association”.
Thus, in such jurisdictions, subject to permitted limitations, the board of directors is empowered
and required to manage or to supervise (CBCA/OBCA), or to manage or direct (DGCL), or simply
to direct (MBCA), the management of the business and affairs of the corporation. In the CBCA
and the OBCA, the term “business” is not defined, but the term “affairs” is defined to mean “the
relationships among the corporation, its affiliates, and the shareholders, directors and officers of
such bodies corporate but does not include the business carried on by such bodies corporate”. 4
Neither term, “business” nor “affairs”, is defined, although both are used, in the DGCL or in the
MBCA.
Thus, the Canadian statutes specifically authorize and empower the board to manage or supervise
the management of relationships among the corporation and certain of its primary constituents,
namely its shareholders, directors and officers. Interestingly, the term “affairs” as so defined, does
not expressly include relations between any of the specified parties and the board of directors itself.
This may be because to do otherwise would vest complete authority over such relationships in the
board, without recognizing any rights and responsibilities of the other parties. Certainly, there is
no doubt that the board may manage relationships between individual directors and such other
parties. Accordingly, it may simply be that the collective actions of the board of directors itself
3

American Bar Association, Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 4th ed, (Chicago: American Bar
Association, 2008), s 8.01(a)-8.01(b) [MBCA]. A valuable discussion of the history, development, interrelationship,
and comparison, of the DGCL and the MBCA appears in Jeffrey Gorris, Lawrence A Hamermesh & Leo E Strine, Jr,
“Delaware Corporate Law and the Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis” (2011) 74:1 Law &
Contemp Probs 107.
4
CBCA, supra note 1, s 2(1). The definition in s. 1 (1) of the OBCA is substantially identical. Internet searches failed
to disclose any authority, judicial or otherwise, or any commentary with respect to the latter term in general, apart
from consideration solely in respect of its use as a term of art in the context of the oppression remedy.
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were considered in drafting the statute to be adequately represented by the word “directors” alone.
The subject seems unaddressed by commentaries on the section. Importantly, however, these
statutes expressly recognize that relationships, legal and arguably otherwise, exist or may exist
among these various corporate constituents, and that such relationships may be managed by the
board.
As discussed elsewhere in this chapter and later in this Part, the scope of the management authority
and responsibility vested in the board of directors by statute and its divorcement from equity
ownership by such management, unlike in the case of other business entities, particularly when
combined with capital lock-in, is, to some extent, intermediated by other statutory mechanisms.
These include the election of, duties of, and ability to remove, directors, the ability of shareholders
to oppose management nominees for election as directors, the ability to raise matters for
consideration at meetings of shareholders, and the power and authority to approve transactions
considered to be fundamental to the corporation, and its business and affairs, including those
transactions affecting the rights and respective entitlements of corporate participants. In these
ways, the corporate statutes instantiate and operationalize the essentialist attributes of the
corporation.
Duties of Directors
Under most modern corporate statutes, directors have a duty of good faith, which is often referred
to as their fiduciary duty, and which is referred to here as their “duty of loyalty”. They also have a
duty of care. For example, s. 122 of the CBCA and s. 134 of the OBCA provide, in effect, that
every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties
shall (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation (the
“duty of good faith” or “duty of loyalty”); and (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a
reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances (the “duty of care”). These
sections also require directors and officers to comply with the Act, the regulations, articles, bylaws and any unanimous shareholder agreement (which we shall refer to here as the “duty of
compliance with corporate law” or “duty of compliance”).
They provide, too, that no provision in a contract, the articles, the by-laws or a resolution relieves
a director or officer from the duty to act in accordance with the statute and the regulations, or
relieves him or her from liability for a breach thereof. As can be seen, these provisions apply not
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only to directors but also to officers. However, both Canadian statutes recognize that directors and
officers cannot be expected themselves to possess the information necessary to make all requisite
decisions and thus must frequently rely on information supplied by others.
Under subsection 123 (5) of the CBCA, a director has complied with his or her duties “if the
director relied in good faith on (a) financial statements of the corporation represented to the
director by an officer of the corporation or in a written report of the auditor of the corporation
fairly to reflect the financial condition of the corporation; or (b) a report of a person whose
profession lends credibility to a statement made by the professional person.” Thus, the type of
reliance which, on its own, relieves a director from liability is quite circumscribed indeed.
The equivalent OBCA provision, subsection 135 (4), somewhat broadens the scope of permissible
reliance. Compliance with duty occurs “if the director exercised the care, diligence and skill that a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable circumstances, including reliance
in good faith on, (a) financial statements of the corporation represented to him or her by an officer
of the corporation or in a written report of the auditor of the corporation to present fairly the
financial position of the corporation in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;
(b) an interim or other financial report of the corporation represented to him or her by an officer
of the corporation to present fairly the financial position of the corporation in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles; (c) a report or advice of an officer or employee of the
corporation, where it is reasonable in the circumstances to rely on the report or advice; or (d) a
report of a lawyer, accountant, engineer, appraiser or other person whose profession lends
credibility to a statement made by any such person.”
In effect, reliance in good faith upon any of the documents or reports stipulated in paragraphs (a)
through (d) only avails the director if and to the extent that such director otherwise meets the
standard of care required. Accordingly, a director has to determine whether reliance on such
documents or reports evidences the exercise of “the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably
prudent person would have exercised in comparable circumstances”. Not only must the standard
be satisfied generally to amount to compliance with duty, but it must be satisfied specifically with
respect to reliance on such documents or reports.
With respect to Delaware corporations, the DGCL refers to a fiduciary duty and a duty of loyalty
obliquely in that it allows such duties to be limited in prescribed manners in the certificate of
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incorporation.5 In particular, under s. 102 (b) (7), personal liability of directors for breach of the
duty of care, but not the duty of loyalty (and the related duty to act in good faith), may be eliminated
or limited. The content of these duties, then, are determined at common law, and the relevant case
law is very extensive and complex, thereby preventing its review here.6
As is well known, Delaware courts apply the “business judgment” rule, which, until 1985, at least,
protected directors who acted in accordance with their business judgment from liability except in,
and protected shareholders only against, extreme cases of incompetence.7 The business judgement
rule, as applied in Delaware, protects directors from liability in respect of their business judgement
provided that they act in good faith, with the degree of care of an ordinarily prudent person in such
circumstances, and reasonably believe the decision to be in the corporation’s best interests. 8 In
effect, the court will defer to, and will not review such decisions. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme
Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom9 found the directors liable for a breach of their duty of
care, although they were found to be acting in good faith. This caused great consternation. Section
102 (b) (7) was enacted, apparently in response to that finding, the following year, thus restoring
the status quo ante.10
The Model Business Corporations Act creates both duties. It provides, in section 8.30 (a), that
“[e]ach member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1)
in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the

5

DGCL, supra note 2, § 102(b)(7). As noted in the article cited in footnote 83 below, this was enacted in 1986,
apparently in response to the Smith v. Van Gorkom decision discussed here.
6
For example, for the duty of care, see the discussion in Stephen J Lubben & Alana J Darnell, “Delaware’s Duty of
Care” (2006) 31:2 Del J Corp L 589; and for the fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, see Randy J Holland, “Delaware
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty” (2009) 11:3 U Pa J Bus L 675. The latter article offers the
perspective of a Justice on the Supreme Court of Delaware. A useful discussion written from the perspective of
practitioners appears in William M Lafferty, Lisa A Schmidt & Donald J Wolfe Jr, “A Brief Introduction to the
Fiduciary Duties of Directors Under Delaware Law” (2012) 116:3 Penn St L Rev 837. A more academic perspective
is provided by a leading corporate law professor, Lyman Johnson, in “Delaware's Non-Waivable Duties” (2011) 91:2
BUL Rev 701.
7
See Lubben & Darnell, supra note 6 at 590.
8
Useful and often cited reviews of the rule appear in S Samuel Arsht, "The Business Judgment Rule Revisited" (1979)
8:1 Hofstra L Rev 93-134; Bayless Manning, “The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention:
Time for Reality” (1984) 39:4 Bus Lawyer 1477; Daniel R Fischel, “The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case” (1985) 40:4 Bus Lawyer 1437.
9
488 A (2d) 858 (Del Supt Ct). See also articles after that decision, including Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, “Smith v. Van
Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment” (1986) 41:4 Bus Lawyer 1187; Lynn A Stout, “In Praise of
Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule” (2002)
96:2 Nw UL Rev 675.
10
Edward Rock and Michael Wachter, “Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal
Transplants” (2002) 96:2 Nw UL Rev 651 at 652.

779

corporation”, and, in s. 8.30 (b), that “[t]he members of the board of directors or a committee of
the board, when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting
attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like
position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”11
In connection with these duties, the MBCA recognizes that directors act collectively and, further,
that it is often appropriate for them to rely on information provided by others, including, from time
to time, other directors. Consequently, section 8.30 (c) requires a director to disclose or cause to
be disclosed to other board or board committee members “information not already known by them
but known by the director to be material to the discharge of their decision-making or oversight
functions” unless it would violate a legal duty, legally enforceable confidentiality obligation, or
professional ethics rule. As the Official Comment notes at page 264, this makes explicit a moral
or a legal obligation which has often been considered to obtain, but the statutory provision is
separate from any common law duty.
Since directors make decisions both individually, in respect of each of their own positions relating
to an issue, and collectively, as a board, in taking board decisions, it makes sense that information
not legally restricted from such disclosure should be disclosed by a director to the other directors,
lest there arise some imputation to all of them of knowledge possessed by only some of them.
Further, unless the director has knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted, such director is
entitled to rely on the performance of officers or employees “whom the director reasonably
believes to be reliable and competent in the functions performed or the information, opinions,
reports or statements provided” as specified in section 8.30 (f) (1) and (3) “to whom the board may
have delegated, formally or informally by course of conduct, the authority or duty to perform one
or more of the board’s functions that are delegable under applicable law”.
Under section 8.30 (e), in discharging board or board committee duties, a director “who does not
have knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, prepared or presented
11

MBCA, supra note 3, s 8.30. A thorough review and analysis of the duty of good faith in Delaware law and more
broadly, but not specifically addressing the MBCA provision, is that of Melvin A. Eisenberg in “The Duty of Good
Faith in Corporate Law” (2006) 31:1 Del J Corp L 1. A comparison of the MBCA provision then in force with the
applicable Delaware law from the perspective of practitioner later jurist (Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court)
appears in Norman Veasey & WE Manning, “Codified Standard – Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of
the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law” (1980) 35:3 Bus Lawyer 919.
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by any of the persons specified in subsection (f).” In addition to the officers and employees, and
the board committees mentioned previously, section 8.30 (f) entitles directors to rely on “legal
counsel, public accountants, or other persons retained by the corporation as to matters involving
skills or expertise the director reasonably believes are matters (i) within the particular person’s
professional or expert competence or (ii) as to which the particular person merits confidence”. As
the Official Comment notes at page 267, this might include not only parties who are licensed with
respect to the activity concerned, such as lawyers, accountants and engineers, but also those with
special skills and experience, such as investment bankers, geologists, management consultants,
actuaries, appraisers, and private investigators.
Other specific duties are also imposed. Some of the statutes, such as the CBCA and the OBCA,
also contain specific provisions relieving a director from liability. For example, sections 135 and
123, respectively, provide that a director may dissent from actions of the board by taking on certain
prescribed options, in which case such director avoids liability for such actions.
In summary, the modern corporation statutes mentioned specifically impose on directors the duties
of loyalty, care, and compliance. As is discussed in Chapter Four under the heading
“Organizational Liability for Acts of Corporate Actors” and its sub-headings, particularly “The
Agency Relationship in Law” and “The Principal-Agent Relationship Inter Se”, these fiduciary
and other duties are similar to and are derived from duties of agents to principals and trustees to
beneficiaries (in the case of fiduciary duties of directors) at common law.
The discussion in Chapter Four below demonstrates that agency law principles continue to apply
to actors within the corporation who are not subject to obligations expressly codified in the statutes,
which means, in effect, those who are in a level of the corporate hierarchy below directors and
officers. The scope of the term “officer” under the corporate statutes will be discussed later in this
chapter.
It is recognized that directors and officers must rely on others for certain information and advice.
The parties responsible for information on which the directors may rely include the corporation’s
officers, employees, auditors, and other persons who are actual or putative experts in the subjectare concerned and who are, generally, acting as its agents with respect to the matter concerned. In
this way, the common law of agency has “filtered into” the statutory law of the corporation.
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As a separate legal entity, the directors rely upon officers and employees who are internal the
corporation, as well as auditors, counsel and others, acting as agents and otherwise, who are
external to the corporation, but whose actions are, to some degree, “internalized” by reason of their
adoption into internal processes, at least vis-à-vis other external parties. In relying upon the
personnel by means of whom the corporate entity and its organization carry on operations, the
board is also relying upon its internal structure and processes. These matters upon which they are
entitled to place reliance, namely, structure, processes and personnel, are ones over which the
board has authority and responsibility, and they are also attributes of its internal organization.
As noted, other “external” parties, such as the auditors, regular external corporate counsel, ongoing
investment banking advisors, and regularly engaged management consultants may also participate
in its organization. This is particularly the case with respect to the auditors, who have a formal
legal role by statute. Thus, the legal essentialist attributes of the corporation discussed above affect
the corporation’s organization and operations.
Of course, officers and employees of the related corporations, unless they are also officers and
employees of the focal corporation, do not qualify as officers or employees of the focal corporation
as a separate legal entity and, accordingly, reliance upon them does not protect a director statutorily
unless, of course, the “skills and expertise” provision has, or is accepted to have, application.
These observations raise questions concerning the “boundaries of the organization” within the
corporation and, in particular, the extent to which the boundaries of the organization may be
confined or limited to, or, on the other hand, may extend beyond, the boundaries of the corporation
as a legal entity. In effect, the external parties upon which the board actually relies may be outside
the legal boundaries of the corporation but may be considered by organizational participants to be,
in some respects, within, or part of, the organization itself for certain limited purposes. On the
other hand, it is only where such parties are actually engaged by the focal corporation itself, rather
than, say, by a parent corporation, subsidiary, or other affiliate corporation, that the legal
entitlement to reliance may be said to unequivocally arise.
This recalls the discussion amongst economists concerning the respective boundaries of the market
and, on the other hand, of the firm.12 For example, Rock and Wachter consider these boundaries
12

Of course, the leaders in these discussions include Coase, Williamson, Holmstrom and Milgrom, Roberts, and
Tirole. See e.g. RH Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4:16 Economica 386; Oliver Williamson, Markets and
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as matters of economic logic.13 In the present case, as lawyers and legal theorists, what concerns
us is the respective boundaries between the corporation, as a legal entity, and the organization
which animates and vivifies it. However, those legal boundaries and constraints may be at variance
with economic and organizational boundaries and constraints.
The nature of the corporation as involving or implicating an organization is more fully explicated
in Part 3 of this book. However, for the purpose of the present discussion, considering an
organization as a group of people structured and managed in order to accomplish some goal or
objective, it can be seen that the group or some part of it must structure and manage the group
towards attainment of such goal or objective.
Rational pursuit of such ultimate goal or objective is ordinarily pursued by seeking to achieve what
might be called “subultimate” goals or objectives, which may be more proximate or immediate,
on the one hand, or, on the other hand, purely instrumental. The means by which any organization
pursues its ultimate or subultimate goals or objectives may be subject to significant contestation
among the members of the organization. Their rational pursuit may be facilitated by imposing
specific duties and responsibilities on its ultimate decision makers as they determine how the
organization will pursue its various goals and objectives.
As is discussed further in Part 3, the organization which animates or vivifies the corporation,
thereby enabling it to take action, is, of course, a group of persons, within which various groups
and subgroups may themselves act (perhaps even as intraorganizational organizations) within the
corporation’s organization. Accordingly, each of these groups and subgroups may have its own
subultimate, proximate, and instrumental goals and objectives. The alignment and synchronization
of those group and subgroup goals and objectives with those of the corporation itself are important
to the overall management of the corporation.
In the case of the corporation, the statutes assign to the board of directors the duty, responsibility,
and authority to manage or supervise its business and affairs. They also impose specific duties and
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975); Oliver Williamson, “TransactionCost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations” (1979) 22:2 JL & Econ 233; Oliver Williamson, The
Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, “The
Boundaries of the Firm Revisited” (1998) 12:4 J Economic Perspectives 73; Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom,
“Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design” (1991) 7 JL Econ &
Org 24; Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, “The Firm as an Incentive System” (1994) 84:4 American Economic Rev
972; Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, “Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form” (1991) 7:2: JL Econ & Org 201.
13
Rock & Wachter, supra note 10 at 652.
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responsibilities, namely, the duties of loyalty, care, and compliance, which may be considered as
constraining the behaviour of the board in the course of pursuing the organization’s ultimate and
subultimate goals and objectives. These duties also seek to create alignment or congruence among
the goals and objectives of the corporation, those of the board, and those of individual directors.
In the case of the corporation, the duties of loyalty, care, and compliance are imposed on directors
in connection with the instantiation of central management (by the board), the separation of such
management (by the board) from equity ownership (by shareholders), and the related locking-in,
and transferability of, capital. The imposition of such duties is thought to provide equity owners
and other corporate constituents with some degree of assurance that the ultimate ends or ultimate
goals and objectives of the corporation will be pursued rationally and effectively.
Indemnification of Directors
Under section 124 of the CBCA and section 136 of the OBCA, a corporation may indemnify a
current or former director or officer “against all costs, charges and expenses, including an amount
paid to settle an action or satisfy a judgment, reasonably incurred by the individual in respect of
any civil, criminal, administrative, investigative or other proceeding in which the individual is
involved because of that association with the corporation” provided that the individual “acted
honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation” and “in the case of
a criminal or administrative action or proceeding that is enforced by a monetary penalty… [t]he
individual had reasonable grounds for believing that the individual’s conduct was lawful.” The
statutes also provide that a corporation may, with court approval, indemnify such individual in
respect of derivative actions. An individual who is eligible for indemnity on such grounds is
entitled to indemnity if such person was not judged by the court or other competent authority to
have committed any fault or omitted to do anything that the individual ought to have done.
Under section 145 of the DGCL, the corporation’s general power to indemnify is expressed in
similar terms, but it also extends to employees and agents. It is also specifically provided that “the
termination of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon
a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person
did not act in good faith and in a manner which the person reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding,
had reasonable cause to believe that the person’s conduct was lawful.” The requisite
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determinations must be made in each specific case by a majority, even though less than a quorum,
of directors or a committee of directors, who are not parties to such action, suit or proceeding, or
if there are no such directors or if such directors so direct, by independent legal counsel in a written
opinion, or by the stockholders. It appears that a shareholder determination would always suffice.
The MBCA differentiates among the corporation’s abilities to indemnify directors, officers, and
employees or agents. In the case of directors, this ability is expressed in Section 8.51 in terms
similar to the CBCA and the OBCA, except that s. 8.51 distinguishes between conduct in an
official capacity and conduct in other cases. The discussion of agency law below will show that
such distinction is made in agency law more generally, and is relevant to liability of the principal,
as well as indemnity, for the relevant actions.
In the case of conduct in an official capacity, the director must have reasonably believed that his
or her conduct was in the best interest of the corporation, while in other cases, he or she must only
have reasonably believed that such conduct was at least not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation. Indemnification by the corporation is required where a director was “wholly
successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding to which the director was
a party because he or she was a director of the corporation.” Indemnification of officers is the
subject of section 8.56, which is discussed below in relation to the duties of officers.
Such rights of indemnification are sought to be justified on the grounds that each director is
considered to be acting for the benefit of the corporation, and not in his or her interests. In many,
if not most, cases in with respect to public companies, the extent of personal benefit derived by
assuming directorial responsibilities would be quite inadequate as compared with potential liability
if the business judgment of such a director was not protected, and if such indemnification was not
available.
The discussion of agency law below, especially under the heading “Duties of Officers and
Employees” and in Chapter A3, will demonstrate that, in the absence of applicable provisions in
the relevant corporate statutes or other statutes, intracorporate agents, like other agents generally,
may be entitled to indemnification from their corporate principal. Thus, while the corporate
statutes codify indemnification rights and obligations at the level of the hierarchy with which they
expressly deal, other somewhat similar rights may obtain at other levels of the organizational
hierarchy. Unlike the other statutes, the MBCA provisions purport to extend statutory indemnity
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provisions to employees and agents, which may enlarge, reduce, or conflict with, common law
agency rights and obligations.
Delegation of Powers
Sections 115 of the CBCA and 127 of the OBCA provide, in effect, that directors of a corporation
may appoint from their number a managing director (who must be a resident Canadian under the
CBCA) or a committee of directors and delegate to such managing director or committee any of
the powers of the directors. It is clear that the person or persons appointed as managing director or
as members of such a committee must themselves be directors.
Under both statutes, no managing director and no committee of directors has authority to submit
to shareholders any question or matter requiring their approval; fill a vacancy among the directors
or in the office of auditor, or, under the CBCA, appoint additional directors or, under the OBCA,
appoint or remove any of the chief executive officers, however designated, the chief financial
officer, however designated, the chair or the president; issue securities except as authorized by the
directors; in the case of the CBCA, issue shares of a series under section 27 except as authorized
by the directors; declare dividends; purchase, redeem or otherwise acquire shares issued by the
corporation; pay a commission on the sale of shares of the corporation (under certain specified
sections); approve a management information circular; approve a take-over bid circular, directors’
circular, or in the case of the OBCA an issuer bid circular; approve certain financial statements; in
the case of the OBCA, approve an amalgamation or an amendment to the articles; or adopt, amend
or repeal by-laws.
It is notable that most of these matters reserved for action by the full board affect the relationship,
or involve the interface, between the board and the shareholders, or involve related disclosures and
potential liabilities arising from such relationship or interface. In such circumstances, it is
considered appropriate that such matters be considered by the board of directors as a whole. While
there may be some disagreement with particular limitations in this regard, the general principle is
quite sensible.
The OBCA does, in paragraph 127 (3)(b), but the CBCA does not, require that each of the CEO,
CFO, Chair, and President be appointed and removed only by the full board, and not by any
managing director or committee of directors. Thus, the OBCA appears to attach greater importance
to those appointments and removals than to those of other officers. This seems appropriate in the
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light of the authority and responsibilities attaching to those positions by reason of corporate and
securities law, including, in some cases, the authority to appoint subordinate officers who, in turn,
may have considerable authority and responsibilities.
Paragraph 141 (c) (2) of the DGCL, creates extensive powers of delegation, permitting the full
board to designate one or more committees consisting of as few as one director, to designate one
or more directors as alternate members of any committee to act at a meeting in the place of any
absent or disqualified director, and, if permitted by the bylaws, permitting such committees to
appoint other directors to act in a particular meeting.
It also stipulates, in effect, that any such committee, to the extent provided in the resolution of the
board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the powers
and authority of the board of directors in the management of the business and affairs of the
corporation, and may authorize the seal of the corporation to be affixed to all papers which may
require it. It provides, however, in effect, that no committee has power or authority to approve or
adopt or recommend to stockholders any action or matter (other than the election and removal of
directors) expressly required to be submitted to stockholders for approval; or to adopt, amend or
repeal any bylaw. This limited restraint on board delegation accords the board much greater
flexibility in determining how it will exercise its management authority than do the CBCA and
OBCA.
Section 8.25 of the MBCA likewise permits the full board to create one or more committees and
to appoint one or more directors to any such committee, unless the statute, the articles of
incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise. The rules pertaining to board procedures apply
likewise to its committees. No committee may authorize or approve distributions, except according
to a formula or method, or within limits, prescribed by the board: approve or propose to
shareholders action that the statute requires to be approved by shareholders; or fill vacancies on
the board or, if the articles, bylaws or the resolution creating committee so provide, on any of its
committees. These restrictions on delegation are thus wider than in the DGCL, but much narrower
than in the Canadian statutes.
As the Official Comment notes, in some cases, the creation of certain committees, such as a
nominating and compensation committee, audit committee, or a corporate governance committee,
may be required by listing standards and public securities markets, but in other cases may be
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appropriate to improve efficiency, especially for larger and in more diffuse boards of directors, or
when decisions are required to be made on short notice or require particular expertise not shared
by all members of the board. However, wholesale delegation of authority to a committee to the
point of abdication of responsibility by the full board is inappropriate and undesirable. As noted
in the Official Comment, delegation by a divided board to one faction of the board may usurp basic
board functions and may further enhance such factionalism.
The Official Comment indicates that the prohibitions against delegation are limited, in effect, to
actions that substantially affect the rights of shareholders or are fundamental to the governance of
the corporation. As indicated above, these principles are also applied in the CBCA and OBCA, as
well as the DGCL.
In particular, while the directors have the power and authority to manage or supervise the
management of the corporation, in the case of certain fundamental changes, the shareholders are
accorded the power to approve or disapprove of certain of their decisions. Of course, such power
of approval or disapproval cannot be considered to constitute management or supervision of the
management of the corporation. Such power also operates at a very high level of decision-making
and in quite exceptional circumstances.
In summary, however, subject to: firstly, certain requirements as to what powers may not be
delegated; and secondly, to certain requirements of corporate law, securities law, listing or other
authorities and regulators, requiring the existence of certain committees, and their consideration
of stipulated matters; and thirdly, to any restrictions in the charter documents; the power of the
board to fashion the structure by which the corporation is organized is essentially unlimited. This
recognizes the enabling nature of corporate statutes, and the principle that the directors should be
left to devise a structure that they consider appropriate (even if not necessarily the most
appropriate) to the business and affairs of the corporation, and to revise and refine it from time to
time based on their renewed assessments in that behalf.
In addition to limitations on the content of the powers which may be delegated, which may be
described as “substantive” limits, the board, like other delegators of authority, may impose
restrictions as to the means by which delegated powers may be exercised, which may be described
as “procedural” or “processual” limits. Subject to the restrictions just described, the board of
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directors of the corporation is free to delegate power subject to such substantial and to such
processual limitations as it may think appropriate.
Consequently, the board may configure and reconfigure the organization of the corporation as it
considers appropriate in order to accomplish its goals and objectives. The corporate statutes make
clear that the board’s freedom and authority in this regard extends not only to its personnel, but
also to its structure and processes. As we have maintained previously, these “central management”
powers and responsibilities are consistent with other corporate essentialist attributes.
The separation of management from equity ownership (“management ownership separation”)
ensures that equity owners are not disadvantaged as a result of the corporation having to change
its organization as a result only of a change in equity ownership. A partnership may have to change
its internal organization as a result of the departure from the partnership of one partner, requiring
formation of a new partnership, if it is desired to continue the business. Because partners who
depart are unable to take part in the management of partnership business, the departure of one
partner may require a reconfiguration of the partnership’s structure, processes, and personnel. For
example, the manager responsibilities of the departing partner may have to be assigned to another
existing or to a new partner. This may require a reconfiguration of the partnership’s structure and
processes. As to its personnel, one member of management departs and may or may not be replaced
by another, who may or may not be an equity owner.
In a partnership, it may not be possible to transfer an equity interest except by transmission of law.
It can readily be seen that permitting the transfer of an equity interest of a general partner would,
on its face, permit the new partner to take part in the management of the partnership business,
without the consent and approval of the other general partners.
Of course, such transfers are possible in the case of limited partnerships, where limited partners
are not able to participate in the management of the limited partnership business. In such cases,
the general partner and the other limited partners need not be concerned about the management
capabilities and capacities of the new limited partner, his or her interest in participating in
management, and the effect of such participation on management otherwise, including such
matters as divisions of powers and authorities, and the extent of cooperation and collegiality to be
expected in the event of such management participation.
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Capital lock-in, in the case of the corporation, prevents withdrawals of capital which might impact
the corporation’s capacity to carry on its business and which might require it to change its structure,
such as by going out of a particular line of business or selling a division; its operating processes,
such as eliminating intracorporate purchases or sales as a result of the termination of a particular
line of business or divestment of a particular division; and its personnel, such as by way of layoffs
of management and other employees. As noted in Chapter One in the discussion of transferable
equity interests and capital lock-in as an essential legal attribute, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout
have emphasized the importance of capital lock-in with respect to investment in specialized assets
and development of a specialized organization the benefits of which are expected to accrue to the
corporation only when measured over a long term.14
Accordingly, centering management authority in the board of directors and separating
management authority from equity ownership not only permits the board to “organize” the
corporation as it sees fit, in terms of its structure, processes, and personnel, but is also consistent
with the other essential legal attributes of the corporation. Thus, it is an expression of corporate
legal essentialism.
Board Appointment of Chief Executive Officer, Other Officers, and Other Management
Most modern corporate statutes provide for the appointment of officers. For example, the CBCA15
and the OBCA16, in effect, state that subject to the articles, the by-laws or any unanimous
shareholder agreement, the directors may designate the offices of the corporation, appoint as
officers persons of full capacity, specify their duties, and delegate to them powers to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation, except, in the case of the CBCA, certain prescribed powers
to do anything referred to in subsection 115(3); and further, that a director may be appointed to
any office of the corporation; and two or more offices of the corporation may be held by the same
person.17 The board’s ability to delegate these powers was discussed in the immediately preceding
section.
Two of the most significant of the articles in which they have explored these issues are Margaret M Blair, “Locking
in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century” (2003) 51:2 UCLA L
Rev 387 at 388-89; Lynn A Stout, “On the Nature of Corporations” (2005) 2005:1 U Ill L Rev 255 at 255-6.
15
CBCA, supra note 1, s 121.
16
OBCA, supra note 1, s 133.
17
CBCA, supra note 1, s 121. The excepted powers are those referred in s. 115 (3) of the CBCA relating to higher
order matters affecting shareholders and share capital. These matters are also not delegable to a committee of directors,
except as authorized by the full board.
14
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The modern corporate law model assumes that the board (or some committee or delegate thereof)
appoints the officers of the corporation and determines their duties and powers. Subsection 142 (a)
of the Delaware statute provides, inter alia, that “[e]very corporation organized under this chapter
shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution
of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws”; and that “[a]ny number of
offices may be held by the same person unless the certificate of incorporation or bylaws otherwise
provide.” S. 142 (b) states that “[o]fficers shall be chosen in such manner and shall hold their
offices for such terms as are prescribed by the bylaws or determined by the board of directors or
other governing body.”18
In effect, s. 142 (b) of the DGCL permits the bylaws or the board (or other governing body) to
empower the selection of officers otherwise than by selection by the board of directors. It is
possible for the bylaws or the board to authorize the CEO (or any other officer) to determine what
offices should be appointed and to authorize such CEO (or other officer) to determine what persons
should be appointed to which offices, as officers of the corporation.
Section 8.40 of the MBCA provides, inter alia, that “[a] corporation has the offices described in
its bylaws or designated by the board of directors in accordance with the bylaws”; that “[t]he board
of directors may elect individuals to fill one or more offices of the corporation; that an officer may
appoint one or more officers if authorized by the bylaws or the board of directors”; and that “[t]he
same individual may simultaneously hold more than one office in a corporation”.19
Accordingly, unlike the Canadian statutes, the DGCL and the MBCA both permit the bylaws or
the board of directors to authorize the CEO (or any other officer) to create the offices and to appoint
officers. Section 8.41 of the MBCA also expressly permits the board, subject to, and to the extent
consistent with, the bylaws, to authorize an officer to prescribe the duties of other officers, saying
that “[e]ach officer has the authority and shall perform the duties set forth in the bylaws or, to the
extent consistent with the bylaws, the duties prescribed by the board of directors or by direction of
an officer authorized by the board of directors to prescribe the duties of other officers.” 20 The
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DGCL, supra note 2, § 142.
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authority of the duly authorized officer making the appointment to prescribe the duties of the
officer so appointed is not expressly dealt with, but, rather, is implicit, in the DGCL provision.
Consequently, it appears that under both American statutes, the CEO could be accorded authority
to determine what offices should be appointed, what their duties should be, and what persons
should be appointed to such offices. Consequently, the CEO might be authorized by the board to
appoint all subordinate officers. Alternatively, the CEO could be authorized by the board to
appoint all officers who are his or her direct reports, and the officers who report directly to the
CEO could be authorized to appoint, in turn, officers who report directly to them, for example.
Indeed, the officer authorized to appoint other officers need not be the CEO at all and the
appointments made need not relate to the function otherwise (that is to say, except for such
appointment authority) performed by the officer receiving delegation to make such appointments.
It appears, however, that the duties of officers must be prescribed, if not by the board, then by
direction of an officer authorized by the board to do so. While it is not free from doubt, this may
allow an officer authorized by the board, who might be the CEO, to prescribe the duties of other
officers and may also permit an officer authorized by the board to direct some officer or officers
to prescribe the duties of other subordinate officers. It does not seem to be necessary that the
appointing officer be the hierarchical superior, in terms of reporting, of the officer appointed. The
limits of these powers are not clear, however, as it appears, that there are no cases of relevance
discussing this provision.21 It is thought that the body or officer who appoints such officer (or, the
author would suggest, the body or officer who delegates such right of appointment) must ordinarily
approve the removal of that officer.22
Methods, and Evidence, of Appointment of Officers
It is not clear how prevalent is the practice of officers appointing other officers. For example,
section 5.2 of the bylaws of Alphabet Inc. (formerly Google Inc.) provides that the board “shall
appoint the officers of the corporation except such officers as may be appointed in accordance with
the provisions of Sections 5.3 of these bylaws, subject to the rights, if any, of an officer under any

Richard E Wood, “Hiring, Firing, and Setting the Compensation of Corporate Officers: Who Has the Authority?”
(2006) 19:2 Benefits LJ 77 at 80.
22
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contract of employment.”23 Section 5.3 provides that: “The Board may appoint, or empower the
chief executive officer of the corporation, to appoint, such other officers and agents as the business
of the corporation may require. Each of such officers and agents shall hold office for such period,
have such authority, and perform such duties as are provided in these bylaws or as the Board may
from time to time determine.”24
The effect of those provisions is that the bylaws or the Board, as the case may be, determine which
offices exist, for what period, and the authority and duties of those offices. However, the Board
may empower the CEO to appoint persons to those offices upon the terms determined by the
bylaws or the board of directors. It appears, however, that despite the existence of authority
permitting such appointments, the appointments of executive officers, at least, of Alphabet Inc.
are, as a matter of fact, made or approved by the board.25 Its proxy materials do not indicate
whether or not officers below the executive level are appointed by the board or otherwise. There
appears to be little research or other information on appointment of officers by CEOs of Delaware
corporations or corporations incorporated in states whose incorporation statutes are modelled on
the MBCA.26
Appointments of officers by the board of directors are, of course, memorialized in the minutes of
the board of directors. Indeed, one view is that a person is an officer if appointed by the board as
such, or is an officer if appointed by the board even without specifying such person as an officer.
Thus, a review of the corporate charter (the instrument of incorporation), by-laws, unanimous
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Alphabet Inc, Amended and Restated Bylaws of Alphabet Inc. (effective as of October 2, 2015), online:
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shareholder agreement (for “private” companies) and minutes of the board would normally permit
a determination of the identity and, to at least some degree, the (broad) scope of authority of
officers it appoints.
However, where the CEO or some other officer is permitted to effect the appointment of other
(normally subordinate) officers, no method of such appointment is prescribed, at least in the
statute, and, accordingly, no memorialization in any prescribed form is required by the statute. In
consequence, unless some particular form of appointment and memorialization is prescribed by
the board, non-board appointments of officers, and hence the identity and scope of responsibilities
of such officers, may be more difficult to conclusively determine.
Whatever the original means or instrument of appointment, the amendment or revocation of such
an appointment is not specifically required to be effected in any prescribed manner. As a result,
such changes may be effected orally by the appointing officer and, perhaps in some circumstances,
by the delegate or delegates of such appointing officer. The appointing officer might even appoint
one person to supervise the officer concerned, and retain or delegate to another person entirely
(that is, a person who is not the supervisor) the power to amend or revoke such appointment or
authority. This may be found to present significant evidentiary problems in particular cases.
It can be easily seen, as well, that, to a much greater extent even than a board appointment,
appointment of officers by a CEO or other authorized officer or officers introduces a possibility of
overlapping, duplicative, or conflicting authorities among officers. While there are many other
cogent reasons to permit such non-board appointments, this fact alone makes assignment of
responsibility by officers in concrete instances, certainly ex post, and often even ex ante, somewhat
problematic. This may be important in situations in which the corporation is found liable for some
tortious, criminal or quasi-criminal, or other, action or inaction, and some assignment of blame,
legally or even just internally, to the “responsible” individual officer(s) is sought to be effected.
Of course, these factors may also complicate “after-action” reviews which are initiated for the
purpose of avoiding problems of the relevant nature in the future.
Even where officers are formally appointed by the board of directors, it is often argued that the
senior most officer of the corporation, today normally denominated as the “Chief Executive
Officer” or CEO, effectively controls the appointment of all other officers. It is maintained that the
CEO determines what officers shall be appointed in terms of positions and persons, and that this
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is part of his or her determination of the structure of the internal organization of the corporation.
Some observers argue that the board is not normally in a position to determine the best way to
structure the corporation’s internal organizational structure, nor, further, to identify and to assess
the candidates and their suitability for particular positions, because the directors lack the detailed
knowledge required. Such observers often argue that the CEO seeks to control such information
in order to ensure that only he or she possesses the information relevant to such determinations.27
Whether or not these observations are correct, there is no doubt that the most senior members of
the management of a corporation (which we will refer to as the “top management team” or “TMT”)
are expected to work closely with the CEO in performing their duties and responsibilities. As such,
it is generally recognized that the CEO should have at least a significant, if not decisive or
determinative, role with respect to their selection, duties and responsibilities, and tenure and
termination of office. Thus, there may be a discrepancy between formal authority, power, or
influence, which may reside in the board of directors, and actual authority, power, or influence,
which may reside in the CEO and, in some cases, in other members of the TMT.
Apparent or Ostensible Authority of Directors, Officers, and Others
Subsections 18 (1) and 18 (2) (d) of the CBCA and section 19 (d) of the OBCA each provide, in
effect, that no corporation and no guarantor of an obligation of the corporation may assert against
a person dealing with the corporation or against a person who acquired rights from the corporation
that a person held out by a corporation as a director, officer, or agent (or, in the case of the CBCA,
a mandatary) of the corporation has not been duly appointed or has no authority to exercise the
powers and perform the duties that are customary in the business of the corporation or usual for a
director, officer or agent (or, in the case of the CBCA, a mandatary), except where the person has
or ought to have: in the case of the CBCA, knowledge of a situation described in subsection 18
(1); or, in the case of the OBCA, by virtue of the person’s position with or relationship to the
corporation, to that effect.
These provisions quantify and expand the indoor management rule insofar as it relates to outsiders
being able to rely on the ostensible authority of persons purporting to act on behalf of the
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corporation.28 As is well known, that rule was established in 1856 in the case of Royal British Bank
v. Turquand.29
The Official Comment on the authority of officers’ provision in section 8.41 of the MBCA
acknowledges that, in addition to their statutory authority, corporate officers may be clothed with
apparent or ostensible authority by reason of corporate conduct on which other persons may
reasonably rely. Professor Deborah DeMott, who was the Reporter for the Restatement of the Law,
Third, Agency 2006,30 does not refer to any provisions of either the DGCL or the MBCA which
deal with apparent or ostensible authority, which subjects are, however, dealt with in the
Restatement.31
Remuneration of Directors, Officers, and Others
Section 125 of the CBCA and section 137 of the OBCA provide that subject to the articles, the
bylaws or any unanimous shareholder agreement, the directors of the corporation may fix the
remuneration of directors, officers and employees of the corporation.
In the case of the DGCL, section 141 (h) provides that unless otherwise restricted by the certificate
of incorporation or bylaws, the board of directors has authority to fix the compensation of directors.
It makes no provision with respect to the compensation of officers.
Section 8.11 of the MBCA empowers the Board of Directors to fix the compensation of directors,
unless the articles are bylaws provide otherwise. However, Chapter 8 of the MBCA does not
contain any similar provision with respect to compensation of officers.
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Accordingly, since the board is empowered to appoint officers under both the DGCL and the
MBCA, the power to fix their compensation must be considered to be a necessary corollary of the
appointment power.
Of course, the effect of these provisions is that the board as a whole has authority to fix the
compensation of directors, and in the CBCA and OBCA, that of officers and employees. Those
provisions, then, determine what authority within the corporation may take action to legally bind
the corporation in such respect. These provisions recognize, however, that while the board may
not be disempowered, as a matter of corporate law, from determining compensation for the
stipulated classes of persons, this may have been effected, as a practical legal matter, by legally
binding contractual provisions entered into between the corporation, as a legal entity, and an
individual director, officer, or employee, as the case may be. While the board might determine to
compensate an officer otherwise than in accordance with his or her contract, and this would be
legally binding on the corporation as a matter of corporate law, it would result in the corporation
being in breach of its legally binding agreement with such officer, as a matter of contract law.
Where the board or its delegate (the “board”, in this section) appoints or determines the
compensation of a director or an officer, the board is acting as the ultimate decision-making
authority of the corporation in respect of the relationship between the individual director or officer,
as the case may be, and the corporation. For example, if there are seven directors, denominated for
the purpose of this example as individuals A through G inclusive, when the board, comprised of
individuals A through G acting as the board of directors as the corporation, determines the
compensation of A (or any other director) as a director (assuming, for purpose of this example,
that it, and A, can do so within the conflict rules applicable), it is making a decision on behalf of
the corporation as a legal entity vis-à-vis that individual, considering that individual as a party
separate from the corporation. In effect, A through G, as the board, are dealing with A in his or her
capacity as an individual. A, as a member of the board, is involved, then, in making a collective
decision binding the corporation in respect of A’s rights and obligations to the corporation, and its
correlative rights and obligations to him.
This can be analyzed as involving a distinction between A’s collective identity as part of the board,
and his individual identity as a director, (notionally) separate from the board and the corporation.
In effect, A is acting as a member of the collective decision-making authority for the corporation,
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the board, and separately, individually, as a person or party engaging in legal relations with the
corporation. As will be outlined below in connection with the corporative perspective developed
in this work, directors and officers, and employees generally, may be considered both as external
third parties with whom the corporation deals as a single legal entity, and constituents of its internal
organization, which instantiates and animates the corporation as an actor in relation to other actors.
This chapter investigates the means by which the essential attributes of the corporation, as a legal
entity acting as such “in the real world”, are instantiated in the corporation as a matter of corporate
law, thereby affecting its internal organizational attributes, including its structure, processes, and
personnel. The issue of remuneration for directors, officers, and employees of the corporation, and
the example mentioned above each draw attention to the attributes of the organization that animates
or instantiates the corporation as an actor in the real world. Those organizational attributes are
affected by, and also enact, instantiate, or operationalize its essentialist attributes or some of them,
in some respects. Those are explored further in this chapter.
Removal and Resignation of Officers
Neither Part X of the CBCA nor Part IX of the OBCA deal with the removal or resignation of
officers. However, the board’s power to appoint officers is considered to implicitly include the
power to replace incumbent officers. More generally, however, a power of appointment is usually
considered to include the power to revoke or terminate such appointment.32 Under section 141 (b)
of the DGCL, each officer holds office until such officer’s successor is elected and qualified or
until the earlier resignation (at any time upon written notice) or removal of such officer.
Section 8.43 of the MBCA provides that an officer may resign at any time by delivering notice to
the corporation, which time it is effective unless a later effective time is specified. An officer can
also be removed either by the board; by the officer who appointed such officer, unless the bylaws
or the board provide otherwise; or by any other officer authorized by the bylaws or the board. As
indicated in the Official Comment, while an employment agreement with an officer is binding on
the corporation, the refusal of a board to appoint or renew the appointment of such officer entitles
the person to sue for damages but not for specific performance of the contract. Likewise, section
8.44 provides that the appointment of an officer does not of itself create contract rights; removal
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of an officer does not affect the officer’s rights, if any with the corporation; and resignation of an
officer does not affect, the corporation’s contract rights, if any, with the officer.
As in the case of remuneration, the validity of the removal or resignation of an officer, as a matter
of corporate law, are not completely determinative of the rights of the respective parties. Instead,
the agreements between the officer and the corporation will determine the rights and obligations
of the parties, whether or not any breach has taken place, and the consequences as a matter of
contract law, agency law, common law, and other statutory law. While corporate law may
determine the position of the officer or former officer as a representative of the corporation, when
acting on its behalf, as a legal actor, vis-à-vis other legal actors, in respect of the relationship
between the officer and the corporation, corporate law may be determinative of the presence or
absence of officer status but is arguably less important, in terms of that relationship, than contract
or other legal specifications.
Considering the position of the officer vis-à-vis the internal organization of the corporation and
vis-à-vis other internal constituents, it can readily be seen that a change of officer status does not
necessarily involve organizational consequences. That is to say, someone who is in charge of the
manufacturing function at a certain corporation who resigns or is removed as “Vice-President,
Manufacturing” does not automatically thereby lose his or her role as the person in charge of the
manufacturing function. Such a change resonates in the “external” or “legal” structure of the
corporation as a legal actor, but not necessarily in its “internal” or “organizational” structure.
On the other hand, the promotion of the same individual to “Senior Vice-President,
Manufacturing” may have some external or legal consequences, but may or may not have any
internal or organizational consequences in terms of the role as senior-most person in the
manufacturing function. That is not to say, however, that enhancements in prestige, income, and
other accompaniments of the position may not accrue as a result of the new appointment. At the
same time, if the subject individual is only formally in charge of that function, and another
individual exercises informal authority and, as a result, is “really” in charge of the function, this
change in status vis-à-vis the corporation as legal actor might even be entirely bereft of
organizational consequences. These distinctions will be explored further in later parts of the book.
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Part C – DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Statutory Duties under Corporate Law
Some corporate statutes do not distinguish between the statutory duties and standards of
performance of such duties imposed on directors and those imposed on officers. This is the case
in the CBCA and the OBCA. The duties imposed on officers, namely, a duty of good faith, and a
duty of care, and a duty of compliance with corporate law, and the standards of conduct imposed
in that regard, are the same for officers as for directors.33 This approach is discussed further in
Chapter A3 under the heading “The Representative Role of the Board”.
The Delaware corporate statute does not impose any specific statutory duties on officers nor
prescribe any standards for the conduct of any duties of officers. Accordingly, the duties of officers
under Delaware law arise at common law, most notably under agency law and by analogy from
the law of trusts, and by contract. However, s. 141 (e) fully protects directors in the performance
of their duties “in relying upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions,
reports or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or
employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to matters of the
member reasonably believes are within such other persons professional or expert competence and
who has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.” Although the
statute does not create an affirmative duty on officers or employees in this regard, it does permit
reliance by directors if such officers or employees did have a duty, whether explicit or implicit.
In the case of the MBCA, the standards of conduct for officers are prescribed in section 8.42.
Under subsection 8.42 (a), an officer, when performing in such capacity, is required to act in good
faith; with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar
circumstances; and in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation. Since an officer may act in a personal capacity, these duties apply only when such
person is acting as an officer. These duties are similar to the duties of directors under the MBCA.
However, unlike the DGCL, the MBCA imposes an explicit ordinary course reporting duty and a
“whistle blower” duty on officers. Subsection 8.42 (b) specifies that “[t]he duty of an officer
includes the obligation: (1) to inform the superior officer to whom, or the board of directors or the
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committee thereof to which, the officer reports of information about the affairs of the corporation
known to the officer, within the scope of the officer's functions, and known to the officer to be
material to such superior officer, board or committee; and (2) to inform his or her superior officer,
or another appropriate person within the corporation, or the board of directors, or a committee
thereof, of any actual or probable material violation of law involving the corporation or material
breach of duty to the corporation by an officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, that the
officer believes has occurred or is about to occur.”
The first duty, the obligation of an officer to report information about the affairs of the corporation
that is within the scope of that officer’s functions known about officer, and known by that officer
to be material to that officer’s direct report, is highly significant. It obligates officers to
communicate material information within the scope of his or her functions to the officer, board, or
committee to which such officer reports. The objective, then, is to ensure that, as a matter of
corporate law, material information is communicated to each successively higher level of the
organization to facilitate proper decision-making and supervision, including varying any
outstanding, or introducing any new, remedial or other instructions.
The duty to inform set forth in s. 8.42 (b) (2), the so-called “whistle-blowing” duty, was introduced
in the 2006 revisions of the MBCA, in response to various situations in which such provisions
might have had some utility, and to the introduction of such a duty in securities law. In particular,
the provision seeks to mitigate or avoid “Enron-type situations” involving wrongdoings that were
uncovered only after the fact.34
Subsection 8.42 (c) specifies that “[i]n discharging his or her duties, an officer who does not have
knowledge that makes reliance unwarranted is entitled to rely on: (1) the performance of properly
delegated responsibilities by one or more employees of the corporation whom the officer
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in performing the responsibilities delegated; or
(2) information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other financial
data, prepared or presented by one or more employees of the corporation whom the officer
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented or by legal counsel,
public accountants, or other persons retained by the corporation as to matters involving skills or
Balotti, R Franklin, & Megan W Shaner, “Safe Harbor for Officer Reliance: Comparing the Approaches of The
Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware's General Corporation Law” (2011) 74:1. Law & Contemp Probs 161
at 163.
34
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expertise the officer reasonably believes are matters: (i) within the particular person's professional
or expert competence or (ii) as to which the particular person merits confidence.”
The Official Comment in relation to the latter provision states that:
The proper delegation of responsibilities by an officer, separate and apart from the exercise of
judgment as to the delegatee's reliability and competence, is concerned with the procedure
employed. This will involve, in the usual case, sufficient communication to the end that the
delegatee understands the scope of the assignment and, in turn, manifests to the officer a
willingness and commitment to undertake its performance. The entitlement to rely upon
employees assumes that a delegating officer will maintain a sufficient level of communication
with the officer's subordinates to fulfill his or her supervisory responsibilities. The definition
of "employee" in section 1.40(8) includes an officer; accordingly, section 8.42 contemplates
the delegation of responsibilities to other officers as well as to nonofficer employees.

In effect, since every officer is obliged to “report up” material information that is within scope,
and since every officer is entitled to “rely down” on employees to perform responsibilities that are
properly delegated to them provided that the officer reasonably believes them to be reliable and
competent in performing such responsibilities, every officer, as well as every director, is entitled
to assume that material information will be transmitted to the appropriate level and that
responsibilities properly delegated to persons reasonably believed to be reliable and competent
will be duly performed. As the Official Comment suggests, this may involve not only appropriate
supervision but also communication of relevant information by the superior officer to the inferior
officer as and when required or appropriate.
Subsection 8.42 (d) states that “[a]n officer shall not be liable to the corporation or its shareholders
for any decision to take or not to take action, or any failure to take any action, as an officer, if the
duties of the office are performed in compliance with this section. Whether an officer who does
not comply with this section shall have liability will depend in such instance on applicable law,
including those principles of section 8.31 that have relevance.” Officer liability to the corporation
or the shareholders does not feature prominently in many discussions of corporate law, however,
as the Official Comment notes:
In some cases, failure to observe relevant standards of conduct can give rise to an officer's
liability to the corporation or its shareholders. A court review of challenged conduct will
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involve an evaluation of the particular facts and circumstances in light of applicable law.
In this connection, subsection (d) recognizes that relevant principles of section 8.31, such
as duties to deal fairly with the corporation and its shareholders and the challenger's burden
of establishing proximately caused harm, should be taken into account. In addition, the
business judgment rule will normally apply to decisions within an officer's discretionary
authority. Liability to others can also arise from an officer's own acts or omissions (e.g.,
violations of law or tort claims) and, in some cases, an officer with supervisory
responsibilities can have risk exposure in connection with the acts or omissions of others.
Despite these obligations of declaratory law, however, in their work examining the fiduciary duties
of officers, Lyman Johnson and David Millon concluded that, historically, officers appear not to
have been sued for fiduciary wrongdoing in such capacity.35 Of course, officers who are also
directors may have been sued in their capacity as directors. This will be discussed further below.
Duties at Common Law
The common law imposes certain duties on officers of a corporation. Where the officer is an
employee of the corporation, those duties may extend beyond those imposed on employees
generally. For example, senior officers have common law duties not to compete with the
corporation, not to disclose information which is confidential to the corporation, and not to pursue
corporate opportunities.36
All officers and all employees have a common law duty of loyalty, that is, a duty to act in good
faith with respect to the corporation; and a duty of care. These duties arise from agency law and
are discussed in greater detail in Chapter A3. For example, according to Johnson and Millon, the
duty of loyalty includes not acting adversely to the principal without consent; not acting on behalf
of one with interests adverse to the principal without consent; not competing with the principal;
not wrongly appropriating a corporate opportunity; providing an accounting to the principal for
profits; and not using or wrongly communicating confidential information.37
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In the case of officers, the duty of loyalty may go further than requiring the officer not to betray
the interests of the corporation, but may also extend to a more affirmative duty to act solely in the
interests of the corporation in that capacity.38As Johnson and Millon indicate, this would require
an officer to advance the well-being of the corporation, not simply to refrain from harming it.39
Breach of duty by an officer or employee may result in liability. A review of the circumstances in
which such liability may arise is beyond the scope of the present discussion. As in the case of
breaches of statutory duty, breaches of common law duties of officers are not often the subject of
litigation. Johnson and Millon posit four possible reasons for this: Firstly, most breaches of officer
duties are dealt with internally, by intracorporate sanction, such as discharge, reprimand,
adjustment of compensation, demotion, or delayed promotion, and most discharges of officers
involved severance packages which also include releases of claims. Secondly, lawyers for
shareholders, for boards, and even judges, may not (fully) appreciate the distinctive fiduciary
obligations owed by officers to the corporation’s agents, which arise separately from and in
addition to any contract obligations. Thirdly, there is a lack of knowledge of agency law principles,
which are relevant to the duties of persons who are only officers, but which are not the subject of
attention where an officer is also a director. Fourthly, until the nineteen eighties, the majority of
most boards of directors were also officers. Thus, litigation against officers as such was relatively
unusual.40
The “fiduciary” duties of directors and of officers, as agents, and otherwise, are discussed in
Chapter A3 below.
Indemnification of Officers
As indicated above, under sections 124 of the CBCA and 136 of the OBCA, the provisions relating
to indemnification permitted by a corporation of a current or former officer are the same as with
respect to a current or former director and, accordingly, generally require compliance with the duty
of good faith. Again, as indicated above, section 145 of the DGCL also permits the indemnification
of directors and officers in the same circumstances, but also extends the scope of permitted
indemnification to employees and agents.
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In effect, officers who are not directors may be, and are entitled to be, indemnified to the same
extent as a director, and may even be indemnified beyond the director level, subject to stated limits.
Importantly, there can be no indemnification for liabilities, in effect, arising in connection with
wrongful acts with respect to the corporation (other than for expenses of the proceeding
concerned), improper receipt of financial benefits, intentional infliction of harm to the corporation
or the shareholders, or for an intentional violation of criminal law. An officer who is also a director
benefits from both sets of indemnification rights if the conduct that is the subject of the proceedings
relates solely to acts in the capacity of an officer.
Section 8.56 (a) of the MBCA provides for indemnification of officers in great detail, saying that
“[a] corporation may indemnify and advance expenses under this subchapter to an officer of the
corporation who is a party to a proceeding because he or she is an officer of the corporation: (1) to
the same extent as a director; and (2) if he or she is an officer but not a director, to such further
extent as may be provided by the articles of incorporation, the bylaws, a resolution of the board of
directors, or contract except for: (A) liability in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of
the corporation other than for expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding or (B) liability
arising out of conduct that constitutes (i) receipt by the officer of a financial benefit to which he or
she is not entitled, (ii) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders, or
(iii) an intentional violation of criminal law.
Sections (b) and (c) further provide that: “(b) The provisions of subsection (a) (2) shall apply to an
officer who is also a director if the basis on which he or she is made a party to the proceeding is an act
or omission solely as an officer”; and “(c) An officer of a corporation who is not a director is entitled
to mandatory indemnification under section 8.52, and may apply to a court under section 8.54 for
indemnification or an advance for expenses, in each case to the same extent to which a director may
be entitled to indemnification or advance for expenses under those provisions.

The differences between director and officer indemnification in the DGCL may be considered to
reflect the greater capacity for officers to engage in self-dealing, at least in terms of appropriating
and awarding financial benefits, as well as their greater capacity to inflict intentional harm on the
corporation or its shareholders, and to intentionally breach criminal laws. In each of these cases,
officers, employees and agents may have greater opportunities to engage in conduct which is not
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observed by others or, if observed, is ignored or not reported, or to collude with others in the
organization.
As is discussed under the two previous headings and in Chapter A3 below, the positions of director
and officer are not directly comparable. Directors are not agents. Agents are required to act in
accordance with the limitations on their authority and other terms of their agency arrangements.
They are also required to act in accordance with the lawful instructions of their principal. This is
the case with officers, who are required to comply with instructions of the board of directors, and
if applicable, duly authorized more senior officers. They are “agents” of the corporation.
However, if and to the extent that directors are hypothesized as agents of the corporation, there is
no other party who is empowered to give them instructions. Instead, directors are “agents” only in
the sense that they are the individual persons having the capacity, and having been granted the
authority, to act on behalf of the corporation. The statutes reviewed empower the directors to
manage or supervise the business and affairs of the corporation.
While the scope of directors to manage the corporation may be restricted under some statutes, such
as in Delaware, such that this might be considered to be part of the arrangements under which they
are required to operate, this is not the case under most statutes. The restrictions on board authority
and the consequent assumption of directorial rights and obligations that arise with respect to
unanimous shareholder agreements do not apply in the case of public corporations, which is the
predominant concern of this work. This subject will be further explored in Chapter Four.
The MBCA does not expressly provide for indemnification of employees or agents, according to
the Official Comment, “because the concerns of self-dealing that arise when directors provide for
their own indemnification and expense advance (and sometimes for senior executive officers) are
not present when directors (or officers) provide for indemnification and expense advance for
employees and agents who are not directors or officers.” As the comment suggests, the self-dealing
argument is more applicable to more senior officers, however determined, than to officers more
generally. The Official Comment also argues that “the rights of employees and agents to
indemnification and advance for expenses derive from principles of agency, the doctrine of
respondeat superior, collective bargaining or other contractual arrangements rather than from a
corporation statute. It would be presumptuous for a corporation statute to seek to limit the
indemnification bargain that a corporation may wish to make with those it hires or retains.”
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This is consistent with the observation of the present work that statutory law relating to the
organization of the corporation concerns itself only with the very highest levels of the organization.
This is recognized by the Official Comment in its observation that the “same standard applicable
to directors and officers may not be appropriate for office workers and hazardous waste workers,
brokers and custodians, engineers and farm workers. None of their roles or responsibilities are
prescribed by the Model Act.”
In effect, the MBCA recognizes certain limitations of corporate law in this respect, namely, its
lack of suitability or even incapacity to deal with the structure and processes of the corporation at
anything but the highest levels: in this case, the levels of directors and of officers of the
corporation. It also recognizes that, at those other levels, such matters may be more appropriately
dealt with by means of contract and common law, rather than by corporate and by statutory law.
Instead, as the indemnification example indicates, the corporation’s relationship with, and its
capacity to act by and through, employees and agents is the proper subject of other statutory
enactments and common law principles and case-law. The corporative perspective adopted in this
book will support this attitude to corporate legislation and associated rulemaking.
Generally speaking, corporate law is enabling, and permits corporations subject to its jurisdiction
to devise structures and procedures suitable for them. Indeed, that ability is often highly prized as
conducive to innovation and success. This work will return to these subjects below and in the
chapters following.
PART D - MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RUNNING THE BUSINESS
As discussed, in a corporation of any significant size, the board of directors of the corporation is
not responsible for managing the corporation but, instead, is responsible for supervising or
directing its management. This has been discussed above.
General Matters
The actual management of the corporation is the purview of its properly appointed officers and
employees. The allocation of such responsibility may be determined in part by reference to formal
documents of the corporation, including its articles or certificate of incorporation, its bylaws, the
resolutions of its board of directors, and contracts of employment.
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Where some particular officer is, or some particular officers are, given authority to appoint other
officers, such appointments may be effected by means of some one or more documents or
otherwise. In certain cases, the only evidence of appointment may be a contract of employment
for the officer concerned. In some cases, an officer promoted from within the organization may or
may not be subject to an employment agreement relating to his or her present position, but may be
subject to other more detailed agreements, such as non-disclosure, confidentiality, and other types
of agreements. Where that officer is not an employee of the corporation, the appointment may be
contained in an agency or other agreement between the corporation and the officer concerned.
Consequently, defining the limits of a particular officer’s formal authority, and identifying
relationships among the formal authority of officers may themselves be problematic. However, the
effects of the informal organization on the exercise of real authority may be even more
problematic. These issues, canvassed above, will be discussed in more detail in Part 3 of this work.
Capital
Of course, a major decision for any business is the quantum of capital required, the apportionment
of capital as between debt and equity capital, and the terms and conditions attaching to such capital.
Share Capital
Share Characteristics
Sections 24 of the CBCA and 22 of the OBCA require all shares of the corporation to be without
nominal or par value. Under sections 25 of the CBCA and 23 of the OBCA, subject to the terms
of those sections, the articles, the bylaws and any unanimous shareholder agreement and to any
preemptive rights under section 28 of the CBCA or section 26 of the OBCA, as the case may be,
shares may be issued at such times, to such persons, and for such consideration, as the directors
determine. As to the latter, if so provided in the articles or, in the case of the OBCA only, in a
unanimous shareholder agreement, no shares may be issued unless first offered to shareholders as
provided therein. This is referred to as a “pre-emptive right”. All such shares are non-assessable
and the holders are not liable to the corporation or to its creditors in respect thereof.
Section 151 of the DGCL permits the Corporation to issue shares with the voting and other rights
expressed in the certificate of incorporation or, where expressly authorized in such certificate, in
a board resolution providing for the issuance of such stock. Consequently, what it describes as
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“preferred” or “special” stock may be issued. Section 102 (b) (3) negates pre-emptive rights except
to the extent that such rights are expressly granted in the certificate of incorporation.
Sections 152, 153, and 156 of the DGCL permit the issuance of partly paid or assessable shares,
as well as fully paid and nonassessable shares, and also permits the issuance of shares with or
without par value. Those sections require the board to determine the consideration for the issuance
of the shares, unless the certificate of incorporation requires that the stockholders make such
determination. Under section 161, the directors may issue or take subscriptions for additional
shares of capital stock up to the amount authorized in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation.
Section 2.02 (b) of the MBCA permits the articles to set forth a par value for shares but does
require the same. The general powers of the corporation in section 3.02 include the powers to
borrow money and issue notes, bonds and other obligations, which may be convertible into or
include the option to purchase other securities of the corporation. As previously noted, section 6.01
requires that one or more classes or series of shares have unlimited voting rights and that one or
more classes or series be entitled to receive the net assets of the corporation upon dissolution. One
class or series may have both attributes and more than one class or series may have such attributes.
Under section 6.03, shares possessing both attributes must be outstanding at all times that any
shares are outstanding. Under section 6.30, shareholders do not have a preemptive right to acquire
the corporation’s unissued shares except to the extent that the articles of incorporation so provide.
Section 6.02 permits the corporation to delegate to the board the power to establish terms of a class
or series none of which yet been issued, but these terms must be set forth in an amendment to the
articles of incorporation which is effective before such shares are issued. Although the interests
authorized to be created under section 6.01 are generally “equity” rather than “debt” securities, the
Official Comment notes that it is possible to create classes or series of securities under section 6.01
that have some of the characteristics of debt securities and hence are “hybrid securities”.
The powers of the directors in each of these jurisdictions to issue shares is so extensive that
exercise of such powers, even just by way of increasing the number of shares outstanding, may
affect entitlement to, or exercise of, the most basic rights of shareholders, namely, voting rights
and rights to the remaining property of the corporation upon any termination of its existence.
Consequently, among other things, the directors’ powers may affect or even determine who has
voting control of the corporation. Of course, these powers are subject to constraints, not only
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statutorily but also by way of common law. Some of these constraints are exercisable by action of
the shareholders. This will be dealt with further in the next chapter.
Dividends
As previously noted, under sections 127 of the CBCA and 115 of the OBCA, the directors’ power
to declare dividends cannot be delegated to a managing director or committee of directors. Under
151 (c) of the DGCL, entitlement to dividends must be set forth in the certificate of incorporation
or, if authorized therein, in the board resolution issuing the shares. Section 6.01 (c) states that
articles of incorporation may authorize one or more classes or series of shares that entitle the
holders to distributions, including dividends that may be cumulative, noncumulative, or partially
cumulative. Section 6.40 empowers the board of directors to authorize and the corporation to pay
distributions to shareholders subject to restrictions in the articles of incorporation and the solvency
restriction in subsection 6.40 (c).
The power of the board of directors to declare dividends aligns with its power to manage or
supervise the management of the business of the corporation. It can determine the funds required
to implement its business plan and may declare dividends on classes and series of shares having
no fixed entitlement to dividends and may declare or withhold from declaring (and hence accrue
or accumulate) dividends on classes and series of shares having some fixed entitlement to
dividends. Declaration of dividends invokes various solvency and director liability provisions.
Borrowing
Generally, the board of directors has the power to borrow money on the credit of the corporation
and without authorization of the shareholders. Sections 189 of the CBCA and 184 of the OBCA
each provide that the articles or bylaws or a unanimous shareholder agreement may provide
otherwise. Section 122 (13) of the DGCL provides that every corporation has power to make
contracts, incur liabilities, borrow money, issue notes and bonds and other obligations, and secure
any of its obligations. The general borrowing power of a corporation contained in section 3.02 (7)
of the MBCA, which applies unless its certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, is, of
course, exercised by the directors under section 141 (a) except as provided in such certificate.
Accordingly, unless otherwise restricted, such as by means of its charter documents, the board
enjoys complete statutory power and authority to determine the capital structure, both as to equity
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capital and as to debt. Creating new classes of shares may involve amending the charter documents,
which may invoke shareholder approval. Some classes of shares which have a fixed preferential
right to dividends which accrue if not declared may limit the ability of the board to declare
dividends on the common shares, and this limitation may be attenuated when the dividend
obligation is in arrears. The corporation may also determine to issue debt which has rights of
conversion into equity, or debt which is accompanied by rights to acquire equity. Except as limited
by other general and specific duties, the board has complete authority in this regard.
Conflicts of Interest
Modern business corporation statutes attempt to constrain possible opportunities for self-dealing
by directors and officers. One mechanism for this is a requirement that directors and officers
declare their interests in significant contracts or transactions. Among other things, this permits the
directors or the non-interested directors where the declarant is a director to take such matters into
account in assessing the reasoning and possible biases attendant upon, and the appropriateness of,
the contract or transaction. However, it does rely upon the non-conflicted directors to avoid any
possible bias or favouritism towards the declaring director.
Such mechanisms also attempt to constrain self-dealing by rotation or exchange, for example,
whereby one director or group of directors is permitted some benefit by way of a conflict of interest
on the understanding or expectation that similar treatment will be accorded the non-conflicted
director(s) or officer(s) in other situations.
At the same time, these mechanisms recognize that it may be advisable and in the best interests of
the corporation for a corporation to be able to take advantage of a contract or other arrangement in
which someone or more directors are interested, provided, that is, that there are other nonconflicted directors who may consider an approve it, and, if there are not, that the contract is
approved by the shareholders. This recognizes the collective responsibility of the board of directors
and provides an alternative to absolute prohibition of such contracts or arrangements.41
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Constraining such self-dealing is, of course, necessary and appropriate in view of the plenary
powers of management assigned to the board of directors and its delegates. Only those having such
management authority may be expected to acquire knowledge of, and the ability to restrain, such
self-aggrandizement at the expense of the corporation. Shareholder authority with respect to the
appointment of directors (and related matters) is not only of limited relevance, but operates only
ex post facto; and, thus, is of limited utility ex ante the impugned conduct. However, the prospect
of shareholder approval of conflict transactions based upon full and complete information raises
for consideration the question of the interrelationship between the management prerogative of the
board of directors and the oversight rights of shareholders, many other instances of which will be
considered in the immediately following chapter.
The common law on the subject evolved considerably from an American rule of absolute
prohibition in the nineteenth century. Harold Marsh, Jr. indicates that by 1910 the general rule in
the United States was that a contract between a director and the corporation which he was a director
was valid if approved by a disinterested majority of his fellow directors and, if challenged by the
court a court was not found to be unfair or fraudulent; however, the contract in which a majority
of directors was interested was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its shareholders.42
According to Marsh, by 1960 the general rule in the United States was that no transaction between
a corporation and any or all of its directors was automatically voidable at the instance of a
shareholder, whether or not approved by a disinterested majority of the board; but that a court
review such a contract and would invalidate it if it was found under rigid and careful scrutiny to
be unfair to the corporation.43 By that time, however, statutory intervention had taken or was taking
place in a number of states.44
Sections 120 of the CBCA and 132 of the OBCA require a director or officer to disclose to the
corporation the nature and extent of any interest that he or she has in a material contract or a
material transaction, actual or proposed, with the corporation if the director or officer is a party to
the same, if the director or officer acts in a similar capacity of such party or, in the case of the
CBCA, has a material interest in such party. Such disclosure must be made, generally, at the first
meeting at which the proposed contract or transactions is first considered, or, if not then interested,
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at the first meeting after he or she becomes interested, or, if he or she becomes interested after the
contract is made or transaction entered into, at the first meeting after he or she become so
interested.
Of course, since an officer who is not also a director may not know that a contract or transaction
or proposed contract or transaction is to be, is being, or has been considered, at a meeting of
directors, declarations of interest by interested persons who are only officers and not directors are
required to be made after the officer becomes aware that the contract or transaction or proposed
contract or transaction is to be, or has been, considered a meeting of directors. Where such contract
is one that, in the ordinary course of the corporation’s business would not require approval by the
directors or shareholders, the director or officer must disclose it in writing to the corporation or
request have it entered in the minutes of the meetings of the board or its committees, as the case
may be.
Unless it relates to remuneration, indemnity or insurance, or is with an affiliate, both statutes
provide that such director shall not vote on any resolution to approve the contract or transaction
and, in the case of the OBCA, shall not attend any part of a meeting of directors during which the
contract or transaction is discussed. In the latter case, if this results in no quorum, the remaining
directors are deemed to constitute a quorum; and if all directors are so interested, the contract or
transaction may be approved only by the shareholders. Both statutes provide for the giving of a
continuing disclosure that the relevant director or officer is a director or officer of or has a material
interest in a specified person.
Upon approval of the contract or transaction after the prescribed disclosure of interest, the director
or officer is not accountable to the corporation or its shareholders for any profit or gain realized
from the contract or transaction, and the contract or transaction is neither void nor voidable by
reason only of that relationship or being counted in the quorum, provided that the contract or
transaction was reasonable and fair to the corporation at the time it was so approved.
Both statutes provide, further, that, in spite of any failure to comply with the disclosure of interest
requirements, a director or officer is not accountable for any profit from the contract or transaction,
and it is not invalid, by reason only of such interest, provided that such contract or transaction is
approved or confirmed by special resolution at a meeting of shareholders, after disclosure of the
interest to them “in a manner sufficient indicate its nature” and if it was “reasonable and fair to the
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corporation when it was approved and confirmed”. Thus, while the directors may approve a
director-interested contract or transaction if reasonable and fair to the corporation, the shareholders
may do so even if the same is not reasonable and fair to the corporation.
Section 144 of the DGCL does not deal with the issue of accountability by directors or officers
with respect to contracts in which they are interested, but deals only with contracts or transactions
between a corporation and one or more of its directors or officers; or between a corporation and
any other corporation, partnership, association or organization of which one or more of its directors
or officers are directors or officers or in which they have a financial interest.
Such contracts or transactions are not void or voidable solely for that reason, nor solely because
such director or officer is present at, participates in, or votes at a meeting of the board or committee
which authorizes the contract or transaction, provided that the material facts as to the relationship
or interest and as to the contract or transaction are known or disclosed to the board, the committee,
or the shareholders; and the contract or transaction is authorized or approved in good faith; and is
fair as to the corporation as of the time of such authorization, approval or ratification.
Section 8.61 (b) of the MBCA provides, in effect, that a “director’s conflicting interest transaction”
may not be enjoined, rescinded or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions against the
director on the grounds that the director has an interest respecting the transaction, provided that
the director’s actions comply with section 8.62, or the shareholders’ actions comply with section
8.63, or the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the relevant time, is established
to have been fair to the corporation.
All the relevant terms are defined in section 8.60, including a “director’s conflicting interest
transaction” which involves a transaction affected or proposed to be effected by the corporation to
which the director is a party, or respecting which the director had knowledge and had a material
interest therein known to the director, or respecting which, the relevant time, the director knew
that a related person was a party or had a material financial interest. The term “material financial
interest” is defined to mean “a financial interest in a transaction that would reasonably be expected
to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment when participating in action on the
authorization of the transaction”. The term “related person” is broadly defined to include a spouse
and various relatives, and an entity controlled by them, or by the director. The “required
disclosure” means disclosure of the existence and nature of the director’ s conflicting interest and
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“all facts known to the director respecting the subject matter of the transaction that a director free
of such conflicting interest would reasonably believe to be material in deciding whether to proceed
with the transaction”.
The MBCA provisions are drafted so as to align, generally, with securities law and stock exchange
listing requirements with respect to directors, and hence are somewhat more detailed than
equivalent provisions in the other statutes, except, of course, that its provisions do not apply to
officers.
As will be demonstrated in Chapter A3, in exercising, in accordance with its duties, its ability to
approve director-interested contracts or transactions, subject to certain limitations, the board,
collectively, seeks to supervise certain duties of individual directors, namely, those interested in
certain contracts or transactions. These duties of individual directors are often analogized to those
of trustees but can also be seen as similar to the duties of agents. The board, on the other hand, is
acting, in its collective capacity, on behalf of the corporation itself.
Chapter A3 argues that the function of the board of directors is distinctively different from that of
trustees or agents, but that the function of officers is more clearly aligned with the function of other
agents, including lower-level employees. Accordingly, while board approval of director-interested
contracts or transactions may be analogized to beneficiary approval of trustee-interested contracts
or transactions or to principal approval of agent-interested contracts or transactions, board approval
of officer-interested contracts or transactions may be meaningfully analogized only to the latter.
The utility of such analogies is discussed further in Chapter A3.
PART E – CONCLUSION
The authority of the board of directors to manage or to supervise the management of the
corporation is plenary, and extends to many matters affecting the rights of shareholders and others
vis-à-vis the corporation; however, it is subject to certain statutory limitations, which are discussed
in the following chapter, and to certain other limitations of declarative law.
Certain limitations of statutory law relate to oversight of the board by shareholders. Such rights of
oversight, such as with respect to particular fundamental transactions, do not conflict with the
corporate essentialist attribute of central management separated from equity ownership, and these
oversight rights and other rights of voice and exit give effect to capital lock-in and equity
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transferability. The nature of such shareholder rights and their relationship to the essential legal
attributes of the corporation will be explored in the following Chapter A2.
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CHAPTER A2:
CORPORATE ESSENTIALISM AND EQUITY OWNERS
PART A – LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT-RELATED RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS
Relationship to the Defining Legal Attributes of the Corporation
As discussed above, the fundamental attributes of the corporation include: its status as a separate
legal entity, or rights-and-duty bearing entity, with potentially unlimited lifespan, a status which
implicates its other fundamental attributes; the locking-in of its capital such that capital may not
be withdrawn freely by its contributor; the transferability of equity interests in the corporation;
asset partitioning involving the limited liability of owners and of the corporation for liabilities of
the other; and, in relation to the foregoing matters, the separation of equity or capital interests in
the corporation from management of the entity, which is often expressed in terms of the separation
of ownership and management; and indefinite duration. Of course, these attributes are highly
salient in respect of the development of the “public” corporation, meaning a corporation whose
shares are available to members of the public generally and may be listed and posted for trading
on a recognized stock exchange or other share or securities market, which is the focus of this book.
The implications of the foregoing have been widely considered by knowledgeable authors and
commentators and cannot be permitted to detain the present inquiry at this point. However, they
give rise to important questions relating to the mechanisms by which management can be selected
and changed, the influences which holders of equity interests may be expected to bring upon
management of the corporation, in both ordinary and extraordinary circumstances, and the
implications, on the one hand, of employing, and, on the other hand, losing, the ability to transfer
one’s equity interest to someone else at a price which might be considered to bear some
relationship to its intrinsic, or even market, value. These will be discussed below.
Voting and Related Rights of Shareholders, and Corporate Legal Essentialism
Matters relating to selecting, monitoring, and changing management may be considered to relate
to the ability of a holder of equity interests to express his or her “voice” in that regard. Holders of
common shares normally are entitled to vote for the election or removal of directors, to propose
certain matters for consideration by the shareholders generally, and to exercise a “right of veto”
with respect to certain transactions which are regarded as fundamental to the corporation. These
voting and other rights provide shareholders with some say over who will be the directors
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responsible for management of the corporation. They also provide shareholders with a “voice” in
respect of the management of the corporation.
Thus, they facilitate the institution of centralized management and its separation from equity
ownership, as well as capital lock-in, which is also facilitated by transferability of shares.
Accordingly, these shareholder rights are important in respect of the essentialist attributes of the
corporation. This chapter will examine how they are instantiated in the modern business
corporation.
Similarly, matters relating to the transfer of such equity interest, in whole or in part, may be
considered to represent that holder’s “exit” from his or her participation in the corporation.
Shareholders who wish to liquidate their investment in the corporation, perhaps due to
dissatisfaction with the performance of management, may transfer and monetize it. Such
transferability can be considered as part of the “tradeoff” for central management, its separation
from equity ownership, and the extensive management powers enacted in most corporate statutes.
This chapter will also consider how rights of transferability, a key essential attribute of the
corporation, are operationalized in the corporate statutes considered here.
Shareholders have rights to propose nominees for the election of directors, to attempt to procure
their election, and to propose matters for consideration at meetings of shareholders. They are
permitted to exercise certain collective action in those regards. It can immediately be seen,
therefore, that shareholder activities in relation to management, as matters of “voice”, may involve
activities which may be considered, in some way or other, as intrinsically “political” vis-à-vis
management and, perhaps, vis-à-vis other shareholders, and even the corporation itself. On the
other hand, shareholder activities in relation to “exit” represent a termination of the particular
shareholder’s interest in the corporation which, in the case of a public corporation, is frequently
seen as primarily economic in nature.
In Part 3 of this work, it will be established that other participants in the corporation, both as a
legal entity and as an organization, engage in activities some of which may be considered as
primarily economic in terms of their objectives, but may be considered to be highly political in
their performance. Such participants may include directors, officers, and other employees.
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Exit and Voice as Responses to Organizational Decline
Albert Hirschman’s book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty1, may be usefully considered in this regard. Its
subtitle, “Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States” indicates that its theme
concerns responses to performance decline in organizations having primarily economic, social,
and political goals and objectives. He says that “under any economic, social, or political system,
individuals, business firms, and organizations in general are subject to lapses from efficient,
rational, law-abiding, virtuous, or otherwise functional behavior”, accidental or otherwise, some
of which dysfunctional behaviour or misbehaviour is tolerated. However, he says “lest the
misbehavior feed on itself and lead to general decay, society must be able to marshal from within
itself forces which will make as many of the faltering actors as possible revert to the behavior
required for its proper functioning.”2
As Hirschman suggests, the factors contributing to such failure may be wholly or partly
endogenous or exogenous (such as accident). As an example of the former, organizational
personnel may exhibit shortfalls from expected behaviour. From the perspective of the
organization, this may also involve defects in, failures of, or failures to observe, the prescribed
structure and processes. Hirschman argues that exit belongs to the realm of economics, while voice
belongs to the realm of politics. This argument will be considered in due course.
Shareholders and Other Corporate Participants
Interestingly, given the later uses of the terms “exit” and “voice” in relation to public companies
and their shareholders, and the relationship between them, this relationship is nowhere discussed
in these terms in his work. Instead, Hirschman’s analysis at the micro-economic level primarily
concerns the relationship between a firm and its customers.
Hirschman maintains that exit “is the sort of mechanism economics thrives on. It is neat - one
either exits or one does not; it is impersonal – any face-to-face confrontation between customer
and firm with its imponderable and unpredictable elements is avoided and success and failure of
the organization are communicated to it by a set of statistics; and it is indirect – any recovery on
the part of the declining firm comes by courtesy of the Invisible Hand, as an unintended by-product
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of the customer's decision to shift”. On the other hand, “in all these respects, voice is just the
opposite of exit. It is a far more "messy" concept because it can be graduated, all the way from
faint grumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of one's critical opinions rather than a
private, "secret" vote in the anonymity of a supermarket; and finally, it is direct and straightforward
rather than roundabout. Voice is political action par excellence.”3
In effect, Hirschman argues that exit, in his case by customers rather than by investors, is a
phenomenon of microeconomics, while voice, even when practiced by customers, is a
phenomenon, not of microeconomics, but of politics. While it may be maintained that the exercise
of voice has some “political” aspect inasmuch as it aims to affect supplier behaviour, it is also
obvious that customers exercise voice in respect of their economic relationship with the supplier.
However, Hirschman’s analysis of exit is very much intrinsically economic, not only in terms of
the supply of capital to and investment in the firm, but also as it concerns the supply by the firm
of products to customers in an impersonal market. This is also the emphasis of Michael Jensen’s
much-cited 1993 article, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems”.4
Of course, when Hirschman was writing, in 1970, a wide dispersion of share ownership among
many small shareholders was typical in public corporations, and holders of larger blocks of shares,
such as institutions, had not yet demonstrated significant interest in engaging in any meaningful
shareholder activism with respect to their investee companies. Instead, mass exit, effected by way
of a takeover bid, and often resulting in a change of control of the corporation, was considered by
leading expositors of this mechanism, such as Henry Manne,5 to be more meaningful and effective,
especially as a means of disciplining management.
The members of an organization or persons or groups within or affected by an organization who
may be in a position to observe and to respond to organizational decline would include, in the case
of a business corporation, not only customers, who are the focus of Hirschman’s attention, but also
suppliers, employees, directors, and shareholders. Members of these constituencies might exercise
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rights of voice and exit as well. For example, a 1999 study by Brown and Maloney found that
outside directors of underperforming firms often choose to resign rather than to challenge inside
directors and management in boardroom discussions and deliberations, thereby exercising their
right of exit, rather than voice.6
The relationship between the benefits and disbenefits of exit may be significantly different for
other corporate constituents, for example for suppliers, and for employees, as compared with
shareholders. Suppliers and employees may have some dependence on continuing their
relationship with the corporation in order to secure benefits over a long term. In fact, they may be
prepared to incur certain short term disbenefits in the hope of securing greater benefits over a
longer term. While this may not be the case, uniformly, with respect to suppliers and employees,
there may be a greater preponderance of willingness to effect such tradeoffs than with respect to
shareholders at large.
Of course, the concepts of “exit” and “voice” may be useful beyond a context of organizational
decline. In fact, even with respect to customers, these concepts may apply in the context of ongoing
relationships, whether contractual, regular, ongoing, habitual, or otherwise. They may be seen as
not only responses to organizational decline, but also as responses to regular or irregular shortfalls
from expected performance, in which case voice may invite a performance improvement, and exit
may document the extent and even duration of performance inadequacy or nonperformance. Exit
and voice may also be seen as responsive to other dissatisfactions.
Dynamics of Shareholder Exit and Voice
Shareholders in modern business corporations that are publicly traded have certain opportunities
for “voice”, such as by way of voting against directors, writing to or meeting with management or
directors, and making shareholder proposals; and for “exit”, by means of selling their shares. These
rights of shareholders are discussed further below.
Alex Edmans reviews research on the use of voice and exit by large shareholders, often referred
to as “blockholders”, finding that “although most of the early research on blockholder governance
has focused on voice, a recent literature has analyzed a second governance mechanism — trading

William O Brown Jr & Michael T Maloney, “Exit, Voice, and the Role of Corporate Directors: Evidence from
Acquisition
Performance”
(1999)
Claremont
McKenna
College
Working
Paper,
online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=160308>.
6

821
a firm’s shares, otherwise known as “exit,” following the “Wall Street Rule,” taking the “Wall
Street Walk,” or “voting with your feet.” In effect, “if the manager destroys value, blockholders
can sell their shares, pushing down the stock price and thus punishing the manager ex post. Ex
ante, the threat of exit induces the manager to maximize value.”7
Of course, it is not only blockholders who can exercise the options of voice and exit, but also other
shareholders. Blockholders, however, can avail themselves of the extra significance attached to
their voices and exits when they engage with management or choose not to do so. They also benefit
from economies of scale in incurring costs relating to exercising voice, which holders of smaller
numbers of shares do not. As is frequently observed, the costs and difficulties of organizing
concerted action among large number of diffuse shareholders is one that is not usually susceptible
of recoupment by the organizing shareholder. This is often referred to as a “collective action” and
as a “free riding” problem.8
Edmans suggests that exit and voice became a subject of research in corporate governance only
relatively recently, and apparently separately, without regard to their interactions. He says that “the
few papers that study voice and exit together assume the same blockholder engages in both, but in
reality, different blockholders have expertise in different strategies. Moreover, it would be fruitful
to study how voice and exit interact with other, nonblockholder governance mechanisms.”9
We will have occasion to examine these matters further in connection with our discussion of hedge
fund activism later in Chapter Ten in the section entitled “Short-Termism and Long-Termism –
On the Merits” under the heading “Balancing Short Term and Long Term Horizons” where we
briefly argue in favour of, and reference research supporting, the proposition that certain hedge
fund activist mechanisms may promote or increase organizational decline, rather than contributing
to arresting or reducing it. This can take place when external governance initiatives, which are
largely generic and not specifically adapted to the particular corporation concerned, conflict with
otherwise effective internal governance mechanisms within the organization.
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This conflict between external and internal governance mechanisms may be expected to occur in
many cases in which different time frames for measuring organizational success, decline, or
improvement are applied by relevant parties in interest or by observers. That is to say, activist
hedge fund investors may be seeking to attain somewhat different goals and objectives over
different time periods then may be the case with management and with long-term institutional or
other investors.
Another fundamental issue in this regard is that parties external to the corporation may not be
aware of the ways in which its organizational structure, processes and personnel contribute to
successful performance. Accordingly, it may be desirable to place considerable weight, subject to
appropriate reduction for self-interest, of course, on internal organizational concerns and their
relation to internal governance mechanisms which are articulated by the board and management
of the corporation. Their greater and sometimes even intimate knowledge of the focal corporation’s
organization, including its structure, processes and personnel, and the relation of such matters to
its strategy, goals and objectives, may be expected to provide a more informed and accurate
assessment than might be made by external observers.
Loyalty
Hirschman discusses the activation of voice as a function of loyalty, saying, with respect to
customers, that whether customer-members will favour voice over exit will depend upon how they
weigh its certainties against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product; and
upon how they estimate their ability to influence the organization. He argues that the likelihood of
a customer exercising voice increases with the degree of loyalty to the product or organization.
Further, he argues that a member with considerable attachment to a product or organization will
often search for ways to make herself more influential and, conversely, that a member who wields
or thinks she wields considerable power in the organization may become convinced that she can
get it “back on track” and may develop a strong affection for the organization with respect to which
she exercises such power.10 In effect, an individual who lacks, and does not expect to acquire,
influence can remain loyal provided he or she expects that someone will act or that something will
happen to improve matters. Hirschman argues that loyalty is not irrational but can serve the socially
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useful purpose of preventing deterioration from being cumulative,11 that is to say, from continuing,
even, perhaps at an accelerating rate. Thus, we can conclude that loyalty may be highly rational in
some or, perhaps, in many instances.
Hirschman claims that loyalty increases the cost of exit; that it may redress the balance in some
cases in which exit might be preferred to voice because the effectiveness of voice depends on the
discovery of new ways of exerting influence and pressure toward recovery; and that the usefulness
of loyalty depends on the closeness of the available substitute.12 Although his examples relate to
loyalty to products and to countries, similar considerations may be relevant to shareholder loyalty.
A shareholder who thinks that a corporation presents some unusually attractive proposition over
his investment horizon, which is not easily replicable, may be prompted by this and other loyalty
inducing influences to exercise voice, rather than exit. On the other hand, if the investment is
highly fungible, all other things being equal, exercising voice may be more costly than exit.
Shareholder Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
We may conclude that loyalty promoting activities may tend to dissuade exit, particularly at times
when exit, and, perhaps, especially mass exit, may be undesirable for the corporation, such as in
responding to takeover bids or proxy contests. Meeting regularly and consulting with significant
shareholders, engaging in shareholder relations “reach outs” to shareholders generally, and
providing relevant and usable information to the investment community concerning the
corporation’s “value proposition” as an investment may be expected to increase shareholder
loyalty and prevent shareholder defection, by way of decreasing receptivity to takeovers, proxy
proposals, and other actions hostile to the board and management of the corporation, assuming, of
course, that the latter are not acting in a fashion which is significantly or obviously self-interested.
In fact, as discussed below in relation to shareholder activism, research has supported the
effectiveness of such activities in this regard.
“Exit” and “voice” in the context of shareholder-management relations express the rights of
transferability and limited management rights to elect, monitor, and replace management accorded
to shareholders in connection with the assignment of plenary management rights to the board of
directors. As mentioned above, these are among the legal essentialist attributes of the corporation.
11
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Voting in Relation to Directors
Modern corporate statutes require that at least one class of shares have voting rights, which must
be stipulated, like other rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the shares, in the
articles of incorporation and in the case of certain corporate statutes, in a unanimous shareholder
agreement for non-public companies only. Thus, the articles may provide for classes of shares, and
for series of shares within a class of shares to vote separately, either generally or with respect to
particular matters.
Under section 140 of the CBCA and section 102 of the OBCA, unless the articles provide
otherwise, each share of a corporation entitles the holder to one vote at a meeting of shareholders.
Section 151 of the DGCL provides that classes of stock or series of stock within a class may have
such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting powers, as stated and expressed in the certificate
of incorporation or any amendment thereto or in any board resolution issuing shares pursuant to
authority expressly vested pursuant to such certificate of incorporation or amendment thereto. It
also expressly provides (as does the MBCA) that these matters may be made dependent upon “facts
ascertainable outside” such document or board resolution.13
Section 6.01 (c) of the MBCA states that the articles of incorporation may authorize one or more
classes or series of shares that have special, conditional, or limited voting rights, or no right to
vote, except to the extent otherwise provided in the statute. It permits the terms of shares to vary
among holders of the same class or series of shares so long as such variations are expressly set
forth in the articles of incorporation. The mechanics of class and series voting are set forth in
section 7.25. Section 7.21 states that unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation,
each outstanding share is entitled to one vote on each matter voted on at a shareholders’ meeting.
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pill" provisions increasing voting rights in the event of certain external actions, including the making of tender offers
or other proposals for corporate combinations that are not approved by the board of directors of the target. As a matter
of corporate law, questions may arise concerning the "facts" relied upon in such certificate of designation. These issues
are discussed, for example, in C Stephen Bigler & Seth Barrett Tillman, “Void or Voidable? – Capturing Defects in
Stock Issuances under Delaware Law” (2008) 63:4 Bus Lawyer 1109.
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Each of the statutes mentioned contains provisions relating to the determination of the shareholders
entitled to vote at a meeting, the requisite quorum for a meeting, notice of meeting, and other
similar matters. A review of such matters, and indeed, a review of the effectiveness of shareholder
voting generally, is beyond the scope of the present work.
Voting for the Election of Directors
As the review above has indicated, and as is generally well known, the board of directors of the
corporation manage or supervise the management of its business and affairs. In this regard, the
board may appoint committees or subcommittees of the board and may delegate to them and to a
managing director certain duties. They are also empowered to appoint officers.
In effect, the board of directors is empowered under corporate law to determine virtually all aspects
of its internal organization, including its structure, processes, and its personnel. In the case of a
public corporation, which is not permitted to have a unanimous shareholder agreement, the only
statutory limitations on the board’s authority are those contained in its charter documents, and in
securities law, stock exchange or other market requirements. Consequently, the power to elect
directors is the most notable authority shareholders may exercise with respect to the ordinary dayto-day operations of the corporation.
Sections 106 of the CBCA and 119 of the OBCA require shareholders to elect directors at the first
meeting of shareholders and at each succeeding annual meeting at which such election is required,
to hold office for a term expiring not later than the close of the third annual meeting of shareholders
following such election. Unless a term is expressly stated, a director ceases to hold office at the
close of the first annual meeting of shareholders after election. The term of office of each director
need not be the same as that of each other director.
As a matter of practice, directors of both CBCA and OBCA corporations which are “public” in
common parlance14 are elected for one year terms. However, recent amendments to the CBCA (the
“2018 Amendments”)15 require, inter alia, annual elections for every ‘distributing corporation”, a

The CBCA provisions apply to “distributing corporations”, infra, note 16, while the OBCA provisions apply to
“offering corporations”. In effect, under s 1 (1) and (6) of the OBCA, an “offering corporation” is a corporation that
has filed a prospectus or equivalent under Ontario law in respect of its securities any of which are outstanding, which
is not subject to an order of the Ontario Securities Commission deeming otherwise.
15
An Act to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Cooperatives Act, the Canada Not-for-profit
Corporations Act and the Competition Act, S.C. 2018 – Bill C-25 (the “2018 Amendments”).
14

826
term defined in section 2 of the CBCA and section 2 of the Regulations under the Act.16 Other
provisions of the 2018 Amendments have been enacted but not yet proclaimed, which affect voting
for directors, however, they do not directly affect the balance of management authority as between
the board of directors and shareholders, and, accordingly, are not discussed here in detail.17
Under sections 107 of the CBCA and 120 of the OBCA, the articles may provide for cumulative
voting, which allows shareholders to cast a number of votes per share held equal to the number of
directors to be elected. Under sections 108 of the CBCA and 121 of the OBCA, a director ceases
to hold office when he or she dies or resigns, is validly removed, or becomes disqualified to be a
director.
Under section 216 of the DGCL, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes entitled to vote on
the election of directors and either present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting.
Subsection 7.28 (a) of the MBCA states that, unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in
the election at a meeting at which a quorum is present. Subsection 7.28 (b) permits cumulative
voting only if so provided in the articles of incorporation.
Voting for the Removal of Directors
Under sections 109 of the CBCA and 122 of the OBCA, the shareholders may by ordinary
resolution at a special meeting (CBCA) or at an annual or special meeting (OBCA), remove any

Canada Business Corporation Regulations, 2001, SOR/2001-512. The term “distributing corporation” includes a
corporation that is a “reporting issuer” under the securities legislation of a province or territory of Canada, one that
has filed a prospectus or registration statement under provincial law or under the law of a jurisdiction outside Canada,
or is listed and posted for trading on a stock exchange in or outside Canada. The term also includes a corporation that
is involved in, formed for, resulting from or continued after an amalgamation, a reorganization, an arrangement or a
statutory procedure, if one of the participating bodies corporate is a corporation which is a distributing corporation,
but excludes a corporation subject to an exemption or order under provincial legislation or regulation with effect that
the corporation is not a reporting issuer thereunder.
17
Certain provisions of the 2018 Amendments come into force only upon proclamation, to take place upon concurrent
adoption of relevant regulations. These include provisions requiring majority (not plurality) voting and separate (not
slate) voting for the election of directors (for prescribed corporations, expected to include certain, but not all,
distributing (public) corporations, which now must be held annually (preventing staggered boards); and permitting
shareholders to vote for or against director nominees. Previously, voting shareholders could only vote for or withhold
from voting in respect of such election. The expressions “class of prescribed corporation” and “prescribed
circumstances” in relation to inclusions and exceptions refer, in effect, to determinations effected in the regulations
made pursuant to the statute, which regulations have not yet been adopted at the date of writing. Proposed amendments
to the OBCA implementing similar provisions were introduced in Bill 101, Enhancing Shareholders Rights Act, 2017,
a private members’ bill, which received Second Reading March 9, 2017, before the change in government on June 7,
2018. As result, its enactment is uncertain.
16
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director or directors from office. Of course, directors elected by any class or series of shares may
only be removed by ordinary resolution at a meeting of the holders of such class or series of
shares.18
Under sections 110 and 123 of those statutes, respectively, a director is entitled to receive notice
of, to attend, and to be heard at every meeting of shareholders. A director who resigns or receives
notice of or learns of a meeting of shareholders called for the purpose of removing him or her from
office is entitled to submit a written statement giving the reasons for such resignation or the reasons
for opposing any proposed action or resolution. Such a statement is required to be distributed to
shareholders, either separately or as part of the required management information circular.19
While the power and authority to manage the corporation inheres in the board of directors,
collectively, as discussed here and elsewhere, each director is elected separately, even if as part of
a proposed slate of directors, and has separate rights and obligations vis-à-vis the corporation. The
right to make representations directly to shareholders concerning his or her proposed removal as a
director allows such director to account for his or her performance as a director and to reply to any
criticisms.
Dissident shareholders may propose the removal of a single director, a number of directors, or the
whole board. In the latter two cases, each of the directors may submit a separate statement. In fact,
each statute does not expressly permit collective statements; that is, they do not expressly require
a collective statement to be distributed to shareholders. In the case of a board of, say, nine directors,
such separate statements could, when aggregated, run to a considerable length and their preparation
and distribution might incur significant costs and might even reduce the attention thus received.

18

The OBCA provision was applied in Tancho-Defyrus (GP) Inc v Masotti, 2013 ONSC 2043, finding that the court
lacked the power under the OBCA to remove a director in a proceeding in which the oppression remedy was neither
pleaded nor sought by way of relief. Citing the London Finance Corporation Limited v Banking Service Corporation
Limited (1923), 23 OWN 138 (Ont HC); Stephenson v Vokes (1896), 27 OR 691 (Ont HC), the court held that common
law directors could not be removed from office during the term for which they were elected or appointed. It followed
the decision in Stelco Inc (Bankruptcy), Re, 75 OR (3d) 5, 253 DLR (4th) 109 (CA) [Stelco Inc], finding, paragraph
51, judicial removal of directors to be an exceptional remedy that is rarely exercised, both because of judicial
reluctance to interfere in the internal management of corporate affairs, and because of well-established deference to
the directors’ exercise of business judgment in managing the business and affairs of the corporation. The OBCA
expressly gave authority to remove directors to shareholders (absent alternative provision in a unanimous shareholders'
agreement).
19
Failure to give such notice to a director of an OBCA corporation has been held to invalidate the purported removal
of that director in Kaiser v Borrilia Holdings Inc (2007), 32 BLR (4th) 306, 2007 CanLII 18729 (ON SC). Failure to
give such notice was held, in all the circumstances, to amount to oppressive conduct in Castillo v Xela Enterprises
Ltd et al, 2015 ONSC 6671.
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Under subsection 141 (k) of the DGCL, any director or the entire board of directors may be
removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at
an election of directors, subject to class or series voting rights and to any cumulative voting
provisions.
Section 8.08 of the MBCA permits the shareholders to remove one or more directors with or
without cause, unless the articles require cause; directors elected by particular class or series of
shareholders can be removed only by such shareholder; cumulative voting provisions that apply to
election of directors also apply to their removal; and a director may be removed by the shareholders
only at a meeting called for such purpose and the notice of the meeting must state that the purpose,
or one of the purposes, of the meeting is removal of the director.
It must be borne in mind that removal of directors by express action is an alternative to waiting
until the next annual general meeting to oppose election of such directors, to propose alternative
nominees as directors and, if necessary, to conduct a proxy contest for this purpose. Removal of
one or more directors is more immediately effective and, accordingly, may reflect a higher degree
of urgency or concern. For example, such action may be a response to perceived breaches of the
duties of loyalty, care and compliance, or perceived incompetence or inefficiency,20 as discussed
above; but may also be a response to differences of opinion over proximate, instrumental, or
subultimate goals and objectives, arising from changes in the shareholder base, or otherwise.
Accordingly, the threat of being removed as a director, especially prior to the completion of one’s
term, is considered to provide some motivation for directors to adhere to acceptable standards in

20

By way of example, Cheffins remarks on the use of such provision to "orchestrate the removal of disloyal or
ineffective managers". Brian R Cheffins, “Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan
Via Toronto” (1999) 10:1 Duke J Comp & Intl L 5 at 33. Cheffins also refers to Ronald J Daniels & Jeffrey G
Macintosh, “Toward a Distinctive Corporate Law Regime” 29:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 863 at 884-85. The considerable
literature on the subject includes the foundational article by Manne, supra note 5, with particularly relevant comments
112-3 and 119, noting the attractiveness of corporate takeovers as opposed to bankruptcies as methods of effecting
changes in corporate control; and the highly influential and much cited article by Michael C Jensen & Richard S
Ruback, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence” (1983) 11:1 J Financial Economics 5. An early
study by Dodd and Warner reported that even failed proxy contests contributed to the creation of higher stock prices.
It may be that targets benefit in such cases from increased visibility and the opportunity for shareholders to exercise
voice, which may be expressed in support for management contributing to failure of the bid. See Peter Dodd & Jerold
B Warner, “On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests” (1983) 11:4 J Financial Economics 401.
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their conduct as directors.21 Removal for these reasons is considered to affect the reputation of the
director or directors concerned.22
Fama and Jensen argue that there is a market for the services of outside directors who, accordingly,
“have incentives to develop reputations as experts in decision control”. 23 Indeed, when demands
on directors were less arduous than at present, the number of directorships held was considered to
represent the director’s reputation in the external markets for directors.24 David Yermack notes
that most studies of the market for outside directors have found “some evidence that fewer offers
for new directorships are made to a board members of firms that perform poorly”.25
Removal of directors may also be effected by a successful bidder after the takeover bid or tender
offer has been completed. Successful bidders are normally unwilling to wait until the next annual

21

The motivational effect of the threat of such removal, including whether it exists, and how it operates, is discussed
in the considerable literature including: E Norman Veasey, “Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good
Corporate Governance Practices – or Vice Versa?” (2001) 149 U Pa L Rev 2179. See also materials cited in footnotes
19 and 20 below.
22
Measuring the reputation of directors presents difficulties, which are often subsumed in the practice of treating the
number of board seats held by a particular individual as a measure of his or her reputation. Reputation standing may
also be consistent with membership on boards of large, particularly prestigious, or highly regulated corporations, such
as banks. The increase in the amount of time required in order to discharge board responsibilities effectively has
reduced the number of board seats typically held by even prominent directors (depending on their perspective), which
as likely made using the number of board seats held as a proxy for reputation somewhat more problematic.
23
Eugene F Fama & Michael C Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control” (1983) 26:2 JL & Econ 301. See also
E Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) 88:2 J Political Economy 288. The monitoring and
other functions of directors engage a vast literature. For example, a meta-review of corporate governance (mainly
board and audit committee) and accounting issues alone is undertaken in Joseph V Carcello, Dana R Hermanson &
Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye, “Corporate Governance Research in Accounting and Auditing: Insights, Practice Implications,
and Future Research Directions” (2011) 30:3 Auditing 1. This might be styled a "meta-meta-review" inasmuch as it
reviews twelve literature review or meta-analysis papers together considering 250 papers. Of course, they all relate
only to accounting issues.
24
Porrnsit Jiraporn, Manohar Singh & Chun I Lee, “Ineffective Corporate Governance: Director Busyness and Board
Committee Memberships” (2009) 33:5 J Banking & Finance 819 at 820; citing circumstances adversely affecting the
number of outside board memberships: S Gilson, “Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks and Blockholders: Evidence on
Changes on Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default” (1990) 27:2 J Financial Economics 355
(bankruptcy or other financial distress); S Kaplan & D Reishus, “Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance”
(1990) 27:2 J Financial Economics 389 (dividend cuts); J Coles & CK Hoi, “New Evidence on the Market for
Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310” (2003) 58:1 J Finance 197 (hiring CEOs following
retirement); Brown & Maloney, supra note 6.
25
David Yermack, “Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors” (2004) 59:5 J Finance
2281 at 2281. Yermack notes that this effect of poor performance includes directors of firms that experience financial
distress, cut dividends, opt out of stringent anti-takeover provisions, and hire their CEOs as board members are
directors following retirement, citing many of the studies referenced in the immediately preceding footnote. Of course,
Yermack’s article predates that of Jiraporn et al. Bujega et al. report that directors with multiple directorships,
considered to be a measure of reputation, have a lower rate of removal after a successful takeover bid. They also report
that when the target has better pre-takeover performance, the percentage of directors replaced is lower. See Martin
Bugeja, Raymond Da Silva Rosa & Andrew Lee, “The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the
Turnover in Board Seats of Target Firm Directors” (2009) 36:1-2 J Business Finance & Accounting 185.
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general meeting in order to replace the board and thereby assert control of the corporation unless,
of course, the date of the next scheduled meeting is relatively proximate.26 Needless to say, the
propriety of proceedings undertaken to remove directors is a frequent subject of judicial
challenge.27
This right of removing directors in exceptional circumstances may be seen as part of the “tradeoff” involved in separating management from equity ownership, as well as capital lock-in and
share transferability, and as permitting shareholders to exercise rights of voice, rather than rights
of exit. Such removal rights are, therefore, intrinsically related to corporate legal essentialism.
Approval of Director-Interested Contracts or Transactions
As discussed previously, it is important that directors declare the nature and extent of any interests
that they may have been in any proposed contract or transaction with the corporation or its affiliates
in order that the declaring director’s fellow directors be able to identify the nature and extent of
such interest, appreciate its significance, and assess the role of the conflicted director accordingly,
and in order to discourage reciprocity of self-dealing. It is also important that the interested director
not participate in the portion of the meeting that concerns such proposed contract or transaction,
as this may give rise to opportunities for the conflicted director to act favourably towards the matter
at hand, and to encourage adoption of the proposed contract or transaction by the remaining
directors, and may facilitate perceptions of deliberately conferring, or even trading, benefits in this
way.

26

As noted in the immediately preceding footnote, director reputation and target performance may sometimes mitigate
against or delay the removal of all of the directors of the target.
27
Often proceedings are taken which seek the removal of directors by the court. Such proceedings are often coupled
with oppression claims or with restructurings in insolvency under either the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act,
RSC 1985, c C-36 [CCAA], or the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA]. Also see the following
cases under the CBCA: Stelco Inc, supra note 15; Ivaco Inc, Re (2006), 83 OR (3d) 108, 275 DLR (4th) 132 (CA);
Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc v Hollinger Inc (2006), 79 OR (3d) 288, 266 DLR (4th) 228 (CA). See also the
cases cited in notes 15 and 16, for example, and the discussion in the section of this chapter entitled “Shareholder
Rights Beyond Voting” under the heading "Oppression Remedy".
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Furthermore, although the board is empowered to act collectively, each director is required to make
his or her own decision with respect to each matter considered. Except in situations in which the
declaration is required to be made, and is made, before the consideration and approval of the
proposed contract or transaction, a director is entitled to assume that each of the other directors, is
also approaching the subject in consideration free of extraneous influences. The statutes normally
provide curative provisions where such a contract or transaction is approved by the board without
the conflicted director, and hence the board, being aware of the circumstances giving rise to the
conflict.
Where a conflict is declared, the non-conflicted directors may wish to consider, among other
things, the attitude which the conflicted director manifests in relation to the conflict. They may
consider that the circumstances provide information as to the conflicted director’s attitude to real,
perceived, or possible violations of moral or legal obligations and other relevant norms and
practices. Accordingly, these situations may provide information to other directors, about the
interested director and otherwise, which is much more extensive than the circumstances of the
situation at hand. The non-conflicted directors may take such information into account in
determining whether or not, firstly, to approve the subject contract or transaction, and secondly, to
submit to shareholders.
As indicated previously, in circumstances in which it is not possible for the board of directors to
approve the proposed contract or transaction itself, the matter may be put forward to the
shareholders for approval, by special resolution under the CBCA and the OBCA, which approval
is effective provided that the shareholders are given adequate disclosure of the interest and that the
contract or transaction is reasonable and fair to the corporation at the time at which it is approved
or confirmed. Again, this permits shareholders to permit conflict of interest situations to persist in
cases in which they consider them advantageous to the corporation.
As is the case in other respects, the ways in which the statutes address director conflict situations
bespeak the tradeoffs among powerful central management divorced from equity ownership and
the other legal essentialist attributes of the corporation.
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Approval of Matters Submitted to Shareholders by Directors
Section 146 of the DGCL states that a corporation may agree to submit a matter to a vote of its
stockholders whether or not the board of directors determines at any time subsequent to approving
such matter that such matter is no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders reject
or vote against the matter. Section 13.40 of the MBCA provides that a corporate action described
in section 13.02 (a) may not be contested nor may it be enjoined, set aside or rescinded, in a
proceeding by a shareholder after the shareholders have approved the action, subject to certain
exceptions, principally involving procedural defects, procurement by fraud, material
misrepresentation or omission that makes statements made misleading, or a corporate action that
is an interested transaction, as described in section 13.01.
In effect, shareholder approval may shield certain matters from judicial review and, thus, such
matters may be submitted to shareholders for approval in order to acquire such shielding. While
the MBCA makes this objective quite explicit and obviously acceptable, the other statutes also
permit shareholder approval to be employed for this purpose. Indeed, it may be conjectured that
this is the almost inevitable purpose of submitting such conflict transactions to shareholders, rather
than taking some sounding of acceptability or proper purpose.
Voting to Approve or Disapprove Fundamental Actions or Transactions
Various actions or transactions which are considered to be fundamental to the corporation or to its
shareholders, or to both, are required to be submitted to shareholders for approval before becoming
effective. The following review demonstrates that shareholder approval for such fundamental
actions or transactions evidences a species of “reinvestment” intention; that is, an indication by
the shareholder concerned and the shareholders supporting such initiative of willingness to
continue their investment in the corporation or to “reinvest” in the altered entity, rather than to
“disinvest” or liquidate such investment. As discussed below, certain protective devices are
provided statutorily, such as appraisal and oppression mechanisms, with respect to certain modes
of desired disinvestment.
As noted previously, these statutory provisions instantiate, and also attempt to effect, the tradeoffs
already described among, and so ameliorate a strict adoption of, the legal essentialist attributes of
the corporation.
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Articles of Amendment
The corporate charter, styled articles of incorporation under the CBCA and the OBCA, as well as
the MBCA, and certificate of incorporation under the DGCL, referred to here as the “corporate
charter” or “charter”, sets forth details of the share capital of the corporation, the attributes of its
shares, including voting rights, rights, if any, to dividends, and rights upon dissolution of the
corporation. In the case of the DGCL, the business or purposes which the corporation is to conduct
or promote may, but need not, be limited to those stated in the certificate of incorporation.
The MBCA requires the articles of incorporation to set forth the number of shares which the
Corporation is authorized to issue, and if there is more than one class of shares authorized, the
attributes of each class must be included in the articles. Otherwise, the contents of the articles of
incorporation may be determined, to a large extent, by the preferences of the incorporators,
although some of the more common provisions that are permissible and relatively common are
listed in the statute.
The extensive scope of the charter documents, of course, raises the possibility that amendments
thereto may be more or less significant to particular shareholders, and may even be critical to a
particular shareholder’s investment in the corporation, such that amendment of certain charter
provisions may necessitate or make appropriate or desirable the termination of such investment.
In some cases, with respect to privately held corporations, the charter documents may be carefully
designed to align with the various capacities and interests of the shareholders, sometimes likened
to or described as an “incorporated partnership”.
Accordingly, subject to some exceptions for matters that are generally considered to be quite minor
in nature, amendments to the charter documents generally require shareholder approval, in the
cases of the CBCA and the OBCA by special resolution pursuant to sections 173 and 168,
respectively, including class or series votes, also by special resolution, where specially affected.
Under sections 2(1) and 1(1) of the CBCA and the OBCA, respectively, the term “special
resolution”, in effect, means a resolution passed by at least two thirds of the votes cast on such
resolution at a special meeting duly called for the purpose of considering the resolution.
With respect to certain amendments to the articles, certain shareholders may be entitled to exercise
a right of dissent and appraisal under sections 190 of the CBCA and 185 of the OBCA. Under both
statutes, these rights arise if the corporation resolves to amend its articles to add, remove or change
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any restrictions on: the issue transfer or ownership of shares of a class or series; or the business or
businesses that the corporation may carry on; or the powers that the corporation may exercise.
Although discussed in more detail under that heading below, this right provides an opportunity for
shareholders to avoid the power of the majority to force these new provisions on dissenting
shareholders and to avoid selling their shares in the market. In this regard, it provides a remedy for
shareholders whose ability to exercise voice, by voting and otherwise, has been ineffective, and
whose ability to exercise a right of exit may be ineffective or unsatisfactory. Consequently, such
right reflects the balancing that obtains among the legal essentialist attributes of the corporation,
most notably as between capital lock-in and free transferability of interest.
In the case of the DGCL, amendments must be approved by a majority of all outstanding shares
under section 242, voting as a class or even series (voting as a class), even where not otherwise
entitled to vote, if, among other things, the proposed amendment would alter the powers,
preferences or special rights of that class or series so as to affect them adversely.
Chapter 10 of the MBCA deals with amendment of the articles and bylaws. Under section 10.03,
any amendment must be adopted by the board and submitted to the shareholders for approval
except that under section 10.05 certain routine “housekeeping” matters that do not affect
substantial rights in any meaningful way, as described in the Official Comment, do not require any
shareholder vote. Where a shareholder vote is required, under section 10.05, classes and series of
shares that are entitled to vote separately vote separately on the amendment.
Under section 10.03, where the board approves the amendment and submits it to the shareholders
for approval (as is required), the board is required to recommend approval unless special
circumstances apply. As noted in the Official Comment, these include situations where a board
cannot act by reason of conflict of interest or where a board is deadlocked, but agrees that
shareholders should be able to consider the amendment.
Section 10.03 (c) states that the “board of directors may condition its submission of the amendment
to the shareholders on any basis”. As the Official Comment notes, among the conditions which
may be imposed by the board are provisions that the amendment is not deemed to be approved:
unless approved by a specified vote of the shareholders, or by one or more specified classes or
series of shares, voting as a separate voting group, or by a specified percentage of disinterested
shareholders; or if shareholders holding more than a specified fraction of outstanding shares
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exercise appraisal rights. Otherwise, under section 10.03 (f), only a majority of votes cast is
required provided that there is a quorum consisting of at least a majority of the votes entitled to be
cast on the amendment.
In the result, the board of directors exercises a much higher degree of control over adopting articles
of amendment under the MBCA than under the other statutes. Similar provisions apply with
respect to other fundamental changes under the MBCA, as discussed below. Thus, in this respect,
the MBCA tradeoff between management independence of equity ownership and the other
essential attributes greatly favours central management over its monitoring by shareholders.
Bylaw Amendments
Under section 103 of the CBCA and section 116 of the OBCA, unless otherwise provided in the
articles, by-laws or a unanimous shareholder agreement (not applicable to public companies), bylaws that regulate the business or affairs of the corporation may be adopted, amended, and repealed
by ordinary resolution of the directors. Such by-laws are effective until confirmed, confirmed,
amended, or rejected at the next meeting of shareholders.28
Under section 109 of the DGCL, the bylaws of the corporation may contain any provision not
inconsistent with law or its certificate of incorporation relating to its business, the conduct of its
affairs, its rights or powers, or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees. Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, and unless the bylaws
are adopted, amended or repealed by the incorporators, but, after payment for its stock, the power
to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws is in the stockholders entitled to vote; but the certificate of
incorporation may confer this power on the directors, except that such provision does not divest
or limit the power of the stockholders to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws. This permits the directors
to exercise initial authority over the content of the bylaws, without a “sunset” provision as in the
Canadian statutes, as one example of the “management friendliness” ascribed to the DGCL.
Section 2.06 of the MBCA provides that the bylaws of the corporation may contain any provision
that is not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation. Unless reserved to the shareholders

28

Some guidance concerning these matters as provided in Wells v Melnyk (2008), 92 OR (3d) 121, 46 BLR (4th) 112
(Sup Ct). A bylaw passed immediately prior to a contested meeting of shareholders which reduced the quorum for
meetings of shareholders generally was held to be ineffective for the purposes of that meeting, when passed that
meeting, because of noncompliance with the applicable notice requirements. It may be significant, however, that the
subject matter of the bylaw related to rights of shareholders which, in the case at hand, were significantly affected.
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“in whole or in part” (for example, by way of specific articles, or sections, or subjects, or topics)
in the articles, or in sections 10.21 (which may impose a supermajority requirement for the election
of directors) or 10.22 of the statute (which may impose a plurality requirement for the election of
directors), either the shareholders or the directors may amend or repeal bylaws generally; provided
that the shareholders in amending, repealing or adopting a bylaw may expressly provide that the
board may not amend, repeal or reinstate that bylaw.
Accordingly, the significance of the power of to amend bylaws is recognized in each of the statutes.
The weighting of the power and authority of the board to manage the corporation as against
shareholder influence with respect to such management is balanced somewhat differently in each.
This implicates the overall assignment of essentialist legal attributes of the corporation.
Amalgamation
Sections 181 of the CBCA and 174 and 175 of the OBCA allow two or more corporations to
amalgamate and continue as one corporation.29 Under sections 183 and 176, respectively, directors
of each amalgamating corporation are required to submit the amalgamation agreement for approval
by the shareholders and by each class or series of shareholders, as a special resolution. Each share
carries the right to vote on the amalgamation agreement, even if such shares are nonvoting
otherwise.
Section 251 of the DGCL permits two or more corporations to merge into a single corporation,
which may be any one of the constituent corporations, pursuant to an agreement of merger, or may
consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of
consolidation. The first requirement is that the directors pass a resolution approving the merger
agreement or consolidation agreement and declaring its advisability. Under section 251 (f),
approval of shareholders of a constituent corporation surviving the merger is not required unless:
required by its certificate of incorporation; it amends the certificate of incorporation in some
respects; each share of such constituent corporation does not become an identical share of the
surviving corporation after the merger; the shares to be issued or delivered under the plan of

29

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that no "new" company is created and no "old" company is extinguished
upon such amalgamation. Instead, they continue in their new identity as the amalgamated corporation. See R v Black
& Decker Manufacturing Co, [1975] 1 SCR 411, 43 DLR (3d) 393 rev’g [1973] 2 OR 460, 34 DLR (3d) 308 (CA);
Witco Chemical Co v Oakville (Town), [1975] 1 SCR 273, 43 DLR (3d) 413, rev’g [1973] 2 OR 467, 34 DLR (3d)
315 (CA), aff’g [1972] 3 OR 712 (H Ct J).
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merger, fully diluted, exceed by at least 20% the number of shares outstanding immediately prior
to the merger.30
Further, under section 251 (h), unless expressly required by its certificate of incorporation, no
approval is required, in effect, where the constituent corporation merging has a class of shares
listed on a national securities exchange or has more than two thousand shareholders of record. In
that case, the merger becomes effective as soon as practicable following the consummation of a
qualifying offer pursuant to which the merger consummates an offer for all of the outstanding
stock of such constituent corporation that otherwise would be entitled to vote on the merger. Such
offer-for-all may be conditional on a minimum number or percentage tender, may exclude certain
stock owned by parties having stipulated relationships to the offeror, and may involve separate
offers for separate classes or series of stock of such constituent corporation.
As a result, shareholders of public companies who do not tender to such an offer may not have an
opportunity to vote on the ensuing merger. Furthermore, the fairness of the offer may be somewhat
problematic.31 Section 262, however, provides appraisal rights in certain circumstances.
Section 11.02 of the MBCA permits one or more domestic entities or foreign business corporations
or other eligible entities to “merge into a new domestic business corporation to be created in the
merger in the manner provided in this chapter [11].” This permits a much broader class of merging
parties than do the other statutes. It is interesting that whereas the MBCA creates a new corporation
as a result of the merger, into which the previously existing corporations merge, the DGCL allows

30

This provision became effective August 1, 2013. It was considered in a series of cases including: In re Zale Corp
Stockholders Litig, 2015 WL 5853693 (Del Ct Ch); In re Zale Corp Stockholders Litig, 2015 WL 6551418 (Del Ct
Ch); the latter of which was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Singh v Attenborough, 2016 WL 2765312
(Del Sup Ct); Corwin v KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A (3d) 304 (Del Sup Ct 2015); and In re Volcano
Corporation Stockholder Litigation, 2016 Del Ch Lexis 99. Ultimately, the Volcano decision held that a tender of
shares by a majority of shareholders who were fully informed and not coerced had a "cleansing effect" similar to a
shareholder vote and, accordingly, the standard of review applicable to the board of directors' decision to approve the
merger, as the second step in a two-step merger transaction, was the business judgment rule, as would be applicable
in a one-stage merger, rather than the "entire fairness" rule. See Robert S Reder & Stephanie Stroup Estey, “Sell-Side
Financial Advisors in the M&A Crosshairs” (2016) 68 Vand L Rev En Banc 279; Robert S Reder, “Delaware Supreme
Court Clarifies “Cleansing Effect” of Fully-Informed Stockholder Vote”, (2016) 68 Vand L Rev En Banc 219; Robert
S Reder, “Delaware Chancery Court Extends "Cleansing Effect" of Stockholder Approval Under KKR to Two-Step
Acquisition Structure” (2016) 69 Vand L Rev En Banc 227.
31
Among the many excellent discussions of the duties, and standards of review, of boards of directors in Delaware
are: Lyman PQ Johnson, “Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose”
(2013) 38:2 Del J Corp L 405; and Lyman Johnson, “Delaware's Non-Waivable Duties” (2011) 91:2 BU L Rev 701.
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the merging entities to create a new corporation or to continue the existence of one or the other of
the constituent corporations. This seems to indicate a different perspective on the nature of merger.
Section 11.03 provides for a share exchange whereby a domestic corporation may acquire shares
in exchange for, or for a combination of, shares or other securities, interests, obligations, rights to
acquire shares or other securities, or cash or property.
Except under sections 11.04 (g), which applies where the articles expressly limit or eliminate
separate class or series voting rights, and 11.05, where a parent and subsidiary, or two subsidiaries,
merge, after the directors adopt a plan of merger or plan of share exchange they must submit the
plan to shareholders for approval with a recommendation of the shareholders approve the plan.
The latter requirement has certain exceptions, similar to those with respect to approval of
amendments to the articles under section 10.03.
Section 11.04 contains provisions applicable where shareholder approval is required, which are
similar to those in section 10.03 and related sections with respect to amendments to the articles.
As with amendments to the articles, the board can impose conditions on submission of a plan to
shareholders, such as approval by a higher vote (in numbers or by percentage), by separate classes,
by disinterested shareholders, or a condition that not more than a certain percentage or number of
shareholders exercise appraisal rights.
While the board has the power to initiate and enter into the amalgamation agreement under each
of the statutes, shareholder approval is required under the CBCA and OBCA, but is not required
in some circumstances under the DGCL or MBCA. The greater authority accorded to the board
under the latter American statutes reflects a higher prioritization of management power over other
essentialist characteristics.
Continuance – Export and Import
Another example of a fundamental change requiring shareholder approval is the continuance of
the domestic corporation into a foreign jurisdiction such that it ceases to be subject to the laws of
the original domestic jurisdiction (referred to as an “export” of the corporation), and acceptance
of a foreign corporation by the domestic jurisdiction of a corporation or other entity as a domestic
entity subject to domestic regulation (referred to as an “import” or “domestication”).
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In the case of exports, sections 188 of the CBCA, 181 of the OBCA (which also requires approval
of the corporate authorities, principally to ensure that the corporation’s rights and obligations
continue, unaffected), 390 of the DGCL and s. 9.20 (b) of the MBCA, respectively, apply.
Generally, they require shareholder approval, by special resolution in the CBCA and OBCA, as to
which each share carries a right to vote whether or not it otherwise carries the right to vote; and
create dissent or dissent and appraisal rights (CBCA and OBCA) or appraisal rights (MBCA),
which rights are discussed further below. No dissent or appraisal rights exist under the DGCL. In
the case of the MBCA, such appraisal rights arise if the shareholder does not receive shares having
terms at least as favourable to the shareholder in all material respects and without dilution as the
shares originally held.
In the case of imports, sections 187 of the CBCA, 180 of the OBCA, 388 of the DGCL, and 9.20
(a) of the MBCA apply. Section 388 of the DGCL permits a variety of non-United States entities
to become domesticated as a Delaware corporation. These include a corporation, limited liability
company, statutory trust, business trust or association, real estate investment trust, a common-law
trust, or any other unincorporated business or entity including a general partnership (including a
limited liability partnership) or limited partnership. As noted in the Official Comment, there are
virtually no restrictions or limitations on the terms and conditions of a domestication, except that
they have to be set forth in the plan of domestication. This is arguably appropriate, since the laws
of the external jurisdiction would be expected to apply to its export. The types of entities that may
be imported into Delaware corporate law as corporations may be surprising, last considered in
light of the immediately foregoing observation. As well, this may be seen as an indication of the
competitiveness of Delaware vis-à-vis other American states.32
Quite clearly, exporting the corporation from the law of one jurisdiction to another may have
extremely important consequences for shareholders and others, including with respect to the
balance of power as among directors, shareholders, and others. The lack of appraisal rights under
the DGCL is significant in this regard. However, significant common law protections may exist in

32

The subject of competition among states for charters and the Delaware case, has given rise to considerable discussion
among academics, jurors, and practitioners. An article which is widely cited in this regard is Roberta Romano, “The
State Competition Debate in Corporate Law” (1987) 8 Cardozo L Rev 709. A Canadian perspective on the debate is
provided by Ronald J Daniels, “Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market”
(1991) 36:1 McGill LJ 130.
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some situations. In general, these protections arise as a result of the application to the instant
transaction of the business judgment rule, whose terms are beyond the scope of the present work.33
Arrangement and Reorganization
Section 192 of the CBCA and section 182 of the OBCA permit a corporation to apply to court for
an order approving an arrangement “where it is not practicable for a corporation that is not
insolvent to effect a fundamental change in the nature of an arrangement under any other provision
of this Act”. Other than the “not practicable” requirement, and ensuring that the corporation is not
insolvent (in which case other legislation applies), no guidance is given concerning the
determination of whether the court should approve the arrangement proposed. As a result, while
the case law provides some guidance to applicants and others, the approval of each arrangement is
very fact specific.34
The types of transactions included in the definition of an “arrangement” include a capital
reorganization, an amendment of the articles, an amalgamation, a liquidation, and a dissolution.
As Chris Nicholls observes, while the word “arrangement” might suggest that it might be intended
for use by distressed corporations (but which, under the CBCA, we would note, are not actually
insolvent) this provision is often used in connection with structure and complex business
acquisitions and complex organizations, such as spin offs.35 A corporation which is insolvent as
defined in subsection 192 (2) is unable to undertake an arrangement under subsection 192 (3) of
the CBCA.36

A useful review, by a Delaware Supreme Court Justice, is Randy J Holland, “Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties:
The Focus on Loyalty” (2009) 22:3 U Pa J Bus L 675.
34
In the case of Re Electrohome Ltd (1998), 40 BLR (2d) 210, 4 CBR (4th) 239 (Ont SC), Spence J describes some
of the relevant considerations as distilled from previous cases, but, unusually, by way of a memorandum appended to
the decision. The relevant principles are now set forth in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in BCE Inc v 1976
Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE]. Other major cases include: Canadian Pacific Ltd (1990),
73 OR (2d) 212, 70 DLR (4th) 349 (H Ct J) (application dismissed); Canadian Pacific Ltd (Re), 30 OR (3d) 110,
1996 CanLII 8029 (Gen Div); Stelco Inc (Re), 2007 CanLII 46175 (Ont Sup Ct J); Masonite International Inc (Re),
56 CBR (5th) 42, 2009 CanLII 40563 (Ont Sup Ct J); Magna International Inc (Re), 2010 ONSC 4123, 101 OR (3d)
736; Magna International Inc (Re), 2010 ONSC 4685, 101 OR (3d) 721 (Div Ct).
35
Christopher Nicholls, Corporate Law (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2005) at 455-456.
36
OBCA and CBCA corporations which are insolvent may, instead, seek relief under the BIA, supra note 24, or the
CCAA, supra note 24. The CCAA may be used where the corporation is not insolvent and is often used to make
compositions with creditors. Thus, both statutes may be employed to vary the "bargain" among corporate participants,
even extending to legal essentialist attributes. Among the leading sources of authority concerning the statutes are:
Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2003); and Janis P Sarra, Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Toronto: Carswell,
2007). Where an order is made under the BIA approving a proposal, the corporation may file articles of reorganization
33
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The requirements for a special resolution and as to voting are similar to those with respect to other
fundamental changes. As the court must approve the arrangement, as proposed or as amended as
the court may direct, no dissent rights automatically arise under section 190 of the CBCA and
section 185 of the OBCA, although they may be accorded to shareholders by the court. As only
the corporation may initiate an arrangement, it must be initiated by the board of directors and
cannot be initiated by other parties in interest, such as shareholders.
Unlike other fundamental changes, which are initiated by the board but approved by the
shareholders, the arrangement mechanism substitutes court approval for shareholder approval as a
means of attempting to balance the respective interests of the participants in the corporation. This
effects a different accommodation of essentialist attributes. It also permits fundamental changes to
be made to the charter documents and underlying fundament of the corporation in cases where
shareholder approval is not likely to be forthcoming, such as in cases of shareholder deadlock.
The DGCL and the MBCA do not appear to contain any equivalent statutory provisions.
An arrangement must be distinguished from a reorganization. Section 191 of the CBCA and
section 186 of the OBCA deal with a reorganization, which is defined to mean an order made under
section 241 of the CBCA or under section 248 of the OBCA, respectively, dealing with the
oppression remedy;37 under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada);38 or, in the case of the
CBCA only, under “any other Act of Parliament that affects the rights among the corporation, its
shareholders and creditors”, or, in the case of the OBCA provision only, under the Companies
Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada).39 All these provisions effect or may effect substantial
changes in the articles of the corporation, effect to which is given, as a matter of corporate law, by
the issuance of articles of reorganization. Although the issuance of the court orders themselves
often requires some vote or indication of preference by shareholders, a vote is not required as a

under section 191 of the CBCA, receipt of which results in a certificate of amendment to the corporation's articles.
OBCA companies can restructure as a matter of federal insolvency law under the BIA or under the CCAA but must
amend their articles accordingly, very often by way of arrangement. Often, the creditor restructuring provisions and
corporate restructuring provisions, federal or otherwise, are combined in a single set of judicial proceedings.
37
These sections deal with the oppression remedy, which is discussed, infra, in the section entitled “Shareholder
Rights Beyond Voting”.
38
Supra note 27.
39
Supra note 27. As the names of the statutes suggest, orders under the BIA and the CCAA may affect the rights of
debtors, creditors, and others.
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matter of corporate law for approval of the articles of reorganization, and no dissent and appraisal
rights arise under section 185 of the OBCA.
Sale or Lease of All or Substantially All the Property of the Corporation
Another type of fundamental change or transaction which requires shareholder approval is a sale,
lease or exchange “of all or substantially all the property of a corporation other than in the ordinary
course of business of the corporation” under subsections 189 (3) and 184 (3) of the CBCA and
OBCA, respectively. The requirements for a special resolution and as to voting are similar to those
with respect to other fundamental changes. Dissent rights arise under section 190 of the CBCA
and section 185 of the OBCA.
Such a sale, of course, would ordinarily be expected to have the effect of terminating the
corporation’s existing business. Of course, the proceeds of such a sale may be employed in a
similar business or in a quite different business; however, such a sale may represent a change in
the investment originally made by the shareholder at the time of acquisition of the shares.
Redeployment of the proceeds may likewise constitute a form of reinvestment by such shareholder
in the “new” business. Accordingly, shareholder approval is appropriate. Shareholders may not,
however, initiate a sale of such assets, either by entering into an agreement for such purpose or by
passing a resolution authorizing the execution and performance of such an agreement. Such power
of management is reserved to the directors. The directors retain the power and authority to exercise
such powers of management even if in so doing they are acting contrary to the expressed wish of
the shareholders.40
A leading case on the interpretation of these provisions is Benson v. 3rd Canadian General
Investment Trust Ltd., which held that in determining whether the sale required a special resolution,
a qualitative test of whether the sale of the assets concerned would fundamentally change the
nature of the corporation’s business was preferable to a purely quantitative test based on the value
of the assets being sold.41 Citing that case, a sale to a wholly owned subsidiary was held not to
40

Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Automatic Co v Cunningham, [1906] 2 Ch 34 (Eng CA).
Benson v Third Canadian General Investment Trust Ltd (1993), 14 OR (3d) 493, 13 BLR (2d) 265 (Gen Div). Cited
by way of obiter in GATX Corp v Hawker Siddeley Canada Inc, 27 BLR (2d) 251 at para 81, 1996 CanLII 8286 (Ont
SC): "In determining whether a sale involves ‘substantially all’ of the assets of a corporation, the Courts have tended
to look beyond a mere ‘quantitative’ test. That is, the exercise requires more than simply comparing the value of the
asset in question with the total value of the corporation’s assets and deciding where the resultant percentage crosses
the line and becomes ‘substantially all’ of the assets. Rather, the Courts will look at the relationship between the asset
in question and the nature of the company’s operations as a whole, taking into account the quantitative aspects of the
41
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engage the application of the provision in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Pension Plan v.
BF Realty Holdings Ltd.42 This is interesting in that a broader enterprise concept involving
common ownership supplanted a strict application of the separate legal entity approach.
Section 271 of the DGCL requires approval of such a sale by holders of the outstanding voting
stock entitled to vote, but does not accord votes to all shares, and does not require class or series
voting, the latter presumably because all classes and series of shares are equally affected. It
considers the property of subsidiaries as property of the corporation.
Section 12.01 of the MBCA provides that, unless the articles otherwise provide, no approval of
shareholders of the corporation is required to sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of any or
all of the corporation’s assets in the usual and regular course of business. Under section 12.02, any
other sale, lease, exchange, or disposition of assets requires approval of the shareholders if such
disposition would leave the corporation without a significant continuing business activity. A
corporation is conclusively deemed to have retained a significant continuing business activity if it
retains a business activity that represented at least 25% of the total assets at the end of the most
recently completed fiscal year, and 25% of either income from continuing operations before taxes
or revenues from continuing operations for that fiscal year, in each case on a consolidated basis.
Unless the articles of the board require a greater vote or a greater quorum, such approval is to be
given by shareholders at a meeting at which at least a majority of the votes entitled to be cast on
the disposition are represented. As in cases of other fundamental changes, the board may impose
conditions on its submission of such disposition of the shareholders. Such a transaction generally
gives rise to appraisal rights under section 13.02.
Like other fundamental changes, these fundamental sale or lease transactions invoke differing
statutory accommodations of the corporate essentialist attributes.

case in the process but trying to determine on an overall basis whether the sale will have the effect of fundamentally
changing or destroying the nature of the corporation’s business because ‘it is a sale of a part of the business so integral
as to be essential for the transaction of its ordinary day-to-day business’."
42
Canadian Broadcasting Corp Pension Plan v BF Realty Holdings Ltd (2002), 10 BLR (3d) 188, 18 CBR (4th) 181
(Ont SC).
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Approval of Fundamental Changes - Summary
As demonstrated above, the power of the board of directors as a matter of corporate law to manage
or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the corporation engages some limits
with respect to certain fundamental changes or transactions, which, generally speaking, involve
the legal rights of its participants. Often, they relate, broadly speaking, to its “affairs” in the sense
of the relationships among the corporation, its affiliates and the shareholders, directors and officers
of such bodies corporate (but not including the business carried on by such bodies corporate).
Indeed, they often involve the realignment of rights of shareholders vis-à-vis the corporation.
Sometimes, they involve changes in the authority of the board of directors vis-à-vis the
corporation. Some of the latter cases involve realignments of the authority as between directors
and shareholders with respect to the corporation.
As in the case of certain other shareholder rights, the right to approve fundamental changes,
especially when combined with other remedies, notably the shareholders’ dissent and appraisal or
appraisal remedy, is intended to operate as a sort of “fail-safe” mechanism, restraining self-dealing
and other forms of opportunism by directors, and by the controlling plurality, or majority, of
shareholders.
From a corporative perspective, changes in the legal rights of participants in respect of the legal
entity in terms of corporate law must be considered in relation to the effect of these changes on the
functioning of the organization and its structure, processes, and personnel. As has been shown,
however, the effects of corporate law largely concern structural matters, and sometimes processes,
in relation to the legal rights of participants; and they are principally concentrated at the boardshareholder level and with respect to that interface.
Shareholder Rights to Initiate Consideration of Certain Matters
As will be described in more detail below, the rights of shareholders to initiate consideration of
certain matters by the directors and management, as well as by shareholders, by bringing those
matters to the attention of shareholders generally, has become more significant in recent years.
This is been the result, in part, of changes and shareholding patterns involving the balance of
institutional and “public” shareholders, including “odd lot” shareholders (shareholders who
acquire, hold, or sell less than a “board lot” or usual trading quantity, of such shares). As
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institutional investors, such as insurance companies and large corporations, and administrators of
benefit plans, such as pension plans and retirement plans (including registered retirement savings
plans in Canada and section 401 (k) savings plans in the United States), have come to represent an
increasingly large, even dominant, proportion of public company shareholdings, and have
increased in size such that meaningful management of their portfolios often requires reasonably
large minimum investments, they have become more active in asserting these rights.
Principally, these involve enabling shareholders to assert some “voice” in matters affecting the
corporation. These rights include making shareholder proposals and requisitioning meetings of
shareholders. Shareholder remedies, including those alleviating compulsory or inadequate
provisions relating to “exit” from share ownership, will be discussed separately.
Shareholder Proposal
Sections 137 of the CBCA permits a registered holder or beneficial owner of shares that are entitled
to be voted at an annual meeting to submit to the corporation notice of any matter that the person
proposes to raise at the meeting (a “proposal); and to discuss at the meeting any matter in respect
of which the person would have been entitled to submit a proposal. In order to be eligible to submit
a proposal, a person must have been a registered holder or beneficial of owner of the minimum
number of shares required for at least the prescribed period, or must have the support of persons
who, in the aggregate, satisfy these conditions.43
A corporation that solicits proxies is required to set out in, or attach to, the management proxy
circular the proposal and any supporting statement of the proposer meeting prescribed
requirements. A proposal supported by not less than five per cent of the shares or class of shares
entitled to vote at the meeting may include nominations for the election of directors. A corporation
is not required to include in the management proxy circular a proposal if: it does not satisfy
prescribed notice requirements; it clearly appears that its primary purpose is to enforce a personal
claim or address a personal grievance against the corporation or its directors, officers or security
holders, it does not relate in any significant way to the business or affairs of the corporation; it has
been the subject of a prior proposal by the same proposer within a prescribed period that was not
proceeded with; if substantially the same proposal was submitted to a prior meeting and was
43

Only the registered owner is "entitled to vote" and, accordingly, to submit a proposal: Verdun v Toronto-Dominion
Bank, [1996] 3 SCR 550, 139 DLR (4th) 415.

846
defeated; or if the rights so conferred are being abused to secure publicity. It is apparent, of course,
that these matters require determination based on all the relevant circumstances, with the result
that determining and applying relevant principles is complicated accordingly. As discussed under
the next heading with respect to shareholder requisitions for meetings, the grounds for refusing to
include proposals and for refusing to requisitioning meetings are the same. Consequently, the case
law frequently deals with both issues.44
A corporation receiving such proposal which refuses to include the proposal in its management
proxy circular is required to provide notice of such refusal and of the reasons for refusal within a
prescribed period of time. The proposer may make application to court restraining holding of the
meeting or making any further order that it thinks fit, and a corporation or any person claiming to
be aggrieved by a proposal may apply to court for an order permitting the corporation to omit the
proposal from management proxy circular and to make such an order as it thinks fit. Any person
claiming to be aggrieved by a corporation’s refusal to include such a proposal in the management
proxy circular may likewise apply to court.45
Until recently, Section 99 of the OBCA was substantially similar but with certain variations of
terminology and otherwise. Amendments to it were effected in 2017 by means of the Cutting
Unnecessary Red Tape Act (the “2017 Amendments”).46 At the request of a person submitting
notice of a proposal, the corporation is required to include a statement in support of the proposal
and the proposer’s name and address in the management information circular (if required) or notice
of meeting (otherwise).47 In the case of an offering corporation,48 notice of a proposal must be
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For example, in Watkin v Open Window Bakery Ltd, 26 BLR (2d) 301, 1996 CanLII 8284 (Ont SC), it was
determined on the facts that the sole purpose of requesting a meeting was to advance claims in a shareholders' action,,
and not for a bona fide purpose related in any significant way to the business or affairs of the corporation. That court
applied the decision in Cappuccitti v Bank of Montreal (1989), 46 BLR 255 (Ont HC), which held on the facts that
the proposal was purely designed to embarrass the bank and to give the applicant leverage in a lawsuit with the Bank
concerning the applicant's guarantee of a loan.
45
In the case of Paulson & Co Inc v Algoma Steel Inc (2006), 79 OR (3d) 191, 14 BLR (4th) 104 (Sup Ct J), the court
held that the meeting was required to be "called" within the period stated in the statute, but that the scheduling of a
requisition meeting was a matter left to the business judgment of the directors, to be determined by the directors acting
honestly, in good faith and with a view to the best interest of the corporation; and that the court should defer to such
business judgment provided that it was within a range of reasonableness.
46
The Cutting Unnecessary Red Tape Act, SO 2017, c. 20 – Bill 154. Royal Assent received November 14, 2017 (the
“2017 Amendments”).
47
Supra, note 42 s. 8(1), repealing and substituting s. 99(2) and (3).
48
Supra, note 14.

847
submitted not less than 60 days before the anniversary date of the last annual meeting if proposed
to be raised at an annual meeting or, otherwise, the date of the proposed meeting.49
Any proposal made by a proposer who submitted a proposal that was included in a management
information circular or notice of meeting but failed to present such proposal at the meeting of
shareholders need not be included in such a document subsequently.50 Proposals that are
substantially similar to proposals submitted to a previous meeting within five years or other
prescribed period which did not receive a minimum level of support specified in s. 99 (5.4) need
not be included in the management information circular or notice of meeting, as the case may be.51
Neither the DGCL nor the MBCA contain any provision similar to or equivalent to the proposal
mechanism, however, federal securities law, in particular, Rule 240.14a-8 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,52 creates some rights that are similar in this respect and in respect of which
there is extensive case law. Such matters of securities law exceed the limitations of our review.
Of course, it is generally beyond the capacity of shareholders to initiate corporate action, except
by means of statutory and other remedies. Accordingly, while a proposal may be used to bring the
matter to the attention of the directors and management, generally speaking, it has no binding
effect. However, successful passage of a proposal, significant support for proposal, or even just
the making of a proposal, the initiation of a proposal may have some persuasive effect on the board
and management. In some cases, securities laws promote such actions, as in the case of “say on
pay”.
A 2010 study by Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben considered the increased likelihood of boards
implementing non-binding majority-vote governance-related shareholder proposals, the major
determinants of which implementation were found to be shareholder pressure, as measured by the
voting outcome and the influence of the proponent of the proposal, the nature of the specific
proposal, and the acceptance of such proposals by corporate peers. It also found that listening to
shareholder “voice” had positive consequences for board members. Implementation of such
proposals were associated with a reduction of approximately one-fifth in director turnover at the
49

Supra, note 42 s. 8(2), repealing and substituting s. 99 (5) (a).
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target firm and a like reduction in target firm directors losing board seats in other firms. It appears
that implementing such proposals is regarded as positive behaviour by directors, who are rewarded
(or, at least, not disbenefited) accordingly.53
Under sections 103 (5) of the CBCA and 116 (5) of the OBCA, a shareholder can make a proposal
to make, amend, or repeal a by-law.54 Under the OBCA, if such proposal is adopted by the
shareholders at a meeting, it becomes immediately effective and does not require any further
confirmation. In other words, this type of shareholder proposal can be binding on the corporation
in accordance with its purported effect, provided that it is otherwise lawful. For example, a by-law
requiring advance notice of nominations for election as directors (commonly called an “advance
notice bylaw”) could be repealed by means of a shareholder proposal which is adopted at a meeting
of shareholders. Consequently, this provision may be seen as limiting or derogating from the
general and extensive management powers of the board, although only to the extent otherwise
permitted to be effected by means of by-laws.55
At the very least, the proposal mechanism provides an opportunity for shareholders to voice
concerns about the corporation’s business and affairs. In some cases, the exercise of such voice
may be motivated, in part, by the shareholder’s loyalty to the corporation and in other cases by a

See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R Stubben, “Board of Directors' Responsiveness to Shareholders:
Evidence from Shareholder Proposals” (2010) 16:1 J Corporate Finance 53.
54
Piikani Investment Corporation v Piikani First Nation, 2008 ABQB 775, involved a complex situation concerning
a shareholder proposal to amend the articles and bylaws of the subject corporation which held funds received by the
Piikani First Nation in settlement of certain land claims against Canada and the Province of Alberta The matters at
issue related to alleged differences between the settlement agreement providing for the creation of the corporation and
the corporation's actual articles and bylaws. It is a textbook example of the manifold issues, complex and otherwise,
that can be brought before a court with respect to such shareholder procedural matters. The settlement agreement was
held to be a unanimous shareholder agreement under section 146 of the CBCA as a result of which it was held that
the bylaws had to comply with such agreement", both "as a foundational document" (para 88) and as a unanimous
shareholder agreement (para 91).
55
In Wells v Melnyk, supra note 28, however, the ability of the board to control the bylaws even in the absence of a
shareholder proposal to amend the bylaws was contested. The withdrawal of proxies immediately before the scheduled
meeting of shareholders, which had the effect of denying a quorum, was met by a board resolution purporting to amend
the bylaws to reduce the quorum. The meeting which was then held was found by the court to be improperly constituted
as the quorum reducing bylaw was invalid for lack of notice and lack of shareholder approval. The requirement of
section 103 (2) of the CBCA that any bylaw passed by the directors had to be submitted to the shareholders “at the
next meeting of shareholders” was strictly interpreted, although section 103 (3) provided that the board resolution was
effective until confirmed, amended or rejected or until it ceased to be effective under subsection 103 (4 4 by reason
of being rejected by shareholders or not being submitted to shareholders. The court’s interpretation of these provisions
meant that the entitlement of shareholders to vote at a meeting of shareholders could not be affected by board action
taken immediately before the meeting. Of course, it was to avoid this result that the quorum reducing bylaw was
passed by the board. The shareholders' statutory right to approve certain board actions (in this case, an amendment of
the bylaws) was thereby protected.
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desire to increase the current market value of its shares, in both cases as an alternative, or as
preparatory, to the shareholder’s sale of shares, thereby exercising a right of exit. As will be
discussed below, shareholders with a significant interest in the corporation and who engage in
regular dialogue with the board and management may enjoy influence which might obviate the
necessity of bringing a proposal; however, the ability to initiate a proposal may facilitate and
encourage such dialogue.
Like shareholder approval of fundamental transactions, the shareholder proposal mechanism
provides shareholders with a right of voice which may operate in connection with loyalty to
mitigate against a shareholder seeking to exit the investment, in at least some cases. As such, it
engages with the centrality of management, separation of management from ownership, capital
lock-in, ownership of assets and exclusive subjection to liabilities, and transferability attributes of
the corporation, which are essential to it being a corporation.
Requisition for a Meeting of Shareholders
Sections 143 of the CBCA and 105 of the OBCA empower the holders of not less than five per
cent of the issued voting shares of a corporation to requisition the directors to call a meeting of
shareholders for the purposes stated in the requisition. The directors are required to call such
meeting unless: a record date has been fixed and notice given; the directors of called a meeting of
shareholders and given notice; or the business of the meeting stated in the requisition (which we
will here call “unsuitable business”) does not require this.
This unsuitable business is business in respect of which a proposal may also be disqualified. In
fact, the disqualification provision of the requisition sections incorporates by reference the
disqualification provisions in the proposal sections. If the directors do not within twenty-one days
of receiving such requisition call a meeting, any shareholder who signed the requisition may call
the meeting, in which case the corporation is required to reimburse such shareholder for the
expenses reasonably incurred and requisitioning, calling and holding the meeting.56
As in the case for proposal, the ability of the shareholders to pass resolutions which will be legally
effective are subject to the limitations of corporate law and other law. However, this procedure
may be employed where shareholders are empowered to effect results, such as in the case of the
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See the discussion in the text accompanying, and the text in, notes 26-28 above.
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removal of directors. Of course, there is a significant body of case law concerning these provisions.
Under sections 144 of the CBCA and 106 of the OBCA, in these and other circumstances resort
may be had to the court which may order a meeting to be called, held, and conducted in the manner
that the court directs.57
There is no equivalent provision in the DGCL. Section 7.02 (a) (2) of the MBCA requires a
corporation to call a special meeting if the holders of at least 10% of all the votes entitled to be
cast on an issue proposed to be considered at the proposed special meeting deliver to the
corporation one or more written demands for the meeting describing the purpose or purposes for
which it is to be held, provided that the articles may fix a lower percentage or a higher percentage
not exceeding 25% of such votes.
The Official Comment notes that one or more factions of shareholders may demand meetings at
roughly the same time or that a single or changing faction of shareholders may request consecutive,
overlapping, or repetitive meetings; and that, in such cases, the responsible corporate officers have
some discretion as to the calling and purposes of the meeting. They may refuse to call a meeting
for a purpose identical or similar to that purpose for which a previous special meeting was held in
the recent past or to decline to call a special meeting where an annual meeting will be held in the
near future. Where the corporation does not call a meeting within the prescribed period of time, a
shareholder who signed such a demand may apply to court under section 7.03 for an order calling
such meeting.
Consequently, the statutory requisition power, where available, may be used not only to give
“voice” to shareholder concerns but also, in certain cases, to implement permitted actions,
including removal of directors. Such removal, in turn, could facilitate a change of management
and of corporate policies. Accordingly, this power can be seen as one of intermediate effect in
monitoring and in seeking to moderate behaviour, particularly excessive behaviour, of the board
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The cases which concern these issues include: Canadian Jorex Limited v 477749 Alberta Ltd (1991), 117 AR 222,
85 Alta LR (2d) 313 (CA) (concerning the power of the board of directors to cancel a meeting of shareholders
previously called); Airline Industry Revitalization Co v Air Canada (1999), 45 OR (3d) 370, 178 DLR (4th) 740 (Sup
Ct J); Sparten Establishment v International Telepresence (Canada) Inc, 1999 CanLII 6293 (BC SC); Environmental
Management Solutions Inc v D’Addario, 11 BLR (4th) 286, 2005 CanLII 51351 (Ont Sup Ct J) [Environmental
Management Solutions] (an application to restrain the holding of a meeting); Wells v Melnyk, supra note 28;
Goodwood Inc v Cathay Forest Products Corp, 2013 ONSC 2696 (an application for costs of a meeting); Marks v
Intrinsyc Software International Inc, 2013 ONSC 727 (complaint concerning an alleged delay in scheduling a meeting
requisitioned by the applicant); Wells v Bioniche Life Sciences Inc, 2013 ONSC 4871.
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or of a controlling shareholder exercising control or influence over the board. It may be used to
redress imbalances obtaining from time to time vis-à-vis the corporate essentialist attributes.
Such requisition pursuant to corporate law might also thereby effect changes in the internal
organization of the corporation, involving its structure, processes and personnel. Legislators and
regulators concerned with the availability of proposal, requisition and other shareholder mechanics
giving them voice and even power with respect to taking actions binding on the corporation would
be well to consider such relationships.
PART B – INFORMED VOTING BY SHAREHOLDERS
As demonstrated above, the power to vote for the election of directors is perhaps the most
important right of shareholders. It enables the shareholders to select the directors, who have the
right and the power, as a matter of corporate law, to manage or supervise the management of the
business and affairs of the corporation. The board of directors has plenary authority in this respect,
subject only to qualifications principally relating to fundamental transactions, self-dealing, and
significant abuses of authority. In order to be said meaningfully to possess and exercise such
“oversight”, “review”, or “”residual” power and authority, however, shareholders must be
informed about the relevant matters. Positive corporate law imposes obligations on the board of
directors to this end.
Proxy Solicitation and Voting
In recognition of the inconvenience that that might be consequent upon the necessity to attend
meetings of shareholders in person, most modern corporate statutes permit the holders of voting
shares to appoint a person, known as a proxyholder, to represent the shareholder at a meeting and
to attend and vote and act on behalf of the shareholder as if the shareholder were personally present
at the meeting. Section 147 and following of the CBCA and section 109 and following of the
OBCA may be cited as examples. The ostensible purpose of such provisions is to permit
participation at meetings by shareholders who might otherwise be unable to be personally present.
Generally speaking, a proxyholder is required to attend and comply with the directions of the
shareholder concerned. For example, this is required by sections 152 of the CBCA and 114 of the
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OBCA. Detail of the requirements as to the use of, and as to the form and contents of proxies are
prescribed by regulations under each statute.58
For a number of reasons, including some relating to the real or perceived legitimacy of the process
and result, most modern corporate statutes require management of a “public” corporation (in effect,
a “distributing corporation” under the CBCA59 and an “offering corporation” under the OBCA60)
to solicit proxies from the shareholders generally, as in section 149 of the CBCA and sections 111
and 112 of the OBCA. This broadens the base of shareholders represented at a meeting, beyond
those attending the meeting in person or executing proxies of their own motion. It also provides
some indication of the extent of support by shareholders generally for the incumbent board of
directors. Shareholders and others may also solicit proxies, for example under sections 150 of the
CBCA and section 112 of the OBCA. Among other things, this permits shareholders to organize
themselves to oppose management proposals for the election of directors or relating to certain
substantive matters or both.
Organizers of dissident campaigns may be able to avail themselves of an exception from the proxy
requirements where the total number of shareholders is proxies are solicited is fifteen or fewer
under subsection 150 (1.1) of the CBCA or 112 (1.1) of the OBCA. Soliciting proxies by public
broadcast, speech or publication does not by itself require preparation of a circular by reason of
subsections 150 (1.2) and 112 (1.2) of the CBCA and OBCA, respectively. The adequacy of proxy
circulars, management or dissident, and whether they are required in any particular case are
frequently challenged in court.61
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For the CBCA, the Canada Business Corporations Regulations, SOR/2001-512, especially at ss. 54 and 67-69
inclusive, and, for the OBCA, RRO. 1990, Reg 62, especially at ss. 27-29.3 inclusive.
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Supra note 16.
60
Supra note 14.
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For example, in Polar Star Mining Corporation v Willock (2009) 96 OR (3d) 688, 57 BLR (4th) 71 (Sup Ct J), the
issuance of press releases prior to distribution of a dissident proxy circular was held not to merit the order sought
which would restrain further breaches by the dissident. Reliance on the safe harbour provision of subsection 150 (1.1]
was upheld by the court in Smoothwater Capital Partners LP I v Equity Financial Holdings Inc, 2014 ONSC 324
[Smoothwater Capital]. The court there cited, inter alia, two of the leading cases on proxy solicitation: Western Mines
Ltd v Sheridan, [1975] BCJ No 54 (SC), in which the court found, in all the circumstances, that the letter sent could
not be considered to be "reasonably calculated" to result in the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy
under the equivalent provision of the Business Corporations Act (British Columbia), SBC 2002, c 57; and Brown v
Duby, 28 OR (2d) 745, 111 DLR (3d) 418 (H Ct J). Some discussion of these issues appears in L Getz, “Proxies – The
Meaning of Solicitation” (1976) 1 Can Bus LJ 472; and BG Hansen, “Annual Survey of Canadian Law – Corporation
Law” (1978) 10:1 Ottawa L Rev 617.
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Proxy Solicitation and Mandated Disclosure
Most modern corporate statutes recognize the considerable information asymmetry between
management and shareholders at large and attempt to reduce this asymmetry to some degree by
requiring a certain level of disclosure in regard to the election of directors and in relation to other
matters as to which the shareholders exercise an approval/disapproval function. In connection with
its solicitation of proxies, which is mandatory for “public corporations”,62 management is required
to distribute to shareholders, the directors, and the auditor a base disclosure document, which is
known as a “management proxy circular” under section 150 of the CBCA and an “information
circular” under section 112 of the OBCA. Shareholders soliciting proxies are required, subject to
certain exceptions, to distribute a “dissident’s proxy circular”.63
The requirements as to the form and contents of such circulars are quite extensive, and are
prescribed in regulations under the respective statutes.64 Although interesting, these must be
treated as beyond the scope of the present work. As might be expected, however, compliance with
those requirements are frequently challenged by those in opposition to the proponents of the
circular.65
An annual meeting of shareholders is required under section 133 of the CBCA and section 94 of
the OBCA. Notice is required to be given under sections 135 of the CBCA and 96 of the OBCA.
The normal business of an annual meeting consists of consideration of the financial statements and
the auditor’s report, election of directors and reappointment of the incumbent auditor. All other
business is considered to be special business. In effect, where the only business to be considered
is annual meeting business, extensive disclosure of the background of directors, their
compensation by way of cash, stock options and otherwise, and that of management is required.

OBCA, S. 111.This applies, effectively, to distributing corporations. CBCA s. 149, applying, effectively to “offering
corporations”, supra, note 44.
63
CBCA, s. 150; OBCA, s. 112. See discussion under the immediately preceding heading in the text.
64
Supra note 47; especially, in the case of the CBCA, at ss. 55-66 and, in the case of the OBCA, ss.30-42 inclusive.
65
In Smoothwater Capital, supra note 48, the court held that the term "solicitation" was to be defined broadly in an
inclusive manner and that the existence of a solicitation is a question of fact, on the nature of the communication of
the circumstances of its transmission, citing HR Nathan and ME Voore, Corporate Meetings Law and Practice
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 1995) (loose-leaf). Among the leading cases on compliance with the standard of
disclosure are: CI Covington Fund v White, [2000] OJ No 4589 (Sup Ct) at para 46; Deluce Holdings Inc v Air Canada
al (1992) 12 OR (3d) 131, 98 DLR (4th) 509 (Gen Div); UPM-Kymmene Corp v UPM-Kymmene Miramachi Inc
(2004), 250 DLR (4th) 526, 183 OAC 310 (CA).
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Where any special business is to be transacted the meeting, sections 135 of the CBCA and 96 of
the OBCA require the nature of that business to be stated in the notice in sufficient detail to permit
the shareholder to form a reasoned judgment thereon and to contain the text of the relevant special
resolution.66
Such provisions are intended to ensure that shareholders are able to exercise their voting rights in
a meaningful way. This confers some legitimacy on the voting process and binds shareholders,
other corporate participants, and the investment community generally to the result, not only in
legal, but also in practical, and even moral, terms. It also seeks to encourage feelings of fairness
by, confidence in, and loyalty towards the directors and management, and seeks to discourage exit
due to diminished perceptions of fairness, confidence and loyalty.
These objectives are reinforced by the powers of the court under the relevant corporate statutes.
Both sections 144 of the CBCA and 106 of the OBCA empower a shareholder, a director, or the
corporate regulator to apply to court for an order that a meeting be called, held and conducted in a
manner that the court directs. Such order may be made if it is impracticable to call or to conduct
the meeting in the manner prescribed by the articles, the by-laws, or the statute or for any other
reason that court thinks fit.67
An application to court may also be made under sections 145 of the CBCA and 107 of the OBCA
by a corporation, shareholder or a director to determine any controversy with respect to an election
or appointment of a director or auditor. The court may restrain the party concerned from acting
pending determination of the dispute, may declare the result of the disputed election or
appointment, may order a new election or appointment and provide directions in the management
of the business and affairs of the corporation in the interim; and may determine the voting rights
of shareholders and the of persons claiming to own shares.68
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Cases concerning the standards of disclosure and compliance therewith include: Environmental Management
Solutions, supra note 46; Wells v Melnyk, supra note 25; Meson Capital Partners LLC v Aberdeen International Inc,
2015 ONSC 532, which left the determination to an independent chair of the meeting, who was appointed by the court.
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The relevant case law includes many of the cases referenced here, including those cited in footnotes 35 and 37.
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The ruling of the President of the corporation, acting as chairman of a meeting of shareholders in accordance with
the bylaws went to the Supreme Court of Canada in Blair v Consolidated Enfield Corp, [1995] 4 SCR 5, 128 DLR
(4th) 73, holding that such person was entitled to indemnification, despite a personal interest in the outcome of the
decision, provided that he acted honestly and in good faith.
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The considerable extent of such powers, although narrower than in respect of the oppression
remedy, do permit the court to intrude into the relationships among the constituents of the
corporation. The DGCL, in sections 225 and 227, and the MBCA, in section 7.29A, have
provisions of this general nature. As the official comment to the MBCA indicates, such provisions
seek to prevent the corporation from being immobilized as a result of such controversies.
Of course, elaborate rules deal with many details affecting a shareholder’s entitlement to vote;
which are too extensive to review here. However, considering that the right to elect and remove
directors is a principal, perhaps even the principal, right of shareholders, this attention to detail is
usually considered to be entirely appropriate.
In addition to the requirements of corporate law, of course, extensive provisions of securities law
may also apply to the process of shareholder meetings and related disclosure. As indicated above,
these are beyond the purview of the present work.
Proxy Contests
Significance of Proxy Contests
Of course, organizing or participating in a dissident campaign can be regarded as a means of
expressing shareholder voice, by exercising the shareholders’ superintendence or monitoring
function vis-à-vis the board, as well, perhaps, as advancing the prospect of shareholder “exit”. In
the case of a proxy contest, the shareholder may be participating in Manne’s “market for corporate
control”, three mechanisms of which he identifies as the proxy fight, direct purchase of shares, and
the merger.69 Manne identifies these mechanisms as ways of affecting control of the corporation.
Both proxy contests and takeover bids prominently display the trade-offs made in connection with
establishing the corporation as a legal entity; most notably, the associations among the legal
69

See the discussion of exit and voice in the early sections of the present chapter. See also Manne, supra note 5 at 112
and 114, respectively. Although this article is cited most frequently for its foundational discussion of the "market for
corporate control generally, and for its discussion of "residual claimants", it has a useful early discussion of proxy
fights as an alternative to share purchases as a means of acquiring control, at pp. 114-115. The foundational article
(usually cited as to the economics and organization of the firm) by Armen A Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization” (1972) 62:5 American Economic Rev 777, likewise discusses the
difficulties of monitoring in cases of team production, at pp. 780-781, the advantages of assigning the monitoring
function to a residual claimant, at pp. 782-73; and the use of proxy battles or stock purchases for such purposes to
displace existing management or to modify managerial policies, at p. 788. See also the early study by Richard M
Duvall & Douglass V Austin, “Predicting the Results of Proxy Contests” (1965) 20:3 J Finance 464, reviewing all
proxy contests between 1956 and 1960, and finding that the targets of proxy contests tended to have lower rates of
return on network and lower profit margins than their peers.
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essentialist characteristics of capital lock-in and transferability of shares, such that investors who
are unable to demand a return of their capital may nevertheless liquidate their investment by
transferring shares; and central management independent of, but, at least theoretically, selected by,
accountable to, monitored by, and with certain rights of approval allocated to, equity ownership,
such that the corporation is managed by powerful central authority regardless of changes in its
ownership, while equity owners possess certain vestigial authority.
Many of the same considerations are relevant in the context of takeover bids; however, their
regulation is primarily effected by means of securities law, which has been identified as beyond
the scope of the present work. For this reason, some effort will be devoted here to “unpacking”
some of the implications of these relationships in the context of the proxy contest.
Henry Manne, averting to the separation of ownership and control identified by Berle and Means,
and to the inability to discern “any control relationship between small shareholders and corporate
management”, asserts that “the market for corporate control gives to the shareholders both power
and protection commensurate with their interest in corporate affairs”.70 In this regard, Alchian and
Demsetz argue that both proxy battles and stock purchases “concentrate the votes required to
displace existing management or modify managerial policies”.71
Thus, both may be considered to implicate the relationship between the allocation of extensive
powers of management to the board of directors and the lock-in of capital, on the one hand, and
the residual election, monitoring and other management-related rights, as well as the transferability
of interest of equity owners, on the other. Of course, all of the foregoing corporate essentialist
attributes and allocations of corresponding rights also relate to the other corporate essentialist
attributes of separate legal entity status, and limited liability and asset partitioning.
Needless to say, especially where dissident shareholders propose alternative candidates for
election as directors, such action may be expected to be opposed by the existing board and
management,72 who have the not insignificant, and arguably considerable, advantages of
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Manne, supra note 5 at 112. The reference to the extent of interest of small shareholders refers to the necessity for
them to assert their "power" and to claim "protection" in order to avail themselves of either.
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Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 69 at 788.
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In many cases, dissidents respond to proposals made by management for the reelection of incumbent directors, a
situation which itself is likely to precipitate conflict. Bebchuk and Stout consider these advantages to be extremely
formidable. See Lucian A Bebchuk, “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise” (2007) 93:3 Va L Rev 675; Lynn A
Stout, “The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control” (2007) 93:3 Va L Rev 789.
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incumbency, control over the proxy apparatus, and ability to charge the expenses of the proxy
battle to the corporation (in "real-time" and regardless of success),73 resulting in a proxy contest,
“proxy battle”, or “proxy fight”.74 Consequently, as noted by Oliver Hart and others, engaging in
a proxy contest involves the dissidents in a substantial “free rider” problem in which the dissidents
incur the costs and risks of success and possible reimbursement, while other shareholders may
benefit without making any such contribution.75
There is a vast literature too extensive to review here concerning the purpose of conducting such
proxy contests,76 including removing “managers” who fail to maximize shareholder wealth77, and
acquiring practical or effective control over the subject corporation,78 without necessarily
acquiring (and incurring the expense of acquiring) a majority or significant minority equity
ownership position);79 the effectiveness of proxy contests, whether in terms of success in achieving
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Manne, supra note 5, notes that incumbents, unlike dissidents who are likely to be reimbursed for proxy contest
expenses only if they are successful, are able to finance proxy contest expenses from corporate funds. See also John
Pound, “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight” (1988) 20 J Financial Economics 237,
attributing some of the management advantage, at p. 237, to "inefficiency in the system of proxy vote solicitation".
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adopt rules more favourable to challengers. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, “A Framework for Analyzing
Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests” (1990) 78:5 Cal L Rev 1071.
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normally is highly incented to resist: A study by Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, “Proxy Contests and the
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Oliver Hart, “Corporate Governance: Theory and Implications” (1995) 105:430 Economic Journal 678 at 682-683.
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Stuart B Morrow, “Proxy Contests and Shareholder Meetings” (2003) 36 UBC L Rev 483.
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See Manne, supra note 5 at 112, 114; and discussion in footnotes 5 and 52 above.
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Manne, supra note 5 at 114. Although this article is cited most frequently for its discussion of "residual claimants",
it advances a useful early discussion of proxy fights as an alternative to share purchases as a means of acquiring
control: pp. 114-115. He notes that prices often rise on the proxy fight announcement reflecting both a rise in market
price of the vote and the discounted value of potential gain and share price in the event that the dissidents succeeds.
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the stated objective80 or otherwise;81 their effect (including on the corporation’s management team,
strategy, share price, and performance);82 and other related matters.
Consequences of Proxy Contests
Importantly, proxy contests have important consequences for the reputation of the incumbent
directors involved.83 Specifically, Fos and Tsoutsoura found that contested nominations attract
more intensive media coverage for all directors nominated, including the incumbents, especially
after the results of the contest become known.84 They concluded that such publicity contributes to
the significant career cost which is imposed on incumbent directors after a proxy contest: such
directors are likely to lose directorships not only in the targeted company, but also in other
corporations; and not only when such other corporations are themselves targeted subsequently, but
even when there is no proxy contest at all. This is considered to attest to the depreciation of the
value of such directors in the directorial labour market after a proxy contest.
They found that incumbent directors who keep their seats at the target company after a proxy
contest are expected to lose seats on the boards of other corporations, while incumbent directors
who are replaced are expected to lose board seats at an even higher rate. This effect is most
pronounced with respect to independent directors.85 Accordingly, it appears that the proxy contest
focuses attention not only on corporate performance, but also on corporate governance in terms of

See, for example, Lee Harris, “Corporate Elections and Tactical Settlements” (2014) 39 J Corp L 221, finding, at
pp. 246 and 250, that the majority of investors acting as dissidents comprised a small number of activist institutional
investors, who employed proxy contests as one of their investment strategies, and who often acquired holdings in the
target companies for the purpose of conducting such activities; and, at pp. 250-251, in order to precipitate
advantageous changes in target activities.
81
See Roberta Romano, “Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism and Valuable Mechanism of Corporate
Governance” (2001) 18:2 Yale J Reg 174 at 183; Randall S Thomas & James F Cotter, “Shareholder Proposals in the
New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction” (2007) 13:2-3 J Corporate Finance
368 at 376. A useful historical study is that by Stuart L Gillan & Laura T Starks, “The Evolution of Shareholder
Activism in the United States” (2007) 19:1 J Applied Corporate Finance 55.
82
See, for example, Dodd & Warner, supra note 17, finding that although dissidents generally fail to secure a majority
of the board, they often acquire some board seats, and also finding that proxy contests, regardless of outcome, are
associated with increased share price.
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See the discussion of director reputation in the previous section under the heading “Voting for the Removal of
Directors”. The "stigma" attached to losing a director's position in a proxy contest is arguably less severe than losing
it as a result of a shareholders' removal resolution.
84
Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, “Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy
Contests” (2014) 114:2 J Financial Economics 316 at 329-331.
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Ibid at 334.
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the involvement of the directors in that regard. While this may be advantageous for shareholders,
directors may want to avoid such contests and attention.
Dodd and Warner’s early and extensively cited study examined all of the proxy contests (96) for
the election of directors conducted between July 1, 1962 and January 31, 1978 with respect to
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange. They
found that most dissidents failed to obtain a majority of seats on the board, but gained some seats
in more than half of the cases; however, proxy contests generally increased stock prices, apparently
by improving corporate performance.86
Those results were largely replicated in Ikenberry and Lakonishok’s 1993 study of 97 proxy
contests during the period 1968-1987,87 which found that the corporations that were targets of
proxy contests had experienced negative abnormal returns and deteriorating operating
performance prior to announcement of the contest.88 Where dissidents acquired at least one seat
on the target board, such targets had “remarkable” increases in operating income before
depreciation, but where all of the incumbent directors were returned, there was a short-term decline
in that benchmark, but a continued upward trend somewhat later.89
Mulherin and Poulsen examined 270 proxy contests over the 1979-1994 time, finding 116 cases
in which the proxy contest was followed by a takeover bid, which was successful in 63 instances,
resulting in significant share price increases, but in decreases where the bid was not successful.90
They found that the key determinant of share price for companies involved in proxy contests which
were not followed by takeover bids was the replacement of the senior most officer. In 85 cases in
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which the dissidents gained at least one seat on the board, the CEO was replaced in 68 (80%).
They also found that 71% of the firms with management turnover engaged in significant corporate
restructuring, including liquidations, sales of major divisions or significant asset pools, plant
closings or substantial write-downs of assets.91
Mulherin and Poulsen concluded that investors anticipate that dissident success in acquiring board
seats will be followed by management turnover, and thence in a share price increase; however,
they anticipate that where there is no management turnover, the share price will tend to decrease.
When dissidents did not win seats, firms that nevertheless replaced senior management did
experience a share price increase, while the others had a share price decrease.92
There are, of course, a myriad of other studies of proxy contests; however, as noted above, there
is at least some evidence that proxy contests can achieve meaningful corporate governance and
other results in many cases. Such acknowledgement may contribute to validating the trade-offs
that are implicit in the corporate form, as reflected in its legal essentialist characteristics.
Settlement of Proxy Contests
Many proxy contests are settled before election as between the dissidents and management on
terms varying in their acceptability to the respective parties. An empirical study of such settlements
by Lee Harris in 2014,93 which purports to be the first such study,94 examined 191 contested
elections over a four-year period from 2006 to 2009. It found that firms with poor short-term or
immediate past returns (rather than long-term returns), low price-to-book values, and whose
dissidents have a significant ownership stake were more likely to settle.95
Harris found that directors of such firms anticipate that a contested shareholder vote may result in
a replacement on the grounds of performance; and are less confident that they will be offered future
board positions; and, consequently, settle the proxy contest in an attempt to avoid these
consequences.96 Dissidents, who are normally activist investors, may be motivated to settle by the
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desire to obtain representation on the board and then to be able to influence other directors to make
beneficial changes, including changes to the management team.97
Harris maintains that settlements allow directors to sidestep a shareholder vote, keep themselves
and management in place, and avoid giving shareholders a meaningful choice about the identity
of directors and the strategic direction of the firm.98 He argues that contested elections provide an
opportunity for “rank-and-file shareholders to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
existing management team” and thereby participate in and influence firm behaviour, which is
meaningful because contested elections are so rare.99
Thus, settlements are less desirable for average shareholders, especially because there is reason to
think that “as a matter of human psychology, a formal vote may enhance shareholder power, even
in cases where managers are not ousted and the challenge fails”, such that “in theory, a formal vote
they have a unique disciplinary effect on managerial behavior”.100 Accordingly, even if the
dissidents do not acquire representation of the board in consequence of the contested election, “the
disciplinary effect on managers remains”, such that managers become more responsive to
shareholder interests.101
Accordingly, proxy contests present an opportunity, in the context of declarative corporate law, to
consider the instantiation, and interaction, of legal essentialist attributes, and the interactions of
such instantiations, each in “real world” or concrete circumstances. While the scope of the present
work does not permit the more detailed examination of these considerations more generally, it is
thought that the example of proxy contests can illustrate the benefits of a more detailed
examination more generally.
Financial Disclosure
In the case of “public” companies, the modern corporate statutes require extensive disclosure of
information to shareholders. Sections 155 of the CBCA and 154 of the OBCA require the directors
to place before shareholders at every annual meeting comparative financial statements meeting
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certain prescribed standards, the report of the auditor, and any other information required by the
articles, the bylaws or any unanimous shareholder agreement. Both the CBCA, in sections 148 and
following 158 and 162, and the OBCA, require that the shareholders appoint auditors, who must
meet certain requirements as to qualifications and independence. They also have the power to
remove auditors under sections 165 of the CBCA and 149 of the OBCA.
Sections 158 of the CBCA and 159 of the OBCA require the directors to approve, and sections
159 of the CBCA and 154 of the OBCA require them to deliver, the financial statements to
shareholders. The rights and duties of the auditors are prescribed by statute, particularly in sections
168 and following of the CBCA, and 151 and following of the OBCA.
These rights include the right under sections 170 of the CBCA and 153 of the OBCA to obtain
information from directors, officers, employees and agents. In order for shareholders to have
access to certain base financial information complying with certain stipulated standards, so as to
be able to exercise their “choice” and “oversight” roles with respect to the board’s “central
management” function, the auditors who are appointed by, and report to, the shareholders are
afforded statutory rights to obtain information from “central management” which might not be
available otherwise to shareholders or their agents. The generation, custody, and employment of
the information to which the auditors may gain access might otherwise have been regarded as a
prerogative of the “central management” function upon which this right of the auditors might
otherwise have been seen as impinging.
Sections 171 of the CBCA and 158 of the OBCA require corporations that are “public”, in effect,
to have an audit committee, which is required to review the financial statements prior to their
approval by the full board of directors. The objective, of course, is that a group smaller than the
full board of directors, being composed of persons with suitable background, experience, and
qualifications, and a majority of whom are not officers or employees, should be able to consider,
to review with the auditors, and to reach informed conclusions concerning, the requisite matters in
more detail and with enhanced judgment than might be possible for the full board otherwise.
Extensive requirements of securities law applicable in the provinces and territories of Canada
regulate these matters extensively, concerning, in particular, the independence and qualifications

863
of members of the audit committee and related matters. These are beyond the scope of the present
work, which deals with the corporate law, including corporate declarative law.102
The members of the audit committee are subject to potential liability for breaches of duty under
the provisions generally applicable to directors under sections 122 of the CBCA and 134 of the
OBCA. The standards of care and good faith, respectively under subsection 123 (4) and (5) of the
CBCA and 135 of the OBCA, are considered to be affected by the background, experience, and
qualifications of audit committee members.103
Changes of auditor, whether by way of resignation or otherwise, trigger certain disclosure
obligations by the corporation and may entitle the auditors to provide certain disclosures to
shareholders under sections 168 of the CBCA and 149 of the OBCA. Certain provisions of
securities law, regulatory authorities, and stock or other trading exchanges may also apply.104
Delaware has no requirements for such disclosure (thereby leaving the matter to securities law),
while the MBCA’s limited requirements in s. 16.20 primarily have in view corporations that are
not subject to federal securities law.
The disclosure requirement of the corporate law statutes facilitates the division of authority in
respect of management between the board of directors, as possessor of and actor with respect to
such authority, on the one hand, and the owners of the equity capital of the corporation (which is
locked-in but rights in respect of which are transferable), on the other hand, who have no rights to
participate directly in management but have certain rights to select, opine on, and change
management.
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The owners of equity capital have no explicit rights to the assets, or have any liability in respect
of obligations, of the corporation as a separate legal entity. Access to the ability to acquire some
minimal level of meaningful knowledge of the business and affairs of the corporation is considered
to be essential to a meaningful exercise of these shareholder rights. As can be seen, the rights of
corporate statutory law accorded in this behalf under the statutes examined do, in fact, instantiate
the essential legal attributes of the corporation as such.
PART C – SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BEYOND VOTING
Right to Sell or Transfer Shares
As discussed above, the right to sell or transfer the shares is related to key attributes of the
corporation as a matter of law; namely, the independence of management and ownership, on the
one hand, and the lock-in of capital (except for capital which is made, by its terms, redeemable at
the option of the shareholder or the corporation), on the other. The lack of any necessary
relationship between ownership of the equity capital of the corporation and its management,
facilitates the transferability of that equity capital. Unlike other types of entities, the capacity to
direct the business entity is not a direct consequence of ownership over equity capital of the entity.
The equity capital provider’s inability to demand a return of capital from the entity, the so-called
“lock-in” effect, when combined with the absence of a right to manage the entity, forces the
shareholder who is dissatisfied with management performance may motivate the equity capital
provider to liquidate its investment in the entity. However, such equity capital provider may elect
to sell the shares in a voluntary transaction to another party, who thereby assumes the same position
in law. As noted above, such a change of share ownership does not, of itself, affect the
creditworthiness of the entity.
Consequently, it is extremely important that the shareholder’s freedom to alienate his or her shares
be protected. In circumstances in which there may be no free market for those shares, or in which
there may be a reduced, little, or no, prospect of receiving a fair value for those shares, alternative
non-market mechanisms are provided under some corporate statutes.
The principal mechanism whereby shareholders can initiate the transfer of their shares in such
circumstances is the dissent and appraisal remedy; but, in the case of certain modern Canadian
statutes, the oppression remedy is also available. As the purchase of shares from a shareholder by
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the corporation or the payment of compensation relating to the purchase of shares are only
examples of the plenary power of the court in relation to the oppression remedy, its discussion will
be left to the remedy section below.
A shareholder’s right to determine when to hold such shares and when to sell or transfer shares
voluntarily may be considered to be limited by the existence of rights of others to acquire such
shares compulsorily, that is to say, where the shareholder is forced to sell or transfer shares
involuntarily. However, the right to sell or transfer shares in transactions that are voluntary on the
part of both the seller and the purchaser may be considered to be expanded in cases in which a
shareholder has a right to force another party to acquire shares in certain circumstances. Both of
these matters are discussed below under the heading “Compulsory and Compelled Acquisitions”.
Dissent and Appraisal Rights
As previously discussed, shareholders who dissent in the prescribed manner from special
resolutions approving certain fundamental transactions are entitled to be paid by the corporation
the value of their shares as determined in the prescribed manner. These fundamental transactions
include certain amendments to the articles of incorporation, amalgamations, export of the
corporation to another jurisdiction, arrangements, and sales, transfers, or leases of all or
substantially all the assets of the corporation other than in the ordinary course of business, as well
as going-private transactions and squeeze-out transactions.
Sections 190 of the CBCA and 185 of the OBCA allow a shareholder to dissent in respect of all
shares held and to be paid the fair value of such shares by taking action in the prescribed manner,
a detailed review of which is beyond our present purpose.105 Where a corporation fails to make an
offer to pay an amount the directors considered to be the fair value as determined in a detailed
statement accompanying the offer, the dissenting shareholder may apply to court to fix such a fair
value.106
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The DGCL contains no such provision; however, Chapter 13 of the MBCA deals with what it
describes as “appraisal rights”. As mentioned above, these arise in connection with various
fundamental transactions, including mergers or share exchanges, certain asset sales, certain
amendments to the articles, certain domestications, and certain conversions to nonprofit status or
conversions into a nonprofit entity and certain conversions into an unincorporated entity. The
MBCA provides an exception for corporations whose shares trade in organized market, which
have at least 2,000 thousand shareholders and which have a market capitalization by way of public
float of at least $ 20 million. Effectively, then, appraisal rights not available under the MBCA with
respect to most significant public companies.107 As in the case of the CBCA and the OBCA, the
exercise of appraisal rights under the MBCA involves compliance with extensive procedures set
forth in Chapter 13. As noted in the Official Comment, the existence of a viable public market is
thought to provide a proxy for differences of opinion that might obtain among shareholders as to
the fair value of the shares concerned.
The absence of appraisal rights from the DGCL significantly limits shareholder protection against
being “locked in and frozen out” as unwilling shareholders who are unable to secure reasonable
compensation for their shares in public or other markets. However, the Delaware courts may
provide some relief in certain situations. This subject is beyond the scope of the present work.
Compulsory and Compelled Acquisitions
The attributes of the legal entity, the corporation, have been previously discussed; including, in
particular, the relationship between capital lock-in and the ability of the shareholder to transfer his
or her shares for value in a voluntary, negotiated, market transaction, whether face-to-face or
impersonally in an organized market. However, in certain situations involving a public
corporation, such as after a public takeover bid for all the shares of a certain class (a “bid-for-all”)
in obiter, that a premium for "forcible taking" could be awarded in some cases (but not in the instant case) and that an
enhanced value might be awarded in appropriate cases (but not in the instant case), particularly involving force outs,
due to the synergies anticipated from the transaction; Domglas Inc v Jarislowsky, Fraser & Co. (1980), 13 BLR 135
(Que. S.C.), aff’d (1982), 138 DLR (3d) 521, 22 BLR 121 (Que CA); Ford Motor Company of Canada Ltd v Ontario
Municipal Employees Retirement Board, ), 79 OR (3d) (ON CA); 263 DLR. (4th) 450; 12 BLR. OAC 61; Smeenk v
Dexleigh Corp (2006), 74 OR (2d) 385, 72 DLR (4th) 609 (H Ct J).
107
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as a result of which only a very small percentage of the shares remain outstanding in the hands of
parties other than the original offeror, some complex considerations arise which may call for
abridgement of the paradigmatic shareholder rights.
Where, after a bid-for-all, a small percentage of shares remains outstanding, unless the shareholder
has a right to require the corporation to purchase or redeem his or her shares (a “right of
retraction”), which is not currently the case with respect to common shares or equity shares, the
capital lock-in attribute of the corporate legal structure prevents the shareholder from demanding
the return of his or her investment. At the same time, the reduction in the percentage of shares not
owned by the offeror and so comprising the “public float”, as well as in the number of holders of
such shares, will normally restrict both the liquidity and depth of the market for such shares, with
the result that bid and ask prices, as well as transaction prices, may be highly volatile and may not
suitably reflect the fair value of such shares. The liquidity and depth of the market, as well as its
transparency, are considered to be indicative of effectively functioning securities markets. 108
From the perspective of the original offeror, the existence of a small number and percentage of
shares in the public float outstanding after the bid (sometimes called a “rump”) may restrict the
ability of the offeror to deal with the target company as originally contemplated, for example, as a
wholly-owned subsidiary, whose financial statements are consolidated with those of the acquiror
(either in toto, or without discount for minority interest). Thus, it may be advantageous for both
the offeror and for rump shareholders to be quit of each other.
Consequently, section 206 of the CBCA provides, in effect, that if within one hundred and twenty
days after the date of a takeover bid, the bid is accepted by the holders of not less than ninety per
cent of the shares of any class of shares to which the takeover bid relates, other than those held at
the date of the bid by the offeror and its affiliates and associates, the offeror is entitled, on
complying with that section, to acquire the shares held by dissenting offerees on the same terms
as the takeover bid. This is generally referred to as a “force-in” right, as it is a right to force the
108
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non-accepting shareholders to tender their shares to the offer or on the same terms as the original
bid. A “dissenting offeree” is, in effect, a shareholder (or subsequent holder) of the class of shares
for which a bid-for-all is made who does not accept the takeover bid.
The offeror triggers this right by giving a notice which must include a statement of the right of the
dissenting offeree to elect to transfer such shares or to exercise their rights of appraisal under this
section. A dissenting offeree who does not give notice of exercise of the appraisal rights is deemed
to have elected to transfer the shares to the offeror on the same terms as the original bid. The
section contains detailed provisions as to its operation.
Under section 206.1 of the CBCA, if a shareholder of shares of a distributing (i.e. “public”
corporation) does not receive an offeror’s notice under section 206 within prescribed time limits,
such shareholder may require the offeror to acquire those shares, again on the same terms as the
original offer.
The OBCA contains provisions in sections 187 and 188 that are similar to section 206 and in
section 189 that are similar to section 206.1.
The DGCL and MGCA appear to contain no equivalent provisions. Consequently, apart from any
relevant common law or securities law, minority shareholders lack this kind of statutory protection.
This is particularly concerning, since two-tiered tender offers, in which the price offered in the
second tier or tranche, by way of subsequent tender offer or merger, is lower than that offered in
the first, were long (but are no longer) permitted under federal securities law. Although there are
many useful discussions of this subject109, a review of them exceeds the purview of this work.
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Remedies of Shareholders and Others
Participants in the corporation and in its business and affairs, including but not limited to
shareholders, may be entitled to pursue various statutory remedies. Section 238 of the CBCA
defines the term “complainant” to mean, in effect, a current or former registered holder or
beneficial owner of a security of a corporation or of any of its affiliates, a current or former director
or officer of a corporation or any of its affiliates, the Director (the regulator appointed under the
statute) or “any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an
application under this Part.” Subsections 2(2) through 2(5) of the CBCA define the term “affiliate”
and related terms.
The court’s ability to recognize as a complainant any person who, in its discretion, is a “proper
person” to make an application permits the court to determine what participants in the corporation
and in its business and affairs, and what other persons even beyond this, may seek relief. Relief
may be sought by means of derivative actions and by means of the oppression remedy. In respect
of those two matters, the provisions of the CBCA and OBCA are effectively the same. Some other
Canadian statutes also have similar provisions. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to the
CBCA here.
Derivative Actions
Under sections 239 of the CBCA and 246 of the OBCA, a complainant may apply to court for
leave to bring an action in the name of and on behalf of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries,
or to intervene in an action to which any such body corporate is a party, for the purpose of
prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of the body corporate. However, the
court must be satisfied that: the complainant has given the prescribed notice to the directors of the
corporation or its subsidiary, if they have not taken action within the prescribed time (CBCA) or
if the court is satisfied that the directors will not bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue
the action (OBCA); the complainant is acting in good faith; and it appears to be in the interests of
the corporation or its subsidiary that the action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued.
Under sections 240 of the CBCA and 247 of the OBCA, the court may make various orders,
including an order authorizing the complainant or any other person to control the conduct of the
action; giving directions for the conduct of the action; directing any amount adjudged payable by
a defendant in the action to be paid, in whole or in part, directly to former and present security
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holders of the corporation or its subsidiary, instead of to the corporation or subsidiary; and
requiring the corporation or its subsidiary to pay reasonable legal fees incurred by the complainant
in connection with the action.
Derivative actions are dealt with in sections 327 of the DGCL, and 7.40 and following of the
MBCA. The only generally applicable substantive provision of the DGCL relating to derivative
actions is section 327, which requires that the plaintiff be a stockholder at the time of the
transaction complained of or successor to such stockholder by operation of law. The MBCA also
requires that the shareholder “fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in
enforcing the right of the corporation”, and that such shareholder make a demand to the board that
it take suitable action and it is not done so within the prescribed period. Its provisions are much
more extensive than those of the DGCL.
The derivative action allows complainants, who are not limited only to shareholders, with the
approval and subject to the directions of the court, to circumvent the power of the directors with
respect to certain legal actions and proceedings. Ordinarily, the power to manage or supervise the
management of the business and affairs of the corporation would include matters relating to legal
actions and proceedings.
Because the term “affairs” in the CBCA and OBCA means “the relationships among the
corporation, its affiliates and the shareholders, directors and officers of such bodies corporate” (but
not their business) the management prerogative of the directors unless otherwise restricted,
specifically and expressly includes all matters relating to those relationships. This would, of
course, include such matters as compliance with, and breaches of, the duties of directors and the
consequences of the same. Accordingly, absent remedies such as the derivative action, directors
might not be held accountable for their behaviour in circumstances in which this might be
appropriate.
In effect, the remedy lies where the court is satisfied that: the prescribed demand has been made
for the directors to take action; the complainant is acting in good faith; and such action appears to
be interests of the corporation or subsidiary. In effect, the court may at any time make any order it
thinks fit. This may include assuming or authorizing others, including but not limited to the
complainant, and subject to any directions of the court made at any time, to assume control over
the conduct of the action.
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As is well known, the “business judgment” rule expresses the deference that courts generally
exhibit towards the determinations of directors made prudently and diligently with respect to
business matters. In the leading case of Aronson v. Lewis the business judgment rule was stated as
“a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.”110 This is considered to be appropriate for many reasons not the least of which
are, firstly, that responsibility for such matters is assigned by law to the directors; and, secondly,
that judges are considered to possess less information relevant to, and be less experienced in, the
matters affecting, and in making, business decisions.111
These considerations may be dispositive in most cases, and particularly relating to the underlying
substance of the matters that may be an issue in the litigation. However, on the assumption that
the court is comfortable that the information, likely including expert evidence, adduced before it,
justifies proceeding in such manner, the court hearing the application with respect to the derivative
action is not itself making a determination on the merits but is merely determining that the matter
at issue should be brought before another appropriate trier of fact, which it presumably would do
only in situations in which this is appropriate. It might be done, for example, where there is some
evidence of self-dealing among the directors or by a controlling shareholder.
The nature of the determination the court is asked to make in connection with an application for a
derivative action and in subsequent applications and orders relates to judicial proceedings and,
accordingly, is of a nature that courts make all the time. Indeed, the court granting the derivative
action application is thereby ensuring that another appropriate trier of fact may have the
opportunity to adjudicate the issue or issues concerned, based upon the evidence before it, and
subject to the usual legal standards, including, where appropriate, the business judgment rule.
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Accordingly, while the derivative action constitutes some intrusion upon the prerogatives of the
board of directors in terms of its legal responsibilities in respect of the corporate entity, it is
exceptional in nature and antique in origin.112 Similarly, its intervention in the internal organization
of the corporation is relatively limited, as it engages the structure, processes and personnel of the
corporation only at the board, which is the highest, level. The remedy gives effect to the legal
essentialist attributes of the corporation.
Oppression Remedy
The drafters of the oppression remedy, which was adopted in the new CBCA in 1975, considered
by way of example a predecessor provision in the United Kingdom, section 210 of the UK
Companies Act of 1948.113 Christopher Nicholls explains that it offered a remedy less drastic than
winding up a company, where winding up would have been justified on just and equitable grounds,
but which would bring an end to the matters complained of without bringing an end to the company
itself.114 However, it was little used and apparently only successfully applied on two occasions.115
The version adopted and subsequently developed in the CBCA is vastly different from its UK
predecessor and is considered to be “the broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended
shareholder remedy and the common law world.”116 The definition of the term “complainant” is
that contained in section 238 of the CBCA, discussed above. It permits the court to exercise its
discretion to determine who is a proper party.
Christopher Nicholls has observed that the courts “have been somewhat wary of too readily
permitting creditors to launch oppression actions”; 117 but have permitted this in appropriate cases,
such as by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of People’s Department Stores Inc. v. Wise.118
Although the scope of the present work precludes any attempt at an extensive review of the
112
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considerable scholarship on this subject, a review of the statutory provisions is, of course,
appropriate to our descriptivist analysis of statutory law relating to the corporation.
Under subsection 241 (2) if the court is satisfied that: (a) any act or omission of the corporation or
any of its affiliates effects a result, or (b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its
affiliates are or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or (c) the powers of the directors
of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner; that is oppressive
or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor,
director or officer, the court may make an order to rectify the matters complained of.
Thus, regard may be had to: (a) the results of acts or omissions of the corporation (called herein
the “results” test); (b) the manner in which the business or affairs are or have been carried on or
conducted (the “manner of conduct” test); and (c) the manner of exercise of the powers of the
directors (the “exercise of power” test). We will refer to these tests, that is to say, the results test,
the manner of conduct test, and the exercise of power test, collectively, as determining the “scope
of review”.
If any of these are determined to be either: (A) oppressive (“oppressive”); (B) unfairly prejudicial
to the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer (“unfairly prejudicial”); or (C)
unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer (“unfairly
disregards”); then an order to rectify the matters complained of may be issued.119 We will refer to
these determinations, collectively, as determining the “characterization” of the matter considered
within the scope of review.
Thus, the scope of review under section 241 relates to matters for which the directors are
responsible as a matter of corporate law but, except for the exercise of power test, is not limited to
their actions or omissions but, instead, comprehends actions or omissions of, within, and relating
to, the corporation. Accordingly, it may include a wide range of participants in the activities of the
corporation.
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The characterization determined as a result of investigating matters within the scope of review
specifically references the interests of certain participants, namely, security holders, creditors,
directors, and officers, however, it is not absolutely clear from a strict reading of the section
whether conduct determined to be “oppressive” must be oppressive in relation to those enumerated
interests. The repetition of the phrase “of any security holder, creditor, director or officer” in
relation to the language relating to the unfairly prejudicial determination and again in the language
relating to the unfairly disregards determination but which is not present in relation to the language
relating to the oppressive determination supports this conclusion. However, subsequent
interpretation of the oppressive determination renders this point moot as, in effect, the cases
(including the BCE case discussed in the next paragraph) interpret the word “oppressive” as
relating to interests of the named corporate participants, at least. It may also relate to interests of
other participants.
The nature of the remedy is discussed authoritatively by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2008 in
the BCE case as follows:
The oppression remedy focuses on harm to the legal and equitable interest of a wide range
of stakeholders affected by oppressive acts of a corporation or its directors. This remedy
gives a court a broad jurisdiction to enforce not only what is legal but what is fair.
Oppression is also fact specific: what is just and equitable is judged by the reasonable
expectations of the stakeholders in the context and in regard to the relationships at play.
In assessing a claim of oppression, a court must answer two questions: (1) Does the
evidence support the reasonable expectation asserted by the claimant? and (2) Does the
evidence establish but that the reasonable expectation was violated by conduct falling
within the terms “oppression, “unfair prejudice” or “unfair disregard” of a relevant interest?
For the first question, useful factors from the case law in determining whether a reasonable
expectation exists include: general commercial practice; the nature of the corporation; the
relationship between the parties; past practice; steps the claimant could have taken to
protect itself; representations and agreements; and the fair resolution of conflicting interests
between corporate stakeholders. For the second question, a claimant must show that the
failure to meet the reasonable expectation involved unfair conduct and prejudicial
consequences under s. 241.
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Where conflicting interests arise, it falls to the directors of the corporation to resolve them
in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. The
cases on oppression, taken as a whole, confirm that this duty comprehends a duty to treat
individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and fairly. There are no
absolute rules and no principle that one set of interests should prevail over another. In each
case, the question is whether, in all the circumstances, the directors acted in the best
interests of the corporation, having regard to all relevant considerations, including – but
not confined to – the need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate
with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen. Where it is impossible to
please all stakeholders, it will be irrelevant that the directors rejected alternative
transactions that were no more beneficial than the chosen one.120
In effect, the term “interests” has been conflated into “reasonable expectations”. The latter seems
to invoke considerations of the circumstantial context, as well as legitimacy. Before discussing the
importance of this, it is well to examine the extensive scope of the possible remedies available
under section 241 (3) which are, accordingly, quoted directly from the statute:
In connection with an application under this section, the court may make any interim or
final order it thinks fit including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(a) an order restraining the conduct complained of;
(b) an order appointing a receiver or receiver-manager;
(c) an order to regulate a corporation’s affairs by amending the articles or by-laws or
creating or amending a unanimous shareholder agreement;
(d) an order directing an issue or exchange of securities;
(e) an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then
in office;
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(f) an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or any other person, to
purchase securities of a security holder;
(g) an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or any other person, to pay a
security holder any part of the monies that the security holder paid for securities;
(h) an order varying or setting aside a transaction or contract to which a corporation is a
party and compensating the corporation or any other party to the transaction or contract;
(i) an order requiring a corporation, within a time specified by the court, to produce to the
court or an interested person financial statements in the form required by section 155 or an
accounting in such other form as the court may determine;
(j) an order compensating an aggrieved person;
(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a corporation under
section 243;
(l) an order liquidating and dissolving the corporation;
(m) an order directing an investigation under Part XIX to be made; and
(n) an order requiring the trial of any issue.
Under subsection 241 (4), where the court directs an amendment of the articles or bylaws pursuant
to section 241 (3) (c) no further amendments can be made without the consent of the court or until
a court otherwise orders. Subsection 241 (5) dispenses with the dissent rights of shareholders under
section 190. This is appropriate since the investigations possible and remedies available under
section 241 are so much more extensive. 121
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Oppression as a Legal, Organizational, and Corporative Remedy
The Power to Fashion New Entity Law
The powers of the court in applying the oppression remedy include powers to vary or set aside
contracts or transactions, including requiring the purchase of shares by another shareholder or by
the corporation itself, powers to replace directors or appoint additional directors, and powers to
liquidate or dissolve the corporation. In this regard, Christopher Nicholls observes that “one of the
most important practical implications of the oppression remedy is that it can be used to impose
personal liability on a corporation’s shareholders, directors, or officers (or others) under
circumstances where, as a matter of common law, no such personal liability would necessarily be
imposed.”122
In fact, imposing personal liability despite the corporate paradigms of asset shielding and entity
shielding is only one example of how the powers of the court under section 241 can be used to
vary the paradigmatic legal attributes of the corporation, Instead, in connection with the oppression
remedy, which arises, of course, statutorily as a matter of corporate law, not only may the court
remediate oppressive conduct within normal corporate law parameters, but it may also abrogate,
vary or amend the essential characteristics or attributes of the corporation as a single legal entity,
including the singularity or exclusivity of its liability with respect to its own obligations.
Considered from this perspective, the court can fashion new “entity law” for the corporation under
the authority of the statute, which may be, however, quite different, and separate, from the statutory
paradigm of the corporation as a legal entity. In fact, various commentators, including Professor
Nicholls in his knowledgeable discussion of the subject in the work cited, appear not to have fully
identified this aspect of the remedy. To restate it: the oppression remedy permits a court, in
fashioning a remedy, and while operating under the guise of the authority conveyed in a
corporation law statute, to revise and refashion the paradigmatic attributes of the corporation as a
legal entity, which are conveyed in statue law, as well as in common law.
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Entity Law as Organizational Law
Thus, the oppression remedy may be seen to permit or even to implicitly adopt a corporative
perspective: it enables the possible reconciliation of the “hard” outer shell or legal rights exterior
of the corporation as a legal entity with the “soft” inner organization, involving such attributes as
structure, process and personnel, within.
As the present review has demonstrated, the statutory law which establishes a corporation as a
separate legal entity and which accords to it certain often-described paradigmatic attributes
operates at a very high level, dealing principally with matters relating to the rights of shareholders,
and the rights and duties of directors and officers, and to a limited extent (which we have not
reviewed here) with the rights of secured creditors; but does not deal significantly with the rights
of other participants in the corporation, such as employees, agents, trade creditors and other parties
contracting with the corporation, pensioners, unions, and legal jurisdictions and communities in
which a corporation operates or which it otherwise affects. Of course, some of these matters form
the subject-matter of other statutes.
Thus, this book maintains that statutory corporate law deals only to a very limited extent and in a
very limited fashion with matters relating to the actual organization which animates the corporation
and pursues its goals and objectives. That is not, of course, an argument that academics, jurists,
and practitioners involved in corporate law should confine their attentions only to statutory
corporate law, or even declarative corporate law incorporating common law as well as statutes.
Instead, the limited sphere of operation of statutory corporate law vis-à-vis organizational matters
necessitates the examination of a broader range of organizational research and theory in order to
devise test, and sustain a theory of corporate law and legal theory in a much broader perspective,
namely, as organizational law and legal theory.
As will be argued subsequently, the interests of participants in many organizations, including the
corporation, and, in particular, the public corporation, may differ significantly from the interests
of other participants, and the interests even of any particular participant, which may also change
over time. To the extent that participation in the corporation is negotiated by and among its
participants at the time of its inception, subsequent negotiations may be required from time to time,
if not regularly, constantly or perennially, in order to readjust and realign the interests of
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participants with each other and with the corporation. Such renegotiations may result in changes
in reasonable expectations, at least, if not also in amendments to actual contracts.
Hence, ascertaining the reasonable expectations of relevant organizational parties may involve not
just matters that may be considered to be purely “legal”, such as provisions of the corporate charter,
bylaws, board and committee resolutions, and contracts, but also intracorporate rules, norms, and
practices that are engaged by its formal and informal organization, structure, processes, and
attributes of its personnel.
Aligning Participants’ Reasonable Expectations and Legal, and Organizational, Form
Supporters of the “nexus of contracts”123 and “incomplete contracts”124 perspective on the
corporation may argue that such readjustments and realignments are necessitated by the necessary
“incompleteness” of the contracts originally formed. As will be argued in later chapters, this view
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adopts assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics which will be argued to be, at the very
least, highly contestable, and inadequate as a basis for prediction and action. In many of their more
influential formulations, such nexus of contracts and incomplete contracts perspectives ignore the
social, and even political, bases on which such contracts are constructed.
It might be expected that any “contracts” relating to participation in the corporation would be
constructed so as to be enforceable in respect of the corporation as a legal entity, without the
requirement of any additional or supplemental contractual provisions. Accordingly, as a matter of
the legal theory of the corporation, and the instantiation of that theory by means of corporate law
statutes creating the corporation as a separate legal entity, the nexus of contracts and incomplete
contracts theories in relation to the corporation involve a certain circularity. That is, they assume
that contracts which are legally effective may be renegotiated in such a way as to continue to be
legally effective, as amended, and that contracts of this nature may be legally enforced, in effect,
as a matter of corporate law.
Supporters of such theories might argue that the oppression remedy instantiates their theories;
however, such argument is ineffective and unsatisfying. In fact, the oppression remedy
acknowledges that the reasonable expectations of corporate participants may not be reflected in
any binding agreements, that any relevant binding agreements may not be updated so as to
correspond with “reality on the ground” in terms of the expectations of the affected parties, and
that this may never occur, and may never even be intended by the affected parties.
Instead, the oppression remedy invites the court to look beyond contracts to the reality within
which the participants operate and to give effect to the reasonable expectations of organizational
participants, quite apart from any considerations of legal rights and duties, whether contractual,
statutory, or otherwise. In this way, the court has the opportunity to “do equity” among the
participants. In proceeding in this manner, the court may be seen to be invoking equitable
principles that are related to the organization, and to its structure, processes and personnel, rather
than being related to the corporation as a legal entity. In fact, the court may be seen as invoking
“organizational equity” rather than “corporate entity legal equity”.
In this respect, the legal entity and, perhaps a lesser extent, its formal organization and the
relationships among participants in such formal organization, may each “lag behind” the informal
organization and informal relationships which will be demonstrated in Chapters Four and
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following to be endemic in all formal organizations. Indeed, it may be that the informal
organization and informal relationships achieve greater prominence in the “reasonable
expectations” of organizational participants than do their formal counterparts.
As argued here, the corporative perspective, among other things, invites policymakers, legislators,
regulators, and courts to consider and take into account implications for, and characteristics of, the
internal organization of the corporation, and not merely the superficial legal characteristics of the
corporation as a legal entity. As such, the oppression remedy and the concrete fact situations in
which it is sought to be invoked present themselves as providing immediate opportunities for the
exercise of the corporative perspective. The application of the corporative perspective in such
circumstances may also demonstrate its relevance in other legal contexts, including those invoking
corporate, as well as other legal, considerations.
Of course, at a fundamental level and quite apart from specifically applying the corporative
perspective to oppression remedy situations, in addition to demonstrating the panoply and plenary
powers that the court has in connection with the oppression remedy, as discussed above, the scope
and basis of exercise of such powers facilitate a new interpretation of the corporation as involving
both legal entity and organizational aspects, which is characteristic of the corporative perspective
advanced in this work.
The oppression remedy directs our attention to the understanding that may be said to be prevalent
among constituents of the corporation, who seek to accomplish its goals and objectives, but taking
action as human actors in the real world on its behalf: that is to say, by permitting the separate
legal entity to function as an organization. To that subject our attention now devolves.
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CHAPTER A3:
INTRACORPORATE ORGANIZATION IN LAW
PART A – ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF CORPORATE ACTORS
As discussed previously, one of the defining attributes of a corporation is that it is a separate legal
entity, which signifies here that it is a separate rights-and-duty-bearing entity as a matter of law.
Some of the implications of the status have been discussed under the heading “Legal Attributes of
the Corporation”. A key question which presents itself in this connection is how an inanimate
incorporeal entity is able to acquire and exercise rights and, likewise, to assume and discharge
duties and obligations.
In keeping with the methodology of this work in seeking to investigate the nature the corporation
and to formulate a legal theory of the corporation which is both susceptible of verification and in
testing, but also has significant explanatory capacity, this section will not investigate other
theoretical explanations offered for this problem. Instead, it will seek to describe the explanations
offered as a matter of corporate law, statutory and otherwise, and common law. This will facilitate
a transition to other elements of our descriptive analysis, such as examining and challenging
assumptions underlying corporate law and corporate legal theory, and explicating a new,
corporative, perspective.
As will be further discussed below, a classical or neoclassical economic analysis of the firm
employs certain concepts of agency. For an inanimate incorporeal legal entity to take action
requires the presence of at least one human individual who is capable of taking actions in the real
world. As is well known, the word “actor” derives from the Latin verb “ago, agere”, meaning “to
do” or “to act”. Similarly, the word “agent” derives from the same Latin verb, hence meaning
“someone who does something”, “someone who acts”, “someone who takes an active role”, or
“someone who produces a specified effect”. The sense of the word in which it means “someone
who acts on behalf of another” is a more particular usage. Both senses are relevant in the present
case.
As Deborah DeMott indicates, “widespread use of agency terminology in academic disciplines
like economics, philosophy, and literary studies does not necessarily parallel the content of the
common law of agency.”1 With respect to the latter, DeMott’s procedure is similar to that
1
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employed here in connection with the corporation: she first distinguishes “the elements that must
be present in a relationship to characterize it as one of agency and the legal consequences that
follow from this characterization”; and observes that “confusion and circularity result of analysis
proceeds in the opposite direction.”2
In the economic model of the firm, the proprietor, the owner of, and supplier of capital to, the firm
engages another person as an employee or agent to perform work on behalf of the proprietor within
the “firm”, which is the sole proprietorship. That person, who may be denominated as the manager,
in turn engages and directs the work of other employees. The manager, or some employee or other,
may enter into contracts on behalf of the firm, binding the firm with respect to the same. Likewise,
the manager or some employee may engage in activities on behalf of the firm which may cause
damage or injury to parties outside the firm. These contracts and injurious actions may result in
contractual rights and liability and in non-contractual rights or tortious or other liability,
respectively.
In the economic model of the firm, “agency costs” are costs that arise as a result of the separation
of management and ownership, as identified by Berle and Means.3 The owner incurs agency costs
by reason of engaging separate management. These costs include extraction of economic “rents”,
costs in excess of those necessary for the performance of the management services, often taking
the place of benefits secured by management without the express knowledge or agreement of the
owners, and including performance of management duties at a level of fidelity and competence
below that envisioned in or required by the arrangements calling for such management. Agency
costs also include the costs to the principal of monitoring the performance of the agent.4
The economic concept of agency thus involves an agency relationship between ownership and
management, in a simple model in which a single owner, or sole proprietor, engages a single
2
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manager as an employee of the sole proprietor, thereby constituting the organization as a “firm”
for economic purposes. Of course, there may be more than one “owner” or “proprietor”, in which
case the manager is considered to be the agent for the shareholders at large.5
This is different from the legal concept of agency which will be discussed in this chapter, whereby
a principal appoints an agent to perform certain duties with respect to the business itself. In the
economic model, each of the principal, or owner, and the agent, in this case the manager, adopt
certain duties and responsibilities in consequence of the economic agency relationship and the
particular, contractual and other, arrangements between them. The economic model of agency
concerns itself primarily with the owner-manager relationship and its associated agency costs. Any
situation other than a firm owned by a single owner-manager is considered to involve agency costs
arising from management’s shirking and consumption of perquisites.6
As to the legal relationship of agency, Deborah DeMott notes that the legal consequences of the
agency relationship have a dual aspect: they include both “inward-looking” consequences, namely,
those applicable to the rights and duties as between the agent and the principal; and the “outwardlooking consequences applicable to the agent’s interactions with third parties”. Both types of
consequences are limited to the scope of the agency relationship7, determined as a matter of law,
through such doctrines as actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification.8
In turn, the duties of the manager, as agent, may involve that manager acting as agent of the
principal both “internally”, inside the firm, and “externally”, outside the firm. Such manager may
authorize certain agents, both within and without the firm, to engage other sub-agents, in effect, to
create further agency relationships, which might be denominated in respect of the head agency
relationship in pursuance of which such action is taken as “sub-agency” relationships. Again, as
will be shown in this chapter, the legal relationship of agency is different from the economic
concept of agency.
However, again as shown in the following section, the economic analysis of the firm, which
purports to rely upon the “agency” relationship between owners or shareholders and a manager,
See e.g. Eric W Orts, “Corporate Law and Business Theory” (2017) 74:2 Wash & Lee L Rev 1089 at 1091.
See the extremely widely cited article by Ang, Cole & Lin, supra note 4 at 81-2. They find that agency costs are
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does not engage sufficiently with the legal relationship of agency both inside and outside the firm,
or with the nature of the “firm” itself, which it by and large ignores or invisibilizes. Indeed, as
recently as 2010, a widely cited article by management academics in strategy and organization
lamented the failure of corporate governance literature to go beyond economic and finance
concepts of agency theory and to take into account the legal environment, and legal theories, of
the firm;9 and proposed treating the corporation itself as the principal, thus aligning agency theory
more closely with legal doctrine and precedent.10 Of course, it is this principal-agent relationship
between the corporation and its management which is posited by traditional corporate law and by
agency law.11
The simple model of the firm in economics and finance does not adequately explain how legal
agency can be much more widely distributed than between only owner and manager. It also does
not explain who or what the owner of the firm is when that firm is a separate legal entity, such as
a corporation. In that regard, it also does not explain who or what acts as principal, in economic or
in legal terms, in that case.
As is discussed below, the concept of management or the board of directors acting as “agent” for
the shareholders alone is extremely problematic, as a matter of law, legal theory, and otherwise.
The argument that the board of directors or management is the agent of the corporation itself is
also problematic. If the principal of the corporation is the corporation itself, apart from the obvious
regressivity, and hence disutility, of the definition, a fundamental question in that regard is how
that principal is enabled to take any action, including, but not limited, to action to appoint a
manager or a management for the legal entity.
These issues will be discussed further below. For the present, we will consider the issues
surrounding agency as a legal concept which are primarily relevant, or in some way distinctive, in
the context of the corporation. That is to say, we will tend to focus on legal issues that are salient
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where the economic “firm” is composed of more than a single owner and a single
employee/manager; namely, where it is an organization. This necessarily entails omitting or
reducing focus on agency law principles salient in respect of the non-organizational firm or
business enterprise. This will permit greater attention be paid to agency law as applied in relation
to the business corporation as a separate legal entity as a matter of law.
Master and Servant Law
It is generally conceded that employment law originated, in common law jurisdictions, from the
law of master and servant. In turn, the law of master and servant reflected the transition of the
English economy from one with an agrarian emphasis to one with an industrial emphasis. Servants,
whether working in the fields or in the household, very often worked for a master who was resident
at the place of work.
Of course, as a result of many developments in society and the economy, the need for workers for
an increasingly industrialized economy increased. Urban environments were also the setting for
the practice of trades and crafts, in which masters trained apprentices, who often progressed either
by continuing with their masters as servants or tradesmen or by setting up their own establishments
and, in turn, engaging apprentices or servants. This process in Britain and in the United States is
chronicled by a recent article which looks at the transformation of the master-servant relationship
as a result of the separation of household-based activities into either home-based or workplacebased activities.12
Of course, a master was liable with respect to all contracts made by the servant with the master’s
authority or which he later adopts by ratification.13 In his influential article, Harold J. Laski
commented that “If a master choose to give orders to his servant, no one can fail to understand
why he should be held liable for the consequences of their commission. Nor is the case in substance
different when he ratifies his servant's act.” He argues that when what is done for the master is
expressly done for him with “his approval is tacitly, but obviously, to accept the act as his own;
and that is true no less where the ratification is implicit, than where it is expressly made manifest.
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No one, however, deems it necessary to take objection to liability which is consequent upon a
general negligence.”14
The proposition that a master should be liable for actions of a servant within express authority is
easily maintainable within contract law as an action impliedly authorized by the master. The
relationship between the actor and the person authorizing or empowering the actor to act on his or
her behalf is one of agency. A servant or employee may also be seen as the agent of the master or
employer. Seavey asserts that the difference between a servant and any other agent is that the
servant is under a more complete control than is a non-servant.15 The legal relationship of agency
involves “three legally cognizable dealings – between the principal and the third party, the
principal and the agent, and the agent and the third party”.16
As such agent, the servant or employee can be regarded as an “extension” of the master or
employer. DeMott maintains that the agent functions as the principal’s representative, as an
extension of the principal, the agent does so while retaining its own separate legal personality.17
This is reflected, says Seavey, in the Latin saying: Qui facit per aliium facit per se: He who acts
through another does the act himself.18
In this regard, Dowrick averts to the legal fiction which treats the agent and the principal as one
person.19 Seavey begins his discussion of the rationale of agency by quoting Oliver Wendell
Holmes concerning “the absorption pro hac vice of the agents legal individuality into that of the
principal”.20 This principle is considered to apply not only to the master-servant or employeremployee relationship but also to relationships of guardianship, trusteeship, and executorship. All
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agency relationships are not necessarily created as a matter of contract between principal and
agent. This is often the case with to guardianship, trusteeship and executorship relationships.21
Donald Langevoort notes that “[t]he garden of agency law was planted at a time when the paradigm
principal-agent relationship involved two natural persons”22 but acknowledges that today, by
contrast, “by far, most principals are firms, not people”, and increasingly, firms of substantial
size.23 In fact, “[t]hat corporation law builds on the foundation of agency law is beyond doubt.
Almost every corporate employee with discretionary responsibilities is an agent”.24
A corporation may be bound by the contracts entered into by an employee or other agent who is
authorized to contract on behalf of the corporation; but may also be bound by contracts which are
not authorized but where the employee or agent was ostensibly or apparently representing the
corporation. In the first case, liability would arise where it was reasonable for the third-party
contracting with the corporation to believe that the employee or agent had actual authority; and in
the second case, liability would arise where the corporation allowed the employee or agent to
appear to have authorization.25
However, the argument that the master authorized tortious commitment of an action by a servant
or agent, is more subject to contestation on the grounds that the authorization envisioned
performance of only lawful acts. Tortious liability for actions not authorized by the master is a
different proposition still; however, as Laski points out, a servant may perform acts incidental to
the master’s business without express authority for their performance.26
In fact, the amount of detail required to be provided to convey express authority otherwise would
be unduly burdensome, and would frustrate the effectuation of many tasks. Still more subject to
contestation is the proposition that a master should be liable for acts done in positive disobedience
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to a command, or that the master may be “at first acquaintance…anxious to repudiate”.27 Clearly,
subjecting the master to liability for omissions is also subject to a high level of contestation.
The liability of the firm or the corporation for contractual and tortious liabilities incurred by a
servant, employee, or agent is discussed further in the immediately following section.
The Agency Relationship in Law
It has been previously observed that corporate law is built on the foundation of agency law”.28
Accordingly, before discussing further details of intracorporate agency matters, some discussion
of agency law more broadly may be appropriate at this juncture.
The elements, and various definitions, of the agency relationship at common law were reviewed
in 1920 by Warren Seavey, an eminent expert on the subject. Determining that the agency relation
involves power, fiduciary relationship, and control, he finds that “agency is a consensual
relationship in which one (the agent) holds in trust for and subject to the control of another (the
principal) a power to affect certain legal relations of that other.”29 Dowrick describes agency as a
fiduciary relation,30 and averts to the well-known fact that the roles of the Court of Chancery and
its principles of equity were applied, and extensively applied in the 18th and 19th centuries, to
agency cases in which the agent had abused the confidence of the principal.31
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The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Agency (the “Restatement”) provides a
useful definition of the term of agency” as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person
(a “principal) manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act.”32 The Restatement usefully and succinctly summarizes the American law, both
state and federal, concerning other aspects of agency law, many of which are also common to
Canadian and English law.
Consequently, for reasons of brevity and to prevent undue diffusion of attention, this chapter will
employ its “restatement” as a statement of such current Canadian, American, and English law,
rather than delving into the extensive, complex, and highly fact-based case law of such
jurisdictions. The development of the Restatement, like other Restatements authored by the
American Law Institute, is such that it is highly respected as an accurate statement of the law by
members of the bench and bar alike, as well as being both easily comprehensible and well ordered.
In particular, section 2.01 of the Restatement states that an “agent acts with actual authority when,
at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably
believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes
the agent so to act”.33 Under section 2.02, the consequences of actual authority are as follows:
“(1) An agent has actual authority to take action designated or implied in the principal's
manifestations to the agent and acts necessary or incidental to achieving the principal's objectives,
as the agent reasonably understands the principal's manifestations and objectives when the agent
determines how to act. (2) An agent's interpretation of the principal's manifestations is reasonable
if it reflects any meaning known by the agent to be ascribed by the principal and, in the absence
of any meaning known to the agent, as a reasonable person in the agent's position would interpret
the manifestations in light of the context, including circumstances of which the agent has notice
and the agent's fiduciary duty to the principal. (3) An agent's understanding of the principal's
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objectives is reasonable if it accords with the principal's manifestations and the inferences that a
reasonable person in the agent's position would draw from the circumstances creating the agency.”
Thus, acts reasonably understood by the agent to be designated or implied in manifestations to the
agent or reasonably understood by the agent to be necessary or incidental to achieving the
principal’s objectives are considered to be done with actual authority. Section 2.03 provides that
“[a]pparent authority is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal
relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on
behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”
Section 2.05 of the Restatement creates an estoppel with respect to ostensible or apparent authority,
inasmuch as: “A person who has not made a manifestation that an actor has authority as an agent
and who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction purportedly done by the actor on that
person's account is subject to liability to a third party who justifiably is induced to make a
detrimental change in position because the transaction is believed to be on the person's account, if
(1) the person intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or (2) having notice of such belief and
that it might induce others to change their positions, the person did not take reasonable steps to
notify them of the facts.”
In connection with torts, section 2.04 provides that “[a]n employer is subject to liability for torts
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”
In respect of contract, as in tort, criminal and administrative law, these comments invoke the
concepts of vicarious liability and respondeat superior, as the same developed at common law.
These matters will be discussed further below.
Vicarious Liability and Respondeat Superior
As discussed, firms, including corporations, must act through human agents. Accordingly, the firm
or corporation may be held liable for the acts of its agents with respect to torts and, in some
jurisdictions, with respect to criminal and administrative offenses. As Eric Orts indicates, for at
least three hundred years in the Anglo-American legal tradition, under the principal of vicarious
liability, firms have been held strictly liable as principals for the actions or material omissions of
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their agents who are employees when they cause wrongful harm to third parties in acting or failing
to act within the scope of their employment34
Such absolute liability of the principal for the misconduct of someone, the agent, whose activity
the principal directs constitutes, as Kraakman says, a form of strict secondary liability. He
describes the principal vehicle in the common law for “holding principals liable for the torts and
other delicts of their agents” as the legal doctrine of respondeat superior, which is the legal
doctrine that “principals are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs committed within the ‘scope
of employment’ by agents whose behavior they have the legal right to control (‘servants’).”
In fact, Kraakman claims that “most corporate liability for torts, and in the United States for crimes
as well, is vicarious liability imposed under respondeat superior or a similar doctrine.”35
Kraakman even argues that direct corporate liability, such as “when the independent actions of
several corporate agents cumulatively result in a business tort, although no single agent is
individually culpable” so as to found “liability of corporate principals is best conceptualized as
vicarious liability for the failure of the firm’s management to supervise its employees.”36
It is thought that such liability of the principal encourages supervision ex ante and discovery of
misconduct ex post.37 In this regard, Laski cites Bentham, to the effect that: "The obligation
imposed upon the master," he says, "acts as a punishment, and diminishes the chances of similar
misfortunes. He is interested in knowing the character, and watching over the conduct of them for
whom he is answerable. The law makes him an inspector of police, a domestic magistrate, by
rendering him liable for their imprudence."38 Laski describes this as “important truth” namely, that
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“if we allow the master to be careless of his servant's torts we lose hold upon the most valuable
check in the conduct of social life.”39
In his text on vicarious liability, Baty mentions a number of cases from the last half of the
nineteenth century in which courts attributed the malice of the employee to the principal in finding
the employer liable for torts committed that required the presence of express malice or other
improper motive. 40 Laski says that, by 1800, liability had been extended far beyond cases in which
the employee has express authority to act, such that “special authority apart, the duties assigned to
a servant give him the power to bind his master in such contracts as come within the scope of his
employment.” He says that, in fact, “the law goes further, and makes the master generally liable
for his servant's torts so long as they are fairly and reasonably to be traced to his service, though
no burden is thrown upon the employer where no such connection can be shown.”41
As noted above, vicarious liability in tort may extend beyond actual authority and even beyond
apparent or ostensible authority.42 Laski points out that even defining “scope of employment” as
“consisting in acts incidental or natural to the servant’s occupation, we are only on the threshold
of our difficulties. For there has been the most widespread divergence of opinion as to what comes
within the scope of such acts, and no statistical measurement is at all possible.”43 In effect, in
applying the principles, each case is in itself a separate issue.44
Laski goes so far as to suggest that it may be sufficient to establish that the servant is acting “for
the master’s benefit”.45 In this regard, he says that “[t]he employment of a servant to perform
certain functions must, on the whole, mean his employment to perform them as he deems best
fitted, in his interpretation of his instructions, to serve his master's interest.”46 However, the master
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“is not liable for the acts of the servant which are shown to be clearly unconnected with his
service”.47
Fleming James, Jr., observed, to similar effect, that if the servant is engaged in performing what
he is hired to do, the master is liable for the servant’s negligence in the manner of carrying out that
performance even if the servant’s conduct consists in acts or omissions which have been
specifically forbidden, or if the servant uses a forbidden means or instrumentality in carrying out
the assigned task, at least where the means chosen fall within the range of what the master might
reasonably expect the servant to use.48 As he notes, also, in addition to authorized work, the master
is also liable for acts that may “fairly and reasonably [be] regarded as incidental to the work
specifically directed or which [are] usually done in connection with such work.”49
As demonstrated above, the Restatement applies many of these common law principles, with
reference, of course, primarily to American law (which it purports to restate). However, as
previously noted, agency law is quite similar in all the Anglo-American jurisdictions, and in some
other common law jurisdictions. Under subsection 7.03 (1), a principal is subject to direct liability
to a third party harmed by an agent’s conduct and when either (a) the agent has actual authority or
the conduct is ratified; or (b) the principal is negligent in selecting, supervising, or otherwise
controlling the agent; or (c) another agent of the principal to whom such duty is delegated fails to
use care to protect other persons or their property. Under subsection 7.03 (2), a principal is subject
to vicarious liability to a third party harmed by an agent’s conduct when either (a) the agent is an
employee who commits a tort while acting within the scope of employment; or (b) the agent
commits a tort when acting with apparent authority in dealing with a third party on or purportedly
on behalf of the principal.
Section 7.07 sets out the scope of employment for the purposes of section 7.03, which is generally
as indicated above, saying that “(1) An employer is subject to vicarious liability for a tort
committed by its employee acting within the scope of employment. (2) An employee acts within
the scope of employment when performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course
47
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of conduct subject to the employer's control. An employee's act is not within the scope of
employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the employee
to serve any purpose of the employer.” Subsection 7.07 (3) states that “For purposes of this section,
(a) an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and
means of the agent's performance of work, and (b) the fact that work is performed gratuitously
does not relieve a principal of liability.”
The tests set out in s. 7.07 reflect the common law principles outlined above. Of course, the section
makes it clear that no vicarious liability arises for an act that occurs within an independent course
of conduct of the employee, that is to say, one not intended by the employee to serve any purpose
of the employer, often referred to as a “frolic” of the employee’s own.
As discussed above, section 7.08 deals with vicarious liability in cases of apparent authority, as
follows: “A principal is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by an agent in dealing or
communicating with a third party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal when actions taken
by the agent with apparent authority constitute the tort or enable the agent to conceal its
commission.”
As provided in section 7.07 of the Restatement, the employer does not, but the employee may,
incur liability for an act that “occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the
employee to serve any purpose of the employer” (again, often called a “frolic” of the employee’s
own). Section 7.01 provides that an agent is subject to liability to a third party harmed by the
agent’s tortious conduct and that, unless an applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains
subject to liability although the actor acts as an agent or an employee, within actual or apparent
authority, or within the scope of employment. Thus, it is possible for both the employer and the
employee to incur liability to third parties.
Where such joint liability arises, employers, such as a corporation, may agree to indemnify the
employees concerned and, in connection therewith or otherwise, may provide insurance coverage
with respect to such situations. As the present chapter has shown, corporate legislation in various
jurisdictions permits, in certain circumstances, and, in others requires, the corporation to indemnify
directors and officers, and in some cases, other employees and agents, in these respects.
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The Principal-Agent Relationship Inter Se
The relationship between the principal and the agent inter se is a matter of both contract and
common law. Section 8.01 of the Restatement imposes a fiduciary duty on the agent to act loyally
for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship, while section 8.08
imposes on the agent a duty to act with the care, confidence, and diligence normally exercised by
agents in similar circumstances. Section 8.02 refers to a duty of the agent not to acquire a material
benefit from a third party in such connection, while section 8.03 imposes on the agent a duty not
to deal with the principal as, or on behalf of, an adverse party in that connection.
Of course, it is the common law, and not the Restatement itself, which “imposes” these duties and
obligations; however, using the “imposition” language in this text permits some abbreviation of
otherwise much longer summaries of the law, and, accordingly, will be employed here from time
to time. As noted, the Restatement actually recognizes, declares, or summarizes the common law.
Other duties of the agent include a duty in section 8.04 not to compete with the principal or to take
action on behalf of or otherwise assisting the principal’s competitors; a duty in section 8.05 not to
use property of the principal for the purposes of the agent or a third party, and not to use or
communicate confidential information of the principal for such purposes; a duty in section 8.07 to
act in accordance with the express and implied terms of any contract between them; a duty in
section 8.09 to act only within the scope of the agent’s actual authority and to comply with lawful
instructions of the principal; and a duty under section 8.10 to act reasonably and to refrain from
conduct that is likely to damage the principal’s enterprise.
The agency agreement may accord the agent, on the one hand, a very wide discretionary authority
as to what may be done in pursuance of the agency, or, on the other hand, a very narrow
discretionary authority. In addition to the terms of the agency agreement, the authority of the agent
may be circumscribed, further, by lawful instructions that the principal gives, generally (as
standing instructions) or from time to time. The agent’s responsibility includes not only acting
only within his or her actual authority, but also acting reasonably in connection with the mandate.
As will be seen, issues as to the scope of discretionary authority and the ability of the principal to
give and the duty of the agent to follow lawful instructions are especially important facts which
differentiate the corporation and the board of directors from a principal-agent relationship. This is
discussed in more detail in the next following section.
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The Restatement recognizes a general duty to provide information, in section 8.11, and a specific
duty in connection with securing the consent of the principal, in section 8.06. As to the first of
these, unless the agent has a superior duty to another person, section 8.11 imposes a duty to use
reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts that the agent knows, has reason to know, or
should know, subject to any manifestation by the principal, when the agent knows or has reason
to know that the principal would wish to have those facts or that the facts are material to the agent’s
duties to the principal.
The duty of individual directors to inform their fellow directors of conflicts of interest, and where
such duty obtains, the duties to advise fellow directors information known to the subject-director
seem to take inspiration from this principle, considering the full board of directors as, or as
representing or animating, the corporation as principal. As noted above, section 8.30 (c) of the
MBCA specifically imposes this duty on directors. It may be considered to be related to the duty
of disclosure in agency law, as opposed to trust law, which strictly proscribes such conflicts. This
is discussed further under the heading “Intracorporate Agency”.
Section 8.06 makes effective the principal’s consent to conduct that would otherwise constitute a
breach of duty, provided that in obtaining such consent the agent acts in good faith, discloses all
material facts that the agent knows, has reason to know or should know would reasonably affect
the principal’s judgment (unless already known or the desire to know them is negatived); and
otherwise deals fairly with the principal. Importantly, to be operative, the consent must relate to
either a specific act or transaction or acts or transactions of a specified type that, in either case,
could reasonably be expected to occur in the ordinary case of the agency relationship. Thus, with
respect to transactions that are extraordinary, either liability for breach of duty cannot be waived
by the principal, or, if that is possible, it must be done in the most express terms.
Again, for example, the consent of the board to conduct that would otherwise breach a director’s
duty by reason of conflict of interest, which, strictly speaking is given by way of approval of the
contract or transaction involving such conflict of interest, may be considered as related to this
principle of agency law.
By comparison, the summary of the duties of principals contained in the Restatement is much
simpler; it comprises only three sections. Section 8.13 indicates that a principal has a duty to act
in accordance with the express and implied terms of any contract between the principal and the
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agent. The obligation, then, extends beyond the actual express terms of the contract to include any
terms that might arise by implication, presumably from law, custom, or dealings between the
parties. It parallels the agent’s obligation in section 8.07.
Quite apart from contract, however, section 8.15 states that a principal has a duty to deal with the
agent fairly and in good faith. It provides, further, that this includes a duty to provide the agent
with information about risks of physical harm or pecuniary loss that the principal knows, has
reason to know, or should know are present in the agent’s work but unknown to the agent. For
example, the principal may be aware of some defect not known to the agent in the product or
services provided to customers that might result in a risk of physical harm or financial loss to
customers, the agent, or others, that are involved in the work of the agent. This may be seen as
similar to, but more limited than, the duty of the agent under section 8.11 to inform the principal
of certain facts, facts that are ones that the principal would wish to have or that are material to the
agent’s duties, that the agent either knows, has reason to know or should know.
Under section 8.14 of the Restatement, a principal has a duty to indemnify an agent in accordance
with the terms of any contract between them; and, unless otherwise agreed, when the agent makes
a payment within the scope of the agent’s actual authority, or that is beneficial to the principal
(subject to a limited exception); or when the agent suffers a loss that fairly should be borne by the
principal in light of their relationship.50 As noted previously, as a matter of corporate law, by
statute, in some jurisdictions a corporation is permitted, in some cases, and in some cases, is
required, to indemnify directors, officers, employees, and other agents. These statutory
permissions and obligations give effect to agency principles relating to indemnification.
PART B – THE CORPORATION AS PRINCIPAL
Authority of Principal Divided Between Board and Shareholders
As discussed in Chapters A1 and A2, the fundamental attributes of the corporation include: its
status as a separate legal entity, or rights-and-duty bearing entity, a status which implicates its
other fundamental attributes; the locking-in of its capital such that capital may not be withdrawn
freely by its contributor; the transferability of equity interests in the corporation; asset partitioning
involving the limited liability of owners and of the corporation for liabilities of the other; and, in
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relation to the foregoing matters, the separation of equity or capital interests in the corporation
from management of the entity, which is often expressed in terms of the separation of ownership
and management.
It has been demonstrated in those chapters that modern corporate statutes generally provide, in
effect, that the board of directors shall manage or supervise the management of the business and
affairs of the corporation. Save for the exceptional circumstances for which statutory provision is
made, as is noted in Chapter A1, the board of directors need not even take into account the wishes
of the shareholders.51 While the statutes do not define precisely of what such “management”
consists, the duty and responsibility assigned thereby is quite clearly extremely extensive, as
indicated not only by the usual import of such term, but also by reference to the specific duties and
responsibilities which accompany the general management duty and responsibility as delineated
in the statutes. Of course, the statutes also provide the board with considerable discretion
concerning the means by which the board may organize such management.
As demonstrated in those chapters, while the statutes assign the board of directors plenary
management authority, they also provide shareholders, who, as equity owners, have no intrinsic or
automatic right to participate in management of the corporation as such shareholders, with certain
rights in respect of the selection of the directors, the approval of fundamental transactions, and the
expression of their views concerning management of the corporation to other equity owners and
to the board of directors.
As has been shown, the powers which the corporation may exercise, as a separate legal entity, are
usually expressed either by analogy to those of a natural person or are extensively prescribed, in
which case any adverse consequences of acting in excessive the prescribed powers are usually
eliminated by statutory rescission of the common-law rule of ultra vires. As noted previously,
stipulating that a corporation has the rights and powers of a natural person signifies that a
corporation has the legal capacity to engage in any activities which may be undertaken by a natural
person. We have noted that this does not necessarily entail, of course, that the corporation is a
51
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person in the view of the law, or that a corporation has legal personality, or that a corporation is
possessed of legal personhood.
It is obvious, of course, that a statutory stipulation that a corporation has the legal capacity to
engage in any activities which may be undertaken by a natural person does not implicate the statute
as conveying to the corporation the practical or factual capacity to engage in such activities. For
example, the statute does not convey the capacity to exercise, or to engage in the sensory
movement, or intellectual capacities, or physical capacities, of which a natural person is possessed.
This gives rise to the question as to how a corporation engages in activities or takes actions.
Investing the board of directors with responsibility for management of the corporation is generally
taken to affirm that the board is the first-order actor in relation to the corporation. That is to say,
subject to certain legal limitations, as previously discussed, the board has the power and authority
to take action on behalf of the corporation. In terms of the corporation acting as a separate legal
entity, the actions taken, or authorized, by the board of directors in pursuance of such power and
authority are recognized, as a matter of law, as being those of the corporation. This might be
considered as a rule of corporate authorization or as a rule of corporate recognition. It will be
referred to here as the “corporate act rule”.
Pursuant to the corporate act rule, any actions taken by others purportedly or impliedly on behalf
of the corporation that contravene board actions or authorizations are considered, in the first
instance, not to be those of, nor those authorized by, the corporation. However, the corporate act
rule has been modified, with the intention of eliminating injustice, by a rule known as the “rule in
Turquand’s case” or the “indoor management rule”.52
As stated in a later Canadian case, “where an outsider dealing with a corporation satisfies himself
that the transaction is valid on its face to bind the corporation, he need not inquire as to whether
all of the preconditions to validity that the corporation’s internal law might call for have in fact
been satisfied.”53 As noted in Chapter A1 in the section entitled “Management Role of the Board
of Directors under the subheading “Apparent or Ostensible Authority of Directors, Officers, and
Others”, this rule has been modified by sections 17 and 19 of the CBCA and OBCA, respectively.
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Broadly speaking, a corporation cannot deny the due appointment and the customary or usual
authority of a person it holds out as a director, officer or agent of the corporation.54
Each of the common law “indoor management” rule and the statutory rules is consistent with the
principles of agency law concerning ostensible or apparent authority. Reference is made to the
preceding Part A of the present chapter.
Respective Capacities of the Board and of Shareholders to Initiate Action
If the corporate act rule recognizes as corporate acts, in law, acts that are taken by, or in pursuance
of, the board of directors’ lawful powers of management, the question arises whether the board of
directors is then acting as a principal who may appoint agents and sub-agents. Whether or not the
board is acting as a principal in so acting, it is clear that its management power and authority allows
it to appoint such agents and sub-agents. It is also clear that other parties who may subsequently
abrogate, amend, or fail to approve board actions or authorizations in the exceptional
circumstances in which such action is required or permitted cannot, in the first instance, be
considered as principals in relation to the corporation. This refers, of course, to the approval or
amendment powers of shareholders in exceptional circumstances.
It is also clear that shareholders are not, and do not act as, principals in relation to the corporation.
The board of directors, rather than the shareholders, is empowered to manage the corporation and
the shareholders are not entitled to give instructions to the board concerning such management.55
Thus, the board cannot be considered to be an agent of the shareholders, collectively, acting as
principal. Likewise, the shareholders have no general power to set aside the actions of the board.56
The statutory powers of shareholders to approve, amend, or reject actions proposed by the board
are powers which are exercised in specific instances after the fact. They cannot, as such, initiate
any management action.57 Their statutory powers to make proposals to the board are just that:
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powers to make proposals for consideration by the board with knowledge of the extent of
shareholder interest in the same, not powers to give instructions. But their power to determine who
will exercise the power of management, which is vested in the board of directors, is a right similar
in nature to that exercisable by a human being who might be acting as principal.
In fact, although the board of directors may be considered to exercise most of the powers which a
human “principal” would have with respect to appointing another human “agent”, a limited
number of the powers exercisable by a human “principal” are allocated to the shareholders vis-àvis their relationship to the board of directors. Consequently, as Langevoort remarks, the division
of “rights and responsibilities normally allocated to the principal in a simple enterprise… between
the board of directors and the shareholders, albeit with a strong bias toward board primacy as it
relates to the running of the corporation’s affairs”58 entails that neither the board or the
shareholders is a real principal. Neither of them alone is “actually able to make the choices
principals are normally entitled to make”.59 At least, neither of them can make such choices solely
on their own.
However, as Professors Johnson and Millon state in an important article from 2005, the board “is
endowed with plenary governance authority and is the body most centrally responsible for the
well-being of the corporate enterprise”,60 although it normally vests the actual management
function in others, whom it appoints as officers, who act pursuant to its direction. Accordingly,
Johnson and Millon say that the board, as governing body, is required to monitor and evaluate
those to whom management is been delegated.61 They argue that “organizational principals – be
they corporations, churches, universities, or other groups – differ from individual principals” in
this respect, namely, that an organization, as such, lacks human capacity.
The present work has suggested that the corporation, as a separate legal entity, is “animated” or
“vivified”, in the first instance, by the board of directors. That is to say, they “bring it to life” or
enable it to act. The board “represents” the corporation to, and personifies it within the “real world”
of human actors both within and without the corporation. As will be argued more fully in Part 3 of
this work, the corporation, as a separate legal entity, must be considered as intrinsically linked to
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the persons and groups of persons who enable it to function in the real world. That implicates the
corporation as involving an organization, by which is meant a group of persons acting collectively
in endeavouring to achieve or accomplish one or more commonly held goals or objectives.
All of this indicates that the board of directors is not the “agent” either of the shareholders or of
the corporation itself. Instead, as we have said, the board “animates” or vivifies” the corporation
and enables it to act in the “real world” among individual human actors. Unlike an agent, the board
of directors exercises, within the scope of its authority, the powers of the corporation. This can be
distinguished from an agency situation, as explained by Dowrick, in which the power of one party,
the agent, to alter the legal relations the other party “is a reproduction of the power possessed by
the latter to alter his own legal position” such that “the power conferred by law on the agent is a
facsimile of the principal’s own power.”62
This is unlike the board of directors’ relationship with the corporation for, without the board of
directors or other animating party, the corporation is unable to act at all. Furthermore, Dowrick’s
descriptions are quite apt with respect to the relationship between the board of directors and the
principal officers of the corporation. Equally well, Pollock’s description of the effect of agency
seems quite useful with respect to the board-officer relationship, but not with respect to the
corporation-board relationship, when he says that “by agency the individual’s legal personality is
multiplied in space”.63
In effect, Pollock provides an appealing visual motif which is particularly apt in the case of a
corporation or other organizational principal. Each of the corporation’s employees, to the extent
that they act as agents, present or re-present the legal capacity of the corporation. As we have
maintained, while the legal capacity so produced or multiplied is that of the corporation, and while
the board of directors may act on its behalf in appointing agents, the board is not itself an agent of
the corporation. At the same time, of course that “replicated” legal capacity enables the corporation
to function on a very large scale, often involving a great number of employees, businesses, plants,
offices, regions, countries, and continents.
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Nature of the Duties and Responsibilities of Directors
While the board may be seen to represent the corporation as principal, it is clear that the board is
not itself, as a matter of law, the principal in relation to other parties acting on behalf of the
corporation. Firstly, its powers of management which are, in the first instance, plenary (within the
limitations of statutory and constating documents), do not extend as far as the rights of a principal
acting as owner with respect to his or her own property. For example, the board cannot lawfully
commit the tort of waste. Secondly, the directors, individually and collectively, exercise powers
and bear duties and responsibilities towards the corporation itself. Principals are not considered to
have “duties” towards themselves.
Admittedly, the nature of the duties of directors is subject to some contestation, but need not be
determined here. Whatever the nature of such duties, however, principals have no duties towards
themselves as such. The statutory duties of loyalty, care, and compliance may all be considered,
in some senses, as fiduciary, that is, as having some similarities to those of a trustee towards
beneficiaries. There also similar to the duties of agents towards their principals.
Indeed, as Professor Hazen observes, prior to 1984, the MBCA referred to the duties of directors
as “fiduciary duties”, and he observes that the deletion of this description in the 1984 revision “was
not intended to change the current law relating to directors’ and managers’ responsibility [but,]
[r]ather, the reformulation was designed to eliminate unhelpful analogies to the law of trusts. As
others have shown however, the trust analogy has been very useful.”64 Although the duties of the
board of directors bear some similarities to the duties of trustees and to the duties of agents, they
are quite distinctive. Again, a lengthy discussion of this subject is beyond our present mandate.
Subject to the terms of the statutes and the constating documents of the relevant corporation, the
board’s power to manage exceeds the powers of both trustees and agents. Professor Hazen argues
that the directors, as corporate managers, “should and can take risks that ordinary trustees cannot”
and “are encouraged to be less risk averse than trustees in their pursuit of economic gain for the
corporation.”65 Indeed, the directors must balance the risks and opportunities of certain courses of
action, and pursue a course of action consistent with the corporation’s goals and objectives.
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As we have indicated, both the trustee and the agent paradigms are inadequate by themselves as
descriptions of the function of the board of directors. Rock and Wachter comment that “[t]he
corporate relationship is thus at the opposite pole from the trust or agency relationship – open
ended in time and scope, transactionally intensive, and often involving physical assets that are
illiquid and difficult to value. The corporate director thus needs more flexibility to deal with
evolving events than does the trustee.”66 In effect, managing or supervising the management of a
business is intrinsically different from exercising the responsibilities of a custodian or curator of
assets. Assuming appropriate levels of risk proportionate to anticipated benefit and goals is
consistent with directorial duties in respect of the business and its objectives.
The Representative Role of the Board
Actor on Behalf of the Corporation
There is no doubt, however, that the board of directors of the corporation, as its highest authority,
is considered to represent the corporation for the purpose of agency law. Whether or not the board
is, as such, an agent of the corporation, which is its principal; is itself the principal; or is something
in between the two; or is something else 8entirely; is subject to considerable contestation, as has
been previously mentioned.
Donald Langevoort, for example, concedes that the board holds the ultimate decision-making
authority with respect to the corporation as a distinct juristic entity67, but nonetheless treats the
board, at the very top of the corporate pyramid, as a principal with respect to the officers and
employees. In effect, he assumes that the board is the ultimate superior in the corporate pyramid.
Eric Orts sees the board as the “top-level representative of the firm”, which, in such capacity, acts
“as a ‘principal’ for purposes of hiring and delegating authority to agents”.68
This may be considered to be something less than an assertion that the board is the principal;
instead, Orts maintains that as a principal or some analogous form of expression, it acts as if it is
a principal. The argument of this chapter is that, as representing the corporation and, as its highest
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order representative, taking action on its behalf, the board acts as a principal would act if the
principal was a natural person, rather than a separate legal entity.
As our review in Chapters A1 and A showed, while most of the attributes of the principal in a
principal-agency relationship inhere in the board of directors, there is some sharing of these
attributes as between the board and the shareholders. However, while shareholders exercise some
authority which might be considered to be consistent with that of a principal, even in those
situations, the board of directors, rather than the shareholders, is the party empowered to take
action, vis-à-vis the shareholders or otherwise, on behalf of, and in the name of, the corporation.
Langevoort, for example, observes that “on close inspection, in many ways the basic purpose of
corporation law is to address the question of who the "principal" is in the corporate setting.” 69 Its
collision with the simplicity of agency law arises, in his estimation, because “corporation law
complicates relationships by making the principal a fiction for purposes of its agency relationships,
and then spends much of its effort pretending that it is nonetheless meaningful to think of the
corporate principal as if it were real.”70 Langevoort concludes that although senior managers act
as principals, they are actually agents and that “[b]oards of directors are closer in theory to
principals, but even they are fiduciaries beholden to some abstraction of the corporation.”71
Despite his somewhat misleading “fiction” characterization, Langevoort appears to recognize that
the “problem” of characterizing the nature of the board of directors arises from the simple failure
of an entity to be able to take action without involving human persons. It is submitted that many
of the problems associated with the characterization of the corporation as a fiction, a discussion of
which extends beyond the scope of the present work, arise from this distinction between the legal
entity and the actors representing, impersonating, or taking action on behalf of that entity.
Characterizing the corporation simultaneously as a legal entity and as an organization avoids these
difficulties. This characterization is effected by means of the corporative theory or perspective set
forth in this work.
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Compared to Trustee and Agent Roles
Johnson and Millon conclude that, as a matter of law and as reflected in the Restatement of Agency
and case law, neither the board as a whole nor individual directors are agents of either stockholders
or the corporation.72 It is also apparent that the types of fiduciary duties incumbent upon directors
do not arise in connection with an exclusively trustee-beneficiary relationship and, for the reasons
set forth above, also do not arise as a result of a relationship which is strictly, in law, solely one of
principal and agent. In distinguishing the duties of directors from those of trustees, Rock and
Wachter refer to the first Restatement of Trusts as providing “a comprehensive articulation of the
classical law of trusts.”73
They also indicate: “According to the Restatement, a trustee has the following duties: to administer
the trust; to act with loyalty to the beneficiaries; s not to delegate; to keep and render accounts; to
furnish information; to exercise reasonable care and skill; to take and keep control; to preserve
trust property; to enforce claims; to defend actions; to keep trust property separate; to make the
trust property productive; to pay income to beneficiaries; and to deal impartially with beneficiaries.
A trust relationship is a "fiduciary" relationship and the duties that arise out of it are "fiduciary"
duties.”74
As demonstrated in Chapter A1, the declarative law obligations of directors are much broader and
much less specific in their nature. As demonstrated in the present chapter, a primary obligation of
agents is adhering to the instructions of the principal. As discussed, in the context of ordinary
management matters, no one other than the board of directors has the capacity to provide such
instructions on behalf of the corporation, as principal.
The nature of the relationships between the board as a whole and the corporation and between
individual directors in the corporation differs from conventional trustee-beneficiary and also from
conventional principal-agent relationships, which are considered to be primarily contractual
arrangements. Rock and Wachter adopt the argument of theorists of the firm such as Coase,
Williamson, Hart, and others that “when costs are high enough, transactions are brought inside the
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firm. For transactions inside the firm, the firm’s authority structure replaces the market’s command
structure.”75
The remit of the board involves managing or supervising the management of the corporation. The
board is at the apex of the firm’s authority structure and, because the board represents the
corporation, it is difficult to conceive of the board negotiating its remit and compensation with
“the corporation”. Thus, as Rock and Wachter observe, “[t]he corporate relationship is thus at the
opposite pole from the trust or agency relationship – open ended in time and scope, transactionally
intensive, and often involving physical assets that are illiquid and difficult to value. The corporate
director thus needs more flexibility to deal with evolving events than does the trustee.”76
In fact, corporate directors must be afforded extensive, almost complete, discretion, subject to their
duties of care, loyalty and compliance, in exercise of their duties as such. Their powers to manage
the business and affairs of the corporation are, in the first instance unlimited. This is recognized
by the business judgment rule, which accords directors considerable discretion in exercising their
judgment in making business decisions.77 An investigation of this interesting but complex subject
exceeds our present mandate, which, at present, is to situate the board of directors and individual
directors within the hierarchy of the formal organization of the corporation and to explain their
respective relationships with the corporation and with organizational subordinates.
In the result, for the purposes of taking action on behalf of the corporation, the board of directors
represents the corporation and is its highest authority for the purpose of agency law. It is important
in this regard, to maintain distinction between the legal role of the board of directors and the legal
role of officers. As has been demonstrated, the role of the board, as a matter of statute law, is to
manage or supervise the management of the corporation. Likewise, as a matter of statute law, the
board may delegate, within prescribed limits, certain roles or functions to officers and other
employees of the corporation. Generally speaking, the roles and functions of officers derive from
such delegation by the board.
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Rights and Duties Differ from Trustees and Agents
As discussed above, the board of directors may be seen acting both as the top-level actor (but not
agent) of the corporation and as the embodiment of the corporation as principal in engaging (other)
agents. As a matter of corporate law, when acting as the top-level actor of the corporation, it is
logical that the board of directors have rights and duties somewhat similar to those of a trustee or
agent, mutatis mutandis, in relation to the corporation, as principal. But as the only party capable
of forming and giving expression to the will of the corporation with respect to matters of its
ongoing management, the board acts in the capacity of, that is to say, as if it were, principal in
relation to other agents of the corporation appointed by or pursuant to its authority and subordinate
to the same. In effect, for most purposes, the Chief Executive Officer and other officers of the
corporation act as highest-order agent of the corporation as principal, as represented by the board.
Thus, the officers of the corporation, for most purposes, act as if the board was the principal.
Corporate law, which provides rights to the board of directors, also imposes liabilities, some of
which rights and liabilities differ from those of the trustee in trust law or of the agent and agency
law. As shown in Chapter A1, in most jurisdictions, these provisions are most extensive with
respect to directors and officers.
It is noteworthy that the board has certain collective rights, duties and responsibilities and that each
director has certain individual rights, duties, and responsibilities. For example, an oppression
remedy may lie with respect to the past, present and possible future exercise of the powers of the
directors, that is to say, collectively in many cases, although perhaps individual in some cases; yet
the court may among other things, replace any of the directors, thereby applying a remedy which
might be considered personal in nature with respect to actions taken by the board collectively.
However, as noted above, an individual director has rights which are personal, such as the right to
attend meetings of the board and the right to contest shareholder actions for his or her removal.
As the embodiment or personation of the corporation, however, it is the board of directors, rather
than any individual director (unless authorized by the board), which acts, collectively, as the
principal or as the highest-level actor on behalf of the principal, which is the corporation, vis-à-vis
subordinate agents. This is recognized in many ways, including the requirement that individual
directors disclose conflicts of interest to the full board, which is similar to the disclosure required
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by agents to the principal.78The vesting of collective authority in a defined group of persons gives
rise to a number of questions which cannot be permitted to detain us here, but all of which are
discussed extensively in the respective literatures. These questions include: Why a board?79 What
historical and institutional factors may have attributed to the adoption of a model of collective
exercise of authority?80 What structure and processes do or should boards adopt in an effort to
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discharge their responsibilities and functions?81 Does board composition affect board
performance?82 Can improved board performance result in improved corporate performance?83
Whatever the origin, nature, and objective of collective action, however, there is no doubt that it
is facilitated, among other things, by trust and respect among the directors. Accordingly,
requirements such as disclosure of conflicts of interest, which apply to the individual directors, are
intended, in turn, to facilitate such trust and respect. Of course, such disclosure also enables the
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board of directors, collectively, to take the appropriate action to insulate it from any collective
liability for its decisions, as well to protect such decisions for the benefit of the corporation.
The dissent rights of directors allow individual directors to “opt out” of collective responsibility
for board decisions. However, strictly speaking, the legal liability for breaches of duty and
entitlement to any defenses in respect of the same apply to each director individually. Thus, for
example, disclosure of conflicts of interest by a director provides each director with some
protection from liability individually, even though such disclosure of interest is provided to the
board as a whole. In acting upon disclosure, however, each director may have individual liability
based upon such director’s individual circumstances.
Consequently, indemnification of individual directors (and officers) is permitted, subject to certain
limitations, but not required, under the corporate statutes surveyed above. This indemnification is
in respect of the individual director’s participation in a collective action. Thus, corporate law
recognizes the individual agency of individual directors while, the same time, recognizing that the
individual director, as agent, unless authorized by the board, can take no action with respect to
subordinate agents except in combination with other individual directors acting, collectively, as
the board of directors.
In this regard, it is important to notice that much of the corporate essentialist discourse, including,
unfortunately, some corporate legal essentialist discourse, elides, consciously or unconsciously,
the board of directors, on the one hand, and officers and employees, on the other, into an
undifferentiated concept of “management”. While this may be appropriate in many circumstances,
it is important to differentiate the two as a matter of law, as the discussion the next section will
illustrate.
The Role of the Chief Executive Officer and Other Top Management Team Members
Top Level or Superior Agents
Appointment of CEO and Other Officers
Our examination of the corporate statutes in Chapter A1 revealed that under the CBCA and OBCA,
the directors designate the offices of the corporation, appoint officers, specify their duties, and
delegate to them powers to manage the business and affairs of the corporation subject to certain
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limitations prescribed in the statutes. Under the DGCL, the method of appointment of officers may
be prescribed by the bylaws or by resolution of the board of directors.
Under the MBCA, the bylaws or the board determine the offices of the corporation; whose duties
may be prescribed either by the board or to the extent permitted by the bylaws, by one or more
officers; and such officers may be appointed accordingly. Of course, this permits the Chief
Executive Officer or CEO of DGCL or MBCA corporations to appoint other officers directly;
whereas under the Canadian statutes, the appointment of other officers is made, at least formally,
by the board itself.
Representation and Superior Agency – BOD and CEO Relationship
Johnson and Millon argue that in a public corporation the directors do not exercise their statutory
power to manage “because realistically, they cannot” and that and that, instead, the real
management function is vested in others appointed by the board, as officers, who act under the
board’s direction.84 These officers act as agents of the corporation and, as such, are in a fiduciary
relationship with the corporation. Having delegated management of the corporation to its corporate
officers, as agents, the board, acting on behalf of the corporation which lacks human capacity,
acting as governing body, must monitor and evaluate the performance of the persons to whom they
have delegated management of the corporation.85
The effectiveness of the board in performing its role of monitoring the CEO and the TMT generally
is, of course, affected by a number of factors, not the least of which are ability, time, and interest.
As discussed in Chapter Five and following in connection with organizational aspects of the
corporation, another significant determinant of the effectiveness of board monitoring is the
information available to the board, its appropriate selection, scope, relevance, informed and fair
presentation of alternatives, as well as other related factors. Such information not only assists in
evaluating the merits of decisions at hand, but also assists in evaluating the decision making and
other abilities of the CEO and the TMT. Unfortunately, a more thorough discussion of this
interesting subject and literature is beyond the scope of the present work.86
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Acting as the “top-level representative of the firm”, in hiring and delegating certain management
authority to agents, in this case, corporate officers, the board may likewise authorize those
corporate officers to engage and delegate authority to lower-order agents, or sub-agents.87 In
agency law generally, whether an agent can engage one or more sub-agents is determined by the
arrangements between the principal and the agent.88 Dowrick indicates that an agent may not
delegate his powers to a sub-agent without express authority to effect such appointment.89 Within
the context of the corporation, higher order agents may be expected to have such express authority.
As noted previously, however, the broad management authority delegated to CEOs or to officers
generally, may present some confusion concerning the role of such officers.
In view of the very broad range of authority normally delegated to CEOs, Orts says that “top
executives in business corporations often play a dual role’, both as “top-level “superior agents”
who have been delegated (by the firm’s shareholders and boards of directors) significant power
and authority to act on behalf of the organization as a whole” and also “as the embodiment of the
corporation itself as a “quasi-principal” for most business purposes regarding other internal agents
as well as external third parties.”90
However, considering the CEO as a “quasi-principal”, as Orts suggests, may be considered as
accurate only in the sense that an agent appointing any other subagent might be considered, for
certain relevant purposes, or from a certain perspective, to be the principal with respect to such
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subagent. Considering the CEO as “the embodiment of the corporation itself” effects an improper
and unnecessary elision of board and CEO boundaries and functions. There is no doubt that Orts
knows this, but is struggling with the familiar problems concerning the nature of the corporation
as an incorporeal entity and the necessity of explaining how it can take action. This difficulty is
compounded, of course, by the historical characterization of boards as appointed by, and
subservient to, the CEO. As a matter of fact, and, importantly, as a matter of law, it is the board of
directors which can properly be considered as “the embodiment of the corporation itself”.
Of course, when the corporation is treated as principal and the board is treated as representing or
acting in the place of the corporation as principal in a principal-agent relationship, then when the
board appoints the CEO or other officers directly, it may be argued that such appointees should be
considered as a highest order, superordinate, or ultimate, agent of the corporation. As noted,
characterizing the corporation as principal and the board as agent is highly problematic,
unnecessarily complexifying, misleading, and fundamentally inaccurate.
Complexity of BOD Role
This work has argued that the board of directors animates and vivifies the corporation: it enables
the corporation to act in a world of in which action is undertaken by individuals or human actors.
It also represents the corporation or “re-presents” itself as, and on behalf, of the corporation to
other human actors as the group of human individuals which identifies the corporation to those
other human actors. As has been argued previously, the role of the board of directors vis-à-vis the
corporation does not satisfy the requisites of an agency relationship. Hence, it is difficult to
characterize the role of the board vis-à-vis the corporation as being an agent of the corporation, as
principal.
Comparison of Duty of Directors with Duty of Officers
Chapter A1 shows that the CBCA and the OBCA do not distinguish between the statutory duties
and standards of performance of directors, on the one hand, and officers on the other hand. The
Delaware corporate statute does not deal with these matters in respect of officers at all, thus leaving
these matters to, common law, and, in particular, to agency law.
Section 8.42 (a) of the Model Business Corporations Act imposes a duty on officers to act in good
faith; with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar
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circumstances and in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation. There is no express duty of loyalty. Accordingly, Johnson and Millon view this as “a
statutory duty of care only. Violations of the duty of loyalty and other duties of an agent, therefore,
are not governed by this statute. The statute essentially adopts a "reasonable care" standard of
behavior.”91
Section 8.42 (d) provides, in effect, that the upon compliance with such standard the officer is not
liable to the corporation or its shareholders, but also provides, in effect, that liability for
noncompliance will depend upon applicable law, including the section 8.31 duty to deal fairly with
the corporation and its shareholders. Johnson and Millon conclude that “[t]he reference to
"applicable law" is murky. If "applicable law" means agency law - which it should – under
established agency principles, the agent is clearly liable to the principal for any damage caused by
the agent's breach of duty.”92
Subsection 1.40 (8) states that the term “employee” includes an officer but not a director; however
“a director may accept duties that make the director also an employee”. In effect, a director,
whether or not also an officer, may, in certain circumstances, be considered as an employee. An
officer always enjoys both officer and employee status. Consequently, section 8.44 provides that
appointment as an officer “does not itself create contract rights” nor does his or her removal or
resignation from office affect contract rights as between the corporation and the officer.
Agency Law Duties
As discussed above under the immediately preceding subheading “Top Level or Superior Agents”,
while the CBCA and OBCA expressly impose duties of care, loyalty, and compliance on officers,
as well as on directors, the DGCL imposes no such duties, while the MBCA imposes only a duty
of care. In each of these cases, however, the common law, primarily by way of the law of agency,
applies to officers, as well as the directors, in cases in which the relevant statute is silent, including
without limiting the generality of the same, situations to which the statute does not expressly apply.
Consequently, where the statutory limits of corporate law are not applicable to the relationships
between the board of directors, individual directors, and officers, on the one hand, and the
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corporation, on the other hand, it is frequently agency law to which resort is had for the legal
principles relevant to the situation.
For example, an officer who is not a director who causes loss to the corporation by breaching the
duties of care, confidence, or diligence, is subject to liability to the corporation on a standard of
negligence.93 However, the liability of a director, say of a Delaware corporation, arises only in
cases of gross negligence, but subject to a deferential standard of review, the business judgment
rule which requires a presumption that in making a business decision directors “acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.”94
Of course, a comparison of the relevant statutory duties to the duties imposed by agency law and
otherwise at common law leads inexorably to the conclusion that the principles enshrined in the
statutes were based, not only on previous statutes as judicially interpreted, but also on agency law,
and on the common law more generally. This relationship may complexify the interpretation of
statutory duties, since the agency and other common law which are the basis of, or at least the
background to, the duties adopted in the relevant statute, may not be identical with the terms of
which such duties are expressed in the relevant statute. This may lead to interpreting statutory law
against the background of the common law, not necessarily only in circumstances in which the
statutory law is otherwise silent.
Officer Status
Internal and External Functions
The officers who are directly appointed by the board (as “direct agents” or “highest level agents”)
often cause the appointment of other officers who are formally appointed by the board of the
CBCA and OBCA or, under the DGCL and MBCA, may actually appoint such other officers
themselves (both of which may be distinguished from direct agents by referring to them as “second
level agents” or “subordinate agents”).
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It has not always been recognized that officers act as agents of the corporation not only with respect
to parties external to the corporation with whom the corporation deals as a legal entity, but also
with respect to persons internal to the corporation who are, accordingly, part of its internal
organization. This is recognized, for example, by Professor Kempin, who says that “the officers of
a corporation, like the mythical Janus, face in two directions. On the one hand they function as a
part of the internal organizational structure of a corporation” and “supervising subordinate officers
and employees” in which capacity “they do not deal with persons outside the corporation. On the
other hand, officers often have duties with regard to the world beyond the corporation. They
purchase material for the corporation, negotiate for the purchase or sale of real property, hire and
fire, borrow money, and enter into all the various kinds of contracts essential to corporate
existence.”95
The distribution of such duties as between internal and external agency functions may vary
significantly: “Internal management may be the sole duty of some officers. Other officers may
have few internal responsibilities, since their primary function is to deal with third persons outside
the corporation. Between these two extremes a given officer may have some internal and some
external duties.”96
Professor Kempin considered that only the external activities constituted the officer as an agent of
the corporation, observing that “considerable confusion of thought has resulted from the
intermittent failure of courts and writers to separate these two entirely different and distinct
functions of corporate officers”, which “omission is understandable because the term "officer"
relates strictly to the internal management of a corporation, and of itself does not necessarily
bestow agency power to deal with third persons.”97
He argues that when officers deal with third persons, “their agency powers do not derive from the
fact that they are officers, but from specific agency power given them to deal with persons outside
the corporation” and maintains that “for purposes of analysis it may be well to adopt the
terminology used in Rosenblum v. New York Central R.R. Co. which referred to the agent-officer
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as an "officer of the business" and the officer with purely internal powers as an "executive
officer.”98
This distinction may be merely semantic. In any event, as our discussion of the “executive
function” in Chapter Six shows, almost a century ago, Chester Barnard, in his classic study of the
subject from a management perspective, distinguished very clearly between executive functions
and non-executive functions, in such a way as to suggest that executive functions are carried out
by executive officers.99 At the very least, it may be suggested that the distinction between executive
and non-executive officers connotes some degree of seniority of the former over the latter.100
Certainly, common usage, at least in modernity, would support the views, firstly, that not all
officers with purely internal powers are non-executive officers; and, secondly, that not all officers
with purely internal powers are “executive officers”. Accordingly, Kempin’s definition of the term
“executive officer” is not supported by more modern usage, Barnardian or otherwise, which often
describes “executive officers” as performing policy-making functions.101
However, Kempin’s distinction between “officers of the business” who act as external agents of
the corporation, on the one hand, and executive officers or officers, with their internal function, on
Ibid 1273-74. Kempin’s citation for the case is: Rosenblum v New York Central RR Co, 162 Pa Super 276, 57 A
(2d) 690 (1948).
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the other hand, draws attention to the distinction identified in the present work between the
corporation as a legal entity and the organization “within” the corporation which animates and
vivifies it. It is Kempin’s executive officers, whom we would denominate simply as officers, who
function, according him, “as a part of the internal organizational structure of a corporation”. Thus,
he assumes that the actions of his agent-officers or his “officers of the business” are undertaken
solely in relation to parties outside the corporation, such that they are not part of its internal
organizational structure.
While Kempin’s distinction may have some analytical utility, the distinction is taken too far. If, as
a matter of fact, his “agent-officers” are not part of the corporation’s internal organizational
structure, then they would be unable to undertake their external functions which necessitate
internal liaison. In fact, even mere external agents of the corporation, or outside the corporation,
require some liaison, this time externally, with individuals who are part of its internal
organizational structure. Furthermore, the internal agency function of “officers” and even of
employees more generally is too important to be marginalized or under-emphasized by such
terminological choices.
Officers as Agents of the Corporation
Interestingly, Johnson and Millon note that “[w]ithin the field of corporate governance, the
undoubted legal status of corporate officers as agents is rarely noted. The agency status of officer
seems to be far more significant to the issue of whether, in a particular case, officers have power
to affect the corporation’s relationship with third parties than to the issue of fiduciary duties owed
by officers, as agents, to their corporate principal.”102As previously argued in this work, and as
further emphasized in the present and in the next subsection entitled “Intracorporate Agency”, an
officer of the corporation is also ipso facto, an agent of the corporation, which is his or her
principal.
Indeed, Johnson and Millon take pains to distinguish between the duties of the directors, as
representative of the principal, and hence as fiduciaries, but not as agents, as compared with the
fiduciary duties of corporate officers, which they incur by reason of acting as agents of the
principal.103 As already noted, we maintain that the board of directors, as such, is not an agent of
102
103

Johnson & Millon, supra note 60 at 1609 [emphasis in the original].
Ibid at 1605-07, 1625-26, 1636-37.

921

the corporation and that an individual director acting solely in his or her capacity as a member of
the board of directors is likewise not an agent of the corporation.
DeMott emphasizes this with her observation that “like any agent, an officer lacks discretion to
ignore unambiguous directors receive from the principal” saying, also, that “as an agent an officer
does not have a right unilaterally to redefine the scope of her authority.”104 She points out that
unlike directors, who have a duty of care, officers have duties of care, competence, and diligence
and that the difference in these duties is “tied to the fact that officers, like other agents, are chosen
on the basis of the skills and knowledge that they possess (or claim to possess), which range from
highly specialized to very general.”105 Of course, unlike directors, officers are able, at least
notionally, to negotiate with the corporation concerning an applicable standard of performance
with respect to performance of their duties.106
The officers who supervise subordinate officers and employees working in plants and departments
of the corporation are, like those subordinate officers and employees, part of the internal
organizational structure of the corporation. As discussed in Chapter Four, all such officers occupy
“offices” in the Weberian sense.107 However, those subordinate officers and employees are also
persons, third parties to the corporation, with whom the corporation deals as a legal entity, through
the instrumentality or agency of the board or some supervising officer. Again, this is recognized
by Weber and by other organizational theorists.
In respect of such legal dealings, the subordinate officers and employees are, as a matter of law,
external parties each of whom have their own legal rights and duties vis-à-vis the corporation. For
example, employees may be subject to employment or collective agreements which make these
legal rights and duties explicit and may amplify upon those otherwise applicable. Alternatively,
their legal rights and duties may be determined by agency law and other common law principles.
The corporative theory or corporate perspective adopted in this work assists in understanding these
relationships.
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Deborah DeMott acknowledges that the term “officer” generally identifies a person entrusted with
“administrative and executive functions but not persons who lack “judgment or discretion as to
corporate matters”.”108 She characterizes “officer” status as having both an “externally-oriented
role as an agent” and “an internally oriented perspective”.109
She notes that the title or position held by an officer may create apparent authority in the holder to
do acts conventionally associated with an officer holding a like title or position. However, a
corporation, for its own purposes, may assign an officer’s title to an employee “either as an
honorific reward or to enable the employee to perform specified tasks on the corporation’s behalf,
despite the fact that the employee’s job duties and tell no executive or supervisory functions.”110
This is also consistent with the corporation’s authority under most statutes to determine what
offices and officers it will create.111 In the result, characterization of employees as officers may
not only create rights by the officer against the corporation but may also enlarge the corporation’s
potential liability to third parties. The absence of a specific functional designation (such as “Vice
President, Sales”) may negative the existence of actual or apparent authority to bind the
corporation.112
When an officer, whether a direct agent or otherwise, engages or hires subordinate officers or
employees on behalf of the corporation, questions may arise concerning the relationship of the
subordinate officer or employee to the appointing agent, on the one hand, and to the corporation,
on the other hand. This is discussed in the next section.
Intracorporate Agency
Hierarchies of Agents
It is now recognized, however, that, as Langevoort says, “[a]lmost every corporate employee with
discretionary responsibilities is an agent”.113 Consequently, the legal relationships within the
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corporation’s organization and hierarchy can be considered as a series or hierarchy of agency
relationships.
This characterization is important because, as we have seen, declaratory corporate law, considered
as statutory law only, deals explicitly only with the rights and duties of directors and officers of
the corporation vis-à-vis the corporation, who are at the very top of the organizational hierarchy,
implicitly leaving the rights and duties of other employees and agents, namely, those at the many
lower levels of the organizational hierarchy, to be dealt with as a matter of common law,
principally agency law. While such agency law may sometimes be supplemented by, or even
conflict with employment agreements, collective agreements or other contracts, and even other
statutes, sometimes agency law alone will be relevant to, and hence determinative of, the respective
rights and obligations of the corporation and the employee or agent.
Donald Langevoort’s laments that “To many legal academics, agency law is a backwater subject,
long banished from the formal law school training except for brief introductory reference in
corporations or business associations.” This is in spite of the fact that agency law “permeates an
extraordinary amount of everyday law, applying anyplace that one person (the agent) agrees to act
on behalf of another (the principal) to carry out the principal's affairs under the principal's control.
It covers most employment relationships, and a good bit else.”114 To like effect, Deborah DeMott
observes that “[a]gency has not enjoyed much fashion within the legal academy in recent years.”115
Yet, agency law is critical to the operations of a corporation. As Langevoort suggests, it is
pervasive in the context of employees and officers of corporations. In a corporate hierarchy, there
may be a very long series of levels in the “organizational chart” depicting successive levels of
agents engaged by the corporation who are appointed, directly or indirectly, by or on behalf of the
board of directors acting as the representative of the corporation, as principal. A question may arise
as to whether a sub-agent appointed or engaged by, or reporting to, a higher-level agent has duties
and responsibilities to the higher-level agent by whom he or she is appointed in addition to duties
and responsibilities to the corporation, as the principal. This question may arise even where the
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sub-agent is hired, appointed, or engaged, by or through a human resources department of the
corporate principal.
As some of the examples below will indicate, this question is not insubstantial or inconsequential.
It is but one example of what Langevoort calls “problems that involve the interaction among
multiple agents –"systems" or team production problems – [which] are the ones where the simple
application of agency law rules will most likely disappoint or confuse. When these systemic
interactions go to the heart of the firm's actions and how it is governed, agency law becomes too
blunt an instrument.”116
In this regard, it is important to note that the corporate organizational structure normally has both
vertical and horizontal dimensions. Thus, the complex structure of agency relationships is affected
not only by hierarchical, or vertical, ordering but also by ordering horizontally, which often is
effected in terms of function, product, or geography, and but may be ordered otherwise. Thus, the
personnel within the organization are interacting not only with different levels of agents and subagents, variously appointed, but also with agents and sub-agents operating, for example, in
different functions, with respect to different products, or in different geographic areas. The
importance of effective and efficient delegation of authority and responsibility is obvious. This is
particularly the case that the scale and scope of the corporation’s operations is extended or
attenuated.
Consequently, Eric Orts maintains that “[l]aw explains the relationship of authority, power, and
hierarchy in firms… [t]he essence of agency’s authority, power, and hierarchy” 117, to such extent
that “[w]ithout legal agency, business firms of any complexity are impossible.”118 Accordingly,
Orts argues that “[f]irms of more than one person are better described not as a nexus of contracts,
but as a nexus of agency relationships.”119
Agency Beyond Contract, and Agency Chains
Orts also argues that legal agency, while most often created through a special kind of contract, is
something more than a contract. “A contract alone does not create the open-ended relationships of
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agency authority characteristic of most business firms”, in which employer and employee enter
into “an agency relationship that extends beyond the explicit terms of the employment contract.”120
That legal agency is more than a contract is also indicated, he says, by the fact that “agency
authority inheres in the board of directors” as a matter of corporate law “even for participants who
join after the corporation is formed”, by which he must mean something like “after the contract
establishing the corporation is agreed”. Orts also argues: “Firms are more than a matter of contracts
because of the importance of the relationships of authority and power among principals and agents
organized within a business entity.”121 Of course, as seen from our review, authority and power
are endemic in agency relationships.
Langevoort identifies a problem with agency law in the context of the corporation, inasmuch as
“agency law itself has not systematically been evaluated to see whether, or how well, its blackletter rules fit when the principal is an organization and the problem under consideration operates
that agency’s shared border with corporation law.”122 The present work can attempt only a
preliminary review of the discussion of that subject.
An analysis of the agency relationships within the corporation indicates the presence of an iterative
scheme in which agents appoint subagents recursively, with the frequency and to the extent
considered appropriate. Eric Orts observes that agency law and corporate law allow for the creation
of “agency chains”, including “superior and subordinate co-agents” and “subagents” within the
firm structure.123
Orts derives support from Deborah DeMott, the academic reporter for the Restatement, who says
that “[m]ultiple agencies focused on the same agent, create multiple chains of imputation,
attribution, and duties. Multiple agency chains may run parallel or may intersect and create
conflicting duties to one degree or another.”124 Demott’s remarks, of course, focus on the lawyer
as agent for various clients, however, her comments are also appropriate to a situation which an
individual person within a corporation functions as agent or sub-agent for various other
individuals. Her description is particularly apt for the situation in which an individual has several
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reporting relationships, each in different capacities, as discussed under the immediately following
heading.
Orts argues that subagents, including agents who are subordinate to superior agents, often owe
allegiance to the same principal (by which he may mean the same “superior agent” or, perhaps,
the firm itself), and says that to account for these more complex agency relationships, the law of
agency recognizes that firms act as “organizational principals.”125 In addition, of course,
corporations and other business organizations may enter into agency relationships that are external
to the firm and, hence, outside its strict legal boundaries.126
Agents for the Corporation, and Agents for Higher Order Agents
Like the present work, but unlike many economic and other commentators, Orts does attempt to
construct some kind of legal framework for the corporation’s internal legal structure. As DeMott
points out, this internal legal framework may involve chains of agency relationships, whereby
certain agents appoint sub-agents who in turn appoint lower-level subagents, and so on, which
becomes extremely complex.
Ultimately, of course, all of the agency appointments relate to the same principal, at the apex of
all these agency relationships, namely, the corporation, whose authority reposes in the board of
directors. Although all of the agents and sub-agents may ultimately act on behalf of the same
ultimate principal, the corporation, each may also be the agent or subagent, as the case may be, of
a superior agent or subagent within the corporation whose authority that individual represents, and
on whose behalf such individual acts in exercising his or her rights, duties and responsibilities.
In some cases, an employee may be appointed as agent or sub-agent of more than one superior
agent. For example, someone employed in a particular department or function of the corporation
may be posted to some other country and may be appointed to the department or function in that
country by both a superior member of the department or function, acting as a superior agent, and
to the other country by the “country head” or “regional head” or designee, again acting as a superior
agent. Thus, the employee may have two titular superiors and, indeed, two superior agents to whom

125
126

Supra note 25 at 58.
Ibid at 61.

927

the employee may owe duties, although subordinate to the employee’s overall duties to the
corporation, as the ultimate principal. This will be discussed later as “matrix reporting”.
For example, Langevoort says that “every corporate agent has a duty of disclosure: the interesting
questions are of what and to whom.”127 Normally, an employee would be required to report “the
chain of command” to “his or her immediate superior in the chain of authority created under the
direction of the board.”128 In the case posited, a question arises as to whether the employee is
required, as an agent of the corporation, to report to both superior agents or to only one of them;
and whether the employer is required, in the capacity as a sub-agent of each superior agent, to
report to each of them.
In organizations denominated as “matrix” organizations, this is common. In some cases, one of
the superior agents may be recognized as having an authority over the employee which is superior
to that of the other superior agent. However, the “ultimate principal” is always the corporation
itself. The cascading chains of agency relationships, when considered in relation to parallel
cascading chains, and sometimes even longitudinal relationships or chains of relationships, may
be described as a kind of “waterfall” or “cascade” of agency, authority, and responsibility.
Accordingly, in view of this complexity, it is perhaps not surprising that many legal theorists and
commentators do not “drill down” into the principal-agent hierarchy within the corporation in this
manner. Despite such reticence, it is clear that those principal-agent relationships may be analyzed,
generally, as a matter of agency law, and, in some cases, as a matter of corporate law.
Of course, the legal relationships of principal and agent just described are just that: legal
relationships. They are legal relationships that are established and exist in right of the corporation
as a legal entity. Quite apart from legal relationships, there may also be other relationships that
relate to the structure, processes, and personnel of the organization, both formal and informal.
Agency Relationships, and Organizational Placement
For example, considering some five levels of hierarchy of principal and agent relationships, from
principal A to agent E and considering only the issue of actual authority, the authority which may
be exercised at each level may be dependent, in part, upon such legal issues as the manifestations
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and known objectives of each higher-level principal as known to the agent and, if not known to
the agent, as might be interpreted by a reasonable person in the position of the agent, including
circumstances in which the agent has notice and taking into account the fiduciary duty owed to the
principal, as required under section 2.01 of the Restatement. The complexity of this analysis is
further exacerbated by formal and informal organizational considerations.
As discussed under the heading “Hierarchies of Agents” above, the agency relationships within
the organization engage both vertical (i.e. hierarchical) and horizontal dimensions. Actual, as well
as apparent and ostensible, authority of the subject agent may be determined by his or her
placement on the horizontal agency axis, as well as on the vertical agency axis. For example, if the
horizontal axis gives effect to functional differentiations, a very simple organizational structure
might differentiate among production or operations, finance and accounting, sales and marketing,
and human and other resources might consider as being ranged from numbers 1 to 4 inclusive. It
can readily be seen that the 5 hierarchical levels and the 4 functional spaces result in a matrix of
some twenty basic (that is to say, direct, as between immediately adjacent locations) principalagent relationships.
These rights and obligations of agency law apply, quite apart from the corporate law embodied in
corporate statues, unless and to the extent varied by the same, to directors, officers, employees,
and other agents of a corporation. Consequently, as noted above, it cannot simply be assumed that
a corporate statute exhausts the capacity of the law to affect matters relating to the internal
organization of the corporation. These include matters that relate to corporate legal essentialism.
To mention but one important such instance, in order for the corporation to act as one party or
legal entity vis-à-vis outsiders, and since the corporation can act only by and through human
agents, some natural person must take action on its behalf with respect to a third party, say, entering
into a contract. So acting calls into operation the principles of agency law. While some principles
of corporate law may be involved in determining whether or not the putative agent acted with real
authority, an investigation into the legal structure proceeding from the board to officers to lower
levels of management ending with the putative agent will not be determinative of whether
contractual relations with the third party have successfully been engaged. In addition to such
matters, which may be quite relevant to actual authority, other principles of agency law, including
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those relating to ostensible or apparent authority, affect whether or not the corporation is bound,
as a matter of law, with respect to such third party.
An additional example of how agency law may apply to a corporation may be as follows. An
individual employee of the corporation may have information that bears on a particular transaction,
proposed or actual. In such case, the knowledge of the employee may be imputed to the principal.
This may have the effect that another employee lacking such knowledge makes a decision to
opposite effect from the decision that he or she would have made if in possession of such
knowledge. Because the knowledge of the “knowing” employee is imputed to the corporate
principal and thence to the second “transacting” employee, the relevant knowledge, although
unknown to the second transacting employee, may be attributed to the corporation. One effect of
such imputations is to reduce incentives to structure an organization “so that knowledge of bad
facts is isolated to agents who are not otherwise implicated in the organization’s dealing with a
third party.”129
Another useful example that presents itself is one in which the actions of two employees of the
corporation vis-à-vis the same third party contradict each other. For example, one may affirm and
another may deny the existence of a contract. In that case, the inquiry into actual legal authority
may not be determinative. For example, one employee may have authority over the other. If that
fact was or should have been known to the third party (which will be determined as a matter of
agency law), the actual legal authority of one vis-à-vis the other may determine whether or not
legal relations arose. In that regard, actual authority may be significantly affected by matters of
corporate statutory law. But otherwise, agency law alone will provide the relevant legal principles
for the determination of whether a contact has or has not come into being.
Agency Relationships in Law as Distinctive
It is worth being emphatic on this point. What determines the legal effect of actions of natural
persons acting as agents of the corporation vis-à-vis the relationship between the corporation and
a third party is the law of agency, not the concept of agency as employed by economists, political
scientists, sociologists, philosophers, or others. The legal meaning of the term “agent” is much
more circumscribed than the term as used in ordinary speech to indicate someone who acts on
See DeMott, “Agent’s Knowledge”, supra note 115 at 317-18. DeMott also discusses the situation in which the
agent appointing a sub-agent is fixed with the knowledge and intention of the sub-agent. Ibid at 295-296.
129
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behalf of another; while the legal concept of agency involves the person having authority to act on
behalf of such other.130
The concept of agency in each of these disciplines and fields are, no doubt, worthy of respect
within each such discipline or field, and may be worthy of some consideration and deference in
the legal discipline or field. Importantly, they may be key elements in assessing the ways in which
agency law should develop. However, such concepts, as used in other disciplines or fields, are not,
as such, relevant to the determination of whether, as a matter of agency law as it exists today, and
applying its principles and practices in a “legal” manner, a contract has arisen as a result of contract
between a corporate agent and a third party.
As explained previously at a more general level, the lexicon and grammar of various disciplines
and fields may be considered to be heterogeneous. Each discipline and field has its own vocabulary
and rules of using its language. The words “type”, and “group”, and “family”, and “household”,
to mention but a few such examples, have different meanings in one discipline or field from
another. Developing a perspective on, or theory of, the nature of the corporation as a matter of law
requires paying attention to the necessity of such discriminations. As noted above, corporate
essentialism in law may be sensitive to corporate essentialist discourse in other disciplines and
fields, but is, and should be, more sensitive to corporate essentialist discourse in law, here
denominated as corporate legal essentialist discourse.
The analysis presented in Appendix B concerning common assumptions of economics and other
disciplines and fields relating to the corporation will prove that such assumptions are highly
susceptible to contestation, and, further, that they are not appropriate for immediate “translation’
into legal discourse, and, in particular, corporate legal essentialist discourse, without considerable
“linguistic” understanding, whereby the “translator” may be informed as to the differences in
grammar, syntax, historical usage, and other linguistic characteristics. As noted previously, it is
necessary not only to find the appropriate vocabulary in the legal field, but also to recognize
differences in how the grammar of law and that of, say, economics, differ. To do otherwise is to
invite, and, even more, to commit to, ambiguity, misunderstanding, and error.

130

Of course, this point is made by many legal authors. Dowrick does so in substantially these terms. Supra note 19
at 35.

931

Liability and Indemnification of Directors, Officers, and Others
As has been maintained here repeatedly, corporations can act only through human agents. With
respect to contracts, as discussed above, where the agent has actual authority, a contract entered
into by an agent binds the corporation. As noted in section 6.01 of the Restatement and in the
official comments on that section, an agent of the corporation acting with actual or apparent
authority binds the corporation, but not themselves personally, to contracts. However, the principal
may seek recovery from employees who enter into contracts exceeding their authority, in breach
of express or implied terms of the contract between the corporation and the corporation, as noted
in Restatement section 8.07.
Under section 8.09 (1) of the Restatement, an agent has a duty to take action only within the scope
of the agent’s actual authority and, under section 8.09 (2), to comply with all lawful instructions
of the principal concerning the agent's actions on behalf of the principal. Thus, officers and other
employees may be held liable for breaching instructions from the principal. As to such matters,
Orts finds that “In these cases, courts tend to defer to business participants and the internal
arrangements of authority within the firm” which often involves not attempting to recover damages
“from a manager or employee who simply made a mistake in exceeding his or her authority. Rather
than suing their own agents, most firms prefer self-help remedies, such as dismissing, demoting,
or otherwise internally sanctioning the offending agent.” 131
Among other things, when the employer corporation takes proceedings in accordance with the
contract, the other contracting party may not know that the agent’s authority was exceeded or that
that the agent was disciplined as a result. Where the corporation exercises internal discipline alone,
the limits of such authority are thus not necessarily revealed to outside parties who may be enabled
thereby to take such information into account in subsequent dealings. In this way, the legal
relations (and even expectations) of the corporation with outside entities may not be affected by
the employment internal discipline, however much its intracorporate or intraorganizational
relations may be so affected. The position of the corporation with respect to directors and officers
is discussed further below.
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As discussed above and in section 7.03 of the Restatement, the corporation may be subject to direct
or vicarious liability where the agent has actual or apparent authority for tortious acts within the
scope of employment. In some cases, both the corporation and the employee may be subject to
joint liability in accordance with legal agency principles.132 As Orts notes, firms may act to protect
executives, managers and employees by allocating the risks of such liability primarily to the
corporation by way of indemnification agreements and insurance.133 In most cases, as he says, an
agent who acts without authorization and in a manner that does not benefit the corporation is not
entitled to indemnification under agency law. However, agency law,134 as well as corporate law in
some jurisdictions, permits indemnification for damages and expenses in connection with actions
taken on behalf of the corporation.
Unlike agency law, many of the corporate statutes reviewed do not provide for mandatory
indemnification, apparently for reasons of policy. As indicated in Chapter A1 above in the section
entitled “Indemnification of Directors”, while the CBCA and the OBCA permit the corporation to
indemnify directors and officers, the DGCL and the MBCA also permit it to indemnify other
employees and agents. Subsection 145(a) of the DGCL permits a corporation to indemnify a person
“if the person acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or
proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the person's conduct was unlawful.” Section 8.51
of the MBCA is to similar effect. However, section 8.52 of the MBCA requires a corporation to
indemnify a director “who was wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of any
proceeding to which the director was a party because he or he or she was a director of the
corporation”.
Indeed, arguably section 102 (b) (7) of the DGCL goes even further, for it permits the articles of
incorporation to contain a provision “eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty” except for
breach of the duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not in good faith, acts or omissions which involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, unlawful payment of dividends or unlawful
132
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stock purchases, or for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit.
Allowing the articles to eliminate or limit the financial consequences of breaches of fiduciary duty
may, of course, be seen as typical of what many characterize as the “pro-management” stance of
the Delaware statute generally. It is also possible, however to see it as permitting corporate
constituents to allow directors to take levels of risk in pursuance of the corporation’s objectives
which others, in part due to lack of information, might consider excessive. It is apparent that the
exceptions from personal liability which apply despite provisions in the articles to contrary effect
relate to the relationship between individual directors, as members of the group representing the
corporation (albeit normally disempowered from acting individually), and the corporation, as
principal. They apply separately to each individual director.
Conclusion - The Intracorporate Organization of the Corporation in Law
The Corporation as Legal Entity, and as Legal Actor
This Part One of the book has considered the essential, characteristic, or paradigmatic attributes of
the corporation as adopted in certain leading corporate statutes. For the purposes of discussion, we
have identified these as separate legal entity status; limited liability or asset partitioning;
transferable equity interests and capital lock-in; central management Independent of “owners”;
and indefinite duration or longevity. The chapters of the book up to this point have examined the
ways in which these essential legal attributes have been given effect in such statutes to matters
relating to the structure and processes of the corporation. They have also examined certain aspects
of the common law, principally relating to agency law, which form part of the background of, and,
in many cases, supplement, the interstices of statutory corporate law.
In this regard, these chapters have demonstrated that the corporation, as an idea and abstraction, is
reified and instituted by means of declaratory law, both statutory and common law, and principally,
in the common law, agency law, as a legal entity (that is, as a rights-and-duty bearing entity)
possessing certain attributes; which legal entity is, however, dependent upon real or actual
individual persons to act on its behalf or, as one may say, to instantiate itself, or perform acts on
its behalf, in the real world and among other real or actual individuals. In this regard, Part One of
the book has demonstrated how the paradigmatic legal attributes of the corporation have impacted
the construction and institution of its structure and processes as a matter of statutory corporate law.
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The thoroughgoing assignment of responsibility for determining the actions of the corporation,
that is to say, managing or supervising its management, to a board of directors constitutes the board
as the primordial actor in its ongoing day-to-day activities and also thereby constitutes the board
as the representative of the corporation for such purposes. As demonstrated in this part of the book,
such board of directors is subject to fiduciary duties, as its highest order representative, for which
it is accountable to the corporation; and each director is also subject to fiduciary duties for which
he or she is accountable, individually, to the corporation.
In this regard, the present chapter has considered how the corporation as a legal entity is enabled
to take action. Accordingly, it surveyed the ways in which the corporate statutes selected for
examination specify and concretize the rights and duties of the board of directors, of individual
directors, and of individual officers, in their capacities as actors for, or on behalf of, or as agents
of, the corporation.
Such rights and duties are generally consistent, with appropriate variations, in the case of the board
and individual directors, with trust law, agency law, and the common law generally; and, in the
case of officers, with agency law and the common law generally. As demonstrated here, the
statutory principles of corporate law are also broadly consistent with agency and common-law
principles relating to extra-corporate, that is to say, external or extrinsic, actions of agents, as well
as intracorporate, that is to say, internal or intrinsic, actions of agents.
The Law, Management of the Corporation, and the Corporate Actor
The present chapter has also demonstrated the scope and flexibility of statutory corporate law in
terms of the legal structure and processes of the corporation. Statutory corporate law engages at
the highest structural and processual levels, namely, with respect to the board and its committees
and officers, and is generally silent otherwise, implicitly leaving lower-level structural and
processual issues to be dealt by means of higher-order structure and process, and by related agency
and other common law.
As the corporate law form has become dominant as the principal legal form through which business
enterprises conducted, so has the corporation become primary context in which agency law is
applied in the contemporary business environment. Thus, as the statutory domain of directors’ and
officers’ duties is sought to be applied or is considered as inapplicable, perhaps because its limits
have been exceeded by the activities in question, the law of agency, together with other common
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law, asserts itself as applying in the instant circumstances. The legal or other reader of judicial
decisions must constantly bear in mind that the relevant boundaries, those between the statutory
corporate law and other declaratory law, and the one hand, and those of agency and common law,
on the other hand, may not always be clearly enunciated in judicial decisions, opinions, and
commentary.
The present chapter has demonstrated that, whatever the role of individual directors and of
individual officers in law, as a matter of law, the board of directors as a whole does not act as agent
for the corporation as principal. Some of the consequences of this conclusion have been mentioned
previously, however, the consequences of this conclusion with respect to corporate essentialist
discourse can hardly be emphasized too forcefully. It is particularly important to attend to this
before reviewing assumptions and generalizations, and in corporate essentialist discourse.
Quite simply, the concepts of agency, principal, and agent, and otherwise arising in the law of
agency, much of which is not declaratory law but, instead, is, common law, are distinct from the
concepts to which the same nomenclature is applied in other disciplines and fields. The
relationships of agency, including the status and consequences of being denominated as principal
or as agent, have specific and precise meanings in law. Those specific meanings are not necessarily
common as among legal and non-legal disciplines or fields.135 As recommended by the
descriptivist methodology adopted in the present work, it is necessary to investigate the meanings
attached to those terms outside of the legal environment and within the particular non-legal
environment under review.
The Law, Corporate Action, and Equity Owners
As also demonstrated here, the shareholders of the corporation are possessed of certain rights,
including rights relating to participation in its management, which are, however, principally
limited to selection and oversight of directors and to approval or disapproval of certain
fundamental transactions proposed by the directors. These aforementioned rights are supported by
certain rights to information relevant to such matters. In exceptional circumstances, rights to
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initiate corporate actions and to oppose certain corporate actions, are provided statutorily. Also, in
exceptional circumstances, appraisal and other rights provided statutorily seek to remedy inherent
disadvantages of capital lock-in and transferability of equity interests.
The availability of derivative actions in certain circumstances provide a sort of “safety valve”
against a board of directors which is considered to have failed its agency responsibilities to the
corporation. While the statutory remedy of derivative actions permits a court to “interfere” in the
assignment of management responsibility in this regard, the oppression remedy, by its terms,
permits a court to “re-write” or realign arrangements among corporate participants on a
“wholesale” or thoroughgoing basis. This affords an opportunity for courts to adopt and apply the
corporative perspective advocated in the present work.
The writer is unaware of any significant endeavours to demonstrate the relative correspondence
between statutory agency and common-law agency principles, or, the analysis of paradigmatic
corporate attributes, in the fashion undertaken in this chapter and otherwise in the present work.
Perhaps this is in error, in which case the contribution of the present chapter and present work may
only be to organize discussions of these other subjects around a common central, in this case,
corporative, perspective. As argued here, applying an empirical, verifiable, testable perspective to
a description of the phenomenon of statutory corporate law may alone make some contribution to
the analysis of such subject-matters.
CONCLUSION – PART 1 - GOING BEYOND PRESENT ASSUMPTIONS AND LAW
The Corporation and Descriptivist Methodology
The introduction to, and Part 1 of, this work have advanced a methodology denominated here as
empirical or “descriptivist”. This work has proceeded, initially, by “describing” the corporation
and the statutory framework of the corporation as observed “in the real world”. It has identified
assumptions upon which theories of the “firm” or the “corporation” as an economic actor are
thought to be based or which seem to be fundamental to such theories. These assumptions will be
criticized in more detail in the following chapters.
Our descriptivist methodology has then proceeded to describe the statutory framework of the
corporation as implicating its internal structure and processes considered from a legal perspective,
and has identified the common law, and most notably agency law, background against which these
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structural and processual “fundamental” elements have been developed and which apply in
circumstances not specifically the subject of determination otherwise. Based upon our review and
critique of assumptions, principally economic, and more particularly those derived from classical
and neoclassical economic theory, the present work will propose a theory, described here as
“corporative” theory or as evidencing a “corporative perspective”, the explanatory power of which
can be assessed, tested, and developed empirically, against “real world” phenomena.
Descriptivist Derivation of Theory of the Corporation
This descriptivist derivation of theory, notably, legal theory, and more especially, corporate legal
theory, is notable in its differentiation, developmentally, from purely abstract theorization. Some
support for this approach is provided by Herbert Hart, in his inaugural lecture as Professor of
Jurisprudence at Oxford, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, delivered on May 30, 1953.136
Hart argues that when legal theories “spring from the effort to define notions actually involved in
the practice of a legal system, they rarely throw light on the precise work they do there"137 Instead,
as Orts says, Hart’s argument is that beginning in this fashion, abstracted from the “practical reality
of corporate law”, risks failing to describe the phenomenon sought to be defined. Further,
“Inevitably, ideological baggage appears on the ground floor of any corporate theory if the first
question asked is ‘What is a corporation?’”, according to Orts, and words like “corporation” are
often neutral as between competing theories.
In the result, “corporate theorists who prefabricate various versions of “the corporation” separate
themselves from the world of practice and “stand apart with their heads at least in the clouds”, Orts
argues.138 Accordingly, says Orts, “Hart brushes aside unhelpful debates, such as whether a firm
is “a mere abstraction, a fiction, a metaphysical entity,” and he calls for closer attention to “the
legal rules of the game” about how terms such as the “corporation” are actually used and what
legal consequences follow.”139
Hart’s perspective on the nature of the corporation supports the present work’s “descriptivist”
method of proceeding, which, broadly speaking, seeks to identify the attributes of the “corporationHLA Hart, “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” in HLA Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy
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in-use” or the “corporation-in-action” rather than the attributes of some “corporation-in-theory”,
before then proceeding to theorize concerning the corporation and its instantiation and operation
“in the real world”. The methodology of the present work, which is referred to herein as
“descriptivist”, rather than the more common but highly contestable term “empirical”, may be
considered to employ observation to generate a working description or definition of the
corporation, which might be considered to relate to the corporation-in-use, as it describes or
defines what is commonly the referent of the term “corporation”.
Definition and Theorization of the Corporation
In this respect, Hart is found by Orts to maintain that “descriptions of these legal concepts and
practice are required, rather than beginning from abstract attempts at philosophical definitions.
Hart follows the legal theorist James Bryce in arguing that some “fundamental legal notions could
perhaps not be defined, only described”.140
Instead of separating the exercise of theorizing the corporation from the world of practice, this
work attempts to “throw light on the precise work” that the term “corporation” actually performs
in the practice of a legal system, rather than separating our theorizing from the world of practice
and “stand[ing] apart with [our] heads at least [and possibly more, as Hart hints] in the clouds.”
Most importantly, of course, this work attempts to avoid impractical definitions that occlude, like
clouds, perceptions otherwise possible, and possibly even veridical.
According to Orts: “Beginning with a definition or theory of the corporation is not especially
helpful because the idea of a corporation is a complex one that presupposes a legal system. To say
"corporation" is not like saying "chair" or "dog." The reality to which "corporation" refers is more
complex than an easily identifiable material thing or animal, and any attempt to force a
preconceived theory on a complex legal reality results in what Hart calls "contrivances varying
with tastes." The idea of the corporation is complex precisely because it involves various
relationships that presuppose the rules and principles, and methods of enforcement and compliance
that compose a legal system. Describing the corporation, therefore, should not begin with a
definition of what a corporation is.” 141
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What this argument attempts to show is that a simple definition of the term “corporation” cannot
be generated by virtue of the complexities which attend its attributes and the background to those
attributes. These issues were considered by John Dewey in his magisterial article The Historic
Background of Corporate Legal Personality.142 Dewey identifies one type of definition “inherited
from Greek logic reflecting a definite metaphysical conception regarding the nature of things”,
which type of definition “proceeds in terms of an essential and universal inhering nature.”143
Dewey identifies a second mode of definition “which proceeds in terms of consequences” in which
“a thing is –is defined as – what it does, "what – it – does" being stated in terms of specific effects
extrinsically wrought in other things. This logical method was first stated by Charles S. Peirce as
the pragmatistic rule: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings,
we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the
whole of our conception of the object".”144
To the extent that the present work employs a definition of the term “corporation”, it does so in
the latter sense. As Dewey himself indicates, “the mode of definition, however, has no inherent
dependence upon pragmatism as a philosophy except incidentally and epistemically.”145
Descriptivism and Theorization in This Work
Instead of proceeding by definitional fiat to identify that which is a corporation as matter of abstract
legal theory, this work examines its “meaning in use”, that is to say, what the signification of the
term “corporation” is to drafters, interpreters, and users of corporate law statutes. It asks, as do
linguistic and analytical philosophers: what it is that we mean by, or call, a corporation? What are
the essential legal characteristics of that which we call, in law, a corporation?
Such a question is clearly one which is appropriate to the discipline or field of law; and may be
expected to have a meaning in use in such discipline or field that differs from that in which the
same term might (or might not) be used in other disciplines or fields. This is also true of other
associated terms or concepts such as agency, whose meaning in law is quite distinct from that in
which the same word is employed in economics, to mention but one example.
John Dewey, “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926) 35:6 Yale LJ 655.
Ibid at 660.
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Furthermore, this work has sought to explain how the essential characteristics of the corporation
relate to each other, in principle, and as principles that are essentially “legal” principles, as well as
in corporate law statutes (again, purely as matters of law), and to relate both of these areas of
discussion to other common law and legal theory, including principles of agency law.
In order to prepare the way for a legal and organizational analysis of the nature of the corporation,
denominated here as a corporative approach to, perspective on, or theory of, the corporation, it is
necessary to identify, analyze, criticize, and, to some extent, circumscribe certain assumptions and
concepts of economic theory, principally emanating from classical and neoclassical economics,
that perpetuate confusion and error with respect to the legal theorizing of the corporation. To that
task our attention now turns.
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APPENDIX B:
WHY THIS?
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE CORPORATION
SECTION A:
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, THE POLITY, AND THE
STATE AS SPHERES OF ACTION
INTRODUCTION - THE CORPORATION IN DISCOURSE
A brief recapitulation of some of the discussion above may assist in appreciating the objectives of
this part, and this chapter, of the book. Part 1 of the book, together with Appendix A, examines
corporate law and corporate governance regimes adopted by the statutes and model statutes and
other declarative law of leading Canadian and American jurisdictions. Proceeding from a
description of the attributes which are generally agreed to be the essential, characteristic, defining,
identifying, or paradigmatic attributes of the modern business corporation as set forth therein, Part
1 and Appendix A, examine the instantiation of those attributes in those statutes and other
declarative law.
Part A of Chapter One denominated those attributes as “essential legal attributes of the
corporation” or “essential attributes of the corporation in law” and those attributes, collectively, as
“corporate legal essentialism”, distinguishing those terms from, in the first case, essential nonlegal attributes and, in the second case, from non-legal and corporate essentialism. It also averted
to the discussion of essential legal attributes of the corporation, denominating this as “corporate
legal essentialist discourse” or, for the purposes of this work, which relates only to the corporation,
“legal essentialist discourse”, and averted to the discussion of “essential” attributes of the
corporation in non-legal discourse as “corporate essentialist discourse”.
Part A discusses the methodology of the book as a whole, which involves identifying and
investigating the essential legal attributes of the corporation their instantiation in significant
instances, in Part 1 and Appendix A of the book, followed by an investigation of corporate
essentialist discourse, not limited only to legal essentialist discourse, in Part 2 of the book and in
this Appendix B, which supplements Part 2. As indicated in Chapter One, much corporate
essentialist discourse emanates from classical and neoclassical economics and, in consequence, is
often not significantly “legal” in its nature; as a result of which, much corporate essentialist
discourse is not easily translatable to legal essentialist discourse and much legal essentialist
discourse is not easily translatable to corporate essentialist discourse emanating from non-legal
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fields. As discussed there, barriers of terminology, frames of reference, subject matter disciplines
and perspectives, methodology, and accepted investigatory procedures, and others, all complicate
such translations or mappings.
In fact, corporate essentialist discourse of a non-legal nature is relatively limited in comparison
with “firm essentialist discourse”, namely, non-legal discourse relating to the “firm” generally,
including sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited partnerships, and other business forms, and is
not limited to, or distinguished from, the corporation as a legal entity. Often, such non-legal
discourse does not distinguish among the legal forms just mentioned by which “the firm” carries
on business. Often, firm essentialist discourse is considered in relation to legal essentialist
discourse without adequate consideration of these direct or indirect limitations. This is frequently
the case with respect to assumptions or generalizations of classical and neoclassical economics.
Especially important in this regard is the realization that those assumptions or generalizations of
classical and neoclassical economics do not generally reach a level of specificity which would
facilitate their comparison, readily, easily, or generally, against legal essentialist characteristics.
Lest it be thought that such difficulties of comparability might be a consequence of the
directionality of comparison, it should be noted that the direction of comparison could proceed by
taking each element of legal essentialism and asking what assumptions or generalizations of
classical and neoclassical economics, or some other discipline, can be brought to bear to
understand each element of legal essentialism, as well as those elements collectively. Such
comparisons may be more useful in some cases, and at some levels of generalization, than with
others. In many cases, identifying, assessing the salience of, and operationalizing points of
comparison present substantial difficulties.
Part 2 of the main text and this Appendix A to the main text demonstrate, however, that perhaps
the highest level of correspondence is found with respect to the “single legal entity” attribute. That
is to say, the corporation, as a single legal entity, may be analyzed as an economic actor, as a social
actor, or as a political actor, both internally and externally; and, correspondingly, may be analyzed
as the situs of economic, social, and political action.
The question discussed in Part 2 and this Appendix, then, is what assumptions are conventionally
made, explicitly or implicitly, in, or in relevant discourse concerning, Anglo-American law and
legal theory about the corporation, particularly the modern business corporation or MBC. The
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judgment made in this regard concerning the existence of such conventions is, necessarily, not
only subjective but conclusory. The assumptions to which reference is made below are those which
seem to underlie theoretical literatures and public discussions concerning the nature of the firm
and the corporation, their role in the economy, society, and the polity, and in the statutory,
regulatory, common law provisions relating to any of the foregoing.
Part 1 of this book demonstrates, however, that the statutory law governing the formation and
governance of the modern business corporation does not expressly adopt any specific legal theory
of the corporation or economic theory of the firm. Instead, it is notably agnostic in these respects.
It treats the corporation as a single legal entity or “rights-and-duty bearing” entity having certain
other defining characteristics, including limited liability and asset partitioning, transferable equity
interests and capital lock-in, central management independent of ownership of “owners”, and
indefinite and possibly unlimited duration. This may be said to be the “legal theory” that is
enshrined in the corporate statutes.
To be sure, there is no doubt that the creation of the corporation as a legal entity represents a
“concession” granted by government, the society, and the polity, as posited by “concessionary
theory”; and that the corporation as a legal entity may be affected by legal contracts, norms, and
practices and might, therefore, be described as the situs, network or nodal centre, point of
connection or “nexus” of such legal contracts, norms, and practices, as posited by the “nexus of
contracts” theory; that participants in the corporation combine as a team to produce goods or
services and may negotiate the terms of their participation, as posited by “team production” theory;
that the corporation is affected by various stakeholders within and without the corporation, as
posited by “stakeholder” theory; and that the incorporators and other participants “combine”
themselves or certain aspects of themselves, in social certain respects, as the corporation, as posited
by social organism theory as held by Gierke and other late nineteenth century German theorists.
However, as demonstrated above, statutory corporate law does not expressly or manifestly indicate
its adoption of, or reliance upon, any such theory.
The agency law adopted in the statutes affecting the relationship between the board and the
corporation, and between individual directors and officers and the corporation is likewise more or
less agnostic as to the legal theory of the corporation or the economic theory of the firm. The same
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may be said of concerning the relationships of other management and employee personnel to
superior agents and to the corporation.
If not apparent in the statutory corporate law, then, the influence of assumptions of corporate legal
theory of the corporation and of economic theory of the firm may be sought in purely theoretical
discussions or in practical discussions seeking to characterize practical matters from a particular
theoretical perspective. Such discussions may arise in respect of policymaking, drafting statutes
and regulations, applying the same in a regulatory context, and in judicial consideration, both
generally and in particular instances. Thus, such assumptions may arise in respect of both positive
law statutory provisions and in respect of the common law.
Furthermore, certain aspects of securities law and practice, and attitudes of securities law
regulators may be said to adopt these assumptions of microeconomic theory and, especially of the
economic theory of the firm. The same may be true with respect to the judiciary, especially in
jurisdictions such as Delaware and in other jurisdictions having particularly highly developed
corporate and securities law courts, benches, or individual judges. Most significantly, of course,
such observation applies with respect to the legal professoriate and the legal academic world more
generally. Even those credited with developing or acting as leading proponents of such theories,
such as Blair and Stout with team production theory, often express those “legal” theories in the
language of economics and the economic theory of the firm and otherwise adopt such principles.
This work maintains that: in the main, the assumptions commonly made in academic and other
discussions concerning the legal nature of the corporation and the theory of the corporation and
the firm are not assumptions of law or of legal theory at all, but are, instead, assumptions of
classical and neoclassical economics; such assumptions are of a purely theoretical and largely
unverifiable nature; are generally not subject to empirical verification or to generating hypotheses
that are empirically testable; and are largely unsupportable, or, at the very least, are highly
contestable, empirically, and even logically. This conclusion arises from examination in this and
the following chapters.
Advancing and critiquing these assumptions must necessarily involve: firstly, asserting the
particular assumption or generalization; secondly, displaying and discussing its instantiation in
various explications, whether by different authors or by different schools of interpretation; and
thirdly, of course, criticizing the assumption or generalization and related claims. Consequently,
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both expository and critical narratives will be set forth in this Part. Undertaking this work will
therefore require significant references to and explanation of various literature.
As previously noted, this work does not set out to prove that each of the assumptions and
generalizations is either, on the one hand, completely and irrevocably veridical or, on the other
hand, completely and irrevocably erroneous. Instead it aims to examine the issues critically and,
where appropriate, to cast doubt on the veracity of those assumptions, on their explanatory and
predictive capacities, and on their efficacy for the purposes of understanding, and regulating, the
behaviour of modern business corporations.
The transmogrification of economic theory and assumptions into assumptions of law and legal
theory requires some affirmation of the merit of so proceeding beyond the mere assertion of the
same. As is well known, even the language and procedures of economic theory are significantly
distinct from those of legal theory to such an extent as to be productive of great confusion and
consternation if not translated from that of the economic field into that of the legal field. All of
these considerations complexify the project of generating a descriptivist account of the legal theory
of the corporation which can be used to generate a working hypothesis or working hypotheses
which can be verified and texted “in reality”. The difficulties attending such transmogrification
will be demonstrated in this and the following chapters.
The extent to which such assumptions may be said to so underlie such positive and common law
provisions and such theoretical and other discussions may vary according to various
circumstances, including temporal, and the particular instantiations under discussion. However,
broadly speaking, these assumptions may be explicated in several dimensions, the first of which
are those related to the relationships among the economy, the society, the polity, and the state.
ASSUMPTIONS EXAMINED
Certain assumptions of economic theory that have influenced Anglo-American law and legal
theorizing concerning the modern business corporation relate to the relationships among the
economy, society, the polity, and the state. These relationships will be explicated below.
As noted in Chapter One, this work reviews five principal assumptions in this regard:
1. Economic roles and functions are intrinsically distinct from other functions in a society or
polity.
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2. The economy engages, overlaps with, or is part of, the “private” sphere. It is fundamentally
“private” in nature; as opposed to “public” in sense of being intrinsically related to its ambient
society or polity. In such private sphere, parties interact with considerable freedom, largely by
way of contract in the case of economic matters. Such contracts, relating to matters between
the parties, are essentially private, and unaffected by public interests.
3. The private sphere is intrinsically separate and distinct from the public sphere. Matters of
public interest include the constitution of the political entity or state, and any subdivisions, the
manner of its exercise of authority, and any limitations on it, elections, regulation of crime,
and protection of certain human, political or social rights, including economic rights, welfare
rights, and the authorization and exercise of distributive or redistributive functions, such as
taxation and provision of public goods and services. The economy does not engage those
matters sufficiently directly to be considered other than as part of the private sphere.
4. The economy, as such, can be analyzed in a manner which is distinctive to it, and to the private
sphere.
5. The economy, while related to the ambient society and polity, is distinct from, and operates
intrinsically independently of, such society and polity.
CHAPTER B1:
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, THE POLITY, AND THE
STATE AS SPHERES OF ACTION
ASSUMPTION ONE - SEPARATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL
FUNCTIONS
As noted, the first assumption to be discussed is the assumption that, although the economy has
some relationship to its social and political environs, the economy, that is to say, the production of
goods and services for present or future consumption, is intrinsically distinct from other aspects of
the social and political life of a given society or polity. Society, the economy, and the state are thus
considered as separate and distinct categories for purposes of analysis. Economic activity is
considered to take place in a distinct notional “place”. The economy is considered to constitute a
separate “sphere” of activity.
The identification of economic activity as a field or sphere of activity separate and apart from other
activities, including social and political activities, and of “the economy” as the agglomeration of
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economic activities (which will suffice as a definition for present purposes) is one of ancient
vintage, as is discussed below. This distinction has been a subject of discussion since ancient Greek
and Roman times. Although the validity of this distinction has been the subject of considerable
dispute, from time to time, it has been conceded relevance in the theory of the firm and, as
borrowed therefrom, in the law and legal theory relating to the MBC. The merits of such distinction
are discussed further below, in relation to assumption five. However, some preliminary remarks
may be in order.
Origins of the Economy and the State - Archaeological and Historical Evidence
As discussed, this work has adopted a descriptivist or empirical approach to analyzing the
corporation. As such, it has examined the attributes of the corporation under statutes “creating”
the corporation. In effect, this investigates the corporation “in the real world” in terms of what it
is and what it does. This approach is also consistent with an analytical or linguistic philosophy
approach which asks, in effect, what it is to which we refer when we refer to the corporation.
Consistent with this approach, this work now examines the attributes of the economy, society, and
the polity, state, or government “in the real world” in terms of what each is and does. Although
the scope of this book does not permit an in-depth consideration of sources from various
disciplines, some empirical and historical perspective can be obtained from archaeological and
anthropological investigations of the historical origins of the economy, society, and the polity,
state or government. Such investigations demonstrate their origins and interrelationship almost
six thousand years ago.
For reasons of economy and authority, the discussion under this heading will make extensive
references to two leading authorities, namely, Professor Elman Rogers Service, and Professor
Henry T. Wright. In 1977, Professor Wright, an investigational anthropologist, published a review
article entitled “Recent Research on the Origin of the State”,1 in connection with the centenary of
the publication of Professor Lewis Morgan’s influential Ancient Society.2 Wright’s discussion of
the origins of government relied on Service’s The Origins of the State and Civilization,3 which
considered archeological evidence of state emergence in archaic civilizations.

Henry T Wright, “Recent Research on the Origin of the State” (1977) 6 Annual Rev Anthropology 379.
Lewis H Morgan, Ancient Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
3
Elman Rogers Service. Origins of the State and Civilization (New York: Norton, 1975).
1
2

948
Wright observes that Service’s focus is on the origins of "government", which Service defines as
"a bureaucracy instituted to rule a populace by right of authority", treating a bureaucracy as a
hierarchy of offices. Government begins with the first institutionalization of centralized leadership
in "chiefdoms." According to Service, societies in this evolutionary stage "have centralized
direction, hierarchical status arrangements with an aristocratic ethos, but no formal legal apparatus
of forceful repression". Such societies use political power to organize the economy, but as “a
redistributive, an allocative system, not an acquisitive system".4
While the state, for Service, originated with the use of force as an institutionalized sanction, he
found that existing data concerning archaeologically attested archaic civilizations, did not indicate
that the origin of the state was necessarily accompanied by forceful repression.
Wright explained that “[a]fter considering many cases of the development of institutionalized
government, both ethnohistoric and archaeological, Service presents a series of conclusions”
concerning “some general conditions which all efforts to explain state origins must take into
account.”5 The most relevant conclusion for present purposes is that “[i]ntensification of
production, and in particular irrigation agriculture, long precedes state emergence as a technique
of local production units and only becomes a major focus of societal investment and higher
political concern after state emergence.”6
Service, says Wright, concluded that even the simplest society periodically requires its more
esteemed members to act as leaders; that leadership becomes a regular activity when it is linked to
the pooling and redistribution of commodities; that a chiefdom emerges when the office of leader
comes to be regularly filled, typically by inheritance; and that the gradual progress of archaic
civilizations shows that a state has emerged (from a chiefdom) when coercion is used in the society
to correct “chiefly” failures.
For Service, then, and for Wright, even the emergence of a chiefdom is linked to pooling and
redistribution of commodities, an activity generally described as economic in its nature. Their
research on ancient societies led both of them to conclude, further, that the emergence of a state
occurs after the intensification of production, especially agricultural production; and that after the
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state emerges, activities that further intensify production become a major focus of societal
investment and higher political concern.
For them, a chiefdom involves a central decision-making authority that is “differentiated from,
though it ultimately regulates, decision-making regarding local production and local social
process; but is not itself internally differentiated. It is thus externally but not internally
specialized.’7 Wright cites one example, in Hawaii, in which the flow of goods resulted from
producing a surplus to local needs, primarily to enable central elites to demonstrate their elite
status, and in which threats to subsistence resulted either in rebellions to replace the chief or war
in order to acquire more resources. In either case, we might describe these as economic
motivations.
For Wright a state is characterized by decision-making that is more differentiated, being
specialized internally, with the result that “[i]n contrast to a developed chiefdom, a state can be
recognized as a cultural development with a centralized decision-making process which is both
externally specialized with regard to the local processes which it regulates, and internally
specialized in that the central process is divisible into separate activities which can be performed
in different places at different times.” This creation of a central process and division and
specialization of its components has an important consequence: “Aspects of decision-making can
be delegated with minimal fear that subordinate elements in the hierarchy will engage in effective
independent action. Indeed, the dominant political strategy in higher-order decision-making is to
encourage as much hierarchy and segmentation as possible in order to create contexts of organic
solidarity.”8 Wright explains that “[w]ith the wealth of regulatory capacity in a state development,
the control of many local units and the administration of exchange economies or redistribution
from pools of sustenance products is not difficult.”9
Wright clearly links the emergence of the state and economic activity. He also notes that
conducting exchange and redistribution operations requires planning, and obtaining and verifying
information. By way of example, he references the construction of irrigation canals in the state of
Larsa in the right of King Sumuel about 1880 B.C. where, to eliminate falsification and distortion
of information, information was obtained from independent, as well as official, sources, and cross7
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checked, supplemented by regular and independent inspections involving complementary
activities of two separate sets of officials.10
Wright finds that states differ from chiefdoms in many ways, including regulatory pattern,
regulatory strategy, hierarchical structure, and oscillation of hierarchical pattern in time, many of
which differences are archaeologically detectable and may enable specification of when the state
emerges in any particular situation.11 Relying on such archaeological evidence, he places the
emergence of the state (within his definition, above) generally in Greater Mesopotamia at the
beginning of the Uruk Period approximately 3700 B.C., almost two millennia earlier than the reign
of Sumuel of Larsa.12
He concludes that the evidence indicates that “an administration controlled the movement of goods
from production points to assembly points and thence to central points for aggregation and
subsequent redistribution”13 in a large area comprehending northern Iraq, Ancient Assyria, and
southwestern Iran, Ancient Elam:
What social units did Uruk administrative networks control? Each had a major center in an
agriculturally rich area, within which was a network of smaller administrative centers and
production centers. Production in these networks was differently organized. For example,
while some settlements seemed to be primarily concerned with agriculture and moved their
products through central pools into redistribution networks, parts of central settlements
were concerned with ceramics production and moved their products to agricultural
settlements by nonredistributional means. The major centers, furthermore, controlled small
centers in distant areas, some of which had special resources and some of which were on
important travel routes.14
Wright says that research has defined the period of state emergence in Greater Mesopotamia and
that, despite limited evidence, researchers have suggested that similar developments attended the
development of the primary state in Mesoamerica.15
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In effect, according to Wright, archaeological evidence concerning the origin of the state
demonstrates that economic functions were not separate from organs of the society and the polity;
instead, the development of the state (and even chiefdoms) was closely linked to the economy of
the society concerned. For present purposes, the demonstration of these interrelationships based
on archaeological evidence must suffer, for the time being, as “proof” of the same. This is
consistent with the descriptivist and empirical methodology adopted in this work. Also consistent
with this approach is the next step to which we now turn: identifying concepts of the state which
may be expected to have differing degrees of utility in generating working and testable hypotheses.
Conceptions of the Polity, the State, and Government
Certainly, the state can be conceptualized as distinct from both the economy and society, and
arguably, even from the polity. Again, for reasons of economy, it is convenient to refer,
extensively, to a useful 1984 review essay, entitled “Approaches to the State: Alternative
Conceptions and Historical Dynamics”, by Stephen D. Krasner.16 Krasner adopted the categories
of conceptualization of the state identified in the literature by Roger Benjamin and Raymond
Duvall, being: 1. The state “as government,” by which is meant the collective set of personnel who
occupy positions of decisional authority in the polity.” 2. The state as “public bureaucracy or
administrative apparatus as a coherent totality” and as an institutionalized legal order. 3. The state
as ruling class. 4. The state as normative order.”17
Krasner concluded at that time, that, while certain political scientists, often following Dahl18,
adopted the first position19, “[t]he dominant conceptualization in the non-Marxist literature is the
state as a bureaucratic apparatus and institutionalized legal order in its totality.”20
As to the first view, Krasner, notes that “Benjamin and Duvall have referred to this formulation as
"the state as the government" which treats the state as merely a collection of individuals who
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occupy role positions (those of governing authority) and who act as a group to govern. In this
formulation, “[i]nstitutional imperatives and constraints, including general political beliefs, do not
play a significant role… The pluralist universe is atomistic. Different societal groups and political
leaders have different objectives and political resources. Public policy is the outcome of the
resolution of vectors resulting from interests and resources. Formal, authoritative institutions are
of little importance.”21
Such a construct must place the individuals and groups who constitute “the state as government”
within the society or polity. The “state as government”, acting in that capacity, asserts control over
matters within its purview. Because the outcome of vectors resulting from interests and resources
is contingent, we would argue that the coalition of interests and resources that attains a successful
outcome may, and in very many cases, will, often vary from time to time.
Thus, in this formulation, “the state as government” identifies a function, and directs attention to
those who from time to time participate in its exercise (with different degrees of effectiveness),
instead of attributing exercise of that function to a separate set of institutions of public bureaucracy
or administration. Thus, “the state as government” is not a completely discrete function, group, or
organization within the larger society or polity.
Krasner’s description of the pluralistic universe of society and the polity as “atomistic” does not
necessarily entail that the human individual is the subject “atom”, as is often the case with
economic characterizations, which purport to treat each human individual as a separate and distinct
economic actor. Instead, Krasner’s unit of analysis, the ground-level category for many political
purposes, is the societal group. The subject of this “atomism” and the appropriate unit of analysis
as such “atom” will recur in various contexts below.
As against this, a “statist” orientation may be considered to posit more of a divide between the
society or polity and the state, as “[s]tatist orientations take institutions and political beliefs more
seriously. The political universe is not atomistic. Atoms are bound within stable molecules and
compounds. The preferences of public officials are constrained by the administrative apparatus,
legal order, and enduring beliefs. There are only a limited number of ways in which political actors
can combine their resources. The nature of political resources is itself defined by institutional
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structures. The ability of a political leader to carry out a policy is critically determined by the
authoritative institutional resources and arrangements existing within a given political system”.22
For Krasner, “[a] second distinction between sophisticated pluralist and statist views is that
pluralism does not sharply differentiate public actors from their own society. Dahl's unit of analysis
most closely related to the state is the political stratum, composed of subleaders and leaders.
Members of the political stratum possess more political resources than ordinary citizens. Some of
these resources are drawn from the public arena, including legality, but most derive from the
society, including control over jobs and information. Individuals carry many of these resources
with them both in and out of public office. Many important members of the political stratum never
hold public office at all.”23
In effect, Dahl does not see political actors as sharply differentiated from their own society, nor
the resources to which they have access as emanating otherwise than from the society.
Consequently, for pluralists, public officials are relatively more constrained by societal pressures.
On the other hand, “[s]tatist perspectives contrast individuals in and out of public office. Political
leadership is closely related to official position. The administrative apparatus and legal order
constrain preferences and provide means of influence. Political leaders are state actors pursuing
either particular state goals or collective societal objectives and utilizing resources primarily
derived from their official positions.”24
Krasner says that the third distinction “is that pluralist theories of leadership see public officials as
relatively more constrained by societal pressures…The ability of leaders to alter the preferences
of citizens depends upon the extent of agreement among leaders, and this in turn depends in large
part on the degree to which they are drawn from the same "social strata." Only a coherent
leadership cadre can change the desires of citizens.” Statist orientations, he says, “see political
leaders as less constrained by societal forces. They can alter preferences using the state's own
resources. They may even be able to change the distribution of political resources possessed by
societal groups.”25
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Krasner concludes that while the pluralist tradition in America has not entirely ignored the role of
political leaders, “it has seen these leaders as being substantially constrained by societal forces,
commanding resources that are derived from a wide variety of public and private sources, and
functioning in a fluid, institutional environment which has a limited impact on the power and
interests of actors.”26 A statist perspective accords much more scope to leadership. He argues that
some statist positions consider ideology not only as an instrument of governance, but as a goal of
governance. Thus, “[i]deology may not only coordinate expectations and delineate legitimate
modes of interaction between state institutions and societal actors, but it may also serve as a basic
source of identity, and its preservation may be a consummatory function of the state. One of the
critical purposes of the state is to represent symbolically the existence and unity of the political
community.”27
Seeing the political community as a source of identity for its members, and seeing the state as
having a role in enhancing and preserving that source of identity does not commit one to either of
these approaches to the nature of the state. However, it does commit one to recognizing a
relationship among society, the polity and the state, as do both the pluralist and statist approaches.
Economic Institutions and the State
We have found that the archaeological evidence demonstrates that the origin of the state is rooted
in economic and social functions, and that that modern conceptions of the state recognize the
relationships among society, the polity, and the state, embracing economic and other matters. Such
relationships continue to obtain in modernity, as discussed in this section and following.
In his important 1996 article, “Markets as Politics”28, Neil Fligstein examined the relationship
between economic institutions and the state, noting: “One implication of my metaphor, "markets
as politics," is that states play an important role in the construction of market institutions. Why are
states so important? The organizations, groups, and institutions that comprise the state in modern
capitalist society claim to make and enforce the rules governing economic interaction in a given
geographic area. Capitalist firms could not operate without collective sets of rules governing
interaction.” He concludes that “modern capitalist states have been constructed in interaction with
26
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the development of their economies, and the governance of economies is part of the core of statebuilding.”29
Fligstein claims that local context determines the extent and direction of state intervention into the
economy, the content of laws, and their applicability to given firms and markets. By adopting and
enforcing laws concerning property rights, governance structures and rules of exchange, states
“provide stable and reliable conditions under which firms organize, compete, cooperate, and
exchange” and under which stable markets can develop. He says that “it is likely that states are
important to the formation and ongoing stability of markets. How they will be important and to
what degree is a matter of context. Some states have greater capacities for intervention than others,
and the likelihood of intervention depends on the nature of the situation and the institutional history
of the state.”30
As the Varieties of Capitalism literature demonstrates31, the nature of state intervention in the
economy may vary even among capitalist economies. Fligstein himself distinguishes between
interventionist states and regulatory states. The former, such as France, “are involved in making
substantive decisions for many markets. They may own firms, direct investment, and heavily
regulate firm entries, exits, and competition in markets.” Regulatory states, such as the United
States, “create agencies to enforce general rules in markets, but do not decide who can own what
and how investments proceed.”32 Of course, economies that are centrally managed by the state
may be said to constitute the zenith of interventionism. In general, however, modern states and
their economies must be considered to be closely related.
The Isomorphism of Modern Sovereign States, and Economic and Other Activities
Whether the economy is capitalist or otherwise, the link between the state, society, and the
economy is often seen as critical. Krasner explains that sovereign states “[i]nfluence the self-image
of those individuals within their territory through the concept of citizenship, as well as by
exercising control, to one degree or another, over powerful instruments of socialization.”33 Indeed,
“states are the most densely linked institutions in the contemporary world. Change the nature of
29
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states and virtually everything else in human society would also have to be changed.”34 These
observations are certainly an extremely forceful attestation to the closeness of the relationship
between state and society.
In fact, there is an almost invariable tendency towards isomorphism, not only in the form of the
sovereign state itself, but also with respect to its stated economic objectives, as the eminent John
W. Meyer and his colleagues argue in their 1997 seminal article, “World Society and the Nation
State”: 35
As we develop our argument, we want to keep in the forefront a number of empirical
observations about contemporary nation-states. First, nation-states exhibit a great deal of
isomorphism in their structures and policies. Second, they make valiant efforts to live up
to the model of rational actorhood. Third, and partly as a result of the second observation,
they are marked by considerable, and sometimes extraordinary, decoupling between
purposes and structure, intentions and results. Fourth, they undergo expansive structuration
in largely standardized ways. The generality of these observations makes sense only if
nation-states are understood as, in part, constructions of a common wider culture, rather
than as self-directed actors responding rationally to internal and external contingencies.36
Meyer et al go on to indicate that the model of the modern nation-state as rational and responsible
actor “is utterly dominant”, and that its features include “territorial boundaries and a demarcated
population; sovereign authority, self-determination, and responsibility; standardized purposes like
collective development, social justice, and the protection of individual rights; authoritative, lawbased control systems; clear possession of resources such as natural and mineral wealth and a labor
force; and policy technologies for the rational means-ends accomplishment of goals.”37 Meyer et
al find that “[n]ation-states are remarkably uniform in defining their goals [in constitutions and
otherwise] as the enhancement of collective progress (roughly, gross domestic product [GDP] per
capita) and individual rights and development (roughly, citizen enhancement and equality).”38
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In short, effectively all nation-states have economic goals, such as enhancement of GDP, and social
or societal goals, such as individual rights and development. This speaks to the interconnectedness
of the state, the economy, and the society.
Meyer, who pioneered the expression “world polity” in 198039 to analogize the international
system to a domestic polity or civil society,40 sees nation-states as fundamental actors in world
society or in world polity and characterizes them as generally seeking to represent themselves as
rational and responsible actors. Anecdotal evidence of this can be seen from numerous public
denunciations of states widely considered as “rogue” states.
Meyer et al argue that nation-states are modeled on an external culture that cannot be imported
wholesale as a fully functioning system, because they are often inconsistent with local practices,
requirements and cost structures, as well as highly idealized and internally inconsistent.41 These
factors generate expansive structuration, the formation and spread of explicit, rationalized
differentiated organizational forms, but Meyer et al. observe that “[t]he structuration of the nationstate greatly exceeds any functional requirements of society, especially in peripheral
[impoverished] countries”.42
Despite attempts of “political and organizational theorists [who] try to explain the apparent
irrationalities of specific structural changes as products of local constellations of power and
interests—the delusions of a self-aggrandizing leader, perhaps, or the interests of dominant
elites… in recent decades nation-states and other organizations have clearly expanded inordinately
across many different social domains.”43 Meyer et al. argue that despite distinct and complex
histories, “nation-states … all have expanded structurally in similar ways in the same historical
period…to manage the expanding externally defined requirements of rational actorhood.”44 Meyer
and his colleagues attempt to account for such isomorphism by identifying “three processes by
which world-societal elements authorize and fashion national states: the construction of identity
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and purpose, systemic maintenance of actor identity, and legitimation of the actorhood of such
subnational units as individuals and organized interests.”45
They argue that the process of state construction in world society is not independent of culture,
just as domestic political processes are not independent of culture. In fact, they find that
construction of nation-state identity and purpose involves conformity to world-wide models, often
by simple mimesis and without consideration of their applicability, finding that “[t]hroughout
modern history, dependent territories have moved to sovereign statehood at a steadily increasing
rate that accelerated rapidly in the postwar period. Once sovereign, countries almost never revert
to dependence. Even the breakup of the Soviet Union produced not dependent territories but
formally sovereign nation-states, unprepared as some of the former republics were for this
status.”46
According to Meyer et al., acceptance into this world society affects other aspects of the social
structure of the domestic society of the state itself, in that: “Having committed themselves to the
identity of the rationalizing state, appropriate policies follow—policies for national development,
individual citizenship and rights, environmental management, foreign relations. These policies are
depicted as if they were autonomous decisions because nation-states are defined as sovereign,
responsible, and essentially autonomous actors. Taking into account the larger culture in which
states are embedded, however, the policies look more like enactments of conventionalized scripts.”
The authors find that “even if a state proclaims its opposition to the dominant world identity
models, it will nevertheless pursue many purposes within this model. It will develop bureaucratic
authority and attempt to build many modern institutions, ranging from a central bank to an
educational system. It will thereby find itself modifying its traditions in the direction of worldcultural forms.” 47
Meyer et al’s arguments in this regard have a certain resonance with observation and experience.
The world culture that he posits seems to have at least some of these effects, many of which directly
impinge on the domestic society of the state concerned. In substance, his argument is that states
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are cultural artifacts, not only of domestic society and culture, but of international or, for him,
“world” society and culture. That world society in which a state is embedded imposes certain of
its own artifacts on the domestic society and the state itself.
Meyer et al assert: “World-cultural principles license the nation-state not only as a managing
central authority but also as an identity-supplying nation. Individual citizenship and the
sovereignty of the people are basic tenets of nationhood.” In effect, states not conforming to those
principles are not regarded as legitimate sources of identification for persons within their
jurisdiction. Other basic tenets of nationhood include “the legitimacy and presumed functional
necessity of much domestic organizational structure, ranging from financial market structures to
organizations promoting individual and collective rights (of labor, ethnic groups, women, and so
on). World-society ideology thus directly licenses a variety of organized interests and functions.”48
In Meyer et al’s view, world society and world culture concede that function of the state with
respect to the economy and its organizational structures. As will be demonstrated later, these
aspects of the state are consistent with analyzing the state as a species of organization.
As was the case with the authors we have examined, for Meyer and his colleagues, society, the
polity, and the economy cannot be assumed to be functionally separate. We submit that to the
extent that bodies of discourse, whether economic or otherwise, embody such assumption, they
must be in error, and their models inefficacious, in that respect. If that position is not accepted,
then, as a minimum, our examination of this assumption casts substantial doubt on its validity,
which warrants further critical attention to theories and models that substantially rely on it.
ASSUMPTION TWO - THE SITUATION OF THE ECONOMY IN THE “PRIVATE”
SPHERE
Next, we consider the second assumption, which is that the economy engages, overlaps with, is
part of, or is situated in, the “private sphere”. That is not to say that there may not be other spheres
of action which are also part of the “private” sphere, but, instead, to say that the economy is
fundamentally “private” in nature. For the present, this can be understood as connoting that it is
not so intrinsically related to that society or polity that it can be regarded as “public” in nature.
It is assumed, further, that in this private sphere, parties interact with considerable freedom, largely
by way of contract in the case of economic matters. Such contracts are essentially private in nature,
48
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relating to matters between the parties, and are essentially unaffected, at least directly, by public
interests. It is considered that as long as the parties have contractual capacity, and contract freely,
and meet other standards stipulated as necessary for contractual probity and efficacy, the
arrangements that the parties devise, by means of contracts or otherwise, should be given full effect
within their limits to accomplish the purposes sought. The scope of the private sphere, and its
relationship to the economy are discussed under the next heading.
The Ancient Economy and the Household
The word “economy”, of course, derives from the Greek word “oikonomia”, meaning
“management (or administration) of a household” or “household management”49, which, in turn,
is derived from the words “oikos” or “okia”, terms referring in some way to an extended family
unit or household, much like the Latin word “familia”, and from the word “nomos” meaning
“managing” or “neimen” meaning “manage”. Of course, even the meaning of the words is not
completely free from doubt.
A small diversion here will make a useful point. Douglas MacDowell, considered by many to be
a leading, if not the foremost, authority on Greek law during his lifetime, suggested that certain
statements attributed to Socrates in Xenophon's Oikonomikos appeared to clearly distinguish
between oikos meaning “property” and oikia meaning “house”. He says that Attic writers of the
fifth and fourth centuries much more often referred to a house as “oikia” rather than as “oikos” but
admits that oikia can also mean 'property' or 'family'.50 MacDowell takes issue with Aristotle as
failing to recognize differences between legal usage and common usage:
[E]ven in lawcourt speeches by Attic writers oikia does not invariably mean 'house';
sometimes it means 'family', and sometimes it means 'property'. In Aristotle's Politics the
distinction between oikia and oikos breaks down altogether, and he uses both words
indiscriminately in his account of the nuclear family. But in this paper I am not concerned
with Aristotle but with Athenian law. In legal contexts it is more usual for oikia to mean
'house' and for oikos to mean either 'property' or 'family', and so I shall observe that
distinction.51
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However, Aristotle, often cited for his references to the household, apparently causes some
confusion. MacDowell asks: “By what criterion was it decided whether a person was a member of
a particular oikos? If we judged by the word itself, we might suppose that an oikos consisted of all
the people living in a particular house. That is indeed what Aristotle seems to mean when he
discusses an oikos or an oikia. He defines an oikos as a ‘natural association for everyday purposes’,
and he regards it as including not only a husband, wife, and children but also slaves. But it is not
normal Attic usage to regard slaves as members of the oikos in this sense. Normally the term oikos,
when it refers to persons, refers to the line of descent from father to son through successive
generations.”52
The point of interest here is that a single word, oikia, except when used in a strictly legal context,
may refer to house, family, and property, suggesting the close connection among the three
referents, each one of which would relate to the household as part of a distinctly private sphere, as
will be discussed below. When used in a legal context, however, separate words are used for
“house” and for either “family” or “property”, with the result that the concepts of family and
property are seen to be closely connected as a matter of law.
Lin Foxhall concluded that it is now widely accepted that the household was the fundamental
building block of ancient Greek society53 She argues that the household embodies a complex of
relationships among its members relating to its property resources that suggested that the kyrios,
or head of the household, who owned the property in the household, and was empowered to cross
the boundary between household and community in dealing with such property, worked on behalf
of, or in consensus with, the other members of his household, rather than as a tyrant.54 This may
have been a later development, some acknowledgement of natural justice as applied to the
household.
Etymologically, then, the terms “economy” and the “family” are closely related.
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The Embedding of the Ancient Economy in Social Institutions
Why is the origin of this term of importance to the present discussion? The concept of the economy
and of the economic sphere of activity arose in the context of the household, often considered as a
unit of social action and as part of the social sphere of activity. In fact, according to classicist
Bradley Ault, the ancient Greek household itself has been said to constitute a viable economic
enterprise. He found that the ancient economy was “embedded” in social institutions (as discussed
below in more general terms) to such a point that classicists have not often studied the ancient
economy separately from their study of its society generally.55
Relying primarily on archaeological evidence, Professor Ault concludes, in effect, that the
household economy of ancient Greece was the totality of its economy, finding that “even in the
most humble circumstances in the Archaic and Classical periods, households engaged in a range
of activities from textile production and other craftwork, to agricultural production and processing,
which had the potential for going beyond mere subsistence.” He argues that the “time-honoured
notions of domestic self-sufficiency” are inaccurate; instead, “the orientation of the household
would tend, in stressed and favourable circumstances alike, towards market exchange, and hence
local and regional economic involvement. The stigma against non-agrarian, banausic activities or
mercantile involvement so often cited in the primary sources… similarly needs to be dismissed as
elitist and moralising in tone rather than being reflective of reality. In short and in fact, the ancient
Greek domestic economy was to a large extent co-terminous with the macroeconomy.”56
The historical and etymological origins of the word “economy” considered here have revealed
significant evidence that the economy of classical Greece was sitused in the family or household.
While that situs may appear to be part of the “private sphere”, one can ask whether, and if so, in
what sense the case may be otherwise. A discussion of the private and public distinction will follow
in relation to the next assumption.

Bradley Ault, “Oikos and Oikonomia: Greek Houses, Households and the Domestic Economy” (2007) 15 British
School at Athens Studies 259 at 259. Ault points out that Moses Finley’s reluctance to consider archaeological
evidence, and his reputation as one of the greatest economic historians of the ancient world, contributed to this. See
MI Finley, The Ancient Economy, updated ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
56
Ibid.
55

963
ASSUMPTION THREE - ACTUAL AND ANALYTICAL SEPARATION OF PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC SPHERES
We now consider the assumption that the private sphere and the public spheres are separate and
distinct from each other and that each can be analyzed in a manner which is distinctive to it alone.
Matters of public interest include the constitution of the political entity or state, and any
subdivisions, the manner of its exercise of authority, and any limitations on it, elections, regulation
of crime, and protection of certain human, political or social rights, including economic rights,
welfare rights, and the authorization and exercise of distributive or redistributive functions, such
as taxation and provision of public goods and services. It is conventionally assumed in classical
liberal legal and political economy literature that the economy does not engage those matters
sufficiently directly to be considered otherwise than as part of the private sphere. This section will
establish that the separation in fact and in analysis of the private and public spheres is either
fallacious, or is highly contestable or problematic.
The Private/Public Distinction - Context and Characteristics
The philosopher Hanna Pitkin considers how the private/public distinction may present itself,
asking “When we talk of public and private, do we know what we are talking about? Wanting to
theorize, we seize on or are seized by the first image that springs to mind: the private is "in here,"
personal, intimate, closest to the self, secluded from unwanted others, where we have "privacy"
and are free to be ourselves. The public, by contrast, is "out there," impersonal, distant, formal;
whatever goes "out in public" must be ready for "publication," its "private parts" properly clothed.
This is the view developed most recently by Richard Sennett, who speaks in spatial metaphors of
a "geography" of public and private. It is a plausible view.”57
Pitkin says that “[t]he economist obviously distinguishes public from private in a different way…
Here "public sector" is divided from private on the basis of ownership, and public means, roughly,
government, the state.”58 The description of private as “in here” and of public as “out there” likely
resonates with some readers. Notably, however, Pitkin acknowledges that the distinction has
different significance for economists than for others. Those others may include legal academics,
theorists, and practitioners and others in the legal field, such as jurists. Pitkin’s observation itself
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leads to the suggestion that the significance of the distinction depends to some significant degree
on the context in which it is used or applied.
Pitkin argues that in ordinary use words like "public" and "private" function mainly as adjectives;
and that turning them into general categories, as Arendt does as "The Public" and "The Private,"
makes them seem mysterious entities, “seducing us into reification”; whereas attaching them as
adjectives to some general noun, such as the public (or private) sector, sphere, domain, or realm
subjects us to the unexamined connotations of our own metaphor. Instead, she concludes that
“[p]rivate and public, it is important to realize, are relative terms. Things in the world are not
generally classifiable exclusively as either public or private.”59 Instead, public and private should
best be regarded as a continuum.
Pitkin explains the distinction which C. Wright Mills drew in The Sociological Imagination,
between "the personal troubles of milieu", which “occur within the character of the individual and
. . . his immediate relations with others” and "the public issues of social structure."60 Personal
troubles "occur within the character of the individual and . . . his immediate relations with others"
and their "statement and resolution" properly lie with “the individual as a biographical entity and
within the scope of his immediate milieu – the social setting that is directly open to his personal
experience and to some extent his willful activity. A trouble is a private matter.” She argues that
for Mills, “[p]ublic issues of social structure, however, transcend "these local environments of the
individual," and deal with “the organization of many such milieux into the institutions of an
historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various milieux overlap and interpenetrate to
form the larger structure of social and historical life. An issue is a public matter.”61 In effect, Pitkin
says that for Mills the distinction is between individual-immediate group relations, or milieu, a
“trouble”, as private, and relations among various milieux, that is to say, as an “issue”, as public.
Pitkin herself notes that not only are the terms private and public adjectival, in that they modify a
noun, but they are also relative terms. That is to say, the terms modify some noun so that the sense
of that adjective is affected by the nature of the nominative which it is used to describe. Further,
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the terms are relative, rather than objective. Again, we might expect, then, that the terms and their
referents may fall along some type of continuum.
Pitkin argues that our ways of distinguishing public and private, then, are heterogeneous, saying
that the question of who gets to do the defining is itself part of the problem. She identifies three
dimensions along which we distinguish public from private, which help to make up our concept
of the public, calling them the dimension of access or attention, the dimension of impact or effect,
and the dimension of governance or control:
First, something may be public in the sense that it is accessible to all, open to scrutiny by
anyone, visible as a focus of attention. Here the term connects with publicity, public
knowledge, public opinion, and going "out in public," and contrasts with reserved, closed,
hidden.
Second, something may be public in the sense that it affects all or most of us, public in its
consequences and significance. This objective publicness may go unrecognized by the
people affected; thus the first and second sort of publicness really are distinct. The
decisions of, say, a private corporation can have enormous public impact and importance.
Here the opposite of public is not secluded or withdrawn, but personal, of limited impact,
affecting only select individuals or groups. Mills's distinction between personal troubles
and public issues, then, telescopes the first and second dimensions of the public:
troublesome social conditions are public in their impact, but become public issues only
when made the focus of public attention.
When they do, it is usually with a view toward the third dimension: public direction or
control. This is the publicness of government, public administration, and collective action.
It includes Arendt's main conception. But public direction or control is in itself difficult to
define, particularly in times like ours, for a nation may be governed more by "private"
aggregations of power than by its official government, and its government may be so
dominated by special interests that it functions more as a private than a public agency?62
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This relatively modern view of the distinction in terms of access or attention, impact or effect, and
governance or control focuses attention on ways in which the distinction is experienced. Can this
focus apply equally in various historical epochs?
The Private/Public Distinction in Liberal Thought
In a 1982 symposium on the distinction, Duncan Kennedy contended that: “The history of legal
thought since the turn of the century is the history of the decline of a particular set of distinctions
– those – those that, taken together, constitute the liberal way of thinking about the social world.
Those

distinctions

property/sovereignty,

are

state/society,

contract/tort,

public/private,

law/policy,

individual/group,

legislature/judiciary,

right/power,

objective/subjective,

reason/fiat, freedom/coercion, and maybe some more I'm not thinking of.” He explains that, while
not synonymous, these distinctions “are all in a sense "the same." By this I mean that it is hard to
define any one of them without reference to all, or at least many of the others, and that if one
understands the common usage of one of them, one understands, pretty much ipso facto (what a
fudge!), all the others.”63 Having thus described the distinctions that characterize such liberal
thinking, Kennedy then purports to chronicle the stages of its decline.
Morton Horwitz, averting to Karl Polanyi, attempts to identify the liberal origins of the distinction,
saying that it “arose out of a double movement in modern political and legal thought”.64 One aspect
of this double movement involved “ideas of a distinctly public realm that began to crystallize”
with “the emergence of the nation-state and theories of sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries”. The other aspect of the double movement involved “a countervailing effort to stake out
distinctively private spheres free from the encroaching power of the state.”65 In part, these involved
the development of “[n]atural rights theories …for the purpose of setting limits on state power,
both over property and religious conscience” and “were therefore not only efforts to incorporate
into law what one writer has called a philosophy of "possessive individualism," but also to provide
an important basis for arguing for religious toleration.”66 The general tenor of Horwitz’s argument
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will be outlined here in more detail, as one explication of the history of the private/public
distinction.
Horwitz argues that by the late medieval period, English law distinguished between lands held by
the King as feudal lord, which he could alienate as private property, and lands held by him in his
role as the crown or embodiment of the public, which he could not alienate.67 Later, other legal
developments reinforced this distinction. Gradually, legal doctrines developed that separated a
public realm on the one hand, and “a separate private realm free from public power”.68
According to Horwitz, “[a]lthough one can find the origins of the idea of a distinctively private
realm in the natural-rights liberalism of Locke and his successors, only in the nineteenth century
was the public/private distinction brought to the center of the stage in American legal and political
theory. Before this could occur, it was necessary to undermine an earlier tradition of republican
thought that had closely identified private virtue and public interest.”69
Horwitz claims that “[t]he emergence of the market as a central legitimating institution brought
the public/private distinction into the core of legal discourse during the nineteenth century…. One
of the central goals of nineteenth century legal thought was to create a clear separation between
constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law – public law – and the law of private transactions –
torts, contracts, property, and commercial law.”70 We might observe that public law was often
thought to be concerned either with the state alone, or with matters concerning the relationship
between the state and citizens. These “private” transactions were paradigmatically thought to occur
between or among private citizens, exclusively.
This separation was attacked by the legal realists, says Horwitz, “in reaction to the Supreme Court's
1905 decision in Lochner v. New York71, constitutionalizing freedom of contract.” Horwitz argued
that “[t]he Legal Realist Movement of the 1920's and 1930's…[r]idiculed the invisible hand
premise behind any assumption that private law could be neutral and apolitical. All law was
coercive and had distributive consequences… must therefore be understood as a delegation of
coercive public power to individuals, and could only be justified by public policies. Contract, that
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most "private" of nineteenth-century legal categories, was reconceptualized as simply a delegation
of public power that could be justified only by public purposes.”72
Of course, the premises behind the public/private distinction, and the distinction itself, were not
only under attack in the United States but also in Europe, as we have seen. Horwitz claims that
progressivism in the period prior to World War II posited a sharp conflict between a substantive
public interest and private self-interest, and recognized as a primary function of the state the
creation of institutions that would promote a public interest, an observation that has some historical
basis. He asserts that after the war, a substantive conception of the public interest was a first step
towards totalitarianism. Then, the public interest became defined in procedural and pluralist terms
as the outcome of interaction among pluralist interest groups. This means that private self-interest
was the only legitimate political reality.73
In effect, according to Horwitz, interest-group pluralism nullified the public interest: “The recent
revival of natural-rights individualism in legal and political theory is a symptom of the collapse of
a belief in a distinctively public realm standing above private self-interest. It is not only a
dangerous symptom of the unravelling of all sense of community, but also a relapse into a
predatory and vicious conception of politics.”74 Horwitz, like the Greeks and Romans, and British
and American republican thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, conceived of a
public interest and a distinctive public realm quite apart from politics as “politicking” and
negotiating the influence of competing private perspectives with others having similar objectives.
Indeed, Horwitz argues that imbalances in power among pluralist interests had dire consequences:
“Yet reality has a funny way of intruding upon theory. The public/private distinction could
approximate the actual arrangement of legal and political institutions only in a society and
economy of relatively small, decentralized, nongovernmental units. Private power began to
become increasingly indistinguishable from public power precisely at the moment, late in the
nineteenth century, when large-scale corporate concentration became the norm. The attack on the
public/private distinction was the result of a widespread perception that so-called private
institutions were acquiring coercive power that had formerly been reserved to governments.”75
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Horwitz’s attack on corporate power, whether or not sound, does not detract from his principal
argument, which seems to be that the distinction made sense only where the state, and other legal
and political institutions, social actors and economic actors were each at a relatively small and
relatively comparable scale. The implication seems to be that larger economic actors and a larger
state would erode the distinction.
Of course, the “liberal” conception of the distinction does not exhaust its logical dimensions and
possible explanatory power, nor does its attack by Horwitz constitute the final chapter in the
discussion of the distinction. With that, we now turn to the perspectives of Jürgen Habermas and
Hannah Arendt. Both Habermas and Arendt develop philosophical perspectives which are both
thoroughgoing and extensive in scope. Consequently, each of their arguments will require some
exposition in order for them to be useful for our purposes. For that reason, these will be set out in
much the same order as to that was adopted by their authors.
The “Public Sphere” and the “Private Sphere” of Habermas
Perhaps the most famous observation made by Habermas in this connection is his “definition” of
“the public sphere”, at the beginning of his famous article on the subject, to mean “first of all a
realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is
guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation
in which private individuals assemble to form a public body. They then behave neither like
business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional
order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when
they confer in an unrestricted fashion – that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and
association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions-about matters of general
interest.” 76
For Habermas, then, as a philosopher of discourse, it is not surprising that the public sphere is a
realm of social life in which, in effect, the body of public citizens, informally and in periodic
elections, formally, engages in the tasks of criticizing and controlling the state as ruling structure.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to ignore the similarity between the public sphere of
Habermas and that of the Greek polis.
Jürgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)”, translated by Sara Lennox & Frank
Lennox (1974) 3 New German Critique 49 at 49.
76
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Yet for Habermas, the state authority, while the executor of the political public sphere, is not a part
of it. Instead, he says, it derives its “public” task of caring for the well-being of all citizens from
the public discussion of matters concerning the activity of the state. In effect, the political public
sphere legitimates the state and its governmental and bureaucratic structure. In this description, the
society and the polity are part of the public sphere, and may be distinguished only by their differing
objectives, whether social, in the sense of participating in a common life, or political, in the sense
of state, governmental or bureaucratic activity concerned with caring for the well-being of citizens.
Yet the state is not part of Habermas’s public sphere.77
The Effect of the Demise of Feudalism
Habermas finds “no indication European society of the high middle ages possessed a public sphere
as a unique realm distinct from the private sphere. Nevertheless, it was not coincidental that during
that period symbols of sovereignty, for instance the princely seal, were deemed "public." At that
time there existed a public representation of power.”78 Thus, “the holder of the position represented
it publicly: he showed himself, presented himself as the embodiment of an ever present "higher"
power. The concept of this representation has been maintained up to the most recent constitutional
history. Regardless of the degree to which it has loosed itself from the old base, the authority of
political power today still demands a representation at the highest level by a head of state.”79 As
will be argued further below, such representation is also effected in the case of non-state
organizations, including corporations.
Habermas maintains, in effect, that the demise of feudalism de-linked its authoritative institutions
from the representative public sphere. That demise and de-linkage caused a functional separation
within those institutions, as between public functions, on the one hand, and private functions, on
the other. He argues that “the feudal authorities (church, princes and nobility), to which the
representative public sphere was first linked, disintegrated during a long process of polarization”
such that “by the end of the eighteenth century they had broken apart into private elements on the
one hand, and into public on the other.”80
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Habermas explains each element of this delinkage as follows: “The position of the church changed
with the reformation: the link to divine authority which the church represented, that is, religion,
became a private matter. So-called religious freedom came to insure what was historically the first
area of private autonomy. The church itself continued its existence as one public and legal body
among others. The corresponding polarization within princely authority was visibly manifested in
the separation of the public budget from the private household expenses of a ruler. The institutions
of public authority, along with the bureaucracy and the military, and in part also with the legal
institutions, asserted their independence from the privatized sphere of the princely court. Finally,
the feudal estates were transformed as well: the nobility became the organs of public authority,
parliament and the legal institutions; while those occupied in trades and professions, insofar as
they had already established urban corporations and territorial organizations, developed into a
sphere of bourgeois society which would stand apart from the state as a genuine area of private
autonomy.”81
In this excerpt, Habermas ignores the land ownership of the church, and its related economic
activities, and assumes, without so stating, that the activities of the feudal lords in the post-feudal
were significantly economic in nature, thereby ignoring their functions as law-givers in making
local law, and as law-appliers, in applying that law in their own courts. Further, he erroneously
assumes that the source of economic activity in the post-feudal era, and the origin of bourgeois
society, was only the feudal lords, thereby ignoring the church and other participants in the feudal
economy, such as smallholders, manufacturers, traders, and others.
Habermas also assumes that the church did not suffer a translation of some of its activities into
those of a “public” nature, as well as those of a private nature, relating to religious observance
(including the investiture of kings, princes, and nobles). While he separates “princely” activities
of the prince and its expenses from the prince’s household, he fails to remark on the often
significant landholdings of the prince in relation to which significant economic activity took place,
not only with respect to agriculture, but also with respect to industry and commerce, as was the
case also with respect to the aristocracy at that time, as in ancient Greece and Rome. Thus, the
apparent appeal of his argument is diminished somewhat by its incompleteness.
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The Rise of the Liberal State
His explanation of the origin of the public sphere is likewise both engaging and incomplete: “The
representative public sphere yielded to that new sphere of "public authority" which came into being
with national and territorial states… "Public" no longer referred to the "representative" court of a
prince endowed with authority, but rather to an institution regulated according to competence, to
an apparatus endowed with a monopoly on the legal exertion of authority. Private individuals
subsumed in the state at whom public authority was directed now made up the public body.”82
Habermas appears to argue that the creation of state apparatus based on bureaucratic principles,
including expertise, divorced the state from the “re-presentative” princely court in which authority
had to be re-presented and re-legitimized constantly and thereby opposed the state to the large
swathe of non-state participants, who were without voice and without power, he says, but
nevertheless subject to the power of the state. This is similar to the conception of the state as
government discussed previously in this work. It is also consistent with Habermas’s conception of
the “public sphere” that is said to exist not so much as a sphere or section of society or the polity
but, instead, as an ethereal realm of discourse. In this regard, his concept hearkens back to the
Greek and Roman city states.
In fact, Habermas goes further than this, appearing to argue that the state de-linked itself from the
society, and “[s]ociety, now a private realm occupying a position in opposition to the state, stood
on the one hand as if in clear contrast to the state. On the other hand, that society had become a
concern of public interest to the degree that the reproduction of life in the wake of the developing
market economy had grown beyond the bounds of private domestic authority. The bourgeois
public sphere could be understood as the sphere of private individuals assembled into a public
body, which almost immediately laid claim to the officially regulated "intellectual newspapers"
for use against the public authority itself.”83
Habermas thus characterizes the liberal model of the public sphere as one founded on private
authority over property, and in which the claims of individuals vis-à-vis the state or public
authority are based on the sharing of power, as well as opposing the publicity of proceedings
(which he calls “supervision”, and considers as a means of transforming the nature of power). It
82
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is, of course, possible to argue that the public sphere is divided by Habermas into various segments,
only one of which is the bourgeois public sphere. That is to say, the bourgeois public sphere may
not be the public sphere as a whole. That point, although interesting, cannot detain us here.
Habermas’ exposition continues: “In the first modern constitutions the catalogues of fundamental
rights were a perfect image of the liberal model of the public sphere: they guaranteed the society
as a sphere of private autonomy and the restriction of public authority to a few functions.”84
Habermas seems to suggest that the “liberal” private sphere was coeval with the society, and that
the “liberal” public sphere was a sphere within which public authority, the state, conducted a
limited range of activities. In the liberal model, the economy was part of society, but society, and
presumably the polity, were, at least notionally, or arguably, outside the state.
The early liberal constitutions, says Habermas, provided for communication of the needs of society
to the state, which would act accordingly: “Between these two spheres, the constitutions further
insured the existence of a realm of private individuals assembled into a public body who as citizens
transmit the needs of bourgeois society to the state, in order, ideally, to transform political into
"rational" authority within the medium of this public sphere.” He says that thereby, the “general
interest, which was the measure of such a rationality, was then guaranteed, according to the
presuppositions of a society of free commodity exchange, when the activities of private individuals
in the marketplace were freed from social compulsion and from political pressure in the public
sphere.”85
For Habermas, then, liberal models of society posit a very small public sphere, in which public
authority is exercised by the state rationally, considering the interests of citizens acting on an
atomistic and pluralistic basis, and a very large private sphere, in which private and atomistic
individuals could operate in a marketplace free from social or political pressures. In effect, he
argues that the rationality of political authority was established in terms of its efficacy in relation
to commodity exchange. As has been argued above, such a model could only be, at best, an ideal
type incapable of instantiation in the real world. As discussed, markets are socially constructed
and operated; consequently, they are not free from social or political pressures.
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The Demise of the Liberal State and the Rise of the Social Welfare State
Habermas argues that the liberal model of the public sphere, which assumed a coherence of
attitudes and interests among the bourgeois participants in public matters, “cannot be applied to
the actual conditions of an industrially advanced mass democracy organized in the form of the
social welfare state.”86 That is, it can only be an ideal type. Habermas claims that the diffusion of
the press and propaganda which accompanied the Chartist movement in England and the February
revolution in France created an expansion of the public body beyond the bounds of the bourgeoisie,
as a result of which “[t]he public body lost not only its social exclusivity; it lost in addition the
coherence created by bourgeois social institutions and a relatively high standard of education.
Conflicts hitherto restricted to the private sphere now intrude into the public sphere.”87
Of course, on his account, the public body lost its social exclusivity and coherence as a result of
extension of public discourse much more broadly. At the same time, this may be thought to have
changed the nature of such discourse, at least in terms of expanding the role of the state. A broader
public, of course, lessened “social activity and coherence”, which might be expected to be
approved by Habermas. While it did introduce new opportunities for conflict, Habermas seems to
have underestimated the degree of conflict extant in earlier periods in England and France.
Habermas argues that those “group needs which can expect no satisfaction from a self-regulating
market now tend towards a regulation by the state. The public sphere, which must now mediate
these demands, becomes a field for the competition of interests”.88 As we have already noted, this
competition of interests either predated or accompanied the extension of participation in public
affairs and voting, but, in any case, arose well before the welfare state.
Instead of laws “arising from the consensus of private individuals engaged in public discussion”,
the laws “correspond in a more or less unconcealed manner to the compromise of conflicting
private interests. Social organizations which deal with the state act in the political public
sphere…[and], [w]ith the interweaving of the public and private realm, political authorities assume

86

Ibid at 54.
Ibid.
88
Ibid.
87

975
certain functions in the sphere of commodity exchange and social labor, while social powers
assume certain political functions. This leads to a kind of "refeudalization" of the public sphere.”89
Here, Habermas treats the political public sphere as peopled, not by atomistic private individuals
pursuing private interests, but by groups acting as social organizations pursuing their respective
interests, in effect, a species of interest group pluralism. He suggests that where these large
organizations cannot reach compromises among themselves, with or without the state and its
political parties and bureaucracy, they may be forced to engage in the public sphere. He argues
that the political public sphere of the social welfare state is characterized by a peculiar weakening
of its critical functions yet, at the same time, by the extension of fundamental rights, including
rights to information90, which would enable organizations to participate in dealings with the state
and would legitimize the compromises reached.
Habermas concludes that the “idea of the public sphere, preserved in the social welfare state mass
democracy, an idea which calls for a rationalization of power through the medium of public
discussion among private individuals, threatens to disintegrate with the structural transformation
of the public sphere itself. It could only be realized today, on an altered basis, as a rational
reorganization of social and political power under the mutual control of rival organizations
committed to the public sphere in their internal structure as well as in their relations with the state
and each other.”91
Amelioration requires, in his view, the introduction of the public sphere to the organizations
internally, in relation to each other, and in relation to the state. Ignoring for the moment, the
similarities of his model to the corporatist model popularly discredited by its association with
totalitarian regimes of the past century, his model and his call for action engage a conception of
the public sphere as embracing social and even economic domains, and arguably vastly exceeding
the private sphere in its scope and scale.
On the whole, Habermas seems to maintain that the private sphere, in its economic and other
aspects, has been drastically reduced in scope and scale, if not largely eliminated, by the modern
welfare state. He thus juxtaposes individuals against, firstly, organizations competing for social
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and political power with each other and the state, on the one hand; and secondly, against the state.
This is a recurring theme in the discourse of various social sciences and humanities. In the result,
then, Habermas identifies the private sphere with the personal or the intimate sphere, as does
Hanna Pitkin. With that, we turn next to Hannah Arendt.
The “Public Realm” and the “Private Realm” of Arendt
Hannah Arendt devotes a chapter of her 1958 book The Human Condition92 to The Public Realm
and the Private Realm, as she calls it. It has been cogently analyzed by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin,
whose observations on Pitkin’s work and otherwise will be employed extensively here.93
Classical Origins
Arendt finds the origins of the distinction in classical Greece, says Pitkin, in that the distinction
between public and private, Arendt tells us, "corresponds to" the distinction between "the
household and the political realm" that first emerged in ancient Greece and continued until the
onset of the modern age, when it was blurred by the emergence of a third "realm" she calls the
"social."94 As is widely known, in the ancient Greek world, the public realm, characterized by the
way of life of the polis, distinguished Greek from barbarian, and made possible a free and truly
human life.
Indeed, the “rise of the city-state meant that man received “besides his private life a sort of second
life, his bios politikos. Now every citizen belongs to two orders of existence; and there is a sharp
distinction in his life between what is his own (idion) and what is communal (koinon).”95 For the
ancient Greeks, the life of the household enabling the bodily life (which she calls “private”) was
vastly inferior to the citizen’s second life, his political life or the life of, and in, and what is yet
you and me to let all know the polis. This can be compared with Cartesian and Christian concepts.
We have previously discussed the importance of the ancient Greek household in relation to the
etymology of the word “economy” and the private/public distinction. Pitkin explains:
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The household was a "pre-political realm," a necessary prerequisite for citizenship, but
strictly a means to that higher end. First, that household was ruled by domination and force,
by a despotes, while polis life was carried on through speech and reason. Second, by
contrast with household inequality and despotic barbarian kingship, polis citizenship was
a relationship of equality. The polis "knew only 'equals,"' though the Greek notion of
equality was different from ours; it had nothing to do with universal natural rights, nor did
it assume parity in wealth, talent, or ability. Rather, it was a special, artificially created
equality of status as citizens. Thus, to be a citizen "meant neither to rule or be ruled.”
Third, citizenship in the polis meant admission to a public "sphere of freedom," while the
private sphere was governed by necessity – not just the domination of the master over the
family and slaves, but the "necessities of life" that would rule even the master if he did not
have others to provide for him. The household was considered the locus of economic life;
it was the basic unit of production, as is suggested by the Greek word for household (oikia)
which is the root of our word "'economics."'' It was the proper place for labor, for activities
"related to the maintenance of life," Arendt argues, just as the more direct necessities of
bodily function and species reproduction are properly hidden away in privacy.
Accordingly, "no activity that served only the purpose of making a living, of sustaining
only the life process, was permitted to enter the political realm." Anything "economic" was
"non-political . . . by definition," for "everything merely necessary or useful" had to be
"strictly excluded" from the bios politikos, the realm of freedom.96
For the Ancient Greeks, as mentioned previously, economic matters, in the earliest times, were
conducted largely in, or in connection with, the household and its environs, as a place, and as an
extended family or kinship unit, as a social entity. Once such economic matters were dealt with,
the citizen (and only the citizen), freed from rule by the necessities of life, was free to participate
in the life of the polis, free to live his second or political life, and free to achieve a free and truly
human life, Arendt says.
Hence, economic matters were not proper subjects of political life, but were assumed by it, or
treated as effective pre-conditions of political life. Economic concerns were also excluded on the
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grounds that the intrusion of “the social” would destroy true public life.97 Pitkin explains that
economics was “to be excluded because it serves the needs of the body, and the body is a threat to
human greatness and freedom, an encumbrance that ties us to our animal nature, something
shameful to be hidden in private darkness. Public life, by contrast, is the quest for secular
immortality, the hope of being remembered after one's death so that one's name and fame live
on.”98
It would be difficult to avoid noticing the similarity between this Greek view and the Greekoriented Christian view espoused in the early Christian era. Yet, to the Greeks, it is civic, not
religious, virtue that is attained by freeing oneself from the needs of the body. Arendt explains:
“To be free meant both not to be subject to the necessity of life or to the command of another and
not to be in command oneself. It meant neither to rule nor to be ruled. Thus within the realm of the
household, freedom did not exist, for the household head, its ruler, was considered to be free only
in so far as he had the power to leave the household and enter the political realm, where all were
equals.”99 The other members of the household were not “free” in this sense, either within or
without the household.
The Greek notion of freedom obtained only in the realm of the polis and, consequently, only with
respect to citizens, who were far from the majority of the population: “To be sure, this equality of
the political realm has very little in common with our concept of equality: it meant to live among
and to have to deal only with one's peers, and it presupposed the existence of "unequals" who, as
a matter of fact, were always the majority of the population in a city-state. Equality, therefore, far
from being connected with justice, as in modern times, was the very essence of freedom: to be free
meant to be free from the inequality present in rulership and to move in a sphere where neither
rule nor being ruled existed.”
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political.101 As Arendt notes, the work of the legislator, who did not need to be a citizen, was not
political but pre-political, in that “political life, however, could begin only after he had finished
his legislation.”102
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The Middle Ages
How is it, then, that modernity aligns the economic, social, and political domains? Arendt argues
that in the modern world, the social and the political realms are much less distinct, and, moreover,
“that politics is nothing but a function of society”. In fact, she says, “[t]his functionalization makes
it impossible to perceive any serious gulf between the two realms; and this is not a matter of a
theory or an ideology, since with the rise of society, that is, the rise of the "household" (oikia) or
of economic activities to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the
private sphere of the family have become a "collective" concern. In the modern world, the two
realms indeed constantly flow into each other like waves in the never-resting stream of the life
process itself.”103 The argument, then, is that the translation of “household” or economic matters
from the private into the public realm somehow created a “society” with respect to which those
private and public realms constantly interacted.
Arendt explains that the gulf in the ancient world between the narrow realm of the household and
the loftier realm of politics was continued in the Middle Ages, since “after the downfall of the
Roman Empire, it was the Catholic Church that offered men a substitute for the citizenship which
had formerly been the prerogative of municipal government. The medieval tension between the
darkness of everyday life and the grandiose splendor attending everything sacred, with the
concomitant rise from the secular to the religious, corresponds in many respects to the rise from
the private to the public in antiquity. The difference is of course very marked, for no matter how
"worldly" the Church became, it was always essentially an otherworldly concern which kept the
community of believers together.”104
The religions of Greek and Roman city states, of course, provided some element of otherworldly
cohesion. Allowing for that difference, “the secular realm under the rule of feudalism was indeed
in its entirety what the private realm had been in antiquity. Its hallmark was the absorption of all
activities into the household sphere, where they had only private significance, and consequently
the very absence of a public realm.”105 Arendt seems to locate the church in the political space, as
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it assumed functions that were undertaken by municipal government in antiquity and in later
Europe. She also fails to explicitly acknowledge its role in the feudal economy.
Unlike Habermas, Arendt attempts to deal with the application of the public/private distinction in
relation to the Catholic Church, finding its religious aspects in the private sphere and its
superintendence of the well-being of its citizen-members in the public sphere. However, she fails
to note that the pursuit of the virtuous public life of the Greek philosopher or any other Greek
citizen had a parallel, in the medieval period, namely, the pursuit of the virtuous Christian life.
Arendt also fails to acknowledge the similarity between the economic support provided by
coreligionists of those in Holy Orders to the priests, friars, nuns, and others in Holy Orders, on the
one hand, and by the non-citizen members of the household to the Greek citizen of the polis, on
the other hand.
The highest pursuit of virtue, for the Greeks, in the life of the polis, and for medieval Christians,
in the truly Christian life, was available only to a fortunate few, many of whose “economic” or
“requisite for (higher) living” needs were supplied by others, as in many other religiously
dominated societies. Consequently, while Arendt’s comparison between the private realm or
household sphere of antiquity and that of the feudal era is striking and innately appealing, she
claims too much when she alleges that all activities were absorbed into the household sphere and
that the private realm and feudalism were devoid of any public realm.
The next step in Arendt’s analysis of the public/private distinction is to extend feudal or household
models into medieval economic pursuits:
It is characteristic of this growth of the private realm, and incidentally of the difference
between the ancient household head and the feudal lord, that the feudal lord could render
justice within the limits of his rule, whereas the ancient household head, while he might
exert a milder or harsher rule, knew neither of laws nor justice outside the political realm.
The bringing of all human activities into the private realm and the modeling of all human
relationships upon the example of the household reached far into the specifically medieval
professional organizations in the cities themselves, the guilds, confreries, and compagnons,
and even into the early business companies, where "the original joint household would
seem to be indicated by the very word 'company' icmnpanis) . . . [and] such phrases as 'men
who eat one bread,' 'men who have one bread and one wine.' ” The medieval concept of the
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"common good," far from indicating the existence of a political realm, recognizes only that
private individuals have interests in common, material and spiritual, and that they can retain
their privacy and attend to their own business only if one of them takes it upon himself to
look out for this common interest. What distinguishes this essentially Christian attitude
toward politics from the modern reality is not so much the recognition of a "common good"
as the exclusivity of the private sphere and the absence of that curiously hybrid realm where
private interests assume public significance that we call "society."106
Arendt assigns the feudal lord a role, in dispensing justice within the limits of his rule (which
actually were quite extensive at various points in time), which she considers to be political. Perhaps
Arendt was not bearing in mind the extent to which enforcing order within the household was a
prerogative of the heads of ancient household heads, who admittedly would not have thought that
they were exercising a political function. While later feudal lords may have considered that they
were exercising a political function, the characterization of the power by the person exercising it
does not seem to be a valid basis for its functional characterization (although it might indicate
something about the historical discourse surrounding it).
Arendt fails to see that the feudal lord enforcing order within his estates was acting as household
head, just like an ancient household head, but, because the latter characterized such action
otherwise than as exercising a political function, she infers that the former, whose characterization
of the same activity is not disclosed to us, must be exercising a political function. In fact, one
suspects that the reason for her inference is that she considers the feudal order and feudal estates
as political in nature, particularly in reference to the subsequent roles of the feudal lords and later
landed nobility in reaching accords with the Crown, a form of undertaking she would be expected
to consider to be within the political realm.
More importantly, Arendt fails to sufficiently acknowledge the kinship nature of the ancient
household when she says that the household model was applied to the medieval professional
organizations in the cities, municipalities and early business companies which organizations
acknowledged as members those who share the same bread and wine. She ignores the possibility
that the extension of such household models beyond the kinship-based household might involve,
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implicitly or explicitly, some acknowledgement of kin-like or affiliative relationship. An argument
which is mentioned throughout the present book is that the need for social intercourse, sometimes
extending to such a relationship, is an originative element in the creation of many organizations,
including the modern business corporation.
Similarly, Arendt’s comments go astray when she says that the medieval conception of the
common good expresses only that private individuals have interests in common the achievement
of which depends on some person or entity looking out for this common interest, namely the ability
to maintain one’s own privacy and to pursue one’s own private interests. Her argument fails to
acknowledge that extending the kin-like or affiliative aspect of the household model to the
extended community or society may involve similar kin-like or affiliative feelings and motivations.
Instead, she “breaks out” individuals, considered atomistically, from their household groups and
attributes to them a pursuit of exclusively personal interests. If not Hobbesian, such analysis
assumes at least a liberal orientation, which, however, Arendt proceeds to criticize. However,
having built such “straw man” unverified assumptions into her description of the transition from
feudal to early modern European history, attacking the straw man may facilitate an attack on
liberalism and neoliberalism.
Modernity
Arendt claims that modernity assigns all activities to the household or private sphere and thereby
eliminates the social sphere, or society, “that curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume
public significance”. She argues, further that “[w]e no longer think primarily of deprivation when
we use the word "privacy," and this is partly due to the enormous enrichment of the private sphere
through modern individualism. However, it seems even more important that modern privacy is at
least as sharply opposed to the social realm—unknown to the ancients who considered its content
a private matter – as it is to the political, properly speaking. The decisive historical fact is that
modern privacy in its most relevant function, to shelter the intimate, was discovered as the opposite
not of the political sphere but of the social, to which it is therefore more closely and authentically
related.”107
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Arendt seems to consider society as existing beyond the household. She argues that the rise of
society coincided with the decline and disintegration of the family, which “indicates clearly that
what actually took place was the absorption of the family unit into corresponding social groups.
The equality of the members of these groups, far from being an equality among peers, resembles
nothing so much as the equality of household members before the despotic power of the household
head, except that in society, where the natural strength of one common interest and one unanimous
opinion is tremendously enforced by sheer number, actual rule exerted by one man, representing
the common interest and the right opinion, could eventually be dispensed with. The phenomenon
of conformism is characteristic of the last stage of this modern development.”108
Arendt analogizes the household to modern society, with the household members replaced by
social groups and the head of the family by the state, eventually not represented only by a monarch.
Arendt’s analysis conflates the decline of the family with its “disintegration”, and ignores the
complexity of the medieval household and its economic as well as social functions. In addition,
she assumes that the complex membership of the household in medieval and later times is divided
up into new social groups, within the social sphere, the members of all of which groups are all and
only atomistic individuals.
Arendt’s analysis of the discontinuity is such that she assumes that there were no social groups in
medieval times and, consequently, that there was no continuity of social groups from medieval
times to modernity. Thus, according to Arendt, these “abandoned” atomistic individuals, divorced
from their household and extended kin-like origins, as well as from pre-existing social groups
whose existence she does not recognize, now must enter into new affiliative groupings, which
requires eliminating their own interests and opinions in favour of the new common interest and
opinion.
Consequently, Arendt argues that following the decline of the family, the rise of society, and the
admission of “household and housekeeping activities to the public realm”, society has exhibited
“an irresistible tendency to grow, to devour the older realms of the political and private”.109 She
argues that the constant and constantly accelerating growth “derives its strength from the fact that
through society it is the life process itself which in one form or another has been channeled into
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the public realm”.110 This was because the necessities of life, of individual survival as well as of
continuity of the species, were taken care of and guaranteed in the private realm of the household.
In effect, she maintains that the demands of “the life process” itself accelerates in some
unexplained manner once the household dissolves and individuals are cast into a vast panoply of
atomistic individuals that she maintains constitute society.
Arendt relates that antiquity held tremendous contempt for the private sphere because “man existed
in this sphere not as a truly human being but only as a specimen of the animal species man-kind”
and the emergence of the private into society “has hardly transformed its nature. The monolithic
character of every type of society, its conformism which allows for only one interest and one
opinion, is ultimately rooted in the one-ness of man-kind.”111 That one-ness is the pursuit of life
itself.
For Arendt, “society constitutes the public organization of the life process itself” and the new
social realm is one of jobholders, in effect, “centered around the one activity necessary to sustain
life.”112 Society, then, is “the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and
nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival
are permitted to appear in public.”113 In a sense, Arendt might consider that the assertion “man is
a social animal” is either completely vacuous or tautologous, because for her, society, the social
realm, is that of man as animal.
Arendt considers that the extension of the domain of the household, or private, so as to devour the
older domains of the political and the private, and to create the domain of the social, or society,
has rendered supreme man as a social animal, and has rendered the once private needs of life
public. For Arendt, the word “public” has come to signify, first, “everything that can be seen and
heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity”114 and, second, “the world itself in so
far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it.” 115 In the
first sense, appearance to others, as well as ourselves, Arendt says, “constitutes reality”, perhaps
in the sense that it “institutes reality” or that it “institutes that reality which is common to all”.
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The common world is related “to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to
affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together. To live together in
the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a
table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and
separates men at the same time.”116 For her, that which was formerly private, the means of life,
has become both public and celebrated and “[t]he public realm, as the common world, gathers us
together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so
difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the
world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them.”117
Arendt thinks that the public realm, the common world, the world between (inter-esse) people has
become dominated by a common objective measurement, money, as a common denominator for
all needs. For her, such “objectivity” entails the failure of public life, the significance of which
derives from being the common meeting ground of those present, each of whom has a different
position from which they observe the common world, a world in which everybody is always
concerned with the same object.118
In mass society, as in isolation, “men have become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived
of seeing and hearing others, of being seen and being heard by them. They are all imprisoned in
the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same
experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is
seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective.”119
Conclusion
Thus, for Arendt, the public realm or common world has been destroyed when the universal
perspective is economic, or, as we may say, when the only perspective is that of the household,
that is to say, when the public and the private can no longer be distinguished, and when the
economic, social and political domains have disappeared or have merged into a single economic
domain. It is not necessary, of course, to adopt Arendt’s arguments or conclusions; however, it is
necessary to admit that she presents with some cogency an argument concerning the devolution
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and disappearance of the distinction between the public and private spheres, on the one hand, and
the distinction between the economic, social and political spheres on the other.
It will be recalled that Habermas criticizes liberal models of society in which states consider the
interests of individuals who act atomistically and pluralistically, and in which the public sphere is
very small and the private sphere very large. Recognizing that this model no longer obtains, he
calls, instead, for the restoration of the public sphere as a place for rationalization of power through
discussion among competing organizations each of which is committed to the public sphere in
terms of their relationships to their own constituents, to those other organizations, and to the state.
Habermas and Arendt argue cogently that the private and public spheres are not completely
discrete, either actually or analytically. In conclusion, the assumption of orthodox economics,
which is often expressed in legal theory and legal discourse, that the private sphere is
fundamentally separate and distinct from the public sphere, and the related assumption that the
each can be analyzed in a manner which is distinctive to it are both contrary to historical and
archaeological evidence, and to logical analysis, and are highly contestable.
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CHAPTER B2:
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, THE POLITY, AND THE
STATE AS SPHERES OF ACTION
ASSUMPTION FOUR - THE DISTINCTIVE MODE OF ANALYSIS OF THE
ECONOMY
The fourth assumption concerning the economy, and society, the polity and the state is that the
economy must be analyzed in a distinctive manner from society and the polity. It is most frequently
unarticulated, but, instead, assumed by economists and others. We have already seen that certain
assumptions, such as the atomistic behavior of individuals, are common in various social sciences,
not only in economics. However, this fact that some assumptions are common does not touch the
issue of the distinctiveness of the mode of analysis, to which we now turn.
In these investigations, alternative modes of analysis will be explicated, critiqued, and evaluated.
This will entail significant exposition of perspectives taken by influential academic and other
analysts and commentators. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that the assumption
considered in this chapter, viz., that the economy must be analyzed in a manner that is distinctive
from that in which society and the economy may be analyzed, is either unsupported (in the strong
form of the hypothesis), or, (in the weaker form of the hypothesis) is highly contestable and
problematic.
Markets, The Economy, and Society
One of the most powerful explications of the relationships among the social, economic, and
political realms is that of embeddedness, a perspective that speaks to the relationship of those
realms, and to the relationships among individuals, groups, and institutions. This perspective,
therefore, provides a suitable focus for issues relating to the analytical uniqueness of the economy
which are discussed in this chapter. That perspective will also be employed in the following
chapter, which concerns the independence and distinctness of the economy from society and the
polity. The focus in the present chapter will be on classical and neoclassical analysis of the
economy.
In his influential 1985 article “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness”,1 Mark Granovetter accepts that “[i]t has long been the majority view among
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sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and historians that [economic] behavior was
heavily embedded in social relations in premarket societies but became much more autonomous
with modernization. This view sees the economy as an increasingly separate, differentiated sphere
in modern society, with economic transactions defined no longer by the social or kinship
obligations of those transacting but by rational calculations of individual gain. It is sometimes
further argued that the traditional situation is reversed: instead of economic life being submerged
in social relations, these relations become an epiphenomenon of the market.”2
While Granovetter admits that “most [economists] assert instead that embeddedness in earlier
societies was not substantially greater than the low level found in modern markets”, 3 he argues
that historians and social scientists see the economy “as an increasingly separate, differentiated
place in modern society” with economic transactions determined by rational calculations of
individual gain.4 He also argues that how the absence of social relations (which he asserts are
always present) might affect behaviour and institutions can only be imagined by a thought
experiment like Thomas Hobbes’s “state of nature” or John Rawls’s “original position”.
Granovetter maintains that “[m]uch of the utilitarian tradition, including classical and neoclassical
economics, assumes rational self-interested behavior affected minimally by social relations, thus
invoking an idealized state nor far from that of these thought experiments.”5 The inference is that
economic activity cannot be separated from social relations, except in some idealized or purely
conceptual state, or in some thought experiment. The assumption of classical and neoclassical
economics concerning rational self-interested behaviour largely unaffected by social relations
invokes a particular understanding of the nature of man. As this chapter proceeds to consider the
question whether the economy may or must be analyzed in a distinct and separate manner from
the society and the polity, partly by means of applying a lens of “embeddedness”, it will also
consider that question by way of a perspective or lens concerning different assumptions or
generalizations with respect to the nature of man.
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The Conception of Man in Neoclassical Economics
The assumption that economic transactions proceed “by rational calculations” is characteristic of
neoclassical economics. John Lie, a leading proponent of sociological analysis of markets, argues
that “the problem with neoclassical economics is that it demarcates the economy as an arena within
which social relations do not matter…. Hirschman writes that in the neoclassical vision "there is
no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstration or mutual adjustment and the various operators
that contract together need not enter into recurrent or continuing relationships as a result of which
they would get to know each other well." Unfortunately, these insights have been lost by
neoclassical economics, which relies on the notion of atomized individuals who maximize
subjective utility.”6
Neoclassical economics, says John Lie, ignores the social relations that underlie economic activity.
As already mentioned, its “notion of atomized individuals” is not, unique to classical and
neoclassical economics, but is also shared by much classical and neoclassical liberal political
theory, and by much sociological theory. The explication of neoclassical economics in any
significant detail is beyond the scope of the present work, although some of its principal
assumptions and generalizations will be discussed in Chapters A4 and A5.
However, as a rough working summary, for present purposes, we will adopt the usage of Roy
Weintraub, a leading writer in the history of economics, that neoclassical economics is a
metatheory, “a set of implicit rules or understandings for constructing satisfactory economic
theories. It is a scientific research program that generates economic theories the fundamental
assumptions of which are not open to discussion in that they define the shared understandings of
those who call themselves neoclassical economists, or economists without any adjective.” In the
case of neoclassical economics, indicates that the “fundamental assumptions include the following:
1. People have rational preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize utility and firms
maximize profits. 3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.”7
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These fundamental assumptions involve what we may characterize as an even more fundamental
meta-assumption, the atomism of economic actors. The economic actors posited by neoclassical
economics are individuals, and they seek outcomes for themselves, which are based on preferences
that are their own, and in a sense, unique to them. Their economic behaviour is instrumentalist, as
it is directed towards attainment of preferences that are rationally determined and which they
expect to be satisfactory to them. This atomistic meta-assumption and these assumptions of
metatheory are operationalized in more detailed theory, as explained by Weintraub here:
The framework of classical economics is easily summarized. Buyers attempt to maximize their
gains from getting goods, and they do this by increasing their purchases of a good until what
they gain from an extra unit is just balanced by what they have to give up to obtain it. In this
way they maximize “utility” – the satisfaction associated with the consumption of goods and
services. Likewise, individuals provide labor to firms that wish to employ them, by balancing
the gains from offering the marginal unit of their services (the wage they would receive) with
the disutility of labor itself – the loss of leisure. Individuals make choices at the margin. This
results in a theory of demand for goods, and supply of productive factors.
Similarly, producers attempt to produce units of a good so that the cost of producing the
incremental or marginal unit is just balanced by the revenue it generates. In this way they
maximize profits. Firms also hire employees up to the point that the cost of the additional hire
is just balanced by the value of output that the additional employee would produce.
The neoclassical vision thus involves economic “agents”, be they households or firms,
optimizing (doing as well as they can), subject to all relevant constraints. Value is linked to
unlimited desires and wants colliding with constraints, or scarcity. The tensions, the decision
problems, are worked out in markets. Prices are the signals that tell households and firms
whether their conflicting desires can be reconciled.8
This description evokes what we may characterize as another meta-assumption, namely, that the
actions of individual monadic agents take the form of transactions (etymologically, and
substantially, actions between, across, or through actors) that are dyadic in nature, in that there are
two parties to each such transaction.
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These transactions are monadic or unique as transactions in the sense that each is separate and
distinct from every other transaction. That is not, of course, to say that transactions are not linked
to other transactions. For example, an actor pursuing and seeking to maximize his or her utility
may engage in functionally intermediate transactions that are of an instrumental nature, but aimed
at securing his or her preferences and overall utility. We might choose to characterize this as a
meta-assumption of discreteness. Such meta-assumptions (atomism, dyadism, and discreteness)
may be said to underlie the fundamental assumptions Weintraub identifies and to be
operationalized in the framework that he describes.
Another leading economic historian, David Colander, summarizes the primary attributes of
neoclassical economics, in effect, as follows: 1. It focuses on allocation of resources at a given
moment in time. 2. It accepts some variation of utilitarianism as playing a central role in
understanding the economy. 3. It focuses on marginal tradeoffs. 4. It assumes farsighted
rationality. 5. It accepts methodological individualism. The individual is “doing the maximizing”
and the market translates that individual rationality into social rationality. 6. It is structured around
a general equilibrium conception of the economy.9 In effect, the market of neoclassical economics,
as described by Colander, is the aggregation of individual rationality, utility, and marginalism
(secondary or marginal, utility, additional satisfaction derived from each additional unit of the
product or service considered).
Another leading economist, Sherwin Rosen, elucidates upon the rationality assumption, saying
that “[i]n neoclassical economics, individual behavior is described as the outcome of rational
choices – doing the best one can under the circumstances, and pursuing those specific actions from
available alternatives that maximize the difference between personal benefits and costs. The choice
set is fully specified, technology of sellers and tastes of buyers are given, as are the number and
varieties of goods. There is a well-defined solution to the resource allocation problem. General
conditions can be found for which a market equilibrium "exists" in the sense that all individual
agents can independently fulfill the plans that best serve their self-interests, given the model

David Colander, “The Death of Neoclassical Economics” (2000) 22:2 J History Economic Thought 127 at 134-35.
Weintraub and Colander both identify Thorstein Veblen as the first user of the term. Colander says this was in Veblen’s
“Preconceptions of Economic Science” (1899) 13:4 QJ Economics 396. His citations for discussions of this are: Tony
Aspromourgos, “On the Origin of the Term “Neoclassical” (1986) 19:30 Cambridge J Economics 265; and Susan
Fayazmanesh, “On Veblen’s Coining of the Term ‘Neoclassical’” in Susan Fayazmanesh & Marc R Tool, eds,
Institutionalist Method and Value: Essays in Honor of Paul Dale Bush, vol 1 (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1998) 1.
9

992
assumptions.”10 Indeed, for neoclassical economics the existence of an equilibrium is a logical
necessity, “[f]or if the individual plans chosen to fulfill self-interest turn out to be infeasible, the
problem must have been incorrectly specified in the first instance”, which make it important that
the conditions under which an equilibrium exists are fairly minimal.11
In effect, neoclassical economics posits an aggregation of the result of the behaviours of individual
atomistic actors that can be independently derived from the assumptions of a given model, such
that a failure of such aggregation to derive the result hypothesized must result from an underspecification of the problem. Neoclassical economics assumes that the characterization of an
economic problem can be adequately specified, and that once set in motion, the calculations
required are somewhat mechanical.
Weintraub emphasizes the rationalism assumption of neoclassical economics, saying that it
“conceptualized the agents, households and firms, as rational actors. Agents were modeled as
optimizers who were led to “better” outcomes. The resulting equilibrium was “best” in the sense
that any other allocation of goods and services would leave someone worse off. Thus, the “social
system” in the neoclassical vision was free of unresolvable conflict.”12
Weintraub explains that the atomistic conception of individual action employed was quite
deliberate, indeed that “[t]he very term “social system” is a measure of the success of neoclassical
economics, for the idea of a system, with its interacting components, its variables and parameters
and constraints, is the language of mid-nineteenth-century physics. This field of rational mechanics
was the model for the neoclassical framework. Agents were like atoms; utility was like energy;
utility maximization was like the minimization of potential energy, and so forth.” 13 Linking the
“rhetoric of successful science” to neoclassical theory linked the two disciplines, and treated
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neoclassical theory as “scientific economics” with the result that “to challenge the neoclassical
approach was to seem to challenge science and progress and modernity.”14
Conceptions of Economic Man Abstracted from Social and Political Contexts
It may be somewhat more accurate to say that neoclassical economics, in its meta-assumptions and
assumptions, “assumed away” social and political influences, consequences, and spheres of human
existence, and so did not concern itself with them as matters of primary importance. As Mark
Granovetter said, some interpreters consider those social relations to be “an epiphenomenon of the
market”.15
It is said by some commentators that it was a reaction to this signal fact that led to the development
of sociology and, in particular, to the sociological critique of economic behaviour and of markets.
For example, the sociologist Dennis Wrong in his highly influential 1962 article “The
Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology”16 says: “Modern sociology, after all,
originated as a protest against the partial views of man contained in such doctrines as utilitarianism,
classical economics, social Darwinism, and vulgar Marxism. All of the great nineteenth and early
twentieth century sociologists saw it as one of their major tasks to expose the unreality of such
abstractions as economic man, the gain-seeker of the classical economists; political man, the
power-seeker of the Machiavellian tradition in political science; self-preserving man, the securityseeker of Hobbes and Darwin; sexual or libidinal man, the pleasure-seeker of doctrinaire
Freudianism; and even religious man, the God-seeker of the theologians.”17 For Dennis Wrong, as
the title of his article suggests, even the social or socialized conception of man can be in error,
either as oversocialized or as undersocialized.
These assumptions and mechanistic models of man and his activities abstracted of social context
may be expected to be deficient, as the political scientist Terry M. Moe observed, with respect to
economic man, in a 1984 article entitled “The New Economics of Organization”: “The
neoclassical theory of the firm is not in any meaningful sense a theory of economic organization.
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It centers around the entrepreneur, a hypothetical individual who, by assumption, makes all
decisions for the firm and is endowed with a range of idealized properties defining his knowledge,
goals, computational skills, and transaction costs.” As we will argue, this single individual
entrepreneur “firm” thus excludes, by hypothesis, consideration of the firm as an organization.
Instead, Moe says: “Virtually all aspects of business enterprise that organization theorists find
interesting and consequential –from formal structure to social context and worker psychology to
bounded rationality, adaptive search, and goal conflict – are thereby assumed away. The model
firm is simply a black box that produces optimal choices automatically as a function of any given
environment.”18
He argues that neoclassical economists dismiss criticism of this nature “since the theory was never
intended to be realistic in its assumptions nor to be accurate in its micro-level implications for
individuals and organizations.” As a result, “assumptions about the firm and perfect competition
are simply vehicles” used to derive “formal implications for market prices and outputs, resource
allocation, equilibria, and other aggregate properties of economic systems.19
While Moe’s argument that neoclassical economic theory of the firm was not intended to be
realistic or accurate at the micro-level may be true with respect to later neoclassical economists,
we may reserve some doubt on this point, at least with respect to earlier neoclassical economists,
based on their own descriptions of their own micro-economic theories. We will defer until later a
discussion of the theory of the firm, especially as a “black box”, and of perfect competition as
involving “atomized decisional units” operating without any system of central coordination. We
will also discuss the rationality assumption in more detail in Chapters B4 and B5.
Moe maintains that many of the weaknesses and omissions attributed to neoclassical models can
often be answered within the broader neoclassical framework, which he characterizes as “less a
unified neoclassical theory than a large family of diverse theories related by shared analytical
foundations, chief among them: a focus on the individual as the unit of analysis; the assumption
of rational, utility-maximizing behavior; a concern for efficiency, optimality, and equilibrium; and
a preference for mathematical modeling over other approaches to theory construction.”20
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Rationality, as practiced by atomistic profit-seeking individuals, is (at least, formally) considered
by neoclassical economists (but no longer by all modern economists, for example, with respect to
bounded rationality and other behavioural limitations) to exclude behaviours that are other than
strictly profit-seeking. Granovetter claims: “That such behavior is rational or instrumental is more
readily seen, moreover, if we note that it aims not only at economic goals but also at sociability,
approval, status, and power” which, he says, are rarely seen by economists as rational goals, “in
part on account of the arbitrary separation that arose historically, as Albert Hirschman (1977)
points out, in the 17th and 18th centuries, between the "passions" and the "interests," the latter
connoting economic motives only.” Accordingly, economists came to analyze human behaviour
as “motivated only by "interest" and to assume that other motives occur in separate and
nonrationally organized spheres; hence Samuelson's much-quoted comment that "many
economists would separate economics from sociology upon the basis of rational or irrational
behavior".”21
According to Granovetter, following one’s passions is considered intrinsically irrational by
economists; however, it is scarcely open to doubt that the motivations he identifies, (viz.,
sociability, approval, status, power) are powerful drivers of individual behavior in their own right,
and not just as instrumental to economic or utilitarian goals.
Socialization and Models of Man
That motivations to behaviour are more complex than suggested by utilitarian theory is maintained
by Dennis Wrong in his influential article, which was elucidated and expanded upon by
Granovetter in his famous discussion of embeddedness. Wrong raises what he calls the Hobbesian
question: “The question may be variously phrased as, "What are the sources of social cohesion?”;
or, "How is social order possible?"; or, stated in social-psychological terms, "How is it that man
becomes tractable to social discipline?" I shall call this question in its social-psychological aspect
the "Hobbesian question" and in its more strictly sociological aspect the "Marxist question."”
Wrong then continues by explicating the distinctions between these two questions as follows: “The
Hobbesian question asks how men are capable of the guidance by social norms and goals that
makes possible an enduring society, while the Marxist question asks how, assuming this capability,
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complex societies manage to regulate and restrain destructive conflicts between groups. Much of
our current theory offers an oversocialized view of man in answering the Hobbesian question and
an over-integrated view of society in answering the Marxist question.”22
Oversocialized and Undersocialized Models of Atomistic Man
Wrong asks, in turn, “What is the answer of contemporary sociological theory to the Hobbesian
question? There are two main answers, each of which has come to be understood in a way that
denies the reality and meaningfulness of the question. Together they constitute a model of human
nature, sometimes clearly stated, more often implicit in accepted concepts, that pervades modern
sociology. The first answer is summed up in the notion of the "internalization of social norms."
The second, more commonly employed or assumed in empirical research, is the view that man is
essentially motivated by the desire to achieve a positive image of self by winning acceptance or
status in the eyes of others.”23 Wrong concedes, then, that not only economists, but also
sociologists, make use of implicit assumptions.
In Wrong’s judgment, modern sociologists believe “that they have understood these [noninstinctive social processes] and that they have not merely answered but disposed of the Hobbesian
question”.24 In effect, the social norms that are internalized and the approbation of others become
goals of the individuals concerned. This model of human nature, while still atomistic, models the
way in which atomistic individuals are affected by the behaviour of others, which is conducive to
maintaining social order.
Wrong discusses Durkheim’s interpretation of constraint as explained by Parsons: “Parsons argues
that Durkheim originally conceived of society as controlling the individual from the outside by
imposing constraints on him through sanctions, best illustrated by codes of law. But in Durkheim's
later work he began to see that social rules do not "merely regulate 'externally' . . . they enter
directly into the constitution of the actors' ends themselves." Constraint, therefore, is more than
an environmental obstacle which the actor must take into account in pursuit of his goals in the
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same way that he takes into account physical laws: it becomes internal, psychological, and selfimposed as well.”25
This sort of internalization (characteristic, according to Wrong, of modern sociology generally), is
equated by Durkheim and Parsons with learning or habit formation, such that, according to Wrong,
“when a norm is said to have been ‘internalized’ by an individual, what is frequently meant is that
he habitually both affirms it and conforms to it in his conduct”26. Wrong notes that from a
psychoanalytic perspective, this eliminates an individual’s inner conflict between Freud’s id and
the superego, or between impulses and controls over desires. For Freud, the internalization of the
norm means that it has become part of the individual’s superego.27
Dennis Wrong argues that the sociological perspective on human motivation still characterizes it
in individualistic or atomistic terms, saying that “Parsons' model of the "complementarity of
expectations," the view that in social interaction men mutually seek approval from one another by
conforming to shared norms, is a formalized version of what has tended to become a distinctive
sociological perspective on human motivation.”28 It certainly generalizes, at the group level, a
characteristic said to pertain to the individual. Presumably, however, each individual is aware of
the fact that each other individual in the group is seeking approval, if not necessarily of the first
individual, then certainly of individuals in the group generally, however, this is not remarked in
the passage just discussed. Wrong says that Ralph Linton states the same view, but in explicit
psychological terms, when he says: "The need for eliciting favorable responses from others is an
almost constant component of [personality]. Indeed, it is not too much to say that there is very
little organized human behavior which is not directed toward its satisfaction in at least some
degree.”29
In Wrong’s view the importance of "social factors" to sociologists easily leads them to stress the
priority of such socialized or socializing motives in human behavior. However, in psychological
terms, due to socialization motives, approbation becomes a distinct attribute of personality. Dennis
Wrong claims that this perceived need for the approbation of others is applied mechanistically in
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sociology in respect of behaviour but not in psycho-analysis, which “is primarily concerned with
the inner life, not with overt behavior” (as with sociologists), noting that even for sociologists,
“[s]o long as most individuals are "socialized," that is, internalize the norms and conform to them
in conduct, the Hobbesian problem is not even perceived as a latent reality.”30
This is what Wrong describes as the “overocialized conception of man”, which he describes as
“yet another reified abstraction in socialized man, the status-seeker of our contemporary
sociologists”.31 Interestingly, Wrong appears to think that the Freudian psychoanalytic concept of
man avoids this tendency, since “[t]he drives or "instincts" of psychoanalysis, far from being fixed
dispositions to behave in a particular way, are utterly subject to social channelling and
transformation and could not even reveal themselves in behavior without social molding…To
psychoanalysis man is indeed a social animal”.32
Wrong distinguishes between the Freudian view, on the one hand, and both sociological and neoFreudian conceptions of man, on the other:
To Freud man is a social animal without being entirely a socialized animal. His very social
nature is the source of conflicts and antagonisms that create resistance to socialization by
the norms of any of the societies which have existed in the course of human history.
"Socialization" may mean two quite distinct things; when they are confused an oversocialized view of man is the result. On the one hand socialization means the "transmission
of the culture," the particular culture of the society an individual enters at birth; on the other
hand the term is used to mean the "process of becoming human," of acquiring uniquely
human attributes from interaction with others. All men are socialized in the latter sense,
but this does not mean that they have been completely molded by the particular norms and
values of their culture. All cultures, as Freud contended, do violence to man's socialized
bodily drives, but this in no sense means that men could possibly exist without culture or
independently of society.33
In effect, Wrong claims that Freud’s man is a social animal in the sense that he engages in social
interaction and so acquires uniquely human attributes as a result of such interaction, but is only
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partly socialized in the sense of adopting the norms and values of their culture, which he may resist
where they conflict with his bodily and other drives. In Wrong’s terms, this means that Freud’s
conception of man is certainly not overly-socialized, and may even be under-socialized, although
in a different sense from the conceptions of man in neoclassical economics and politics.
In Wrong’s analysis, an “overly socialized conception of man” sees men as having “been
completely molded by the particular norms and value of their culture” such that they behave in
ways that are largely or even entirely predictable in concrete instances given knowledge of the
norms and values of that culture, and the roles the individual plays in that culture. In such a view,
the behaviour of individuals is not only atomistic (in any concrete instantiation), in the sense of
derivable without interaction with other individuals (or groups), but is derivable in a mechanistic,
scientific and regular way. Such a conception, we may say, commits an “atomistic” fallacy.
The Atomistic Homo Economicus
As argued here, the atomistic conception of man in neoclassical economics, which Wrong and
Granovetter maintain is undersocialized, likewise lacks efficacy and predictive capacity as a guide
to human behaviour. Granovetter maintains that this results from its abstraction of the individual
and of interpersonal interactions among individuals from their individuated and social contexts.
He argues that “even when economists do take social relationships seriously…they invariably
abstract away from the history of relations and their position with respect to other relations – what
might be called the historical and structural embeddedness of relations. The interpersonal ties
described in their arguments are extremely stylized, average, “typical" – devoid of specific content,
history, or structural location. Actors' behavior results from their named role positions and role
sets; thus, we have arguments on how workers and supervisors, husbands and wives, or criminals
and law enforcers will interact with one another, but these relations are not assumed to have
individualized content beyond that given by the named roles.”34
Granovetter asserts that such treatment relegates “the specifics of individual relations to a minor
role in the overall conceptual scheme, epiphenomenal in comparison with enduring structures of
normative role prescriptions deriving from ultimate value orientations. In economic models, this
treatment of social relations has the paradoxical effect of preserving atomized decision making
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even when decisions are seen to involve more than one individual. Because the analyzed set of
individuals - usually dyads, occasionally larger groups - is abstracted out of social context, it is
atomized in its behavior from that of other groups and from the history of its own relations.
Atomization has not been eliminated, merely transferred to the dyadic or higher level of
analysis.”35 Thus, according to Granovetter, such analysts employ an oversocialized conception –
that of actors behaving exclusively in accord with their prescribed roles – to implement an
atomized, undersocialized view.
Granovetter’s argument here is that economists who pay any attention to social relationships
abstract such social relationships away from their history and structural position, generating a
description of interpersonal ties that is highly stylized and role-based, without any individualized
content or surrounding historical and structural circumstances. Behaviour is predicted by ideal
type, without any individuation. Specific intra-dyadic characteristics, history and circumstances,
are ignored in favour of systemic typology. Individual relations are not distinctive, and hold no
interest, as they are completely typified. This excessive orientation to typology may be said to
characterize certain perspectives not only in economics, but also in sociology, as Granovetter
admits, and also in political science.
Indeed, Granovetter’s description of such individual relations as “epiphenomenal” seems to be
inadequate: instead, they are minor, unexplained, aberrant instantiations of a typology that is
assumed to be all but invariably accurate. The “epiphenomenal” aberrations may even be
hypothesized as statistical variances or anomalies. Thus, attempts by economics at “socializing”
economic man (or generating an economic sociology) may become oversocialized, while still
atomized, like such efforts by the Parsonian sociologists Granovetter criticizes. The key point
which Granovetter makes, of course, is that relations are embedded in history and structure. Both
economists and sociologists who “oversocialize” man excessively typologize, or, as Granovetter
calls it, “oversocialize” the relations they seek to describe, whether economic or social. They
overlook any possibility of atypicality or differentiation of the individual actor. Put another way,
they generalize or abstract away individuation and the individual as such.
Of course, as noted earlier, the original atomized characterization of the Hobbesian problem might
be expected to lead to no different conclusion. As argued here, the dyadic interaction of atomized
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individuals leaves no “space” for the “social”, except a binary one, between one atomized
individual and another atomized individual. As Granovetter says, when even groups of individuals
are abstracted out of social context, the group remains atomistic in its behaviour vis-à-vis other
groups, just as do its component individuals in terms of one another. The atomization continues at
the group level, and regardless of the elevation to a higher level of analysis.
Granovetter rightly concludes that “[a] fruitful analysis of human action requires us to avoid the
atomization implicit in the theoretical extremes of under- and oversocialized conceptions. Actors
do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script
written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy.
Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social
relations.”36
Actors as Members of Social Groups
Actors also act as members of groups, not just as atomistic individuals. And each such group does
not just engage with a single other group in a series of dyadic encounters. Groups, like individuals,
often engage simultaneously or closely with more than one other. Similarly, at the group level,
groups may interact with other groups at the same time or within a short space of time, just as
individuals do not engage only in serial monadic interactions with only one other individual at a
time. Social relations are also causal.
In a highly influential 2003 article to which we will refer in more detail below,37 the network
theorists James W. Moody and Douglas R. White comment on the ways in which social groups
are maintained and how they relate to each other:
Here, we identify an important feature of the relational dimension of social solidarity that
is applicable to groups of any size. Following Simmel, that feature is the extent to which a
group depends on particular individuals to retain its character as a group. The relevant
quantitative measure is the minimum number of individuals whose continued presence is
required to retain the group's connectedness. For clarity and theoretical consistency, we
refer to this relational aspect of social solidarity as structural cohesion. Structural cohesion
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simultaneously defines a group property characterizing the collectivity, a positional
property that situates subgroups relative to each other in a population, and individual
membership properties. Although we do not claim to capture the full range of either
"solidarity" or “embeddedness," structural cohesion provides an exact analytic
operationalization of a dimension of each.38
Structural cohesion, as they use the term, recognizes properties of the group, sub-groups within
that group, and individuals as members. It is not clear whether they hypothesize that individuals
may simultaneously be members of more than one sub-group or more than one group. We assume
that this is the case. Indeed, we would submit that structural cohesion is one aspect or measure of
individual-group loyalty, salience, identification, and identity, subjects which are discussed below.
Thus, for Moody and White, “structural cohesion necessarily entails a positional analysis of the
resulting groups with respect to their nesting within the population at large. Theoretically, the
resulting concept of nestedness captures one dimension of Granovetter's concept of social
embeddedness. Like "solidarity," "embeddedness" is a multidimensional construct relating
generally to the importance of social networks for action.”39
Moody and White’s concept of “nestedness” thus describes the relationships among sub-groups in
relation to higher order groups and in relation to the population at large. This does not eliminate
the possibility that groups, like sub-groups, may not overlap and thereby capture individuals who
are simultaneously members of one or more other sub-groups or groups. This view of “nestedness”
does not necessarily entail that nestings or groups or sub-groups are, like Faberge eggs, always
contained within the higher order entity in which they are nested. Like embeddedness, the concept
of nestedness indicates that the extreme atomism posited by classical and neoclassical economists
is not maintainable except as a theoretical construct. Even in that employment, it presents
difficulties as to how social order might be attained. Groups are part of the social fabric of a
population.
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The Hobbesian Problem of Order in Political and Economic Contexts
We next examine the Hobbesian problem of order in political and economic contexts. In a useful
discussion of embeddedness to which we will refer further in due course, 40 the sociologists Greta
Krippner and Anthony Alvarez discuss the problems of atomism and embeddedness from
Granovetter’s and from Polanyi’s perspectives, noting that “the Granovetterian formulation of
embeddedness deals fundamentally with the problem of atomism, whereas the Polanyian tradition
deals most centrally with the problem of the analytically autonomous economy. These two
problems are indistinguishable within the neoclassical paradigm.”41
Yet atomism is fundamental to neoclassical economics, and, accordingly, Krippner and Alvarez
find it applied in the criticisms of neoclassicism by both embeddedness perspectives, saying: “An
atomistic perspective, that is, a perspective that assumes isolated, self-interested actors who arrive
on the scene already equipped with an inborn tendency to “truck, barter, and exchange,” requires
essentially no governance structure to police exchange. In such a world, there is no opportunity
for fraud, collusion, corruption, or vice of any kind, hence no need for government meddling in
the economy. With the assumption of atomism, we are therefore in the world of the self-regulating
market—a world in which politics and culture enter into the market only as an interference and in
which the economy can legitimately be described as an analytically autonomous sphere. As
critique, Granovetterian and Polanyian perspectives provide a unified and compelling assault on
the neoclassical perspective.”42
The human tendency to ‘truck, barter, and exchange” was, of course, noted by Adam Smith in his
classic work, The Wealth of Nations.43 As we will discuss below, it is not clear that Adam Smith’s
treatment of economic man was as thoroughgoingly atomistic as was that of some other economists
considered to be neoclassical in orientation. Krippner and Alvarez find that both Granovetter and
Polanyi are hostile to the atomistic assumptions of the neoclassical perspective, but their
approaches to the relationship between economic and social action differ:
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Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness involves identifying relational bases of social
action in economic contexts; [that of] Polanyi, in contrast, concerns the integration of the
economy into broader social systems. These are not the same problem. They invite different
strategies of analysis and involve different assumptions about the nature of the underlying
reality that these analytical strategies purport to describe. In particular, we argue that
Granovetter’s conception of embeddedness puts forward what we call an exterior
relationship between the economic and the social, whereas Polanyi’s elaboration of the
concept posits an interior view of this relationship. In the former case, social relations shape
economic outcomes from the outside; in the latter case, the social and the economic are
seen as mutually constituting.44
In terms of the present, fourth, assumption, it can be seen that these are two different perspectives
concerning the extent of separation of the economic and the social sphere and the interaction
between the two. Indeed, as we will argue below, the present writer would maintain that
Granovetter adheres rather too closely to the economic conception of social action. Perhaps this is
affected by his concern to avoid an oversocialized account.
Krippner and Alvarez maintain that “Granovetter argued that a conception of social action as
embedded in social networks could avoid the twin perils represented by undersocialized and
oversocialized accounts. He noted, “Actors do not decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do
they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories
that they happen to occupy.” Rather, examination of individuals’ patterns of insertion into social
relations affords a more compelling explanatory account of behavior in economic contexts.”45
Krippner and Alvarez mention Granovetter’s example of economic wrongdoing. Granovetter
maintains that this is reduced not by efficient institutions, which they describe as an
undersocialized account, or by generalized morality, which they maintain is an oversocialized
account, but because “economic transactions are enmeshed in a thick net of personal relationships
that explains order in economic life. These relationships both provide information on the
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motivations of one’s exchange partner—is this person likely to fleece me? – and transform those
motivations by infusing personal trust into exchange.”46
Whether one adopts the Granovetterian or the Polanyian perspective, embeddedness treats
economic transactions as “enmeshed in a thick net of personal relationships” that explains order
in economic life. Both dispute the neoclassical atomistic account of “self-interested actors who
carry full formed preference rankings in their heads and make maximization decisions in isolation
from other social actors”.47
Krippner and Alvarez say that: “Implicitly or explicitly, purveyors of the Granovetterian view of
embeddedness reject the existence of Homo Economicus: The self-interested, maximizing agent
who makes decisions in isolation from other agents is little more than a fiction. This is not to say
that self-interest is not a motivator in economic life, nor that individuals do not attempt to
maximize utility, narrowly or broadly conceived. Far from it – many Granovetterians are
comfortable with rational choice theory, if not necessarily card-carrying adherents; similarly, many
rational choice theorists have warmly embraced Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness.”48
Instead, rational motivation is not thought to be the exclusive motivation of economic behaviour.
According to them, “[w]hat this perspective rejects is the notion that there is some pure, invariant
motive driving human behavior: Because motivations inhere in social relations, and because
relations are by their very nature multipurpose, motivations are likely to be mixed. More to the
point, it is appropriate to think of social relations, rather than the set of motivations (mixed or
otherwise) produced by these relations, as causal. Primacy is given to the context of social
action.”49
Although developments in psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, sociology and political
science have made it difficult to maintain the exclusivity of economic gain, self-interest, or utility
as the sole motivating force behind the actions of individuals, it might behoove us to briefly
examine the some of the background of those notions. As is well known, Hobbes describes a state
of nature in which he conceptualizes man as a solitary individual.50 He asked what Dennis Wrong
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describes as the “Hobbesian question”, which as noted above,” may be variously phrased as, "What
are the sources of social cohesion?; or, "How is social order possible?"; or, stated in socialpsychological terms, "How is it that man becomes tractable to social discipline?" …The Hobbesian
question asks how men are capable of the guidance by social norms and goals that makes possible
an enduring society… Much of our current theory offers an oversocialized view of man in
answering the Hobbesian question”.51 With that, attention turns to some consideration of that
question.
Thomas Hobbes’s Conception of Man
Hobbes posits a “state of nature” and says that it is “manifest that during the time men live without
a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war: and such a
war is of every man against every man”52. He observes that the natural equality of mankind in
body and mind is such that none can without all have the hope of attaining their ends, but when
two men desire the same thing which both cannot enjoy, they become enemies and everyone tries
to master the persons of others, even more so than security requires, so long as he is not endangered
by a greater power. He assumes that “men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of
grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all”53, for every man
wants others to value him as highly as he values himself. His state of nature is one in which men
quarrel by reason of, firstly, competition, or gain; secondly, for diffidence, or safety; and, thirdly,
for glory, or reputation over others.
In a famous passage, Hobbes delineates the consequences of such state:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every
man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what
their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition
there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no
culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by
sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no
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letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death;
and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.54
The solitary man in a state of nature pursues his passions, which do not include social or moral
impulses, by using force and fraud, unrestrained by law or justice:
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be
unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where
there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are
in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the
body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well
as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude.
It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine
and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can
keep it. And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed
in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in
his reason.55
It is, of course, reason, according to Hobbes, that inclines men to agree on “convenient articles of
peace”, which Hobbes describes as the laws of nature, and which result in the constitution of the
Commonwealth.
The fundamental law of nature, laid down in Chapter XIV, is that each man has the liberty to use
his own power as he wishes to preserve his own life and to do anything which is, in his judgment,
apt for that purpose. From this, Hobbes derives a second law of nature that, in order to obtain peace
and to defend himself, a man should be willing to lay down this right to all things insofar as do
others, and to but to retain only so much liberty as he would allow others against himself. The third
law of nature, laid down in Chapter XV, is that men perform their covenants, without which a state
of war would prevail. Performance of these covenants is ensured by a Commonwealth.
Other laws of nature are, respectively: fourth, that the recipient of a benefit given freely not give
any reasonable cause for the donor to regret his good will; fifth, that every man strive to
accommodate the rest; sixth that a man ought to pardon offences past of them that repent; seventh,
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that men look not at the greatness of the evil past but the greatness of the good to follow; eighth,
that men show no hatred or contempt for others; ninth, that every man acknowledge another for
his equal by nature; tenth, that no man reserve at the time of entry into conditions of peace rights
that he is not content to be reserved by every other; eleventh, that a man deal equally between men;
twelfth, that things that cannot be divided or enjoyed in common be distributed by lot or by first
possession; and thirteenth, that men who mediate peace be allowed safe conduct. Hobbes says that
“[t]hese are the laws of nature, dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in
multitudes; and which only concern the doctrine of civil society.”56
Of course, Hobbes is not prescribing any laws of nature in the sense of laws that obtain in a state
of nature; instead, he is stipulating certain rules, norms, conventions, or laws of civil society that
are necessary, in his judgment, to permit man to depart from the state of nature and to commence
construction of a civil society. Many of these may be thought to have religious, even Biblical,
origins. Certainly, his “laws of nature” are consistent with Biblical injunctions. What cannot be
doubted, however, is that most, if not all, of these “laws of nature” are effectively prescriptions for
accommodating atomistic individuals to society. This is true even of the first or fundamental law,
to seek peace and follow it, though it is bound up with man’s right in a state of war to everything
that is conducive, in his judgment, to maintaining his person and liberty.
It is clear, then, that the state of nature, of atomized individuals engaged in war against every other,
is hypothesized only for the purpose of contrasting it to a social or societal environment adopted
figuratively to end that state of war. However, what cannot be ignored is that the “laws of nature”
posited to accomplish that purpose recognize, quite clearly and cogently, man’s social, sociable,
or societal needs, desires, or impulses, or “passions”. Despite Hobbes’s claim that in a state of
nature man gains no pleasure in keeping company with others, this claim is strictly predicated on
the dangers that others present. That is not to say, however, that even the rational atomist asserts
that in that state of nature man does not have social “passions”. In their guise as “laws of nature”,
these social “passions” influence the construction of a social domain.
In fact, even in the state of nature, combinations of men are possible. In his discussion of the rough
equality of men in body and mind, Hobbes admits that “the weakest has strength enough to kill the
strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger
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with himself.”57 He recognizes that atomistic individuals might gather together to take action
against a common danger. This involves social action. However, a purely dyadic war of every man
against every man would not likely result in perennial war, although Hobbes admits that he
considers war to include “a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently
known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war”.
In any event, as Mark Granovetter observed, the “extent of disorder resulting from force and fraud
depends very much on how the network of social relations is structured. Hobbes exaggerated the
extent of disorder likely in his atomized state of nature where, in the absence of sustained social
relations, one could expect only desultory dyadic conflicts. More extended and large-scale disorder
results from coalitions of combatants, impossible without prior relations. We not generally speak
of "war" unless actors have arranged themselves into two sides, as the end result of various
coalitions. This occurs only if there are insufficient crosscutting ties, held by actors with enough
links to both main potential combatants to have a strong interest in forestalling conflict”.58
Granovetter allows that “disorder and malfeasance also occur in the absence of social relations.
“But the level of malfeasance available in a truly atomized social situation is fairly low; instances
can only be episodic, unconnected, small scale. The Hobbesian problem is truly a problem, but in
transcending it by the smoothing effect of social structure, we also introduce the possibility of
disruptions on a larger scale than those available in the "state of nature."”59
In conclusion, then, the Hobbesian state of nature and laws of nature cannot be said to portray
individuals as atomistic actors, possessed of both reason and passion, seeking only satisfaction of
wants. The wants which he ascribes to men in a state of nature embrace not only security and
satisfaction of other physical needs and desires, but also needs and desires for approbation and
regard, and other social and affiliative impulses. One might speculate concerning whether the serial
dyadic conflicts posited in the Hobbesian state of nature would be sufficient to motivate the
aggregation of atomistic actors then present to engage in social relations, including, of course,
those social relations necessary in order to adopt the articles of peace terminating the state of war
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prevailing in that state of nature. A series of dyadic relationships between various series of
individuals in a given environment may not be sufficient.
The question also arises how negotiations for exiting the state of nature could be conducted in
safety and in time to benefit the individuals concerned. Of course, while a given individual
bargained with each of the others, others that he or she had not bargained (yet) with might seek to
impose their will by force or otherwise. The recursive feature of dyadic negotiations being
conducted by multiple parties with multiple parties might itself constrain, and even make
impossible, reaching agreement, even without considering such matters as the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and other more arcane learning from game theory. Fortunately, for present purposes, it is not
necessary to solve these problems: a mere acknowledgement that they arise from atomistic
assumptions is sufficient.
If doubt is cast on the Hobbesian model of atomized individuals as a basis for the economic man
of later neoclassical economists, perhaps we can consider Adam Smith’s economic man as a more
suitable model. Adam Smith’s 1776 book The Wealth of Nations60 is frequently considered to be
the origin of classical economics. Marx is said to have originated the term “classical economics”
to identify the work of David Ricardo, James Mill, and their predecessors, but the term later came
to include followers of Ricardo, including John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, Francis Edgeworth,
and Arthur C. Pigou.61
Adam Smith’s Conception of Man
In this regard, Adam Smith argued that free competition and free trade were conducive to the
wealth of a nation. Individual pursuit of needs and desires would by some invisible hand attain
aggregate welfare. He pretended not to start from a hypothesized state of nature as did Hobbes,
but from “an early and rude state of society” in which there were minimal inequalities of wealth,
power and income. The economist John Elliott explains that Smith “imagines (one surmises more
as a hypothetical mental experiment than a definitive historical observation) an "early and rude
state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land". In
such a society, ownership of land and capital, and hence wealth power based on ownership, is
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nonexistent. Consequently, "the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer", and workers do
not share income with capitalists or landlords.”62
Smith allowed that the produce of labour, and hence income, and thence power, from labour, might
vary as a result of differences in effort, or “dexterity and ingenuity, which he considered likely to
be relatively small. Elliott summarizes his argument: “First, the talents characterizing diverse
occupations "can seldom be acquired but in consequence of long application and the superior value
of their produce may frequently be no more than a reasonable compensation for the time and labour
which must be spent in acquiring them." Second, Smith tells his readers early in Wealth that the
"difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware of." "The
difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street
porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, custom and education".
Consequently, a social order in which the worker "has neither landlord nor master to share with
him" is likely to be highly egalitarian and free from substantial income differences based on
differential wealth power.”63
Accordingly, Smith assumed that political powers and duties would be relatively equally dispersed
among the labourer members of this society, who were expected to be either self-employed or
communally employed with the result that there would be no separate employer with “employer
power”. As Elliott maintains, Smith, paraphrasing Hobbes, says that “wealth is power”, as wealth
conveys the power of purchasing; a certain command over labour or products available in the
market,64 but is only one of several different sources of power which Smith identifies: namely,
wealth power, monopoly power, employer power, and political power.65 Wealth power can be
obtained either through ownership of capital or through ownership of land.66
Monopoly power does not exist in early societies with free competition. Smith, says Elliott, argues
that “under a regime of "perfect liberty" or "free competition", market prices, wages, and profits
tend to approximate their "natural" levels, resources are allocated efficiently, income inequalities
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are minimized, labor markets tend toward full employment, capital is accumulated vigorously, and
the economy grows robustly. Under these (freely competitive) circumstances, according to Smith,
private self-interest, notably in the pursuit of profit and acquisition of wealth, is not necessarily
anti-social. Indeed, self-interest often fosters the social good. In his discussion of foreign trade, for
example, Smith states that individuals employ their capital and direct their industry so that "its
produce may be of the greatest possible value." But in maximizing his own income, he also renders
the "annual revenue of the society as great as he can." Thus, the individual is "led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention." And "by pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote
it", says Smith.67
This alignment of self-interest and public interest by means of the invisible hand disappears with
monopoly power: “Smith makes painstakingly clear that, in practice, monopoly and monopoloid
behavior is widespread in both economic conduct and public policy. Consequently, things are not
left "at perfect liberty," free competition does not actually prevail in practice, and substantial
inequalities, considerably larger than compensating differences (for example, differences in wages
to compensate for differences in the time and expense of education), emanate from the exercise of
monopoly power.”68 Elliott cites Smith’s famous quote about monopoly power: “The interests of
merchants and manufacturers Smith avers, are promoted by collusion. “People of the same trade
seldom meet together," Smith observes in an often quoted passage, "even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or some contrivance to raise
prices".”69
Self-interested behaviour of merchants and manufacturers and merchants, according to Smith,
conflicts with the public interest in cases of monopoly, aligns with it in foreign trade, and its
possibly pernicious effects are countervailed by means of free competition.70 However, for Smith,
free competition does conduce to the attainment of aggregate social welfare. As such, he maintains
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that government policy which departs from perfect liberty of competition generates substantial
inequalities.71 Thus, it attracts his criticism.
Smith’s analysis of economic phenomena incorporates a theory of power; and if Elliott’s
arguments convince, theories of (at least four) sources of power. Elliott argues that this explication
of power is absent from neoclassical models, to their detriment. He asserts that in standard models
of market relationships, perfect competition assumes that the number of individual suppliers or
purchasers is such that each individual exercises no appreciable power and influence over any
individual competitor, aggregate supply and demand, or the ambient society or polity. “Hence,
power is conceived as external to or beyond the scope of economy as thus defined, a proper topic,
perhaps, for politics or sociology, but not economics.”72
The argument Elliott asserts here is that standard neoclassical assumptions eliminate the
consideration of power as a factor in economic activity. “By contrast, Smith's argumentarium
incorporates, indeed features, causes and consequences of the pursuit and exercise of social power
by individuals, organizations, classes, and governments. Thus, the scope of Smith's social or
political economy is broader than twentieth century orthodoxy in economics, and expressly
includes within its corpus the "visible hand" of power and politics as well as the "invisible hand"
of market exchange relationships.”73
Elliott argues that from “a Smithian perspective, neoclassical economics (or at least the version
thereof which has dominated the economics discipline in the last 50 years or so) contains a logical
or internal flaw. Market exchange and power, Smith believed, are not merely related but are
interdependent, not separate, topics. On the one hand, the "obvious and simple system of natural
liberty establishes itself of its own accord." On the other, "every man, as long as he does not violate
the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way. . .”.74 Since power
is an integral component of market exchange, certain exercises of power may “violate the laws of
justice” and thus require to be restrained; whether such power constitutes monopoly power, wealth
power, employer power, or political power.
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Elliott concludes that “Adam Smith's analysis was broader and richer than the neoclassical
theories, which followed a century later. But "even within the realm of pure neoclassical economic
theory, in the absence of a perfectly and costlessly functioning legal system, one cannot rule out"
differential power and its impact on economic relationships. "The notion that markets
spontaneously solve these [economic] problems by themselves, so widely believed and
propagated, is simply logically incorrect". …Smith understood the relationships between power
and market processes to be interdependent, not separate… ”.75As remarked previously, markets
are socially constructed. While power may be instrumental in their construction, substantial
inequalities of power in their operation may impair their free functioning and attainment of
aggregate welfare. Adam Smith apparently understood this.
Markets and Social Order
Smith’s concept of the interdependence of markets and power concerns not only what Dennis
Wrong calls the “Hobbesian question”, namely, how man becomes tractable to social discipline,
but also what he calls the “Marxist question”, namely, how social cohesion arises or how social
order becomes possible.76 This is discussed above under the heading “Socialization and Models of
Man”. As discussed in the section next following that heading, the Hobbesian state of nature in
which each man opposes his power to that of every other man in order to preserve his person and
liberty ends, according to Hobbes, when use of reason inclines men to agree on “convenient articles
of peace”, which Hobbes describes as the laws of nature, and which result in the constitution of
the Commonwealth. The resulting Leviathan is able to ensure the imposition and continuance of
social order.
Mark Granovetter argues that classical and neoclassical economics substitute markets for Hobbes's
autocratic authority and provide the social relations and institutional context which, like Leviathan,
end the state of disorder prevailing in the Hobbesian state of nature. Instead: “The solution of
classical liberalism, and correspondingly of classical economics, is antithetical: repressive political
structures are rendered unnecessary by competitive markets that make force or fraud unavailing.
Competition determines the terms of trade in a way that individual traders cannot manipulate. If
traders encounter complex or difficult relationships, characterized by mistrust or malfeasance, they
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can simply move on to the legion of other traders willing to do business on market terms; social
relations and their details thus become frictional matters.”77
Granovetter’s comparison invites the question whether he really means to assert that, like
Leviathan for Hobbes, competitive markets, for classical liberalism and classical economics, solve
not only the Hobbesian question of how man becomes subject to social discipline, but also the
Marxist question of how social cohesion and social order becomes possible. It may be that
Granovetter asserting that social and political acceptance of competitive markets in which all
personal and social goods and services are commoditized ends all manner of personal, social, and
political contention. This is obviously problematic.
Instead of considering directly how the market equates with Leviathan in terms of its acquisition
and exercise of power, Granovetter pursues the social aspects of the operation of power with his
famous claim that in “classical and neoclassical economics, therefore, the fact that actors may have
social relations with one another has been treated, if at all, as a frictional drag that impedes
competitive markets.”78

He cites Adam Smith’s suggestion that public trade registers be

eliminated as evidence of their “recognition that social atomization is prerequisite to perfect
competition.”79 It may be suspected, however, that Adam Smith’s proposal related to facilitating
formation of monopolies.
As demonstrated in the immediately preceding section, Adam Smith appealed to natural justice
with respect to both of Dennis Wrong’s foundational social questions, the Hobbesian question and
the Marxist question. Importantly, Smith also took those questions into account from the
perspective of continuum: namely, how man’s tractability to social discipline, once established, is
maintained on an ongoing basis; and how social cohesion and social order, once established, is
maintained on an ongoing basis. The Hobbesian solution to both questions seems to relate to the
external overarching authority of the Leviathan.
Granovetter maintains that such later economic and transaction cost theorists as Oliver
Williamson80 “appeal to authority relations in order to tame opportunism”, a development which
77
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constitutes a rediscovery of Hobbesian analysis, though confined here to the economic sphere.”81
Such authority relations appear in the firm, which efficiently employs internal organization of
relationships and hierarchical authority to mitigate the limitations of bounded rationality and
opportunistic behaviour otherwise prevalent in the market.82 For reasons discussed in the next
paragraphs, we would maintain that the “rediscovery of Hobbesian analysis argument” made by
Granovetter might be (better) sustained by envisioning “the market” as some kind of superordinate
authority over economic relations.
For the moment, however, this argument has to be left to one side while we consider Granovetter’s
observation of Williamson: “This analysis entails the same mixture of under-and oversocialized
assumptions found in Leviathan. The efficacy of hierarchical power within the firm is overplayed,
as with Hobbes’s oversocialized foreign state. The "market" resembles Hobbes's state of nature. It
is the atomized and anonymous market of classical political economy, minus the discipline brought
by fully competitive conditions – an under-socialized conception that neglects the role of social
relations among individuals in different firms in bringing order to economic life.”83
Granovetter fails to explain, as he does with the firm, the oversocialized assumption that
Williamson makes in relation to the market. In that regard, it would be open to them to argue that
the market itself functions as a latter-day Leviathan with respect to individual consumers and
producers whose behaviour is constrained by their aggregation. In effect, aggregate supply and
demand may be said to “rule” individual consumers and producers in the economic sphere, just as
Leviathan itself rules members of the society and the polity in those spheres.
As we have suggested previously, continued social relations must be considered as important with
respect to the Hobbesian and Marxist questions, not only in terms of the origins, but also in terms
of the continuance, of man’s tractability to social influence, and of social order in general.
However, on a less esoteric level, openness to social influence and the continuance of social order
may be effected by various means, in the economic sphere, as in other spheres of human activity.
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In this regard, Granovetter cites examples of cases in which Williamson acknowledges some social
influence on the market, saying: "Norms of trustworthy behavior sometimes extend to markets and
are enforced, in some degree, by group pressures.... Repeated personal contacts across
organizational boundaries support some minimum level of courtesy and consideration between the
parties.... In addition, expectations of repeat business discourage efforts to seek a narrow advantage
in any particular transaction.... Individual aggressiveness is curbed by the prospect of ostracism
among peers, in both trade and social circumstances. The reputation of a firm for fairness is also a
business asset not to be dissipated".84
As seen above, even Hobbes conceded the existence and operation of some associative
motivations. Granovetter argues in the following famous passage that Williamson’s concept of the
market as a powerful controlling influence over human economic actors, which fails to accord real
weight to the influence of social relations, supports his argument that, in choosing to establish
firms, economic actors are choosing hierarchy over market. He says: “A wedge is opened here for
analysis of social structural influences on market behavior. But Williamson treats these examples
as exceptions and also fails to appreciate the extent to which the dyadic relations he describes are
themselves embedded in broader systems of social relations. I argue that the anonymous market
of neoclassical models is virtually nonexistent in economic life and that transactions of all kinds
are rife with the social connections described.”85
While Granovetter concedes that the network of intrafirm social relations may be more dense and
long-lasting than those between firms, “all I need show here is that there is sufficient social overlay
in economic transactions across firms (in the "market," to use the term as in Williamson's
dichotomy) to render dubious the assertion that complex market transactions approximate a
Hobbesian state of nature that can only be resolved by internalization within a hierarchical
structure.”86
Finding that “the anonymous market of neoclassical models is virtually nonexistent in economic
life”, Granovetter maintains that even dyadic one-off trades in a discrete market “are themselves
embedded in broader systems of social relations”.
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Markets in Economic Theory
With that, we now turn to a summary exploration of the nature of markets in economic theory. A
review article on this subject is “What is a Market? On the Methodology of a Contested Concept”
by the economist Eckehard F. Rosenbaum published in 2000.87 Contrary to expectations, perhaps,
discussions of this subject are relatively uncommon, and thus Rosenbaum’s discussion presents
itself as both learned and relatively comprehensive; and hence useful for present purposes.
Rosenbaum says that many economists find markets at almost any place and time, and assume that
they emerge spontaneously once a set of necessary conditions, including well defined property
rights and liberalized prices obtain, and citing Oliver Williamson’s dictum that “in the beginning,
there were markets”.88 He contrasts that ubiquity view with Herbert Simon’s view that the
institutional structure of economic life on Earth is divided among organizations (which dominate,
except for rural areas in India, Africa or China perhaps), market relationships, and contractual
relations, with a combination of market relationships and contractual relations prevailing in the
Western hemisphere and large parts of Asia, and prior to 1989 contractual relations prevailing in
the North Eastern hemisphere.89
Rosenbaum notes that “No less an authority than Ronald Coase has observed that the role of
markets in modern economic theory is even more opaque than that of enterprises.” He argues that,
even though its frequent use in economic discourse might suggest otherwise, “closer inspection
immediately reveals a wide range of meanings and contents”, reflecting the fact that “the market
concept itself is hardly if ever analyzed in a systematic fashion with a view to identifying the
constituting or essential elements of a market.”90 A non-economist observing the use made of the
term by some economists might conclude that the market is some sort of deus ex machina, as it
seems often to be “pulled out”, as if from a hat, in order to explain higher order conclusions for
which no further proof is offered.
One explanation for this lack of formal definition might be that the term is used in different
contexts with somewhat different meanings, which meanings are, at least in part, referable to the
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purpose and context of their use. This is not to say that the term means what one wants it to mean.
Rosenbaum emphasizes that: “Hypotheses about the functions and the properties of markets (e.g.
establishment of prices, allocation of resources, efficiency) which claim to have empirical validity
presuppose that the researcher outlines the characteristics of the social object "market" for which
the hypothesised relationship or property is to hold.” This is only infrequently the case. “Arrow
and Hahn's (1971) General Competitive Analysis, for example, provides no explicit definition of
what a market is and only a highly abstract account of how markets function. Indeed, it is not until
page 348 that they acknowledge that they have taken the "existence of markets... for granted."91
Rosenbaum analyzes definitions of markets into three categories: firstly, observational, which
describe some empirical phenomenon;92 secondly, functional, which “focus on what the market
does rather than on what, from an empirical perspective, the market is”93; and, thirdly, structural,
which “draw attention to the underlying and thus not immediately observable structure of a market,
emphasizing the putative mechanisms and structure that give rise to market phenomena.”94 He
finds two types of functional definitions branch: firstly, those (generally neoclassical views) which
consider the market as an allocation mechanism (or as an “invisible hand” in the Smithian
tradition), or a mechanism “for the determination of relative prices by supply and demand”
(culminating in a general equilibrium as pioneered by Walras); and, secondly, those in which the
function of the market is to provide “a natural order or equilibrium of social activities” (in some
resonance, he says, with Hayek’s notion of spontaneous order).95 In the former, “the market is
synonymous with the intersection of unobservable and merely hypothesized demand curves devoid
of any institutional, spatial or social features, and each individual market is interrelated with others
and aggregated into the economy as a whole, which jointly determines relative prices and the
allocation of commodities.”96 Of course, many uses of the term by economists and others fit into
more than one category.
As has already been suggested, how one uses the term may be affected by the purpose and context
of a particular research program. Rosenbaum notes that: “observational definitions… single out
91
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for further investigation some empirical phenomenon”; functionalist definitions, which are based
on a great deal of analysis which supports ascribing specific function to the market which, in turn,
“provides a guiding line for further research”; while structural definitions, represent “an
intermediate position in that, accepting as they do the function of markets in principle, their
concern is to open the black box of the disembedded and deinstitutionalized market of neoclassical
theory, and to provide a better understanding of the working of the market by highlighting some
central structural features of markets.”97
Rosenbaum concludes that because “each definition belongs to a specific part of economic
discourse, it has first of all to be judged in its own terms, with the result that it would be
“nonsensical to criticize structural definitions for being empirically ambiguous, as it would be
problematic to look for rich empirical content in functional definitions.”98 Taking this perspective
on board, it may be maintained that neoclassical views of the market generally are, or, at least,
purport to be, empirical or functional, and, as such, abstract the market from its institutional, spatial
or social context and environment. While later neoclassical economists purport to take account of
certain institutional and social features, as noted above, even such features are often abstracted
from their social and institutional contexts. Rosenbaum argues that even such traditional
economists as Marshall who focus (in his later work) on the social organization of a market,
describe it as “a group or groups of people, some of whom desire to obtain certain things, and
some of whom are in a position to supply what the others want".99
Rosenbaum contrasts the market with five “alternative social forms”, namely, firms and
organizations, central planning, bargaining, casual exchange, and the exchange of gifts, eventually
evaluating them in terms of voluntarity and specificity, regularity and typification, and
competition. This description of “alternative social forms” seems to owe much to Polanyi, whose
classification is largely ignored by Rosenbaum, who allows for more (and different) categories.100
Rosenbaum concludes that the characteristics which are unique in markets are: firstly, voluntary
and specified exchange; secondly, typification and regularity of exchange; and thirdly,
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competition. Following the economic and political sociologist Fred Block,101 he maintains that
exchange situations exhibit different degrees of “marketness” according to the degree to which
these criteria are realized and that market economies do not necessarily exhibit the same degree of
“marketness” across time and space.102
Of course, if regularity and typification is an essential formal criterion of markets, it is clear that
some social context must be presumed. To the vacation and regularity are also “the most basic
elements of the institutional character of markets” considering institutions, in the most
fundamental sense, as routines.103 Consequently, “markets constitute institutions because they
involve certain routines (typical exchanges) that are repeated over time (regularity)”. While
institutionalists like Douglas North, limited use of the term “institutions” to “sets of rules with or
without enforcement mechanisms” which involves “investigating the institutional framework of
exchange, the present account thus emphasises the institutionalized form of exchange.”104
Again, such routines and repetition would be unlikely to arise without social context. Rosenbaum
indicates that “many markets can also be regarded as institutions in a more specific sense in that
market clearing and the determination of prices follow (procedural) rules or in that there is a
number of auxiliary institutions and/organizations which facilitate certain types of exchange” as
argued by Hodgson, thereby requiring consideration of “the social and cultural embeddedness of
economic interaction”.105 Rosenbaum posits that “Hodgson's auxiliary institutions or
organizations, which serve to overcome problems relating to moral hazard, trust and asymmetric
information, are likely to be shaped by the social and cultural setting. There are no reasons to
suggest after all that similar problems are always solved by using the same set of institutions.”106
Considering only modern capitalist societies “there is not only a wide range of institutional forms
in use…but when it comes to addressing specific problems within the economic sphere, there is
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also a tendency to adopt institutional or organizational forms which originate outside the economic
system and which have to do with the culturally impregnated "Wirschaftsstil" [economic styles]
of a society.” Economic institutions, forms and practices can vary significantly across societies.
“At one extreme, certain forms of exchange are tabooed or so heavily overshadowed by cultural
influences that economic factors can hardly be detected, at the other extreme culture provides little
more than the background of transactions in the form of general norms of behavior.” 107 These
observations accord with the position taken in this book with respect to the interrelatedness of the
economy, the society, the polity, and the state;108 the consequential situation of the modern
business corporation within that interrelated economy-society-polity-state environment;109 and its
status as a rights-and-duty-bearing entity as a matter of law situate, and whose legal counterparties
are situate within that environment, and the firm as an organization situate, like its organizational
participants, within that interrelated economy-society-polity-state environment.
That the institutional response to specific economic and other problems is affected by social and
cultural factors involved in a given society and its “economic style” may seem, in some senses,
trite or self-evident, however, as has been shown, the characterization of the economic sphere as
one that is separate and apart from the social, cultural, political, and other spheres of a society, is
one explicitly or implicitly accepted by the neoclassical economic tradition that is broadly reflected
in modern law, regulation, and governance, not only with respect to business organizations, but
even more generally. Before proceeding to consider this “embeddedness” further, we will briefly
examine the social construction of markets.
Social Construction of Markets
In an important review article from 2007, the sociologists Neil Fligstein and Luke Dauter discuss
contributions from political economy, sociology and organizational theory that led to the new field
of “sociology of markets”110, remarking: “Scholars in all these fields doubted that economics could
sufficiently make sense of what happens in markets. In essence, they discovered that the atomized,
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price-taking actors, with perfect and symmetrical information assumed by neoclassical theory, did
not seem to exist empirically. Social relations seemed to be crucial to the functioning of markets
and market actors in a myriad of ways.”111 We use Fligstein and Dauter to guide this discussion.
As indicated above, Rosenbaum’s examination of the market of neoclassical economics showed
that markets were distinguished from other “alternative social forms” of distribution of goods in
that only markets exhibit the three characteristics of voluntarity, typification and regularity of
exchange, and competition.112 These characteristics relate to actors and the form of exchange. As
noted in the present work, each of those characteristics presupposes some underlying social
relations among market participants. Fligstein and Dauter remark:
For neoclassical theory, markets simply imply exchange between actors for goods or services.
These exchanges are usually thought to be fleeting, with price (i.e., the amount of a commodity
that is exchanged for another using a generalized medium of exchange, i.e., money) determined
by the supply and demand for the commodity. From the point of view of the sociology of
markets, the problem is that this type of exchange already shows a great deal of social structure.
Market actors have to find one another. Money has to exist to allow market actors to get beyond
bartering nonequivalent goods. Actors have to know what the price is. Underlying all exchange
is that both buyers and sellers have faith that they will not be cheated. Such faith often implies
informal (i.e., personal knowledge of the buyer or seller) and formal mechanisms (i.e., law)
that govern exchange. Furthermore, market actors are often organizations, implying that
organizational dynamics influence market structures. For sociologists, market exchange
implies a whole backdrop of social arrangements that economics does not even begin to hint
at.113
As Fligstein and Dauter say, these market actors have to find each other, must have a desire to
exchange, must have a medium of exchange (such as money), must exchange something that has
determinable characteristics, with some frequency or regularity, must be able to generate a price
for the exchange on some reasonable basis, and must have some basis (such experience, reputation,
and rules) to justify having some trust or confidence in the completion and effectiveness of the
exchange. These characteristics of a market envision a complex set of social relationships
111
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necessarily affecting the actors who are the immediate parties to the exchange and others. The
social nature of these characteristics and related relationships in real instantiations, not
hypothesized circumstances, is apparent.
Markets, say Fligstein and Dauter, involve “day-to-day social relationships” among market actors
which are “based on trust, friendship, power, and dependence”. Thus, “unstructured, haphazard,
one-shot, anonymous social exchange is not a market. Instead, markets imply social spaces where
repeated exchanges occur between buyers and sellers under a set of formal and informal rules
governing relations between competitors, suppliers, and customers.”114 Local understandings,
formal and informal rules, and conventions “guide interaction, facilitate trade, define what
products are produced, indeed are constitutive of products, and provide stability for buyers, sellers,
and producers. These marketplaces are dependent on governments, laws, and larger cultural
understandings supporting market activity.”115 Market actors develop social practices, processes,
and structures to mediate the problems they encounter in exchange, competition, and production.116
Of course, the market actors in actual cases are not the atomistic individuals specified in the
hypothesis of neoclassical economics, but are often themselves social groups or organizations.
Firms are often not composed of a single entrepreneur hiring a manager to produce and sell at a
product with the objective of generating a profit. More often, firms, as they are experienced in real
instantiations, are socially constructed, as groups or organizations, of people.
Thus, each element of production and exchange engages social activity. While buyers and sellers
may sometimes be known to each other, in many cases they are not. Confidence in the completion
of the exchange, in the quality and quantum of the goods exchanged, and in other aspects of its
“fairness” may involve the reputation of the parties concerned, the mechanics of verification of
quality, quantity and method of exchange, and on the relative market power of the actors
concerned.117 Fligstein and Dauter emphasize the importance of trust in linking buyers and sellers,
indicating that the “experimental literature shown that trust matters most in situations in which
there is a great deal of uncertainty about the qualities of the product being exchanged;” noting
“Granovetter’s main argument about embeddedness is that if one has close ties to others over long
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periods of time, one can trust that in any particular transaction, people are less likely to try to cheat
one another.”
Such close ties can arise from a course of dealing or from knowledge of the reputation of the other
party through one’s network ties. However, “[j]udging the trustworthiness of another actor is not
just a matter of having a long-term network tie to them. Trust is also about power and resource
dependence. Firms work to reduce uncertainty and resource dependence by choosing partners who
they either know to be reliable or others think are reliable.” 118
Resource dependence concerns the dependence of an organization on its environment, economic
social and political, for resources upon which its existence, operations and profitability depend and
which therefore affect its organization, strategy, and structure. These resources include labour,
capital, and raw materials, and may include access to customers and markets. As such, resource
dependence affects the production and distribution of an organization’s products, including its
competitive strategy and its implementation. Power is related to access to resources, and the ability
to employ them effectively. Trust can increase the power of the economic actor by reducing
uncertainty and by reducing resource dependence.
Resource dependence theory became prominent with the publication of Pfeffer and Salancik’s
book, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective, in 1978.119
The ability to access resources required for an organization, of course, necessarily implicates it in
engagement to procure those resources, to manage them, and to ensure their continuity. All such
activities require social activity.
The environment upon which an organization is dependent, therefore, necessarily includes social
elements. As Fligstein and Dauter mention, “institutional theory posited that the environment was
at least partially a social construction. Scott & Meyer (1982) called such environments “sectors”
and described the socially constructed environment of firms as a function of all the other
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organizations that might impinge on a particular organization. They included governments,
suppliers, workers, and customers as part of such a social construction.”
Fligstein and Dauter go on to explain that DiMaggio & Powell, instead of “sectors”, called these
environments “organizational fields,” and state that this “metaphor implies that firms watch one
another, engage in strategic behavior vis-à-vis one another, and look to one another for clues as to
what constitutes successful behavior. DiMaggio & Powell’s main focus was how firms in
organizational fields came to resemble one another through processes of mimetic, coercive, and
normative isomorphism.”120 Harrison White applied these insights, even more specifically, to
intra-industry competition, as will be discussed next.
In an important and much-cited contribution to discussion of the origin of markets, Harrison C.
White’s 1981 article asked “Where do markets come from?”121 He sought to answer this question
by “embedding economists’ neoclassical theory of the firm within a sociological view of
markets”.122
White posited that production markets involve a producer side and a buyer side, each of which
operate as cliques and constantly monitor the other side by means of terms of trade, a joint social
construction including, but not limited to price, which may, however, be the most readily available
such term. Each producer is a separate firm with a distinctive product who determines production
volumes in part by observing the volumes of other producers. “Each producer acts purely on selfinterest based on observed actions of all others, summarized through a feedback process. The
summary is the terms-of-trade schedule, which reduces to constant price only limiting cases. The
market emerges as a structure of firms with a defined niche for each firm.”123 The market is thus
built by “self-reproducing cliques of firms” engaging in “a conflict-written and erratic process with
quite a range of outcomes possible in the form of market schedules”.124
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Fligstein and Dauter argue that such a “sociological view of relations among producers begs the
question of who these producers are and how they make production decisions. From the point of
view of neoclassical economics, whether producers are individuals or organizations matters little;
what is important is the production function and the combination of capital and labor used in the
productive process.”125 Conversely, they say, sociologists have long examined organizations as
social structures with “complex internal dynamics that are important for organizational form and
for the strategies they use to solve the problems of competition and exchange. They have pointed
to competition within the firm, culture, and power struggles, in addition to environmental
influence, as important to understanding a firm’s strategy and thus the structure of markets.”126
An examination of the firm will appear later in this work; however, for present purposes, we may
take note that the sociology of markets literature and resource dependence literature both consider
the internal dynamics of organizations, that is to say, they go “inside the black box” of the firm to
consider its internal structure and processes.
Conclusion
It goes without saying that the sociological study of markets or of business organizations is merely
one of the lenses though which a business organization can be examined. In respect of some of
these issues, as Fligstein noted, economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists,
social and other psychologists, and academics in business disciplines, including management,
strategy, organizational behaviour, marketing, and finance, have influenced the development of
more fulsome approaches to the study of business organizations.
As we have seen in our short discussion of the first assumption, anthropologists such as Henry
Wright, nineteenth century social and cultural anthropologist, social theorist and lawyer Lewis
Henry Morgan (author of Ancient Society, which influenced Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
among others), and cultural anthropologist Elman R. Service contributed to our understanding of
the importance of leadership and the state to economic development. We have also averted to
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contributions made by political scientists such as Stephen D. Krasner, Terry M. Moe, and by
organizational, institutional and political sociologist John W. Meyer.
As Fligstein observes: “The production of market institutions is a cultural project in several ways.
Property rights, governance structures, conceptions of control, and rules of exchange define the
social institutions necessary to make markets. Economic worlds are social worlds; therefore, they
operate according to principles like other social worlds. Actors engage in political actions vis-avis one another and construct local cultures to guide that interaction.”127
In conclusion, the assumption that not only markets, but the economy as a whole, can be analyzed
in a manner that is distinctive to it and to the private sphere within which the economy is
constituted was not assiduously maintained even by early liberal political and economic theorists,
such as Hobbes and Smith, who nevertheless perceived a relationship among the economic, social,
and political spheres that is generally eliminated in modern economic and mathematical models of
the economy.
The assumptions of classical and neoclassical economic theory that individuals are atomistic
rational individuals each of whom seeks only to maximize his own welfare ignore social and
affiliative needs, as even Hobbes and Smith recognized. This presents an “undersocialized” model
of man. However, the continuance of assumptions of atomistic rational individuals by Parsonian
and other modern sociological and political theorists, which is often implicit and subtle, often
contributes to modelling individual human beings in a way that is excessively determined by roles
and social positions, without considering the context, and personal history, and choices of the
operative individual. This may be considered to constitute an “oversocialized” model.
Modeling group behaviour on such an atomistic rational individual seeking only his or her own
welfare is not conducive to comprehension and prediction of such behaviour. Simple aggregation
of individual behaviour to predict group behaviour ignores the personal attributes and history of
the individual and the way in which his or her negotiation of personal identity constantly proceeds,
as our experience demonstrates. It also ignores, necessarily, inter-subjective (individual-toindividual) and individual-to-group influences. Instead, economic activity is socially constructed.
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Its advancement is dependent upon creation of necessary institutional supports, including, as we
have seen, the state, even in the earliest societies of which we have detailed archaeological
evidence, such as in Uruk. As has been noted here, those institutions make it possible, in many
ways, for exchange to take place.
If the argument presented in this section have at least raised significant doubts as to propriety of
analyzing the economy and the private sphere in a manner distinctive to it and distinctive from the
social and political spheres, the related question of whether the operation of the economy can be
distinctive from and even intrinsically independent of the social and political spheres may seem,
to some extent, already decided. It may still be possible, however, that the operation of the
economy proceeds as if it were distinct and intrinsically dependent of the ambient society and
polity or even that it does so proceed as a matter of fact. It is to these matters that we now turn.
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CHAPTER B3:
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, THE POLITY, AND THE
STATE
ASSUMPTION FIVE - THE ECONOMY AND ITS FUNCTION AS DISTINCT AND
INDEPENDENT FROM THE SOCIETY AND THE POLITY
The previous chapter explores the question whether the economy must be analyzed in a manner
distinctive to it alone and distinctive from the mode of analysis applicable to the society and the
polity. That question was considered by applying, in part, two different analytical perspectives, the
one being embeddedness, and the other, although involved in the foregoing, being the analytically
distinct perspective of the nature of man. Of course, the embeddedness perspective speaks directly
to the question raised about analytical methodology, while the perspective that considers the nature
of man proceeds from the particular viewpoints of classical and neoclassical economics, political
economy, political and social theory, and the modern disciplines of political science and sociology
may be said to reflect some blend of ideology and analytical methodology.
In any event, that chapter demonstrates the effectiveness of those methodological lenses, in the
course of demonstrating that analysis of the economy is not a uniquely distinctive pursuit, and does
not require a uniquely distinctive methodology; or, at the very least, that such a proposition is
highly doubtful. It is also shown that assumptions or generalizations concerning the nature of man,
which may be consistent or varied as among different disciplines, can have significant explanatory
and operational consequences.
If it is accepted that the economy is related to its ambient society and to its ambient polity, as the
present work has shown, the question may be asked whether the economy is distinct from and
operates intrinsically independently from such society and from such polity, as is generally
assumed, albeit tacitly and implicitly, by classical and neoclassical economic theory. This is the
fifth assumption that will be considered here. As in the case of the previous assumptions and
generalizations, this chapter does not set out to prove conclusively that the present assumption or
generalization is completely and irrevocably erroneous but, instead, endeavours to cast doubt on
its explanatory and predictive capacity, and on its efficacy, for the purposes of understanding, and
regulating, the behaviour of modern business corporations.
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KARL POLANYI’S EMBEDDEDNESS
One method of investigation that may be used to test these assumptions, and, in particular, the fifth
assumption which we now consider, is to evaluate that assumption against the theory of
embeddedness, which originated in Karl Polanyi’s signal work The Great Transformation: The
Political and Economic Origins of Our Time.1 The sweeping scope of that book is indicated by the
Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz, who summarizes it in the Foreword as “describing the great
transformation of European civilization from the preindustrial world to the world of
industrialization, and the shifts in ideas, ideologies, and social and economic policies
accompanying it.”2
In particular, at the outset of The Great Transformation, which was written during the Second
World War, Polanyi claimed that the book was concerned with the political and economic origins
of the collapse of nineteenth century civilization, based on four institutions: the balance-of-power
system, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market, and the liberal state.3 He
maintained that the proximate cause of the collapse was the collapse of the gold standard, an effort
to save which had caused the sacrifice of most of the other institutions. He described the selfregulating market as “the fount and matrix of the system” as it gave rise to the other institutions
and so to the ambient civilization concerned, so that “[t]he key to the institutional system of the
nineteenth century lay in the laws governing the market economy”.4
The market economy, then, was the primary institution of the growth and collapse of nineteenth
century civilization:
Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an
institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural
substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his
surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself, but
whatever measures it took impaired the self-regulation of the market, disorganized
industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet another way. It was this dilemma which
1
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forced the development of the system into a definite groove and finally disrupted the social
organization based upon it.5
The Great Transformation and the Double Movement
Polanyi’s argues, then, that the expansion of the self-adjusting market disembedded the economy
from society, in effect, “crowding out” the non-market aspects of society, thereby making it
necessary for society to take protective measures, in effect, to reimbed the economy in society.
These two developments constitute what Polanyi refers to as the “double movement”. Of course,
Polanyi’s description of nineteenth century civilization necessarily involves institutions, including
the foundational “self-regulating market”, and he credits laws governing the market economy as
the key to this institutional system. In effect, he seems to assume that the market economy of the
nineteenth century, as what he describes as an “institution”, involved other institutions or
institutional mechanisms, such as laws and the state.
If the “stark utopia of the self-adjusting market”, governed by laws and the state, could not obtain
“for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society”, the liberal
amelioration of the effects of the “great transformation” into modern industrialized civilization,
like that transformation itself, may have been a gradual escalation of measures to protect society,
rather than a single event or even series of events. This interpretation is fortified by his admission
that the market economy of that time was governed by laws, promulgated by the state, and perhaps
otherwise, with the result that it was not entirely self-adjusting at all: at most, its self-adjustment
was affected, and perhaps even significantly affected, by external laws, putting the extent, and
even existence, of its self-adjustment into question.
In making these claims, Polanyi claimed that “the role played by markets in the internal economy
of various countries, it will appear, was insignificant up to recent times”6. As noted previously,
this seems to significantly overstate the claim. We have considered above the position that the
concept of “market” engages a continuum of “marketness”.7 Further, the extent of market type
activity in economic activity in different historical epochs and locations is subject to some
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contestation and, it is argued below, according to recent scholarship, may have been much greater,
even in ancient times, than recognized previously, including the time at which Polanyi was
writing.8
Perhaps more defensibly, in his seminal article, “The Economy as Instituted Process”,9 Polanyi
argued that markets have dominated economic behaviour in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
to a much greater extent than at any time previously, and that before that time, other allocative
systems not grounded in economizing behaviour were much more prevalent.10 This is a more
empirically defensible claim.
Further, as mentioned below, that claim appears grounded on Polanyi’s description of the
“commodification” of “noncommodities”, meaning by that term, “artificial commodities” or
“fictitious commodities”, which he identifies as land, labour, and capital, during the period from
the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. That claim, that the fictitious
commodities became the subject of market transactions to which they were not previously subject
at all (strong form thesis), or to a much greater extent than previously (weak form), may be invoked
in aid of his claim that the nineteenth century saw the dominance of the market institutions over
other institutions in society.
Substantive Economics, Formal Economics, and Their Relation to Society
In that article, Polanyi distinguishes between two different senses of the term “economic”, saying
that “the substantive meaning of economic derives from man’s dependence for his living upon
nature and his fellows. It refers to the interchange with his natural environment in so far as this
relates in supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction.”11 What Polanyi describes
as the “substantive meaning” hearkens back to Aristotle and the discussion of the private/public
distinction that appears above, referencing, in particular, Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas.
The concept of “householding” discussed there involves the difference between production for use
and production for sale or exchange (although the two are not exclusive and may be engaged in by
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a party at the same time). By engaging in householding, man may provide for many, but perhaps
not all, of his material wants.
Because Polanyi acknowledges that man depends for his living not only upon nature but also upon
his fellows, all “substantial” economic issues must involve a social, as well as a “natural” element.
His economic man is an innately social being. The logical consequences of this social description
of man, as opposed to the liberal atomistic concept of man, as expected, are highly significant. The
satisfaction of an individual’s material wants not only include, but is highly dependent upon, joint
or social action. It is not only upon nature, but also upon his fellows, that man depends for his
“living”, for the means of “living” or, more simply, “to live”.
We may say that, for Polanyi, the consequent interchange by man with his “natural environment”
is not only an interchange with “nature” but also with “his fellows”. In fact, it could be argued that
the society of others is part of man’s “natural environment”. Polanyi’s man has associative or
affiliative impulses and is not a purely atomistic individual seeking his own livelihood. Instead,
each individual is dependent, in part at least, upon other individuals for the satisfaction of material
wants. He also seeks to satisfy his non-material wants, which may be taken to include the favour,
affection, regard, or respect of others. This recalls the natural condition of man posited by Thomas
Hobbes and Adam Smith, as discussed above, which acknowledges these social impulses, contrary
to popular conceptions of their work. As noted previously, such social impulses are perceived by
Freudian psychiatry to be a dominant influence on behaviour.
Polanyi differentiates between the “substantive” and “formal” meanings” of economic, saying that
the “formal meaning of economic derives from the logical character of the means-ends
relationship, as apparent in such words as “economical” or “economizing”. It refers to a definite
situation of choice, namely, that between the different uses of means induced by an insufficiency
of those means. If we call the rules governing choice of means the logic of rational action, then we
may denote this variant of logic, with an improvised term, as formal economics.”12 Indeed, he
maintains that the “two root meanings of “economic”, the substantive and the formal, have nothing
in common. The latter derives from logic, the former from fact. The formal meaning implies a set
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of rules referring to choice between the alternative uses of insufficient means. The substantive
meaning implies neither choice nor insufficiency of means”.13
Polanyi claims that the substantive meaning of economics engages the laws of nature and the
physical and social conditions of livelihood, while the formal meaning, involving, as it does,
constructing relationships of means to ends, engages the laws of the mind, so that the two meanings
could not be further apart.14 Polanyi asserts that “only the substantive meaning of “economic” is
capable of yielding the concepts that are required by the social sciences for an investigation of all
the empirical economies of the past and present. The general frame of reference that we endeavor
to construct require, therefore, treatment of the subject matter in substantive terms.”15 In particular,
he says that “the current concept of economic fuses the “subsistence” and the “scarcity” meanings
of economic without a sufficient awareness of the dangers to clear thinking inherent in that
merger.”16
Polanyi’s use of language may be unhelpful here. If the word “satisfactional” is substituted for
“subsistence” and the word “teleological” for “scarcity” in this quotation, a different, arguably
better, sense of its meaning appears. In those senses, satisfactional (i.e. substantive) economics
describes the identification, concatenation and hierarchical organization of one’s materials wants,
while teleological, or technical (in a non-pejorative sense, as in the sense of art, the Greek root
word, techne) describes the process of attainment of those wants. Perhaps a better solution is to
confine the use of the word “economic” to the substantive one, and to use the word “economizing”,
as Polanyi does in the quotations above, for the technical aspect, even if this may have some
assumedly “market” historical intendment.
Historical Investigation of the Place of the Economy in Society
Polanyi argues that the task of economic history, is to conduct “an investigation of all the empirical
economies of the past and present”. This task is in itself an empirical one, considering evidence,
generating hypotheses and testing them. It is also one of considerable breadth and scope. Further
comment on this point appears below, however, for the present, it may be noted that this sort of
empirical investigation is methodologically discrete from one which consists primarily of
13
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intellectual ratiocination conducted by logical inference, considering assumptions which may or
may not have factual relevance. For Polanyi, formal economics employs formal logic to seek a
rational solution where the means are insufficient, without choice, to accomplish the desired ends.
It seeks to construct a programme of rational action given those assumptions.
Polanyi says, in effect, that the organization of man’s livelihood in price-making markets, which
involved man in choices induced by an insufficiency of means, eliminated in practice the
distinction between substantive and formal economics. He finds that this had adverse
consequences in the social sciences (other than economics), since “the anthropologist, the
sociologist or the historian, each in his study of the place occupied by the economy in human
society, was faced with a great variety of institutions other than markets, in which man’s livelihood
was embedded.”17 Yet, he says, the problem of the economy in society required use of analytical
method devised for a specific form of the economy involving specific market elements.
Polanyi seems to be arguing that the specificity or particularity of the means of analysis required
to examine markets, in effect, precluded the application of other means of analysis to markets, and
the dominance of markets in human society thereby also precluded analyzing institutions other
than the market except by use of market-focused means of analysis. Polanyi, however, tends to
focus attention on what he considers to be the market-dominated economy of the late eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries. Accordingly, his arguments concerning institutional analysis may be
considerably influenced by that perspective.
One may observe that a “study of the place occupied by the economy in human society”, if not
intrinsically empirical, leans in that direction in a way that a consideration of means-ends
relationships in conditions of scarcity does not (but, instead, leans in a logical, or, as Polanyi calls
it, an “analytical”, direction). However, the study of Polanyi’s “substantive economy”, of the ways
in which man gains his living from interaction with nature and his fellows, necessarily places that
economy in human society unequivocally and directly in a way in which logical analysis of how
to choose among scarce means to achieve ends does not.
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The Economy and Market Society
As discussed below, although Polanyi sought to explain empirical economies prevailing in
different historical epochs in terms of patterns or “forms of integration”, namely, reciprocity,
redistribution and exchange (the latter of which requires price-making markets),18 he found that
his contemporary economic and social theorists ignored empirical economies other than that
prevailing at that point in time, which was a market economy. Polanyi calls the artificial
identification of the economy with its market form, the “economistic fallacy”.19
As such, Polanyi claims that what he describes as “economic analysis” embraces this fallacy, as
this “discipline results from the application of formal economics to an economy of a definite type,
namely, a market system. The economy is here embodied in institutions that cause individual
choices to give rise to interdependent movements that constitute the economic process. This is
achieved by generalizing the use of price-making markets. All goods and services, including the
use of labor, land and capital are available for purchase in markets and have, therefore, a price; all
forms of income derive from the sale of goods and services – wages, rent, and interest, respectively,
appearing only as different instances of price according to the items sold.”20
Although Polanyi does not expressly say this, price-making markets facilitate the comparison of
goods and services that may be employed in vastly different ways. It enables consideration of the
relative “utility” expected to be derived from a sale by both parties to the transaction. The buyer
can compare the desirability to him, or, as we may say, the “desiredness” by him of various items,
while the seller can compare the desirability or desiredness of continued ownership of the item in
question with the acquisition and continued ownership of other items, which may be purchased by
application of the sale price of the first item to the purchase of the second.
Price-making markets also facilitate a relative or ordinal ranking of preferences by potential market
participants; it does this in a context in which not all preferences can be satisfied. As Polanyi
comments: “The general introduction of purchasing power as the means of acquisition converts
the process of meeting requirements into an allocation of insufficient means with alternative uses,
namely, money. It follows that both the conditions of choice and its consequences are quantifiable
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in the form of prices. It can be asserted that by concentrating on price as the economic fact par
excellence, the formal method of approach offers a total description of the economy as determined
by choices induced by an insufficiency of means. The conceptual tools by which this is performed
make up the discipline of economic analysis.”21
Market Society, Commodification, and Prices
As will be further explained below, Polanyi regarded as commodities “objects produced for sale
on the market”.22 As such, he says: “Labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities; the
postulate that anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically
untrue in regard to them. In other words, according to the empirical definition of a commodity they
are not commodities ... The commodity descriptions of labor, land, and money are entirely
fictitious.”23 Of course, Polanyi’s argument that a commodity is anything that is bought and sold
entails that it must have been produced for sale is obviously erroneous: at a minimum, it plainly
ignores production that exceeds the “use” requirements of the producer. However, it is also clear
that labour, land, and money are not “produced for sale” and, accordingly, are not commodities
(as defined) for that reason.
In the result, for Polanyi, the “commodification of non-commodities” results in their being
denominated in a market system by a price expressed in a medium of exchange (money) which
facilitates comparison with that of other commodities, which results in a prioritization of
preference by allocation of a scarce resource with alternative uses, namely, money. Polanyi
explains that “[o]utside of a system of price-making markets economic analysis loses most of its
relevance as a method of inquiry into the working of the economy”.24
On the other hand, “[t]he fount of the substantive concept is the empirical economy. It can be
briefly (if not engagingly) defined as an instituted process of interaction between man and his
environment, which results in a continuous supply of want-satisfying material means. Want
satisfaction is “material” if it involves the use of material means to satisfy ends; in the case of a
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definite type of physiological wants, such as food or shelter, this includes the use of so-called
services only.”25
Substantive Economics and Satisfaction
To summarize the gist of Polanyi’s distinction between formal economics and substantive
economics, we can say that his substantive economics considers man’s means of satisfying his
wants, whether material or otherwise, provided that such wants require material means to their
satisfaction; but if their satisfaction does not involve those material means, those wants do not
engage substantive economics. Those wants, however, may engage the other social sciences, not
in their “study of the place occupied by the economy in human society”26, but in their study, among
other things, of human non-material wants and their satisfaction and, presumably, the place of such
human non-materials wants and their satisfaction in human society.
Formal economics, though, according to Polanyi, involves choosing between means that are
themselves insufficient to accomplish all man’s desired ends. This insufficiency or scarcity is seen
most clearly in a market economy in which non-commodities, such as labour, are commodified,
and are thus treated as if they were commodities, and priced as such. This presents some
inconsistency with substantive economics, in which man’s gaining the means of satisfying his
material wants from an interchange with his physical and social environment is an end in itself,
and perhaps the most basic or most natural end.
Saying that each human depends for his or her living upon nature and his or her fellows, and that
this trait is universally shared, should not be understood as implying that the abnegation of the
wants, or even lives, of certain individuals effectuates commonly desired ends. Depletion of land,
labor or capital does not avail others of the means to attain their material ends, but, instead,
deprives them of certain of these means. This is seen most clearly in the foreshortening and
diminution of quality of life that Polanyi saw as attending the lives of many industrial workers.
The substantive economy, however, as we have noted, involves interaction among humans.
Polanyi says that social activities that form part of the process, may be called economic; institutions
whose activities concentrate on such activities may be called economic; and any components of
the economic process may be regarded as economic elements. He states that elements belonging
25
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to certain settings “can be conveniently grouped as ecological, technological or societal according
to whether they belong primarily to the natural environment, the mechanical equipment, or the
human setting.”27
Instituting the Economic Process
The empirical economy, then, involves social activities and elements of the human setting, in a
process of interaction, social and otherwise, that must be instituted in some manner. Polanyi
explains that “reduced to a mechanical, biological and psychological interaction of elements that
economic process would possess no all-round reality”, as the unity and stability of the economic
process depends upon the interdependence and recurrence of movements in the process which, in
turn, is affected by individual motives arising from societal conditions. He argues that it is those
motives and social conditions which cause “[t]he interacting elements of nature and humanity” to
form a coherent unit, a “structural entity that could be said to have a function in society or to
possess a history.”28
As we have noted previously, Polanyi argues here that humans institute a process of interaction
among themselves and with nature in order to achieve their motives in that environment, or in that
place and time. Hence, the institutional aspect of the substantive economy becomes critical,
because “[t]he instituting of the economic process vests that process with unity and stability; it
produces a structure with a definite function in society; it shifts the place of the process in society,
thus adding significance to its history; it centers interest on values, motives and policy. Unity and
stability, structure and function, history and policy spell out operationally the content of our
assertion that the human economy is an instituted process.”29
It is the instituting of the economic process that, according to Polanyi, accounts for its function
and importance within society. Economic activity is embedded in society and in social values,
motives and policy. As we have seen, such a conclusion is unsurprising, since, for Polanyi,
economic activity, in the substantive sense, implicitly includes social, political, and ideological
activity. He holds, therefore, that “[t]he human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in
institutions, economic and noneconomic. The inclusion of the noneconomic is vital. For religion
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or government may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary
institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves that lighten the toil of labor.”
Polanyi then explains that “[t]he studying of the shifting place occupied by the economy in society
is therefore no other than the study of the manner in which the economic process is instituted at
different times and places.”30 It may be inferred that this is the task of economic history for Polanyi,
or, perhaps, for economic sociology or, in a market economy, for sociology of markets. For him,
the study of the “manner in which the economic process is instituted” and the study of the “place
occupied by the economy in society” are profoundly interrelated, if not actually non-fungible,
activities. Needless to say, this represents a rejection of the fifth assumption or generalization of
classical and neoclassical economics discussed in the present chapter.
Patterns of Integration
For Polanyi, there are only a limited number of ways in which an economy acquires unity and
stability, which he calls patterns or forms of integration, and which may occur side by side, on
different levels, and in different sectors of the economy: “Empirically, we find the main patterns
to be reciprocity, redistribution and exchange. Reciprocity denotes movements between correlative
points of symmetrical groupings; redistribution designates appropriational movements toward a
center and out of it again; exchange refers here to vice-versa movements taking place as between
“hands” under a market system. Reciprocity, then, assumes for a background symmetrically
arranged groupings; redistribution is dependent upon the presence of some measure of centricity
in the group; exchange in order to produce integration requires a system of price-making markets.
It is apparent that the different patterns of integration assume definite institutional supports.”31
Noting that these same words are often employed to denote personal interrelations, Polanyi
observes that while it might seem that these forms of integration merely reflect aggregates of the
respective forms of individual behaviour, individual behaviour, even aggregated, does not produce
structures. Instead, individual behaviours can be integrated, he says, only by symmetrically
organized structures. In effect, Polanyi’s different “patterns of integration” require definite
institutional supports.32 For example, Polanyi says that “[o]nly in a symmetrically organized
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environment will reciprocative behavior result in economic institutions of any importance; only
when allocative centers have been set up can individual acts of sharing produce a redistributive
economy; and only in the presence of system-making markets will exchange acts of individuals
result in fluctuating prices that integrate the economy.”33
As noted previously in this work, research of early economies not then available to Polanyi has
demonstrated that a redistributive economy is connected with the rise of the state and its
establishment of regional and local centres for collection, allocation, and redistribution of various
products, facilitating emergence of a more highly developed economy.
Material and Non-Material Wants
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi suggests that satisfying non-material or social wants, which
does not involve the formal economy, is equally or even more important than satisfying material
wants, which do implicate the formal economy: “The outstanding discovery of recent historical
and anthropological research is that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in relationships. He
does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts
so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets.”34
Consequently, Polanyi rejects the assumption or generalization of classical and neoclassical
economics concerning the rational pursuit of self-interest by the atomistic individual. For him, the
value of material goods is purely instrumental, in terms of this end: “Neither the process of
production nor that of distribution is linked to specific economic interests attached to the
possession of goods; but every single step in that process is geared to a number of social interests
which eventually ensure that the required step be taken. These interests will be very different in a
small hunting or fishing community from those in a vast despotic society, but in either case the
economic system will be run on noneconomic motives.”35
Consequently, man’s social interests may include, but are not limited to, securing one’s livelihood,
the means of doing which may vary with Polanyi’s patterns or forms of integration. His explanation
of how a tribal society ensures survival recalls Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. In the tribal
society, the “individual's economic interest is rarely paramount, for the community keeps all its
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members from starving unless it is itself borne down by catastrophe, in which case interests are
again threatened collectively, not individually. The maintenance of social ties, on the other hand,
is crucial. First, because by disregarding the accepted code of honor, or generosity, the individual
cuts himself off from the community and becomes an outcast; second, because, in the long run, all
social obligations are reciprocal, and their fulfillment serves also the individual's give-and-take
interests best.”36
In such a tribal society, in which, as one might say, Polanyian man depends not only on nature,
but also upon his fellows for his survival and well-being, motivations of a “give-and-take” nature
coalesce with motivations of a social nature, with the result that “[s]uch a situation must exert a
continuous pressure on the individual to eliminate economic self-interest from his consciousness
to the point of making him unable, in many cases (but by no means in all), even to comprehend
the implications of his own actions in terms of such an interest.” 37
Regularly sharing food from the tribe’s catch, from its food cultivation, and from other activities
reinforces the priority of communal interest, as opposed to self-interest, encourages
industriousness, and the application of high levels of skill in pursuit of common objectives, creates
a perception of fairness, reduces or eliminates jealousy, and encourages prestige-generating
generosity, including the “performance of acts of exchange by way of free gifts that are expected
to be reciprocated though not necessarily by the same individuals”. Polanyi says this makes “any
other behaviour than that of utter self-forgetfulness simply not pay. Personal character has little to
do with the matter. Man can be as good or evil, as social or asocial, jealous or generous, in respect
to one set of values as in respect to another… The human passions, good or bad, are merely directed
toward noneconomic ends.”38
Of course, the categorization of such goals as “noneconomic” may be criticized, in view of
Polanyi’s own terminology, which would seem to characterize such behaviour, instead, as being
“substantively economic”, since it relates to the satisfaction of material and non-material wants.
Yet surely he is correct when he says that such a situation does not involve the economic motives
of individuals; instead “the economic system is, in effect, a mere function of social organization.”39
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Social Interests, Social Influences, and Patterns of Integration
Considering some of the earliest societies of which we are aware, then, social interests, as well as
personal interests, underpinned reciprocity as a pattern of integration. Clearly, in such societies,
individual behaviour cannot be described cogently as atomistic, but, instead, must be considered
to exhibit significant social and collective motivations. Reciprocity often involves family and
kinship. Polanyi cites the example of the Trobriand Islanders of Western Melanesia, where the
sustenance of the family, other than its male head, is the responsibility of their matrilineal relatives,
and where the male head of the family is motivated to deliver the finest part of his crop, not for
immediate material benefit, but to preserve his own reputation.40 He indicates that this was one of
the most elaborate exchange networks known to man.
Polanyi says that case provides an example of redistribution, in which the chief receives and stores
a substantial share of all the island’s produce. “But as all communal activity centers around the
feasts, dances, and other occasions when the islanders entertain one another as well as their
neighbors from other islands (at which the results of long distance trading are handed out, gifts are
given and reciprocated according to the rules of etiquette, and the chief distributes the customary
presents to all), the overwhelming importance of the storage system becomes apparent.
Economically, it is an essential part of the existing system of division of labor, of foreign trading,
of taxation for public purposes, of defense provisions.”41
As this example indicates, Polanyi considered that reciprocity, redistribution and exchange were
not historical developments in which economic behaviour ascended to higher levels, but, instead,
that a society could display each of these patterns of integration simultaneously, even in modernity.
The Market Economy, Commodification, Prices, and the Model of Man
The social elements of reciprocity and redistribution are largely absent, however, from Polanyi’s
characterization in The Great Transformation of the market economy as instantiated from and after
the Industrial Revolution, although he observes that such patterns of integration became more
prevalent as society sought to curtail the most extreme adverse effects of that system:
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A market economy is an economic system controlled, regulated, and directed by market
prices; order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating
mechanism. An economy of this kind derives from the expectation that human beings
behave in such a way as to achieve maximum money gains. It assumes markets in which
the supply of goods (including services) available at a definite price will equal the demand
at that price. It assumes the presence of money, which functions as purchasing power in
the hands of its owners. Production will then be controlled by prices, for the profits of those
who direct production will depend upon them; the distribution of the goods also will
depend upon prices, for prices form incomes, and it is with the help of these incomes that
the goods produced are distributed amongst the members of society. Under these
assumptions order in the production and distribution of goods is ensured by prices alone.42
Unlike reciprocity and redistribution, which assumed that individuals would have material and
non-material wants and would want to satisfy some or all of them, acting individually or
collectively, but in a manner that acknowledged others, group dependence, and social norms,
values, objectives, and institutions, the self-regulating market form of exchange of classical and
neoclassical economists posits a different view of human nature. In it, individuals function
atomistically and rationally with the objective of achieving maximum monetary gains.
Self-Regulating Markets
Accordingly, says Polanyi, “there are markets for all elements of industry, not only for goods
(always including services) but also for labor, land, and money, their prices being called
respectively commodity prices, wages, rent, and interest.” He means to suggest that thereby all
factors of input are priced in the market and he indicates that in such a case “all incomes derive
from sales on the market, and incomes will be just sufficient to buy all the goods produced.”43
This commodification of non-commodities has been discussed above. Polanyi argues that the state
is assumed not to have any role with respect to all such commodities, not interfering with the
formation of markets; or with “the adjustment of prices to changed market conditions-whether the
prices are those of goods, labor, land, or money.” Although markets must exist for all elements of
industry, “no measure or policy must be countenanced that would influence the action of these
42
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markets. Neither price, nor supply, nor demand must be fixed or regulated; only such policies and
measures are in order which help to ensure the self-regulation of the market by creating conditions
which make the market the only organizing power in the economic sphere.”44
Self-Regulating Markets in History
In these passages, Polanyi summarizes many of the assumptions of classical and neoclassical
economics, as a prolegomenon to showing that such a market has never obtained historically.
Polanyi argues that the very concept of a self-regulating market divorces its economy from the
social and political spheres, saying that a “self-regulating market demands nothing less than the
institutional separation of society into an economic and a political sphere. Such a dichotomy is, in
effect, merely the restatement, from of view of society as a whole, of the existence of a selfregulating market.”45 Thus, for Polanyi, “self-regulating” means that society and the polity “leaves
the economy to itself” or “leaves the economy alone”, as we might say.
While any society requires “a system of some kind which ensures order in the production and
distribution of goods”, Polanyi says that this does not require the existence of economic institutions
separated from social institutions; instead, “normally, the economic order is merely a function of
the social order. Neither under tribal nor under feudal nor under mercantile conditions was there,
as we saw, a separate economic system in society. Nineteenth-century society, in which economic
activity was isolated and imputed to a distinct economic motive, was a singular departure.”46
Polanyi overstates the point, in our view, as we have noted previously. While the extent of the
dominance of markets was probably more extensive in the nineteenth century than in previous
times, there is now considerable evidence (admittedly, not all of it available to Polanyi) that market
economies or economies in which the operation of markets were economically significant obtained
even in ancient times.
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Markets, Embeddedness, and the Double Movement
In a famous passage, and one worth quoting in its entirety, Polanyi argued that the extent of market
dominance as a pattern of integration and the commodification of non-commodities presented
difficulties that were almost insuperable:
Social history in the nineteenth century was thus the result of a double movement: the
extension of the market organization in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied
by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones. While on the one hand markets spread all over
the face of the globe and the amount of goods involved grew to unbelievable dimensions,
on the other hand a network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful
institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to labor, land, and money.
While the organization of world commodity markets, world capital markets, and world
currency markets under the aegis of the gold standard gave an unparalleled momentum to
the mechanism of markets, a deep-seated movement sprang into being to resist the
pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy. Society protected itself against the
perils inherent in a self-regulating market system – this was the one comprehensive feature
in the history of the age.47
Polanyi maintains that such regulation, by society and the polity through the state, countered the
power of markets and protected society from the adverse effects of a self-regulating market system,
while operating as part of the double movement. He asserts that “[t]he road to the free market was
opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled
interventionism. To make Adam Smith's "simple and natural liberty" compatible with the needs of
a human society was a most complicated affair.”48
Polanyi differentiates the two elements of the double movement in terms of intentionality,
maintaining that “[w]hile laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate State action,
subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way. Laissez-faire was planned;
planning was not.”49 Polanyi obviously intends his choice of words to emphasize his point. He
argues that “[l]iberal writers like Spencer and Sumner, Mises and Lippmann offer an account of
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the double movement substantially similar to our own, but they put an entirely different
interpretation on it”, seeing the self-regulating market as utopian and its cessation by way of
protectionism as “a mistake due to impatience, greed, and shortsightedness, but for which the
market would have resolved its difficulties.”50 Polanyi’s analysis of the double movement led him
to conclude that “[u]ndoubtedly, our age will be credited with having seen the end of the selfregulating market”, as well as the demise of liberalism as the “basic organizing principle in
society”.
Of course, the non-commodity affected most adversely by the attempt to allow markets to regulate
themselves, was labour, and the market most adversely affected was the labour market. Polanyi
concluded that “[t]o separate labor from other activities of life and to subject it to the laws of the
market was to annihilate all organic forms of existence and to replace them by a different type of
organization, an atomistic and individualistic one.”51 As discussed extensively, the concept of man
as atomistic and individualistic accords with classical and neoclassical economic theory. Polanyi
is critical of both that theory, its application, and the implications of both.
Commodification, and Fungibility, of Labour, Land, and Capital
Polanyi asserts, in effect, that in order to commoditize labour, it was necessary to create a labor
“product” that was homogeneous, and fungible, and, in consequence, exchangeable. That labour
“product” had to be discrete and separate from other competing products. Some of these objectives
were achieved, he says, by creating (or attempting to create) an atomized and individualistic person
as product.
While classical liberal theorists often started their deliberations with the solitary, atomistic
individual, Polanyi argues, instead, that such perspective was the result of liberal economics,
whose principle of freedom of contract facilitated such scheme of destruction. “In practice this
meant that the noncontractual organizations of kinship, neighborhood, profession, and creed were
to be liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual and thus restrained his freedom
[of contract].”52 Instead of not interfering with freedom of contract, he asserts that economic
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liberals interfered, not with contract as such, but to “destroy noncontractual relations between
individuals and prevent their spontaneous reformation.”53
Without taking issue with this description or characterization of the process of organizing labour
for mass industrial production, we may admit that there is at least this element of truth in his
description of the result: whether as a result of industrialization or otherwise, family and
community ties and obligations were subordinated as rural workers moved to urban environments
to work in factories and other industrial and commercial undertakings, thereby reducing the
familial and community supports available during relocation and employment disruption or
cessation.
Polanyi is, of course, critical of the consequences of the commodification of labour, as he is with
the commodification of capital and land. “Traditionally, land and labor are not separated; labor
forms part of life, land remains part of nature, life and nature form an articulate whole. And is thus
tied up with the organizations of kinship, neighborhood, craft, and creed – with tribe and temple,
village, guild, and church.”54 This Elysian and antiquated relationship ended with what he
describes as “One Big Market”, in which markets exist for all the factors of production. Because
those factors are “indistinguishable from the elements of human institutions, man and nature, it
can readily be seen that market economy involves a society the institutions of which are
subordinated to the requirements of the market mechanism.”
This perspective may be considered to be just as utopian in respect of land as in respect of labour.
One might argue with some cogency that the impairment of organizations of rural life was a
consequence, not of the commodification of labour, but of the movement of agricultural and other
rural workers to the cities as increased mechanization of agricultural production reduced the labour
force required to work the land.
Equally well, however, there is some truth to the assertion that the increased mobility of the labour
force and the alternative to agricultural work provided by the prospect of employment in factories
and other work places in the cities reduced the prominence of rural organizations, sometimes, as
Polanyi observed in other situations, without providing suitable means for the amelioration of the
adverse effect of such shifts, such as establishing industrial guilds and unions, and religious and
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community organizations. In effect, the means of ameliorating the social disruptions occasioned
by the self-regulating market required societal responses that were often not put in place for some
time after the disruption transpired.
Significance of Markets in the Modern Era
In an important article, “Markets and Other Allocation Systems in History: The Challenge of Karl
Polanyi,”55 Douglass North concluded: “The stubborn fact of the matter is that Polanyi was correct
in his major contention that the nineteenth century was a unique era in which markets played a
more important role than at any other time in history. Polanyi, not only argued convincingly that
economic historians have overplayed the role of markets in ancient economies, but argued with
equal force that the market was a declining ‘transactional mode” of the twentieth century as
well.”56 The present work has suggested that recent research, in economic history and otherwise,
has demonstrated that markets were more significant in ancient economies than was thought when
Polanyi and even North were writing.
Nonetheless, Polanyi’s argument that the importance of markets declined in the twentieth century
is, at the present time, relatively non-contentious. This decline of the significance of markets
concomitantly reduces the importance of the analysis of such markets. North argues: “To the extent
that economic theory was confined to the analysis of markets, the tools of the economist were not
only irrelevant to an understanding of the ancient world, but were increasingly less useful to
explain the evolving economies of the twentieth century as well. Moreover, Polanyi’s concepts of
reciprocity and redistribution, however imprecisely specified, clearly have characterized and
continue to characterize a great deal of resource allocation. Economic historians have not even
begun to account for such non-market allocative systems, and until they do, they can say very little
about societies in which markets had very limited allocative effects.”57
North draws attention to the presence of reciprocity and redistribution in modern societies
providing welfare and other social benefits to their members. This is consistent with Polanyi’s
argument that his “transactional modes” may obtain simultaneously in a society. North points out,
further, that “[w]hat gives Karl Polanyi’s challenge a force not found in other scholar’s criticism
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of the economist’s tools is that he offers an alternative analytical framework to account for past
and present institutional organization. Polanyi maintains that reciprocity and redistribution were
the dominant “transactional modes” in past societies, and, increasingly, characterize economics in
this century as well. These allocative systems were not based on economizing behavior, but can
only be understood in terms of in-depth studies which are cultural, social, and psychological.”58
Polanyi might say that reciprocity and redistribution, as patterns of integration, are characteristic
of “substantive”, although not necessarily “formal”, economics. They are also, of course,
inextricably linked to underlying social relations. As noted above, Polanyi maintained that “man’s
economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships”59 and, when considered in connection
with reciprocity and redistribution, the “economic system, is, in effect, a mere function of social
organization”.60 Reciprocity involves family and kinship, while redistribution generally involves
an authority figure and is, therefore, territorial.61 Polanyi explains that “reciprocity helps to
safeguard both production and family sustenance.”62 He also provides numerous examples (some
mentioned above) which demonstrate that “redistribution also tends to enmesh the economic
system proper in social relationships.”63
North maintains that reciprocity and redistribution, like markets, were important elements not only
of all previous, but also of all modern, societies, as maintained by Polanyi. “But the point goes
much deeper than even Polanyi realized, and poses a fundamental problem to the economist and
economic historian. How do we account for substitutes for price-making markets of which
families, firms, guilds, manors, trade unions, cooperatives, etc. are organizing institutions which
allocate resources in place of markets. Most fundamental of all, how do we explain government?”64
From North’s perspective, the task of economic history is not only explaining the rise of economic
institutions and activities, but also explaining the origins of institutions generally, or, at least, those
which are organizing institutions of alternative economic activity, which he seems to agree
includes reciprocity and redistribution. North says: “These substitutes for markets not only have
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dominated exchange in past societies, but do so today as well. Without a theoretical explanation
for these allocative institutions, the new economic historian has little to contribute to an
understanding of the past, and contemporary economists can explain less and less about the
contemporary economic scene.”65
Although North faults Polanyi as failing to account for changes in, and in the mix of, these
allocation systems over time, he allows that it “was Karl Polanyi’s intuitive genius that he saw the
issues”.66 Much more than that, however, he provided a cogent argument for the inseparability of
economic and social life.
Conclusion
Polanyi’s analysis has often been summarized as critical of an analysis of economic institutions
that is disembedded from society as a whole.67 However, the position maintained here is that
Polanyi’s criticism is more properly directed to analysis that disembeds economic activity from its
overall social, political, ideological and otherwise broader context. This has implications for the
analysis of economic institutions, including business entities, customs and laws.
Leaving to one side whether Polanyi’s analysis of the pervasiveness of markets in the late
eighteenth century and in the nineteenth century presents excessive claims, Polanyi makes a highly
persuasive argument that economic, social, and political life do not occupy distinct and
independent spheres but, instead, each should be considered to be co-present in an undifferentiated
sphere of human life generally.
At least, his arguments cogently support the proposition that a model of the economy which does
not include the social and political life of the society in which the economy is situate, including
the institutions relating to such life, seems to lack explanatory and predictive power and capacity
and, accordingly, that such model is inadequate as a model for regulation of the economy, the
modern business corporation, and other business entities.
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MARK GRANOVETTER’S EMBEDDEDNESS
The Importance of Social Relations
Mark Granovetter’s seminal 1985 article “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness”68 drew heavily on the work of Karl Polanyi and on Dennis Wrong’s influential
1961 article “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology”.69 Granovetter says
that “[m]uch of the utilitarian tradition, including classical and neoclassical economics, assumes
rational, self-interested behavior affected minimally by social relations, thus invoking an idealized
state not far from that of these thought experiments. At the other extreme lies what I call the
argument of "embeddedness": the argument that the behavior and institutions to be analyzed are
so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous
misunderstanding.”70
The immediately preceding chapter concentrated on the subject of analysis and methodology; and
this chapter concentrates on the subject of the independence of the economy as posited by classical
and neoclassical economics, as compared with the interdependence of the economy and society,
as maintained by others. As was the case in the previous section of this chapter, two lenses, being
embeddedness, and the nature of man, will focus the discussion below.
This section will illustrate both the similarities and the differences between Polanyi’s and
Granovetter’s concepts of embeddedness. As will be seen, both engage a perspective on the nature
of man which differs, as Granovetter noted in the preceding paragraph, from that of classical and
neoclassical economics. Both conceptions of embeddedness assume that economic and other social
behaviours are integrated, rather than completely differentiated.
As noted previously, Granovetter maintains that most social scientists and historians considered
that economic behaviour was “heavily embedded in social relations in premarket societies but
became much more autonomous with modernization”, thereby seeing the economy “as an
increasingly separate, differentiated sphere in modern society, with economic transactions defined
no longer by the social or kinship obligations of those transacting but by rational calculations of
Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness” (1985) 91:3 American
J Sociology 481.
69
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individual gain” to such an extent that, “instead of economic life being submerged in social
relations, these relations become an epiphenomenon of the market.”71
Thus, as a matter of first impression, it can be seen that Granovetter’s view has considerable
affinity with Polanyi’s perspective. Certainly, both contrast their perspectives with of classical and
neoclassical economics. Granovetter opines that the level of embeddedness of economic behaviour
has always been and continues to be more substantial than is allowed for by economists but lower
in nonmarket societies than claimed by some “substantivists and development theorists” in
anthropology and sociology.72
The Undersocialized Man of Economics and the Oversocialized Man of Sociology
Granovetter commences his discussion “by recalling Dennis Wrong's 1961 complaint about an
"oversocialized conception of man in modern sociology" – a conception of people as
overwhelmingly sensitive to the opinions of others and hence obedient to the dictates of
consensually developed systems of norms and values, internalized through socialization, so that
obedience is not perceived as a burden...a conception…[that] resulted in large part from Talcott
Parsons's recognition of the problem of order as posed by Hobbes and his own attempt to resolve
it by transcending the atomized, undersocialized conception of man in the utilitarian tradition of
which Hobbes was part.”73
As previously discussed, the Hobbesian problem of order is, of course, the question of how men
become tractable to social order or, as Dennis Wrong says, become “capable of the guidance by
social norms and goals that makes possible an enduring society”.74 According to Granovetter,
Parsons’s recognition of the embeddedness of actors in social context supplied “the crucial factor
absent from Hobbes's thinking”, but Wrong “warned of exaggerating the degree of this
embeddedness and the extent to which it might eliminate conflict”, in effect, warning against
adopting an oversocialized conception of man.75
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As to economics, Granovetter argues that “[c]lassical and neoclassical economics operates, in
contrast, with an atomized, undersocialized conception of human action, continuing in the
utilitarian tradition,…. [whose] theoretical arguments disallow by hypothesis any impact of social
structure and social relations on production, distribution, or consumption…[i]n competitive
markets [in which] no producer or consumer noticeably influences aggregate supply or demand
or, therefore, prices or other terms of trade.”76
Granovetter considered such hypotheses and arguments as inadequate. Instead, he adopted Albert
Hirschman’s characterization of such markets as “idealized…, involving as they do "large numbers
of price-taking anonymous buyers and sellers supplied with perfect information...[who] function
without any prolonged human or social contact between the parties” with the result that ‘[u]nder
[such] perfect competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstration or mutual
adjustment and the various operators that contract together need not enter into recurrent or
continuing relationships as a result of which they would get to know each other well ."77
We have previously criticized the atomized conception of human nature of classical and
neoclassical economics in our discussion of the fourth, immediately preceding, assumption.
Granovetter takes a somewhat similar position. He argues that in classical and neoclassical
economics social relations between economic actors have been treated, even by Adam Smith, as a
fictional drag that impedes competitive markets78 and that it is assumed “that social atomization
is prerequisite to perfect competition”.79
Undersocialized and Oversocialized Concepts of Atomistic Man
Granovetter notes, as we have done, that both undersocialized and oversocialized views of human
nature conceive of man as atomized, in respect of both action and decision. “In the undersocialized
account, atomization results from narrow utilitarian pursuit of self-interest; in the oversocialized
one, from the fact that behavioral patterns have been internalized and ongoing social relations thus
have only peripheral effects on behavior. That the internalized rules of behavior are social in origin
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does not differentiate this argument decisively from a utilitarian one, in which the source of utility
functions is left open, leaving room for behavior guided entirely by consensually determined
norms and values – as in the oversocialized view.”80
Although the cause of the atomization differs, both undersocialized and oversocialized accounts
atomize and abstract actors from the immediate social context, for example, “in Hobbes's
Leviathan, in which the unfortunate denizens of the state of nature, overwhelmed by the disorder
consequent to their atomization, cheerfully surrender all their rights to an authoritarian power and
subsequently behave in a docile and honorable manner; by the artifice of a social contract, they
lurch directly from an undersocialized to an oversocialized state.”81
According to Granovetter, modern economists who attempt to take account of social influences
generally adopt an oversocialized view, in which the influences of society on individual behavior
“are rather mechanical: once we know the individual's social class or labor market sector,
everything else in behavior is automatic, since they are so well socialized. Social influence here is
an external force that, like the deists’ God, sets things in motion and has no further effects – a force
that insinuates itself into the minds and bodies of individuals… altering their way of making
decisions.”82
Granovetter emphasizes that social influence is not considered to operate subsequently; instead,
social influences are assumed to be pre-set attitudinally ab initio, as it were, and do not arise
otherwise. As such, course, it is assumed that social influences are not subject to change.
Consequently, “in actual decision situations, [the individual] can be atomized as any Homo
economicus, though perhaps with different rules for decisions. More sophisticated (and thus less
oversocialized) analyses of cultural influences… make it clear that culture is not a once-for-all
influence but an ongoing process, continuously constructed and reconstructed during interaction.
It not only shapes its members but also is shaped by them, in part for their own strategic reasons.”83
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Curiously, this argument maintains, in effect, that society influences individual behaviour by
socializing the individual so as to behave in accordance with a certain role or certain roles; and
that once that role and related behaviour are assigned to the individual, other possible types of
individuation, whether in terms of past, present, or future circumstances, can safely be ignored for
practical purposes. In this way, subsequent to role assignment and inculcation, the individual, and
the behaviour of the individual is just as monadic and atomized as is assumed in classical and
neoclassical economics.
The Atomism of Role-Determined Behaviour
One may say, as does Roy Weintraub with respect to economics,84 that this oversocialized
conception posits a mechanistic view of human behaviour as entirely determined by role and
position, seeking rules as in the “hard” sciences, such as mechanics and physics. Such a
mechanistic view may be considered to be contrary to experience. Further, as we have argued
previously, an atomistic and deterministic analysis of economic and other social behaviour cannot
be expected to involve or adequately take into account associative or affiliative motives and
behaviour.
In that sense, Dennis Wrong’s “oversocialized” conception of man is rather less “oversocialized”
than “over-roled” (not “overruled”) in the sense that it involves less a social conception of man
than a conception of man as an enactor of social “roles”. Yet, as soon as one recalls that “roles”
are merely “ideal types” derived from empirical observations of real world behaviour, one can see
the weakness in the reasoning. Summarized simplistically: the characterization of the general is
derived from observations of the particular to derive roles that are seen as enacted in behaviour,
and then the general, the role, is considered to be determinative of the behaviour of individuals
seen as enacting or performing the particular role. All of the history, historicity, and individuality
of the individual is eliminated in the process of abstracting the behaviour of particular individuals
to “role” behaviour, and then the decontextualized behaviour assigned to the generalized “role” is
expected to determine instantiations of particular behaviour of human individuals in the real world.
As we know, though, individuals are constantly negotiating their individual identities: firstly, in
particular contexts; secondly, against the background of competing roles and functions; and,
E Roy Weintraub, “Neoclassical Economics” in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, by David R Henderson,
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thirdly, in accordance with the salience they accord to particular claims on their personal identity
(which we may call their “social identities” as such may obtain from time to time.85 Without
investigating those matters further here, as we do in Chapter Four, we may agree with Granovetter
when he says that “[a] fruitful analysis of human action requires us to avoid the atomization
implicit in the theoretical extremes of under- and oversocialized conceptions. Actors do not behave
or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them
by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at
purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations.”86
As indicated by the names assigned by Wrong and Granovetter, we may agree that neither of these
conceptions of man assigned the proper weight to man’s social relations nor, we would suggest, to
the psychology, personality, and values of individual purposive actors.
The Oversocialized Concept of Man in New Institutional Economics
Granovetter also criticizes as undersocialized the account of new institutional economics (NIE),
which he describes as “a loosely defined confederation of economists with an interest in explaining
social institutions from a neoclassical viewpoint,”87 who adhere to the “general story…that social
institutions and arrangements previously thought to be the adventitious result of legal, historical,
social or political forces are better viewed as the efficient solution to certain economic problems.”88
He gives the example of clever institutional arrangements that make it too costly to engage in
malfeasance and which are considered to have arisen to discourage that practice, such as elaborate
implicit and explicit contracts which do not produce trust, but are a functional substitute for it.
On the other hand, NIE may be considered to be assigning an economic “role” to social institutions
which “role” is then seen as being enacted and instantiated subsequently. It might be argued that,
as is the case with respect to human behaviour (in which excessive role orientation is considered
to be “oversocialized” in its account), treating institutional behaviour solely as a function of its
economic role might also be considered as “over-roled” or “over-institutionalized”. In that sense,
the account of new institutional economics may be considered as excessively prioritizing the
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economic “roles” or functions of institutions, just as oversocialized conceptions of man
excessively prioritize role behaviour with respect to individuals.
Granovetter criticizes the conceptions of NIE theorists as undersocialized “in that they do not allow
for the extent to which concrete personal relations and the obligations inherent in them discourage
malfeasance, quite apart from institutional arrangements.”89 He asserts that “[t]he embeddedness
argument stresses instead the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or "networks") of
such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. The widespread preference for
transacting with individuals of known reputation implies that few are actually content to rely on
either generalized morality or institutional arrangements to guard against trouble.”90
As we noted in relation to the fourth assumption, Granovetter also considers whether “generalized
morality”, an implicit agreement to certain kinds of regard for others,91 prevents malfeasance,
distrust, and disorder. He concludes that “[d]isorder and malfeasance do of course occur also when
social relations are absent… [although] the presence of such relations inhibits malfeasance. But
the level of malfeasance available in a truly atomized social situation is fairly low; instances can
only be episodic, unconnected, small scale. The Hobbesian problem is truly a problem, but in
transcending it by the smoothing effect of social structure, we also introduce the possibility of
disruptions on a larger scale than those available in the "state of nature." 92 The latter observation
claims that the low level of social interaction in a “truly atomized social structure” contains
negative interactions: in effect, as we have argued previously, atomized individuals may engage
in “fights” but lack the social capacity to conduct “wars”.
Granovetter claims that “[t]he embeddedness approach to the problem of trust and order in
economic life, then, threads its way between the oversocialized approach of generalized morality
and the undersocialized one of impersonal, institutional arrangements by following and analyzing
concrete patterns of social relations. Unlike either alternative, or the Hobbesian position, it makes
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no sweeping (and thus unlikely) predictions of universal order or disorder but rather assumes that
the details of social structure will determine which is found.”93
The other example with which Granovetter deals at length is the matter of hierarchy and markets,
when, in effect, economic activity is organized within a firm or hierarchical structure, rather than
in markets, as explicated by Oliver Williamson in his 1975 book Markets and Hierarchies and in
his later articles.94 Discussion of this matter will await our consideration of assumptions of
corporate law and corporate governance concerning the nature of the firm.
Granovetter summarizes the approach of the new institutional economists by saying that “the main
thrust of the "new institutional economists" is to deflect the analysis of institutions from
sociological, historical, and legal argumentation and show instead that they arise as the efficient
solution to economic problems. This mission and the pervasive functionalism it implies discourage
the detailed analysis of social structure that I argue here is the key to understanding how existing
institutions arrived at their present state.”95
Granovetter argues, instead, that the analysis of economic institutions should focus on the social
relations in which economic life is embedded96 and on economic action “as a special, if important,
category of social action.”97 It can be seen that such an argument is, at least on its face, broadly
consistent with Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness.
POLANYI AND GRANOVETTER COMPARED
Polanyi and Granovetter initiated separate intellectual trajectories with respect to embeddedness.98
They are compared and contrasted in two useful articles to which reference will be made here, one
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by John Lie from 1991,99 and the other by Greta Krippner and Anthony Alvarez from 2007.100 It
will be convenient to consider them in reverse order.
Granovetter’s Atomism and Polanyi’s Non-Autonomous Economy
Krippner and Alvarez argue that “embeddedness takes on two aspects of the neoclassical paradigm
– atomism and the analytically autonomous economy – that are logically joined when viewed
through the prism of neoclassical economics but become not only distinct but actually
incommensurable problems within the context of sociology”.101 As noted in our discussion of
analytical methodology in relation to the fourth assumption, they argue that Polanyi and
Granovetter each concentrate primarily on only one aspect of embeddedness: Granovetter on the
role of atomism, and Polanyi on the problem of the analytically autonomous economy, although
these are “indistinguishable within the neoclassical paradigm.”
According to them: “An atomistic perspective, that is, a perspective that assumes isolated, selfinterested actors who arrive on the scene already equipped with an inborn tendency to “truck,
barter, and exchange,” requires essentially no governance structure to police exchange. In such a
world, there is no opportunity for fraud, collusion, corruption, or vice of any kind, hence no need
for government meddling in the economy. With the assumption of atomism, we are therefore in
the world of the self-regulating market—a world in which politics and culture enter into the market
only as an interference and in which the economy can legitimately be described as an analytically
autonomous sphere.”102 These are, of course, the subjects considered in this and in the preceding
chapter.
Naturally, this distinction is a matter of emphasis only, and is arguably considerably less
pronounced than Krippner and Alvarez suggest. As we have discussed, both authors engage with
both concepts, however, they place greater weight on one or the other, just as Krippner and Alvarez
indicate. Indeed, the present author would maintain that Granovetter concedes the separation of
the two spheres, the economic, and the social-political-cultural, whereas Polanyi maintains that it
is the market that has forced a “formal”, but not a “substantive”, separation between the two
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spheres. For Polanyi, such a separation is logically impossible, and hence unsustainable, even
theoretically.
Interior and Exterior Relationships Between the Economic and the Social
Krippner and Alvarez maintain, instead, that Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness “involves
identifying relational bases of social action in economic contexts… [while that of] Polanyi, in
contrast, concerns the integration of the economy into broader social systems. These are not the
same problem. They invite different strategies of analysis and involve different assumptions about
the nature of the underlying reality that these analytical strategies purport to describe. In particular,
we argue that Granovetter’s conception of embeddedness puts forward what we call an exterior
relationship between the economic and the social, whereas Polanyi’s elaboration of the concept
posits an interior view of this relationship. In the former case, social relations shape economic
outcomes from the outside; in the latter case, the social and the economic are seen as mutually
constituting.”103
The posited exteriority of Granovetter’s relationship of the economic and social spheres and the
posited interiority of Polanyi’s characterization of the relationship of those spheres has the logical
results described in the previous sentence; alternatively, these relationships and results may be
seen as endogenous, if not actually tautologous. It is significant, however, that, according to these
commentators, at least, the “embeddedness” of both Granovetter and Polanyi deny the categorical
distinctiveness of the existence and identity of the social and economic spheres.
As we have observed previously, and as previously explicated by Dennis Wrong, the atomistic
perspective on man pervades classical and neoclassical economics, as well as certain schools of
sociology. Krippner and Alvarez explained that:
Granovetter noted an ironic convergence between neoclassical economics and many
sociological accounts of economic behavior: Both traditions share in common an atomistic
perspective on social life. For neoclassical economics, atomism inheres in the assumption
that economists’ models are peopled by self-interested, rational actors who carry fully
formed preference rankings in their heads and make maximization decisions in isolation
from other social actors. With respect to sociology, Granovetter discerned an analogous
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kind of atomism in the tendency lingering from the discipline’s Parsonian past to rely on
internalized norms or values to explain behavior. As Granovetter noted, because social
behavior is essentially prescripted by norms or values in these accounts, the details of social
structure are irrelevant in explaining any given outcome. Thus, neoclassical economics and
sociology represent undersocialized and oversocialized conceptions of social action,
respectively.104
We have previously remarked on the atomistic perspective shared by neoclassical economics and
Parsonian sociology. That subject is reviewed in more detail in the next chapter. In effect,
Granovetter uses the language and approach of neoclassical economics and new institutional
economics to frame and debate the issues, for example, in relation to trust, and to markets and
hierarchies. He may thereby be disenabling himself from challenging the atomistic perspective at
its most basic level, that of motivation and gratification of non-material needs.
Krippner and Alvarez, on the other hand, argue, to the contrary that “[i]mplicitly or explicitly,
purveyors of the Granovetterian view of embeddedness reject the existence of Homo Economicus:
The self-interested, maximizing agent who makes decisions in isolation from other agents is little
more than a fiction. This is not to say that self-interest is not a motivator in economic life, nor that
individuals do not attempt to maximize utility, narrowly or broadly conceived...What this
perspective rejects is the notion that there is some pure, invariant motive driving human behavior:
Because motivations inhere in social relations, and because relations are by their very nature
multipurpose, motivations are likely to be mixed. More to the point, it is appropriate to think of
social relations, rather than the set of motivations (mixed or otherwise) produced by these relations,
as causal. Primacy is given to the context of social action.”105
Polanyi’s Historicization of the Market Economy in Modernity
Krippner and Alvarez emphasize that Polanyi’s analysis is historical, rather than methodological.
Rather than attacking the utilitarian assumptions, including the atomistic or methodological
individualism, discussed in the next chapter, Polanyi sees economic man in an almost evolutionary
sense, as acquiring those attributes in response to historical and institutional developments. As
104

Supra note 98 at 223.
Ibid at 227 [emphasis in the original], citing Mark Granovetter, “Problems of Explanation in Economic Sociology”
in Nitin Nohria & Robert G Eccles, eds, Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action (Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1993) 25.
105

1064
indicated in this work, the characterization of man assumes great importance in social and
economic thought.
Krippner and Alvarez comment on this only indirectly, saying that “Polanyi did not so much reject
as attempt to historicize the self-interested, maximizing agent. For Polanyi, this emanation of
classic liberalism was realized at least in part during the nineteenth century in Western, especially
British, society. As such, Polanyi’s critique of neoclassical economics was not that neoclassical
theory offers a decontextualized account of economic behavior; it was rather that economists
falsely generalize conditions that are approximately true in the nineteenth century (and to a lesser
extent, the twentieth century, although Polanyi observed the grip of liberalism loosening through
the New Deal reforms of mid-century) to periods in which they do not apply. Economists are able
to commit this logical fallacy because they naturalize the type of economy that they observe in
their own society; the (historically specific) institutional bases of Homo Economicus are
obscured.”106
Krippner and Alvarez thus may be understood to suggest that economic man, the self-interested
maximizing agent, was a creature of historical circumstance; in effect, that this characterization of
human nature was referable to particular circumstances and points in time. They may be
understood as arguing that such characterization described human nature as then and there
instantiated. Alternatively, it may be that economic man represented an ideal type consonant with
circumstances then prevailing.
We have suggested, however, that the historicization by Polanyi posited by Krippner and Alvarez
related to Polanyi’s “formal” and not his “substantive” economy. While Polanyi himself argued
that the differences between the two were obscured in late nineteenth century society, he certainly
argued that the real or substantive economy could not, for very long, be disembedded from society.
Polanyi’s focus on that particular period of history should not be allowed to obscure his larger
argument, which, to the present author, is that real or complete disembedding is a logical, but not
a realistic or empirical, possibility. As Krippner and Alvarez acknowledge, Polanyi attempted to
point out that in premodern economies, there was no economy in the sense that there was no
separate institutional sphere in which the substantive task of securing a living was accomplished,
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as there was, albeit, he thought, temporarily, in more modern societies in the nineteenth century.107
This prompted Polanyi to say that “[i]nstead of the economy being embedded in social relations,
social relations are embedded in the economic system.”108 This, in turn, may have affected his
characterization of human nature in terms of the economic man.
Economic Action and Social Relations
Again, with respect, Polanyi’s epigrammatic observation seems to unnecessarily overstate the
position that he wants to maintain. He seems to be constructing an ideal typology that would not
and could not obtain in reality. Surely, his comment is meant to suggest that in the modern selfregulating market economy, social relations are, to a significant degree, subordinate to, and
governed by the economy, rather than the reverse.
Krippner and Alvarez reference Fred Block’s argument that, because it is only an ideal type,
“Polanyi’s disembedded economy never really comes into existence; it is a utopian fantasy on the
part of market liberals. To be sure, strenuous efforts are made on behalf of this vision, and society
does pitch toward the market pole. But the automaticity (and necessity) of the response means that
social protections, typically safeguarded by the state, are built into the very foundation of market
society. As Block argues, the economy is always embedded; the self-regulating market is a
theoretical impossibility.”109 They also observe that “in an important sense, the whole notion of
fictitious commodities—which require continuous state action to function as commodities—places
the state inside the market”.
On the other hand, Krippner and Alvarez maintain that Granovetter insists that all economic action
is intrinsically related to social action, which approach leaves intact the notion of an analytically
autonomous economy, a notion which is so much criticized by Polanyi.110 We have suggested that
Granovetter himself sees economic activity as embedded in dense social relationships but as
notionally distinct from that social sphere, which makes his critique of what Polanyi calls
“economic analysis” less potent than it might otherwise have been.
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Krippner and Alvarez argue that “[s]cholars working in the Granovetterian tradition document the
myriad ways in which social relations leave their imprint on business relations, shaping economic
outcomes in ways that run counter to the expectations of economic theory…But perhaps most
notable here is what is shared with the neoclassical perspective: Social relations affect the economy
from the outside. To be sure, these social relations are ubiquitous rather than marginal, and their
effects are seen as generally positive rather than as generating inefficiencies, but in both cases an
exterior relationship is posed between the economic and the social. In this sense, it is not surprising
that theorists writing in the Granovetterian tradition often seek to complement or extend
neoclassical models rather than overthrow them.”111
They say that this is not the case with Polanyi, says Lie, since “[f]or Polanyians, the notion that
markets could exist outside of state action is simply inconceivable. This is not a matter of some
markets being more or less social than others…nor is it a matter of the state simply setting the
context for market transactions. Rather, as Block argues, the state’s management of fictitious
commodities places the state inside the market. This is an interior relationship of the economic and
the social, and the metaphor of embeddedness here references the internal articulation of
extraeconomic forms (e.g., a system of labor regulation) to market exchange.”112
Historical Construction of Markets
As we have indicated here, the social construction of markets can readily be observed, at least from
the present historical perspective. As noted in the present work, Polanyi did not have available to
him certain information concerning the operation of markets in ancient societies, and was,
accordingly, unable to identify and trace the development of market type activity over millennia,
as is much more possible at the present time. Accordingly, he could not compare the situation
which he describes in the century between 1750 and 1850, the period of the “great transformation”,
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as involving the dominance of the self-regulating price-making market, against previous
instantiations of market activity in previous periods, extending back as far as some thousands of
years. Such an examination might have resulted in a greater rigour in his consideration of markets
and, in particular, their social construction or embeddedness.
This view is supported by the analysis of John Lie in his 1991 article “Embedding Polanyi's Market
Society”113 in which he argues that Polanyi “leaves the core concept of the market unchallenged”,
such that “[d]espite his embeddedness thesis, market exchange remains a disembedded
concept.”114 Lie proposes, and said, that “all economic activities and institutions are embedded in
social relations” including markets, which are “historically variable social organizations
constituted by traders”.115
As we have suggested, part of the problem in undertaking this analysis is that it necessarily depends
upon an examination of historical data, some of which was not available to Polanyi. That, in turn,
becomes highly significant for his theory of embeddedness, due to the parameters of his
methodology. As Lie says, his “goal is to study the place of substantive, or empirical, economy in
society, to investigate how economic actions and institutions are embedded in matrices of
noneconomic movies and institutions”.116 This meant that he did not proceed from prevalent
assumptions, as did classical economists, including that of the rationalist atomistic individual.
Empirical Methodology, Investigation, and Analysis
Instead, Lie says “Polanyi implicitly adopts a realist epistemology, in contrast to the positivism of
neoclassical economic theory [which] seeks to uncover relationships among variables, such as
supply and demand, which are given as universal categories [and whose]…"scientific" model is
classical mechanics, which is deductive and anticontexual.”117 Thus, “neoclassical economics
postulates the universality of utility-maximizing action” as an “overarching theory of human
behaviour applicable to all times and places”, independent of context, such as motives and
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institutions, which are, instead, “dismissed as frictional variables” and, like other non-economic
variables, are banished “to the dustbin of the other social sciences.”118
Polanyi apparently considered that the construction of theories or hypotheticals in advance of
observation was unlikely to have significant explanatory power. Instead, Polanyi’s methodology
accorded primacy, of time and of importance, to observation. As John Lie indicates, “Polanyi
eschews abstract models in favor of institutional analysis. This strategy stems from his belief that
no logic of means-ends schema exists independent of context. Because ends are bound up in
preexisting institutional arrangements, it is necessary to explicate institutions involved in
economic activities. In short, he favors an inductive (or empirical) over a deductive approach, and
institutional analysis over methodological individualism.”119
In support of this observation, Lie cites Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson, to the effect that “[t]o
employ a metaphor, the facts of the economy were originally embedded in situations that were not
in themselves of an economic nature, neither the ends nor the means being primarily material. The
crystallization of the concept of the economy was a matter of time and history. But neither time
nor history have provided us with those conceptual tools required to penetrate the maze of social
relationships in which the economy was embedded. This is the task of what we will here call
institutional analysis.”120
Indeed, as noted above, Polanyi did investigate non-market economies, employing a comparative
and historical approach, finding that “the particular combination of variables assumed to be
universal for classical for neoclassical economists rarely occurs”.121 Lie argues that “Polanyi
castigates attempts to use categories derived from the particular institutional context of market
economy to study nonmarket economies”, quoting Polanyi’s dictum that "[t]he economistic
fallacy…consists in a tendency to equate human economy with its market form".122 However, Lie
118
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maintains that Polanyi underscores the uniqueness of the contemporary market economy, quoting
him as saying: "While history and ethnography know of various kinds of economies, most of them
comprising the institution of markets, they know of no economy prior to our own, even
approximately controlled and regulated by markets".123
We should observe, in passing, that Polanyi admits here that most known economies involved the
institution of markets, as well as other forms of integration, namely, reciprocity and redistribution.
That leads to the logical conclusion that markets, at least in such economies, must have been
socially constituted or embedded. In turn, that suggests, as does this quotation, that it is the extent
of the dominance of markets, rather than their presence, that is distinctive of the “disembedded”
economy of the nineteenth century. However, as Lie also argues, Polanyi does not himself
investigate the nature of non-dominant markets to any significant extent but concentrates his
discussion, instead, on the period of dominant markets.
Non-Market Patterns of Integration and the Market
As previously discussed, Polanyi develops his own nonmarket categories of economies, which he
calls “patterns of integration”. Lie describes these as empirical, rather than logical categories,
saying: “The crux of Polanyi's argument is that the first two of these forms of integration,
reciprocity and redistribution, are inextricably related to underlying social relations. Reciprocity
is bound up in friendship, kinship, and other social ties. It therefore refers to horizontal ties of
exchange, primarily among individual or group actors. A gift relation, for instance, denotes
"reciprocity".”124
Lie explains of the second form of integration, “[r]edistribution, on the other hand, is underlaid by
political and religious factors and, therefore, denotes vertical ties of exchange. Administered trade,
for example, involves "redistribution" since it is often undertaken by the state for political or
military reasons.”125 Lie quotes Polanyi’s explanation of how one or the other might arise, saying:
“Reciprocity, then, assumes for a background symmetrically arranged groupings; redistribution is
dependent upon the presence of some measure of centricity in the group; exchange in order to
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produce integration requires a system of price-making markets. It is apparent that the different
patterns of integration assume definite institutional supports.”126
All of these patterns of integration, including market exchange, are socially instituted. As Polanyi
says in the above quotation, the pattern of exchange requires a system of price making markets in
order to produce integration, and that system of price-making markets must be socially
constructed. Perhaps because, as Lie suggests, Polanyi saw the market as a “place” or, as posited
by neoclassical economists, as a “supply-demand-price mechanism” in a “market society”, Lie
concludes that “Polanyi's commitment to analyze "economy as instituted process" does not extend
to the large set of contemporary "market" economies. This seems to stem from his acceptance of
the neoclassical concept, which posits the market as an asocial and noncontextual entity and market
exchange as an asocial and noncontextual activity. He does not challenge the market concept itself.
Its implications are seen most strikingly in his influential argument on the rise of market
society.”127
Instead of explicating the concept of the market generally, as derived from an examination of its
instantiations in different places and times, Polanyi seeks to explain the origins of the market
society prevailing in his own place and time. Presumably, this is because he considered that market
society to be the one most dominated by markets, and, hence, concentrated his attention there. His
orientation, that is to say, is historical, but not historically comparative.
Polanyi found that the organizing principle of society in England was transformed during the
period from 1750-1850 from one in which the operation of the economy was subordinate to the
satisfaction of human needs to one in which “the organizing principle of a society” is one in which
“industry is based on the institution of a self-regulating market”.128 That transformation, however,
was not effected by means of the market alone, or even at all, for, as Lie says, “Polanyi views the
creation of the free market as a utopian experiment in social engineering. The effort to construct a
laissez-faire economy required active state intervention. He notes: "The road to the free market
was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and
controlled interventionism."129
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Market Society and the Role of the State
For Polanyi, says Lie, the market society of economic liberals was “a chimera, belief in which has
had catastrophic consequences”, making it all but inevitable that society would adopt protective
legislation “in order not to be, in its turn, annihilated by the self-regulating market”130, because
“[n]o society can withstand the dehumanizing effects of treating noncommodities as if they were
commodities.”131 One aspect of that dual movement, the protective reaction, was what John Ruggie
describes as a “social reaction against market reality”, in which as a result of the great
transformation, “land, labor and capital had all seized upon the state in the attempt to reimpose
broader and more direct social control over market forces.”132
It was, then, the interests of land, labour, and capital, all three of Polanyi’s “noncommodities” who
clamoured for protection, according to Ruggie. Ruggie claims that “this shift in what we might
call the balance between "authority" and "market" fundamentally transformed state-society
relations, by redefining the legitimate social purposes in pursuit of which state power was expected
to be employed in the domestic economy. The role of the state became to institute and safeguard
the self-regulating market.”133 This is the classic liberal perspective.
A contradiction is immediately apparent: if the role of the state in society is to institute and
safeguard the self-regulating market, how can that market be described cogently as self-regulating,
and not, at least partially, regulated by the state? Even if one concedes that the societal reaction of
state regulation somehow reimbeds or corrects the disembeddedness of the self-regulating market,
then it is the state, as a socially constructed institution, which causes the reimbedding or reverses
such disembedding. In effect, the possibility of such action alone may be seen as an admission that
the economy is never really entirely disembedded from its ambient society and polity.
Market Dominance and the Role of Society
While Polanyi seeks to explain this dominance of society by the market, and the reactions to it,
including Marxist and fascist reactions, this may have led him to neglect, to some extent, analysis
of the embedded nature of the market, in terms of institutions and processes, even in a situation of
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market dominance, which, in turn, might have led him to conclude that it was, in fact, the
embeddedness of the market, in that situation of market dominance, that led to societal reaction to
reduce that dominance and restrain its effects.
John Lie, who argues that Polanyi also erred in assigning the commodification of land, labour and
capital, and the rise of market society in England, to the period from 1750 to 1850, reaches a
similar conclusion. He states that “[b]y equating market with commodification, underlying forms
of organizing commodity exchange are rendered invisible. Polanyi's analysis neglects the historical
transformations and institutional diversity within which the commodification process occurred. In
short, qualitative changes appear as quantitative changes.”134
Polanyi, says Lie, focuses on the process of commodification, instead of the process of
institutionalization of the market, explaining which process would be useful with respect to
commodities, as well as with respect to what Polanyi considers to be noncommodities. “Thus,
Polanyi analyzes the rise of market society in terms of the process of commodification of
noncommodities, rather than as an instituted process among networks of individuals and
institutions. He provides little to guide investigators in distinguishing market exchange as a social
practice embedded in particular sites, with concrete actors, institutions, and technological and other
constraints.”135
Lie asserts that by treating the market as disembedded, Polanyi overestimated the significance of
market exchange in modern society and underestimated its importance in societies that were not
dominated by the market and which might be considered to be nonmarket societies. Lie alleges
that “because of his treatment of the market as a disembedded structure, Polanyi overemphasizes
the autonomous role of the state in explaining the rise of market society. The state exists as a social
organization, but the economy does not. Because the market is employed as a purely economic
category, its institutional effects are neglected and rendered as a part of the mysterious force of the
laissez-faire economy.”136 Lie says that Polanyi ignores the “social actors or social forces behind
the expansion of the market. Had he adopted his program for embeddedness and applied it to the
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market economy, he would have recognized social organizations and forces behind the
construction of the market economy as well as within the state.”137
When Polanyi concedes the social construction of the state, and assigns it a role in the rise in
market society and later in restricting the dominance of that market in society, an implication seems
to arise that market society is not or, even, is not ever entirely disembedded from society. However,
Polanyi does not quite adopt that perspective. It is almost as if Polanyi, who is prepared to consider
the development of economies at diverse places and times throughout history, somehow has
conceded entirely to neoclassical economics the analysis of economies dominated, as he thinks,
by markets in the modern era. Such an analysis by Polanyi would likely have been most interesting.
CONCLUSION
We have observed that contemporary economic theory generally assumes, albeit often tacitly and
implicitly, that the economy is distinct and operates separately from its ambient society and polity,
although somehow related to them. We have considered that assumption at length and have found
compelling reasons to reject it, on logical, methodological, and epistemological grounds.
More generally, we have found reason to substantially doubt and perhaps even to actually reject
the assumptions made by contemporary economic theory (“Contemporary Assumptions”)
concerning: (1) the separation of economic roles and functions from other functions in a given
society and polity: (2) the assignment of the economy to a “private” sphere of activity; (3) the
separateness and distinctiveness of that “private” sphere from separate and distinct from the
“public” sphere; (4) the distinctiveness of any appropriate analysis of the economy from the public
sphere, from society and from the polity; and (5) as stated in the preceding paragraph, the
distinctiveness and separate operation of the economy from the ambient society and polity.
Part 1 of this book considered the instantiations of legal theory and, in particular, corporate legal
theory, in certain leading modern corporate law jurisdictions. It also investigated whether, and if
so, to what extent, those corporate law instantiations could be demonstrated to be based upon, or
underlain by, certain assumptions and generalizations of classical, neoclassical, and other modern
economic theory. It was determined that the corporate law statutes examined did not appear, at
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least explicitly, and perhaps implicitly, to adopt any particular assumptions, including, for the
purposes of the present discussion, the Contemporary Assumptions.
Thus, notwithstanding the scope and scale of the discourse with respect to economic assumptions
and generalizations which might be applicable in the field of legal discourse, the applicability of
such economic assumptions and generalizations to the legal field, by way of statutes, regulations,
decisions, theorizing and otherwise, must be regarded as problematic. To restate, this is the case
inasmuch as such assumptions and generalizations are in many ways regarded by economists and
others as being somewhat problematic.
It is the contention of this work that an investigation of the Contemporary Assumptions insofar as
they concern the role of the modern business corporation as an economic, social and political actor
are likewise subject to substantial doubt and even perhaps ultimately, rejection. It is to those
assumptions that we now turn.
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SECTION B: ASSUMPTIONS OF CLASSICAL AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
CHAPTER B4:
ASSUMPTIONS OF CLASSICAL AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS PART A
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER AND CHAPTER B5
In accordance with the plan laid out in Chapter One, Part 1 and Appendix A of this book proceeded
by examining the essential attributes of the modern business corporation and investigating the
ways in which they were instantiated in modern corporate statutes; in effect “what” the modern
business corporation “is” today, as a matter of law. As such, it examined the ways in which the
corporation, as a single legal entity, could act extraneously, that is, “outside” or “in the real world”,
namely, by means of human actors who animate, vivify, enliven, or represent such legal entity.
Further, it considered means by which such animation, vivification, enlivening, or representation
of the legal entity could be effected by such human actors in terms of engaging structures,
processes and personnel suitable to such requirements; and the rights, duties, and responsibilities
appurtenant to the human actors “within” the corporate legal entity or, in effect, within its
organization, and by whom its actions are instantiated, as a matter of law and otherwise.
As indicated, Part 2 of this book, including Appendix A, considers the questions: Why this? How
did this come about? What significant influences can be identified that may have contributed to
the present stage of legal development and theorization of the modern business corporation? In
effect, these questions relate to the discourse and theorization of, and relating to, the firm, in
general, and the modern business corporation, in particular, and the situation of such entity or
entities in relation to the economy, the society, the polity, and the state in which such entity
appears.
Expressed, perhaps, more concretely, such discourse, theorization, and situation of the firm and
the modern business corporation addresses how the firm and the modern business corporation, as
a matter of law and otherwise, “fits” into the discourse and theorization of, and relating to, the
economy, the society, the polity, and the state; and, more particularly, what assumptions, common
understandings, perceptions, or methods of proceeding are imported from those discourses and
theorizations to those of the firm and the modern business corporation.
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The preceding chapters in this Appendix B have examined these matters and have established the
salience of the economy and of economic activity generally to the activities of the firm and to the
modern business corporation. They have also demonstrated that the notional separation of the
economy in the economic sphere of activity from the social, political, and statal spheres of activity
problematizes, but does not at all resolve, issues concerning the nature of such relationships. The
location of business actors solely within the economy and the economic sphere of activity, as
distinct from the social, political, and statal spheres of activity, has a similar problematical effect.
Nevertheless, discourse concerning the firm and, latterly, the corporation, has been significantly
influenced by economic discourse; and discourse concerning the firm and the corporation has also
been significantly influenced by assumptions (in the “everyday” or “common” sense not only of
premises or hypotheses, but also of beliefs, presumptions, and suppositions) proceeding from
economic discourse. Before considering the ways in which the firm or the corporation, as a legal
entity, may engage as an economic actor, this chapter will review what might be described as
conventional “assumptions” (in the broad colloquial sense just mentioned) of classical and
neoclassical economics.
PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS
In this connection, it may be useful to interrogate the purpose and methodology of economics and,
in particular, of economic theory. The discussion here is guided by Milton Friedman’s extremely
important article, “The Methodology of Positive Economics”,1 in which he sought to distinguish
between economics, considered as a positive science, and economics, considered as a normative
science.
Purpose of Economic Theory
In that regard, Friedman adopted the usage of John Neville Keynes in his book The Scope and
Method of Political Economy,2 describing economics as a positive science as “a body of
systematized knowledge concerning what is”, and describing economics as a normative or
regulatory science as “a body of systematized discussing criteria of what ought to be… an art… a
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system of rules for the attainment of a given end”; and commenting that “confusion between them
is common and has been the source of many mischievous errors”.3
Friedman, like Keynes, thus maintains that positive economics is, in principle, independent of any
ethical position or normative judgments; further, that its “task is to provide a system of
generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change
in circumstance”; and that its “performance is to be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity
with experience of the predictions it yields.”4 He argues that “[e]conomics as a positive science is
a body of tentatively accepted generalizations about economic phenomena that can be used to
predict the consequences of changes in circumstances.”5
The present chapter and the immediately following chapter investigate the “tentatively accepted
generalizations” of classical and neoclassical economics and considers the “precision, scope, and
conformity with experience” of their predictions. Such chapters thus treat social science generally,
and economics, in particular, in the manner advocated by Friedman with respect to positive
economics as a positive science.
Friedman’s earlier article concerning Alfred Marshall’s theory of demand, “The Marshallian
Demand Curve”,6 averted to Marshall’s statements that economic theory is “an engine for the
discovery of concrete truth”;7 that the “economic organon” introduces “systematic and organized
methods of reasoning”;8 and that the economist must pursue a “plan of interrogating facts in order
to in the manner of action of causes singly and in combination, applying this knowledge to build
up the organon of economic theory, and then making use of the aid of the organon in dealing with
the economic side of social problems”.9
Friedman says that Marshall’s conception of the purpose of economic theory differs from more
purely mathematical perspectives such as that of Leon Walras10. Averting to Marshall, Friedman
3
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says: “Economic theory, in this view, has two intermingled roles: to provide "systematic and
organized methods of reasoning" about economic problems; to provide a body of substantive
hypotheses, based on factual evidence, about the "manner of action of causes." In both roles the
test of the theory is its value in explaining facts, in predicting the consequences of changes in the
economic environment. Abstractness, generality, mathematical elegance - these are all secondary,
themselves to be judged by the test of application. The counting of equations and unknowns is a
check on the completeness of reasoning, the beginning of analysis, not an end in itself.”11
The present work examines the “body of substantive hypotheses” presented by classical and
neoclassical economic theory, in an attempt to assess the extent to which they employ “systematic
and organized methods of reasoning”; and to determine the extent to which such theory explains
facts and predicts “the consequences of changes in the economic environment”. In this regard, we
will follow Marshall, Keynes, and Friedman, rather than Walras.
Friedman criticizes Walras, saying: “Abstractness, generality, and mathematical elegance have in
some measure become ends in themselves, criteria by which to judge economic theory. Facts are
to be described, not explained. Theory is to be tested by the accuracy of its "assumptions" as
photographic descriptions of reality, not by the correctness of the predictions that can be derived
from it.”12 Friedman clearly considers such characterizations to be indicate some aberration of the
purpose of economic theorizing.
It should be emphasized that the present work does not adopt a Walrasian treatment of the
“assumptions” that are used in generating economic theory; instead, it considers the premises
adopted by, and common to, classical and neoclassical economics over time. In this sense, we are
examining more the content and results of economic theory over time, rather than the process of
its development. We are, in fact, examining what Friedman, describes as “economics as a positive
science”, as also identified by Keynes, meaning “a body of tentatively accepted generalizations
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about economic phenomena that can be used to predict the consequences of changes in
circumstances”.13
Methodology of Economic Theory
The performance of positive economics is, according to Friedman, “to be judged by the precision,
scope, and conformity with experience of the predictions it yields”14 Further: “Viewed as a body
of substantive hypotheses, theory is to be judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena
which it is intended to "explain." Only factual evidence can show whether it is "right" or "wrong"
or, better, tentatively "accepted" as valid or "rejected." As I shall argue at greater length below, the
only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.
The hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted ("frequently" or more often than
predictions from an alternative hypothesis); it is accepted if its predictions are not contradicted;
great confidence is attached to it if it has survived many opportunities for contradiction.”15
The evaluation of economic theory conducted in the present work adopts such perspectives. That
is to say, this work attempts to evaluate assumptions and generalizations of classical and
neoclassical economic theory by means of the “precision, scope, and conformity with experience”
of the predictions they yield or, in Friedman’s alternative formulation, by means of “its predictive
power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to ‘explain’.” To recapitulate, the
“assumptions” examined in the present work are not those attendant upon, or of, any particular
hypothesis in the course of scientific examination of the same; but are, instead, the generalized or
generalizable propositions to which assent is given by a significant proportion of those engaged in
discourse on the subject.
That is to say, it is acknowledged in this work that the procedure sought to be adopted in economic
theory or in economic research must often necessarily simplify propositions or facts by eliminating
certain propositions or facts that are not to be subjected to theoretical analysis or empirical
investigation. This is the case in other areas of research seeking to apply scientific methodology.
Friedman takes pains to point out that this may result in a lack of correspondence between the
assumed “facts” as posited by the investigator and the “facts” as observed by others; in part,
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because the investigator attempts to isolate the hypothesis and its relevant considerations from
others in the environment.
Friedman says: “One confusion that has been particularly rife and has done much damage is
confusion about the role of "assumptions" in economic analysis. A meaningful scientific
hypothesis or theory typically asserts that certain forces are, and other forces are not, important in
understanding a particular class of phenomena. It is frequently convenient to present such a
hypothesis by stating that the phenomena it is desired to predict behave in the world of observation
as if they occurred in a hypothetical and highly simplified world containing only the forces that
the hypothesis asserts to be important.”16 The elimination of circumstances considered irrelevant
to the hypothesis simplify it, and its testing, but, as Friedman suggests, this lessens the
correspondence with reality.
In this regard, Friedman stresses that there is no meaningful way in which a theory can be tested
by comparing its “assumptions” directly with reality. Complete "realism", he says, “is clearly
unattainable, and the question whether a theory is realistic "enough" can be settled only by seeing
whether it yields predictions that are good enough for the purpose in hand or that are better than
predictions from alternative theories. Yet the belief that a theory can be tested by the realism of its
assumptions independently of the accuracy of its predictions is widespread and the source of much
of the perennial criticism of economic theory as unrealistic.”17 Indeed, it is often the case that
assumptions, some or all of which may be counterfactual, are combined in order to determine
whether the particular combination posited might produce generalizable results, which may arise
not from the realism of the individual assumptions but, instead, from their combination.
Indeed, as Friedman says, generally “there is more than one way to formulate such a description –
more than one set of "assumptions" in terms of which the theory can be presented. The choice
among such alternative assumptions is made on the grounds of the resulting economy, clarity, and
precision in presenting the hypothesis; their capacity to bring indirect evidence to bear on the
validity of the hypothesis by suggesting some of its implications that can be readily checked with
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observation or by bringing out its connection with other hypotheses dealing with related
phenomena; and similar considerations.”18
The Example of Equilibrium Theory
One example of the assumptions or accepted generalizations of classical and neoclassical
economics is the general equilibrium model or theory. In an article provocatively entitled “The
Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The Emperor has No Clothes”, Alan Kirman
evaluates its broad acceptance in relation to broadly accepted scientific methodology. In this
regard, he states: “General Equilibrium Theory regarded by many as the summum of the 'grand
neo-classical synthesis' has throughout its development been systematically attacked by a wide
variety of critics from many different angles. Yet, curiously, these criticisms have been largely
ineffective and it would not be unfair to say that this theory still furnishes the basic foundations of
what many are pleased to call 'mainstream economics'. Indeed such theory as is used by practical
men to justify their economic recommendations is derived from this underlying framework, albeit
with unwarranted appendages.”19
Despite attacks on general equilibrium theory and other principles of classical and neoclassical
economics, Kirman says that there “seems to be a quiet confidence in the profession that we are
moving, if only slowly, towards a more scientific basis for economics. Indeed, many economists
seem persuaded that we are arriving at the point where the simplest criterion for a scientific theory,
that it generate empirically testable and falsifiable propositions is met.”20 He argues, then, that
economics at the end of the twentieth century was only on the cusp of developing a scientific
methodology.
As with the other assumptions or accepted generalizations that are reviewed here, such as
utilitarianism, general equilibrium theory may be considered as an elemental constituent of
classical and neoclassical economics. Kirman claims that “the fundamental underpinnings of
modern economic work and indeed of quantitative work is the general equilibrium model”.21 So
widely accepted is the general equilibrium model that Nobel laureate Robert M. Solow, in a review
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of the state of macroeconomics provocatively entitled “What Is a Nice Girl like You Doing in a
Place like This? Macroeconomics after Fifty Years”, concluded that “[t]he only complete
economics that was available to serve as a foundation for macroeconomics was Walrasian general
equilibrium theory. In practice, the demand for microfoundations was a demand that
macroeconomics should be built on Walrasian foundations.”22 He expressed the opinion that this
may ultimately be “an exercise in futility” as it continues to be “an exercise in straining
credulity”.23
Solow says that, although “[m]uch of our understanding of the operation of multiple-market
systems comes from the study of Walrasian economics… [t]here is no good reason to believe that
our world is Walrasian, or that it behaves from quarter to quarter or year to year like a Walrasian
economy, or that aggregating it somehow makes everything OK.”24 He maintains, however, that
the commitment to Walrasian general equilibrium theory has been so widely shared that “[t]he
most amazingly far-fetched assumptions have been invoked to induce a Walrasian economy to
exhibit behavior a little like the real world. Even so there is been no major empirical success.”25
As indicated, in order to provide a context for discussion of the firm and of the corporation,
respectively, as an economic actor, it is necessary to review certain major assumptions,
generalizations or common understandings of economics. The merits of this approach are
confirmed by the observations of Kirman and Solow just mentioned, and by identifying
inadequacies in certain of these assumptions, when assessed from the standpoint of scientific
methodology.
This review does not pretend to be, in any sense, definitive or exhaustive, either as to the subject
matter selected or as to the treatment of such subjects. However, an attempt has been made to
select for discussion, and to orient discussion towards, subject matters bearing on the modern
business corporation. This will include the subject matters of earlier chapters in Part 2 of this work
relating to relationships among the economy, the society, the polity, and the state. It will also
include the subject matters discussed later in Part 2, namely, the corporation as an economic actor.
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In each case, the relevant assumptions, generalizations, or common understandings will be
identified, briefly explained, some of the relevant criticisms identified, and some discussion, and
even some tentative conclusions, presented.
ASSUMPTION ONE – ATOMISTIC UTILITARIANISM
1. Statement
Mainstream, that is, classical or neoclassical, economics considers that atomistic individuals who
are motivated to seek their own good, satisfaction, or utility engage in economic activity to
maximize (or, in some later writing, optimize) their own good, satisfaction, or utility. This is said
to be true of all economic actors, whether they are consumers or producers. This view, or a variant
of the same, is fundamental to classical and neoclassical economics.
2. Explanation
Terry Moe suggests that the “textbook components of neoclassical theory”, such as the theory of
the firm and the theory of perfect competition, “have given rise over several decades to an
enormous, richly diverse body of economic theory that does address many of the obvious gaps in
the simple models themselves.”26 In effect, he argues that because the weaknesses and omissions
of many of the simple economic models “can often be handled within the broader neoclassical
framework”27, these cannot be regarded as criticisms of neoclassical theory more broadly.
In fact, Moe maintains that “the simple models of the core of neoclassical economics are ultimately
not so simple after all – and not so easily criticized – having been generalized to yield a complex,
highly varied body of theory.”28 This body of theory, he say, “is less a unified neoclassical theory
than a large family of diverse theories related by shared analytical foundations, chief among them:
a focus on an individual as the unit of analysis; the assumption of rational, utility-maximizing
behavior; a concern for efficiency, optimality and equilibrium; and a preference for constructing
theory by mathematical modeling over other approaches to theory construction.”29
It must be admitted, of course, that the finding that neoclassical theory is less a unified theory
“than a large family of diverse theories” presents challenges to constructing a statement, and later
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a critique, of neoclassical theory, in the present work, as well as otherwise. Moe’s observation
indicates that the analytical foundations mentioned are ones that may be regarded as commonly
accepted elements of neoclassical theory. This supports the merits of the present work in
proceeding to examine exactly those issues.
Of course, the elements identified by Moe are among the ingredients of the economic approach
outlined in the first paragraph of this section. We will consider some objections to this approach
in the next section. However, Moe claims that “[t]he most unsettling criticisms – from
behaviouralists, institutionalists, or Marxists, for instance – are those that challenge the
foundations that neoclassical theories generally share, for these point to deficiencies that may call
for shifts to new and perhaps markedly different theoretical approaches. Given the magnitude of
the edifice they threaten, it is little wonder that these alternative views have had a difficult time
attracting mainstream support or even serious attention.”30 Again, it is those “foundations that
neoclassical theories generally share” which are examined in the present work.
John Lie notes that “neoclassical economics… relies on the notion of atomized individuals who
maximize subjective utility”. 31 He quotes Hirschman to the effect that in the neoclassical vision
“there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstration or mutual adjustment and the various
operators that contract together need not enter into recurrent or continuous relationships as a result
of which they would get to know each other well.”32 Accordingly, “[t]he problem with neoclassical
economics is that it demarcates the economy as an arena within which social relations do not
matter.”33
The assumption that atomistic individuals seek to maximize their utility and the assumption that
perfect competition prevails, together permit a simple aggregation of supply and demand at various
price points and resulting in equilibrium. In their famous article “Existence of an Equilibrium for
a Competitive Economy”, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu credited Leon Walras with having
“first formulated the state of the economic system at any point of time as the solution of a system
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of simultaneous equations representing the demand for goods by consumers, the supply of goods
by producers, and the equilibrium condition that supply equal demand on every market. It was
assumed that each consumer acts so as to maximize his utility, each producer acts so as to
maximize his profit, and perfect competition prevails, in the sense that each producer and consumer
regards the prices paid and received as independent of his own choices.”34 These assumptions are
reminiscent of those identified by Terry Moe. However, Arrow and Debreu maintain that Walras
failed to demonstrate that such equations could be solved.
In effect, the simplicity of these assumptions rendered the theory readily amenable to aggregation
and quantification, and generation of an equilibrium. Arrow and Debreu explain that “[t]he basic
economic motivation in the choice of a consumption vector is that of maximizing utility among all
consumption vectors which satisfy the budget restraint, i.e., whose cost at market prices does not
exceed the individual's income…This economic principle must certainly hold for equilibrium
values of prices and of the profits of the production units.”35 The result, they say is that the supply
and demand for all commodities is determined as a function of price if as the price varies, the
producers and consumers behave as if the announced value the price were the equilibrium value.
Thus, “[t]he market for any commodity is usually considered to be in equilibrium when the supply
for that commodity equals the demand”.36
This classical and neoclassical relationship among supply, demand, and equilibrium does rely, of
course, on the assumption that rational atomistic individuals seek to maximize their own subjective
utility. Krippner and Alvarez comment that an “atomistic perspective, that is, a perspective that
assumes isolated, self-interested actors who arrive on the scene already equipped with an inborn
tendency to “truck, barter, and exchange,” effectively requires essentially no governance structure
to police exchange. In such a world, there is no opportunity for fraud, collusion, corruption, or vice
of any kind, hence no need for government meddling in the economy. With the assumption of
atomism, we are therefore in the world of the self-regulating market — a world in which politics
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and culture enter into the market only as an interference and in which the economy can legitimately
be described as an analytically autonomous sphere.”37
These classical and neoclassical assumptions have already been demonstrated in the preceding
chapters of this work to be, at best, highly problematic and, at worst, entirely fallacious. This work
has already examined the perspectives of Granovetter and Polanyi, which “provide a unified and
compelling assault on the neoclassical perspective” according to Krippner and Alvarez.38 We trust
that readers will agree with this.
The reference to the inborn tendency to “truck, barter, and exchange” is, of course, to Adam
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.39 Smith ascribes the division of labour to the “necessary, though
very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no
such extensive utility”; namely, “the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for
another.”40 This propensity, we would argue, might be motivated, at least in part, by associative
or affiliative, rather than simply economic, impulses. Such impulses, along with “other
propensities of human nature” are, except for rational utility seeking, ignored by the conventional
economic model.
This relatively simple exposition must suffice for the present; the individual components of this
generalization will be considered in more detail later in the chapter and in Part 3 of this work.
3. Criticism
a. Self-Interest as Motive to Action
The statement that individuals engage in economic action from a motive of self-interest in order
to attain their own utility or satisfaction is often considered tantamount to the assertion that all
action by individuals is motivated by self-interest. Indeed, when it is considered that some
commentators seek to characterize marital, family, and friendly relations and interactions as

37

Greta R Krippner and Anthony S Alvarez. "Embeddedness and the Intellectual Projects of Economic Sociology"
(2007) 33 Annual Rev Sociology 219 at 222.
38
Ibid.
39
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 1776. Vol 2, ed by RH Campbell &
AS Skinner (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981).
40
Ibid at Book 1, Chapter 2.

1087
motivated by self-interest, such an interpretation of the statement cannot be ignored. However, as
we have seen, even Adam Smith conceded that there were other non-economic motives for action.
Charles Perrow maintains that most economists assume that individuals maximize their own selfinterest.41 He criticizes the assumption that human nature is ruled only or primarily by self-interest
on the grounds that human nature “signifies primarily a lack of instinctual responses” which
“means humans are highly adaptive (as well as inventive and variable and so on).”42 He says that
if this is the case, “the setting in which interactions or contracts occur is the most important thing
to consider in explaining behavior” and that “[s]ome settings, or organizational structures…will
promote self-interested behavior, others will promote other-regarding behavior, and still others
will be neutral.”43 Perrow’s characterization of man as adaptive presents a different model of man
from that of classical and neoclassical economics, which model, may be expected to have quite
different consequences from the model of economic man.
Perrow concludes that the settings, or organizational structures, in which self-interested behaviour
is favoured are those in which: 1. continuing interactions are minimized; 2. storage of rewards and
surpluses by individuals is encouraged; 3. the measurement of individual effort or contribution is
encouraged; 4. interdependent effort through design of work flow and equipment is minimized; 5.
there is a preference for leadership stability and generalized authority; and 6. there are tall
hierarchies [by which he means hierarchies with many levels, based upon unequal rewards and
notions that coordination must be imperatively achieved].44 An adaptation towards behaviour
which is other than self-interested may, therefore, be expected in other settings or in other
organizational structures.
Of course, these are only exemplary of the criticisms advanced.
b. Desire and Satisfaction/Utility Distinguished
In a major study of the theory of demand and its realism and relevance, the eminent economist
Frank Knight observed that “[i]n scientific economics, of course, we are concerned only with the
quality of desiredness, without regard to any basis it may have in valuation in the higher sense or
41
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even to the "satisfaction" which may actually follow upon choice and action.”45 We also assume,
according to him, “that freedom in choice involves more than mere contingency or chance or
caprice, and ordinarily more than "arbitrary" thought and action.”46 The absence of such chance,
caprice, or arbitrariness does not, however, entail that the satisfaction of desire sought may follow
upon choice and action.
There may be many reasons for this, as a matter of logic and otherwise, including, we submit, the
following: the actor may mistake actual desire for something else, erroneously believing that he or
she desires something when this is not, in fact, the case; the individual may erroneously expect
satisfaction to ensue from satisfaction of desire; the individual may make a mistake as to the extent
or quantum of desire; the individual may make a mistake as to the extent or quantum of satisfaction
to be derived; because of timing differences, the pursuit of the desired object and its attainment
may entail that the elements expected to satisfy the individual’s desire are no longer present at the
time of attainment; the individual’s desires may change over time such that the attainment of the
relevant desire does not produce any satisfaction, or does not produce the expected quantum of
satisfaction; the individual’s prioritization of desires may change over time such that the attainment
of the desire produces less (or, alternatively, more) satisfaction, either on its own or in comparison
to other desires, than was originally anticipated; or, in the case of an instrumental desire, other
means have made it unnecessary or less necessary or appropriate, either on its own or in
comparison to other instrumental desires, than was originally the case, or may make it ineffective
in order to accomplish the higher order desire.
These are but some examples of possible causes of discrepancies between desire and satisfaction.
c. Determination of Desires
A useful criticism of the relationship between desire and utility is presented by Knight, who
considers the methodological problems with respect to the treatment of demand as the most
important and most difficult, “because it is here that behavior facts are most inseparably bound up
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with motivation and that objective data most imperatively call for interpretation by subjective facts
and meanings.”47
Knight discusses a treatment of demand and utility adopted by John R. Hicks, Evgeny Slutzky,
Henry Schultz, and others, which employs “a new psychology of consumption and a distinctive
treatment of the demand curve” based upon it48. He argues that this “new interpretation of
consumption is more relativistic than the conventional view, specifically that of Marshall, and is
adopted for the sake of greater objectivity. It has two aspects. The first is replacement of the
conception of "absolute" diminishing incremental utility (of a single good) with a diminishing
"coefficient of substitution" of one good for another, assumed to be a purely behavioristic
principle, or at least purely relative. The second aspect is a distinctive view of the relation between
change in income and change in the psychic state of the subject – his economic well-being.”49
Knight’s conviction is that these thinkers seem to compare the utility (which is taken as equivalent
to satisfaction), at least by way of diminishing marginal utility (roughly speaking, the principle
that more of a good at some point generates less satisfaction per unit than previously), of various
goods. This will be discussed further below. As to the second aspect of such theory, this posits a
relationship between income and actual satisfaction of desire, rather than simple desire itself. Of
course, taken in combination with the first point, it may be inferred that the marginal utility of the
purchase of more of the same good depends, at least in part, upon the total income available for
the purchase of that good and other goods.
Knight criticizes this, saying that such thinkers “have not been willing to follow through with a
behavioristic complete rejection of subjective magnitudes - or their reduction to the role of a
"force" impelling men to buy and consume and to compare and choose” and that such thinkers
“still think of the individual as controlling his consumption with a view to securing more rather
than less of something called "utility" - a subjective magnitude which is maximized when the
consumer's behavior conforms to the economic ideal. They merely insist that this somethingmaximized need not, and therefore should not, be treated as a quantity in the ordinary "cardinal"
meaning, but as only "ordinal," that is, utilities are subject to ranking but not to real quantification,
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which is identified with measurement.”50 It may be said, more generally, that the treatment of
demand in terms of desire and utility, whether by Marshall or by Hicks et al., is not adequately
explicated either in positive economics or in economic theory.
d. Desire or Utility and Choice or Substitution
Determining desire for a good or service is natural but intrinsically difficult, as Knight
demonstrates in his criticism of the theory of demand, since “[o]ur thinking about conduct must
conform to common-sense introspection and intelligible intercommunication, which always run in
terms of "reasons" for action or choice, meaning ends or motives. In the discussion of conduct we
cannot separate description from teleological interpretation - the "what" from the "why" in this
sense - what is done from what is achieved or expected to be achieved.”51 In effect, rationality is
assumed, not only in economics, but generally; as such, desires must often be justified by being
characterized as instrumental.
Appealing to common experience, Knight says that ruling out motive, which he considers to be
desire for things or their services or for experiences of “satisfaction”,52 from our conception of
human conduct “where everyone is directly aware of it in his own experience and has the most
certain knowledge of its reality and others”53 would be extremely arbitrary. However, “[t]here is a
special reason (motive!) against admitting motive into the interpretation of economic choice, in
that choices do not seem to correspond accurately with motives. This is true with respect to other
persons, and also of one's own choices, viewed with detachment or from a later point in time. This
discrepancy is partly a matter of error in choice itself and partly one of error in the assignment of
motives, including one's own.”54
Desire does not always meet satisfaction. Ratiocination is not always or invariably successful.
Even one’s own motives may be imperfectly understood by oneself. Moreover, the phenomenon
of “economic choice” may admit of influences that are not entirely “economic” in nature. In
addition, as we have seen in connection with our previous discussion of desires, more than one
object or good can be the subject of desire by the same individual. As Knight says, “[i]t is also
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evident that the idea of economic value, or utility, always arises out of the necessity of choosing
between alternative "goods," more or less different in kind. The giving-up of an alternative good
is the meaning of cost.”55
Yet, according to Knight, economics deals with desires independently, such that “any one desire
or attraction is a distinct factor and the associated satisfaction an independent variable under any
actual conditions of choice. (However, discussion of the psychological effect of variation in the
consumption of a single good, under the condition that it is the only one consumed by the
individual, in place of reasonable ceteris paribus conditions, is one of the "classical errors" from
which theory needs to free itself.)”56 In this sense, the economic model of choice and substitution
lacks explanatory power.”57
e. Rationality
The rational choice paradigm of neoclassical economics was challenged by Herbert Simon, who
sought to model “how people think” and to “replace the conventional model of rational economic
man with an empirically adequate theory of individual choice”, as Terry Moe explains.58. He
continues: “At the heart of Simon's contribution is his model of bounded rationality… This model
recognizes that people are limited both in the information and knowledge they possess and in the
computational skills they bring to bear in making choices. Thus, they cannot engage in the kind of
informed optimization attributed to economic man, nor can they engage in the kind of decision
making under uncertainty that information economists and game theorists have subsequently
developed. Instead, boundedly rational individuals "satisfice." This mode of choice, in turn, leads
them to behave in a routine, myopic, but reasonably adaptive manner.”59
While these concepts will be discussed in more detail below, it is noted here that the “bounding”
or “limiting” of rationality has consequences. As Perrow explains, “even where self-interest is
encouraged by the context of behavior, humans (1) do not have clear utilities to maximize, (2) do
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not have much of the information needed to maximize utilities, and (3) do not know of cause-effect
relations regarding maximization.”60 Bounded rationality, in effect, relates to making choices
based on the best available information and expectations, including the relationships between one’s
desires and the means of achieving the same, the likelihood of attaining such desires, expectations
of the satisfaction or utility to be achieved from achievement of those desires, and comparable
information with respect to other desires and their prioritization by the individual as such and when
compared with alternative desires in respect of the matters just mentioned.
Knight says that we “know too much” about motives and behaviour, since “we have direct
knowledge, not only that motives are present but that they do not correspond with hypothetical
forces connecting behavior with its antecedent conditions. Their operation disrupts the uniformity
of sequence. In the first place, action rarely leads to exactly the intended result, because it is always
affected by error, which also is of several kinds. And, beyond this fact, ends are never really given.
Actual desires are partly a matter of curiosity - the urge to explore giving rise to the paradox of
expected surprise as an important element in motivation.”61
We would maintain that the import of this argument is that desire is not necessarily, or only, for
the thing thought to be desired, but also involves a desire to determine if the thing thought to be
desired really is desired. This is separate, according to Knight, from “the problem-solving interest,
the quest of the "right" answer to some question, which it is a sheer contradiction to treat as an end
given in advance. Well-being is largely of this nature, the answer to an unsolved problem, to be
sought through "intelligent" experiment.”62
When Knight says that “ends are never really given” and contrasts curiosity-seeking behaviour
and problem-solving behaviour, he draws attention to the fact that expectations of the satisfaction
or utility sought from the particular course of action may be quite different from that which actually
eventuates. This is not only because of inadequate information, limited rationality, variances
between expected profitability and the occurrence of events, and the prospect of error arising from
these and other sources, but because the satisfaction or utility derived cannot be estimated with
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any real certainty in advance. In consequence, the paradigmatic assumption or generalization of
economics cannot be sustained as a description of experience.
f. Atomism or Methodological Individualism
The assumption that atomistic individuals seek to satisfy their own desires or to maximize their
own utility, and do so completely independently and without any interaction with other such
individuals, has been challenged in the modern era by economists such as Coase and Simon, both
of whom develop quite different theories of economic organizations. Terry Moe characterizes this
difference by saying that “[f]or Coase, transaction costs lead optimizing individuals to prefer
hierarchy to markets. For Simon, uncertainty and limited cognitive capacity lead human decisionmakers to satisfice and thus to engage in highly structured behavior. Both approaches are
individualistic, anchored in economic models of choice, and characterized by the incorporation of
new elements whose value is suggested by empirical observation.”63 Moe says that “both argue
that the relative efficiency of hierarchy - and the explanation of organization - is due at base to
limitations, imperfections, and frictions that shape individual choice in consequential ways but are
omitted from the core neoclassical models.”64
Of course, Simon argued that individuals, who are, unlike economic man, only boundedly rational
instead of fully rational, express this by behaving “in a routine, myopic, but reasonably adaptive
manner”65. Routine behaviour and adaptive behaviour, Simon argued, counteract some of the
limitations of bounded rationality. It will be recalled that Perrow characterized man as highly
adaptive. That characteristic was not part of the model of “economic man”.
Another model which seeks to respond to the difficulties of atomistic individualism is the
organizational evolution or natural selection model set forth by Armen Alchian in his seminal 1950
article “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory”. In effect, Alchian treats individuals and
organizations as similarly adaptive in respect of their learning behaviour; that is to say, individuals
make choices about the structures, processes and behaviours of organizations that are expected to
be conducive to success.
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Terry Moe explains that in “a fundamental sense, Alchian's theory of economic organizations is
different from those of Coase or Simon. He disavows an explicit model of individual choice
(although it is clear he favors some sort of adaptive model), and he offers a system-level
explanation of organizational emergence, structure, and survival that is largely independent of
decision making at the micro level. His theory is not individualistic. Yet it is precisely this
independence of a distinct model of choice that ultimately renders it compatible with the
individualistic theories of both Coase and Simon, however different they might be from one
another, and that provides each of them with a new dimension of explanatory power.”66
Moe says that under Alchian’s logic of natural selection, “[w]hether individuals optimize under
uncertainty or satisfice under the more limiting conditions of bounded rationality, they make
choices about organizational structures, processes, and behaviors that may be far from objectively
efficient and that may vary widely across individuals and organizations”. Hence, “Alchian's logic
of natural selection, when grafted onto either approach, provides a powerful means of deriving and
integrating expectations about individuals, organizations, and systems.”67 This absence of
isomorphism with respect to organizations is considered to reflect differences in individual choicemaking.
Needless to say, quite apart from any theory of natural selection at the individual or group level,
even the atomistic individual may have to employ other instruments, whether animate or
inanimate, to attain satisfaction. As Frank Knight says, treating the human being “as either simple
or constant involves heroic abstraction, even if we could think of our Robinson Crusoe as using
only his own "person" in the satisfaction of his economic wants, ignoring all other
instrumentalities.”68 In other words, a strict application of complete atomism to economic theory
would necessitate ignoring externally-sourced capital and labour in determining the cost of
producing a particular item.
g. The Problem of Aggregation
As has been seen, Kirman’s criticism of general equilibrium theory proceeds from his finding that
the assumptions of uniqueness and stability it makes have no theoretical justification. The source
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of this problem, in turn, he says “seems to be embodied in what is an essential feature of a
centuries-long tradition in economics, that of treating individuals as acting independently of each
other.”69 This is the problem which we have been discussing and which is described in the
preceding heading as “atomism” or “methodical individualism”.
Kirman argues that this tradition does not necessarily entail that there is no interaction among
individuals. Instead, following Paul Samuelson70, he suggests that “once the appropriate signals
are given, individuals behave in isolation and the result of their behaviour may simply be added
together. Then the equilibrium signals can be determined.”71 He says that it is the assumption that
individuals “demand behaviour is completely independent of the others” that is essential to the
construction of economies generating arbitrary excess demand functions.72 This does not entail the
absence of any interaction. Instead, “[i]t is not mere chance that one assumption that leads to strong
results as to uniqueness and stability is that society should behave as an individual. Yet we know
that to obtain such behaviour individuals' behaviour must be very similar. If we are to progress
further we may well be forced to theorise in terms of groups who have collectively coherent
behaviour. Thus demand and expenditure functions if they are to be set against reality must be
defined at some reasonably high level of aggregation. The idea that we should start at the level of
the isolated individual is one which we may well have to abandon.” 73
Kirman’s argument, then, is that a model which describes demand or consumption by the
behaviour of one individual and then aggregates over more than one individual, while it may be
attractive as conducive to a unique and stable equilibrium, is unjustified, and can only be seen as
a pure assumption or postulate. On the other hand, theorizing in terms of group behaviour makes
it necessary, he says, “to explain how and why a sector of society or society itself organizes itself
in such a way as to behave like an individual, if indeed it does” 74. He concludes that, in effect,
“making assumptions on the distribution of agents’ characteristics amounts, in some sense, to
making assumptions about the organisation of society.”75
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We would argue that theorizing, “in terms of groups who have collectively coherent behaviour”
would generate a demand curve at a group level of aggregation, which, presumably, would
intersect separately with the supply or production sector of the economy. The supply or production
side may itself, and for similar reasons, be modelled at a higher level of aggregation than an
individual supplier or producer, in effect, generating a group level supply or production curve.
Each group of consumers and each group of producers might then be said to behave
“independently”. Logically, then, such an approach would seem to require a level of aggregation
above that of groups with collectively coherent behaviour, if it is to provide a model of supply and
demand for the economy as a whole.
Kirman’s argument suggests that if the complete independence of individuals in terms of demand
behaviour is not to be considered purely as a postulate or assumption, it becomes necessary to
make a number of assumptions about the organization of society. These may be necessarily more
complex than the assumption of aggregation of demand.
h. Profit Maximization as Primary Goal
Kirman refers to the argument that the underlying hypothesis of individual maximization is
inappropriate and unnecessarily restrictive and considers Simon’s work as an alternative. He says
that Simon’s model, like that of Arrow and Debreu,76 relies on individuals reacting to signals in
the form of prices. He concludes that “unless it could be proved that individual behaviour of the
type invoked by Simon imposes restrictions on the collective behaviour because it leads people to
behave similarly, we are no further advanced.”77 Such proof has so far been absent.
Armen Alchian rejects utility maximization at both the individual and firm level, following the
criticism of Gerhard Tintner. Alchian maintains that: “Uncertainty arises from at least two sources:
imperfect foresight and human inability to solve complex problems containing a host of variables
even when an optimum is definable. Tintner's proof is simple. Under uncertainty, by definition,
each action that may be chosen is identified with a distribution of potential outcomes, not with a
unique outcome. Implicit in uncertainty is the consequence that these distributions of potential
outcomes are overlapping. It is worth emphasis that each possible action has a distribution of
potential outcomes, only one of which will materialize if the action is taken, and that one outcome
76
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cannot be foreseen. Essentially, the task is converted into making a decision (selecting an action)
whose potential outcome distribution is preferable, that is, choosing the action with the optimum
distribution, since there is no such thing as a maximizing distribution.”78
Accordingly, Alchian argues that realized positive profits, rather than profit maximization, “is the
sine qua non of survival and success”.79 It is the “relevant objective whose fulfilment is rewarded
with survival.” However, because of uncertainty, “[n]either perfect knowledge of the past nor
complete awareness of the current state of the arts give sufficient foresight to indicate profitable
action”.80 As a result, he says, two modes of behavior replace optimum equilibrium conditions as
guiding rules of action: mimesis, and innovation or “trial and error”.
As to mimesis, “wherever successful enterprises are observed, the elements common to these
observable successes will be associated with success and copied by others in their pursuit of profits
or success.”81 He explains that “[m]any factors cause this motive to imitate patterns of action
observable in past successes. Among these are: (1) the absence of an identifiable criterion for
decision-making, (2) the variability of the environment, (3) the multiplicity of factors that call for
attention and choice, (4) the uncertainty attaching to all these factors and outcomes, (5) the
awareness that superiority relative to one's competitors is crucial, and (6) the nonavailability of a
trial-and-error process converging to an optimum position.”82
Alchian explains that the “second type of conscious adaptive behavior, in addition to imitation, is
"trial and error." This has been used with "profit maximization," wherein, by trial and ensuing
success or failure, more appropriate actions are selected in a process presumed to converge to a
limit of "profit maximization" equilibrium. Unfortunately, at least two conditions are necessary
for convergence via a trial-and-error process, even if one admits an equilibrium situation as an
admissible limit. First, a trial must be classifiable as a success or failure. The position achieved
must be comparable with results of other potential actions. … The second condition, then, for the
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convergence via trial and error is the continual rising toward some optimum optimorum without
intervening descents.”83
Of course, in a changing environment, as Alchian says, “there can be no observable comparison
of the result of an action with any other” and “the possibility of an individual’s converging to the
optimum activity via a trial-and-error process disappears. Trial and error become survival or death.
It cannot serve as the basis of the individual’s method of convergence to a “maximum” or optimum
position.”84
It may be conjectured from this that a combination of mimesis and trial-and-error might enable
competitors within a particular industry or sector to copy only practices which are “successful” in
the sense of being co-present with organizational continuity, and not those which are
“unsuccessful” in a sense of being co-present with organizational decline and termination. Apart
from obvious questions of whether the practices observed and the survival or death of the
individual competitor have a relationship of simple collinearity or one of causation, the myriad of
attendant and differing circumstances with respect to organizations that survive and those that die
make comparisons and causative inferences extremely difficult.
Unless conditions in the environment are invariant, which is not the normal case, profit
maximization or even profit optimization is not possible for Alchian, and profit sufficiency must
be sought instead. It may, therefore, be concluded that the assumption of profit maximization as
the primary goal of economic activity is no longer maintained even by all mainstream economists.
i. Time Lag
Assumed invariance of conditions is likewise discussed by Frank Knight, who says that “it is
actually quite unrealistic to think of the functional (cause-and-effect) relations between economic
variables as remaining unchanged through a real change in any independent variable.”85 In
particular, “[t]here is always a significant ‘lag’ in time; and in the meantime other things will not
remain ‘equal’.” 86 As previously noted, this may also result in the utility expected not accruing in
actuality.
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j. Organizations
As discussed above under the subheading “Rationality”, Herbert Simon argued that the
information, knowledge, and computational skills of human beings are limited, result in them
being only bountifully rational, promote satisficing rather than maximization of utility, and leads
them to behave in a routine, myopic, but reasonably adaptive manner.87 Terry Moe relates this
bounded rationality of individuals to Simon’s theory of organizations, explaining that the “key
insight is that, just as individuals will routinize behavior if left to their own devices, so routines
can also be imposed by organizational superiors, who can take steps to shape the decisional
premises (information, beliefs, aspiration levels) of subordinates and provide them with the
programmed responses deemed suitable for efficient pursuit of the organization's objectives. It is
this combination of bounded rationality and managerial efforts to program subordinate behavior
that largely explains organizational structure.”88
In effect, self-routinization can be seen as an adaptation made necessary by the boundedness of
one’s own rationality. Accordingly, routinization by external pressure may be considered as
imposing, and accelerating the imposition of, routinization that the individual may have concluded,
eventually, was a necessary adaptation. Terry Moe explains how this is effected: “Individuals
throughout the organization, precisely because they are boundedly rational, will behave in the
routine, patterned ways characteristic of structured behavior; and (boundedly rational) managers,
in seeking to shape and coordinate individual programs into an organized, efficient structure,
impose behavioral routines via hierarchy, division of labor, communications flows, and training
programs. Thus emerge the basic structural aspects of organization, all of them anchored in the
inherent limitations on human decision-makers.”89
Of course, organizations are not advantageous only because they improve routines which assist in
overcoming the limitations of the bounded rationality of individuals with respect to their individual
decisions but, among other things, are also advantageous because they provide for some
aggregation of bounded rationality, which might be expected to result in increased rationality of
decisions made at the organizational level. More fundamentally, however, organizations exist to
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accomplish certain goals and objectives or to pursue certain stated purposes and may be expected
to adopt, and later to adapt and improve, structures and processes suitable to those ends.
Routinization may be useful in some organizations, and at some levels and in some functions
within organizations, but may not be (as) useful, with height any good news other organizations,
levels and functions.
4. Discussion
As indicated above under the heading “Purpose and Methodology of Economics”, in order to
provide a context for discussion of the firm and of the corporation, respectively, as an economic
actor, it is necessary to review certain major assumptions, generalizations or common
understandings of economics. As noted there, the use of the word “assumption” is used in this
work generally and in this chapter, in particular, in the sense of generalizations or common
understandings, rather than an unproven proposition on the basis of which a scientific hypothesis
is advanced for the purpose of discussing or testing the same. In effect, the assumptions
investigated here are generalized or common understandings which are considered to be
fundamental to mainstream, classical, and neoclassical, economics.
This section has examined a proposition generally accepted in, and fundamental, to mainstream,
that is, classical or neoclassical, economics, namely, that atomistic individuals who are motivated
to seek their own good, satisfaction, or utility engage in economic activity to maximize (or, in
some later writing, optimize) their own good, satisfaction, or utility. The elements of this
assumption are separately identified and analyzed further below. As noted previously, the focus of
discussion here is on assumptions that, and the ways in which such assumptions, may be employed,
on the one hand, in economic discussions concerning the nature of the firm and the corporation
and, on the other hand, in legal discussions concerning the nature of the firm and the corporation.
The review in this section establishes as problematic, or even inaccurate, the assumptions that
individuals act completely atomistically, that they exclusively seek their own good, satisfaction or
utility, and that they engage in economic activity solely to maximize or optimize their own good,
satisfaction, or utility.
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ASSUMPTION TWO – ATOMISM AND METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
1. Statement
As discussed in relation to Assumption One, mainstream, that is, classical or neoclassical,
economics considers that atomistic individuals who are motivated to seek their own good,
satisfaction, or utility engage in economic activity to maximize (or, in some later writing, optimize)
their own good, satisfaction, or utility. As such, the individual is the irreducible entity or monad
from which higher-order units are constructed. As Steven Lukes says in his oft-cited study
“Methodological Individualism Reconsidered”,90 the doctrine of methodological individualism
asserts that “facts about society and social phenomena are to be explained solely in terms of facts
about individuals.”91 Thus, it is reductionist at, and to, the level of the individual.
According to Geoffrey Hodgson in his important article “Meanings of Methodological
Individualism”92, the term methodische Individualismus was originally used by Max Weber’s
student, Joseph Schumpeter, in an eponymous chapter of a book published in 1908.93 The
equivalent English term “methodological individualism” was first used by Schumpeter in his 1909
paper, “On the Concept of Social Value”,94 but was introduced as a methodological precept into
the social sciences by Max Weber, specifically in the first chapter of Economy and Society.95
Stephen Lukes compares the similar definitions of methodological individualism by Hayek,
Popper, and Popper’s student, J. W. N. Watkins. Hayek says that “…there is no other way toward
an understanding of social phenomena but through our understanding of individual actions directed
toward other people and guided by their expected behaviour.”96 Hayek’s definition is discussed
further below in connection with our discussion of the nature of aggregation. Lukes’ further
remarks make frequent descriptions of Hayek as an advocate of methodological individualism
90
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questionable, as Hodgson observes.97 For example, in his important review of the subject, Udehn
describes Hayek as “probably the most well-known Austrian methodological individualist”, saying
that “his methodology is a synthesis of elements taken from Menger, Weber, and Mises.”98 Udehn
calls the Weber – Mises –Hayek perspective the “intersubjectivist theory of society”.99
Karl Popper adds a reference to social institutions, thereby holding that “… all social phenomena,
and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting
from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., of human individuals, and . . . we should never be
satisfied by an explanation in terms of so-called 'collectives'…”, such as states or social groups,
“whose behaviour must be reduced to the behaviour and to the actions of human individuals”.100
Hodgson maintains that Popper’s statement of methodological individualism “omits the
requirement of complete explanatory reduction to individuals, and does not imply that explanation
should be in terms of individual alone. Instead, he claims that explanations (exclusively or
otherwise) in terms of collectives are unsatisfactory.”101 Popper does not deny the existence of
collectives, such as states or social groups, and does not seem to deny that the function or act as
such, but insists that their behaviour must be reduced to the level of the individual. Accordingly,
Popper’s version of methodological individualism may be considered to be psychological in
orientation is often referred to as “psychological” individualism or “psychologist” individualism.
Watkins says, to similar effect, that “large-scale social phenomena must be accounted for by the
situations, dispositions and beliefs of individuals. This I call methodological individualism.”102
Watkins goes on to say that “[t]here may be unfinished or half way explanations of large-scale
social phenomena (say, inflation) in terms of other large-scale phenomena (say, full employment);
but we shall not have arrived at rock-bottom explanations of such large-scale phenomena until we
have deduced an account of them from statements about the dispositions, beliefs, resources and
inter-relations of individuals.”103
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As Hodgson argues, Watkins’ definition “is broad in that it does not reduce explanations of social
phenomena to individuals alone, but also includes ‘resources and inter-relations of individuals’.
The latter term admits a huge class of phenomena, including social relations.104 This work makes
a similar observation below. It should also be noted that Watkins’ phrase “rock-bottom
explanations” anticipates a criticism related to such regression that will be discussed further below.
Lukes explains that it is to be contrasted with sociological holism or organicism, which treats social
systems as “wholes” and explains the behaviour of individuals partly by macro-laws that are not
explicable as mere regularities or tendencies resulting from the behaviour of individuals and partly
by the function of institutions within the whole social system.105
2. Explanation
In his much-cited article, “The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism”,106 the
sociologist Lars Udehn reviewed the subject from historical and methodological perspectives. That
article is used as a guide to those perspectives in this section.
Udehn described Thomas Hobbes, with his theory of the state of nature,107 as adhering to
“methodological individualism-in-use” by which he means that Hobbes conformed to the principle
without expressly stating it.108 The theory of the social contract, positing that individuals living in
a state of nature originate social order, may be considered to express a strong form of
methodological individualism. Udehn notes, as we have done here, that we should not assume that
“individuals in the state of nature are also isolated. They are not, but instead they interact with one
another in their own sort of way, that is by means of fraud and violence. The main characteristic
of individuals in the state of nature is not that there they are asocial, but that they lack culture.”109
Udehn describes the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially David Hume, Adam
Ferguson, and Adam Smith, as adopting a species of individualism, which he calls “institutional
individualism”, that was very different from that of the theory of social contract. He says that it
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knew nothing of “asocial individuals in a state of nature”, but considered individuals “as sociocultural beings shaped by social institutions and by the history of society”.110 Udehn says that even
though Adam Smith is considered to be the founder of classical economics, other classical
economists, particularly John Stuart Mill, were more individualistic than was Smith.111 This
observation supports the view expressed with respect to Adam Smith in the present text.
Udehn advances the following position concerning Mill. He points out that, in A System of
Logic,112 Mill argues that all social sciences are based on laws of mind, or on human nature; and
that finding causal explanations for empirical laws or generalizations describing large-scale social
phenomena requires psychological laws.113 Consequently, Udehn says, Mill is generally
considered, including by such authorities as Karl Popper,114 to be a psychological reductionist and
a methodological individualist whose version of such approaches is sometimes called
“psychologistic individualism”.115
Udehn argues that the marginalist revolution in the 1870s which introduced neoclassical
economics established economics as an individualistic science, explaining economic phenomena
in terms of the subjective evaluations of individual human beings.116 While he describes the
Austrian School of Economics and the English utilitarian tradition, starting with Stanley Jevons,
as explicitly individualistic, Udehn considers the theory of general equilibrium, originating with
Leon Walras, to be the most individualistic.117 The latter has already been discussed in this chapter.
Udehn agrees with others, such as Hausman and Arrow,118 that neoclassical economics is generally
considered as the most individualistic of the social sciences. 119 He also considers contemporary
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general equilibrium theory, whose main architects he considers to be Kenneth Arrow and Gerard
Debreu120, to be a second paradigm of methodological individualism.121 Such commentators as
Lawrence Boland, says Udehn,122 claim that neoclassical economics as a whole manifests
psychologistic individualism, in the sense that no economic explanation can be considered
successful until all exogenous variables have been reduced to psychological states of individuals
and natural constraints; and that social institutions appear in the models of neoclassical economics
only as endogenous variables.123
Hodgson argues that it was “through the Austrian Trinity of Schumpeter, Hayek and von Mises”
that the term “methodological individualism” was exported from economics into other
disciplines.124 This transpired, of course, most obviously in political science and sociology.
In their signally important article, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political
Life”, March and Olsen opine that theories of politics since about 1950 have been, among other
things: contextual, inclined to see politics or the polity as an integral part of society (as discussed
in Part 1 of the present text); reductionist, inclined to see political phenomena as the aggregate
consequences of individual behaviour; and utilitarian, inclined to see action as the product of
calculated separate self-interest.125 Thus, while “[d]iscovering, or deducing, the collective
consequences may be difficult, even impossible”; nevertheless, “outcomes at the collective level
depend only on the intricacies of the interactions among the individual actors”, such that “concepts
suggesting autonomous behaviour at the aggregate level are certainly superfluous and probably
deleterious.”126
Methodological individualism requires explanations of economic, social, political phenomena in
terms of the human individual. Social contract theories and many modern theories of politics,
similarly, according to March and Olsen, are reductionist at the level of the individual. Thus, the
state must be explained in terms of aggregation from the individual. Similarly, other institutions
of and social phenomena must be explained in this manner.
120
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A recent article in the area of comparative law and development theory by Teemu Ruskola
maintains that “[t]he paradigmatic subject in the political and economic spheres is the individual.
Even as the state stands in a relationship of authority over us, we retain certain rights against it as
individuals. Likewise, in the marketplace we enter into contracts as individuals. The family, in
contrast, is the one place where we are expected to shed our self-interested individual motivations
to come together with others.”127 He argues that “[t]he corporation has no natural resting place in
this order. On the one hand, as an economic entity it would seem to be the quintessential actor in
the market. On the other hand, the corporation is also evidently a collective entity while the
marketplace is paradigmatically an arena of interaction among self-interested individuals.”128
Of course, just because the paradigmatic subject of economic and political interactions is the
individual does not entail that social organizations, groups, or other collectivities must lack
ontological, epistemological, methodological, or legal status. However, methodological
individualism requires that all explanations be reduced to the level of the individual. As distinct
from ontological individualism, it does not require that society be made up only of individuals,
thereby denying the reality of social institutions and organizations. Instead, it requires only that
explanations of social organization, groups of individuals be reduced, ultimately, to the level of
the individual.129
On the other hand, ontological individualism, as applied to legal theory, might be considered to
require that only individuals be recognized as rights-and-duty-bearing parties. In turn, if only
“persons” are considered to bear rights and duties, then ontological individualism might be
considered to require that in order to bear rights and duties, the bearer must be a person, or, at least,
that the “rights-and-duty-bearing” status of the bearer be reduced to the level of the human
individual.
In that case, Ruskola might be justified in saying that this might motivate “the legal fiction of the
corporation as a person in its own right, as if it were a human being.”130 As has been argued in this
work previously, however, equating rights-and-duty bearing status with legal personhood is neither
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required nor, if required, would it require further analogizing the corporation or other “legal entity”
or “legal person” with the individual person.
3. Criticism
Much relevant and useful criticism of methodological individualism has been assembled, distilled,
reviewed, and weighed in a number of excellent articles on the subject, notably by Arrow,
Hodgson, Lukes, and Udehn, as mentioned above. These can be mentioned only briefly here.
a. Nature of Aggregation
In an important and widely-cited paper on the subject, Kenneth Arrow argues that while it is “a
touchstone of accepted economics that all explanations must run in terms of the actions and
reactions of individuals”, social categories are, in fact, used, “all the time” and as “absolute
necessities of the analysis.”131
Hodgson maintains that “it is crucial whether it is claimed that the social world simply consist of
individuals, or of individuals and interactive relations between them. The social world, by virtue
of the fact that it is social, must involve such interactive relations.”132 In effect, adopting some
species of ontological individualism need not be entailed simply as a consequence of adopting
methodological individualism.
Hodgson quotes Hayek that “[t]he overall order of actions in a group is in two respects more than
the totality of regularities observable in the actions of the individuals and cannot be wholly reduced
to them.”133 Hayek says that this “is so not only in the trivial sense in which the whole is more
than the mere sum of its parts but presupposes also that these elements are related to each other in
a particular manner. It is more also because the existence of those relations which are essential for
the existence of the whole cannot be accounted for wholly by the interaction of the parts but only
by their interaction with an outside world both of the individual parts and the whole.”134
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Hodgson seeks to explain Hayek’s remark by saying that “society consists not merely of
individuals, but also of interactions between individuals, plus interactions between individuals and
other aspects of their environment including, presumably, both the natural world and other socioeconomic systems.”135 It is suggested here, however, that the “particular manner” in which “these
elements are related to each other” includes not only the relationship of each individual to each
other individual, but also the relationship of each individual to the group composed of all other
individuals; that is, to each individual separately, and to each individual qua group member. This
position has been advanced elsewhere in the present work.
b. Behaviour of Organizations
March and Olsen point out that a reductionist perspective in economics and in the other social
sciences explains the behaviour of the organization as “the consequence of the interlocking choices
by individuals and sub-units, each acting in terms of expectations and preferences manifested at
those levels.”136. For example, “[t]he behavior of a market is the consequence of the interlocking
choices by individuals and firms, each acting in terms of a set of expectations and preferences
manifested at those levels.”137 However, they assert that “[i]t is not necessary that the micro
processes involve choice, of course”, since aggregate behavior of a group can be seen as the
consequence of the interlocking trial-and-error learning at the level of individuals138 and aggregate
behaviour of an industry can be explained as “the consequence of the interlocking of standard
operating procedures and accounting rules followed at the level of the individual firm.”139
However, it is suggested here that the expectations and preferences of individuals and their
“interlocking choices” and, at the next higher level of aggregation, the expectations and
preferences of groups and their “interlocking choices” do, in fact, consider, as inputs for such
expectations, preferences and choices, the actual and expected behaviours of other individuals as
part of the framework of choice. Similarly, with respect to non-choice models, the nature of
“interlocking trial-and-error learning” at the individual level, and the adoption of industry standard
135
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operating procedures and accounting roles at the level of individual firm may each be expected to
consider the actual and expected behaviours of other units. In this sense, actions taken by the lowest
level unit are not the only factors determinative of group or industry behaviour, as the case may
be.
c. Reduction to Level of Individuals
A theory which is essentially reductionist is not thereby necessarily constrained to adopt, as its
basic unit, the individual. March and Olsen note that “[t]here is nothing intrinsic to a perspective
that emphasizes the macro consequences of micro actions which requires that the elementary units
be individuals. All that is required is that the behavior of a more comprehensive system be
decomposable to elementary behaviors explicable at a less comprehensive level.”140
The basic unit of behaviour in a macro system or at a system level, as March and Olsen call it,
need not be that of the individual: “In practice, however, in most of the social sciences, the actions
of individual human beings are considered to determine the flow of events in a larger social system.
Outcomes at the system level are thought to be determined by the interactions of individuals acting
consistently in terms of the axioms of individual behavior, whatever they may be. Thus, we make
assumptions about individual consumers to understand markets, about voters to understand
politics, and about bureaucrats to understand bureaucracies.”141 Accordingly, any reductionist
account, in economics or otherwise, is subject to criticism as to whether it decomposes the
phenomena concerned to a basic or elementary unit that is appropriate to the instant case.
A further criticism of any reductionist account which might be made concerns the necessity of
maintaining the same basic or elementary unit throughout successive levels of aggregation. In turn,
this is related to the criticism that at a higher level of aggregation a new higher level of basic or
elementary unit may interact with a lower level of basic or elementary unit. For example, the
argument that group behaviour is largely determined by interaction among group members, who
are individuals, need not necessarily entail, as a matter of theoretical construction or as a matter of
logic, that the group, so composed, does not interact with individuals, or that the group in respect
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of its interaction with other groups, does not interact with individuals either in the acting group or
in the group with which it interacts.
The relationship between an individual and a non-immediate group, namely, a group of which the
individual’s immediate group is a part or which is otherwise beyond the immediate focal group,
presents particular difficulties in conducting research with respect to conflict resolution, choice,
and decision-making. As James March indicates, in many studies of conflict systems small groups
are treated both as systems involving individuals as basic units and as groups within organizations
(or larger groups) within which the focal small group is an elementary unit. “Since the first
postulate of conflict is essentially that the basic units themselves not be conflict systems, it seems
awkward to be able to view a single system as either an elementary unit or a conflict system
depending on the level of aggregation involved. In fact, most systems studied in the social sciences
are apparently conflict systems of conflict systems.”142
Consequently, the relationship between the individual and groups other than the immediate or focal
group to which the individual is most closely connected, including the organization itself, may be
less amenable to direct research than the more immediate relationship between individual and the
immediate focal group. We submit that at least one reason for this is that the immediate focal group
exercises some intermediating effect with respect to the individual/less immediate group, or
individual/organization, relationship. These research difficulties, however, should not result in
either in ready acceptance of reductionism, or its automatic reduction to the level of the individual.
d. Explanatory Power of Reductionist Theories
In response to the inquiry whether there are any successful explanations of social phenomena in
terms of individuals alone, without social relations and institutions, Hodgson points to Udehn’s
affirmative answers with respect to both social contract theory and general equilibrium theory.143
Hodgson refers to Kenneth Arrow’s counterargument to reductionism, which proceeds “by
pointing out that price mechanisms involve social interactions and structures, and social
phenomena that cannot be reduced entirely to individuals alone.”144 He quotes Arrow’s rejoinder
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that “economic theories require social elements as well even under the strictest acceptance of
standard economic assumptions … individual behavior is always mediated by social relations.
These are as much part of the description of reality as in individual behavior.”145 Accordingly,
Udehn’s examples are put into question.
Hodgson provides examples of these interactions, saying: “All versions of social contract theory
and general equilibrium theory involve individuals communicating with others or, at least,
adopting tacit presumptions of the intentions and stances of others. All such interactions presume
rules of interaction or interpretation. Trading in models of market interaction presumes some form
of communication over prices or quantities. Communication involves some form of language, and
languages by their nature are systems of rules. Furthermore, exchange involves the transfer of
property rights, with rules established through prior social interactions. Similarly, all contracts rely
on social structures of enforcement.”146
Accordingly, says Hodgson, “social contract theory and general equilibrium theory both presume
structured relations between individuals, rather than individuals in isolation. They also presume
relations between individuals and social institutions. For example, property rights require some
system of enforcement. These things may not be stated explicitly in the models, but they are
presupposed.”147 Social relations are obviously implicitly assumed by such theories.
Arrow himself mentions that “[l]imitations on individualistic methodology appear very strongly
when considering the role of information”148, especially new knowledge, which he says can be
acquired either by observing nature or by learning from other individuals.149 One can learn from
others either intentionally (by communication or education) or by inferring the knowledge of
others by observation of their behaviour. He indicates that both types of learning from others
present “clear empirical problems with maintaining the individualist orientation.”150
Indeed, learning itself involves not only the reception of information but also, as Hodgson says, a
conceptual framework to process and make sense of that information, the acquisition of which

145

Supra note 93 at 217.
Ibid at 217-8.
147
Ibid at 218.
148
Supra note 132, at 2.
149
Ibid at 7.
150
Ibid.
146

1112
framework involves processes of socialization and education by means of extensive interaction
with others.151 Consequently, “[t]he means of our understanding of the world are necessarily
acquired through social relationships and interactions. Cognition is a social as well as an individual
process.”152 Because individual rational choice presumes cognition, “[i]ndividual choice is
impossible without these institutions and interactions.”153
Even the development of social institutions presupposes social interaction. Hodgson credits
Alexander Field with having “shown that key attempts by economists to explain the origin of social
institutions presume individuals acting in a particular context, with rules of behaviour governing
their interaction. In the presumed “state of nature” from which institutions are said to have
emerged, a number of weighty roles, structures and cultural and social norms have already been
(implicitly or explicitly) assumed.”154
e. Social Intermediation
As has been seen, even such neoclassical economists and general equilibrium theorists as Kenneth
Arrow concede that it is “a touchstone of accepted economics that all explanations must run in
terms of the actions and reactions of individuals”, a consequence of which is that “judging
economic research… includes the criterion that in principle the behaviour and the policies we
propose are explicable in terms of individuals, not of other social categories”155 However, some,
like Arrow, nevertheless argue that “even the most standard economic analysis shows that social
categories are in fact use in economic analysis all the time and that they appear to be absolute
necessities of the analysis, not just figures of speech that can be eliminated if need be.”156
In effect, it is acknowledged by Arrow and other mainstream economists that social intermediation
of individual economic behaviour is implicit in such behaviour itself. As noted above, Arrow
himself remarked that “economic theories require social elements as well even under the strictest
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acceptance of standard economic assumptions… Individual behaviour is always mediated by
social relations. These are as much part of the description of reality as in individual behaviour.”157
f. Regression
As suggested previously in relation to Watkins’ demand that “rock-bottom explanations” be
expressed in terms of individuals, a strict form of reductionism at the level of the individual seems
to present what Hodgson calls “an apparently infinite regress” in which “attempts to explain each
emergent level of institutions always rely on previous institutions and rules” with the result that in
this infinite regress “neither individual nor institutional factors have legitimate explanatory
primacy.”158
Hodgson succinctly explains this regress: “If institutional influences on individuals are admitted,
then these too are worthy of explanation. In turn, the explanation of those may be partly in terms
of other purposeful individuals. But where should the analysis stop? The purposes of an individual
could be partly explained by relevant institutions, culture and so on. These, in their turn, would be
partly explained in terms of other individuals. But these individual purposes and actions could then
be partly explained by cultural and institutional factors, and so on, indefinitely. As long as we are
addressing social phenomena, we never reach an end point where there are isolated individuals,
and nothing more.”159
One may speculate that social phenomena are intrinsically inter-subjective and, consequently,
presuppose some kind of connectivity between subjects. Logically, it may be considered unlikely
that this kind of inter-subjective connectivity could be explained in terms of “isolated individuals”.
Social phenomena, by definition, presuppose no such isolation.
As a result, some methodological individualists attempt to assert some kind of “half-way” position.
For example, Udehn explains that Watkins’ recognizes empirical generalizations about large-scale
social phenomena, but claims that they were “in principle” reducible to psychological laws.160
Udehn says that this eventually leads Watkins to “recognize the existence of half-way explanations
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of large-scale social phenomena in terms of other large-scale social phenomena as distinguished
from rock-bottom explanations in terms of individuals and their interrelations.”161
Others, such as Popper’s student, Joseph Agassi, have sought to explicate Popper’s reference to
the “decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., of human individuals” and, in particular, the “etc.” as
embracing all aspects of the situation or circumstances of the individual. Udehn characterizes this,
as does Watkins, as “psychologistic individualism”, a species of individualism which includes only
material conditions, and not social institutions, in the relevant circumstances. 162 As such, it
excludes social institutions from the description of the situations of individuals except insofar as
those social institutions are reflected in or reduced to the attitudes of individuals towards things
and other people.163 Consequently, since those social institutions are not considered as involving
a separate dynamic, this perspective is still considered as “psychologistic individualism”.
The version of methodological individualism advanced by Joseph Agassi, which is described by
Udehn as “institutional individualism”, explicitly “includes social institutions in the situation of
individuals.”164 Agassi argues that “institutions constitute a part of the individual’s circumstances
which together with his aims determine his behaviour”.165 Institutional individualism thus rejects
the claim of psychologistic individualism that only material conditions should be included in the
description of the individual’s relevant circumstances.
Udehn also refers to the development of Agassi’s perspective by the economist Lawrence A
Boland166 who differentiated psychologistic individualism from institutional individualism on the
basis that in the former the only exogenous variables were psychological states and natural
constraints, with the result that social institutions appear, if at all, and such model only as
endogenous variables; whereas in institutional individualism, social institutions were permitted
among the exogenous variables as well.167 Udehn characterizes new institutional economics as
frequently representing an amalgam of psychologistic and institutional individualism.168
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Accordingly, there is a wide range of perspectives within methodological individualism, adherents
of some of which criticize other perspectives. As the foregoing examination indicates, the
perspective adopted may have very significant consequences in terms of theory and explanatory
capacity.
g. Emergence of Institutions
Hodgson concludes that problems of this nature “undermine any claim that the explanation of the
emergence of institutions can start from some kind of institution-free and ensemble of (rational)
individuals in which there is supposedly no rule or institution to be explained.” 169 He concludes
that “[c]onsequently, the project to explain the emergence of institutions on the basis of given
individuals runs into difficulties, particularly with regard to the conceptualization of the initial
state of nature from which institutions are supposed to emerge.”170 The review of the various
arguments discussed here supports that conclusion.
Institutions, according to Hodgson, are “a special case of social structure, involving systems of
widely observed rules.” 171 In effect, he argues that social phenomena cannot be explained in terms
of individual only; and that social structures are equivalent to relations between individuals; with
the result that social phenomena should be explained in terms of individuals and social
structures.172 In the result, “[w]e always have to start from structures and individuals. There is no
other viable explanatory strategy.”173
A strict form of methodological individualism must, as has been demonstrated, present an infinite
regress in argumentation which is intractable. In addition, as we have argued above, the very
concept of “social phenomena” presupposes a lack of isolation as between individuals. The
“social” can be seen as a kind of “inter esse” or “inter-esse”, that which lies between, and both
separates and connects, individuals. As will be recalled, for Hannah Arendt, this characterizes all
reality, which is characterized by its common recognition as such.174
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Hodgson argues that is a mistake to conclude that social structures involve more than relations
between individuals (where such relations also include social positions), saying that: “A danger
here is to reify social structure as something other than an interacting pattern of individuals, which
would exist even if the individuals all disappeared. Social structures are essentially groups of
interacting social individuals, possibly including social positions, and with emergent properties
resulting from this interaction.”175
At the same time, rejection of such reification does not entail admitting the isolation or atomism
of individual human beings. Instead, it is obvious that “[s]tructures and isolated individuals are
different things because interacting and isolated individuals are different things. By definition,
isolated individuals have no causal interaction with other individuals. Structures depend on
interacting individuals and would cease to exist if all the individuals or all their interactions
disappeared.”176
Unlike isolated individuals, “every human individual is born into a world where structures already
exist. Then individuals engage with this world, and play their part in supporting or changing these
structures, while interacting with others.”177 Individuals interact with others through social
structure. Accordingly, a model, economic or otherwise, that rests on the proposition that there is
no interaction among individuals is not likely to facilitate an understanding of the social
construction of reality, the importance of social structures or, more generally, the construction of
hypotheses that are consistent with experience.
4. Discussion
The project of methodological individualism has been demonstrated to present difficulties of such
a high order as to make it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain seriously. Hodgson argues that
even “[s]ophisticated advocates of methodological individualism are aware that the individual is a
social being, enmeshed in relations with others. They are aware of the importance of culture, and
that communication and language are deeply involved in constituting individuality.”178 Indeed,
“the idea of a genuinely isolated individual, free of all social relations, is untenable”; however,
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“[w]hat many methodological individualists seem reluctant to do is to use this awareness to rule
out such isolated individuals in the explanantia.”179
At this point, a question may be raised concerning the relevance of the assumption of
methodological individualism in classical and neoclassical economics to the theory of the firm and
the theory of the corporation and, in particular, to the legal theory of the firm and the legal theory
of the corporation. Certainly, the theory of methodological individualism itself must be considered
to be problematic, and perhaps even completely inefficacious. Indeed, adding somewhat to
Hodgson’s observation, the very idea of an individual so isolated that he or she has been, is, and
will continue for the foreseeable future to be, completely free of social relations does seem to be
completely untenable, both logically and with respect to explanatory capacity “in the real world”.
As will be discussed below, the economic model of the firm which, in its simplest and, in
economic theory, arguably the most prevalent, form essentially involves an entrepreneur, as sole
proprietor, either acting as a manager or engaging a manager, to direct the activities of employees
towards production of a product (most often) or service offered for sale on a market and eventually
sold at a price reflecting, to some extent, the cost of input factors, and the price which consumers
are willing to pay for such product. It is clear that an assumption of methodological individualism
can only go so far in terms of explanatory capacity with respect to such phenomena. As argued
above, the “purity” of such an assumption cannot coherently be maintained.
Accordingly, to the extent that such an assumption is employed in the economic theory of the firm
or otherwise, it can be expected to result in generating explanations which are deficient. As in the
case of other assumptions discussed in this chapter, the “real world” in which the “real corporate
law”, including “real statutory law” is extant is bereft of what Hodgson calls the “genuinely
isolated individual, free of all social relations”. Instead, the constitution and operation of
corporation necessarily involves the actions of individuals who are not genuinely isolated and were
not free of all social relations. Consequently, the application to corporate law and legal theory of
the assumptions or propositions which are generally accepted in economics, including
methodological individualism and other assumptions are or propositions relying upon it, you must
be regarded as highly problematic, if not inappropriate or specious.
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Time does not permit an excursion into the complexities of new institutional economics; however,
it is apparent that post-Walrasian economics may contribute to the solution of some of the
difficulties of Marshallian and Walrasian economics.
The remaining assumptions identified at the beginning of this chapter will be discussed in Chapter
B5, following next.
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CHAPTER B5:
ASSUMPTIONS OF CLASSICAL AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
PART B
ASSUMPTION THREE – INDIVIDUAL DETERMINATION OF UTILITY
1. Statement
As discussed previously, mainstream, that is, classical or neoclassical, economics considers that
atomistic individuals are motivated to seek their own good, satisfaction, or utility; and that they
engage, independently, in economic activity to maximize (or, in some later writing, optimize) their
own good, satisfaction, or utility. There, we quoted John Lie’s comment that “neoclassical
economics… relies on the notion of atomized individuals who maximize subjective utility”.1
Lie’s comment draws attention to the assumption implicit in the view that individuals, acting
independently, seek, and maximize, subjective utility; or satisfaction of their own individual
desires. That assumption involves in turn, the assumption that individuals are capable of
determining, acting independently, what will afford them satisfaction and what will maximize their
satisfaction. To this point we now turn, setting aside for later discussion in connection with
assumption seven, the subject of rationality, the means by which they pursue such satisfaction.
2. Explanation
As discussed previously, Terry Moe’s description of neoclassical economic theory describes it as
a family of theories sharing, among other things, a focus on the individual as a unit of behaviour
and an assumption of rational utility maximizing behaviour.2 As discussed above, the distinguished
economist Alan Kirman criticizes the reductionist perspective in his attack on “the citadel” of
neoclassical economic theory, saying that “if one maintains a fundamentally individualistic
approach to constructing economic models no amount of attention to the walls will prevent the
citadel [of general equilibrium theory] from being empty. Empty in the sense that one cannot
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expect it to house the elements of a scientific theory, one capable of producing empirically
falsifiable propositions.”3 This chapter will devote “attention to the walls”.
As seen previously, attacks on the rational choice paradigm have proceeded from many quarters.
For example, as Moe says, Simon “sought to replace the conventional model of rational economic
man with an empirically adequate theory of individual choice”4 which resulted in his model of
“bounded rationality”. Of course, that model has had a profound effect in management, as well as
economic, circles. However, the rational choice paradigm has continued to be maintained in much
modern economic theory. Moe says that most economists in the economics of organization, at
least, are not willing to reject the optimization model of choice; however, he credits Simon with
demonstrating that aspects of social and human psychology are relevant to economics and
organizations.5 On the other hand, Moe describes Alchian’s “natural selection” or “evolutionary”
theory of organizations as “disavowing an explicit model of individual choice (although it is clear
he favors some sort of adaptive model)”.6
As shown in the previous chapter, Granovetter maintains that “[c]lassical and neoclassical
economics operates…with an atomized, undersocialized conception of human action, continuing
in the utilitarian tradition. The theoretical arguments disallow by hypothesis any impact of social
structure and social relations on production, distribution, or consumption.”7 For example, in
relation to markets Granovetter cites Hirschman’s observation that in the idealized markets
supposed, "large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and sellers supplied with perfect
information...function without any prolonged human or social contact between the parties.”8
Among other things, the very idea of “perfect information” being available to an atomized
individual actor without any social intervention is highly problematic as an assumption or
generalization. Information generation, assembly transmission, and interpretation seem to
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presuppose some social intermediation, as is emphasized by Kenneth Arrow and as discussed in
the preceding chapter.9 Further, the assumption of “perfect information” itself presents substantial
difficulties. Nevertheless, Granovetter maintains, perhaps generously, that the narrow utilitarian
pursuit of self-interest is not admitted in this perspective to exclude social roles, even when
internalized, because in the utilitarian model “the source of utility functions is left open, leaving
room for behaviour guided entirely by consensually determined norms and values”.10
In an extensively cited article concerning the place of the market in economic theory,11 Michel
Callon starts his discussion with the general definition of market proposed by Robert Guesnerie as
“a coordination device in which (a) the agents pursue their own interests and to this end perform
economic calculations which can be seen as an operation of optimization and/or maximization; b)
the agents generally have divergent interests, which lead them to engage in c) transactions which
resolve the conflict”12 (without, as Callon says, resorting to physical violence, in effect by reaching
an acceptable compromise), by defining a price.
For Guesnerie, “a market opposes buyers and sellers, and the prices which resolve this conflict are
the input but also, in a sense, the outcome of the agents’ economic calculation”.13 Among other
things, Callon says this presupposes an organization that takes into account the variety of
calculative agencies and their distribution. He also says that it is assumed that the agents enter and
leave the exchange like strangers, although they are obviously in touch with each other during the
transaction.14 In effect, such an explanation fails to account for how parties who are willing to
transact make contact with each other, bargain, and leave, and then later return, to a “market”
which only exists when transacting parties are present, and are willing, and able, to transact.
Characterizing the market as a “coordination device” requires explication of how such
coordination is effected, which seems to require human, and, moreover, coordinated, agency.
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As observed previously in the present work, it is difficult to avoid the observation, even conclusion,
that markets are socially constructed. However, the third assumption, individual determination of
utility, speaks to the motives of consumers and producers, or of construction of the supply side
and of the demand side, in respect of such market. We now turn to criticisms of this assumption.
3. Criticism
It goes without saying that in a work of this nature a consideration of such criticisms must
necessarily be partial and summary in nature.
a. Knowledge of Desires and Goals
In his important work, previously discussed here, concerning oversocialized and undersocialized
conceptions of man,15 Dennis Wrong argues that, while “material interests, sexual drives and the
quest for power have often been over-estimated as human motives”, this is no reason to deny their
reality.16 His observation calls attention to the multiplicity of human motives.
A discussion of whether, and the extent to which, the goals of individual human beings can be said
to be “innate” on the one hand, or fully or partially socially constructed, on the other, exceeds our
present objectives. Dennis Wrong says that modern sociology presents a model of human nature
in which human motivations or desires are affected firstly, by the “internalization of social norms”
and, secondly, “by the desire to achieve a positive image of self by winning acceptance or status
in the eyes of others”.17 Internalization of social norms may be related to learning and habit
formation.
Dennis Wrong, following Talcott Parsons, concludes that Durkheim’s later work acknowledged
that social rules do not merely “regulate externally” but actually “enter directly into the constitution
of the actors’ ends themselves”.18 As a result, Durkheim maintained that constraint is not only an
external environmental obstacle to be taken into account by an actor in pursuit of his goals, but
also “becomes internal, psychological, and self-imposed as well.”19 Internalization of norms by an
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individual is normally intended to signify that the individual habitually both affirms the norm and
conforms to it in his conduct.20
Wrong explains that in Freudian or psychoanalytic terms, the norm has been interjected to become
part of the superego, which indicates that a person will suffer guilt-feelings if he fails to live up to
it, not that he will live up to it in his actual behaviour.21 He says that “the main explanatory
function” of the concept of the superego “is to show how people repress themselves, imposing
checks on their own desires and thus turning the inner life to a battlefield of conflicting motives,
no matter which side “wins” by successfully dictating overt action.” He also observes that for
psychoanalysis “the wish, the emotion, and the fantasy are as important as the act in man’s
experience”;22 whereas sociologists minimize or even deny the importance of “motivational forces
bucking against the hold social discipline has over him”.23
Indeed, says Wrong: “When Freud defined psychoanalysis as the study of the "vicissitudes of the
instincts," he was confirming, not denying, the "plasticity" of human nature insisted on by social
scientists. The drives or "instincts" of psychoanalysis, far from being fixed dispositions to behave
in a particular way, are utterly subject to social channelling and transformation… To
psychoanalysis man is indeed a social animal.”24
Accordingly, the existence, and recognition, of desires or motives in the atomistic individual which
are completely independent of, and not intermediated by, others must be admitted to be, at the very
least, problematic, and subject to significant contestation.
b. Ranking of Desires and Goals and Calculation
The rational pursuit of a desire or goal by an actor, acting completely independently, requires that
the actor not only recognize the existence of the focal desire or goal, but also the existence of other
desires or goals, and in each case, the circumstances attending the satisfaction of the same, in each
case acting completely independently.
Callon unpacks this by saying that “for calculative agents to be able to make decisions they need
at least to be able to: (i) establish a list of the possible states of the world (each state of the world
20

Ibid at 187.
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid at 188.
24
Ibid at 192.
21

1124
being defined by a certain list of actors and goods, and by a certain distribution of these goods
amongst the actors); (ii) rank these states of the world (which gives a content and an object to the
agent's preferences); (iii) identify and describe the actions which allow for the production of each
of the possible states of the world.”25 Obviously, such decision-making is an extremely
information-intensive activity. Indeed, even these three essential tasks, which are by no means
exhaustive as to the information required, are massively complex. One might conclude that
securing complete information, even as to just those three subject-matters, is virtually impossible.
In addition, of course, to ranking possible states of the world, the individual actor must also rank
his or her preferences in accordance, among other things, with such possible states of the world.
According to Callon, “[f]or an agent to be able to calculate – ie to rank – her decisions, she must
at least be able to draw up a list of actions that she can undertake, and describe the effects of these
actions on the world in which she is situated. This presupposes the existence in organized form of
all the relevant information on the different states of the world and on the consequences of all
conceivable courses of action and the access of all this information to the agent. Thus she will not
only be able to get an idea of possible goals and rank them, but also mobilize the resources required
to attain them.”26
Needless to say, what Callon is describing also involves calculation of instrumental actions
conducive to the attainment of higher order of actions which are, in turn, conducive to the
attainment of higher order actions still, and so on, until eventually the preference sought is
achieved. Each of those calculations of instrumental actions requires identification, assessment,
and weighting, and weighting the likelihood of eventuation, of various influences which may
possibly affect the attainment of the particular instrumental action at hand. It is clear that the
assumption of complete rationality, including acting on a rational basis with respect to complete
information, is, accordingly, highly contestable.
As noted previously, learning and acquiring information presuppose certain social interaction.
Callon argues accordingly, that the presumption of cognitive psychology that individual economic
agents are capable of mental calculation fails to reflect the nature of calculating as a complex
collective practice; and, further, that calculative competence is culturally or socially constructed,

25
26

Supra note 11 at 4.
Ibid.

1125
such that some social structures and cultural forms favouring calculation and pursuit of selfish
interest, while others induce agents to be altruistic, disinterested, generous and even to give
freely.27
These considerations, and others, indicate that the classical and neoclassical assumption of
complete rationality is so highly problematic as to be considered unrealistic.
c. Expectation of Satisfaction
The discussion above, in the section entitled “Individual Determination of Utility”, of the
relationship between desire and satisfaction mentions a number of reasons why the level or
quantum of satisfaction actually experienced may differ from the level or quantum anticipated;
and also why there may be other discrepancies between desiredness and satisfaction, both actual
and anticipated. The same observations are relevant in this context. It is submitted that these
considerations also make it impractical to maintain the utilitarian assumption of classical and
neoclassical economics.
d. Seeking of Personal Utility
As discussed in Chapter B4, many social scientists, including Charles Perrow, criticize the
assumption that individuals mainly or exclusively seek satisfaction of their own self-interest.28 As
discussed there, Perrow considers self-interest as a situationally dependent motivation and
describes a number of variables which are thought to affect behavioural orientation as between
self-interest, other-regarding, and neutral behaviour.
For example, Perrow finds that self-interested behaviour is favoured when: continuing interactions
are minimized; accumulation of rewards and surpluses by individuals is encouraged; measurement
of individual effort or contribution is encouraged; and interdependent effort is minimized through
design of work flow and equipment. He maintains that it is generally conceded that not all
behaviour is motivated by one’s own utility and, in fact, that some organizations appear able to
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minimize self-interested behaviour.29 The present work has presented a variety of perspectives
critical of this assumption.
e. Independent Formation of Goals and Desires
As has been argued in this section, human beings normally internalize social norms, often to such
an extent that such norms are implicit in, or imprinted upon, an individual’s personal goals and
desires. Dennis Wrong mentions that human beings engaged in social interaction mutually seek
approval from one another by conforming to shared norms. Wrong refers to this phenomenon as
Parsons’ model of the “complementarity of expectations”.30
Wrong also refers to Ralph Linton’s assessment of this phenomenon, in explicit psychological
terms, saying that “[t]he need for eliciting favourable responses from others is an almost constant
component of [personality]. Indeed, it is not too much to say that there is very little organized
human behaviour which is not directed towards its satisfaction in at least some degree.”31
These two phenomena, the internalization of social norms, and the need for the approval of others,
provide some evidence that desires and goals are not formulated exclusively and independently by
the individual concerned, as posited in classical and neoclassical economic theory.
f. Independent Determination of Utility
These and other similar factors also suggest that utility is not determined exclusively and
independently by the individual concerned, as posited by classical and neoclassical economics. As
indicated above, Hodgson argued that while social structure should not be reified to the point where
it is considered to exist “even if the individuals all disappeared”,32 it is clear that social structure
is a key explanatory ingredient with respect to the behaviour of individuals. As discussed
previously, this applies to the construction of desires and utility by individuals.
4. Discussion
In conclusion, for reasons including those advanced with respect to our discussion of
methodological individualism, the assumption that individuals are capable of determining, acting
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independently, what will afford them satisfaction and what will maximize their satisfaction, and
in a proceeding to attain such satisfaction must be rejected or, at the very least, regarded as highly
problematic and contested.
ASSUMPTION FOUR – SIMILARITY OF DESIRES AND UTILITY
1. Statement
As discussed in relation to Individual Determination of Utility, mainstream, that is, classical or
neoclassical, economics considers that atomistic individuals are motivated to seek their own good,
satisfaction, or utility; and they engage, independently, in economic activity to maximize (or, in
some later writing, optimize) their own good, satisfaction, or utility.
As noted above, the assumption implicit in such view is that individuals, acting independently,
seek, and maximize, subjective utility; or satisfaction of their own individual desires. That
assumption involves in turn, ascertaining what those desires are and, in turn, whether or not the
desires sought by individuals are homogeneous or heterogeneous. A related issue is whether the
answers to these questions matter to the economist. To the extent possible, these questions will be
considered separately in separate subsections combining explanation, criticism, and discussion.
2. Identity or Similarity of Desires and Utility
One possibility is that is the desires and goals of atomistic individuals acting independently are
identical or, failing that, similar, as between one individual and another. This may be maintained
by its proponents as an assumption not subject to contestation. Otherwise, a difficulty arises in
seeking to explain how this complete or relative homogeneity arises.
Since individuals are assumed to act independently, a mimetic explanation would not seem to be
available: they are assumed not to observe the conduct of others, the desires or goals sought, and
the utility or satisfaction derived by those other individuals from such desires or goals. While
certain needs or goals, expressed broadly, may be invariant, usual, or common, these would likely
be at a very high level: for example, food, clothing, or shelter. It would seem to be difficult to
attain higher levels of specificity or granularity on this basis; for example, a need for a Savile Row
suit. Another explanation for such identity or similarity might be that such uniformity arises from
human instinct. Such a suggestion, however, would also require some evidentiary support.
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In our discussion of Individual Determination of Utility, it was noted that Alan Kirman, following
Paul Samuelson, conceded that methodological individualism, in assuming the independence of
action of individuals, did not require that there be no interaction among individuals at all; saying,
instead, that individuals may react in isolation to the appropriate signals, thereby producing an
aggregate demand function, and then generating equilibrium signals.33 In effect, the argument is
that similarity in behaviour might result from interaction through signalling, at least by price, and
perhaps otherwise.
As indicated there, Kirman argues that the assumption that individuals’ demand behaviour is
completely independent of others is essential to constructing economies that generate arbitrary
excess demand functions; however, generating a unique and stable equilibrium requires that one
assumes that society behaves as an individual which, in turn, requires that individuals’ behaviour
must be very similar.34 This suggests one justification for maintaining as an assumption the
independence of individuals’ demand behaviour: namely, that it facilitates generating a unique and
stable equilibrium. As indicated, while this might provide a motive for such assumption, it
certainly does not supply justification for it.
Kirman argues that “demand and expenditure functions if they are to be set against reality must be
defined at some reasonably high level of aggregation. The idea that we should start at the level of
the isolated individual is one which we may well have to abandon.”35 We might posit that it is this
starting point which, to a large extent, may motivate the assumption of complete or relative
homogeneity of individual demand. Otherwise, a significant dispersion of demand among
individuals, although perhaps more likely to obtain, might be difficult to manage theoretically.
For example, a broad dispersion that was relatively consistent might generate a “band” that might
be said to approximate aggregate demand, at least ignoring outliers, but it would not reduce to a
single point forming a demand curve, which could be said to intersect with the supply curve. That
supply curve, moreover, might be similarly constituted, that is to say, as a “band” rather than as a
single point. While it might then be possible to generate a supply and demand “band” representing
the areas of intersection of the supply and demand “bands”, just as it was not possible to generate
a single point representing either supply or demand at a particular price point, it would not be
Supra note 3 at 137. See the discussion under the subheading “The Problem of Aggregation”.
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possible to generate a single point of intersection of the supply and demand “bands”. Indeed, the
“band” of intersection might involve a very wide swath indeed.
It is possible, therefore, that the motivation for greater precision accounts, to some degree, for the
assumption of complete or relative homogeneity of demand. In this way, it could be said that the
assumption of complete or relative homogeneity of demand is, in itself, “reductionist”, that is to
say, quite separately, from being “reductionist” in the sense of reductionism to the level of the
individual. One might speculate that aggregations of “reductionist” methodologies might be
expected to generate conclusions which are less dependable than a single “reductionist”
methodology alone might produce. Of course, this is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
Kirman does not, of course, raise the matters mentioned here in the discussion to which we avert.
He does conclude, however, that “[t]here is no more misleading description in modern economics”
than describing “the consumption or production sector by the behaviour of one individual or
firm.”36 Such a model based on aggregation at the individual level is, he says, unjustified, yet the
alternative is to “be honest from the outset and assert simply that by assumption we postulate that
each sector of the economy behaves as one individual and not claim spurious microjustification.”37
Consequently, the aggregation problem, for him, requires an explanation of “how and why a sector
of society or society itself organizes itself in such a way as to behave like an individual, if indeed
it does. Whatever the answer, this seems to be a question which economists have singularly failed
to address.”38 Kirman concludes that making assumptions about the distribution of agents’
characteristics amounts, he says, to making assumptions about the organization of society, which,
accordingly, must then be separately justified.
Accordingly, the identity or similarity of goals and desires from one agent to another is an
assumption which is conceded by a number of prominent economists, such as Kirman, to require
justification, which has hitherto been absent.
3. Dispersion of Desires and Utility
An assumption or generalization to this effect accords with methodological individualism. In turn,
it affects the interpretation of the general equilibrium model. The economist Frank Ackerman, in
36
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a review of such model, concluded that the “mathematical dead end reached by general equilibrium
analysis… arises from intentional design features, present in neoclassical theory since its
beginnings.”39 He says that these are variously ascribed to two principal features of neoclassical
theory: aggregation, and the individualistic model of consumer behaviour. Both of these have been
discussed above.
In neoclassical economic theory, he says, “a different utility function motivates each individual,
giving a group of people a structureless, unpredictable pattern of change. No common forces move
them all in parallel; no interactions with each other, save through market exchange, coordinate
their motions.”40 Accordingly, the modelling of individual and firm behaviour by the behaviour of
a single individual or firm, criticized by Kirman under the immediately preceding heading, would
be subject to similar objections.
Because the microeconomic model of neoclassical economics “concentrates on one aspect of
human activity and assumes away everything else”, namely, the utility function, Ackerman says
that it fails to interpret human behaviour as involving “a complex combination of relatively
predictable responses to social forces on the one hand, and unpredictable individual preferences
and choices on the other hand.”41 Because utility cannot be directly observed, it cannot be
compared from one person to another, leading to the consequence, according to Ackerman, that
“Walrasian general equilibrium was devoid of empirical content.”42 However, some economists,
such as Alfred Marshall and Arthur Pigou, “maintained that interpersonal comparison of utility
was at least sometimes possible, for group averages if not for individuals.”43
The later substitution of revealed preference relations (of preferences) for utility functions,
involved ranking preferences rather than absolute measures of utility. However, this still
maintained “the asocial individualism of the model, the feature which subverts structure and
prediction of group behaviour. Each individual still marches to a different drummer, even if the

39

Frank Ackerman, "Still Dead After All These Years: Interpreting the Failure of General Equilibrium Theory" (2002)
9:2 J Economic Methodology 119 at 119.
40
Ibid at 131.
41
Ibid at 132.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.

1131
drums are now labeled ‘revealed preference relation’ instead of `utility function’. Naturally, this
leaves no way of telling where the parade is headed.”44
This exposition of the difficulties of what Ackerman calls “asocial individualism” recalls the
argument of Alan Kirman in the immediately preceding section. In Kirman’s view, “the standard
assumptions on the endowments, production possibilities and preferences of individuals” do not
generate a satisfactory general equilibrium model.45 In support, Kirman cites Morishima’s
statement to the effect that even if such assumptions could be employed to devise a correct general
equilibrium model, without some social connection among individuals, “that equilibrium solution
will amount to no more than a utopian state of affairs which bears no relation whatsoever to the
real economy.”46
Kirman’s review of literature concerning general equilibrium theory also sought, among other
things, to determine whether greater or lesser dispersion of individual preferences could result in
equilibrium conditions that are stable and unique. He concluded that it could not;47 but that a
sufficiently wide dispersion of preferences in a large enough market could generate a continuous
aggregate demand function, which, he argued, would not satisfy the requisite conditions of
uniqueness and stability.48 As discussed under the immediately preceding heading, Kirman
concluded that methodological individualism may have to be abandoned; and that describing the
behaviour of the consumer or production sector of the economy by the behaviour of one individual
or firm is as misleading as any description in modern economics.
Accordingly, it is clear that substantial difficulties attend maintaining this position.
4. Relevance to Economic Inquiry
Of course, the third possible position in relation to desire and utility is that its investigation is not
a proper subject of economic inquiry. In his extremely widely cited article “Rational Fools: A
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Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory”,49 Nobel economics laureate
Amartya Sen discussed economic models based on egoistic behaviour, concluding that “[t]he
nature of man in these current economic models continues, then, to reflect the particular
formulation of certain general philosophical questions posed in the past. The realism of the chosen
conception of man is simply not a part of this inquiry.”50
The political scientist Stephen Krasner agrees. He describes the Chicago School’s work as
exemplifying the “most pristine and imperialistic form of this argument”, in that it “applies
microeconomic analysis to all aspects of human behaviour. It assumes that preferences are
universal.”51 This may be, at least in part, because economists do not consider the formation of
preferences as an appropriate or interesting subject for economic inquiry, as Sen maintains. For
support, Krasner cites Gary Becker, who argues that since “economists generally have had little to
contribute, especially in recent times, to the understanding of how preferences are formed,
preferences are assumed not to change substantially over time, nor to be very different between
wealthy and poor persons, or even missions in different societies and cultures”. 52 It can be
conceded immediately that such assumptions are, in general, at variance with ordinary experience.
In an extremely widely cited article, provocatively entitled “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum”,53
Nobel economic laureates George Stigler and Gary Becker explicate this further, discussing two
possible interpretations of the “venerable admonition not to quarrel over tastes”.54 They note that
this admonition “is commonly interpreted as advice to terminate a dispute when it has been
resolved into a difference of tastes, presumably because there is no further room for rational
persuasion. Tastes are the unchallengeable axioms of a man’s behavior: he may properly (usefully)
be criticized for inefficiency in satisfying his desires, but the desires themselves are data.” 55
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It may be noted, in passing, that this admonition and related observations assume that tastes and,
accordingly, individual demand, vary among individuals. The admonition adopts the perspective
that “an explanation of economic phenomena that reaches a difference in taste between people or
times is the terminus of the argument: the problem is abandoned at this point to whoever studies
and explains tastes (psychologist? anthropologist? phrenologists? sociobiologists?).”56 The
suggestion made here appears to be that the economist should assume complete or relative
homogeneity of individuals’ tastes and preferences.
Stigler and Becker also advance “another and preferable interpretation [of the admonition]: that
tastes neither change capriciously nor differ importantly between people”, on which interpretation,
they say, “one never reaches this impasse: the economist continues to search for differences in
prices or incomes to explain any differences or changes in behavior.”57 They submit that, in
consequence, “[t] he choice between these two views of the role of tastes in economic theory must
ultimately be made on the basis of their comparative analytical productivities”.58
In that regard, they propose (ambitiously, they say) “the hypothesis that widespread and/or
persistent human behaviour can be explained by a generalized calculus of utility-maximizing
behaviour, without introducing the qualification “tastes remain the same”… [a] thesis that does
not permit a direct proof because it is an assertion about the world, not a proposition in logic.”59
They also claim that “no significant behavior has been illuminated by assumptions of differences
in tastes”, whether by wealth or other classifications.60
Of course, the hypothesis, assumption, or generalization which remains subject to contestation,
even without the qualification concerning “tastes remaining the same”, is the larger one concerning
the universality of utility-maximizing behaviour. Consideration of that subject in the present work
has suggested that such a hypothesis, assumption, or generalization is either highly contentious, at
best, or is unsupported.
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5. Conclusion
Accordingly, it may simply be the case that the preferences of individuals are not of significant
concern to economists. In his 1992 Nobel lecture, Gary Becker explains that “[w]hile the economic
approach to behavior builds on the theory of individual choice, it is not mainly concerned with
individuals. It uses theory at the micro level as a powerful tool to derive implications at the group
or macro level.”61 This suggests that individual choice theory is only of interest insofar as it
concerns aggregate demand (or supply). In that case, Becker’s observations may be tantamount to
asserting that the theory of individual choice and individual demand is not seriously maintained;
and that, instead, what is important is the aggregation. As demonstrated in the discussion here,
aggregation of individual behaviour presupposes the existence of both inter-subjective behaviour
and group-subject oriented behaviour.
Even if it is maintained that individual choice and individual demand are not relevant to economic
theory, the considerations advanced in the present work suggest that some conclusions may be
drawn, at least preliminarily, about the relevance of economics to behaviour. One such conclusion
is that for the purposes of analyzing behaviour within groups, including a variety of organizations,
and, in particular, business corporations, it may be expected that “the economic approach to
behaviour” may have but little to contribute to understanding how individuals behave, and how
their behaviour and choices relate to the behaviour and choices of groups. These matters will be
investigated in the immediately following chapters of Part 2 of the present work.
ASSUMPTION FIVE – DESIRE AND AVAILABILITY MISMATCH
1. Statement
Mainstream economics assumes that the desires and goals of individuals are effectively unlimited:
that is to say, individuals seek an unlimited quantum of utility, however it may be acquired.
Alternatively, it can be said that there may be some limitation on the utility sought by individuals,
although such limitation would be at a relatively high order. In turn, the possibility arises that an
individual may not be able to completely satisfy or attain the utility that he or she seeks. This may
occur because the individual lacks the resources to acquire the utility satisfying item; or because
the availability of that item is limited, and perhaps even scarce; or both.
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Notwithstanding this, mainstream economics also assumes that the supply and demand for a
product at a particular price are matched, that is to say, that supply and demand are in equilibrium.
That assumption, in turn, maintains that demand does not exceed supply at the relevant price,
which is to say that there is no excess demand. In part, this is because both “demand” and “supply”
are always modified by a price assumption: “demand” is demand at a particular price; while
“supply” is supply at a particular price. As a result, the goals and desires of consumers may be
effectively be limited by the availability of their resources to pay for additional commodities they
seek; and the goals and desires of producers may be effectively limited by their ability to produce
additional commodities at the prices which purchasers are willing to pay.
2. Explanation
In their important article “Existence of An Equilibrium for A Competitive Economy”, Kenneth
Arrow and Gerard Debreu sought to prove the existence of an equilibrium for an integrated model
of production, exchange and competition, employing what they maintain are, in effect, “more
realistic” assumptions than in some other cases.62 However, many of these assumptions are broadly
consistent with mainstream economic assumptions.
Among other things, they assume that there are a finite number of distinct commodities, including
services, including spatial and temporal specifications, that is to say, such that the same commodity
at two different locations would be regarded as two different commodities. Similarly, the same
commodity at two different points in time may be regarded as two separate commodities. Thus,
the same commodity instantiated at two different places and at two different times may be
considered to be not one, but four separate commodities.
They assume that the commodities are produced in “production units” or firms, each of which has
a set of possible production plans involving, among other things, input and output schedules.63 As
they say, ‘[u]nder the usual assumptions of perfect competition, the economic motivation for
production is the maximization of profits taking prices as given.”64

62

Kenneth J Arrow and Gerard Debreu, "Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy" (1954) 22:3
Econometrica 265 at 266.
63
Ibid at 267.
64
Ibid at 268 [emphasis in the original].

1136
Arrow and Debreu also assume the existence of a number of “consumption units”, typically
families or individuals, but also including institutional consumers;65 and, further, assume that the
consumer is not subject to any budgetary restraints. They also assume that “[a]s is standard in
economic theory, the choice by the consumer from a given set of alternative consumption vectors
is… made in accordance with a preference scale” which reflects the consumer’s utility.66
These assumptions may give rise to situations of unsatisfied demand. Even in the situation of one
producer and one consumer, the possibility can be envisioned that the producer might maximize
profits at a level of production lower than that at which the consumer is able to satisfy his or her
entire demand. This may be the case even where the consumer’s resources are unrestricted, such
as by income or alternative resource deployment. Moreover, because the specified assumptions
include the existence of a finite number of specified commodities, it may be that the availability
of an unlimited number of the specified commodities or the specification of an unlimited number
of commodities may also result in unsatisfied demand. In all those cases, of course, there is a limit
on the availability of commodities which may be sought.
In Arrow and Debreu’s model, “[t]he basic economic motivation in the choice of a consumption
vector is that of maximizing utility among all consumption vectors which satisfy the budget
restraint, i.e., whose cost at market prices does not exceed the individual’s income.” 67 This is an
assumption commonly made in such models. They explain that “the supply and demand for all
commodities is determined as a function of [price] (not necessarily single-valued) if we vary
[price] and at the same time instruct each production and consumption unit to behave as if the
announced value of [price] were the equilibrium value. The market for any commodity is usually
considered to be in equilibrium when the supply for that commodity equals the demand”.68
They explain that their model generates “the dynamic picture of the classical “law of supply and
demand” … [t]hat is, the price of a commodity rises if demand exceeds supply, falls if supply
exceeds demand. Equilibrium is therefore incompatible with excess demand on any market.”69 The
“law of supply and demand”, that is, maintains that supply and demand are equal at each price
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point. Consequently, according to this “law”, demand is exhausted when prospective purchasers
are unwilling to pay more in order to secure additional supply of the relevant commodity; and,
similarly, supply is exhausted when prospective suppliers are not willing to supply additional
quantities of the relevant commodity at the price for the question.
However, once again, it can be seen that the budget restraint alone may entail the consequence that
the individual concerned, acting independently and rationally, is not able to maximize his or her
utility. The assumptions of consumer or demand side independence and rationality of action have
already been shown to be problematic. The inability to maximize utility as a consequence of the
budget restraint assumption introduces the possibility that the individual will be required to
reprioritize his or her preferences; and that such required reprioritization may reduce the
individual’s aggregate utility. Similarly, on the supply side, the price required to generate
additional supply may exceed the limit that prospective purchasers are willing to pay for the
commodity. Indeed, they may be willing to pay more for the commodity than the highest point of
intersection of the supply and demand curves but not as much they would be required to pay in
order for the supplier to make additional quantities of the commodity available.
3. Criticism
These mechanical or mathematical explanations of supply and demand or of production and
consumption do not seem to assist us much in our quest to situate the corporation “in the real
world” and in legal theory. The assertion that individuals seek only to maximize their own utility
has been demonstrated to be highly problematic and, even more, likely inaccurate. Treatment of
producers as taking into account only maximizing profits has been suggested to be somewhat
misleading. Among other things, these perspectives on consumers and producers of products do
not take into account factors underlying demand. The argument that consumers seek to maximize
utility does not assist in explaining how it is that certain products or services are expected to
maximize utility, which seems to require something in the way of a behavioural explanation.
Indeed, generating supply and demand curves for a “product” seems to depend upon reaching a
conclusion as to what a product is and how the particular product concerned differs from other
products with respect to certain prescribed indicia (for example, substitutability) such that those
other products are not included in the supply and demand curves under consideration. As
previously noted, in their discussion of the sociology of markets, Fligstein and Dauter observed
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that determining what products are produced and even determining what constitutes a product are
both matters that are socially determined.70
Likewise, they argue that nation states may influence the types of products which may be
exchanged and rules supporting and surrounding exchange; and that specific exchange relations
may be deeply affected by cultural meanings behind specific products that are bought and sold.71
In these ways, demand seems to be affected by aspects of utility that are socially and not
individually determined; such that the construction of demand is more complex than
methodological individualism would suggest. The supposition that similar social dynamics, with
appropriate changes, apply to the supply side may be considered to be not unreasonable.
The assumption of rationality has been closely linked with supply and demand; however, this has
not always been the case, at least on the demand side. In his important article “Rationality of Self
and Others in an Economic System”,72 Kenneth Arrow, says that “[a]mong the classical
economists, such as Smith and Ricardo, rationality had the limited meaning of preferring more to
less” (which seems, at least, anecdotally appealing), and “their rationality hypothesis was the
maximization of profits by the firm”.73 However, “[t]here is no hypothesis of rationality on the
side of consumers among the classicists. Not until John Stuart Mill did any of the English classical
economists even recognize the idea that demand might depend on price”; or notice that “the
demand for any commodity must depend on the prices of all commodities”.74
The latter insight was one that Jevons, Walras, and Menger, the “great pioneers of the marginalist
revolution” later developed into “their rationality hypothesis for the consumer [which] was the
maximization of utility under a budget constraint. With this formulation, the definition of demand
as a function of all prices was an immediate implication, and it became possible to formulate the
general equilibrium of the economy.”75
Our observation above that certain economists assume a homogeneity of utility and in its demand,
while others assume the opposite, echoes here in connection with the assumption of rational
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behaviour. Arrow explains that in connection with what he describes as “new classical” or “rational
expectations” models, strong supplementary assumptions are added to the general model of
rationality, of which the “[m]ost prevalent of all is the assumption that all individuals have the
same utility function (or at least that they differ only in broad categories based on observable
magnitudes, such as family size). But this postulate leads to curious and, to my mind, serious
difficulties in the interpretation of evidence.” He asks why, if all individuals are alike, a dispersion
is observed in the evidence as to choices actually made. This was discussed previously.76
Arrow concludes that “[t]his dilemma is intrinsic. If agents are all alike, there is really no room for
trade. The very basis of economic analysis, from Smith on, is the existence of differences in
agents.”77 Arrow argues that the apparent force of the rationality hypothesis “only comes from the
addition of supplementary hypotheses”,78 the deepest of which is homogeneity across individual
agents. Without that assumption, he adjudges the rationality hypothesis as weak, but he maintains
that this assumption is especially dangerous because “[i]t denies the fundamental assumption of
the economy, that it is built on gains from trading arising from individual differences. Further, it
takes attention away from a very important aspect of the economy, namely the effects of the
distribution of income and of other individual characteristics on the workings of the economy.”79
Again, this recalls the discussion above in relation to the previous assumption.
While the classical view “emphasized how a complete price system would require individuals to
know very little about the economy other than their own private domain of production and
consumption”,80 once it was recognized that demand was a function of all prices, “the individual
agent has to know all (or at least a great many) prices and then perform an optimization based on
that knowledge. All knowledge is costly, even the knowledge of prices”81 The dependence of the
demand for any commodity upon the prices of all commodities, it may be recalled from Arrow’s
discussion of the classical economists, was first observed by “the great pioneers of the marginalist
revolution, Jevons, Walras, and Menger” and, as later discovered, by Herman Heinrich Gossen.82
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On the supply side, “[t]he firm has to know not only prices but a demand curve. Whatever
definition is given to complexity of knowledge, a demand curve is more complex than a price. It
involves knowing about the behavior of others” and imputes scientific behaviour to them, which
“does seem to lead to an infinite regress.”83 However, it is not only the demand curve that requires
knowledge about the behaviour of others. As a minimum, it would seem that construction of the
supply curve would also require similar knowledge. Knowledge of other modes of behaviour may
also be required.
Significantly, Arrow says that to construct a rationality-based theory of economic behaviour, “the
rationality of all agents must be common knowledge”.84 Such rationality has an iterative aspect,
since “[e]ach agent must not only know that the other agents (at least those with significant power)
are rational but know that each other agent knows every other agent is rational, know that every
other agent knows that every other agent is rational, and so forth. It is in this sense that rationality
and the knowledge of rationality is a social and not only an individual phenomenon.”85
On the demand side, of course, Arrow suggests that an individual, in order to act rationally, is
required to perform an optimization based on his or her knowledge of all, or, at least, a great
number of, prices attributable, if not to all, then, at least, to a great number of, the products
available. Yet logically, as well as in the real world, this may involve, if not an infinite number of
products, then at least a very large finite number of such products. This presents a highly complex
problem.
4. Discussion
Accordingly, assumptions concerning the homogeneity of goals and desires, and the one hand, or
their heterogeneity, on the other, both lead to substantial logical difficulties. This is also the case
with respect to assumptions of rational and independent behaviour. As in the case of other
disciplines and fields, lawyers and legal theorists must be aware of these consequences and
limitations on the applicability of these generalized assumptions or statements of knowledge.
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ASSUMPTION SIX – INDEPENDENT RATIONAL INFORMED ACTORS
1. Statement
As stated in Chapter B4 in relation to “Atomistic Utilitarianism”, mainstream, that is, classical or
neoclassical, economics considers that atomistic individuals who are motivated to seek their own
good, satisfaction, or utility engage in economic activity to maximize (or, in some later writing,
optimize) their own good, satisfaction, or utility. In discussion of the previous assumptions,
particularly in relation to “Atomistic Utilitarianism” under the heading “Desire or Utility and
Choice of Substitution”, it has been noted that these individuals are assumed to make choices
independently and rationally based on relevant and complete information.
2. Explanation
According to the sociologist James A. Coleman, most economists consider an actor “as having
goals independently arrived at, as acting independently, and as wholly self-interested”, the
"principal virtue [of which view] lies in having a principle of action, that of maximizing utility.”86
Maximizing utility equates to economic rationality, however, Kenneth Arrow observes that “the
everyday usage of the term "rationality" does not correspond to the economist's definition as
transitivity and completeness, that is, maximization of something. The common understanding is
instead the complete exploitation of information, sound reasoning, and so forth.”87 Thus, Arrow
claims that economic rationality consists in maximizing utility. Obviously, such a definition of
economic rationality excludes certain normal “rational” considerations. Such definition also does
not comport with many of the uses of the term “rationality” to which that term is put by economists
of a variety of persuasions and in a variety of contexts.
Rationality, considered more generally, is assumed to be the basis on which choices are made.
March and Olsen say that not only in modern political science “but throughout modern theoretical
work in the social sciences, the pre-eminent vision of human behavior as a vision of choice. Life
is characterized as deliberate decisionmaking.”88 Among other things, rational decision-making is
considered to be deliberate and thoughtful.
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3. Criticism
As noted previously, the rational choice assumption of economic decision-making relies on
individuals who have complete information relevant to the decision engaging in rational action, in
identifying what would be conducive to their utility ordering their preferences accordingly, and
taking “rational” steps towards their attainment. Herbert Simon maintains that models of rational
choice rely upon specific assumptions as to the “givens” or “constraints within which rational
adaptations take place”, including “(1) the set of alternatives open to choice, (2) the relationships
to determine the pay-offs (“satisfactions,” “goal attainment”) as a function of the alternative that
is chosen, and (3) the preference-orderings among pay-offs.”89
As to the achievement of these “pay-offs”, March and Olsen say that the “details of the choice
metaphor varied from one treatment to another,” however, “the characteristic form is one that
assumes choices stem from two guesses about the future. The first is a guess about the uncertain
future consequences of possible current action.”90 Such a guess requires information about
probable consequences, a measure which is subject to the human limitations of precision and bias,
as well as limitations as to cost.91
March and Olsen explain that “[t]he second guess on which intentional, anticipatory choice is
based is a guess about a decision maker's uncertain future preferences for possible future outcomes.
In any theory of deliberate choice, action depends on the decision maker's values. Since the
consequences of interest are to be realized in the future, it is necessary to anticipate not only what
will happen but how the decision maker will feel about those outcomes when they are
experienced.”92 This has been noted in our discussion above.
Further, we have also drawn attention to the fact that the effluxion of time and intrusion of other
events, changes in preferences, as well as mispredictions as to how the decision maker will feel
about the outcomes sought, and any other factors, may result in the decision maker not attaining
the utility or satisfaction sought. March and Olsen make a similar specification, namely, that “[t]he
complexities of the second guess are largely ignored by theories of choice. In their standard forms,
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the theories assume that preferences are stable, thus that current preferences are good predictors
of future preferences; that preferences are unambiguous and consistent, thus that a choice will be
clearly indicated, given the first guess; and that preferences are exogenous, thus that whatever
process generates preferences, it precedes choice and is independent of the choice process.”93 It
has been argued here that these assumptions are problematic and even highly doubtful, factors
which contributed, in some degree, to the replacement of “utility” by “revealed preferences”.
Knight argues that “action rarely leads to exactly the intended result, because it is always affected
by error”, and also because “ends are never really given”. For example, he says that actual desires
are partly a matter of curiosity and that expected surprise is an important element in motivation.94
Well-being, according to him, is not a matter of seeking the “right” answer to some question but
is, instead, to be sought through “intelligent” experiment.95
March and Olsen described “revealed preference” theory as “one of the best-developed forms of
choice theories” in which “these assumptions about preferences are taken as axioms, and
preferences are discovered not by asking decision makers to report them but by defining a
"revealed preference" function that satisfies the axioms and is consistent with choices made by a
decision maker”.96 In effect, the axioms plus the actual choices of the decision-maker are assumed
to reveal the preferences of such decision maker. It can readily be seen that this is a relationship
founded on logical, not empirical, construction. It also accords with Knight’s observations
concerning well-being.
The development of revealed preference theory was originally credited to Paul Samuelson in his
1938 article “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers’ Behaviour”.97 However, as indicated in
the short description by March and Olsen quoted in the preceding paragraph, the theory also
assumes that values held by the individual decision maker do not change over time, an assumption
which we have identified as problematic. Further, according to Ackerman, revealed preference
theory itself assumes not only that a consumer knows about all of the commodities on the market
93
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and is able to preference order them, but also that the consumer learns of the availability of all new
commodities on the market when they become available, and is able to revise their initial
preference ordering at once in order to reflect the change.98
In order to depict this, Ackerman invokes “a commodity space that, in a modern industrial
economy, may have hundreds of thousands of dimensions”;99 and describes a consumer in such
environment as being “lost in commodity space”.100 Consequently, he admits that “[c]learly, no
real person come close to fulfilling this role.”101 Thus, revealed preference theory is subject to
challenge on this ground, and on a number of other grounds.
As noted previously, commentators such as Herbert Simon have indicated that an individual cannot
have perfect information as to a matter requiring decision, but must proceed, instead, based on
information actually known, and in a manner as closely approximating rational process as possible,
that is to say, by employing procedures devised in an attempt to make the best use of the
information.102 Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality” takes into account both limitations of
information available to the individual and limitations of cognitive capacity.
In this respect, Simon’s theory differs from “traditional economic theory” which, as described by
Simon, “postulates an "economic man," who, in the course of being "economic" is also "rational."
This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not
absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to have a
well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that enables him to
calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these will permit
him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale.”103 These characteristics of
“economic man”, their implications, and criticisms in that behalf have been discussed above.
Instead, Simon sought to “replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational
behaviour that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that
are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such
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organisms exist.”104 He indicates that “[l]acking the kinds of empirical knowledge of the decisional
process that will be required for a definitive theory, the hard facts of the actual world can, at the
present stage, enter the theory only in a relative unsystematic and unrigourous way”105, in effect,
by “common experience” of such matters. In these respects, we would propose that, instead of the
“global rationality” of “economic man”, something approaching “practical rationality” may be
considered to be characteristic of “practical economic man”, “real economic man”, or “economic
man in the world”.
In this connection, Simon argued that “there is a complete lack of evidence that, in actual human
choice situations of any complexity, it [the classically required] computations can be, or are in
fact, performed” referring to the “classical” concepts of rationality, including the ability to specify
the exact nature of the outcomes (free of “unanticipated consequences”); a complete ordering of
pay-offs; and the certainty or definable probability of outcomes of particular alternatives.106 We
have made a similar argument previously in this work. We would also repeat, in passing, the
observation that this description of rationality approximates that in use in fields other than
economics, contrary to Arrow’s description of “economic rationality” as congruent with utility.107
Simon posited that, instead of making the classically required computations, a decision maker
would formulate “some aspiration as to how good an alternative he should find” and that once an
alternative was discovered which met this level of aspiration, the decision-maker would terminate
that search and choose that alternative, a selection process which he referred to as “satisficing”.108
Simon himself referred to the existence of a large mass of descriptive data concerning “how human
problem serving and decision-making actually take place in a wide variety of situations”109, and
which were incorporated in a variety of theories which “do not yet constitute a single coherent
whole” but which commonly, in one way or another, “incorporate the notions of bounded
rationality: the need to search for decision alternatives, the replacement of optimization by targets
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and satisfy some goals, and mechanisms of learning and adaptation.”110 Simon counselled against
the uncritical use of counterfactual assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics on the
grounds that “we have seen, on the contrary, that neoclassical theory does not always lead to the
same conclusions at the level of aggregate phenomena and policy as are implied by the postulate
of bounded rationality, in any of its variants.”111
When Simon asserts that the assumptions of perfect or “classical” rationality may lead to different
conclusions from assumptions of bounded rationality, the “difference” may consist in greater
correspondence with real world phenomena. Accordingly, this assertion may be seen as an implicit
recognition that the assumption of bounded rationality is preferable to that of perfect or “classical”
rationality because the assumption of bounded rationality has greater explanatory power with
respect to phenomena in the real world. Rejecting an assumption of perfection seems to lead to
superior results, hence, Simon applies this perspective to assumptions other than rationality.
Accordingly, he rejects the assumption that rational human behaviour can be accounted for by a
handful of invariants, such as perfect adaptation to the environment, arguing that each of these
principles “operates in interaction with extremely complex boundary conditions imposed by the
environment and by the very facts of human long-term memory and of the capacity of human
beings, individually and collectively, to learn.”112 In this way, he rejects the perfect rationality
assumptions of decision making of mainstream economics, preferring, instead assumptions of
bounded rationality.
The influences determined to attend upon decision-making were extended and further specified by
other behavioural scientists, including economists, and included the very significant contributions
of Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and of Amos Tversky. For example, “framing effects”
describe the effects of “the passive acceptance of the formulation given”. 113 Prospect theory
recognizes that perception is reference dependent, such that preferences appear to be defined in
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relation to a reference point. Consequently, for example, changes in wealth might affect attitudes
to risk more than would the quantum of wealth itself.114
Similarly, loss aversion explains the “familiar observation that out-of-pocket losses are much more
distressing than foregone gains”.115 Richard Thaler identified a particular example of loss aversion
which he called the “endowment effect: the finding that the “maximum amount that people pay to
acquire a good is commonly much less than the minimal amount they demand to part from it once
they own it.”116 Kahneman concluded that “[t]he interpretation is straightforward: A good is worth
more when it is considered as something that could be lost or given up than when it is evaluated
as a potential gain.”117
Kahneman and Tversky also determined that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities in predicting values to simpler
judgemental operations”118, which heuristics can be quite useful sometimes but can sometimes
lead, instead, to severe and systematic errors119, including heuristically induced bias. Their 1974
review article described “three heuristics of judgment, labelled representativeness, availability,
and anchoring,… along with a dozen systematic biases, including non-regressive prediction,
neglect of base-rate information, overconfidence, and overestimates of the frequency of events that
are easy to recall.”120 Kahneman and other collaborators also “propose that an automatic affective
evaluation – the emotional core of an attitude – is the main determinant of many judgments and
behaviours”121, which is to say that judgments and behaviours are often determined emotively,
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rather than rationally. Unfortunately, in spite of their intrinsic interest, time does not permit a
further excursion into these issues.
4. Discussion
As demonstrated in this section and previously, social scientists, including economists, have
criticized the “rational choice” assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics and have,
instead, adopted principles concerning “bounded rationality” and advances of “behavioural
economics”. Accordingly, to the extent that the perspectives of mainstream economics concerning
decision-making are sought to be applied in analyzing and regulating participants in the economy,
such as the economic “firm” or the legal “corporation”, such an approach must be rejected or
amended to conform work closely with “bounded rationality” and “behavioural economics”
approaches to decision-making.
ASSUMPTION SEVEN – UTILITARIAN INDEPENDENT MARKET TRANSACTIONS
1. Statement
As stated in Chapter B4 in the section entitled “Atomistic Utilitarianism”, mainstream, that is,
classical or neoclassical, economics considers that atomistic individuals who are motivated to seek
their own good, satisfaction, or utility engage in economic activity to maximize (or, in some later
writing, optimize) their own good, satisfaction, or utility. Mainstream economics also assumes that
these individuals make choices rationally based on relevant and complete information, an
assumption demonstrated here to be highly problematic. It has also been demonstrated here that
the quest for subjective utility may be ephemeral and unsustainable. It is also assumed by
mainstream economics that these atomistic individuals pursue their own utilitarian goals and
objectives independently through market transactions. This last point will be taken up in this
section.
2. Explanation
As noted above, according to Coleman, most economists consider an actor “as having goals
independently arrived at, as acting independently, and as wholly self-interested” the “principal
virtues [of which view] lie in having a principle of action, that of maximizing utility.”122
Maximizing utility equates to economic rationality, as to which Kenneth Arrow observes that “the
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everyday usage of the term "rationality" does not correspond to the economist's definition as
transitivity and completeness, that is, maximization of something. The common understanding is
instead the complete exploitation of information, sound reasoning, and so forth.”123 This point has
been discussed above in the section entitled “Independent Rational Informed Actors”.
Rationality is assumed to be the basis on which choices are made. We restate here March and
Olsen’s observation that not only in modern political science “but throughout modern theoretical
work in the social sciences, the pre-eminent vision of human behavior as a vision of choice. Life
is characterized as deliberate decisionmaking.”124 Simon and others purport to accept the choice
paradigm, but reject the assumption of complete rationality in favour of “bounded” rationality.
For present purposes, what is important is that these choices are exercised by decision makers in
the context of a market. We have previously argued that the market is socially constructed, with
the result that the decision maker who acts in the market does not do so in an atomistic or
methodologically individualistic capacity, or completely “independently”, but acts, instead, in a
socially constructed sphere of action and in accordance with his or her expectations of the
behaviour of others.
Kenneth Arrow allows that “the possibility of rational expectations cannot be denied. But they
require not only extensive first-order knowledge but also common knowledge, since predictions
of the future depend on other individuals’ predictions of the future.”125 This is been discussed here
previously. Indeed, Arrow argues that “rationality is not a property of the individual alone,
although it is usually presented that way. Rather, it gathers not only its force but also its meaning
from the social context in which it is embedded.”126 This recalls our discussion of Arendt’s
characterization of “reality” as the product of common recognition among individuals.127
Arrow takes pains to ensure that his observation of the social nature of reality is not limited only
to theory. He goes on to say that “rationality in application is not merely a property of the
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individual” but, instead, “[i]ts useful and powerful implications derived from the conjunction of
individual rationality and the other basic concepts of neoclassical theory – equilibrium,
competition, and completeness of markets.”128 Of course, the notions of equilibrium and
competition, as well as completeness of markets, all relate in some way to markets, which are often
considered to be a paradigmatic example of the social construction of reality.
At the same time, a definite substratum of Arrow’s analysis is the notion that markets are rational.
This is, of course, consistent with his observation that rationality in application relates to the other
basic concepts of neoclassical theory which he mentions. These include, importantly, matters
relating to markets. Having said that, Arrow also admits, that “[r]ationality also seems capable of
leading to conclusions flatly contrary to observation.”129 He may be distinguishing between
“rationality in application” as being at least partly socially derived and “rationality in theory” and
expressing the view that rationality and theory may lead to results not borne out by observation.
On the other hand, he may be returning to his treatment of neoclassical “rationality”, in theory, as
signifying only utility. Although interesting, resolution of this issue need not detain us.
3. Criticism
As indicated at the beginning of this discussion under the heading “Statement”, this chapter has
considered the proposition that atomistic individuals motivated to seek their own utility engage in
market transactions, acting independently and rationally, based on complete relevant information,
for that purpose. Each of the elements of this proposition have been discussed in the immediately
preceding chapter and in this chapter. The nature of human individuals positive by economics as
exclusively self-interested in their pursuit of their desires, own good, and satisfaction was
discussed in B4.130 The atomism of human individuals and the related subjects of methodological
individualism, reductionism, and aggregation were also discussed in that chapter.131
Accordingly, the present chapter up to this point has examined various matters relating to how the
posited atomistic individual independently acquires knowledge of, formulates, or determines his
or her desires and goals and expectations of their satisfaction. 132 This chapter has discussed the
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independence, identity, similarity and dispersion of desires and utility,133 and constraints on
achievement of desires, goals, or utility.134 The behaviour of human individuals independently
from one another and acting completely “rationally” and with full and complete information was
also the subject of discussion in the present chapter.135 Finally, the pursuit of such desires, goals,
or utility by means of independent market transactions is the subject of discussion in the present
section.
The subject of utilitarian independent market transactions involves questions concerning whether
individuals determine their utility completely independently, which has been discussed earlier in
this chapter,136 and the question whether market actions or market transactions can be effected by
human individuals completely independently, which is discussed in the present section. As noted
in Chapter B4,137 Kirman argues that the independence of individual action posited by economics
for centuries does not deny the existence of any interaction among individuals.138 It is apparent
that there is such interaction.
Kirman quotes Samuelson, who analogized such interaction to “individualistic atoms of the rare
gas in my balloon”, and said that they “are not isolated from the other atoms”, eventually claiming
that even Adam Smith “would have stressed… that the contacts between the atoms [individuals]
were organized by the use of markets and prices.”139 Kirman says that Samuelson is objecting here
to the argument that “once the appropriate signals are given, individuals behave in isolation and
the result of their behaviour may simply be added together”,140 in effect to produce aggregate
supply or demand curves, as the case may be. As noted in the immediately preceding paragraph,
the problem of aggregation is the subject of discussion in B4.141
Rosenbaum objects that such unobservable and merely hypothesized demand curves intersect at a
transactional point or Walrasian market which is “devoid of any institutional, spatial or social
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features”.142 Walrasian markets and market equilibrium are discussed below.143 Kirman maintains,
of course, that the classical assumption of independence of action of individuals does not conflict
with the existence of some degree of interaction between or among them. As argued above,
organization of contacts, whether conscious or otherwise, constitutes a form of social action.
Markets are socially constructed.
In this regard, the nature and role of markets in economic theory is investigated in Chapter B2,144
guided by a review article by Rosenbaum.145 The social construction of markets is likewise
investigated in Chapter B2,146 guided on this subject by a review article by Fligstein and Dauter.147
4. Discussion
In conclusion, as demonstrated in B2, the assumption of neoclassical economics that market
transactions take place between or among atomized individuals acting independently and rationally
seeking to maximize their own utility must be rejected as an empirical description of reality. As
such, that assumption and others based upon it should be rejected as a principle which may be used
empirically by legal theorists, commentators, legislators, regulators, and judges, whether in
relation to the corporation or otherwise (“legal readers”).
As previously noted, legal readers of economically oriented academic and other materials,
particularly those who lack a background in economics, should exercise due care in relying upon
economic discourse and other discourse seeking to apply or involve economic terms, principles,
assumptions, and practices. Special heed should be paid to unstated or underlying terms, principles,
assumptions, and practices that are not specifically identified to readers.
Those who seek to engage in legal discourse and seek assistance in economic discourse should be
particularly attuned to the differences in the use of terms, principles, assumptions, and practices as
between law, on the one hand, and economics and other social sciences, on the other. The present
work has sought to juxtapose terms, principles, assumptions, and practices applied in economic
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discourse, particularly in classical and neoclassical theory, with those extant in other social
sciences, and in the legal field. This practice will continue throughout the present work.
ASSUMPTION EIGHT – MARKET PRICES TEND TOWARDS AN EQUILBRIUM
1. Statement
Alan Kirman, in his review of General Equilibrium Theory, indicates that it is “regarded by many
as the summum of the ‘grand neo-classical synthesis’” and, although subjected to varied and
systematic criticism, “still furnishes the basic foundations of what many are pleased to call
‘mainstream economics’.”148
2. Explanation
As noted in our discussion in the section entitled “Desire and Availability Mismatch”, Arrow and
Debreu credited the origination of General Equilibrium Theory to Leon Walras, who described the
economy at any point in time “as the solution of a system of simultaneous equations representing
the demand for goods by consumers, the supply of goods by producers, and the equilibrium
condition that supply equal demand on every market.” In turn, this involved assuming “that each
consumer acts so as to maximize his utility, each producer acts so as to maximize his profit, and
perfect competition prevails, in the sense that each producer and consumer regards the prices paid
and received as independent of his own choices.”149 Consequently, it may be said that the “market
price” of any commodity is determined invariantly by supply and demand. These issues have been
reviewed and their analysis by orthodox economics found at least problematic and, more properly,
erroneous, in the text above.
Rosenbaum indicates that “the market is synonymous with (the intersection of) unobservable and
merely hypothesized demand and supply (curves) and devoid of any institutional, spatial or social
features, and where each individual market is part of a set of interrelated markets that make up the
economy as a whole and that is seen is jointly determining a vector of relative prices and an
associate allocation of commodities.”150
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Samuel Hollander, an economist well known for his work in the history of classical economics,
writes that Adam Smith’s “cost of production theory whereby competition, through the operation
of supply and demand, assures that market prices gravitate towards their “natural” prices defined
as the sum of the unit wage, profit and rent cost, the factors paid at their “natural” rates.” 151 In
effect, this “natural” state is general equilibrium. Hollander describes this as “the true classical
tradition” as taken up by John Stuart Mill and later by W. Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall.
Hollander takes issue with Schumpeter’s finding that “Ricardo’s procedures were diametrically
opposed to the spirit of general equilibrium.”152 The details of this history need not concern us.
3. Criticism
General Equilibrium Theory and criticisms of the same have been discussed previously in this
chapter, most particularly in the discussion in the section entitled “Atomistic Utilitarianism” in
Chapter B4 and in the sections entitled “Similarity of Desires and Utility” and the immediately
preceding “Utilitarian Independent Market Transactions” in the present chapter. Consequently, the
present section will mention only a few additional criticisms.
In their discussions of Walrasian equilibrium, as just noted under the heading “Explanation”,
Arrow and Debreu indicate that Walras did not provide “any conclusive arguments to show that
the equations, as given, have a solution.”153 Thus, Walras left proof of the theory to others. Such
proof appears from the commentary cited below to have been elusive.
The elements of the theory of general equilibrium have been variously challenged, including by
Milton Friedman. Friedman criticized the Marshallian demand curve, among other things, on the
ground that that “[d]emand and supply are to him concepts for organizing materials, labels in an
"analytical filing box." The "commodity" for which a demand curve is drawn is another label, not
a word for a physical or technical entity to be defined once and for all independently of the problem
at hand.”154 Friedman maintains that Marshall treats commodities other than the one which is the
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focus of immediate attention at the particular time only in groups and treats only their average
price as relevant.155
Clearly, the specifications of the commodity in question, closely related commodities, and all other
commodities are highly significant. Philip Mirowski argues that neoclassical theory, contrary to
its claims to be based on individual behavior and the coordination activities of a market, has had
little to say about the “dual coincidence of wants” [A wants “commodity” one and B has and wants
to sell commodity one and buy commodity two] and the problems of getting the trading activities
of numerous individual actors to mesh.156
Mirowski’s point is that markets are based on the complementary objectives of a willing buyer and
a willing seller of a specified commodity. How their interaction arises requires explanation, and,
as argued in this work, this is difficult to imagine without some form of social interaction.
Moreover, standardizing commodity identities is another important aspect of the function of the
market.157 Mirowski assumes that both the specification of the identity of commodities and the
institution of a connected trading market are, necessarily, social activities.158 The present work has
noted frequently that commodification, like other aspects of the market, is a social phenomenon.
Friedman also criticizes Marshall’s stasis or ceteris paribus assumption concerning the derivation
of the demand curve arguing, among other things, that when it is said that a demand curve shows
the quantity of the commodity that will be purchased by the group per unit of time at each price,
“all other things being the same”, the word “same” does not mean “same over time”, nor does it
or can it, without emasculating the concept, mean that literally “all” other things remain the
same.159 Friedman maintains that different specifications of the “other things” will yield different
demand curves.
As to equilibrium, Kirman points out that a frequent criticism of general equilibrium theory is “that
the underlying hypothesis of individual maximization is inappropriate and that such an assumption
155
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is unnecessarily restrictive.”160 This aligns with the discussion and conclusions presented in
Chapter B4 in relation to “Atomistic Utilitarianism”.
As noted previously, the second common criticism Kirman mentions is that “general equilibrium
lacks any results as to the stability or uniqueness of equilibrium that can be derived from the
standard assumptions on the endowments, production possibilities and preferences of
individuals.”161
Thirdly, Kirman adopts the argument of Michio Morishima that a general equilibrium solution,
even if proven, could not be realized without the necessary institutional backing. Accordingly, any
such equilibrium solution “will amount to no more than a utopian state of affairs which bears no
relation whatsoever to the real economy.”162 This third criticism seems to be consistent with more
general criticisms, such as by Granovetter163 and by Hirschman,164 concerning the idealized
markets, devoid of influence from social structure, social contact, or other social interaction, which
are posited by classical and neoclassical economics. These were discussed in more detail in relation
to the assumption “Individual Determination of Utility” at the beginning of the present chapter.
Ackerman, like Kirman, draws attention to the fact that a general equilibrium solution cannot be
proven either to be unique or to be stable.165 Instead, he says that the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu
(SMD) theorem166 shows that “almost any continuous pattern of price movements can occur in a
general equilibrium model, so long as the number of consumers is at least as great as the number
of commodities. Cycles of any length, chaos or anything else you can describe, will arise in a
general equilibrium model for some set of consumer preferences and initial endowments. Not only
does the general equilibrium fail to be reliably stable; its dynamics can be as bad as you want them
160
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to be.”167 Ackerman maintains, to the contrary, that “the SMD theory proved that there is no hope
of showing that stability is a generic property of market systems,”168 which “should challenge the
foundations of economic theory.”169 If correct, these criticisms seem to the non-economist, at least,
to be critical, highly problematic, and possibly even fatal, objections to equilibrium theory and,
possibly, as Ackerman maintains, to orthodox economic theory generally.
Ackerman asserts that “[r]ecent accounts identify two causes of the finding of instability: the
inherent difficulties of aggregation, and the individualistic model of consumer behaviour… [both]
present in neoclassical theory since its beginnings.170 Both of these matters have been discussed
and criticized in the present work previously.171 It has been noted, as well, that Kirman also
criticizes the assumption of individual maximization of utility.
It is interesting that Ackerman concludes that “[m]odification of economic theory to overcome
these underlying problems will require a new model of consumer choice, nonlinear analyses of
social interactions, and recognition of the central role of institutional and social constraints.”172
Such a modification of economic theory would, of course, represent a substantial abnegation of
classical and neoclassical economic theory. What Ackerman proposes is that the assumptions of
aggregation and individualistic behaviour associated with the neoclassical model must be
discarded, he says, in order to “make economics more realistic”.173 He concludes, then, that
classical and neoclassical economics are not, and should be, more relevant to the real world.
Kirman likewise concludes that “recent theoretical work is shown how little the Walrasian model
has to say about aggregate behaviour. Economists therefore should not continue to make strong
assertions about this behaviour based on so-called general equilibrium models which are, in reality,
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no more than special examples with no basis in economic theory as it stands.”174 Kirman, then,
finds that the Walrasian model does not adequately model actual human economic behaviour.
From this review, it can be concluded that the problem of aggregation and the individualist model
of consumer behaviour are the subject of considerable comment and criticism by modern
economists, not only in relation to the general equilibrium model, but also more generally, and,
moreover, to such an extent as to call for the rejection of such assumptions. Since those
assumptions are at the heart of classical and neoclassical economic theory, such a reassessment
and rejection would seriously affect their continuing relevance.
Ackerman argues that “it is more obvious in practice than in theory that large, complicated market
economies are usually stable. If it is so difficult to demonstrate that stability is endogenous to a
market economy, perhaps it is exogenous.”175 He suggests that such “exogenous factors such as
institutional contexts, cultural habits and political constraints may provide the basis for stability,
usually damping the erratic endogenous fluctuations that could otherwise arise in a laissez-faire
economy.”176 Of course, these exogenous factors are contrary to the neoclassical assumptions of
atomistic rational actors acting independently and seeking to maximize their own personal utility.
Ackerman indicates that there are other approaches closer to conventional theory that also make
institutions central to economic analysis, including what David Colander calls “post-Walrasian
macroeconomics”. As described by Ackerman, “Colander…identifies three distinguishing
characteristics of the post-Walrasian perspective. First, the equations necessary to describe the
economy have multiple equilibria and complex dynamics. Second, individuals act on the basis of
local, bounded rationality, since global rationality is beyond anyone’s information processing
capabilities. Finally, institutions and non-price coordinating mechanisms are the source of
systemic stability in a market economy. Colander refers to the last of these characteristics as
establishing the macrofoundations of microeconomics.”177
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Time does not permit an excursion into the complexities of new institutional economics; however,
it is possible that post-Walrasian economics and institutional economics, in particular, may
contribute to solving some of the difficulties of Marshallian and Walrasian economics.
4. Discussion
The present review has demonstrated some of the difficulties of general equilibrium theory, some
of the reasons giving rise to those difficulties, inhibiting its acceptance, and, moreover, supporting
its rejection.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the present review has demonstrated that the assumptions or generalizations of
classical and neoclassical economics have been criticized by modern mainstream economists of
differing theoretical perspectives, and have been established to be, at best, highly problematic. The
extent to which this is true is illustrated, somewhat comically, by Alan Kirman in giving his paper
“The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory” the subtitle “The Emperor has No Clothes”.
In view of the highly problematic nature of the assumptions and generalizations of classical and
neoclassical economics, the application of such assumptions and generalizations to, and their use
in, legal theorizing, including theorizing about the nature of the corporation, should be carefully
considered, and should be regarded as highly problematic.
Further, chapters in the main text of this book argue that the characterization of the firm or of the
corporation by classical and neoclassical economics as an agent or actor in economic activity “in
the real world” is similarly highly problematic. This discussion begins in Chapter Two.
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